instruction
stringclasses 1
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stringlengths 64
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Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void list_add_leaf_cfs_rq(struct cfs_rq *cfs_rq)
{
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 20,124
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InspectorPageAgent::DidRunJavaScriptDialog() {
GetFrontend()->flush();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,447
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pdf14_copy_alpha_color(gx_device * dev, const byte * data, int data_x,
int aa_raster, gx_bitmap_id id, int x, int y, int w, int h,
gx_color_index color, const gx_device_color *pdc,
int depth, bool devn)
{
const byte *aa_row;
pdf14_device *pdev = (pdf14_device *)dev;
pdf14_buf *buf = pdev->ctx->stack;
int i, j, k;
byte *line, *dst_ptr;
byte src[PDF14_MAX_PLANES];
byte dst[PDF14_MAX_PLANES] = { 0 };
gs_blend_mode_t blend_mode = pdev->blend_mode;
bool additive = pdev->ctx->additive;
int rowstride = buf->rowstride;
int planestride = buf->planestride;
gs_graphics_type_tag_t curr_tag = GS_UNKNOWN_TAG; /* Quiet compiler */
bool has_alpha_g = buf->has_alpha_g;
bool has_shape = buf->has_shape;
bool has_tags = buf->has_tags;
bool knockout = buf->knockout;
int num_chan = buf->n_chan;
int num_comp = num_chan - 1;
int shape_off = num_chan * planestride;
int alpha_g_off = shape_off + (has_shape ? planestride : 0);
int tag_off = alpha_g_off + (has_alpha_g ? planestride : 0);
bool overprint = pdev->overprint;
gx_color_index drawn_comps = pdev->drawn_comps;
gx_color_index comps;
byte shape = 0; /* Quiet compiler. */
byte src_alpha;
int alpha2_aa, alpha_aa, sx;
int alpha_aa_act;
int xoff;
gx_color_index mask = ((gx_color_index)1 << 8) - 1;
int shift = 8;
if (buf->data == NULL)
return 0;
aa_row = data;
if (has_tags) {
curr_tag = (color >> (num_comp*8)) & 0xff;
}
if (devn) {
if (additive) {
for (j = 0; j < num_comp; j++) {
src[j] = ((pdc->colors.devn.values[j]) >> shift & mask);
}
} else {
for (j = 0; j < num_comp; j++) {
src[j] = 255 - ((pdc->colors.devn.values[j]) >> shift & mask);
}
}
} else
pdev->pdf14_procs->unpack_color(num_comp, color, pdev, src);
src_alpha = src[num_comp] = (byte)floor (255 * pdev->alpha + 0.5);
if (has_shape)
shape = (byte)floor (255 * pdev->shape + 0.5);
/* Limit the area we write to the bounding rectangle for this buffer */
if (x < buf->rect.p.x) {
xoff = data_x + buf->rect.p.x - x;
w += x - buf->rect.p.x;
x = buf->rect.p.x;
} else {
xoff = data_x;
}
if (y < buf->rect.p.y) {
h += y - buf->rect.p.y;
aa_row -= (y - buf->rect.p.y) * aa_raster;
y = buf->rect.p.y;
}
if (x + w > buf->rect.q.x) w = buf->rect.q.x - x;
if (y + h > buf->rect.q.y) h = buf->rect.q.y - y;
/* Update the dirty rectangle. */
if (x < buf->dirty.p.x) buf->dirty.p.x = x;
if (y < buf->dirty.p.y) buf->dirty.p.y = y;
if (x + w > buf->dirty.q.x) buf->dirty.q.x = x + w;
if (y + h > buf->dirty.q.y) buf->dirty.q.y = y + h;
line = buf->data + (x - buf->rect.p.x) + (y - buf->rect.p.y) * rowstride;
for (j = 0; j < h; ++j, aa_row += aa_raster) {
dst_ptr = line;
sx = xoff;
for (i = 0; i < w; ++i, ++sx) {
/* Complement the components for subtractive color spaces */
if (additive) {
for (k = 0; k < num_chan; ++k) /* num_chan includes alpha */
dst[k] = dst_ptr[k * planestride];
} else { /* Complement the components for subtractive color spaces */
for (k = 0; k < num_comp; ++k)
dst[k] = 255 - dst_ptr[k * planestride];
dst[num_comp] = dst_ptr[num_comp * planestride]; /* alpha */
}
/* Get the aa alpha from the buffer */
switch(depth)
{
case 2: /* map 0 - 3 to 0 - 255 */
alpha_aa = ((aa_row[sx >> 2] >> ((3 - (sx & 3)) << 1)) & 3) * 85;
break;
case 4:
alpha2_aa = aa_row[sx >> 1];
alpha_aa = (sx & 1 ? alpha2_aa & 0xf : alpha2_aa >> 4) * 17;
break;
case 8:
alpha_aa = aa_row[sx];
break;
default:
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
}
if (alpha_aa != 0) { /* This does happen */
if (alpha_aa != 255) {
/* We have an alpha value from aa */
alpha_aa_act = alpha_aa;
if (src_alpha != 255) {
/* Need to combine it with the existing alpha */
int tmp = src_alpha * alpha_aa_act + 0x80;
alpha_aa_act = (tmp + (tmp >> 8)) >> 8;
}
/* Set our source alpha value appropriately */
src[num_comp] = alpha_aa_act;
} else {
/* We may have to reset this is it was changed as we
moved across the row */
src[num_comp] = src_alpha;
}
if (knockout) {
if (buf->isolated) {
art_pdf_knockoutisolated_group_8(dst, src, num_comp);
} else {
art_pdf_composite_knockout_8(dst, src, num_comp,
blend_mode, pdev->blend_procs, pdev);
}
} else {
art_pdf_composite_pixel_alpha_8(dst, src, num_comp, blend_mode, num_comp,
pdev->blend_procs, pdev);
}
/* Complement the results for subtractive color spaces */
if (additive) {
for (k = 0; k < num_chan; ++k)
dst_ptr[k * planestride] = dst[k];
} else {
if (overprint && dst_ptr[num_comp * planestride] != 0) {
for (k = 0, comps = drawn_comps; comps != 0;
++k, comps >>= 1) {
if ((comps & 0x1) != 0) {
dst_ptr[k * planestride] = 255 - dst[k];
}
}
/* The alpha channel */
dst_ptr[num_comp * planestride] = dst[num_comp];
} else {
for (k = 0; k < num_comp; ++k)
dst_ptr[k * planestride] = 255 - dst[k];
/* The alpha channel */
dst_ptr[num_comp * planestride] = dst[num_comp];
}
}
if (has_alpha_g) {
int tmp = (255 - dst_ptr[alpha_g_off]) * (255 - src[num_comp]) + 0x80;
dst_ptr[alpha_g_off] = 255 - ((tmp + (tmp >> 8)) >> 8);
}
if (has_shape) {
int tmp = (255 - dst_ptr[shape_off]) * (255 - shape) + 0x80;
dst_ptr[shape_off] = 255 - ((tmp + (tmp >> 8)) >> 8);
}
if (has_tags) {
/* If alpha is 100% then set to curr_tag, else or */
/* other than Normal BM, we always OR */
if (src[num_comp] == 255 && blend_mode == BLEND_MODE_Normal) {
dst_ptr[tag_off] = curr_tag;
} else {
dst_ptr[tag_off] |= curr_tag;
}
}
}
++dst_ptr;
}
line += rowstride;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 24,330
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vga_common_post_load(void *opaque, int version_id)
{
VGACommonState *s = opaque;
/* force refresh */
s->graphic_mode = -1;
vbe_update_vgaregs(s);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 7,673
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sock_def_error_report(struct sock *sk)
{
struct socket_wq *wq;
rcu_read_lock();
wq = rcu_dereference(sk->sk_wq);
if (wq_has_sleeper(wq))
wake_up_interruptible_poll(&wq->wait, POLLERR);
sk_wake_async(sk, SOCK_WAKE_IO, POLL_ERR);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
Commit Message: net: sock: validate data_len before allocating skb in sock_alloc_send_pskb()
We need to validate the number of pages consumed by data_len, otherwise frags
array could be overflowed by userspace. So this patch validate data_len and
return -EMSGSIZE when data_len may occupies more frags than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 23,685
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int _nfs4_proc_pathconf(struct nfs_server *server, struct nfs_fh *fhandle,
struct nfs_pathconf *pathconf)
{
struct nfs4_pathconf_arg args = {
.fh = fhandle,
.bitmask = server->attr_bitmask,
};
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_PATHCONF],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = pathconf,
};
/* None of the pathconf attributes are mandatory to implement */
if ((args.bitmask[0] & nfs4_pathconf_bitmap[0]) == 0) {
memset(pathconf, 0, sizeof(*pathconf));
return 0;
}
nfs_fattr_init(pathconf->fattr);
return rpc_call_sync(server->client, &msg, 0);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,461
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int compat_get_prm(int drive,
struct compat_floppy_struct __user *arg)
{
struct compat_floppy_struct v;
struct floppy_struct *p;
int err;
memset(&v, 0, sizeof(v));
mutex_lock(&floppy_mutex);
err = get_floppy_geometry(drive, ITYPE(UDRS->fd_device), &p);
if (err) {
mutex_unlock(&floppy_mutex);
return err;
}
memcpy(&v, p, offsetof(struct floppy_struct, name));
mutex_unlock(&floppy_mutex);
if (copy_to_user(arg, &v, sizeof(struct compat_floppy_struct)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: floppy: fix div-by-zero in setup_format_params
This fixes a divide by zero error in the setup_format_params function of
the floppy driver.
Two consecutive ioctls can trigger the bug: The first one should set the
drive geometry with such .sect and .rate values for the F_SECT_PER_TRACK
to become zero. Next, the floppy format operation should be called.
A floppy disk is not required to be inserted. An unprivileged user
could trigger the bug if the device is accessible.
The patch checks F_SECT_PER_TRACK for a non-zero value in the
set_geometry function. The proper check should involve a reasonable
upper limit for the .sect and .rate fields, but it could change the
UAPI.
The patch also checks F_SECT_PER_TRACK in the setup_format_params, and
cancels the formatting operation in case of zero.
The bug was found by syzkaller.
Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@ispras.ru>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 27,030
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t snd_timer_user_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
size_t count, loff_t *offset)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
long result = 0, unit;
int qhead;
int err = 0;
tu = file->private_data;
unit = tu->tread ? sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread) : sizeof(struct snd_timer_read);
mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
while ((long)count - result >= unit) {
while (!tu->qused) {
wait_queue_t wait;
if ((file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) != 0 || result > 0) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto _error;
}
set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
init_waitqueue_entry(&wait, current);
add_wait_queue(&tu->qchange_sleep, &wait);
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
schedule();
mutex_lock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
remove_wait_queue(&tu->qchange_sleep, &wait);
if (tu->disconnected) {
err = -ENODEV;
goto _error;
}
if (signal_pending(current)) {
err = -ERESTARTSYS;
goto _error;
}
}
qhead = tu->qhead++;
tu->qhead %= tu->queue_size;
tu->qused--;
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
if (tu->tread) {
if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->tqueue[qhead],
sizeof(struct snd_timer_tread)))
err = -EFAULT;
} else {
if (copy_to_user(buffer, &tu->queue[qhead],
sizeof(struct snd_timer_read)))
err = -EFAULT;
}
spin_lock_irq(&tu->qlock);
if (err < 0)
goto _error;
result += unit;
buffer += unit;
}
_error:
spin_unlock_irq(&tu->qlock);
mutex_unlock(&tu->ioctl_lock);
return result > 0 ? result : err;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix missing queue indices reset at SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_SELECT
snd_timer_user_tselect() reallocates the queue buffer dynamically, but
it forgot to reset its indices. Since the read may happen
concurrently with ioctl and snd_timer_user_tselect() allocates the
buffer via kmalloc(), this may lead to the leak of uninitialized
kernel-space data, as spotted via KMSAN:
BUG: KMSAN: use of unitialized memory in snd_timer_user_read+0x6c4/0xa10
CPU: 0 PID: 1037 Comm: probe Not tainted 4.11.0-rc5+ #2739
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x143/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:52
kmsan_report+0x12a/0x180 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1007
kmsan_check_memory+0xc2/0x140 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1086
copy_to_user ./arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h:725
snd_timer_user_read+0x6c4/0xa10 sound/core/timer.c:2004
do_loop_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:716
__do_readv_writev+0x94c/0x1380 fs/read_write.c:864
do_readv_writev fs/read_write.c:894
vfs_readv fs/read_write.c:908
do_readv+0x52a/0x5d0 fs/read_write.c:934
SYSC_readv+0xb6/0xd0 fs/read_write.c:1021
SyS_readv+0x87/0xb0 fs/read_write.c:1018
This patch adds the missing reset of queue indices. Together with the
previous fix for the ioctl/read race, we cover the whole problem.
Reported-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Tested-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 20,102
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_inode_validate_extsize(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
uint32_t extsize,
uint16_t mode,
uint16_t flags)
{
bool rt_flag;
bool hint_flag;
bool inherit_flag;
uint32_t extsize_bytes;
uint32_t blocksize_bytes;
rt_flag = (flags & XFS_DIFLAG_REALTIME);
hint_flag = (flags & XFS_DIFLAG_EXTSIZE);
inherit_flag = (flags & XFS_DIFLAG_EXTSZINHERIT);
extsize_bytes = XFS_FSB_TO_B(mp, extsize);
if (rt_flag)
blocksize_bytes = mp->m_sb.sb_rextsize << mp->m_sb.sb_blocklog;
else
blocksize_bytes = mp->m_sb.sb_blocksize;
if ((hint_flag || inherit_flag) && !(S_ISDIR(mode) || S_ISREG(mode)))
return __this_address;
if (hint_flag && !S_ISREG(mode))
return __this_address;
if (inherit_flag && !S_ISDIR(mode))
return __this_address;
if ((hint_flag || inherit_flag) && extsize == 0)
return __this_address;
if (!(hint_flag || inherit_flag) && extsize != 0)
return __this_address;
if (extsize_bytes % blocksize_bytes)
return __this_address;
if (extsize > MAXEXTLEN)
return __this_address;
if (!rt_flag && extsize > mp->m_sb.sb_agblocks / 2)
return __this_address;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: xfs: More robust inode extent count validation
When the inode is in extent format, it can't have more extents that
fit in the inode fork. We don't currenty check this, and so this
corruption goes unnoticed by the inode verifiers. This can lead to
crashes operating on invalid in-memory structures.
Attempts to access such a inode will now error out in the verifier
rather than allowing modification operations to proceed.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
[darrick: fix a typedef, add some braces and breaks to shut up compiler warnings]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 3,458
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DrawingBuffer::ColorBuffer::~ColorBuffer() {
gpu::gles2::GLES2Interface* gl = drawing_buffer->gl_;
if (receive_sync_token.HasData())
gl->WaitSyncTokenCHROMIUM(receive_sync_token.GetConstData());
if (image_id) {
gl->BindTexture(parameters.target, texture_id);
gl->ReleaseTexImage2DCHROMIUM(parameters.target, image_id);
if (rgb_workaround_texture_id) {
gl->BindTexture(parameters.target, rgb_workaround_texture_id);
gl->ReleaseTexImage2DCHROMIUM(parameters.target, image_id);
}
gl->DestroyImageCHROMIUM(image_id);
switch (parameters.target) {
case GL_TEXTURE_2D:
if (drawing_buffer->client_)
drawing_buffer->client_->DrawingBufferClientRestoreTexture2DBinding();
break;
case GC3D_TEXTURE_RECTANGLE_ARB:
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
gpu_memory_buffer.reset();
}
gl->DeleteTextures(1, &texture_id);
if (rgb_workaround_texture_id) {
gl->DeleteTextures(1, &rgb_workaround_texture_id);
}
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param)
{
return param->depth;
}
Commit Message: Call strlen() if name length provided is 0, like OpenSSL does.
Issue notice by Christian Heimes <christian@python.org>
ok deraadt@ jsing@
CWE ID: CWE-295
| 0
| 2,724
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool netdev_has_any_lower_dev(struct net_device *dev)
{
ASSERT_RTNL();
return !list_empty(&dev->adj_list.lower);
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 9,595
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QQuickWebViewExperimental::setFlickableViewportEnabled(bool enable)
{
s_flickableViewportEnabled = enable;
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,081
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static status_t ConvertAvcSpecLevelToOmxAvcLevel(
WORD32 avcLevel, OMX_VIDEO_AVCLEVELTYPE *omxLevel) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < NELEM(ConversionTable); ++i) {
if (avcLevel == ConversionTable[i].avcLevel) {
*omxLevel = ConversionTable[i].omxLevel;
return OK;
}
}
ALOGE("ConvertAvcSpecLevelToOmxAvcLevel: %d level not supported",
(int32_t)avcLevel);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,898
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: spot1_dummy(double x, double y)
{
return (x + y) / 2;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 3,102
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const char *am_xstrtok(request_rec *r, const char *str,
const char *sep, char **last)
{
char *s;
char *np;
/* Resume */
if (str != NULL)
s = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, str);
else
s = *last;
/* End of string */
if (*s == '\0')
return NULL;
/* Next sep exists? */
if ((np = strstr(s, sep)) == NULL) {
*last = s + strlen(s);
} else {
*last = np + strlen(sep);
memset(np, 0, strlen(sep));
}
return s;
}
Commit Message: Fix redirect URL validation bypass
It turns out that browsers silently convert backslash characters into
forward slashes, while apr_uri_parse() does not.
This mismatch allows an attacker to bypass the redirect URL validation
by using an URL like:
https://sp.example.org/mellon/logout?ReturnTo=https:%5c%5cmalicious.example.org/
mod_auth_mellon will assume that it is a relative URL and allow the
request to pass through, while the browsers will use it as an absolute
url and redirect to https://malicious.example.org/ .
This patch fixes this issue by rejecting all redirect URLs with
backslashes.
CWE ID: CWE-601
| 0
| 21,547
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionOptionsGuest::CloseContents(WebContents* source) {
DispatchEventToView(make_scoped_ptr(
new GuestViewEvent(extension_options_internal::OnClose::kEventName,
make_scoped_ptr(new base::DictionaryValue()))));
}
Commit Message: Make extensions use a correct same-origin check.
GURL::GetOrigin does not do the right thing for all types of URLs.
BUG=573317
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1658913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373381}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 23,007
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int em_call_far(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
u16 sel, old_cs;
ulong old_eip;
int rc;
old_cs = get_segment_selector(ctxt, VCPU_SREG_CS);
old_eip = ctxt->_eip;
memcpy(&sel, ctxt->src.valptr + ctxt->op_bytes, 2);
if (load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, sel, VCPU_SREG_CS))
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
ctxt->_eip = 0;
memcpy(&ctxt->_eip, ctxt->src.valptr, ctxt->op_bytes);
ctxt->src.val = old_cs;
rc = em_push(ctxt);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
ctxt->src.val = old_eip;
return em_push(ctxt);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,566
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OnPrintPreview(const DictionaryValue& dict) {
PrintWebViewHelper* print_web_view_helper = PrintWebViewHelper::Get(view_);
print_web_view_helper->OnInitiatePrintPreview();
print_web_view_helper->OnPrintPreview(dict);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 22,652
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MessageIterator::MessageIterator(const Message& m) : iter_(m) {
}
Commit Message: Verify lfFaceName is NUL terminated in IPC deserializer.
BUG=162066
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11416115
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168937 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,019
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoClearBufferuiv(GLenum buffer,
GLint drawbuffer,
const volatile GLuint* value) {
const char* func_name = "glClearBufferuiv";
if (!CheckBoundDrawFramebufferValid(func_name))
return;
ApplyDirtyState();
if (drawbuffer < 0 ||
drawbuffer >= static_cast<GLint>(group_->max_draw_buffers())) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, func_name, "invalid drawBuffer");
return;
}
GLenum internal_format =
GetBoundColorDrawBufferInternalFormat(drawbuffer);
if (!GLES2Util::IsUnsignedIntegerFormat(internal_format)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, func_name,
"can only be called on unsigned integer buffers");
return;
}
MarkDrawBufferAsCleared(buffer, drawbuffer);
api()->glClearBufferuivFn(buffer, drawbuffer,
const_cast<const GLuint*>(value));
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 19,333
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int convert_sub_to_old_ass_form(AVSubtitle *sub, const AVPacket *pkt, AVRational tb)
{
int i;
AVBPrint buf;
av_bprint_init(&buf, 0, AV_BPRINT_SIZE_UNLIMITED);
for (i = 0; i < sub->num_rects; i++) {
char *final_dialog;
const char *dialog;
AVSubtitleRect *rect = sub->rects[i];
int ts_start, ts_duration = -1;
long int layer;
if (rect->type != SUBTITLE_ASS || !strncmp(rect->ass, "Dialogue: ", 10))
continue;
av_bprint_clear(&buf);
/* skip ReadOrder */
dialog = strchr(rect->ass, ',');
if (!dialog)
continue;
dialog++;
/* extract Layer or Marked */
layer = strtol(dialog, (char**)&dialog, 10);
if (*dialog != ',')
continue;
dialog++;
/* rescale timing to ASS time base (ms) */
ts_start = av_rescale_q(pkt->pts, tb, av_make_q(1, 100));
if (pkt->duration != -1)
ts_duration = av_rescale_q(pkt->duration, tb, av_make_q(1, 100));
sub->end_display_time = FFMAX(sub->end_display_time, 10 * ts_duration);
/* construct ASS (standalone file form with timestamps) string */
av_bprintf(&buf, "Dialogue: %ld,", layer);
insert_ts(&buf, ts_start);
insert_ts(&buf, ts_duration == -1 ? -1 : ts_start + ts_duration);
av_bprintf(&buf, "%s\r\n", dialog);
final_dialog = av_strdup(buf.str);
if (!av_bprint_is_complete(&buf) || !final_dialog) {
av_freep(&final_dialog);
av_bprint_finalize(&buf, NULL);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
av_freep(&rect->ass);
rect->ass = final_dialog;
}
av_bprint_finalize(&buf, NULL);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 20,142
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int codebook_decode_deinterleave_repeat(vorb *f, Codebook *c, float **outputs, int ch, int *c_inter_p, int *p_inter_p, int len, int total_decode)
{
int c_inter = *c_inter_p;
int p_inter = *p_inter_p;
int i,z, effective = c->dimensions;
if (c->lookup_type == 0) return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_stream);
while (total_decode > 0) {
float last = CODEBOOK_ELEMENT_BASE(c);
DECODE_VQ(z,f,c);
#ifndef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_CODEBOOK
assert(!c->sparse || z < c->sorted_entries);
#endif
if (z < 0) {
if (!f->bytes_in_seg)
if (f->last_seg) return FALSE;
return error(f, VORBIS_invalid_stream);
}
if (c_inter + p_inter*ch + effective > len * ch) {
effective = len*ch - (p_inter*ch - c_inter);
}
#ifdef STB_VORBIS_DIVIDES_IN_CODEBOOK
if (c->lookup_type == 1) {
int div = 1;
for (i=0; i < effective; ++i) {
int off = (z / div) % c->lookup_values;
float val = CODEBOOK_ELEMENT_FAST(c,off) + last;
if (outputs[c_inter])
outputs[c_inter][p_inter] += val;
if (++c_inter == ch) { c_inter = 0; ++p_inter; }
if (c->sequence_p) last = val;
div *= c->lookup_values;
}
} else
#endif
{
z *= c->dimensions;
if (c->sequence_p) {
for (i=0; i < effective; ++i) {
float val = CODEBOOK_ELEMENT_FAST(c,z+i) + last;
if (outputs[c_inter])
outputs[c_inter][p_inter] += val;
if (++c_inter == ch) { c_inter = 0; ++p_inter; }
last = val;
}
} else {
for (i=0; i < effective; ++i) {
float val = CODEBOOK_ELEMENT_FAST(c,z+i) + last;
if (outputs[c_inter])
outputs[c_inter][p_inter] += val;
if (++c_inter == ch) { c_inter = 0; ++p_inter; }
}
}
}
total_decode -= effective;
}
*c_inter_p = c_inter;
*p_inter_p = p_inter;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: fix unchecked length in stb_vorbis that could crash on corrupt/invalid files
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,249
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hstoreFindKey(HStore *hs, int *lowbound, char *key, int keylen)
{
HEntry *entries = ARRPTR(hs);
int stopLow = lowbound ? *lowbound : 0;
int stopHigh = HS_COUNT(hs);
int stopMiddle;
char *base = STRPTR(hs);
while (stopLow < stopHigh)
{
int difference;
stopMiddle = stopLow + (stopHigh - stopLow) / 2;
if (HS_KEYLEN(entries, stopMiddle) == keylen)
difference = memcmp(HS_KEY(entries, base, stopMiddle), key, keylen);
else
difference = (HS_KEYLEN(entries, stopMiddle) > keylen) ? 1 : -1;
if (difference == 0)
{
if (lowbound)
*lowbound = stopMiddle + 1;
return stopMiddle;
}
else if (difference < 0)
stopLow = stopMiddle + 1;
else
stopHigh = stopMiddle;
}
if (lowbound)
*lowbound = stopLow;
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 1,971
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void arm_iommu_sync_sg_for_device(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sg,
int nents, enum dma_data_direction dir)
{
struct scatterlist *s;
int i;
for_each_sg(sg, s, nents, i)
__dma_page_cpu_to_dev(sg_page(s), s->offset, s->length, dir);
}
Commit Message: ARM: dma-mapping: don't allow DMA mappings to be marked executable
DMA mapping permissions were being derived from pgprot_kernel directly
without using PAGE_KERNEL. This causes them to be marked with executable
permission, which is not what we want. Fix this.
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 9,567
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nft_trans_chain_add(struct nft_ctx *ctx, int msg_type)
{
struct nft_trans *trans;
trans = nft_trans_alloc(ctx, msg_type, sizeof(struct nft_trans_chain));
if (trans == NULL)
return -ENOMEM;
if (msg_type == NFT_MSG_NEWCHAIN)
ctx->chain->flags |= NFT_CHAIN_INACTIVE;
list_add_tail(&trans->list, &ctx->net->nft.commit_list);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 28,367
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::ResizeOffscreenFrameBuffer(const gfx::Size& size) {
bool is_offscreen = !!offscreen_target_frame_buffer_.get();
if (!is_offscreen) {
LOG(ERROR) << "GLES2DecoderImpl::ResizeOffscreenFrameBuffer called "
<< " with an onscreen framebuffer.";
return false;
}
if (offscreen_size_ == size)
return true;
offscreen_size_ = size;
int w = offscreen_size_.width();
int h = offscreen_size_.height();
if (w < 0 || h < 0 || h >= (INT_MAX / 4) / (w ? w : 1)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "GLES2DecoderImpl::ResizeOffscreenFrameBuffer failed "
<< "to allocate storage due to excessive dimensions.";
return false;
}
DCHECK(offscreen_target_color_format_);
if (IsOffscreenBufferMultisampled()) {
if (!offscreen_target_color_render_buffer_->AllocateStorage(
feature_info_, offscreen_size_, offscreen_target_color_format_,
offscreen_target_samples_)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "GLES2DecoderImpl::ResizeOffscreenFrameBuffer failed "
<< "to allocate storage for offscreen target color buffer.";
return false;
}
} else {
if (!offscreen_target_color_texture_->AllocateStorage(
offscreen_size_, offscreen_target_color_format_, false)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "GLES2DecoderImpl::ResizeOffscreenFrameBuffer failed "
<< "to allocate storage for offscreen target color texture.";
return false;
}
}
if (offscreen_target_depth_format_ &&
!offscreen_target_depth_render_buffer_->AllocateStorage(
feature_info_, offscreen_size_, offscreen_target_depth_format_,
offscreen_target_samples_)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "GLES2DecoderImpl::ResizeOffscreenFrameBuffer failed "
<< "to allocate storage for offscreen target depth buffer.";
return false;
}
if (offscreen_target_stencil_format_ &&
!offscreen_target_stencil_render_buffer_->AllocateStorage(
feature_info_, offscreen_size_, offscreen_target_stencil_format_,
offscreen_target_samples_)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "GLES2DecoderImpl::ResizeOffscreenFrameBuffer failed "
<< "to allocate storage for offscreen target stencil buffer.";
return false;
}
if (IsOffscreenBufferMultisampled()) {
offscreen_target_frame_buffer_->AttachRenderBuffer(
GL_COLOR_ATTACHMENT0,
offscreen_target_color_render_buffer_.get());
} else {
offscreen_target_frame_buffer_->AttachRenderTexture(
offscreen_target_color_texture_.get());
}
if (offscreen_target_depth_format_) {
offscreen_target_frame_buffer_->AttachRenderBuffer(
GL_DEPTH_ATTACHMENT,
offscreen_target_depth_render_buffer_.get());
}
const bool packed_depth_stencil =
offscreen_target_depth_format_ == GL_DEPTH24_STENCIL8;
if (packed_depth_stencil) {
offscreen_target_frame_buffer_->AttachRenderBuffer(
GL_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT,
offscreen_target_depth_render_buffer_.get());
} else if (offscreen_target_stencil_format_) {
offscreen_target_frame_buffer_->AttachRenderBuffer(
GL_STENCIL_ATTACHMENT,
offscreen_target_stencil_render_buffer_.get());
}
if (offscreen_target_frame_buffer_->CheckStatus() !=
GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
LOG(ERROR) << "GLES2DecoderImpl::ResizeOffscreenFrameBuffer failed "
<< "because offscreen FBO was incomplete.";
return false;
}
{
ScopedFrameBufferBinder binder(this, offscreen_target_frame_buffer_->id());
glClearColor(0, 0, 0, (GLES2Util::GetChannelsForFormat(
offscreen_target_color_format_) & 0x0008) != 0 ? 0 : 1);
state_.SetDeviceColorMask(GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE, GL_TRUE);
glClearStencil(0);
state_.SetDeviceStencilMaskSeparate(GL_FRONT, -1);
state_.SetDeviceStencilMaskSeparate(GL_BACK, -1);
glClearDepth(0);
state_.SetDeviceDepthMask(GL_TRUE);
state_.SetDeviceCapabilityState(GL_SCISSOR_TEST, false);
glClear(GL_COLOR_BUFFER_BIT | GL_DEPTH_BUFFER_BIT | GL_STENCIL_BUFFER_BIT);
RestoreClearState();
}
if (offscreen_resolved_frame_buffer_.get())
offscreen_resolved_frame_buffer_->Destroy();
if (offscreen_resolved_color_texture_.get())
offscreen_resolved_color_texture_->Destroy();
offscreen_resolved_color_texture_.reset();
offscreen_resolved_frame_buffer_.reset();
return true;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,475
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: scoped_refptr<VertexAttribManager> CreateVertexAttribManager(
GLuint client_id,
GLuint service_id,
bool client_visible) {
return vertex_array_manager()->CreateVertexAttribManager(
client_id, service_id, group_->max_vertex_attribs(), client_visible,
feature_info_->IsWebGL2OrES3Context());
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 20,407
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd4_decode_open_downgrade(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_open_downgrade *open_down)
{
DECODE_HEAD;
status = nfsd4_decode_stateid(argp, &open_down->od_stateid);
if (status)
return status;
READ_BUF(4);
open_down->od_seqid = be32_to_cpup(p++);
status = nfsd4_decode_share_access(argp, &open_down->od_share_access,
&open_down->od_deleg_want, NULL);
if (status)
return status;
status = nfsd4_decode_share_deny(argp, &open_down->od_share_deny);
if (status)
return status;
DECODE_TAIL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 1,373
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int test_div(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM a,b,c,d,e;
int i;
BN_init(&a);
BN_init(&b);
BN_init(&c);
BN_init(&d);
BN_init(&e);
for (i=0; i<num0+num1; i++)
{
if (i < num1)
{
BN_bntest_rand(&a,400,0,0);
BN_copy(&b,&a);
BN_lshift(&a,&a,i);
BN_add_word(&a,i);
}
else
BN_bntest_rand(&b,50+3*(i-num1),0,0);
a.neg=rand_neg();
b.neg=rand_neg();
BN_div(&d,&c,&a,&b,ctx);
if (bp != NULL)
{
if (!results)
{
BN_print(bp,&a);
BIO_puts(bp," / ");
BN_print(bp,&b);
BIO_puts(bp," - ");
}
BN_print(bp,&d);
BIO_puts(bp,"\n");
if (!results)
{
BN_print(bp,&a);
BIO_puts(bp," % ");
BN_print(bp,&b);
BIO_puts(bp," - ");
}
BN_print(bp,&c);
BIO_puts(bp,"\n");
}
BN_mul(&e,&d,&b,ctx);
BN_add(&d,&e,&c);
BN_sub(&d,&d,&a);
if(!BN_is_zero(&d))
{
fprintf(stderr,"Division test failed!\n");
return 0;
}
}
BN_free(&a);
BN_free(&b);
BN_free(&c);
BN_free(&d);
BN_free(&e);
return(1);
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2014-3570 (with minor bn_asm.c revamp).
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 1,097
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void ehci_set_usbsts(EHCIState *s, int mask)
{
if ((s->usbsts & mask) == mask) {
return;
}
ehci_trace_usbsts(mask, 1);
s->usbsts |= mask;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 11,753
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BlockingNetworkDelegateWithManualCallback()
: block_on_(0),
state_(NOT_BLOCKED) {
}
Commit Message: Tests were marked as Flaky.
BUG=151811,151810
TBR=droger@chromium.org,shalev@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10968052
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158204 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 18,328
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport BlobInfo *CloneBlobInfo(const BlobInfo *blob_info)
{
BlobInfo
*clone_info;
SemaphoreInfo
*semaphore;
clone_info=(BlobInfo *) AcquireMagickMemory(sizeof(*clone_info));
GetBlobInfo(clone_info);
if (blob_info == (BlobInfo *) NULL)
return(clone_info);
semaphore=clone_info->semaphore;
(void) memcpy(clone_info,blob_info,sizeof(*clone_info));
if (blob_info->mapped != MagickFalse)
(void) AcquireMagickResource(MapResource,blob_info->length);
clone_info->semaphore=semaphore;
LockSemaphoreInfo(clone_info->semaphore);
clone_info->reference_count=1;
UnlockSemaphoreInfo(clone_info->semaphore);
return(clone_info);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 28,809
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_rdmsr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u32 ecx = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
u64 data;
if (vmx_get_msr(vcpu, ecx, &data)) {
trace_kvm_msr_read_ex(ecx);
kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
return 1;
}
trace_kvm_msr_read(ecx, data);
/* FIXME: handling of bits 32:63 of rax, rdx */
vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] = data & -1u;
vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] = (data >> 32) & -1u;
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 29,188
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::RemoveFromEvictedList(
WebGLRenderingContextBase* context) {
ForciblyEvictedContexts().erase(context);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 23,137
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderLayerCompositor::CompositingStateTransitionType RenderLayerCompositor::computeCompositedLayerUpdate(const RenderLayer* layer)
{
CompositingStateTransitionType update = NoCompositingStateChange;
if (needsOwnBacking(layer)) {
if (!layer->hasCompositedLayerMapping()) {
update = AllocateOwnCompositedLayerMapping;
}
} else {
if (layer->hasCompositedLayerMapping())
update = RemoveOwnCompositedLayerMapping;
if (layerSquashingEnabled()) {
if (requiresSquashing(layer->compositingReasons())) {
update = AddToSquashingLayer;
} else if (layer->groupedMapping()) {
update = RemoveFromSquashingLayer;
}
}
}
return update;
}
Commit Message: Disable some more query compositingState asserts.
This gets the tests passing again on Mac. See the bug for the stacktrace.
A future patch will need to actually fix the incorrect reading of
compositingState.
BUG=343179
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/162153002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@167069 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 12,254
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintPreviewUI::OnHidePreviewTab() {
TabContents* preview_tab =
TabContents::FromWebContents(web_ui()->GetWebContents());
printing::BackgroundPrintingManager* background_printing_manager =
g_browser_process->background_printing_manager();
if (background_printing_manager->HasPrintPreviewTab(preview_tab))
return;
ConstrainedWebDialogDelegate* delegate = GetConstrainedDelegate();
if (!delegate)
return;
delegate->ReleaseTabContentsOnDialogClose();
background_printing_manager->OwnPrintPreviewTab(preview_tab);
OnClosePrintPreviewTab();
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 9,642
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline struct cfs_bandwidth *tg_cfs_bandwidth(struct task_group *tg)
{
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: sched/fair: Fix infinite loop in update_blocked_averages() by reverting a9e7f6544b9c
Zhipeng Xie, Xie XiuQi and Sargun Dhillon reported lockups in the
scheduler under high loads, starting at around the v4.18 time frame,
and Zhipeng Xie tracked it down to bugs in the rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
manipulation.
Do a (manual) revert of:
a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
It turns out that the list_del_leaf_cfs_rq() introduced by this commit
is a surprising property that was not considered in followup commits
such as:
9c2791f936ef ("sched/fair: Fix hierarchical order in rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list")
As Vincent Guittot explains:
"I think that there is a bigger problem with commit a9e7f6544b9c and
cfs_rq throttling:
Let take the example of the following topology TG2 --> TG1 --> root:
1) The 1st time a task is enqueued, we will add TG2 cfs_rq then TG1
cfs_rq to leaf_cfs_rq_list and we are sure to do the whole branch in
one path because it has never been used and can't be throttled so
tmp_alone_branch will point to leaf_cfs_rq_list at the end.
2) Then TG1 is throttled
3) and we add TG3 as a new child of TG1.
4) The 1st enqueue of a task on TG3 will add TG3 cfs_rq just before TG1
cfs_rq and tmp_alone_branch will stay on rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
With commit a9e7f6544b9c, we can del a cfs_rq from rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list.
So if the load of TG1 cfs_rq becomes NULL before step 2) above, TG1
cfs_rq is removed from the list.
Then at step 4), TG3 cfs_rq is added at the beginning of rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list
but tmp_alone_branch still points to TG3 cfs_rq because its throttled
parent can't be enqueued when the lock is released.
tmp_alone_branch doesn't point to rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list whereas it should.
So if TG3 cfs_rq is removed or destroyed before tmp_alone_branch
points on another TG cfs_rq, the next TG cfs_rq that will be added,
will be linked outside rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list - which is bad.
In addition, we can break the ordering of the cfs_rq in
rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list but this ordering is used to update and
propagate the update from leaf down to root."
Instead of trying to work through all these cases and trying to reproduce
the very high loads that produced the lockup to begin with, simplify
the code temporarily by reverting a9e7f6544b9c - which change was clearly
not thought through completely.
This (hopefully) gives us a kernel that doesn't lock up so people
can continue to enjoy their holidays without worrying about regressions. ;-)
[ mingo: Wrote changelog, fixed weird spelling in code comment while at it. ]
Analyzed-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Analyzed-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Reported-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Reported-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Reported-by: Xie XiuQi <xiexiuqi@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Zhipeng Xie <xiezhipeng1@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Sargun Dhillon <sargun@sargun.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.13+
Cc: Bin Li <huawei.libin@huawei.com>
Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: a9e7f6544b9c ("sched/fair: Fix O(nr_cgroups) in load balance path")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1545879866-27809-1-git-send-email-xiexiuqi@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 5,228
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_push_process_row(png_structp png_ptr)
{
png_ptr->row_info.color_type = png_ptr->color_type;
png_ptr->row_info.width = png_ptr->iwidth;
png_ptr->row_info.channels = png_ptr->channels;
png_ptr->row_info.bit_depth = png_ptr->bit_depth;
png_ptr->row_info.pixel_depth = png_ptr->pixel_depth;
png_ptr->row_info.rowbytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(png_ptr->row_info.pixel_depth,
png_ptr->row_info.width);
png_read_filter_row(png_ptr, &(png_ptr->row_info),
png_ptr->row_buf + 1, png_ptr->prev_row + 1,
(int)(png_ptr->row_buf[0]));
png_memcpy_check(png_ptr, png_ptr->prev_row, png_ptr->row_buf,
png_ptr->rowbytes + 1);
if (png_ptr->transformations || (png_ptr->flags&PNG_FLAG_STRIP_ALPHA))
png_do_read_transformations(png_ptr);
#ifdef PNG_READ_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
/* Blow up interlaced rows to full size */
if (png_ptr->interlaced && (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_INTERLACE))
{
if (png_ptr->pass < 6)
/* old interface (pre-1.0.9):
png_do_read_interlace(&(png_ptr->row_info),
png_ptr->row_buf + 1, png_ptr->pass, png_ptr->transformations);
*/
png_do_read_interlace(png_ptr);
switch (png_ptr->pass)
{
case 0:
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 8 && png_ptr->pass == 0; i++)
{
png_push_have_row(png_ptr, png_ptr->row_buf + 1);
png_read_push_finish_row(png_ptr); /* Updates png_ptr->pass */
}
if (png_ptr->pass == 2) /* Pass 1 might be empty */
{
for (i = 0; i < 4 && png_ptr->pass == 2; i++)
{
png_push_have_row(png_ptr, png_bytep_NULL);
png_read_push_finish_row(png_ptr);
}
}
if (png_ptr->pass == 4 && png_ptr->height <= 4)
{
for (i = 0; i < 2 && png_ptr->pass == 4; i++)
{
png_push_have_row(png_ptr, png_bytep_NULL);
png_read_push_finish_row(png_ptr);
}
}
if (png_ptr->pass == 6 && png_ptr->height <= 4)
{
png_push_have_row(png_ptr, png_bytep_NULL);
png_read_push_finish_row(png_ptr);
}
break;
}
case 1:
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 8 && png_ptr->pass == 1; i++)
{
png_push_have_row(png_ptr, png_ptr->row_buf + 1);
png_read_push_finish_row(png_ptr);
}
if (png_ptr->pass == 2) /* Skip top 4 generated rows */
{
for (i = 0; i < 4 && png_ptr->pass == 2; i++)
{
png_push_have_row(png_ptr, png_bytep_NULL);
png_read_push_finish_row(png_ptr);
}
}
break;
}
case 2:
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 4 && png_ptr->pass == 2; i++)
{
png_push_have_row(png_ptr, png_ptr->row_buf + 1);
png_read_push_finish_row(png_ptr);
}
for (i = 0; i < 4 && png_ptr->pass == 2; i++)
{
png_push_have_row(png_ptr, png_bytep_NULL);
png_read_push_finish_row(png_ptr);
}
if (png_ptr->pass == 4) /* Pass 3 might be empty */
{
for (i = 0; i < 2 && png_ptr->pass == 4; i++)
{
png_push_have_row(png_ptr, png_bytep_NULL);
png_read_push_finish_row(png_ptr);
}
}
break;
}
case 3:
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 4 && png_ptr->pass == 3; i++)
{
png_push_have_row(png_ptr, png_ptr->row_buf + 1);
png_read_push_finish_row(png_ptr);
}
if (png_ptr->pass == 4) /* Skip top two generated rows */
{
for (i = 0; i < 2 && png_ptr->pass == 4; i++)
{
png_push_have_row(png_ptr, png_bytep_NULL);
png_read_push_finish_row(png_ptr);
}
}
break;
}
case 4:
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 2 && png_ptr->pass == 4; i++)
{
png_push_have_row(png_ptr, png_ptr->row_buf + 1);
png_read_push_finish_row(png_ptr);
}
for (i = 0; i < 2 && png_ptr->pass == 4; i++)
{
png_push_have_row(png_ptr, png_bytep_NULL);
png_read_push_finish_row(png_ptr);
}
if (png_ptr->pass == 6) /* Pass 5 might be empty */
{
png_push_have_row(png_ptr, png_bytep_NULL);
png_read_push_finish_row(png_ptr);
}
break;
}
case 5:
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 2 && png_ptr->pass == 5; i++)
{
png_push_have_row(png_ptr, png_ptr->row_buf + 1);
png_read_push_finish_row(png_ptr);
}
if (png_ptr->pass == 6) /* Skip top generated row */
{
png_push_have_row(png_ptr, png_bytep_NULL);
png_read_push_finish_row(png_ptr);
}
break;
}
case 6:
{
png_push_have_row(png_ptr, png_ptr->row_buf + 1);
png_read_push_finish_row(png_ptr);
if (png_ptr->pass != 6)
break;
png_push_have_row(png_ptr, png_bytep_NULL);
png_read_push_finish_row(png_ptr);
}
}
}
else
#endif
{
png_push_have_row(png_ptr, png_ptr->row_buf + 1);
png_read_push_finish_row(png_ptr);
}
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,010
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GfxImageColorMap::getCMYK(Guchar *x, GfxCMYK *cmyk) {
GfxColor color;
int i;
if (colorSpace2) {
for (i = 0; i < nComps2; ++i) {
color.c[i] = lookup[i][x[0]];
}
colorSpace2->getCMYK(&color, cmyk);
} else {
for (i = 0; i < nComps; ++i) {
color.c[i] = lookup[i][x[i]];
}
colorSpace->getCMYK(&color, cmyk);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 12,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLvoid StubGLUniformMatrix4fv(GLint location, GLsizei count,
GLboolean transpose, const GLfloat* value) {
glUniformMatrix4fv(location, count, transpose, value);
}
Commit Message: Add chromium_code: 1 to surface.gyp and gl.gyp to pick up -Werror.
It looks like this was dropped accidentally in http://codereview.chromium.org/6718027 (surface.gyp) and http://codereview.chromium.org/6722026 (gl.gyp)
Remove now-redudant code that's implied by chromium_code: 1.
Fix the warnings that have crept in since chromium_code: 1 was removed.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=91598
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7227009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91813 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,986
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int virtio_net_handle_mq(VirtIONet *n, uint8_t cmd,
struct iovec *iov, unsigned int iov_cnt)
{
VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(n);
struct virtio_net_ctrl_mq mq;
size_t s;
uint16_t queues;
s = iov_to_buf(iov, iov_cnt, 0, &mq, sizeof(mq));
if (s != sizeof(mq)) {
return VIRTIO_NET_ERR;
}
if (cmd != VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_MQ_VQ_PAIRS_SET) {
return VIRTIO_NET_ERR;
}
queues = lduw_p(&mq.virtqueue_pairs);
if (queues < VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_MQ_VQ_PAIRS_MIN ||
queues > VIRTIO_NET_CTRL_MQ_VQ_PAIRS_MAX ||
queues > n->max_queues ||
!n->multiqueue) {
return VIRTIO_NET_ERR;
}
n->curr_queues = queues;
/* stop the backend before changing the number of queues to avoid handling a
* disabled queue */
virtio_net_set_status(vdev, vdev->status);
virtio_net_set_queues(n);
return VIRTIO_NET_OK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 5,267
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: i915_gem_do_execbuffer(struct drm_device *dev, void *data,
struct drm_file *file,
struct drm_i915_gem_execbuffer2 *args,
struct drm_i915_gem_exec_object2 *exec)
{
drm_i915_private_t *dev_priv = dev->dev_private;
struct list_head objects;
struct eb_objects *eb;
struct drm_i915_gem_object *batch_obj;
struct drm_clip_rect *cliprects = NULL;
struct intel_ring_buffer *ring;
u32 exec_start, exec_len;
u32 seqno;
u32 mask;
int ret, mode, i;
if (!i915_gem_check_execbuffer(args)) {
DRM_DEBUG("execbuf with invalid offset/length\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
ret = validate_exec_list(exec, args->buffer_count);
if (ret)
return ret;
switch (args->flags & I915_EXEC_RING_MASK) {
case I915_EXEC_DEFAULT:
case I915_EXEC_RENDER:
ring = &dev_priv->ring[RCS];
break;
case I915_EXEC_BSD:
if (!HAS_BSD(dev)) {
DRM_DEBUG("execbuf with invalid ring (BSD)\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
ring = &dev_priv->ring[VCS];
break;
case I915_EXEC_BLT:
if (!HAS_BLT(dev)) {
DRM_DEBUG("execbuf with invalid ring (BLT)\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
ring = &dev_priv->ring[BCS];
break;
default:
DRM_DEBUG("execbuf with unknown ring: %d\n",
(int)(args->flags & I915_EXEC_RING_MASK));
return -EINVAL;
}
mode = args->flags & I915_EXEC_CONSTANTS_MASK;
mask = I915_EXEC_CONSTANTS_MASK;
switch (mode) {
case I915_EXEC_CONSTANTS_REL_GENERAL:
case I915_EXEC_CONSTANTS_ABSOLUTE:
case I915_EXEC_CONSTANTS_REL_SURFACE:
if (ring == &dev_priv->ring[RCS] &&
mode != dev_priv->relative_constants_mode) {
if (INTEL_INFO(dev)->gen < 4)
return -EINVAL;
if (INTEL_INFO(dev)->gen > 5 &&
mode == I915_EXEC_CONSTANTS_REL_SURFACE)
return -EINVAL;
/* The HW changed the meaning on this bit on gen6 */
if (INTEL_INFO(dev)->gen >= 6)
mask &= ~I915_EXEC_CONSTANTS_REL_SURFACE;
}
break;
default:
DRM_DEBUG("execbuf with unknown constants: %d\n", mode);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (args->buffer_count < 1) {
DRM_DEBUG("execbuf with %d buffers\n", args->buffer_count);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (args->num_cliprects != 0) {
if (ring != &dev_priv->ring[RCS]) {
DRM_DEBUG("clip rectangles are only valid with the render ring\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
cliprects = kmalloc(args->num_cliprects * sizeof(*cliprects),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (cliprects == NULL) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto pre_mutex_err;
}
if (copy_from_user(cliprects,
(struct drm_clip_rect __user *)(uintptr_t)
args->cliprects_ptr,
sizeof(*cliprects)*args->num_cliprects)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto pre_mutex_err;
}
}
ret = i915_mutex_lock_interruptible(dev);
if (ret)
goto pre_mutex_err;
if (dev_priv->mm.suspended) {
mutex_unlock(&dev->struct_mutex);
ret = -EBUSY;
goto pre_mutex_err;
}
eb = eb_create(args->buffer_count);
if (eb == NULL) {
mutex_unlock(&dev->struct_mutex);
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto pre_mutex_err;
}
/* Look up object handles */
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&objects);
for (i = 0; i < args->buffer_count; i++) {
struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj;
obj = to_intel_bo(drm_gem_object_lookup(dev, file,
exec[i].handle));
if (&obj->base == NULL) {
DRM_DEBUG("Invalid object handle %d at index %d\n",
exec[i].handle, i);
/* prevent error path from reading uninitialized data */
ret = -ENOENT;
goto err;
}
if (!list_empty(&obj->exec_list)) {
DRM_DEBUG("Object %p [handle %d, index %d] appears more than once in object list\n",
obj, exec[i].handle, i);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
list_add_tail(&obj->exec_list, &objects);
obj->exec_handle = exec[i].handle;
obj->exec_entry = &exec[i];
eb_add_object(eb, obj);
}
/* take note of the batch buffer before we might reorder the lists */
batch_obj = list_entry(objects.prev,
struct drm_i915_gem_object,
exec_list);
/* Move the objects en-masse into the GTT, evicting if necessary. */
ret = i915_gem_execbuffer_reserve(ring, file, &objects);
if (ret)
goto err;
/* The objects are in their final locations, apply the relocations. */
ret = i915_gem_execbuffer_relocate(dev, eb, &objects);
if (ret) {
if (ret == -EFAULT) {
ret = i915_gem_execbuffer_relocate_slow(dev, file, ring,
&objects, eb,
exec,
args->buffer_count);
BUG_ON(!mutex_is_locked(&dev->struct_mutex));
}
if (ret)
goto err;
}
/* Set the pending read domains for the batch buffer to COMMAND */
if (batch_obj->base.pending_write_domain) {
DRM_DEBUG("Attempting to use self-modifying batch buffer\n");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err;
}
batch_obj->base.pending_read_domains |= I915_GEM_DOMAIN_COMMAND;
ret = i915_gem_execbuffer_move_to_gpu(ring, &objects);
if (ret)
goto err;
seqno = i915_gem_next_request_seqno(ring);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ring->sync_seqno); i++) {
if (seqno < ring->sync_seqno[i]) {
/* The GPU can not handle its semaphore value wrapping,
* so every billion or so execbuffers, we need to stall
* the GPU in order to reset the counters.
*/
ret = i915_gpu_idle(dev, true);
if (ret)
goto err;
BUG_ON(ring->sync_seqno[i]);
}
}
if (ring == &dev_priv->ring[RCS] &&
mode != dev_priv->relative_constants_mode) {
ret = intel_ring_begin(ring, 4);
if (ret)
goto err;
intel_ring_emit(ring, MI_NOOP);
intel_ring_emit(ring, MI_LOAD_REGISTER_IMM(1));
intel_ring_emit(ring, INSTPM);
intel_ring_emit(ring, mask << 16 | mode);
intel_ring_advance(ring);
dev_priv->relative_constants_mode = mode;
}
if (args->flags & I915_EXEC_GEN7_SOL_RESET) {
ret = i915_reset_gen7_sol_offsets(dev, ring);
if (ret)
goto err;
}
trace_i915_gem_ring_dispatch(ring, seqno);
exec_start = batch_obj->gtt_offset + args->batch_start_offset;
exec_len = args->batch_len;
if (cliprects) {
for (i = 0; i < args->num_cliprects; i++) {
ret = i915_emit_box(dev, &cliprects[i],
args->DR1, args->DR4);
if (ret)
goto err;
ret = ring->dispatch_execbuffer(ring,
exec_start, exec_len);
if (ret)
goto err;
}
} else {
ret = ring->dispatch_execbuffer(ring, exec_start, exec_len);
if (ret)
goto err;
}
i915_gem_execbuffer_move_to_active(&objects, ring, seqno);
i915_gem_execbuffer_retire_commands(dev, file, ring);
err:
eb_destroy(eb);
while (!list_empty(&objects)) {
struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj;
obj = list_first_entry(&objects,
struct drm_i915_gem_object,
exec_list);
list_del_init(&obj->exec_list);
drm_gem_object_unreference(&obj->base);
}
mutex_unlock(&dev->struct_mutex);
pre_mutex_err:
kfree(cliprects);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: drm/i915: fix integer overflow in i915_gem_execbuffer2()
On 32-bit systems, a large args->buffer_count from userspace via ioctl
may overflow the allocation size, leading to out-of-bounds access.
This vulnerability was introduced in commit 8408c282 ("drm/i915:
First try a normal large kmalloc for the temporary exec buffers").
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,027
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void btif_hl_close_socket( fd_set *p_org_set){
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("entering %s",__FUNCTION__);
for (const list_node_t *node = list_begin(soc_queue);
node != list_end(soc_queue); node = list_next(node)) {
btif_hl_soc_cb_t *p_scb = list_node(node);
if (btif_hl_get_socket_state(p_scb) == BTIF_HL_SOC_STATE_W4_REL) {
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("app_idx=%d mcl_id=%d, mdl_idx=%d",
p_scb->app_idx, p_scb->mcl_idx, p_scb->mdl_idx);
btif_hl_set_socket_state(p_scb, BTIF_HL_SOC_STATE_IDLE);
if (p_scb->socket_id[1] != -1) {
FD_CLR(p_scb->socket_id[1] , p_org_set);
shutdown(p_scb->socket_id[1], SHUT_RDWR);
close(p_scb->socket_id[1]);
btif_hl_evt_cb_t evt_param;
evt_param.chan_cb.app_id = (int) btif_hl_get_app_id(p_scb->channel_id);
memcpy(evt_param.chan_cb.bd_addr, p_scb->bd_addr, sizeof(BD_ADDR));
evt_param.chan_cb.channel_id = p_scb->channel_id;
evt_param.chan_cb.fd = p_scb->socket_id[0];
evt_param.chan_cb.mdep_cfg_index = (int ) p_scb->mdep_cfg_idx;
evt_param.chan_cb.cb_state = BTIF_HL_CHAN_CB_STATE_DISCONNECTED_PENDING;
int len = sizeof(btif_hl_send_chan_state_cb_t);
bt_status_t status = btif_transfer_context (btif_hl_proc_cb_evt,
BTIF_HL_SEND_DISCONNECTED_CB,
(char*) &evt_param, len, NULL);
ASSERTC(status == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS, "context transfer failed", status);
}
}
}
for (const list_node_t *node = list_begin(soc_queue);
node != list_end(soc_queue); ) {
btif_hl_soc_cb_t *p_scb = list_node(node);
node = list_next(node);
if (btif_hl_get_socket_state(p_scb) == BTIF_HL_SOC_STATE_IDLE) {
btif_hl_mdl_cb_t *p_dcb = BTIF_HL_GET_MDL_CB_PTR(p_scb->app_idx,
p_scb->mcl_idx, p_scb->mdl_idx);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("idle socket app_idx=%d mcl_id=%d, mdl_idx=%d p_dcb->in_use=%d",
p_scb->app_idx, p_scb->mcl_idx, p_scb->mdl_idx, p_dcb->in_use);
list_remove(soc_queue, p_scb);
btif_hl_free_buf((void **)&p_scb);
p_dcb->p_scb = NULL;
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("p_scb=0x%x", p_scb);
}
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("leaving %s",__FUNCTION__);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 6,955
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RendererSchedulerImpl::OnAudioStateChanged() {
bool is_audio_playing = false;
for (WebViewSchedulerImpl* web_view_scheduler :
main_thread_only().web_view_schedulers) {
is_audio_playing = is_audio_playing || web_view_scheduler->IsPlayingAudio();
}
if (is_audio_playing == main_thread_only().is_audio_playing)
return;
main_thread_only().last_audio_state_change = helper_.NowTicks();
main_thread_only().is_audio_playing = is_audio_playing;
UpdatePolicy();
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,233
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: do_des(uint32 l_in, uint32 r_in, uint32 *l_out, uint32 *r_out, int count)
{
/*
* l_in, r_in, l_out, and r_out are in pseudo-"big-endian" format.
*/
uint32 l,
r,
*kl,
*kr,
*kl1,
*kr1;
uint32 f,
r48l,
r48r;
int round;
if (count == 0)
return (1);
else if (count > 0)
{
/*
* Encrypting
*/
kl1 = en_keysl;
kr1 = en_keysr;
}
else
{
/*
* Decrypting
*/
count = -count;
kl1 = de_keysl;
kr1 = de_keysr;
}
/*
* Do initial permutation (IP).
*/
l = ip_maskl[0][l_in >> 24]
| ip_maskl[1][(l_in >> 16) & 0xff]
| ip_maskl[2][(l_in >> 8) & 0xff]
| ip_maskl[3][l_in & 0xff]
| ip_maskl[4][r_in >> 24]
| ip_maskl[5][(r_in >> 16) & 0xff]
| ip_maskl[6][(r_in >> 8) & 0xff]
| ip_maskl[7][r_in & 0xff];
r = ip_maskr[0][l_in >> 24]
| ip_maskr[1][(l_in >> 16) & 0xff]
| ip_maskr[2][(l_in >> 8) & 0xff]
| ip_maskr[3][l_in & 0xff]
| ip_maskr[4][r_in >> 24]
| ip_maskr[5][(r_in >> 16) & 0xff]
| ip_maskr[6][(r_in >> 8) & 0xff]
| ip_maskr[7][r_in & 0xff];
while (count--)
{
/*
* Do each round.
*/
kl = kl1;
kr = kr1;
round = 16;
while (round--)
{
/*
* Expand R to 48 bits (simulate the E-box).
*/
r48l = ((r & 0x00000001) << 23)
| ((r & 0xf8000000) >> 9)
| ((r & 0x1f800000) >> 11)
| ((r & 0x01f80000) >> 13)
| ((r & 0x001f8000) >> 15);
r48r = ((r & 0x0001f800) << 7)
| ((r & 0x00001f80) << 5)
| ((r & 0x000001f8) << 3)
| ((r & 0x0000001f) << 1)
| ((r & 0x80000000) >> 31);
/*
* Do salting for crypt() and friends, and XOR with the permuted
* key.
*/
f = (r48l ^ r48r) & saltbits;
r48l ^= f ^ *kl++;
r48r ^= f ^ *kr++;
/*
* Do sbox lookups (which shrink it back to 32 bits) and do the
* pbox permutation at the same time.
*/
f = psbox[0][m_sbox[0][r48l >> 12]]
| psbox[1][m_sbox[1][r48l & 0xfff]]
| psbox[2][m_sbox[2][r48r >> 12]]
| psbox[3][m_sbox[3][r48r & 0xfff]];
/*
* Now that we've permuted things, complete f().
*/
f ^= l;
l = r;
r = f;
}
r = l;
l = f;
}
/*
* Do final permutation (inverse of IP).
*/
*l_out = fp_maskl[0][l >> 24]
| fp_maskl[1][(l >> 16) & 0xff]
| fp_maskl[2][(l >> 8) & 0xff]
| fp_maskl[3][l & 0xff]
| fp_maskl[4][r >> 24]
| fp_maskl[5][(r >> 16) & 0xff]
| fp_maskl[6][(r >> 8) & 0xff]
| fp_maskl[7][r & 0xff];
*r_out = fp_maskr[0][l >> 24]
| fp_maskr[1][(l >> 16) & 0xff]
| fp_maskr[2][(l >> 8) & 0xff]
| fp_maskr[3][l & 0xff]
| fp_maskr[4][r >> 24]
| fp_maskr[5][(r >> 16) & 0xff]
| fp_maskr[6][(r >> 8) & 0xff]
| fp_maskr[7][r & 0xff];
return (0);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 18,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void serial_update_parameters(SerialState *s)
{
int speed, parity, data_bits, stop_bits, frame_size;
QEMUSerialSetParams ssp;
if (s->divider == 0)
return;
/* Start bit. */
frame_size = 1;
/* Parity bit. */
frame_size++;
if (s->lcr & 0x10)
parity = 'E';
else
parity = 'O';
} else {
parity = 'N';
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 1
| 24,970
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void put_persistent_gnt(struct xen_blkif_ring *ring,
struct persistent_gnt *persistent_gnt)
{
if(!test_bit(PERSISTENT_GNT_ACTIVE, persistent_gnt->flags))
pr_alert_ratelimited("freeing a grant already unused\n");
set_bit(PERSISTENT_GNT_WAS_ACTIVE, persistent_gnt->flags);
clear_bit(PERSISTENT_GNT_ACTIVE, persistent_gnt->flags);
atomic_dec(&ring->persistent_gnt_in_use);
}
Commit Message: xen-blkback: don't leak stack data via response ring
Rather than constructing a local structure instance on the stack, fill
the fields directly on the shared ring, just like other backends do.
Build on the fact that all response structure flavors are actually
identical (the old code did make this assumption too).
This is XSA-216.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 16,467
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lua_websocket_peek(lua_State *L)
{
apr_status_t rv;
apr_bucket_brigade *brigade;
request_rec *r = ap_lua_check_request_rec(L, 1);
brigade = apr_brigade_create(r->connection->pool,
r->connection->bucket_alloc);
rv = ap_get_brigade(r->connection->input_filters, brigade,
AP_MODE_READBYTES, APR_NONBLOCK_READ, 1);
if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) {
lua_pushboolean(L, 1);
}
else {
lua_pushboolean(L, 0);
}
apr_brigade_cleanup(brigade);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,516
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void skb_recv_done(struct virtqueue *rvq)
{
struct virtnet_info *vi = rvq->vdev->priv;
struct receive_queue *rq = &vi->rq[vq2rxq(rvq)];
/* Schedule NAPI, Suppress further interrupts if successful. */
if (napi_schedule_prep(&rq->napi)) {
virtqueue_disable_cb(rvq);
__napi_schedule(&rq->napi);
}
}
Commit Message: virtio-net: drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST
virtio declares support for NETIF_F_FRAGLIST, but assumes
that there are at most MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2 fragments which isn't
always true with a fraglist.
A longer fraglist in the skb will make the call to skb_to_sgvec overflow
the sg array, leading to memory corruption.
Drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST so we only get what we can handle.
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,176
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool decode_vlv_response(void *mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB in, void *_out)
{
void **out = (void **)_out;
DATA_BLOB context_id;
struct asn1_data *data = asn1_init(mem_ctx);
struct ldb_vlv_resp_control *lvrc;
if (!data) return false;
if (!asn1_load(data, in)) {
return false;
}
lvrc = talloc(mem_ctx, struct ldb_vlv_resp_control);
if (!lvrc) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_read_Integer(data, &(lvrc->targetPosition))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_read_Integer(data, &(lvrc->contentCount))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_read_enumerated(data, &(lvrc->vlv_result))) {
return false;
}
if (asn1_peek_tag(data, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)) {
if (!asn1_read_OctetString(data, mem_ctx, &context_id)) {
return false;
}
lvrc->contextId = talloc_strndup(lvrc, (const char *)context_id.data, context_id.length);
if (!lvrc->contextId) {
return false;
}
lvrc->ctxid_len = context_id.length;
} else {
lvrc->contextId = NULL;
lvrc->ctxid_len = 0;
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) {
return false;
}
*out = lvrc;
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool InputWindowInfo::frameContainsPoint(int32_t x, int32_t y) const {
return x >= frameLeft && x <= frameRight
&& y >= frameTop && y <= frameBottom;
}
Commit Message: Add new MotionEvent flag for partially obscured windows.
Due to more complex window layouts resulting in lots of overlapping
windows, the policy around FLAG_WINDOW_IS_OBSCURED has changed to
only be set when the point at which the window was touched is
obscured. Unfortunately, this doesn't prevent tapjacking attacks that
overlay the dialog's text, making a potentially dangerous operation
seem innocuous. To avoid this on particularly sensitive dialogs,
introduce a new flag that really does tell you when your window is
being even partially overlapped.
We aren't exposing this as API since we plan on making the original
flag more robust. This is really a workaround for system dialogs
since we generally know their layout and screen position, and that
they're unlikely to be overlapped by other applications.
Bug: 26677796
Change-Id: I9e336afe90f262ba22015876769a9c510048fd47
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 9,842
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void d_add(struct dentry *entry, struct inode *inode)
{
if (inode) {
security_d_instantiate(entry, inode);
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
}
__d_add(entry, inode);
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 26,985
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserView::UpdateAcceleratorMetrics(
const ui::Accelerator& accelerator, int command_id) {
const ui::KeyboardCode key_code = accelerator.key_code();
if (command_id == IDC_HELP_PAGE_VIA_KEYBOARD && key_code == ui::VKEY_F1)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("ShowHelpTabViaF1"));
if (command_id == IDC_BOOKMARK_PAGE)
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Bookmarks.EntryPoint",
bookmark_utils::ENTRY_POINT_ACCELERATOR,
bookmark_utils::ENTRY_POINT_LIMIT);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
switch (command_id) {
case IDC_BACK:
if (key_code == ui::VKEY_BACK)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_Back_Backspace"));
else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_F1)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_Back_F1"));
else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_LEFT)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_Back_Left"));
break;
case IDC_FORWARD:
if (key_code == ui::VKEY_BACK)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_Forward_Backspace"));
else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_F2)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_Forward_F2"));
else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_RIGHT)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_Forward_Right"));
break;
case IDC_RELOAD:
case IDC_RELOAD_IGNORING_CACHE:
if (key_code == ui::VKEY_R)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_Reload_R"));
else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_F3)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_Reload_F3"));
break;
case IDC_FULLSCREEN:
if (key_code == ui::VKEY_F4)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_Fullscreen_F4"));
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_LOCATION:
if (key_code == ui::VKEY_D)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_FocusLocation_D"));
else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_L)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_FocusLocation_L"));
break;
case IDC_FOCUS_SEARCH:
if (key_code == ui::VKEY_E)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_FocusSearch_E"));
else if (key_code == ui::VKEY_K)
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Accel_FocusSearch_K"));
break;
default:
break;
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,155
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int verify_newsa_info(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p,
struct nlattr **attrs)
{
int err;
err = -EINVAL;
switch (p->family) {
case AF_INET:
break;
case AF_INET6:
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
break;
#else
err = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
goto out;
#endif
default:
goto out;
}
err = -EINVAL;
switch (p->id.proto) {
case IPPROTO_AH:
if ((!attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH] &&
!attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC]) ||
attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AEAD] ||
attrs[XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT] ||
attrs[XFRMA_ALG_COMP] ||
attrs[XFRMA_TFCPAD])
goto out;
break;
case IPPROTO_ESP:
if (attrs[XFRMA_ALG_COMP])
goto out;
if (!attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH] &&
!attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC] &&
!attrs[XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT] &&
!attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AEAD])
goto out;
if ((attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH] ||
attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC] ||
attrs[XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT]) &&
attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AEAD])
goto out;
if (attrs[XFRMA_TFCPAD] &&
p->mode != XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL)
goto out;
break;
case IPPROTO_COMP:
if (!attrs[XFRMA_ALG_COMP] ||
attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AEAD] ||
attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH] ||
attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC] ||
attrs[XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT] ||
attrs[XFRMA_TFCPAD] ||
(ntohl(p->id.spi) >= 0x10000))
goto out;
break;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS:
case IPPROTO_ROUTING:
if (attrs[XFRMA_ALG_COMP] ||
attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH] ||
attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC] ||
attrs[XFRMA_ALG_AEAD] ||
attrs[XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT] ||
attrs[XFRMA_ENCAP] ||
attrs[XFRMA_SEC_CTX] ||
attrs[XFRMA_TFCPAD] ||
!attrs[XFRMA_COADDR])
goto out;
break;
#endif
default:
goto out;
}
if ((err = verify_aead(attrs)))
goto out;
if ((err = verify_auth_trunc(attrs)))
goto out;
if ((err = verify_one_alg(attrs, XFRMA_ALG_AUTH)))
goto out;
if ((err = verify_one_alg(attrs, XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT)))
goto out;
if ((err = verify_one_alg(attrs, XFRMA_ALG_COMP)))
goto out;
if ((err = verify_sec_ctx_len(attrs)))
goto out;
if ((err = verify_replay(p, attrs)))
goto out;
err = -EINVAL;
switch (p->mode) {
case XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT:
case XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL:
case XFRM_MODE_ROUTEOPTIMIZATION:
case XFRM_MODE_BEET:
break;
default:
goto out;
}
err = 0;
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipsec: Fix aborted xfrm policy dump crash
An independent security researcher, Mohamed Ghannam, has reported
this vulnerability to Beyond Security's SecuriTeam Secure Disclosure
program.
The xfrm_dump_policy_done function expects xfrm_dump_policy to
have been called at least once or it will crash. This can be
triggered if a dump fails because the target socket's receive
buffer is full.
This patch fixes it by using the cb->start mechanism to ensure that
the initialisation is always done regardless of the buffer situation.
Fixes: 12a169e7d8f4 ("ipsec: Put dumpers on the dump list")
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 1,083
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline Image *GetImageCache(const ImageInfo *image_info,const char *path,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
key[MaxTextExtent];
ExceptionInfo
*sans_exception;
Image
*image;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
/*
Read an image into a image cache if not already present. Return the image
that is in the cache under that filename.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(key,MaxTextExtent,"cache:%s",path);
sans_exception=AcquireExceptionInfo();
image=(Image *) GetImageRegistry(ImageRegistryType,key,sans_exception);
sans_exception=DestroyExceptionInfo(sans_exception);
if (image != (Image *) NULL)
return(image);
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) CopyMagickString(read_info->filename,path,MaxTextExtent);
image=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
if (image != (Image *) NULL)
(void) SetImageRegistry(ImageRegistryType,key,image,exception);
return(image);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1623
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 27,518
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLTextAreaElement::subtreeHasChanged()
{
setChangedSinceLastFormControlChangeEvent(true);
setFormControlValueMatchesRenderer(false);
setNeedsValidityCheck();
if (!focused())
return;
calculateAndAdjustDirectionality();
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,411
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void correct_endian_ret_unlink(struct usbip_header_ret_unlink *pdu,
int send)
{
if (send)
cpu_to_be32s(&pdu->status);
else
be32_to_cpus(&pdu->status);
}
Commit Message: USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write
Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer
usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a
packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As
part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for
urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted.
Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the
preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data.
Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,092
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reflectedTreatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringCustomStringAttrAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::reflectedTreatNullAsNullStringTreatUndefinedAsNullStringCustomStringAttrAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 14,384
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void event_postload(UNUSED_ATTR void *context) {
LOG_INFO("%s", __func__);
if(vendor->send_async_command(VENDOR_CONFIGURE_SCO, NULL) == -1) {
sco_config_callback(false);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 14,030
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebLocalFrameImpl::WillDetachParent() {
if (text_finder_ && text_finder_->ScopingInProgress()) {
text_finder_->FlushCurrentScoping();
text_finder_->CancelPendingScopingEffort();
}
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 11,962
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void php_cgi_usage(char *argv0)
{
char *prog;
prog = strrchr(argv0, '/');
if (prog) {
prog++;
} else {
prog = "php";
}
php_printf( "Usage: %s [-q] [-h] [-s] [-v] [-i] [-f <file>]\n"
" %s <file> [args...]\n"
" -a Run interactively\n"
" -b <address:port>|<port> Bind Path for external FASTCGI Server mode\n"
" -C Do not chdir to the script's directory\n"
" -c <path>|<file> Look for php.ini file in this directory\n"
" -n No php.ini file will be used\n"
" -d foo[=bar] Define INI entry foo with value 'bar'\n"
" -e Generate extended information for debugger/profiler\n"
" -f <file> Parse <file>. Implies `-q'\n"
" -h This help\n"
" -i PHP information\n"
" -l Syntax check only (lint)\n"
" -m Show compiled in modules\n"
" -q Quiet-mode. Suppress HTTP Header output.\n"
" -s Display colour syntax highlighted source.\n"
" -v Version number\n"
" -w Display source with stripped comments and whitespace.\n"
" -z <file> Load Zend extension <file>.\n"
" -T <count> Measure execution time of script repeated <count> times.\n",
prog, prog);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,559
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: l2tp_accm_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
uint16_t val_h, val_l;
ptr++; /* skip "Reserved" */
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "send=%08x ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
val_h = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
val_l = EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr); ptr++;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "recv=%08x ", (val_h<<16) + val_l));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 18,530
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string SupervisedUserService::GetCustodianEmailAddress() const {
std::string email = profile_->GetPrefs()->GetString(
prefs::kSupervisedUserCustodianEmail);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (email.empty() && !!user_manager::UserManager::Get()->GetActiveUser()) {
email = chromeos::ChromeUserManager::Get()
->GetSupervisedUserManager()
->GetManagerDisplayEmail(user_manager::UserManager::Get()
->GetActiveUser()
->GetAccountId()
.GetUserEmail());
}
#endif
return email;
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 13,382
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HistogramBase* CustomHistogram::DeserializeInfoImpl(PickleIterator* iter) {
std::string histogram_name;
int flags;
int declared_min;
int declared_max;
uint32_t bucket_count;
uint32_t range_checksum;
if (!ReadHistogramArguments(iter, &histogram_name, &flags, &declared_min,
&declared_max, &bucket_count, &range_checksum)) {
return NULL;
}
std::vector<Sample> sample_ranges(bucket_count - 1);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < sample_ranges.size(); ++i) {
if (!iter->ReadInt(&sample_ranges[i]))
return NULL;
}
HistogramBase* histogram = CustomHistogram::FactoryGet(
histogram_name, sample_ranges, flags);
if (!ValidateRangeChecksum(*histogram, range_checksum)) {
return NULL;
}
return histogram;
}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 14,943
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: omx_venc::omx_venc()
{
#ifdef _ANDROID_ICS_
meta_mode_enable = false;
memset(meta_buffer_hdr,0,sizeof(meta_buffer_hdr));
memset(meta_buffers,0,sizeof(meta_buffers));
memset(opaque_buffer_hdr,0,sizeof(opaque_buffer_hdr));
mUseProxyColorFormat = false;
get_syntaxhdr_enable = false;
#endif
bframes = entropy = 0;
char property_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {0};
property_get("vidc.debug.level", property_value, "1");
debug_level = atoi(property_value);
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.debug.bframes", property_value, "0");
bframes = atoi(property_value);
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.debug.entropy", property_value, "1");
entropy = !!atoi(property_value);
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.debug.perf.mode", property_value, "0");
perfmode = atoi(property_value);
property_value[0] = '\0';
property_get("vidc.debug.hybrid.hierp", property_value, "0");
hybrid_hp = atoi(property_value);
property_value[0] = '\0';
handle = NULL;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 13,906
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LocalToAncestorVisualRectInternal(
const PropertyTreeState& local_state,
const PropertyTreeState& ancestor_state,
FloatClipRect& mapping_rect,
bool& success) {
GeometryMapper::LocalToAncestorVisualRectInternal(
local_state, ancestor_state, mapping_rect,
kIgnorePlatformOverlayScrollbarSize, kNonInclusiveIntersect, success);
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,044
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned avcodec_version(void)
{
av_assert0(AV_CODEC_ID_PCM_S8_PLANAR==65563);
av_assert0(AV_CODEC_ID_ADPCM_G722==69660);
av_assert0(AV_CODEC_ID_SRT==94216);
av_assert0(LIBAVCODEC_VERSION_MICRO >= 100);
return LIBAVCODEC_VERSION_INT;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 14,611
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Image *ReadSUNImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define RMT_EQUAL_RGB 1
#define RMT_NONE 0
#define RMT_RAW 2
#define RT_STANDARD 1
#define RT_ENCODED 2
#define RT_FORMAT_RGB 3
typedef struct _SUNInfo
{
unsigned int
magic,
width,
height,
depth,
length,
type,
maptype,
maplength;
} SUNInfo;
Image
*image;
int
bit;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
register Quantum
*q;
register ssize_t
i,
x;
register unsigned char
*p;
size_t
bytes_per_line,
extent,
length;
ssize_t
count,
y;
SUNInfo
sun_info;
unsigned char
*sun_data,
*sun_pixels;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Read SUN raster header.
*/
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&sun_info,0,sizeof(sun_info));
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
do
{
/*
Verify SUN identifier.
*/
if (sun_info.magic != 0x59a66a95)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
sun_info.width=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.height=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.depth=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.length=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.type=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maptype=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
sun_info.maplength=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
extent=sun_info.height*sun_info.width;
if ((sun_info.height != 0) && (sun_info.width != extent/sun_info.height))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.type != RT_STANDARD) && (sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) &&
(sun_info.type != RT_FORMAT_RGB))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maplength != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.depth == 0) || (sun_info.depth > 32))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
if ((sun_info.maptype != RMT_NONE) && (sun_info.maptype != RMT_EQUAL_RGB) &&
(sun_info.maptype != RMT_RAW))
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
image->depth=sun_info.depth <= 8 ? sun_info.depth :
MAGICKCORE_QUANTUM_DEPTH;
if (sun_info.depth < 24)
{
size_t
one;
image->storage_class=PseudoClass;
image->colors=sun_info.maplength;
one=1;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_NONE)
image->colors=one << sun_info.depth;
if (sun_info.maptype == RMT_EQUAL_RGB)
image->colors=sun_info.maplength/3;
}
switch (sun_info.maptype)
{
case RMT_NONE:
{
if (sun_info.depth < 24)
{
/*
Create linear color ramp.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
break;
}
case RMT_EQUAL_RGB:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,image->colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(image->colors,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].red=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].green=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
count=ReadBlob(image,image->colors,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) image->colors)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
image->colormap[i].blue=(MagickRealType) ScaleCharToQuantum(
sun_colormap[i]);
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
case RMT_RAW:
{
unsigned char
*sun_colormap;
/*
Read SUN raster colormap.
*/
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(sun_info.maplength,
sizeof(*sun_colormap));
if (sun_colormap == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=ReadBlob(image,sun_info.maplength,sun_colormap);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.maplength)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile");
sun_colormap=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_colormap);
break;
}
default:
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"ColormapTypeNotSupported");
}
image->alpha_trait=sun_info.depth == 32 ? BlendPixelTrait :
UndefinedPixelTrait;
image->columns=sun_info.width;
image->rows=sun_info.height;
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(DestroyImageList(image));
if ((sun_info.length*sizeof(*sun_data))/sizeof(*sun_data) !=
sun_info.length || !sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if ((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (sun_info.depth >= 8) &&
((number_pixels*((sun_info.depth+7)/8)) > sun_info.length))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
bytes_per_line=sun_info.width*sun_info.depth;
sun_data=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) MagickMax(
sun_info.length,bytes_per_line*sun_info.width),sizeof(*sun_data));
if (sun_data == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
count=(ssize_t) ReadBlob(image,sun_info.length,sun_data);
if (count != (ssize_t) sun_info.length)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
sun_pixels=sun_data;
bytes_per_line=0;
if (sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED)
{
size_t
height;
/*
Read run-length encoded raster pixels.
*/
height=sun_info.height;
if ((height == 0) || (sun_info.width == 0) || (sun_info.depth == 0) ||
((bytes_per_line/sun_info.depth) != sun_info.width))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bytes_per_line+=15;
bytes_per_line<<=1;
if ((bytes_per_line >> 1) != (sun_info.width*sun_info.depth+15))
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
bytes_per_line>>=4;
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory(height,
bytes_per_line*sizeof(*sun_pixels));
if (sun_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
(void) DecodeImage(sun_data,sun_info.length,sun_pixels,bytes_per_line*
height);
sun_data=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_data);
}
/*
Convert SUN raster image to pixel packets.
*/
p=sun_pixels;
if (sun_info.depth == 1)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= 0; bit--)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 : 0x01),
q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=7; bit >= (int) (8-(image->columns % 8)); bit--)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,(Quantum) ((*p) & (0x01 << bit) ? 0x00 :
0x01),q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((((image->columns/8)+(image->columns % 8 ? 1 : 0)) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
else
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=image->columns;
length=image->rows*(image->columns+image->columns % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelIndex(image,*p++,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
else
{
size_t
bytes_per_pixel;
bytes_per_pixel=3;
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
bytes_per_pixel++;
if (bytes_per_line == 0)
bytes_per_line=bytes_per_pixel*image->columns;
length=image->rows*(bytes_per_line+image->columns % 2);
if (((sun_info.type == RT_ENCODED) &&
(length > (bytes_per_line*image->rows))) ||
((sun_info.type != RT_ENCODED) && (length > sun_info.length)))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"UnableToReadImageData");
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
if (image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
SetPixelAlpha(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
if (sun_info.type == RT_STANDARD)
{
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
}
else
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++),q);
}
if (image->colors != 0)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelRed(image,q)].red),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelGreen(image,q)].green),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ClampToQuantum(image->colormap[(ssize_t)
GetPixelBlue(image,q)].blue),q);
}
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (((bytes_per_pixel*image->columns) % 2) != 0)
p++;
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
}
if (image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
(void) SyncImage(image,exception);
sun_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(sun_pixels);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
break;
}
/*
Proceed to next image.
*/
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
sun_info.magic=ReadBlobMSBLong(image);
if (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95)
{
/*
Allocate next image structure.
*/
AcquireNextImage(image_info,image,exception);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(image),
GetBlobSize(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
} while (sun_info.magic == 0x59a66a95);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=26848
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 1,500
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void Ins_SDB( INS_ARG )
{
CUR.GS.delta_base = (Int)args[0];
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,024
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void flush_busy_ctxs(struct blk_mq_hw_ctx *hctx, struct list_head *list)
{
struct blk_mq_ctx *ctx;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < hctx->ctx_map.size; i++) {
struct blk_align_bitmap *bm = &hctx->ctx_map.map[i];
unsigned int off, bit;
if (!bm->word)
continue;
bit = 0;
off = i * hctx->ctx_map.bits_per_word;
do {
bit = find_next_bit(&bm->word, bm->depth, bit);
if (bit >= bm->depth)
break;
ctx = hctx->ctxs[bit + off];
clear_bit(bit, &bm->word);
spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
list_splice_tail_init(&ctx->rq_list, list);
spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
bit++;
} while (1);
}
}
Commit Message: blk-mq: fix race between timeout and freeing request
Inside timeout handler, blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is called
to retrieve the request from one tag. This way is obviously
wrong because the request can be freed any time and some
fiedds of the request can't be trusted, then kernel oops
might be triggered[1].
Currently wrt. blk_mq_tag_to_rq(), the only special case is
that the flush request can share same tag with the request
cloned from, and the two requests can't be active at the same
time, so this patch fixes the above issue by updating tags->rqs[tag]
with the active request(either flush rq or the request cloned
from) of the tag.
Also blk_mq_tag_to_rq() gets much simplified with this patch.
Given blk_mq_tag_to_rq() is mainly for drivers and the caller must
make sure the request can't be freed, so in bt_for_each() this
helper is replaced with tags->rqs[tag].
[1] kernel oops log
[ 439.696220] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.697162] IP: [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.700653] PGD 7ef765067 PUD 7ef764067 PMD 0 ^M
[ 439.700653] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC ^M
[ 439.700653] Dumping ftrace buffer:^M
[ 439.700653] (ftrace buffer empty)^M
[ 439.700653] Modules linked in: nbd ipv6 kvm_intel kvm serio_raw^M
[ 439.700653] CPU: 6 PID: 2779 Comm: stress-ng-sigfd Not tainted 4.2.0-rc5-next-20150805+ #265^M
[ 439.730500] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011^M
[ 439.730500] task: ffff880605308000 ti: ffff88060530c000 task.ti: ffff88060530c000^M
[ 439.730500] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812d89ba>] [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.730500] RSP: 0018:ffff880819203da0 EFLAGS: 00010283^M
[ 439.730500] RAX: ffff880811b0e000 RBX: ffff8800bb465f00 RCX: 0000000000000002^M
[ 439.730500] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000202 RDI: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] RBP: ffff880819203db0 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000202^M
[ 439.730500] R13: ffff880814104800 R14: 0000000000000002 R15: ffff880811a2ea00^M
[ 439.730500] FS: 00007f165b3f5740(0000) GS:ffff880819200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000^M
[ 439.730500] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b^M
[ 439.730500] CR2: 0000000000000158 CR3: 00000007ef766000 CR4: 00000000000006e0^M
[ 439.730500] Stack:^M
[ 439.730500] 0000000000000008 ffff8808114eed90 ffff880819203e00 ffffffff812dc104^M
[ 439.755663] ffff880819203e40 ffffffff812d9f5e 0000020000000000 ffff8808114eed80^M
[ 439.755663] Call Trace:^M
[ 439.755663] <IRQ> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc104>] bt_for_each+0x6e/0xc8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d9f5e>] ? blk_mq_rq_timed_out+0x6a/0x6a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812dc1b3>] blk_mq_tag_busy_iter+0x55/0x5e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d8911>] blk_mq_rq_timer+0x5d/0xd4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3e10>] call_timer_fn+0xf7/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a3d1e>] ? call_timer_fn+0x5/0x284^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff812d88b4>] ? blk_mq_bio_to_request+0x38/0x38^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff810a46d6>] run_timer_softirq+0x1ce/0x1f8^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c367>] __do_softirq+0x181/0x3a4^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8104c76e>] irq_exit+0x40/0x94^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81031482>] smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x33/0x3e^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff815559a4>] apic_timer_interrupt+0x84/0x90^M
[ 439.755663] <EOI> ^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81554350>] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x32/0x4a^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a98b>] finish_task_switch+0xe0/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8106a94d>] ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x163^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff81550066>] __schedule+0x469/0x6cd^M
[ 439.755663] [<ffffffff8155039b>] schedule+0x82/0x9a^M
[ 439.789267] [<ffffffff8119b28b>] signalfd_read+0x186/0x49a^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8106d86a>] ? wake_up_q+0x47/0x47^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811618c2>] __vfs_read+0x28/0x9f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8117a289>] ? __fget_light+0x4d/0x74^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff811620a7>] vfs_read+0x7a/0xc6^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff8116292b>] SyS_read+0x49/0x7f^M
[ 439.790911] [<ffffffff81554c17>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x6f^M
[ 439.790911] Code: 48 89 e5 e8 a9 b8 e7 ff 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 89
f2 48 89 e5 41 54 41 89 f4 53 48 8b 47 60 48 8b 1c d0 48 8b 7b 30 48 8b
53 38 <48> 8b 87 58 01 00 00 48 85 c0 75 09 48 8b 97 88 0c 00 00 eb 10
^M
[ 439.790911] RIP [<ffffffff812d89ba>] blk_mq_tag_to_rq+0x21/0x6e^M
[ 439.790911] RSP <ffff880819203da0>^M
[ 439.790911] CR2: 0000000000000158^M
[ 439.790911] ---[ end trace d40af58949325661 ]---^M
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@fb.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 24,041
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: long vorbis_book_decode(codebook *book, oggpack_buffer *b){
if(book->dec_type)return -1;
return decode_packed_entry_number(book,b);
}
Commit Message: Fix out of bounds access in codebook processing
Bug: 62800140
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: I9960d507be62ee0a3b0aa991240951d5a0784f37
(cherry picked from commit 2c4c4bd895f01fdecb90ebdd0412b60608a9ccf0)
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 9,810
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BluetoothAdapter::NotifyGattServiceAdded(
BluetoothRemoteGattService* service) {
DCHECK_EQ(service->GetDevice()->GetAdapter(), this);
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.GattServiceAdded(this, service->GetDevice(), service);
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Implement getAvailability()
This change implements the getAvailability() method for
navigator.bluetooth as defined in the specification.
Bug: 707640
Change-Id: I9e9b3e7f8ea7f259e975f71cb6d9570e5f04b479
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1651516
Reviewed-by: Chris Harrelson <chrishtr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Giovanni Ortuño Urquidi <ortuno@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Ovidio de Jesús Ruiz-Henríquez <odejesush@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#688987}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,168
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pfkey_spddump(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sadb_msg *hdr, void * const *ext_hdrs)
{
struct pfkey_sock *pfk = pfkey_sk(sk);
if (pfk->dump.dump != NULL)
return -EBUSY;
pfk->dump.msg_version = hdr->sadb_msg_version;
pfk->dump.msg_portid = hdr->sadb_msg_pid;
pfk->dump.dump = pfkey_dump_sp;
pfk->dump.done = pfkey_dump_sp_done;
xfrm_policy_walk_init(&pfk->dump.u.policy, XFRM_POLICY_TYPE_MAIN);
return pfkey_do_dump(pfk);
}
Commit Message: af_key: initialize satype in key_notify_policy_flush()
This field was left uninitialized. Some user daemons perform check against this
field.
Signed-off-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,167
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pkinit_server_verify_padata(krb5_context context,
krb5_data *req_pkt,
krb5_kdc_req * request,
krb5_enc_tkt_part * enc_tkt_reply,
krb5_pa_data * data,
krb5_kdcpreauth_callbacks cb,
krb5_kdcpreauth_rock rock,
krb5_kdcpreauth_moddata moddata,
krb5_kdcpreauth_verify_respond_fn respond,
void *arg)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
krb5_data authp_data = {0, 0, NULL}, krb5_authz = {0, 0, NULL};
krb5_pa_pk_as_req *reqp = NULL;
krb5_pa_pk_as_req_draft9 *reqp9 = NULL;
krb5_auth_pack *auth_pack = NULL;
krb5_auth_pack_draft9 *auth_pack9 = NULL;
pkinit_kdc_context plgctx = NULL;
pkinit_kdc_req_context reqctx = NULL;
krb5_checksum cksum = {0, 0, 0, NULL};
krb5_data *der_req = NULL;
int valid_eku = 0, valid_san = 0;
krb5_data k5data;
int is_signed = 1;
krb5_pa_data **e_data = NULL;
krb5_kdcpreauth_modreq modreq = NULL;
pkiDebug("pkinit_verify_padata: entered!\n");
if (data == NULL || data->length <= 0 || data->contents == NULL) {
(*respond)(arg, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
return;
}
if (moddata == NULL) {
(*respond)(arg, EINVAL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
return;
}
plgctx = pkinit_find_realm_context(context, moddata, request->server);
if (plgctx == NULL) {
(*respond)(arg, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL);
return;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(data->contents, data->length, "/tmp/kdc_as_req");
#endif
/* create a per-request context */
retval = pkinit_init_kdc_req_context(context, &reqctx);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
reqctx->pa_type = data->pa_type;
PADATA_TO_KRB5DATA(data, &k5data);
switch ((int)data->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
pkiDebug("processing KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ\n");
retval = k5int_decode_krb5_pa_pk_as_req(&k5data, &reqp);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("decode_krb5_pa_pk_as_req failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(reqp->signedAuthPack.data,
reqp->signedAuthPack.length,
"/tmp/kdc_signed_data");
#endif
retval = cms_signeddata_verify(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx, CMS_SIGN_CLIENT,
plgctx->opts->require_crl_checking,
(unsigned char *)
reqp->signedAuthPack.data, reqp->signedAuthPack.length,
(unsigned char **)&authp_data.data,
&authp_data.length,
(unsigned char **)&krb5_authz.data,
&krb5_authz.length, &is_signed);
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
pkiDebug("processing KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD\n");
retval = k5int_decode_krb5_pa_pk_as_req_draft9(&k5data, &reqp9);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("decode_krb5_pa_pk_as_req_draft9 failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(reqp9->signedAuthPack.data,
reqp9->signedAuthPack.length,
"/tmp/kdc_signed_data_draft9");
#endif
retval = cms_signeddata_verify(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx, CMS_SIGN_DRAFT9,
plgctx->opts->require_crl_checking,
(unsigned char *)
reqp9->signedAuthPack.data, reqp9->signedAuthPack.length,
(unsigned char **)&authp_data.data,
&authp_data.length,
(unsigned char **)&krb5_authz.data,
&krb5_authz.length, NULL);
break;
default:
pkiDebug("unrecognized pa_type = %d\n", data->pa_type);
retval = EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("pkcs7_signeddata_verify failed\n");
goto cleanup;
}
if (is_signed) {
retval = verify_client_san(context, plgctx, reqctx, request->client,
&valid_san);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
if (!valid_san) {
pkiDebug("%s: did not find an acceptable SAN in user "
"certificate\n", __FUNCTION__);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_CLIENT_NAME_MISMATCH;
goto cleanup;
}
retval = verify_client_eku(context, plgctx, reqctx, &valid_eku);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
if (!valid_eku) {
pkiDebug("%s: did not find an acceptable EKU in user "
"certificate\n", __FUNCTION__);
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_INCONSISTENT_KEY_PURPOSE;
goto cleanup;
}
} else { /* !is_signed */
if (!krb5_principal_compare(context, request->client,
krb5_anonymous_principal())) {
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
_("Pkinit request not signed, but client "
"not anonymous."));
goto cleanup;
}
}
#ifdef DEBUG_ASN1
print_buffer_bin(authp_data.data, authp_data.length, "/tmp/kdc_auth_pack");
#endif
OCTETDATA_TO_KRB5DATA(&authp_data, &k5data);
switch ((int)data->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
retval = k5int_decode_krb5_auth_pack(&k5data, &auth_pack);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to decode krb5_auth_pack\n");
goto cleanup;
}
retval = krb5_check_clockskew(context,
auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.ctime);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
/* check dh parameters */
if (auth_pack->clientPublicValue != NULL) {
retval = server_check_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
&auth_pack->clientPublicValue->algorithm.parameters,
plgctx->opts->dh_min_bits);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("bad dh parameters\n");
goto cleanup;
}
} else if (!is_signed) {
/*Anonymous pkinit requires DH*/
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED;
krb5_set_error_message(context, retval,
_("Anonymous pkinit without DH public "
"value not supported."));
goto cleanup;
}
der_req = cb->request_body(context, rock);
retval = krb5_c_make_checksum(context, CKSUMTYPE_NIST_SHA, NULL,
0, der_req, &cksum);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("unable to calculate AS REQ checksum\n");
goto cleanup;
}
if (cksum.length != auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.length ||
k5_bcmp(cksum.contents,
auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.contents,
cksum.length) != 0) {
pkiDebug("failed to match the checksum\n");
#ifdef DEBUG_CKSUM
pkiDebug("calculating checksum on buf size (%d)\n",
req_pkt->length);
print_buffer(req_pkt->data, req_pkt->length);
pkiDebug("received checksum type=%d size=%d ",
auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.checksum_type,
auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.length);
print_buffer(auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.contents,
auth_pack->pkAuthenticator.paChecksum.length);
pkiDebug("expected checksum type=%d size=%d ",
cksum.checksum_type, cksum.length);
print_buffer(cksum.contents, cksum.length);
#endif
retval = KRB5KDC_ERR_PA_CHECKSUM_MUST_BE_INCLUDED;
goto cleanup;
}
/* check if kdcPkId present and match KDC's subjectIdentifier */
if (reqp->kdcPkId.data != NULL) {
int valid_kdcPkId = 0;
retval = pkinit_check_kdc_pkid(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
(unsigned char *)reqp->kdcPkId.data,
reqp->kdcPkId.length, &valid_kdcPkId);
if (retval)
goto cleanup;
if (!valid_kdcPkId)
pkiDebug("kdcPkId in AS_REQ does not match KDC's cert"
"RFC says to ignore and proceed\n");
}
/* remember the decoded auth_pack for verify_padata routine */
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack = auth_pack;
auth_pack = NULL;
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
retval = k5int_decode_krb5_auth_pack_draft9(&k5data, &auth_pack9);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("failed to decode krb5_auth_pack_draft9\n");
goto cleanup;
}
if (auth_pack9->clientPublicValue != NULL) {
retval = server_check_dh(context, plgctx->cryptoctx,
reqctx->cryptoctx, plgctx->idctx,
&auth_pack9->clientPublicValue->algorithm.parameters,
plgctx->opts->dh_min_bits);
if (retval) {
pkiDebug("bad dh parameters\n");
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* remember the decoded auth_pack for verify_padata routine */
reqctx->rcv_auth_pack9 = auth_pack9;
auth_pack9 = NULL;
break;
}
/* remember to set the PREAUTH flag in the reply */
enc_tkt_reply->flags |= TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH;
modreq = (krb5_kdcpreauth_modreq)reqctx;
reqctx = NULL;
cleanup:
if (retval && data->pa_type == KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ) {
pkiDebug("pkinit_verify_padata failed: creating e-data\n");
if (pkinit_create_edata(context, plgctx->cryptoctx, reqctx->cryptoctx,
plgctx->idctx, plgctx->opts, retval, &e_data))
pkiDebug("pkinit_create_edata failed\n");
}
switch ((int)data->pa_type) {
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ:
free_krb5_pa_pk_as_req(&reqp);
free(cksum.contents);
break;
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REP_OLD:
case KRB5_PADATA_PK_AS_REQ_OLD:
free_krb5_pa_pk_as_req_draft9(&reqp9);
}
free(authp_data.data);
free(krb5_authz.data);
if (reqctx != NULL)
pkinit_fini_kdc_req_context(context, reqctx);
free_krb5_auth_pack(&auth_pack);
free_krb5_auth_pack_draft9(context, &auth_pack9);
(*respond)(arg, retval, modreq, e_data, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Prevent requires_preauth bypass [CVE-2015-2694]
In the OTP kdcpreauth module, don't set the TKT_FLG_PRE_AUTH bit until
the request is successfully verified. In the PKINIT kdcpreauth
module, don't respond with code 0 on empty input or an unconfigured
realm. Together these bugs could cause the KDC preauth framework to
erroneously treat a request as pre-authenticated.
CVE-2015-2694:
In MIT krb5 1.12 and later, when the KDC is configured with PKINIT
support, an unauthenticated remote attacker can bypass the
requires_preauth flag on a client principal and obtain a ciphertext
encrypted in the principal's long-term key. This ciphertext could be
used to conduct an off-line dictionary attack against the user's
password.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:N/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8160 (new)
target_version: 1.13.2
tags: pullup
subject: requires_preauth bypass in PKINIT-enabled KDC [CVE-2015-2694]
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 5,747
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebviewInfo::IsResourceWebviewAccessible(
const Extension* extension,
const std::string& partition_id,
const std::string& relative_path) {
if (!extension)
return false;
const WebviewInfo* info = GetResourcesInfo(*extension);
if (!info)
return false;
bool partition_is_privileged = false;
for (size_t i = 0;
i < info->webview_privileged_partitions_.size();
++i) {
if (MatchPattern(partition_id, info->webview_privileged_partitions_[i])) {
partition_is_privileged = true;
break;
}
}
return partition_is_privileged && extension->ResourceMatches(
info->webview_accessible_resources_, relative_path);
}
Commit Message: <webview>: Update format for local file access in manifest.json
The new format is:
"webview" : {
"partitions" : [
{
"name" : "foo*",
"accessible_resources" : ["a.html", "b.html"]
},
{
"name" : "bar",
"accessible_resources" : ["a.html", "c.html"]
}
]
}
BUG=340291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/151923005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@249640 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 6,837
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void imapd_reset(void)
{
int i;
int bytes_in = 0;
int bytes_out = 0;
proc_cleanup();
/* close backend connections */
i = 0;
while (backend_cached && backend_cached[i]) {
proxy_downserver(backend_cached[i]);
if (backend_cached[i]->last_result.s) {
free(backend_cached[i]->last_result.s);
}
free(backend_cached[i]);
i++;
}
if (backend_cached) free(backend_cached);
backend_cached = NULL;
backend_inbox = backend_current = NULL;
if (mupdate_h) mupdate_disconnect(&mupdate_h);
mupdate_h = NULL;
proxy_cmdcnt = 0;
disable_referrals = 0;
supports_referrals = 0;
if (imapd_index) index_close(&imapd_index);
if (imapd_in) {
/* Flush the incoming buffer */
prot_NONBLOCK(imapd_in);
prot_fill(imapd_in);
bytes_in = prot_bytes_in(imapd_in);
prot_free(imapd_in);
}
if (imapd_out) {
/* Flush the outgoing buffer */
prot_flush(imapd_out);
bytes_out = prot_bytes_out(imapd_out);
prot_free(imapd_out);
}
if (config_auditlog)
syslog(LOG_NOTICE, "auditlog: traffic sessionid=<%s> bytes_in=<%d> bytes_out=<%d>",
session_id(), bytes_in, bytes_out);
imapd_in = imapd_out = NULL;
if (protin) protgroup_reset(protin);
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
if (tls_conn) {
if (tls_reset_servertls(&tls_conn) == -1) {
fatal("tls_reset() failed", EC_TEMPFAIL);
}
tls_conn = NULL;
}
#endif
cyrus_reset_stdio();
imapd_clienthost = "[local]";
if (imapd_logfd != -1) {
close(imapd_logfd);
imapd_logfd = -1;
}
if (imapd_userid != NULL) {
free(imapd_userid);
imapd_userid = NULL;
}
if (proxy_userid != NULL) {
free(proxy_userid);
proxy_userid = NULL;
}
if (imapd_magicplus != NULL) {
free(imapd_magicplus);
imapd_magicplus = NULL;
}
if (imapd_authstate) {
auth_freestate(imapd_authstate);
imapd_authstate = NULL;
}
imapd_userisadmin = 0;
imapd_userisproxyadmin = 0;
client_capa = 0;
if (imapd_saslconn) {
sasl_dispose(&imapd_saslconn);
free(imapd_saslconn);
imapd_saslconn = NULL;
}
imapd_compress_done = 0;
imapd_tls_comp = NULL;
imapd_starttls_done = 0;
plaintextloginalert = NULL;
if(saslprops.iplocalport) {
free(saslprops.iplocalport);
saslprops.iplocalport = NULL;
}
if(saslprops.ipremoteport) {
free(saslprops.ipremoteport);
saslprops.ipremoteport = NULL;
}
if(saslprops.authid) {
free(saslprops.authid);
saslprops.authid = NULL;
}
saslprops.ssf = 0;
clear_id();
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 12,190
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pseudo_begin_execution()
{
thisRemoteResource->beginExecution();
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 15,939
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int propagate_mount_busy(struct mount *mnt, int refcnt)
{
struct mount *m, *child;
struct mount *parent = mnt->mnt_parent;
int ret = 0;
if (mnt == parent)
return do_refcount_check(mnt, refcnt);
/*
* quickly check if the current mount can be unmounted.
* If not, we don't have to go checking for all other
* mounts
*/
if (!list_empty(&mnt->mnt_mounts) || do_refcount_check(mnt, refcnt))
return 1;
for (m = propagation_next(parent, parent); m;
m = propagation_next(m, parent)) {
child = __lookup_mnt_last(&m->mnt, mnt->mnt_mountpoint);
if (child && list_empty(&child->mnt_mounts) &&
(ret = do_refcount_check(child, 1)))
break;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 7,806
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DownloadItemImplDelegate::ShouldCompleteDownload(
DownloadItemImpl* download,
const base::Closure& complete_callback) {
return true;
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,018
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameLoader::RestoreScrollPositionAndViewState(
FrameLoadType load_type,
HistoryLoadType history_load_type,
HistoryItem::ViewState* view_state,
HistoryScrollRestorationType scroll_restoration_type) {
LocalFrameView* view = frame_->View();
if (!view || !view->LayoutViewportScrollableArea() ||
!state_machine_.CommittedFirstRealDocumentLoad() ||
!frame_->IsAttached()) {
return;
}
if (!NeedsHistoryItemRestore(load_type) || !view_state)
return;
bool should_restore_scroll =
scroll_restoration_type != kScrollRestorationManual;
bool should_restore_scale = view_state->page_scale_factor_;
bool can_restore_without_clamping =
view->LayoutViewportScrollableArea()->ClampScrollOffset(
view_state->scroll_offset_) == view_state->scroll_offset_;
bool should_force_clamping =
!frame_->IsLoading() || history_load_type == kHistorySameDocumentLoad;
if (!can_restore_without_clamping && should_force_clamping)
frame_->GetDocument()->UpdateStyleAndLayout();
bool can_restore_without_annoying_user =
!GetDocumentLoader()->GetInitialScrollState().was_scrolled_by_user &&
(can_restore_without_clamping || should_force_clamping ||
!should_restore_scroll);
if (!can_restore_without_annoying_user)
return;
if (should_restore_scroll) {
bool did_restore =
ShouldSerializeScrollAnchor() &&
view->RestoreScrollAnchor(
{view_state->scroll_anchor_data_.selector_,
LayoutPoint(view_state->scroll_anchor_data_.offset_.x,
view_state->scroll_anchor_data_.offset_.y),
view_state->scroll_anchor_data_.simhash_});
if (!did_restore) {
view->LayoutViewportScrollableArea()->SetScrollOffset(
view_state->scroll_offset_, kProgrammaticScroll);
}
}
if (frame_->IsMainFrame()) {
ScrollOffset visual_viewport_offset(
view_state->visual_viewport_scroll_offset_);
if (visual_viewport_offset.Width() == -1 &&
visual_viewport_offset.Height() == -1) {
visual_viewport_offset =
view_state->scroll_offset_ -
view->LayoutViewportScrollableArea()->GetScrollOffset();
}
VisualViewport& visual_viewport = frame_->GetPage()->GetVisualViewport();
if (should_restore_scale && should_restore_scroll) {
visual_viewport.SetScaleAndLocation(view_state->page_scale_factor_,
FloatPoint(visual_viewport_offset));
} else if (should_restore_scale) {
visual_viewport.SetScale(view_state->page_scale_factor_);
} else if (should_restore_scroll) {
visual_viewport.SetLocation(FloatPoint(visual_viewport_offset));
}
if (ScrollingCoordinator* scrolling_coordinator =
frame_->GetPage()->GetScrollingCoordinator())
scrolling_coordinator->FrameViewRootLayerDidChange(view);
}
GetDocumentLoader()->GetInitialScrollState().did_restore_from_history = true;
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 18,865
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nf_tables_newset(struct sock *nlsk, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
const struct nlattr * const nla[])
{
const struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg = nlmsg_data(nlh);
const struct nft_set_ops *ops;
struct nft_af_info *afi;
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct nft_table *table;
struct nft_set *set;
struct nft_ctx ctx;
char name[IFNAMSIZ];
unsigned int size;
bool create;
u32 ktype, dtype, flags, policy;
struct nft_set_desc desc;
int err;
if (nla[NFTA_SET_TABLE] == NULL ||
nla[NFTA_SET_NAME] == NULL ||
nla[NFTA_SET_KEY_LEN] == NULL ||
nla[NFTA_SET_ID] == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
memset(&desc, 0, sizeof(desc));
ktype = NFT_DATA_VALUE;
if (nla[NFTA_SET_KEY_TYPE] != NULL) {
ktype = ntohl(nla_get_be32(nla[NFTA_SET_KEY_TYPE]));
if ((ktype & NFT_DATA_RESERVED_MASK) == NFT_DATA_RESERVED_MASK)
return -EINVAL;
}
desc.klen = ntohl(nla_get_be32(nla[NFTA_SET_KEY_LEN]));
if (desc.klen == 0 || desc.klen > FIELD_SIZEOF(struct nft_data, data))
return -EINVAL;
flags = 0;
if (nla[NFTA_SET_FLAGS] != NULL) {
flags = ntohl(nla_get_be32(nla[NFTA_SET_FLAGS]));
if (flags & ~(NFT_SET_ANONYMOUS | NFT_SET_CONSTANT |
NFT_SET_INTERVAL | NFT_SET_MAP))
return -EINVAL;
}
dtype = 0;
if (nla[NFTA_SET_DATA_TYPE] != NULL) {
if (!(flags & NFT_SET_MAP))
return -EINVAL;
dtype = ntohl(nla_get_be32(nla[NFTA_SET_DATA_TYPE]));
if ((dtype & NFT_DATA_RESERVED_MASK) == NFT_DATA_RESERVED_MASK &&
dtype != NFT_DATA_VERDICT)
return -EINVAL;
if (dtype != NFT_DATA_VERDICT) {
if (nla[NFTA_SET_DATA_LEN] == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
desc.dlen = ntohl(nla_get_be32(nla[NFTA_SET_DATA_LEN]));
if (desc.dlen == 0 ||
desc.dlen > FIELD_SIZEOF(struct nft_data, data))
return -EINVAL;
} else
desc.dlen = sizeof(struct nft_data);
} else if (flags & NFT_SET_MAP)
return -EINVAL;
policy = NFT_SET_POL_PERFORMANCE;
if (nla[NFTA_SET_POLICY] != NULL)
policy = ntohl(nla_get_be32(nla[NFTA_SET_POLICY]));
if (nla[NFTA_SET_DESC] != NULL) {
err = nf_tables_set_desc_parse(&ctx, &desc, nla[NFTA_SET_DESC]);
if (err < 0)
return err;
}
create = nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_CREATE ? true : false;
afi = nf_tables_afinfo_lookup(net, nfmsg->nfgen_family, create);
if (IS_ERR(afi))
return PTR_ERR(afi);
table = nf_tables_table_lookup(afi, nla[NFTA_SET_TABLE]);
if (IS_ERR(table))
return PTR_ERR(table);
nft_ctx_init(&ctx, skb, nlh, afi, table, NULL, nla);
set = nf_tables_set_lookup(table, nla[NFTA_SET_NAME]);
if (IS_ERR(set)) {
if (PTR_ERR(set) != -ENOENT)
return PTR_ERR(set);
set = NULL;
}
if (set != NULL) {
if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_EXCL)
return -EEXIST;
if (nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_REPLACE)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
return 0;
}
if (!(nlh->nlmsg_flags & NLM_F_CREATE))
return -ENOENT;
ops = nft_select_set_ops(nla, &desc, policy);
if (IS_ERR(ops))
return PTR_ERR(ops);
size = 0;
if (ops->privsize != NULL)
size = ops->privsize(nla);
err = -ENOMEM;
set = kzalloc(sizeof(*set) + size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (set == NULL)
goto err1;
nla_strlcpy(name, nla[NFTA_SET_NAME], sizeof(set->name));
err = nf_tables_set_alloc_name(&ctx, set, name);
if (err < 0)
goto err2;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&set->bindings);
set->ops = ops;
set->ktype = ktype;
set->klen = desc.klen;
set->dtype = dtype;
set->dlen = desc.dlen;
set->flags = flags;
set->size = desc.size;
set->policy = policy;
err = ops->init(set, &desc, nla);
if (err < 0)
goto err2;
err = nft_trans_set_add(&ctx, NFT_MSG_NEWSET, set);
if (err < 0)
goto err2;
list_add_tail_rcu(&set->list, &table->sets);
table->use++;
return 0;
err2:
kfree(set);
err1:
module_put(ops->owner);
return err;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 8,177
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t strlen16(const char16_t *s)
{
const char16_t *ss = s;
while ( *ss )
ss++;
return ss-s;
}
Commit Message: libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,441
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int l2tp_eth_create(struct net *net, u32 tunnel_id, u32 session_id, u32 peer_session_id, struct l2tp_session_cfg *cfg)
{
struct net_device *dev;
char name[IFNAMSIZ];
struct l2tp_tunnel *tunnel;
struct l2tp_session *session;
struct l2tp_eth *priv;
struct l2tp_eth_sess *spriv;
int rc;
struct l2tp_eth_net *pn;
tunnel = l2tp_tunnel_find(net, tunnel_id);
if (!tunnel) {
rc = -ENODEV;
goto out;
}
session = l2tp_session_find(net, tunnel, session_id);
if (session) {
rc = -EEXIST;
goto out;
}
if (cfg->ifname) {
dev = dev_get_by_name(net, cfg->ifname);
if (dev) {
dev_put(dev);
rc = -EEXIST;
goto out;
}
strlcpy(name, cfg->ifname, IFNAMSIZ);
} else
strcpy(name, L2TP_ETH_DEV_NAME);
session = l2tp_session_create(sizeof(*spriv), tunnel, session_id,
peer_session_id, cfg);
if (!session) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
dev = alloc_netdev(sizeof(*priv), name, l2tp_eth_dev_setup);
if (!dev) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_del_session;
}
dev_net_set(dev, net);
if (session->mtu == 0)
session->mtu = dev->mtu - session->hdr_len;
dev->mtu = session->mtu;
dev->needed_headroom += session->hdr_len;
priv = netdev_priv(dev);
priv->dev = dev;
priv->session = session;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&priv->list);
priv->tunnel_sock = tunnel->sock;
session->recv_skb = l2tp_eth_dev_recv;
session->session_close = l2tp_eth_delete;
#if defined(CONFIG_L2TP_DEBUGFS) || defined(CONFIG_L2TP_DEBUGFS_MODULE)
session->show = l2tp_eth_show;
#endif
spriv = l2tp_session_priv(session);
spriv->dev = dev;
rc = register_netdev(dev);
if (rc < 0)
goto out_del_dev;
/* Must be done after register_netdev() */
strlcpy(session->ifname, dev->name, IFNAMSIZ);
dev_hold(dev);
pn = l2tp_eth_pernet(dev_net(dev));
spin_lock(&pn->l2tp_eth_lock);
list_add(&priv->list, &pn->l2tp_eth_dev_list);
spin_unlock(&pn->l2tp_eth_lock);
return 0;
out_del_dev:
free_netdev(dev);
out_del_session:
l2tp_session_delete(session);
out:
return rc;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,047
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: QQmlComponent* QQuickWebViewExperimental::confirmDialog() const
{
Q_D(const QQuickWebView);
return d->confirmDialog;
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,792
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sctp_hash_established(struct sctp_association *asoc)
{
if (asoc->temp)
return;
sctp_local_bh_disable();
__sctp_hash_established(asoc);
sctp_local_bh_enable();
}
Commit Message: sctp: Fix another socket race during accept/peeloff
There is a race between sctp_rcv() and sctp_accept() where we
have moved the association from the listening socket to the
accepted socket, but sctp_rcv() processing cached the old
socket and continues to use it.
The easy solution is to check for the socket mismatch once we've
grabed the socket lock. If we hit a mis-match, that means
that were are currently holding the lock on the listening socket,
but the association is refrencing a newly accepted socket. We need
to drop the lock on the old socket and grab the lock on the new one.
A more proper solution might be to create accepted sockets when
the new association is established, similar to TCP. That would
eliminate the race for 1-to-1 style sockets, but it would still
existing for 1-to-many sockets where a user wished to peeloff an
association. For now, we'll live with this easy solution as
it addresses the problem.
Reported-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.cz>
Reported-by: Karsten Keil <kkeil@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 5,212
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_p_b_slice(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
WORD16 *pi2_vld_out;
UWORD32 i;
yuv_buf_t *ps_cur_frm_buf = &ps_dec->s_cur_frm_buf;
UWORD32 u4_frm_offset = 0;
const dec_mb_params_t *ps_dec_mb_params;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error = (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
pi2_vld_out = ps_dec->ai2_vld_buf;
memset(ps_dec->ai2_pred_mv,0,sizeof(ps_dec->ai2_pred_mv));
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb = 0;
ps_dec->u2_first_mb = 1;
ps_dec->u2_picture_width = ps_dec->u2_frame_width;
if(ps_dec->u2_picture_structure != FRAME_PICTURE)
{
ps_dec->u2_picture_width <<= 1;
if(ps_dec->u2_picture_structure == BOTTOM_FIELD)
{
u4_frm_offset = ps_dec->u2_frame_width;
}
}
do
{
UWORD32 u4_x_offset, u4_y_offset;
WORD32 ret;
UWORD32 u4_x_dst_offset = 0;
UWORD32 u4_y_dst_offset = 0;
UWORD8 *pu1_out_p;
UWORD8 *pu1_pred;
WORD32 u4_pred_strd;
IMPEG2D_TRACE_MB_START(ps_dec->u2_mb_x, ps_dec->u2_mb_y);
if(ps_dec->e_pic_type == B_PIC)
ret = impeg2d_dec_pnb_mb_params(ps_dec);
else
ret = impeg2d_dec_p_mb_params(ps_dec);
if(ret)
return IMPEG2D_MB_TEX_DECODE_ERR;
IMPEG2D_TRACE_MB_START(ps_dec->u2_mb_x, ps_dec->u2_mb_y);
u4_x_dst_offset = u4_frm_offset + (ps_dec->u2_mb_x << 4);
u4_y_dst_offset = (ps_dec->u2_mb_y << 4) * ps_dec->u2_picture_width;
pu1_out_p = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_y + u4_x_dst_offset + u4_y_dst_offset;
if(ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb == 0)
{
UWORD32 offset_x, offset_y, stride;
UWORD16 index = (ps_dec->u2_motion_type);
/*only for non intra mb's*/
if(ps_dec->e_mb_pred == BIDIRECT)
{
ps_dec_mb_params = &ps_dec->ps_func_bi_direct[index];
}
else
{
ps_dec_mb_params = &ps_dec->ps_func_forw_or_back[index];
}
stride = ps_dec->u2_picture_width;
offset_x = u4_frm_offset + (ps_dec->u2_mb_x << 4);
offset_y = (ps_dec->u2_mb_y << 4);
ps_dec->s_dest_buf.pu1_y = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_y + offset_y * stride + offset_x;
stride = stride >> 1;
ps_dec->s_dest_buf.pu1_u = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_u + (offset_y >> 1) * stride
+ (offset_x >> 1);
ps_dec->s_dest_buf.pu1_v = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_v + (offset_y >> 1) * stride
+ (offset_x >> 1);
PROFILE_DISABLE_MC_IF0
ps_dec_mb_params->pf_mc(ps_dec);
}
for(i = 0; i < NUM_LUMA_BLKS; ++i)
{
if((ps_dec->u2_cbp & (1 << (BLOCKS_IN_MB - 1 - i))) != 0)
{
e_error = ps_dec->pf_vld_inv_quant(ps_dec, pi2_vld_out, ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan_matrix,
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb, Y_LUMA, 0);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
return e_error;
}
u4_x_offset = gai2_impeg2_blk_x_off[i];
if(ps_dec->u2_field_dct == 0)
u4_y_offset = gai2_impeg2_blk_y_off_frm[i] ;
else
u4_y_offset = gai2_impeg2_blk_y_off_fld[i] ;
IMPEG2D_IDCT_INP_STATISTICS(pi2_vld_out, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
PROFILE_DISABLE_IDCT_IF0
{
WORD32 idx;
if(1 == (ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols | ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows))
idx = 0;
else
idx = 1;
if(0 == ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb)
{
pu1_pred = pu1_out_p + u4_y_offset * ps_dec->u2_picture_width + u4_x_offset;
u4_pred_strd = ps_dec->u2_picture_width << ps_dec->u2_field_dct;
}
else
{
pu1_pred = (UWORD8 *)gau1_impeg2_zerobuf;
u4_pred_strd = 8;
}
ps_dec->pf_idct_recon[idx * 2 + ps_dec->i4_last_value_one](pi2_vld_out,
ps_dec->ai2_idct_stg1,
pu1_pred,
pu1_out_p + u4_y_offset * ps_dec->u2_picture_width + u4_x_offset,
8,
u4_pred_strd,
ps_dec->u2_picture_width << ps_dec->u2_field_dct,
~ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ~ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
}
}
}
/* For U and V blocks, divide the x and y offsets by 2. */
u4_x_dst_offset >>= 1;
u4_y_dst_offset >>= 2;
/* In case of chrominance blocks the DCT will be frame DCT */
/* i = 0, U component and i = 1 is V componet */
if((ps_dec->u2_cbp & 0x02) != 0)
{
pu1_out_p = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_u + u4_x_dst_offset + u4_y_dst_offset;
e_error = ps_dec->pf_vld_inv_quant(ps_dec, pi2_vld_out, ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan_matrix,
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb, U_CHROMA, 0);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
return e_error;
}
IMPEG2D_IDCT_INP_STATISTICS(pi2_vld_out, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
PROFILE_DISABLE_IDCT_IF0
{
WORD32 idx;
if(1 == (ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols | ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows))
idx = 0;
else
idx = 1;
if(0 == ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb)
{
pu1_pred = pu1_out_p;
u4_pred_strd = ps_dec->u2_picture_width >> 1;
}
else
{
pu1_pred = (UWORD8 *)gau1_impeg2_zerobuf;
u4_pred_strd = 8;
}
ps_dec->pf_idct_recon[idx * 2 + ps_dec->i4_last_value_one](pi2_vld_out,
ps_dec->ai2_idct_stg1,
pu1_pred,
pu1_out_p,
8,
u4_pred_strd,
ps_dec->u2_picture_width >> 1,
~ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ~ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
}
}
if((ps_dec->u2_cbp & 0x01) != 0)
{
pu1_out_p = ps_cur_frm_buf->pu1_v + u4_x_dst_offset + u4_y_dst_offset;
e_error = ps_dec->pf_vld_inv_quant(ps_dec, pi2_vld_out, ps_dec->pu1_inv_scan_matrix,
ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb, V_CHROMA, 0);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
return e_error;
}
IMPEG2D_IDCT_INP_STATISTICS(pi2_vld_out, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
PROFILE_DISABLE_IDCT_IF0
{
WORD32 idx;
if(1 == (ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols | ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows))
idx = 0;
else
idx = 1;
if(0 == ps_dec->u2_prev_intra_mb)
{
pu1_pred = pu1_out_p;
u4_pred_strd = ps_dec->u2_picture_width >> 1;
}
else
{
pu1_pred = (UWORD8 *)gau1_impeg2_zerobuf;
u4_pred_strd = 8;
}
ps_dec->pf_idct_recon[idx * 2 + ps_dec->i4_last_value_one](pi2_vld_out,
ps_dec->ai2_idct_stg1,
pu1_pred,
pu1_out_p,
8,
u4_pred_strd,
ps_dec->u2_picture_width >> 1,
~ps_dec->u4_non_zero_cols, ~ps_dec->u4_non_zero_rows);
}
}
ps_dec->u2_num_mbs_left--;
ps_dec->u2_first_mb = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mb_x++;
if(ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_offset > ps_dec->s_bit_stream.u4_max_offset)
{
return IMPEG2D_BITSTREAM_BUFF_EXCEEDED_ERR;
}
else if (ps_dec->u2_mb_x == ps_dec->u2_num_horiz_mb)
{
ps_dec->u2_mb_x = 0;
ps_dec->u2_mb_y++;
}
}
while(ps_dec->u2_num_mbs_left != 0 && impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(&ps_dec->s_bit_stream,23) != 0x0);
return e_error;
}
Commit Message: Fixed Memory Overflow Errors
In function impeg2d_dec_p_b_slice, there was no check for num_mbs_left ==
0 after skip_mbs function call. Hence, even though it should have returned
as an error, it goes ahead to decode the frame and writes beyond the
buffer allocated for output. Put a check for the same.
Bug: 38207066
Test: before/after execution of PoC on angler/nyc-mr2-dev
Change-Id: If4b7bea51032bf2fe2edd03f64a68847aa4f6a00
(cherry picked from commit 2df080153464bf57084d68ba3594e199bc140eb4)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 11,505
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vips_foreign_operation_init( void )
{
extern GType vips_foreign_load_rad_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_rad_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_rad_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_mat_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_ppm_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_ppm_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_png_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_png_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_png_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_png_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_csv_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_csv_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_matrix_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_matrix_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_print_matrix_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_fits_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_fits_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_analyze_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_openexr_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_openslide_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_jpeg_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_jpeg_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_jpeg_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_jpeg_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_jpeg_mime_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_tiff_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_tiff_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_tiff_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_tiff_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_vips_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_vips_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_raw_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_raw_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_raw_fd_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_magick_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_magick_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_magick7_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_magick7_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_dz_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_dz_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_webp_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_webp_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_webp_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_save_webp_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_pdf_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_pdf_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_pdf_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_svg_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_svg_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_svg_buffer_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_gif_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_gif_file_get_type( void );
extern GType vips_foreign_load_gif_buffer_get_type( void );
vips_foreign_load_csv_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_csv_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_matrix_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_matrix_get_type();
vips_foreign_print_matrix_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_raw_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_raw_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_raw_fd_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_vips_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_vips_get_type();
#ifdef HAVE_ANALYZE
vips_foreign_load_analyze_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_ANALYZE*/
#ifdef HAVE_PPM
vips_foreign_load_ppm_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_ppm_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_PPM*/
#ifdef HAVE_RADIANCE
vips_foreign_load_rad_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_rad_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_rad_buffer_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_RADIANCE*/
#ifdef HAVE_POPPLER
vips_foreign_load_pdf_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_pdf_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_pdf_buffer_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_POPPLER*/
#ifdef HAVE_RSVG
vips_foreign_load_svg_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_svg_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_svg_buffer_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_RSVG*/
#ifdef HAVE_GIFLIB
vips_foreign_load_gif_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_gif_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_gif_buffer_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_GIFLIB*/
#ifdef HAVE_GSF
vips_foreign_save_dz_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_dz_buffer_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_GSF*/
#ifdef HAVE_PNG
vips_foreign_load_png_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_png_buffer_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_png_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_png_buffer_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_PNG*/
#ifdef HAVE_MATIO
vips_foreign_load_mat_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_MATIO*/
#ifdef HAVE_JPEG
vips_foreign_load_jpeg_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_jpeg_buffer_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_jpeg_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_jpeg_buffer_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_jpeg_mime_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_JPEG*/
#ifdef HAVE_LIBWEBP
vips_foreign_load_webp_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_webp_buffer_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_webp_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_webp_buffer_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_LIBWEBP*/
#ifdef HAVE_TIFF
vips_foreign_load_tiff_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_tiff_buffer_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_tiff_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_tiff_buffer_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_TIFF*/
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSLIDE
vips_foreign_load_openslide_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_OPENSLIDE*/
#ifdef HAVE_MAGICK
vips_foreign_load_magick_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_magick_buffer_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_MAGICK*/
#ifdef HAVE_MAGICK7
vips_foreign_load_magick7_file_get_type();
vips_foreign_load_magick7_buffer_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_MAGICK7*/
#ifdef HAVE_CFITSIO
vips_foreign_load_fits_get_type();
vips_foreign_save_fits_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_CFITSIO*/
#ifdef HAVE_OPENEXR
vips_foreign_load_openexr_get_type();
#endif /*HAVE_OPENEXR*/
vips__foreign_load_operation =
g_quark_from_static_string( "vips-foreign-load-operation" );
}
Commit Message: fix a crash with delayed load
If a delayed load failed, it could leave the pipeline only half-set up.
Sebsequent threads could then segv.
Set a load-has-failed flag and test before generate.
See https://github.com/jcupitt/libvips/issues/893
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 17,931
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int skb_splice_bits(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned int offset,
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, unsigned int tlen,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct partial_page partial[MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
struct page *pages[MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
struct splice_pipe_desc spd = {
.pages = pages,
.partial = partial,
.nr_pages_max = MAX_SKB_FRAGS,
.flags = flags,
.ops = &nosteal_pipe_buf_ops,
.spd_release = sock_spd_release,
};
struct sk_buff *frag_iter;
struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
int ret = 0;
/*
* __skb_splice_bits() only fails if the output has no room left,
* so no point in going over the frag_list for the error case.
*/
if (__skb_splice_bits(skb, pipe, &offset, &tlen, &spd, sk))
goto done;
else if (!tlen)
goto done;
/*
* now see if we have a frag_list to map
*/
skb_walk_frags(skb, frag_iter) {
if (!tlen)
break;
if (__skb_splice_bits(frag_iter, pipe, &offset, &tlen, &spd, sk))
break;
}
done:
if (spd.nr_pages) {
/*
* Drop the socket lock, otherwise we have reverse
* locking dependencies between sk_lock and i_mutex
* here as compared to sendfile(). We enter here
* with the socket lock held, and splice_to_pipe() will
* grab the pipe inode lock. For sendfile() emulation,
* we call into ->sendpage() with the i_mutex lock held
* and networking will grab the socket lock.
*/
release_sock(sk);
ret = splice_to_pipe(pipe, &spd);
lock_sock(sk);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: skbuff: skb_segment: orphan frags before copying
skb_segment copies frags around, so we need
to copy them carefully to avoid accessing
user memory after reporting completion to userspace
through a callback.
skb_segment doesn't normally happen on datapath:
TSO needs to be disabled - so disabling zero copy
in this case does not look like a big deal.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 7,233
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BluetoothSocketConnectFunction::ConnectToService(
device::BluetoothDevice* device,
const device::BluetoothUUID& uuid) {
device->ConnectToService(
uuid,
base::Bind(&BluetoothSocketConnectFunction::OnConnect, this),
base::Bind(&BluetoothSocketConnectFunction::OnConnectError, this));
}
Commit Message: chrome.bluetoothSocket: Fix regression in send()
In https://crrev.com/c/997098, params_ was changed to a local variable,
but it needs to last longer than that since net::WrappedIOBuffer may use
the data after the local variable goes out of scope.
This CL changed it back to be an instance variable.
Bug: 851799
Change-Id: I392f8acaef4c6473d6ea4fbee7209445aa09112e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1103676
Reviewed-by: Toni Barzic <tbarzic@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sonny Sasaka <sonnysasaka@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#568137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 4,072
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: decode_udev_encoded_string (const gchar *str)
{
GString *s;
gchar *ret;
const gchar *end_valid;
guint n;
s = g_string_new (NULL);
for (n = 0; str[n] != '\0'; n++)
{
if (str[n] == '\\')
{
gint val;
if (str[n + 1] != 'x' || str[n + 2] == '\0' || str[n + 3] == '\0')
{
g_print ("**** NOTE: malformed encoded string '%s'\n", str);
break;
}
val = (g_ascii_xdigit_value (str[n + 2]) << 4) | g_ascii_xdigit_value (str[n + 3]);
g_string_append_c (s, val);
n += 3;
}
else
{
g_string_append_c (s, str[n]);
}
}
if (!g_utf8_validate (s->str, -1, &end_valid))
{
g_print ("**** NOTE: The string '%s' is not valid UTF-8. Invalid characters begins at '%s'\n", s->str, end_valid);
ret = g_strndup (s->str, end_valid - s->str);
g_string_free (s, TRUE);
}
else
{
ret = g_string_free (s, FALSE);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 18,158
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct syscall_metadata *syscall_nr_to_meta(int nr)
{
if (!syscalls_metadata || nr >= NR_syscalls || nr < 0)
return NULL;
return syscalls_metadata[nr];
}
Commit Message: tracing/syscalls: Ignore numbers outside NR_syscalls' range
ARM has some private syscalls (for example, set_tls(2)) which lie
outside the range of NR_syscalls. If any of these are called while
syscall tracing is being performed, out-of-bounds array access will
occur in the ftrace and perf sys_{enter,exit} handlers.
# trace-cmd record -e raw_syscalls:* true && trace-cmd report
...
true-653 [000] 384.675777: sys_enter: NR 192 (0, 1000, 3, 4000022, ffffffff, 0)
true-653 [000] 384.675812: sys_exit: NR 192 = 1995915264
true-653 [000] 384.675971: sys_enter: NR 983045 (76f74480, 76f74000, 76f74b28, 76f74480, 76f76f74, 1)
true-653 [000] 384.675988: sys_exit: NR 983045 = 0
...
# trace-cmd record -e syscalls:* true
[ 17.289329] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address aaaaaace
[ 17.289590] pgd = 9e71c000
[ 17.289696] [aaaaaace] *pgd=00000000
[ 17.289985] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[ 17.290169] Modules linked in:
[ 17.290391] CPU: 0 PID: 704 Comm: true Not tainted 3.18.0-rc2+ #21
[ 17.290585] task: 9f4dab00 ti: 9e710000 task.ti: 9e710000
[ 17.290747] PC is at ftrace_syscall_enter+0x48/0x1f8
[ 17.290866] LR is at syscall_trace_enter+0x124/0x184
Fix this by ignoring out-of-NR_syscalls-bounds syscall numbers.
Commit cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
added the check for less than zero, but it should have also checked
for greater than NR_syscalls.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/1414620418-29472-1-git-send-email-rabin@rab.in
Fixes: cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.33+
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 1,031
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gdImageTileApply (gdImagePtr im, int x, int y)
{
gdImagePtr tile = im->tile;
int srcx, srcy;
int p;
if (!tile) {
return;
}
srcx = x % gdImageSX (tile);
srcy = y % gdImageSY (tile);
if (im->trueColor) {
p = gdImageGetPixel (tile, srcx, srcy);
if (p != gdImageGetTransparent (tile)) {
if (!tile->trueColor) {
p = gdTrueColorAlpha(tile->red[p], tile->green[p], tile->blue[p], tile->alpha[p]);
}
gdImageSetPixel (im, x, y, p);
}
} else {
p = gdImageGetPixel (tile, srcx, srcy);
/* Allow for transparency */
if (p != gdImageGetTransparent (tile)) {
if (tile->trueColor) {
/* Truecolor tile. Very slow
on a palette destination. */
gdImageSetPixel (im, x, y,
gdImageColorResolveAlpha (im,
gdTrueColorGetRed
(p),
gdTrueColorGetGreen
(p),
gdTrueColorGetBlue
(p),
gdTrueColorGetAlpha
(p)));
} else {
gdImageSetPixel (im, x, y, im->tileColorMap[p]);
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 27,051
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::RestoreAllAttributes() const {
state_.RestoreVertexAttribs(nullptr);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 10,377
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sched_ttwu_pending(void)
{
struct rq *rq = this_rq();
struct task_struct *list = xchg(&rq->wake_list, NULL);
if (!list)
return;
raw_spin_lock(&rq->lock);
while (list) {
struct task_struct *p = list;
list = list->wake_entry;
ttwu_do_activate(rq, p, 0);
}
raw_spin_unlock(&rq->lock);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 23,922
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_event_context_sched_out(struct task_struct *task, int ctxn,
struct task_struct *next)
{
struct perf_event_context *ctx = task->perf_event_ctxp[ctxn];
struct perf_event_context *next_ctx;
struct perf_event_context *parent, *next_parent;
struct perf_cpu_context *cpuctx;
int do_switch = 1;
if (likely(!ctx))
return;
cpuctx = __get_cpu_context(ctx);
if (!cpuctx->task_ctx)
return;
rcu_read_lock();
next_ctx = next->perf_event_ctxp[ctxn];
if (!next_ctx)
goto unlock;
parent = rcu_dereference(ctx->parent_ctx);
next_parent = rcu_dereference(next_ctx->parent_ctx);
/* If neither context have a parent context; they cannot be clones. */
if (!parent && !next_parent)
goto unlock;
if (next_parent == ctx || next_ctx == parent || next_parent == parent) {
/*
* Looks like the two contexts are clones, so we might be
* able to optimize the context switch. We lock both
* contexts and check that they are clones under the
* lock (including re-checking that neither has been
* uncloned in the meantime). It doesn't matter which
* order we take the locks because no other cpu could
* be trying to lock both of these tasks.
*/
raw_spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
raw_spin_lock_nested(&next_ctx->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
if (context_equiv(ctx, next_ctx)) {
/*
* XXX do we need a memory barrier of sorts
* wrt to rcu_dereference() of perf_event_ctxp
*/
task->perf_event_ctxp[ctxn] = next_ctx;
next->perf_event_ctxp[ctxn] = ctx;
ctx->task = next;
next_ctx->task = task;
swap(ctx->task_ctx_data, next_ctx->task_ctx_data);
do_switch = 0;
perf_event_sync_stat(ctx, next_ctx);
}
raw_spin_unlock(&next_ctx->lock);
raw_spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
}
unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
if (do_switch) {
raw_spin_lock(&ctx->lock);
ctx_sched_out(ctx, cpuctx, EVENT_ALL);
cpuctx->task_ctx = NULL;
raw_spin_unlock(&ctx->lock);
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix race in swevent hash
There's a race on CPU unplug where we free the swevent hash array
while it can still have events on. This will result in a
use-after-free which is BAD.
Simply do not free the hash array on unplug. This leaves the thing
around and no use-after-free takes place.
When the last swevent dies, we do a for_each_possible_cpu() iteration
anyway to clean these up, at which time we'll free it, so no leakage
will occur.
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 4,980
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: struct ifblock * compiler_create_ifblock(struct condition *conds, struct block *blk)
{
struct ifblock *ifblk;
SAFE_CALLOC(ifblk, 1, sizeof(struct ifblock));
/* associate the pointers */
ifblk->conds = conds;
ifblk->blk = blk;
return ifblk;
}
Commit Message: Exit gracefully in case of corrupted filters (Closes issue #782)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 7,700
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void pdu_free(V9fsPDU *pdu)
{
if (pdu) {
V9fsState *s = pdu->s;
/*
* Cancelled pdu are added back to the freelist
* by flush request .
*/
if (!pdu->cancelled) {
QLIST_REMOVE(pdu, next);
QLIST_INSERT_HEAD(&s->free_list, pdu, next);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 5,715
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void hash_string(const struct ssh_hash *h, void *s, void *str, int len)
{
unsigned char lenblk[4];
PUT_32BIT(lenblk, len);
h->bytes(s, lenblk, 4);
h->bytes(s, str, len);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,082
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: UsbListInterfacesFunction::UsbListInterfacesFunction() {
}
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 23,071
|
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