instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteMPCImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
buffer[MagickPathExtent],
cache_filename[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*property,
*value;
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
offset,
scene;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
depth;
/*
Open persistent cache.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) CopyMagickString(cache_filename,image->filename,MagickPathExtent);
AppendImageFormat("cache",cache_filename);
scene=0;
offset=0;
do
{
/*
Write persistent cache meta-information.
*/
depth=GetImageQuantumDepth(image,MagickTrue);
if ((image->storage_class == PseudoClass) &&
(image->colors > (size_t) (GetQuantumRange(image->depth)+1)))
(void) SetImageStorageClass(image,DirectClass,exception);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,"id=MagickCache\n");
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"magick-signature=%u\n",
GetMagickSignature((const StringInfo *) NULL));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"class=%s colors=%.20g alpha-trait=%s\n",CommandOptionToMnemonic(
MagickClassOptions,image->storage_class),(double) image->colors,
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickPixelTraitOptions,(ssize_t)
image->alpha_trait));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"number-channels=%.20g number-meta-channels=%.20g\n",
(double) image->number_channels,(double) image->number_meta_channels);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"columns=%.20g rows=%.20g depth=%.20g\n",(double) image->columns,
(double) image->rows,(double) image->depth);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
if (image->type != UndefinedType)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"type=%s\n",
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickTypeOptions,image->type));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"colorspace=%s\n",
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickColorspaceOptions,image->colorspace));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
if (image->intensity != UndefinedPixelIntensityMethod)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"pixel-intensity=%s\n",CommandOptionToMnemonic(
MagickPixelIntensityOptions,image->intensity));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->endian != UndefinedEndian)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"endian=%s\n",
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickEndianOptions,image->endian));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->compression != UndefinedCompression)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"compression=%s quality=%.20g\n",CommandOptionToMnemonic(
MagickCompressOptions,image->compression),(double) image->quality);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->units != UndefinedResolution)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"units=%s\n",
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickResolutionOptions,image->units));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if ((image->resolution.x != 0) || (image->resolution.y != 0))
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"resolution=%gx%g\n",image->resolution.x,image->resolution.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if ((image->page.width != 0) || (image->page.height != 0))
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"page=%.20gx%.20g%+.20g%+.20g\n",(double) image->page.width,(double)
image->page.height,(double) image->page.x,(double) image->page.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
else
if ((image->page.x != 0) || (image->page.y != 0))
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"page=%+ld%+ld\n",
(long) image->page.x,(long) image->page.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if ((image->tile_offset.x != 0) || (image->tile_offset.y != 0))
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"tile-offset=%+ld%+ld\n",(long) image->tile_offset.x,(long)
image->tile_offset.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if ((GetNextImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL) ||
(GetPreviousImageInList(image) != (Image *) NULL))
{
if (image->scene == 0)
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"iterations=%.20g delay=%.20g ticks-per-second=%.20g\n",(double)
image->iterations,(double) image->delay,(double)
image->ticks_per_second);
else
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"scene=%.20g "
"iterations=%.20g delay=%.20g ticks-per-second=%.20g\n",
(double) image->scene,(double) image->iterations,(double)
image->delay,(double) image->ticks_per_second);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
else
{
if (image->scene != 0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"scene=%.20g\n",
(double) image->scene);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->iterations != 0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"iterations=%.20g\n",(double) image->iterations);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->delay != 0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"delay=%.20g\n",
(double) image->delay);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->ticks_per_second != UndefinedTicksPerSecond)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"ticks-per-second=%.20g\n",(double) image->ticks_per_second);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
}
if (image->gravity != UndefinedGravity)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"gravity=%s\n",
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickGravityOptions,image->gravity));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->dispose != UndefinedDispose)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"dispose=%s\n",
CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickDisposeOptions,image->dispose));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->rendering_intent != UndefinedIntent)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"rendering-intent=%s\n",CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickIntentOptions,
image->rendering_intent));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->gamma != 0.0)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"gamma=%g\n",
image->gamma);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->chromaticity.white_point.x != 0.0)
{
/*
Note chomaticity points.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"red-primary="
"%g,%g green-primary=%g,%g blue-primary=%g,%g\n",
image->chromaticity.red_primary.x,image->chromaticity.red_primary.y,
image->chromaticity.green_primary.x,
image->chromaticity.green_primary.y,
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.x,
image->chromaticity.blue_primary.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"white-point=%g,%g\n",image->chromaticity.white_point.x,
image->chromaticity.white_point.y);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->orientation != UndefinedOrientation)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"orientation=%s\n",CommandOptionToMnemonic(MagickOrientationOptions,
image->orientation));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
if (image->profiles != (void *) NULL)
{
const char
*name;
const StringInfo
*profile;
/*
Generic profile.
*/
ResetImageProfileIterator(image);
for (name=GetNextImageProfile(image); name != (const char *) NULL; )
{
profile=GetImageProfile(image,name);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,
"profile:%s=%.20g\n",name,(double)
GetStringInfoLength(profile));
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
name=GetNextImageProfile(image);
}
}
if (image->montage != (char *) NULL)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"montage=%s\n",
image->montage);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
}
ResetImagePropertyIterator(image);
property=GetNextImageProperty(image);
while (property != (const char *) NULL)
{
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MagickPathExtent,"%s=",property);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
value=GetImageProperty(image,property,exception);
if (value != (const char *) NULL)
{
size_t
length;
length=strlen(value);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
if (isspace((int) ((unsigned char) value[i])) != 0)
break;
if ((i == (ssize_t) length) && (i != 0))
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,(const unsigned char *) value);
else
{
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'{');
if (strchr(value,'}') == (char *) NULL)
(void) WriteBlob(image,length,(const unsigned char *) value);
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
{
if (value[i] == (int) '}')
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\\');
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,value[i]);
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'}');
}
}
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,'\n');
property=GetNextImageProperty(image);
}
Commit Message: Added check for incorrect number of meta channels report in #492.
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 8,999
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GooString *ASCII85Stream::getPSFilter(int psLevel, const char *indent) {
GooString *s;
if (psLevel < 2) {
return NULL;
}
if (!(s = str->getPSFilter(psLevel, indent))) {
return NULL;
}
s->append(indent)->append("/ASCII85Decode filter\n");
return s;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,254
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: EventListenerProperties LayerTreeHostImpl::GetEventListenerProperties(
EventListenerClass event_class) const {
return active_tree_->event_listener_properties(event_class);
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 24,632
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void push_param(HashTable *params, php_http_params_state_t *state, const php_http_params_opts_t *opts TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (state->val.str) {
if (!state->current.val) {
return;
} else if (0 < (state->val.len = state->input.str - state->val.str)) {
sanitize_value(opts->flags, state->val.str, state->val.len, *(state->current.val), state->rfc5987 TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
ZVAL_EMPTY_STRING(*(state->current.val));
}
state->rfc5987 = 0;
} else if (state->arg.str) {
if (0 < (state->arg.len = state->input.str - state->arg.str)) {
zval *val, key;
zend_bool rfc5987 = 0;
INIT_PZVAL(&key);
ZVAL_NULL(&key);
sanitize_key(opts->flags, state->arg.str, state->arg.len, &key, &rfc5987 TSRMLS_CC);
state->rfc5987 = rfc5987;
if (Z_TYPE(key) == IS_STRING && Z_STRLEN(key)) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(val);
ZVAL_TRUE(val);
if (rfc5987) {
zval **rfc;
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(Z_ARRVAL_PP(state->current.args), ZEND_STRS("*rfc5987*"), (void *) &rfc)) {
zend_symtable_update(Z_ARRVAL_PP(rfc), Z_STRVAL(key), Z_STRLEN(key) + 1, (void *) &val, sizeof(zval *), (void *) &state->current.val);
} else {
zval *tmp;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(tmp);
array_init_size(tmp, 1);
zend_symtable_update(Z_ARRVAL_P(tmp), Z_STRVAL(key), Z_STRLEN(key) + 1, (void *) &val, sizeof(zval *), (void *) &state->current.val);
zend_symtable_update(Z_ARRVAL_PP(state->current.args), ZEND_STRS("*rfc5987*"), (void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *), NULL);
}
} else {
zend_symtable_update(Z_ARRVAL_PP(state->current.args), Z_STRVAL(key), Z_STRLEN(key) + 1, (void *) &val, sizeof(zval *), (void *) &state->current.val);
}
}
zval_dtor(&key);
}
} else if (state->param.str) {
if (0 < (state->param.len = state->input.str - state->param.str)) {
zval *prm, *arg, *val, *key;
zend_bool rfc5987 = 0;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(key);
ZVAL_NULL(key);
if (opts->flags & PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_RFC5988) {
sanitize_rfc5988(state->param.str, state->param.len, key TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
sanitize_key(opts->flags, state->param.str, state->param.len, key, &rfc5987 TSRMLS_CC);
state->rfc5987 = rfc5987;
}
if (Z_TYPE_P(key) != IS_STRING) {
merge_param(params, key, &state->current.val, &state->current.args TSRMLS_CC);
} else if (Z_STRLEN_P(key)) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(prm);
array_init_size(prm, 2);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(val);
if (opts->defval) {
ZVAL_COPY_VALUE(val, opts->defval);
zval_copy_ctor(val);
} else {
ZVAL_TRUE(val);
}
if (rfc5987 && (opts->flags & PHP_HTTP_PARAMS_RFC5987)) {
zend_hash_update(Z_ARRVAL_P(prm), "*rfc5987*", sizeof("*rfc5987*"), (void *) &val, sizeof(zval *), (void *) &state->current.val);
} else {
zend_hash_update(Z_ARRVAL_P(prm), "value", sizeof("value"), (void *) &val, sizeof(zval *), (void *) &state->current.val);
}
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(arg);
array_init_size(arg, 3);
zend_hash_update(Z_ARRVAL_P(prm), "arguments", sizeof("arguments"), (void *) &arg, sizeof(zval *), (void *) &state->current.args);
zend_symtable_update(params, Z_STRVAL_P(key), Z_STRLEN_P(key) + 1, (void *) &prm, sizeof(zval *), (void *) &state->current.param);
}
zval_ptr_dtor(&key);
}
}
}
Commit Message: fix bug #73055
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 677
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void set_page_ext(struct page *pg, struct xen_netbk *netbk,
unsigned int idx)
{
unsigned int group = netbk - xen_netbk;
union page_ext ext = { .e = { .group = group + 1, .idx = idx } };
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ext) > sizeof(ext.mapping));
pg->mapping = ext.mapping;
}
Commit Message: xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 23,876
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gst_asf_demux_get_stream (GstASFDemux * demux, guint16 id)
{
guint i;
for (i = 0; i < demux->num_streams; i++) {
if (demux->stream[i].id == id)
return &demux->stream[i];
}
if (gst_asf_demux_is_unknown_stream (demux, id))
GST_WARNING ("Segment found for undefined stream: (%d)", id);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: asfdemux: Check that we have enough data available before parsing bool/uint extended content descriptors
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777955
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 6,097
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fixup_owner(u32 __user *uaddr, int fshared, struct futex_q *q,
int locked)
{
struct task_struct *owner;
int ret = 0;
if (locked) {
/*
* Got the lock. We might not be the anticipated owner if we
* did a lock-steal - fix up the PI-state in that case:
*/
if (q->pi_state->owner != current)
ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, current, fshared);
goto out;
}
/*
* Catch the rare case, where the lock was released when we were on the
* way back before we locked the hash bucket.
*/
if (q->pi_state->owner == current) {
/*
* Try to get the rt_mutex now. This might fail as some other
* task acquired the rt_mutex after we removed ourself from the
* rt_mutex waiters list.
*/
if (rt_mutex_trylock(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex)) {
locked = 1;
goto out;
}
/*
* pi_state is incorrect, some other task did a lock steal and
* we returned due to timeout or signal without taking the
* rt_mutex. Too late. We can access the rt_mutex_owner without
* locking, as the other task is now blocked on the hash bucket
* lock. Fix the state up.
*/
owner = rt_mutex_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex);
ret = fixup_pi_state_owner(uaddr, q, owner, fshared);
goto out;
}
/*
* Paranoia check. If we did not take the lock, then we should not be
* the owner, nor the pending owner, of the rt_mutex.
*/
if (rt_mutex_owner(&q->pi_state->pi_mutex) == current)
printk(KERN_ERR "fixup_owner: ret = %d pi-mutex: %p "
"pi-state %p\n", ret,
q->pi_state->pi_mutex.owner,
q->pi_state->owner);
out:
return ret ? ret : locked;
}
Commit Message: futex: Fix errors in nested key ref-counting
futex_wait() is leaking key references due to futex_wait_setup()
acquiring an additional reference via the queue_lock() routine. The
nested key ref-counting has been masking bugs and complicating code
analysis. queue_lock() is only called with a previously ref-counted
key, so remove the additional ref-counting from the queue_(un)lock()
functions.
Also futex_wait_requeue_pi() drops one key reference too many in
unqueue_me_pi(). Remove the key reference handling from
unqueue_me_pi(). This was paired with a queue_lock() in
futex_lock_pi(), so the count remains unchanged.
Document remaining nested key ref-counting sites.
Signed-off-by: Darren Hart <dvhart@linux.intel.com>
Reported-and-tested-by: Matthieu Fertré<matthieu.fertre@kerlabs.com>
Reported-by: Louis Rilling<louis.rilling@kerlabs.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: John Kacur <jkacur@redhat.com>
Cc: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
LKML-Reference: <4CBB17A8.70401@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,410
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport ssize_t WriteBlobLong(Image *image,const unsigned int value)
{
unsigned char
buffer[4];
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->endian == LSBEndian)
{
buffer[0]=(unsigned char) value;
buffer[1]=(unsigned char) (value >> 8);
buffer[2]=(unsigned char) (value >> 16);
buffer[3]=(unsigned char) (value >> 24);
return(WriteBlobStream(image,4,buffer));
}
buffer[0]=(unsigned char) (value >> 24);
buffer[1]=(unsigned char) (value >> 16);
buffer[2]=(unsigned char) (value >> 8);
buffer[3]=(unsigned char) value;
return(WriteBlobStream(image,4,buffer));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/issues/43
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 11,331
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void begin_read(TsHashTable *ht)
{
#ifdef ZTS
tsrm_mutex_lock(ht->mx_reader);
if ((++(ht->reader)) == 1) {
tsrm_mutex_lock(ht->mx_writer);
}
tsrm_mutex_unlock(ht->mx_reader);
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 24,122
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kfree(const void *x)
{
struct page *page;
void *object = (void *)x;
if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(x)))
return;
page = virt_to_head_page(x);
if (unlikely(!PageSlab(page))) {
put_page(page);
return;
}
slab_free(page->slab, page, object, __builtin_return_address(0));
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 2,574
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ass_blur1246_horz_c(int16_t *dst, const int16_t *src,
uintptr_t src_width, uintptr_t src_height,
const int16_t *param)
{
uintptr_t dst_width = src_width + 12;
uintptr_t size = ((src_width + STRIPE_MASK) & ~STRIPE_MASK) * src_height;
uintptr_t step = STRIPE_WIDTH * src_height;
uintptr_t offs = 0;
#if STRIPE_WIDTH < 12
int16_t buf[3 * STRIPE_WIDTH];
int16_t *ptr = buf + 2 * STRIPE_WIDTH;
#else
int16_t buf[2 * STRIPE_WIDTH];
int16_t *ptr = buf + STRIPE_WIDTH;
#endif
for (uintptr_t x = 0; x < dst_width; x += STRIPE_WIDTH) {
for (uintptr_t y = 0; y < src_height; ++y) {
#if STRIPE_WIDTH < 12
copy_line(ptr - 2 * STRIPE_WIDTH, src, offs - 2 * step, size);
#endif
copy_line(ptr - 1 * STRIPE_WIDTH, src, offs - 1 * step, size);
copy_line(ptr - 0 * STRIPE_WIDTH, src, offs - 0 * step, size);
for (int k = 0; k < STRIPE_WIDTH; ++k)
dst[k] = blur_func(ptr[k - 12], ptr[k - 10], ptr[k - 8], ptr[k - 7], ptr[k - 6],
ptr[k - 5], ptr[k - 4], ptr[k - 2], ptr[k - 0], param);
dst += STRIPE_WIDTH;
offs += STRIPE_WIDTH;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix blur coefficient calculation buffer overflow
Found by fuzzer test case id:000082,sig:11,src:002579,op:havoc,rep:8.
Correctness should be checked, but this fixes the overflow for good.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,482
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void compose_notify(char *type, char *host, char *buf, size_t len)
{
char usn[256];
if (type) {
if (!strcmp(type, SSDP_ST_ALL))
type = NULL;
else
snprintf(usn, sizeof(usn), "%s::%s", uuid, type);
}
if (!type) {
type = usn;
strncpy(usn, uuid, sizeof(usn));
}
snprintf(buf, len, "NOTIFY * HTTP/1.1\r\n"
"Host: %s:%d\r\n"
"Server: %s\r\n"
"Location: http://%s:%d%s\r\n"
"NT: %s\r\n"
"NTS: ssdp:alive\r\n"
"USN: %s\r\n"
"Cache-Control: max-age=%d\r\n"
"\r\n",
MC_SSDP_GROUP, MC_SSDP_PORT,
server_string,
host, LOCATION_PORT, LOCATION_DESC,
type,
usn,
CACHE_TIMEOUT);
}
Commit Message: Fix #1: Ensure recv buf is always NUL terminated
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <troglobit@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,469
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tsize_t t2p_sample_realize_palette(T2P* t2p, unsigned char* buffer){
uint32 sample_count=0;
uint16 component_count=0;
uint32 palette_offset=0;
uint32 sample_offset=0;
uint32 i=0;
uint32 j=0;
sample_count=t2p->tiff_width*t2p->tiff_length;
component_count=t2p->tiff_samplesperpixel;
if( sample_count * component_count > t2p->tiff_datasize )
{
TIFFError(TIFF2PDF_MODULE, "Error: sample_count * component_count > t2p->tiff_datasize");
t2p->t2p_error = T2P_ERR_ERROR;
return 1;
}
for(i=sample_count;i>0;i--){
palette_offset=buffer[i-1] * component_count;
sample_offset= (i-1) * component_count;
for(j=0;j<component_count;j++){
buffer[sample_offset+j]=t2p->pdf_palette[palette_offset+j];
}
}
return(0);
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiff2pdf.c: avoid potential heap-based overflow in
t2p_readwrite_pdf_image_tile().
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2640
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 27,536
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err trpy_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_TRPYBox *p = (GF_TRPYBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, "LargeTotalRTPBytesBox", trace);
fprintf(trace, "RTPBytesSent=\""LLD"\">\n", LLD_CAST p->nbBytes);
gf_isom_box_dump_done("LargeTotalRTPBytesBox", a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 9,133
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::DecodeSurface(
const scoped_refptr<VaapiDecodeSurface>& dec_surface) {
const bool result = vaapi_wrapper_->ExecuteAndDestroyPendingBuffers(
dec_surface->va_surface()->id());
if (!result)
VLOGF(1) << "Failed decoding picture";
return result;
}
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 17,992
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SVGDocumentExtensions::removeSVGRootWithRelativeLengthDescendents(SVGSVGElement* svgRoot)
{
ASSERT(!m_inRelativeLengthSVGRootsInvalidation);
m_relativeLengthSVGRoots.remove(svgRoot);
}
Commit Message: SVG: Moving animating <svg> to other iframe should not crash.
Moving SVGSVGElement with its SMILTimeContainer already started caused crash before this patch.
|SVGDocumentExtentions::startAnimations()| calls begin() against all SMILTimeContainers in the document, but the SMILTimeContainer for <svg> moved from other document may be already started.
BUG=369860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/290353002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@174338 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 15,894
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ImeObserver::OnActivate(const std::string& component_id) {
if (extension_id_.empty())
return;
std::unique_ptr<base::ListValue> args(input_ime::OnActivate::Create(
component_id, input_ime::ParseScreenType(GetCurrentScreenType())));
DispatchEventToExtension(extensions::events::INPUT_IME_ON_ACTIVATE,
input_ime::OnActivate::kEventName,
std::move(args));
}
Commit Message: Fix the regression caused by http://crrev.com/c/1288350.
Bug: 900124,856135
Change-Id: Ie11ad406bd1ea383dc2a83cc8661076309154865
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1317010
Reviewed-by: Lan Wei <azurewei@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shu Chen <shuchen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605282}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 19,996
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virDomainDestroyFlags(virDomainPtr domain,
unsigned int flags)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "flags=%x", flags);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
conn = domain->conn;
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
if (conn->driver->domainDestroyFlags) {
int ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainDestroyFlags(domain, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 8,280
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void AssociateAlphaPixel(const CubeInfo *cube_info,
const PixelPacket *pixel,DoublePixelPacket *alpha_pixel)
{
MagickRealType
alpha;
alpha_pixel->index=0;
if ((cube_info->associate_alpha == MagickFalse) ||
(pixel->opacity == OpaqueOpacity))
{
alpha_pixel->red=(MagickRealType) GetPixelRed(pixel);
alpha_pixel->green=(MagickRealType) GetPixelGreen(pixel);
alpha_pixel->blue=(MagickRealType) GetPixelBlue(pixel);
alpha_pixel->opacity=(MagickRealType) GetPixelOpacity(pixel);
return;
}
alpha=(MagickRealType) (QuantumScale*(QuantumRange-GetPixelOpacity(pixel)));
alpha_pixel->red=alpha*GetPixelRed(pixel);
alpha_pixel->green=alpha*GetPixelGreen(pixel);
alpha_pixel->blue=alpha*GetPixelBlue(pixel);
alpha_pixel->opacity=(MagickRealType) GetPixelOpacity(pixel);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/574
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 7,748
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AudioInputRendererHost::OnError(
media::AudioInputController* controller,
int error_code) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&AudioInputRendererHost::DoHandleError,
this, make_scoped_refptr(controller), error_code));
}
Commit Message: Improve validation when creating audio streams.
BUG=166795
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11647012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173981 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 16,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int normal_prio(struct task_struct *p)
{
int prio;
if (task_has_rt_policy(p))
prio = MAX_RT_PRIO-1 - p->rt_priority;
else
prio = __normal_prio(p);
return prio;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,964
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sctp_cmd_new_state(sctp_cmd_seq_t *cmds,
struct sctp_association *asoc,
sctp_state_t state)
{
struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk;
asoc->state = state;
pr_debug("%s: asoc:%p[%s]\n", __func__, asoc, sctp_state_tbl[state]);
if (sctp_style(sk, TCP)) {
/* Change the sk->sk_state of a TCP-style socket that has
* successfully completed a connect() call.
*/
if (sctp_state(asoc, ESTABLISHED) && sctp_sstate(sk, CLOSED))
sk->sk_state = SCTP_SS_ESTABLISHED;
/* Set the RCV_SHUTDOWN flag when a SHUTDOWN is received. */
if (sctp_state(asoc, SHUTDOWN_RECEIVED) &&
sctp_sstate(sk, ESTABLISHED))
sk->sk_shutdown |= RCV_SHUTDOWN;
}
if (sctp_state(asoc, COOKIE_WAIT)) {
/* Reset init timeouts since they may have been
* increased due to timer expirations.
*/
asoc->timeouts[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T1_INIT] =
asoc->rto_initial;
asoc->timeouts[SCTP_EVENT_TIMEOUT_T1_COOKIE] =
asoc->rto_initial;
}
if (sctp_state(asoc, ESTABLISHED) ||
sctp_state(asoc, CLOSED) ||
sctp_state(asoc, SHUTDOWN_RECEIVED)) {
/* Wake up any processes waiting in the asoc's wait queue in
* sctp_wait_for_connect() or sctp_wait_for_sndbuf().
*/
if (waitqueue_active(&asoc->wait))
wake_up_interruptible(&asoc->wait);
/* Wake up any processes waiting in the sk's sleep queue of
* a TCP-style or UDP-style peeled-off socket in
* sctp_wait_for_accept() or sctp_wait_for_packet().
* For a UDP-style socket, the waiters are woken up by the
* notifications.
*/
if (!sctp_style(sk, UDP))
sk->sk_state_change(sk);
}
}
Commit Message: sctp: Prevent soft lockup when sctp_accept() is called during a timeout event
A case can occur when sctp_accept() is called by the user during
a heartbeat timeout event after the 4-way handshake. Since
sctp_assoc_migrate() changes both assoc->base.sk and assoc->ep, the
bh_sock_lock in sctp_generate_heartbeat_event() will be taken with
the listening socket but released with the new association socket.
The result is a deadlock on any future attempts to take the listening
socket lock.
Note that this race can occur with other SCTP timeouts that take
the bh_lock_sock() in the event sctp_accept() is called.
BUG: soft lockup - CPU#9 stuck for 67s! [swapper:0]
...
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8152d48e>] [<ffffffff8152d48e>] _spin_lock+0x1e/0x30
RSP: 0018:ffff880028323b20 EFLAGS: 00000206
RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff880028323b20 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff880028323be0 RDI: ffff8804632c4b48
RBP: ffffffff8100bb93 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff880610662280 R11: 0000000000000100 R12: ffff880028323aa0
R13: ffff8804383c3880 R14: ffff880028323a90 R15: ffffffff81534225
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff880028320000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0018 ES: 0018 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00000000006df528 CR3: 0000000001a85000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process swapper (pid: 0, threadinfo ffff880616b70000, task ffff880616b6cab0)
Stack:
ffff880028323c40 ffffffffa01c2582 ffff880614cfb020 0000000000000000
<d> 0100000000000000 00000014383a6c44 ffff8804383c3880 ffff880614e93c00
<d> ffff880614e93c00 0000000000000000 ffff8804632c4b00 ffff8804383c38b8
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01c2582>] ? sctp_rcv+0x492/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffff8148c559>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148c716>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff814974a0>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8149757d>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
[<ffffffff81497808>] ? ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
[<ffffffff81496ccd>] ? ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
[<ffffffff81497255>] ? ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
[<ffffffff8145cfeb>] ? __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
...
With lockdep debugging:
=====================================
[ BUG: bad unlock balance detected! ]
-------------------------------------
CslRx/12087 is trying to release lock (slock-AF_INET) at:
[<ffffffffa01bcae0>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x40/0xe0 [sctp]
but there are no more locks to release!
other info that might help us debug this:
2 locks held by CslRx/12087:
#0: (&asoc->timers[i]){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffff8108ce1f>] run_timer_softirq+0x16f/0x3e0
#1: (slock-AF_INET){+.-...}, at: [<ffffffffa01bcac3>] sctp_generate_timeout_event+0x23/0xe0 [sctp]
Ensure the socket taken is also the same one that is released by
saving a copy of the socket before entering the timeout event
critical section.
Signed-off-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 2,502
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const AtomicString& Document::BodyAttributeValue(
const QualifiedName& name) const {
if (auto* bodyElement = body())
return bodyElement->FastGetAttribute(name);
return g_null_atom;
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 22,088
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderViewImpl* RenderViewImpl::FromRoutingID(int32 routing_id) {
RoutingIDViewMap* views = g_routing_id_view_map.Pointer();
RoutingIDViewMap::iterator it = views->find(routing_id);
return it == views->end() ? NULL : it->second;
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 6,114
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs4_open_done(struct rpc_task *task, void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_opendata *data = calldata;
data->rpc_status = task->tk_status;
if (!nfs4_sequence_done(task, &data->o_res.seq_res))
return;
if (task->tk_status == 0) {
if (data->o_res.f_attr->valid & NFS_ATTR_FATTR_TYPE) {
switch (data->o_res.f_attr->mode & S_IFMT) {
case S_IFREG:
break;
case S_IFLNK:
data->rpc_status = -ELOOP;
break;
case S_IFDIR:
data->rpc_status = -EISDIR;
break;
default:
data->rpc_status = -ENOTDIR;
}
}
renew_lease(data->o_res.server, data->timestamp);
if (!(data->o_res.rflags & NFS4_OPEN_RESULT_CONFIRM))
nfs_confirm_seqid(&data->owner->so_seqid, 0);
}
data->rpc_done = 1;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 21,923
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: brcmf_cfg80211_get_key(struct wiphy *wiphy, struct net_device *ndev, u8 key_idx,
bool pairwise, const u8 *mac_addr, void *cookie,
void (*callback)(void *cookie,
struct key_params *params))
{
struct key_params params;
struct brcmf_if *ifp = netdev_priv(ndev);
struct brcmf_cfg80211_profile *profile = &ifp->vif->profile;
struct brcmf_cfg80211_security *sec;
s32 wsec;
s32 err = 0;
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Enter\n");
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "key index (%d)\n", key_idx);
if (!check_vif_up(ifp->vif))
return -EIO;
memset(¶ms, 0, sizeof(params));
err = brcmf_fil_bsscfg_int_get(ifp, "wsec", &wsec);
if (err) {
brcmf_err("WLC_GET_WSEC error (%d)\n", err);
/* Ignore this error, may happen during DISASSOC */
err = -EAGAIN;
goto done;
}
if (wsec & WEP_ENABLED) {
sec = &profile->sec;
if (sec->cipher_pairwise & WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40) {
params.cipher = WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40;
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP40\n");
} else if (sec->cipher_pairwise & WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104) {
params.cipher = WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104;
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_WEP104\n");
}
} else if (wsec & TKIP_ENABLED) {
params.cipher = WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP;
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_TKIP\n");
} else if (wsec & AES_ENABLED) {
params.cipher = WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC;
brcmf_dbg(CONN, "WLAN_CIPHER_SUITE_AES_CMAC\n");
} else {
brcmf_err("Invalid algo (0x%x)\n", wsec);
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
callback(cookie, ¶ms);
done:
brcmf_dbg(TRACE, "Exit\n");
return err;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,981
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ConfirmEmailDialogDelegate::~ConfirmEmailDialogDelegate() {
}
Commit Message: During redirects in the one click sign in flow, check the current URL
instead of original URL to validate gaia http headers.
BUG=307159
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/77343002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@236563 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 18,563
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dmxBEFreeGlyphSet(ScreenPtr pScreen, GlyphSetPtr glyphSet)
{
dmxGlyphPrivPtr glyphPriv = DMX_GET_GLYPH_PRIV(glyphSet);
int idx = pScreen->myNum;
DMXScreenInfo *dmxScreen = &dmxScreens[idx];
if (glyphPriv->glyphSets[idx]) {
XRenderFreeGlyphSet(dmxScreen->beDisplay, glyphPriv->glyphSets[idx]);
glyphPriv->glyphSets[idx] = (GlyphSet) 0;
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 27,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderViewHostManager::ShouldCloseTabOnUnresponsiveRenderer() {
if (!cross_navigation_pending_)
return true;
int pending_request_id = pending_render_view_host_->GetPendingRequestId();
if (pending_request_id == -1) {
if (pending_render_view_host_->are_navigations_suspended())
pending_render_view_host_->SetNavigationsSuspended(false);
} else {
ViewMsg_SwapOut_Params params;
params.closing_process_id = render_view_host_->GetProcess()->GetID();
params.closing_route_id = render_view_host_->GetRoutingID();
params.new_render_process_host_id =
pending_render_view_host_->GetProcess()->GetID();
params.new_request_id = pending_request_id;
current_host()->GetProcess()->SimulateSwapOutACK(params);
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 5,920
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoRegisterSharedIdsCHROMIUM(
GLuint namespace_id, GLsizei n, const GLuint* ids) {
IdAllocatorInterface* id_allocator = group_->GetIdAllocator(namespace_id);
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < n; ++ii) {
if (!id_allocator->MarkAsUsed(ids[ii])) {
for (GLsizei jj = 0; jj < ii; ++jj) {
id_allocator->FreeID(ids[jj]);
}
SetGLError(
GL_INVALID_VALUE,
"RegisterSharedIdsCHROMIUM: attempt to register "
"id that already exists");
return;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 21,262
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ewk_frame_title_set(Evas_Object* ewkFrame, const char* title)
{
DBG("ewkFrame=%p, title=%s", ewkFrame, title ? title : "(null)");
EWK_FRAME_SD_GET_OR_RETURN(ewkFrame, smartData);
if (!eina_stringshare_replace(&smartData->title, title))
return;
evas_object_smart_callback_call(ewkFrame, "title,changed", (void*)smartData->title);
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,884
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: each_object_field_start(void *state, char *fname, bool isnull)
{
EachState *_state = (EachState *) state;
/* save a pointer to where the value starts */
if (_state->lex->lex_level == 1)
{
/*
* next_scalar will be reset in the object_field_end handler, and
* since we know the value is a scalar there is no danger of it being
* on while recursing down the tree.
*/
if (_state->normalize_results && _state->lex->token_type == JSON_TOKEN_STRING)
_state->next_scalar = true;
else
_state->result_start = _state->lex->token_start;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,616
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int kvm_vcpu_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = filp->private_data;
debugfs_remove_recursive(vcpu->debugfs_dentry);
kvm_put_kvm(vcpu->kvm);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 14,969
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void reference_idct_1d(double input[8], double output[8]) {
const double kPi = 3.141592653589793238462643383279502884;
const double kSqrt2 = 1.414213562373095048801688724209698;
for (int k = 0; k < 8; k++) {
output[k] = 0.0;
for (int n = 0; n < 8; n++) {
output[k] += input[n]*cos(kPi*(2*k+1)*n/16.0);
if (n == 0)
output[k] = output[k]/kSqrt2;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,212
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs4_layoutget_release(void *calldata)
{
struct nfs4_layoutget *lgp = calldata;
struct inode *inode = lgp->args.inode;
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(inode);
size_t max_pages = max_response_pages(server);
dprintk("--> %s\n", __func__);
nfs4_free_pages(lgp->args.layout.pages, max_pages);
pnfs_put_layout_hdr(NFS_I(inode)->layout);
put_nfs_open_context(lgp->args.ctx);
kfree(calldata);
dprintk("<-- %s\n", __func__);
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScriptValue WebGL2RenderingContextBase::getInternalformatParameter(
ScriptState* script_state,
GLenum target,
GLenum internalformat,
GLenum pname) {
if (isContextLost())
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
if (target != GL_RENDERBUFFER) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getInternalformatParameter",
"invalid target");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
switch (internalformat) {
case GL_RGB:
case GL_RGBA:
case GL_R8UI:
case GL_R8I:
case GL_R16UI:
case GL_R16I:
case GL_R32UI:
case GL_R32I:
case GL_RG8UI:
case GL_RG8I:
case GL_RG16UI:
case GL_RG16I:
case GL_RG32UI:
case GL_RG32I:
case GL_RGBA8UI:
case GL_RGBA8I:
case GL_RGB10_A2UI:
case GL_RGBA16UI:
case GL_RGBA16I:
case GL_RGBA32UI:
case GL_RGBA32I:
return WebGLAny(script_state, DOMInt32Array::Create(0));
case GL_R8:
case GL_RG8:
case GL_RGB8:
case GL_RGB565:
case GL_RGBA8:
case GL_SRGB8_ALPHA8:
case GL_RGB5_A1:
case GL_RGBA4:
case GL_RGB10_A2:
case GL_DEPTH_COMPONENT16:
case GL_DEPTH_COMPONENT24:
case GL_DEPTH_COMPONENT32F:
case GL_DEPTH24_STENCIL8:
case GL_DEPTH32F_STENCIL8:
case GL_STENCIL_INDEX8:
break;
case GL_R16F:
case GL_RG16F:
case GL_RGBA16F:
case GL_R32F:
case GL_RG32F:
case GL_RGBA32F:
case GL_R11F_G11F_B10F:
if (!ExtensionEnabled(kEXTColorBufferFloatName)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getInternalformatParameter",
"invalid internalformat when EXT_color_buffer_float "
"is not enabled");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
break;
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getInternalformatParameter",
"invalid internalformat");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
switch (pname) {
case GL_SAMPLES: {
GLint length = -1;
ContextGL()->GetInternalformativ(target, internalformat,
GL_NUM_SAMPLE_COUNTS, 1, &length);
if (length <= 0)
return WebGLAny(script_state, DOMInt32Array::Create(0));
auto values = std::make_unique<GLint[]>(length);
for (GLint ii = 0; ii < length; ++ii)
values[ii] = 0;
ContextGL()->GetInternalformativ(target, internalformat, GL_SAMPLES,
length, values.get());
return WebGLAny(script_state,
DOMInt32Array::Create(values.get(), length));
}
default:
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "getInternalformatParameter",
"invalid parameter name");
return ScriptValue::CreateNull(script_state);
}
}
Commit Message: Validate all incoming WebGLObjects.
A few entry points were missing the correct validation.
Tested with improved conformance tests in
https://github.com/KhronosGroup/WebGL/pull/2654 .
Bug: 848914
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: Ib98a61cc5bf378d1b3338b04acd7e1bc4c2fe008
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1086718
Reviewed-by: Kai Ninomiya <kainino@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#565016}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,030
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FilePath DownloadItemImpl::GetTargetName() const {
return target_path_.BaseName();
}
Commit Message: Refactors to simplify rename pathway in DownloadFileManager.
This is https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10668004 / r144817 (reverted
due to CrOS failure) with the completion logic moved to after the
auto-opening. The tests that test the auto-opening (for web store install)
were waiting for download completion to check install, and hence were
failing when completion was moved earlier.
Doing this right would probably require another state (OPENED).
BUG=123998
BUG-134930
R=asanka@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10701040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145157 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,113
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabContentsContainerGtk::SetTab(TabContents* tab) {
if (tab_ == tab)
return;
if (tab_)
HideTab(tab_);
tab_ = tab;
if (tab_) {
if (tab_ == preview_)
preview_ = NULL;
else
PackTab(tab_);
GtkWidget* widget = tab_->web_contents()->GetContentNativeView();
if (widget) {
GdkWindow* content_gdk_window = gtk_widget_get_window(widget);
if (content_gdk_window)
gdk_window_lower(content_gdk_window);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 893
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::OnSwapOut(
int proxy_routing_id,
bool is_loading,
const FrameReplicationState& replicated_frame_state) {
TRACE_EVENT1("navigation,rail", "RenderFrameImpl::OnSwapOut",
"id", routing_id_);
RenderFrameProxy* proxy = nullptr;
SendUpdateState();
CHECK_NE(proxy_routing_id, MSG_ROUTING_NONE);
proxy = RenderFrameProxy::CreateProxyToReplaceFrame(
this, proxy_routing_id, replicated_frame_state.scope);
if (is_main_frame_)
frame_->DispatchUnloadEvent();
if (is_main_frame_)
render_view_->SetSwappedOut(true);
RenderViewImpl* render_view = render_view_;
bool is_main_frame = is_main_frame_;
int routing_id = GetRoutingID();
bool success = frame_->Swap(proxy->web_frame());
if (is_main_frame)
CHECK(!render_view->main_render_frame_);
if (!success) {
proxy->FrameDetached(blink::WebRemoteFrameClient::DetachType::kSwap);
return;
}
if (is_loading)
proxy->OnDidStartLoading();
proxy->SetReplicatedState(replicated_frame_state);
if (is_main_frame)
render_view->WasSwappedOut();
RenderThread::Get()->Send(new FrameHostMsg_SwapOut_ACK(routing_id));
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,364
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool smbXcli_conn_receive_next(struct smbXcli_conn *conn)
{
size_t num_pending = talloc_array_length(conn->pending);
struct tevent_req *req;
struct smbXcli_req_state *state;
if (conn->read_smb_req != NULL) {
return true;
}
if (num_pending == 0) {
if (conn->smb2.mid < UINT64_MAX) {
/* no more pending requests, so we are done for now */
return true;
}
/*
* If there are no more SMB2 requests possible,
* because we are out of message ids,
* we need to disconnect.
*/
smbXcli_conn_disconnect(conn, NT_STATUS_CONNECTION_ABORTED);
return true;
}
req = conn->pending[0];
state = tevent_req_data(req, struct smbXcli_req_state);
/*
* We're the first ones, add the read_smb request that waits for the
* answer from the server
*/
conn->read_smb_req = read_smb_send(conn->pending,
state->ev,
conn->sock_fd);
if (conn->read_smb_req == NULL) {
return false;
}
tevent_req_set_callback(conn->read_smb_req, smbXcli_conn_received, conn);
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 23,056
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct dentry *proc_task_instantiate(struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, struct task_struct *task, const void *ptr)
{
struct dentry *error = ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);
struct inode *inode;
inode = proc_pid_make_inode(dir->i_sb, task);
if (!inode)
goto out;
inode->i_mode = S_IFDIR|S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO;
inode->i_op = &proc_tid_base_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &proc_tid_base_operations;
inode->i_flags|=S_IMMUTABLE;
inode->i_nlink = 2 + pid_entry_count_dirs(tid_base_stuff,
ARRAY_SIZE(tid_base_stuff));
dentry->d_op = &pid_dentry_operations;
d_add(dentry, inode);
/* Close the race of the process dying before we return the dentry */
if (pid_revalidate(dentry, NULL))
error = NULL;
out:
return error;
}
Commit Message: fix autofs/afs/etc. magic mountpoint breakage
We end up trying to kfree() nd.last.name on open("/mnt/tmp", O_CREAT)
if /mnt/tmp is an autofs direct mount. The reason is that nd.last_type
is bogus here; we want LAST_BIND for everything of that kind and we
get LAST_NORM left over from finding parent directory.
So make sure that it *is* set properly; set to LAST_BIND before
doing ->follow_link() - for normal symlinks it will be changed
by __vfs_follow_link() and everything else needs it set that way.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,783
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: T1_New_Parser( T1_Parser parser,
FT_Stream stream,
FT_Memory memory,
PSAux_Service psaux )
{
FT_Error error;
FT_UShort tag;
FT_ULong size;
psaux->ps_parser_funcs->init( &parser->root, NULL, NULL, memory );
parser->stream = stream;
parser->base_len = 0;
parser->base_dict = NULL;
parser->private_len = 0;
parser->private_dict = NULL;
parser->in_pfb = 0;
parser->in_memory = 0;
parser->single_block = 0;
/* check the header format */
error = check_type1_format( stream, "%!PS-AdobeFont", 14 );
if ( error )
{
if ( FT_ERR_NEQ( error, Unknown_File_Format ) )
goto Exit;
error = check_type1_format( stream, "%!FontType", 10 );
if ( error )
{
FT_TRACE2(( " not a Type 1 font\n" ));
goto Exit;
}
}
/******************************************************************/
/* */
/* Here a short summary of what is going on: */
/* */
/* When creating a new Type 1 parser, we try to locate and load */
/* the base dictionary if this is possible (i.e., for PFB */
/* files). Otherwise, we load the whole font into memory. */
/* */
/* When `loading' the base dictionary, we only setup pointers */
/* in the case of a memory-based stream. Otherwise, we */
/* allocate and load the base dictionary in it. */
/* */
/* parser->in_pfb is set if we are in a binary (`.pfb') font. */
/* parser->in_memory is set if we have a memory stream. */
/* */
/* try to compute the size of the base dictionary; */
/* look for a Postscript binary file tag, i.e., 0x8001 */
if ( FT_STREAM_SEEK( 0L ) )
goto Exit;
error = read_pfb_tag( stream, &tag, &size );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
if ( tag != 0x8001U )
{
/* assume that this is a PFA file for now; an error will */
/* be produced later when more things are checked */
if ( FT_STREAM_SEEK( 0L ) )
goto Exit;
size = stream->size;
}
else
parser->in_pfb = 1;
/* now, try to load `size' bytes of the `base' dictionary we */
/* found previously */
/* if it is a memory-based resource, set up pointers */
if ( !stream->read )
{
parser->base_dict = (FT_Byte*)stream->base + stream->pos;
parser->base_len = size;
parser->in_memory = 1;
/* check that the `size' field is valid */
if ( FT_STREAM_SKIP( size ) )
goto Exit;
}
else
{
/* read segment in memory -- this is clumsy, but so does the format */
if ( FT_ALLOC( parser->base_dict, size ) ||
FT_STREAM_READ( parser->base_dict, size ) )
goto Exit;
parser->base_len = size;
}
parser->root.base = parser->base_dict;
parser->root.cursor = parser->base_dict;
parser->root.limit = parser->root.cursor + parser->base_len;
Exit:
if ( error && !parser->in_memory )
FT_FREE( parser->base_dict );
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 17,964
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void handle_tx(struct vhost_net *net)
{
struct vhost_net_virtqueue *nvq = &net->vqs[VHOST_NET_VQ_TX];
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = &nvq->vq;
unsigned out, in, s;
int head;
struct msghdr msg = {
.msg_name = NULL,
.msg_namelen = 0,
.msg_control = NULL,
.msg_controllen = 0,
.msg_iov = vq->iov,
.msg_flags = MSG_DONTWAIT,
};
size_t len, total_len = 0;
int err;
size_t hdr_size;
struct socket *sock;
struct vhost_net_ubuf_ref *uninitialized_var(ubufs);
bool zcopy, zcopy_used;
/* TODO: check that we are running from vhost_worker? */
sock = rcu_dereference_check(vq->private_data, 1);
if (!sock)
return;
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
vhost_disable_notify(&net->dev, vq);
hdr_size = nvq->vhost_hlen;
zcopy = nvq->ubufs;
for (;;) {
/* Release DMAs done buffers first */
if (zcopy)
vhost_zerocopy_signal_used(net, vq);
head = vhost_get_vq_desc(&net->dev, vq, vq->iov,
ARRAY_SIZE(vq->iov),
&out, &in,
NULL, NULL);
/* On error, stop handling until the next kick. */
if (unlikely(head < 0))
break;
/* Nothing new? Wait for eventfd to tell us they refilled. */
if (head == vq->num) {
int num_pends;
/* If more outstanding DMAs, queue the work.
* Handle upend_idx wrap around
*/
num_pends = likely(nvq->upend_idx >= nvq->done_idx) ?
(nvq->upend_idx - nvq->done_idx) :
(nvq->upend_idx + UIO_MAXIOV -
nvq->done_idx);
if (unlikely(num_pends > VHOST_MAX_PEND))
break;
if (unlikely(vhost_enable_notify(&net->dev, vq))) {
vhost_disable_notify(&net->dev, vq);
continue;
}
break;
}
if (in) {
vq_err(vq, "Unexpected descriptor format for TX: "
"out %d, int %d\n", out, in);
break;
}
/* Skip header. TODO: support TSO. */
s = move_iovec_hdr(vq->iov, nvq->hdr, hdr_size, out);
msg.msg_iovlen = out;
len = iov_length(vq->iov, out);
/* Sanity check */
if (!len) {
vq_err(vq, "Unexpected header len for TX: "
"%zd expected %zd\n",
iov_length(nvq->hdr, s), hdr_size);
break;
}
zcopy_used = zcopy && (len >= VHOST_GOODCOPY_LEN ||
nvq->upend_idx != nvq->done_idx);
/* use msg_control to pass vhost zerocopy ubuf info to skb */
if (zcopy_used) {
vq->heads[nvq->upend_idx].id = head;
if (!vhost_net_tx_select_zcopy(net) ||
len < VHOST_GOODCOPY_LEN) {
/* copy don't need to wait for DMA done */
vq->heads[nvq->upend_idx].len =
VHOST_DMA_DONE_LEN;
msg.msg_control = NULL;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
ubufs = NULL;
} else {
struct ubuf_info *ubuf;
ubuf = nvq->ubuf_info + nvq->upend_idx;
vq->heads[nvq->upend_idx].len =
VHOST_DMA_IN_PROGRESS;
ubuf->callback = vhost_zerocopy_callback;
ubuf->ctx = nvq->ubufs;
ubuf->desc = nvq->upend_idx;
msg.msg_control = ubuf;
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(ubuf);
ubufs = nvq->ubufs;
kref_get(&ubufs->kref);
}
nvq->upend_idx = (nvq->upend_idx + 1) % UIO_MAXIOV;
} else
msg.msg_control = NULL;
/* TODO: Check specific error and bomb out unless ENOBUFS? */
err = sock->ops->sendmsg(NULL, sock, &msg, len);
if (unlikely(err < 0)) {
if (zcopy_used) {
if (ubufs)
vhost_net_ubuf_put(ubufs);
nvq->upend_idx = ((unsigned)nvq->upend_idx - 1)
% UIO_MAXIOV;
}
vhost_discard_vq_desc(vq, 1);
break;
}
if (err != len)
pr_debug("Truncated TX packet: "
" len %d != %zd\n", err, len);
if (!zcopy_used)
vhost_add_used_and_signal(&net->dev, vq, head, 0);
else
vhost_zerocopy_signal_used(net, vq);
total_len += len;
vhost_net_tx_packet(net);
if (unlikely(total_len >= VHOST_NET_WEIGHT)) {
vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll);
break;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
}
Commit Message: vhost-net: fix use-after-free in vhost_net_flush
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait has a confusing name:
it will actually also free it's argument.
Thus since commit 1280c27f8e29acf4af2da914e80ec27c3dbd5c01
"vhost-net: flush outstanding DMAs on memory change"
vhost_net_flush tries to use the argument after passing it
to vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait, this results
in use after free.
To fix, don't free the argument in vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait,
add an new API for callers that want to free ubufs.
Acked-by: Asias He <asias@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 6,963
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rm_assemble_video_frame(AVFormatContext *s, AVIOContext *pb,
RMDemuxContext *rm, RMStream *vst,
AVPacket *pkt, int len, int *pseq,
int64_t *timestamp)
{
int hdr;
int seq = 0, pic_num = 0, len2 = 0, pos = 0; //init to silence compiler warning
int type;
int ret;
hdr = avio_r8(pb); len--;
type = hdr >> 6;
if(type != 3){ // not frame as a part of packet
seq = avio_r8(pb); len--;
}
if(type != 1){ // not whole frame
len2 = get_num(pb, &len);
pos = get_num(pb, &len);
pic_num = avio_r8(pb); len--;
}
if(len<0) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Insufficient data\n");
return -1;
}
rm->remaining_len = len;
if(type&1){ // frame, not slice
if(type == 3){ // frame as a part of packet
len= len2;
*timestamp = pos;
}
if(rm->remaining_len < len) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Insufficient remaining len\n");
return -1;
}
rm->remaining_len -= len;
if(av_new_packet(pkt, len + 9) < 0)
return AVERROR(EIO);
pkt->data[0] = 0;
AV_WL32(pkt->data + 1, 1);
AV_WL32(pkt->data + 5, 0);
if ((ret = avio_read(pb, pkt->data + 9, len)) != len) {
av_packet_unref(pkt);
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Failed to read %d bytes\n", len);
return ret < 0 ? ret : AVERROR(EIO);
}
return 0;
}
*pseq = seq;
if((seq & 0x7F) == 1 || vst->curpic_num != pic_num){
if (len2 > ffio_limit(pb, len2)) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Impossibly sized packet\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
vst->slices = ((hdr & 0x3F) << 1) + 1;
vst->videobufsize = len2 + 8*vst->slices + 1;
av_packet_unref(&vst->pkt); //FIXME this should be output.
if(av_new_packet(&vst->pkt, vst->videobufsize) < 0)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
memset(vst->pkt.data, 0, vst->pkt.size);
vst->videobufpos = 8*vst->slices + 1;
vst->cur_slice = 0;
vst->curpic_num = pic_num;
vst->pktpos = avio_tell(pb);
}
if(type == 2)
len = FFMIN(len, pos);
if(++vst->cur_slice > vst->slices) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "cur slice %d, too large\n", vst->cur_slice);
return 1;
}
if(!vst->pkt.data)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
AV_WL32(vst->pkt.data - 7 + 8*vst->cur_slice, 1);
AV_WL32(vst->pkt.data - 3 + 8*vst->cur_slice, vst->videobufpos - 8*vst->slices - 1);
if(vst->videobufpos + len > vst->videobufsize) {
av_log(s, AV_LOG_ERROR, "outside videobufsize\n");
return 1;
}
if (avio_read(pb, vst->pkt.data + vst->videobufpos, len) != len)
return AVERROR(EIO);
vst->videobufpos += len;
rm->remaining_len-= len;
if (type == 2 || vst->videobufpos == vst->videobufsize) {
vst->pkt.data[0] = vst->cur_slice-1;
*pkt= vst->pkt;
vst->pkt.data= NULL;
vst->pkt.size= 0;
vst->pkt.buf = NULL;
if(vst->slices != vst->cur_slice) //FIXME find out how to set slices correct from the begin
memmove(pkt->data + 1 + 8*vst->cur_slice, pkt->data + 1 + 8*vst->slices,
vst->videobufpos - 1 - 8*vst->slices);
pkt->size = vst->videobufpos + 8*(vst->cur_slice - vst->slices);
pkt->pts = AV_NOPTS_VALUE;
pkt->pos = vst->pktpos;
vst->slices = 0;
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: avformat/rmdec: Fix DoS due to lack of eof check
Fixes: loop.ivr
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 5,986
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SyncBackendHost::Core::DoStartSyncing() {
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), sync_loop_);
sync_manager_->StartSyncingNormally();
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 26,522
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __u8 *mr_report_fixup(struct hid_device *hdev, __u8 *rdesc,
unsigned int *rsize)
{
if (*rsize >= 30 && rdesc[29] == 0x05 && rdesc[30] == 0x09) {
hid_info(hdev, "fixing up button/consumer in HID report descriptor\n");
rdesc[30] = 0x0c;
}
return rdesc;
}
Commit Message: HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 28,223
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void remove_sits_in_journal(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
struct curseg_info *curseg = CURSEG_I(sbi, CURSEG_COLD_DATA);
struct f2fs_journal *journal = curseg->journal;
int i;
down_write(&curseg->journal_rwsem);
for (i = 0; i < sits_in_cursum(journal); i++) {
unsigned int segno;
bool dirtied;
segno = le32_to_cpu(segno_in_journal(journal, i));
dirtied = __mark_sit_entry_dirty(sbi, segno);
if (!dirtied)
add_sit_entry(segno, &SM_I(sbi)->sit_entry_set);
}
update_sits_in_cursum(journal, -i);
up_write(&curseg->journal_rwsem);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 5,772
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void activityLoggingAccessPerWorldBindingsLongAttributeAttributeGetterForMainWorld(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, imp->activityLoggingAccessPerWorldBindingsLongAttribute());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 9,584
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: fst_issue_cmd(struct fst_port_info *port, unsigned short cmd)
{
struct fst_card_info *card;
unsigned short mbval;
unsigned long flags;
int safety;
card = port->card;
spin_lock_irqsave(&card->card_lock, flags);
mbval = FST_RDW(card, portMailbox[port->index][0]);
safety = 0;
/* Wait for any previous command to complete */
while (mbval > NAK) {
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&card->card_lock, flags);
schedule_timeout_uninterruptible(1);
spin_lock_irqsave(&card->card_lock, flags);
if (++safety > 2000) {
pr_err("Mailbox safety timeout\n");
break;
}
mbval = FST_RDW(card, portMailbox[port->index][0]);
}
if (safety > 0) {
dbg(DBG_CMD, "Mailbox clear after %d jiffies\n", safety);
}
if (mbval == NAK) {
dbg(DBG_CMD, "issue_cmd: previous command was NAK'd\n");
}
FST_WRW(card, portMailbox[port->index][0], cmd);
if (cmd == ABORTTX || cmd == STARTPORT) {
port->txpos = 0;
port->txipos = 0;
port->start = 0;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&card->card_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: farsync: fix info leak in ioctl
The fst_get_iface() code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of
struct sync_serial_settings after the ->loopback member. Add an explicit
memset(0) before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 4,252
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int iwl_send_remove_station(struct iwl_priv *priv,
const u8 *addr, int sta_id,
bool temporary)
{
struct iwl_rx_packet *pkt;
int ret;
unsigned long flags_spin;
struct iwl_rem_sta_cmd rm_sta_cmd;
struct iwl_host_cmd cmd = {
.id = REPLY_REMOVE_STA,
.len = { sizeof(struct iwl_rem_sta_cmd), },
.flags = CMD_SYNC,
.data = { &rm_sta_cmd, },
};
memset(&rm_sta_cmd, 0, sizeof(rm_sta_cmd));
rm_sta_cmd.num_sta = 1;
memcpy(&rm_sta_cmd.addr, addr, ETH_ALEN);
cmd.flags |= CMD_WANT_SKB;
ret = iwl_trans_send_cmd(trans(priv), &cmd);
if (ret)
return ret;
pkt = (struct iwl_rx_packet *)cmd.reply_page;
if (pkt->hdr.flags & IWL_CMD_FAILED_MSK) {
IWL_ERR(priv, "Bad return from REPLY_REMOVE_STA (0x%08X)\n",
pkt->hdr.flags);
ret = -EIO;
}
if (!ret) {
switch (pkt->u.rem_sta.status) {
case REM_STA_SUCCESS_MSK:
if (!temporary) {
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->shrd->sta_lock,
flags_spin);
iwl_sta_ucode_deactivate(priv, sta_id);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->shrd->sta_lock,
flags_spin);
}
IWL_DEBUG_ASSOC(priv, "REPLY_REMOVE_STA PASSED\n");
break;
default:
ret = -EIO;
IWL_ERR(priv, "REPLY_REMOVE_STA failed\n");
break;
}
}
iwl_free_pages(priv->shrd, cmd.reply_page);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: iwlwifi: Sanity check for sta_id
On my testing, I saw some strange behavior
[ 421.739708] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: ACTIVATE a non DRIVER active station id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00
[ 421.739719] iwlwifi 0000:01:00.0: iwl_sta_ucode_activate Added STA id 148 addr 00:00:00:00:00:00 to uCode
not sure how it happen, but adding the sanity check to prevent memory
corruption
Signed-off-by: Wey-Yi Guy <wey-yi.w.guy@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 21,147
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabSpecificContentSettings::OnFileSystemAccessed(
const GURL& url,
bool blocked_by_policy) {
if (blocked_by_policy) {
blocked_local_shared_objects_.file_systems()->AddFileSystem(url,
fileapi::kFileSystemTypeTemporary, 0);
OnContentBlocked(CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_COOKIES, std::string());
} else {
allowed_local_shared_objects_.file_systems()->AddFileSystem(url,
fileapi::kFileSystemTypeTemporary, 0);
OnContentAccessed(CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_COOKIES);
}
NotifySiteDataObservers();
}
Commit Message: Check the content setting type is valid.
BUG=169770
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11875013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176687 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,090
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DrawingBuffer::RestoreFramebufferBindings() {
client_->DrawingBufferClientRestoreFramebufferBinding();
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 722
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void php_mysqlnd_sha256_pk_request_free_mem(void * _packet, zend_bool stack_allocation TSRMLS_DC)
{
if (!stack_allocation) {
MYSQLND_PACKET_SHA256_PK_REQUEST * p = (MYSQLND_PACKET_SHA256_PK_REQUEST *) _packet;
mnd_pefree(p, p->header.persistent);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72293 - Heap overflow in mysqlnd related to BIT fields
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,418
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_pkcs7_encrypt)
{
zval ** zrecipcerts, * zheaders = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) * recipcerts = NULL;
BIO * infile = NULL, * outfile = NULL;
long flags = 0;
PKCS7 * p7 = NULL;
HashPosition hpos;
zval ** zcertval;
X509 * cert;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
long cipherid = PHP_OPENSSL_CIPHER_DEFAULT;
uint strindexlen;
ulong intindex;
char * strindex;
char * infilename = NULL; int infilename_len;
char * outfilename = NULL; int outfilename_len;
RETVAL_FALSE;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ppZa!|ll", &infilename, &infilename_len,
&outfilename, &outfilename_len, &zrecipcerts, &zheaders, &flags, &cipherid) == FAILURE)
return;
if (php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(infilename TSRMLS_CC) || php_openssl_open_base_dir_chk(outfilename TSRMLS_CC)) {
return;
}
infile = BIO_new_file(infilename, "r");
if (infile == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
outfile = BIO_new_file(outfilename, "w");
if (outfile == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
recipcerts = sk_X509_new_null();
/* get certs */
if (Z_TYPE_PP(zrecipcerts) == IS_ARRAY) {
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(HASH_OF(*zrecipcerts), &hpos);
while(zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(HASH_OF(*zrecipcerts), (void**)&zcertval, &hpos) == SUCCESS) {
long certresource;
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(zcertval, 0, &certresource TSRMLS_CC);
if (cert == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
if (certresource != -1) {
/* we shouldn't free this particular cert, as it is a resource.
make a copy and push that on the stack instead */
cert = X509_dup(cert);
if (cert == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
}
sk_X509_push(recipcerts, cert);
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(HASH_OF(*zrecipcerts), &hpos);
}
} else {
/* a single certificate */
long certresource;
cert = php_openssl_x509_from_zval(zrecipcerts, 0, &certresource TSRMLS_CC);
if (cert == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
if (certresource != -1) {
/* we shouldn't free this particular cert, as it is a resource.
make a copy and push that on the stack instead */
cert = X509_dup(cert);
if (cert == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
}
sk_X509_push(recipcerts, cert);
}
/* sanity check the cipher */
cipher = php_openssl_get_evp_cipher_from_algo(cipherid);
if (cipher == NULL) {
/* shouldn't happen */
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Failed to get cipher");
goto clean_exit;
}
p7 = PKCS7_encrypt(recipcerts, infile, (EVP_CIPHER*)cipher, flags);
if (p7 == NULL) {
goto clean_exit;
}
/* tack on extra headers */
if (zheaders) {
zend_hash_internal_pointer_reset_ex(HASH_OF(zheaders), &hpos);
while(zend_hash_get_current_data_ex(HASH_OF(zheaders), (void**)&zcertval, &hpos) == SUCCESS) {
strindex = NULL;
zend_hash_get_current_key_ex(HASH_OF(zheaders), &strindex, &strindexlen, &intindex, 0, &hpos);
convert_to_string_ex(zcertval);
if (strindex) {
BIO_printf(outfile, "%s: %s\n", strindex, Z_STRVAL_PP(zcertval));
} else {
BIO_printf(outfile, "%s\n", Z_STRVAL_PP(zcertval));
}
zend_hash_move_forward_ex(HASH_OF(zheaders), &hpos);
}
}
(void)BIO_reset(infile);
/* write the encrypted data */
SMIME_write_PKCS7(outfile, p7, infile, flags);
RETVAL_TRUE;
clean_exit:
PKCS7_free(p7);
BIO_free(infile);
BIO_free(outfile);
if (recipcerts) {
sk_X509_pop_free(recipcerts, X509_free);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 2,606
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void l2tp_eth_dev_uninit(struct net_device *dev)
{
struct l2tp_eth *priv = netdev_priv(dev);
struct l2tp_eth_net *pn = l2tp_eth_pernet(dev_net(dev));
spin_lock(&pn->l2tp_eth_lock);
list_del_init(&priv->list);
spin_unlock(&pn->l2tp_eth_lock);
dev_put(dev);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,025
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nullableStringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMGetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::nullableStringAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 28,825
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::RestoreCurrentFramebufferBindings() {
framebuffer_state_.clear_state_dirty = true;
if (!features().chromium_framebuffer_multisample) {
RebindCurrentFramebuffer(
GL_FRAMEBUFFER,
framebuffer_state_.bound_draw_framebuffer.get(),
GetBackbufferServiceId());
} else {
RebindCurrentFramebuffer(
GL_READ_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT,
framebuffer_state_.bound_read_framebuffer.get(),
GetBackbufferServiceId());
RebindCurrentFramebuffer(
GL_DRAW_FRAMEBUFFER_EXT,
framebuffer_state_.bound_draw_framebuffer.get(),
GetBackbufferServiceId());
}
OnFboChanged();
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,295
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::PropagateStyleToViewport() {
DCHECK(InStyleRecalc());
DCHECK(documentElement());
HTMLElement* body = this->body();
const ComputedStyle* body_style =
body ? body->EnsureComputedStyle() : nullptr;
const ComputedStyle* document_element_style =
documentElement()->EnsureComputedStyle();
WritingMode root_writing_mode = document_element_style->GetWritingMode();
TextDirection root_direction = document_element_style->Direction();
if (body_style) {
root_writing_mode = body_style->GetWritingMode();
root_direction = body_style->Direction();
}
const ComputedStyle* background_style = document_element_style;
if (IsHTMLHtmlElement(documentElement()) && IsHTMLBodyElement(body) &&
!background_style->HasBackground())
background_style = body_style;
Node& root_scroller = GetRootScrollerController().EffectiveRootScroller();
if (this != &root_scroller)
background_style = ToElement(root_scroller).EnsureComputedStyle();
Color background_color =
background_style->VisitedDependentColor(CSSPropertyBackgroundColor);
FillLayer background_layers = background_style->BackgroundLayers();
for (auto current_layer = &background_layers; current_layer;
current_layer = current_layer->Next()) {
current_layer->SetClip(kBorderFillBox);
if (current_layer->Attachment() == kScrollBackgroundAttachment)
current_layer->SetAttachment(kLocalBackgroundAttachment);
}
EImageRendering image_rendering = background_style->ImageRendering();
const ComputedStyle* overflow_style = nullptr;
if (Element* element = ViewportDefiningElement(document_element_style)) {
if (element == body) {
overflow_style = body_style;
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(element, documentElement());
overflow_style = document_element_style;
if (body_style && !body_style->IsOverflowVisible())
UseCounter::Count(*this, WebFeature::kBodyScrollsInAdditionToViewport);
}
}
EOverflowAnchor overflow_anchor = EOverflowAnchor::kAuto;
EOverflow overflow_x = EOverflow::kAuto;
EOverflow overflow_y = EOverflow::kAuto;
bool column_gap_normal = true;
float column_gap = 0;
if (overflow_style) {
overflow_anchor = overflow_style->OverflowAnchor();
overflow_x = overflow_style->OverflowX();
overflow_y = overflow_style->OverflowY();
if (overflow_x == EOverflow::kVisible)
overflow_x = EOverflow::kAuto;
if (overflow_y == EOverflow::kVisible)
overflow_y = EOverflow::kAuto;
if (overflow_anchor == EOverflowAnchor::kVisible)
overflow_anchor = EOverflowAnchor::kAuto;
if (!overflow_style->HasNormalColumnGap()) {
column_gap_normal = false;
column_gap = overflow_style->ColumnGap();
}
}
ScrollSnapType snap_type = overflow_style->GetScrollSnapType();
ScrollBehavior scroll_behavior = document_element_style->GetScrollBehavior();
EScrollBoundaryBehavior scroll_boundary_behavior_x =
overflow_style->ScrollBoundaryBehaviorX();
EScrollBoundaryBehavior scroll_boundary_behavior_y =
overflow_style->ScrollBoundaryBehaviorY();
using ScrollBoundaryBehaviorType =
WebScrollBoundaryBehavior::ScrollBoundaryBehaviorType;
if (RuntimeEnabledFeatures::CSSScrollBoundaryBehaviorEnabled() &&
IsInMainFrame()) {
GetPage()->GetOverscrollController().SetScrollBoundaryBehavior(
WebScrollBoundaryBehavior(
static_cast<ScrollBoundaryBehaviorType>(scroll_boundary_behavior_x),
static_cast<ScrollBoundaryBehaviorType>(
scroll_boundary_behavior_y)));
}
scoped_refptr<ComputedStyle> viewport_style =
GetLayoutViewItem().MutableStyle();
if (viewport_style->GetWritingMode() != root_writing_mode ||
viewport_style->Direction() != root_direction ||
viewport_style->VisitedDependentColor(CSSPropertyBackgroundColor) !=
background_color ||
viewport_style->BackgroundLayers() != background_layers ||
viewport_style->ImageRendering() != image_rendering ||
viewport_style->OverflowAnchor() != overflow_anchor ||
viewport_style->OverflowX() != overflow_x ||
viewport_style->OverflowY() != overflow_y ||
viewport_style->HasNormalColumnGap() != column_gap_normal ||
viewport_style->ColumnGap() != column_gap ||
viewport_style->GetScrollSnapType() != snap_type ||
viewport_style->GetScrollBehavior() != scroll_behavior ||
viewport_style->ScrollBoundaryBehaviorX() != scroll_boundary_behavior_x ||
viewport_style->ScrollBoundaryBehaviorY() != scroll_boundary_behavior_y) {
scoped_refptr<ComputedStyle> new_style =
ComputedStyle::Clone(*viewport_style);
new_style->SetWritingMode(root_writing_mode);
new_style->SetDirection(root_direction);
new_style->SetBackgroundColor(background_color);
new_style->AccessBackgroundLayers() = background_layers;
new_style->SetImageRendering(image_rendering);
new_style->SetOverflowAnchor(overflow_anchor);
new_style->SetOverflowX(overflow_x);
new_style->SetOverflowY(overflow_y);
if (column_gap_normal)
new_style->SetHasNormalColumnGap();
else
new_style->SetColumnGap(column_gap);
new_style->SetScrollSnapType(snap_type);
new_style->SetScrollBehavior(scroll_behavior);
new_style->SetScrollBoundaryBehaviorX(scroll_boundary_behavior_x);
new_style->SetScrollBoundaryBehaviorY(scroll_boundary_behavior_y);
GetLayoutViewItem().SetStyle(new_style);
SetupFontBuilder(*new_style);
}
}
Commit Message: Inherit referrer and policy when creating a nested browsing context
BUG=763194
R=estark@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ide3950269adf26ba221f573dfa088e95291ab676
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/732652
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark <estark@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511211}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,593
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
{
struct shared_msr_entry *msr;
switch (msr_info->index) {
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
case MSR_FS_BASE:
msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_FS_BASE);
break;
case MSR_GS_BASE:
msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_GS_BASE);
break;
case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
vmx_load_host_state(to_vmx(vcpu));
msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base;
break;
#endif
case MSR_EFER:
return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
case MSR_IA32_TSC:
msr_info->data = guest_read_tsc(vcpu);
break;
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
msr_info->data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS);
break;
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP);
break;
case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP);
break;
case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
if (!kvm_mpx_supported() ||
(!msr_info->host_initiated &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_MPX)))
return 1;
msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_BNDCFGS);
break;
case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
!(to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control &
FEATURE_CONTROL_LMCE))
return 1;
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.mcg_ext_ctl;
break;
case MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL:
msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control;
break;
case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
if (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
return 1;
return vmx_get_vmx_msr(vcpu, msr_info->index, &msr_info->data);
case MSR_IA32_XSS:
if (!vmx_xsaves_supported())
return 1;
msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.ia32_xss;
break;
case MSR_TSC_AUX:
if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
return 1;
/* Otherwise falls through */
default:
msr = find_msr_entry(to_vmx(vcpu), msr_info->index);
if (msr) {
msr_info->data = msr->data;
break;
}
return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,117
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nl80211_valid_4addr(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev,
struct net_device *netdev, u8 use_4addr,
enum nl80211_iftype iftype)
{
if (!use_4addr) {
if (netdev && (netdev->priv_flags & IFF_BRIDGE_PORT))
return -EBUSY;
return 0;
}
switch (iftype) {
case NL80211_IFTYPE_AP_VLAN:
if (rdev->wiphy.flags & WIPHY_FLAG_4ADDR_AP)
return 0;
break;
case NL80211_IFTYPE_STATION:
if (rdev->wiphy.flags & WIPHY_FLAG_4ADDR_STATION)
return 0;
break;
default:
break;
}
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,552
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLScriptRunner::stopWatchingResourceForLoad(Resource* resource)
{
if (m_parserBlockingScript.resource() == resource) {
m_parserBlockingScript.stopWatchingForLoad(this);
m_parserBlockingScript.releaseElementAndClear();
return;
}
for (PendingScript& script : m_scriptsToExecuteAfterParsing) {
if (script.resource() == resource) {
script.stopWatchingForLoad(this);
script.releaseElementAndClear();
return;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 15,066
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: kdc_process_s4u_x509_user(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_pa_data *pa_data,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_subkey,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_session,
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user **s4u_x509_user,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_data req_data;
req_data.length = pa_data->length;
req_data.data = (char *)pa_data->contents;
code = decode_krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user(&req_data, s4u_x509_user);
if (code) {
*status = "DECODE_PA_S4U_X509_USER";
return code;
}
code = verify_s4u_x509_user_checksum(context,
tgs_subkey ? tgs_subkey :
tgs_session,
&req_data,
request->nonce, *s4u_x509_user);
if (code) {
*status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_CHECKSUM";
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(context, *s4u_x509_user);
*s4u_x509_user = NULL;
return code;
}
if (krb5_princ_size(context, (*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.user) == 0 ||
(*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.subject_cert.length != 0) {
*status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_REQUEST";
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(context, *s4u_x509_user);
*s4u_x509_user = NULL;
return KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Ignore password attributes for S4U2Self requests
For consistency with Windows KDCs, allow protocol transition to work
even if the password has expired or needs changing.
Also, when looking up an enterprise principal with an AS request,
treat ERR_KEY_EXP as confirmation that the client is present in the
realm.
[ghudson@mit.edu: added comment in kdc_process_s4u2self_req(); edited
commit message]
ticket: 8763 (new)
tags: pullup
target_version: 1.17
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 9,957
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::EnsureWebKitInitialized() {
if (webkit_platform_support_)
return;
webkit_platform_support_.reset(new RendererWebKitPlatformSupportImpl);
blink::initialize(webkit_platform_support_.get());
v8::Isolate* isolate = blink::mainThreadIsolate();
isolate->SetCounterFunction(base::StatsTable::FindLocation);
isolate->SetCreateHistogramFunction(CreateHistogram);
isolate->SetAddHistogramSampleFunction(AddHistogramSample);
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
bool enable = !command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kDisableThreadedCompositing);
if (enable) {
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (SynchronousCompositorFactory* factory =
SynchronousCompositorFactory::GetInstance())
compositor_message_loop_proxy_ =
factory->GetCompositorMessageLoop();
#endif
if (!compositor_message_loop_proxy_.get()) {
compositor_thread_.reset(new base::Thread("Compositor"));
compositor_thread_->Start();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
compositor_thread_->SetPriority(base::kThreadPriority_Display);
#endif
compositor_message_loop_proxy_ =
compositor_thread_->message_loop_proxy();
compositor_message_loop_proxy_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(base::IgnoreResult(&ThreadRestrictions::SetIOAllowed),
false));
}
InputHandlerManagerClient* input_handler_manager_client = NULL;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (SynchronousCompositorFactory* factory =
SynchronousCompositorFactory::GetInstance()) {
input_handler_manager_client = factory->GetInputHandlerManagerClient();
}
#endif
if (!input_handler_manager_client) {
input_event_filter_ =
new InputEventFilter(this, compositor_message_loop_proxy_);
AddFilter(input_event_filter_.get());
input_handler_manager_client = input_event_filter_.get();
}
input_handler_manager_.reset(
new InputHandlerManager(compositor_message_loop_proxy_,
input_handler_manager_client));
}
scoped_refptr<base::MessageLoopProxy> output_surface_loop;
if (enable)
output_surface_loop = compositor_message_loop_proxy_;
else
output_surface_loop = base::MessageLoopProxy::current();
compositor_output_surface_filter_ =
CompositorOutputSurface::CreateFilter(output_surface_loop.get());
AddFilter(compositor_output_surface_filter_.get());
gamepad_shared_memory_reader_.reset(
new GamepadSharedMemoryReader(webkit_platform_support_.get()));
AddObserver(gamepad_shared_memory_reader_.get());
RenderThreadImpl::RegisterSchemes();
EnableBlinkPlatformLogChannels(
command_line.GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kBlinkPlatformLogChannels));
SetRuntimeFeaturesDefaultsAndUpdateFromArgs(command_line);
if (!media::IsMediaLibraryInitialized()) {
WebRuntimeFeatures::enableMediaPlayer(false);
WebRuntimeFeatures::enableWebAudio(false);
}
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(RenderProcessObserver, observers_, WebKitInitialized());
devtools_agent_message_filter_ = new DevToolsAgentFilter();
AddFilter(devtools_agent_message_filter_.get());
if (GetContentClient()->renderer()->RunIdleHandlerWhenWidgetsHidden())
ScheduleIdleHandler(kLongIdleHandlerDelayMs);
SetSharedMemoryAllocationFunction(AllocateSharedMemoryFunction);
if (!command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableDeferredImageDecoding) &&
!is_impl_side_painting_enabled_)
SkGraphics::SetImageCacheByteLimit(0u);
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kMemoryMetrics)) {
memory_observer_.reset(new MemoryObserver());
message_loop()->AddTaskObserver(memory_observer_.get());
}
}
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 5,131
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_arch_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
{
/* Address WBINVD may be executed by guest */
if (need_emulate_wbinvd(vcpu)) {
if (kvm_x86_ops->has_wbinvd_exit())
cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, vcpu->arch.wbinvd_dirty_mask);
else if (vcpu->cpu != -1 && vcpu->cpu != cpu)
smp_call_function_single(vcpu->cpu,
wbinvd_ipi, NULL, 1);
}
kvm_x86_ops->vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
/* Apply any externally detected TSC adjustments (due to suspend) */
if (unlikely(vcpu->arch.tsc_offset_adjustment)) {
adjust_tsc_offset_host(vcpu, vcpu->arch.tsc_offset_adjustment);
vcpu->arch.tsc_offset_adjustment = 0;
set_bit(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, &vcpu->requests);
}
if (unlikely(vcpu->cpu != cpu) || check_tsc_unstable()) {
s64 tsc_delta = !vcpu->arch.last_host_tsc ? 0 :
native_read_tsc() - vcpu->arch.last_host_tsc;
if (tsc_delta < 0)
mark_tsc_unstable("KVM discovered backwards TSC");
if (check_tsc_unstable()) {
u64 offset = kvm_x86_ops->compute_tsc_offset(vcpu,
vcpu->arch.last_guest_tsc);
kvm_x86_ops->write_tsc_offset(vcpu, offset);
vcpu->arch.tsc_catchup = 1;
}
/*
* On a host with synchronized TSC, there is no need to update
* kvmclock on vcpu->cpu migration
*/
if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.use_master_clock || vcpu->cpu == -1)
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_CLOCK_UPDATE, vcpu);
if (vcpu->cpu != cpu)
kvm_migrate_timers(vcpu);
vcpu->cpu = cpu;
}
accumulate_steal_time(vcpu);
kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_STEAL_UPDATE, vcpu);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME to use gfn_to_hva_cache functions (CVE-2013-1797)
There is a potential use after free issue with the handling of
MSR_KVM_SYSTEM_TIME. If the guest specifies a GPA in a movable or removable
memory such as frame buffers then KVM might continue to write to that
address even after it's removed via KVM_SET_USER_MEMORY_REGION. KVM pins
the page in memory so it's unlikely to cause an issue, but if the user
space component re-purposes the memory previously used for the guest, then
the guest will be able to corrupt that memory.
Tested: Tested against kvmclock unit test
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 17,705
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CoordinatorImpl::OnHeapDumpTimeOut(uint64_t dump_guid) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
QueuedRequest* request = GetCurrentRequest();
if (!request || request->dump_guid != dump_guid)
return;
if (request->heap_dump_in_progress) {
request->heap_dump_in_progress = false;
FinalizeGlobalMemoryDumpIfAllManagersReplied();
}
}
Commit Message: Fix heap-use-after-free by using weak factory instead of Unretained
Bug: 856578
Change-Id: Ifb2a1b7e6c22e1af36e12eedba72427f51d925b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1114617
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#571528}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 19,254
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Ins_MPS( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Long* args )
{
if ( NO_SUBPIXEL_HINTING )
{
/* Microsoft's GDI bytecode interpreter always returns value 12; */
/* we return the current PPEM value instead. */
args[0] = exc->func_cur_ppem( exc );
}
else
{
/* A possible practical application of the MPS instruction is to */
/* implement optical scaling and similar features, which should be */
/* based on perceptual attributes, thus independent of the */
/* resolution. */
args[0] = exc->pointSize;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 15,204
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppListController::FreeAnyKeepAliveForView() {
if (keep_alive_)
keep_alive_.reset(NULL);
}
Commit Message: Upgrade old app host to new app launcher on startup
This patch is a continuation of https://codereview.chromium.org/16805002/.
BUG=248825
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17022015
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209604 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 12,217
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int x509_v3_key_usage(const uint8_t *cert, int offset,
X509_CTX *x509_ctx)
{
int ret = X509_OK;
if ((offset = asn1_is_key_usage(cert, offset)) == 0)
goto end_key_usage;
x509_ctx->key_usage_present = true;
x509_ctx->key_usage_is_critical = asn1_is_critical_ext(cert, &offset);
if (asn1_next_obj(cert, &offset, ASN1_OCTET_STRING) < 0 ||
asn1_get_bit_string_as_int(cert, &offset, &x509_ctx->key_usage))
{
ret = X509_NOT_OK;
}
end_key_usage:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Apply CVE fixes for X509 parsing
Apply patches developed by Sze Yiu which correct a vulnerability in
X509 parsing. See CVE-2018-16150 and CVE-2018-16149 for more info.
CWE ID: CWE-347
| 0
| 28,908
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void webkit_web_view_set_maintains_back_forward_list(WebKitWebView* webView, gboolean flag)
{
g_return_if_fail(WEBKIT_IS_WEB_VIEW(webView));
static_cast<BackForwardListImpl*>(core(webView)->backForwardList())->setEnabled(flag);
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,174
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __glXDisp_Render(__GLXclientState *cl, GLbyte *pc)
{
xGLXRenderReq *req;
ClientPtr client= cl->client;
int left, cmdlen, error;
int commandsDone;
CARD16 opcode;
__GLXrenderHeader *hdr;
__GLXcontext *glxc;
__GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_VARIABLES;
req = (xGLXRenderReq *) pc;
if (client->swapped) {
__GLX_SWAP_SHORT(&req->length);
__GLX_SWAP_INT(&req->contextTag);
}
glxc = __glXForceCurrent(cl, req->contextTag, &error);
if (!glxc) {
return error;
}
commandsDone = 0;
pc += sz_xGLXRenderReq;
left = (req->length << 2) - sz_xGLXRenderReq;
while (left > 0) {
__GLXrenderSizeData entry;
int extra;
__GLXdispatchRenderProcPtr proc;
int err;
/*
** Verify that the header length and the overall length agree.
** Also, each command must be word aligned.
*/
hdr = (__GLXrenderHeader *) pc;
if (client->swapped) {
__GLX_SWAP_SHORT(&hdr->length);
__GLX_SWAP_SHORT(&hdr->opcode);
}
cmdlen = hdr->length;
opcode = hdr->opcode;
/*
** Check for core opcodes and grab entry data.
*/
err = __glXGetProtocolSizeData(& Render_dispatch_info, opcode, & entry);
proc = (__GLXdispatchRenderProcPtr)
__glXGetProtocolDecodeFunction(& Render_dispatch_info,
opcode, client->swapped);
if ((err < 0) || (proc == NULL)) {
client->errorValue = commandsDone;
return __glXError(GLXBadRenderRequest);
}
if (entry.varsize) {
/* variable size command */
extra = (*entry.varsize)(pc + __GLX_RENDER_HDR_SIZE,
client->swapped);
if (extra < 0) {
extra = 0;
}
if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry.bytes + extra)) {
return BadLength;
}
} else {
/* constant size command */
if (cmdlen != __GLX_PAD(entry.bytes)) {
return BadLength;
}
}
if (left < cmdlen) {
return BadLength;
}
/*
** Skip over the header and execute the command. We allow the
** caller to trash the command memory. This is useful especially
** for things that require double alignment - they can just shift
** the data towards lower memory (trashing the header) by 4 bytes
** and achieve the required alignment.
*/
(*proc)(pc + __GLX_RENDER_HDR_SIZE);
pc += cmdlen;
left -= cmdlen;
commandsDone++;
}
__GLX_NOTE_UNFLUSHED_CMDS(glxc);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,602
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebContentsImpl::WillNotifyDisconnection() const {
return notify_disconnection_;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,573
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Con_StopLimboMode_f( void ) {
chat_limbo = qfalse;
}
Commit Message: All: Merge some file writing extension checks
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 2,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bson_iter_init_find (bson_iter_t *iter, /* INOUT */
const bson_t *bson, /* IN */
const char *key) /* IN */
{
BSON_ASSERT (iter);
BSON_ASSERT (bson);
BSON_ASSERT (key);
return bson_iter_init (iter, bson) && bson_iter_find (iter, key);
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 18,668
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::createOffer(PassRefPtr<RTCSessionDescriptionRequest>, PassRefPtr<MediaConstraints>)
{
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r127612, r127660, and r127664.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127612
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127660
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/127664
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95920
Source/Platform:
* Platform.gypi:
* chromium/public/WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebKit):
(WebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* chromium/public/WebRTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
Source/WebCore:
* CMakeLists.txt:
* GNUmakefile.list.am:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCErrorCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCErrorCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnection::createOffer):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCPeerConnection):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.h:
(WebCore):
(RTCSessionDescriptionCallback):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionCallback.idl:
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.cpp:
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::create):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestSucceeded):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::requestFailed):
(WebCore::RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl::clear):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl.h:
(RTCSessionDescriptionRequestImpl):
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.cpp: Removed.
* Modules/mediastream/RTCVoidRequestImpl.h: Removed.
* WebCore.gypi:
* platform/chromium/support/WebRTCVoidRequest.cpp: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy::RTCPeerConnectionHandlerDummy):
* platform/mediastream/RTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(WebCore):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::~RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(WebCore::RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RTCPeerConnectionHandler):
* platform/mediastream/RTCVoidRequest.h: Removed.
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.cpp:
* platform/mediastream/chromium/RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium.h:
(RTCPeerConnectionHandlerChromium):
Tools:
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.cpp:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::SuccessCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::SuccessCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::FailureCallbackTask):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::FailureCallbackTask::runIfValid):
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler::createOffer):
* DumpRenderTree/chromium/MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler.h:
(MockWebRTCPeerConnectionHandler):
(SuccessCallbackTask):
(FailureCallbackTask):
LayoutTests:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-createOffer.html:
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-localDescription.html: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription-expected.txt: Removed.
* fast/mediastream/RTCPeerConnection-remoteDescription.html: Removed.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@127679 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,364
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string GetModelContent(app_list::AppListModel* model) {
std::string content;
for (size_t i = 0; i < model->top_level_item_list()->item_count(); ++i) {
if (i > 0)
content += ',';
content += model->top_level_item_list()->item_at(i)->name();
}
return content;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,590
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: spnego_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(
OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
gss_buffer_set_t *data_set)
{
OM_uint32 ret;
ret = gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid(minor_status,
context_handle,
desired_object,
data_set);
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: Fix SPNEGO context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2695]
The SPNEGO mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
mechanism context handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the SPNEGO context structure after context
establishment and refer to it in all GSS methods. Add initiate and
opened flags to the SPNEGO context structure for use in
gss_inquire_context() prior to context establishment.
CVE-2015-2695:
In MIT krb5 1.5 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established SPNEGO context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. This bug may go unnoticed, because
the most common SPNEGO authentication scenario establishes the context
after just one call to gss_accept_sec_context(). Java server
applications using the native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this
bug. A carefully crafted SPNEGO packet might allow the
gss_inquire_context() call to succeed with attacker-determined
results, but applications should not make access control decisions
based on gss_inquire_context() results prior to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-18
| 1
| 17,488
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ring_buffer_put(struct ring_buffer *rb)
{
if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&rb->refcount))
return;
call_rcu(&rb->rcu_head, rb_free_rcu);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 4,721
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ceph_x_update_authorizer(
struct ceph_auth_client *ac, int peer_type,
struct ceph_auth_handshake *auth)
{
struct ceph_x_authorizer *au;
struct ceph_x_ticket_handler *th;
th = get_ticket_handler(ac, peer_type);
if (IS_ERR(th))
return PTR_ERR(th);
au = (struct ceph_x_authorizer *)auth->authorizer;
if (au->secret_id < th->secret_id) {
dout("ceph_x_update_authorizer service %u secret %llu < %llu\n",
au->service, au->secret_id, th->secret_id);
return ceph_x_build_authorizer(ac, th, au);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libceph: do not hard code max auth ticket len
We hard code cephx auth ticket buffer size to 256 bytes. This isn't
enough for any moderate setups and, in case tickets themselves are not
encrypted, leads to buffer overflows (ceph_x_decrypt() errors out, but
ceph_decode_copy() doesn't - it's just a memcpy() wrapper). Since the
buffer is allocated dynamically anyway, allocated it a bit later, at
the point where we know how much is going to be needed.
Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/8979
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 27,438
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DOMHighResTimeStamp PerformanceNavigationTiming::redirectEnd() const {
bool allow_redirect_details = GetAllowRedirectDetails();
DocumentLoadTiming* timing = GetDocumentLoadTiming();
if (!allow_redirect_details || !timing)
return 0;
return Performance::MonotonicTimeToDOMHighResTimeStamp(
TimeOrigin(), timing->RedirectEnd(), false /* allow_negative_value */);
}
Commit Message: Fix the |name| of PerformanceNavigationTiming
Previously, the |name| of a PerformanceNavigationTiming entry was the initial
URL (the request URL). After this CL, it is the response URL, so for example
a url of the form 'redirect?location=newLoc' will have 'newLoc' as the |name|.
Bug: 797465
Change-Id: Icab53ad8027d066422562c82bcf0354c264fea40
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/996579
Reviewed-by: Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws>
Commit-Queue: Nicolás Peña Moreno <npm@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#548773}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 25,492
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void v9fs_fix_path(V9fsPath *dst, V9fsPath *src, int len)
{
V9fsPath str;
v9fs_path_init(&str);
v9fs_path_copy(&str, dst);
v9fs_path_sprintf(dst, "%s%s", src->data, str.data + len);
v9fs_path_free(&str);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 8,445
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Sys_SetDefaultInstallPath(const char *path)
{
Q_strncpyz(installPath, path, sizeof(installPath));
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 11,675
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool virtio_should_notify(VirtIODevice *vdev, VirtQueue *vq)
{
uint16_t old, new;
bool v;
/* We need to expose used array entries before checking used event. */
smp_mb();
/* Always notify when queue is empty (when feature acknowledge) */
if (virtio_vdev_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_F_NOTIFY_ON_EMPTY) &&
!vq->inuse && virtio_queue_empty(vq)) {
return true;
}
if (!virtio_vdev_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_RING_F_EVENT_IDX)) {
return !(vring_avail_flags(vq) & VRING_AVAIL_F_NO_INTERRUPT);
}
v = vq->signalled_used_valid;
vq->signalled_used_valid = true;
old = vq->signalled_used;
new = vq->signalled_used = vq->used_idx;
return !v || vring_need_event(vring_get_used_event(vq), new, old);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,538
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PPAPITestBase::RunTestWithSSLServer(const std::string& test_case) {
FilePath document_root;
ASSERT_TRUE(GetHTTPDocumentRoot(&document_root));
net::TestServer test_server(net::BaseTestServer::HTTPSOptions(),
document_root);
ASSERT_TRUE(test_server.Start());
uint16_t port = test_server.host_port_pair().port();
RunHTTPTestServer(document_root, test_case,
StringPrintf("ssl_server_port=%d", port));
}
Commit Message: Disable OutOfProcessPPAPITest.VarDeprecated on Mac due to timeouts.
BUG=121107
TBR=polina@chromium.org,ddorwin@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9950017
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@129857 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 20,506
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: METHODDEF(JDIMENSION)
get_24bit_row(j_compress_ptr cinfo, cjpeg_source_ptr sinfo)
/* This version is for reading 24-bit pixels */
{
bmp_source_ptr source = (bmp_source_ptr)sinfo;
JSAMPARRAY image_ptr;
register JSAMPROW inptr, outptr;
register JDIMENSION col;
if (source->use_inversion_array) {
/* Fetch next row from virtual array */
source->source_row--;
image_ptr = (*cinfo->mem->access_virt_sarray)
((j_common_ptr)cinfo, source->whole_image,
source->source_row, (JDIMENSION)1, FALSE);
inptr = image_ptr[0];
} else {
if (!ReadOK(source->pub.input_file, source->iobuffer, source->row_width))
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
inptr = source->iobuffer;
}
/* Transfer data. Note source values are in BGR order
* (even though Microsoft's own documents say the opposite).
*/
outptr = source->pub.buffer[0];
if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_EXT_BGR) {
MEMCOPY(outptr, inptr, source->row_width);
} else if (cinfo->in_color_space == JCS_CMYK) {
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
/* can omit GETJSAMPLE() safely */
JSAMPLE b = *inptr++, g = *inptr++, r = *inptr++;
rgb_to_cmyk(r, g, b, outptr, outptr + 1, outptr + 2, outptr + 3);
outptr += 4;
}
} else {
register int rindex = rgb_red[cinfo->in_color_space];
register int gindex = rgb_green[cinfo->in_color_space];
register int bindex = rgb_blue[cinfo->in_color_space];
register int aindex = alpha_index[cinfo->in_color_space];
register int ps = rgb_pixelsize[cinfo->in_color_space];
if (aindex >= 0) {
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
outptr[bindex] = *inptr++; /* can omit GETJSAMPLE() safely */
outptr[gindex] = *inptr++;
outptr[rindex] = *inptr++;
outptr[aindex] = 0xFF;
outptr += ps;
}
} else {
for (col = cinfo->image_width; col > 0; col--) {
outptr[bindex] = *inptr++; /* can omit GETJSAMPLE() safely */
outptr[gindex] = *inptr++;
outptr[rindex] = *inptr++;
outptr += ps;
}
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: tjLoadImage(): Fix FPE triggered by malformed BMP
In rdbmp.c, it is necessary to guard against 32-bit overflow/wraparound
when allocating the row buffer, because since BMP files have 32-bit
width and height fields, the value of biWidth can be up to 4294967295.
Specifically, if biWidth is 1073741824 and cinfo->input_components = 4,
then the samplesperrow argument in alloc_sarray() would wrap around to
0, and a division by zero error would occur at line 458 in jmemmgr.c.
If biWidth is set to a higher value, then samplesperrow would wrap
around to a small number, which would likely cause a buffer overflow
(this has not been tested or verified.)
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 22,099
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void udf_write_failed(struct address_space *mapping, loff_t to)
{
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
struct udf_inode_info *iinfo = UDF_I(inode);
loff_t isize = inode->i_size;
if (to > isize) {
truncate_pagecache(inode, isize);
if (iinfo->i_alloc_type != ICBTAG_FLAG_AD_IN_ICB) {
down_write(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
udf_clear_extent_cache(inode);
udf_truncate_extents(inode);
up_write(&iinfo->i_data_sem);
}
}
}
Commit Message: udf: Avoid infinite loop when processing indirect ICBs
We did not implement any bound on number of indirect ICBs we follow when
loading inode. Thus corrupted medium could cause kernel to go into an
infinite loop, possibly causing a stack overflow.
Fix the possible stack overflow by removing recursion from
__udf_read_inode() and limit number of indirect ICBs we follow to avoid
infinite loops.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 13,758
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int asf_read_ext_content_desc(AVFormatContext *s, int64_t size)
{
AVIOContext *pb = s->pb;
ASFContext *asf = s->priv_data;
int desc_count, i, ret;
desc_count = avio_rl16(pb);
for (i = 0; i < desc_count; i++) {
int name_len, value_type, value_len;
char name[1024];
name_len = avio_rl16(pb);
if (name_len % 2) // must be even, broken lavf versions wrote len-1
name_len += 1;
if ((ret = avio_get_str16le(pb, name_len, name, sizeof(name))) < name_len)
avio_skip(pb, name_len - ret);
value_type = avio_rl16(pb);
value_len = avio_rl16(pb);
if (!value_type && value_len % 2)
value_len += 1;
/* My sample has that stream set to 0 maybe that mean the container.
* ASF stream count starts at 1. I am using 0 to the container value
* since it's unused. */
if (!strcmp(name, "AspectRatioX"))
asf->dar[0].num = get_value(s->pb, value_type, 32);
else if (!strcmp(name, "AspectRatioY"))
asf->dar[0].den = get_value(s->pb, value_type, 32);
else
get_tag(s, name, value_type, value_len, 32);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/asfdec: Fix DoS in asf_build_simple_index()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 17,532
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ssl_rsa_sign( void *ctx,
int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng,
int mode, int hash_id, unsigned int hashlen,
const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *sig )
{
return rsa_pkcs1_sign( (rsa_context *) ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, hash_id,
hashlen, hash, sig );
}
Commit Message: ssl_parse_certificate() now calls x509parse_crt_der() directly
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 16,415
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void register_html_constants(INIT_FUNC_ARGS)
{
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("HTML_SPECIALCHARS", HTML_SPECIALCHARS, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("HTML_ENTITIES", HTML_ENTITIES, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_COMPAT", ENT_COMPAT, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_QUOTES", ENT_QUOTES, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_NOQUOTES", ENT_NOQUOTES, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_IGNORE", ENT_IGNORE, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_SUBSTITUTE", ENT_SUBSTITUTE, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_DISALLOWED", ENT_DISALLOWED, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_HTML401", ENT_HTML401, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_XML1", ENT_XML1, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_XHTML", ENT_XHTML, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("ENT_HTML5", ENT_HTML5, CONST_PERSISTENT|CONST_CS);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 17,983
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rq_attach_root(struct rq *rq, struct root_domain *rd)
{
struct root_domain *old_rd = NULL;
unsigned long flags;
raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&rq->lock, flags);
if (rq->rd) {
old_rd = rq->rd;
if (cpumask_test_cpu(rq->cpu, old_rd->online))
set_rq_offline(rq);
cpumask_clear_cpu(rq->cpu, old_rd->span);
/*
* If we dont want to free the old_rt yet then
* set old_rd to NULL to skip the freeing later
* in this function:
*/
if (!atomic_dec_and_test(&old_rd->refcount))
old_rd = NULL;
}
atomic_inc(&rd->refcount);
rq->rd = rd;
cpumask_set_cpu(rq->cpu, rd->span);
if (cpumask_test_cpu(rq->cpu, cpu_active_mask))
set_rq_online(rq);
raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&rq->lock, flags);
if (old_rd)
call_rcu_sched(&old_rd->rcu, free_rootdomain);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 27,792
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void CleanUp() {
SharedMemory memory;
memory.Delete(s_test_name_);
}
Commit Message: Posix: fix named SHM mappings permissions.
Make sure that named mappings in /dev/shm/ aren't created with
broad permissions.
BUG=254159
R=mark@chromium.org, markus@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/17779002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@209814 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,312
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __update_discard_tree_range(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
struct block_device *bdev, block_t lstart,
block_t start, block_t len)
{
struct discard_cmd_control *dcc = SM_I(sbi)->dcc_info;
struct discard_cmd *prev_dc = NULL, *next_dc = NULL;
struct discard_cmd *dc;
struct discard_info di = {0};
struct rb_node **insert_p = NULL, *insert_parent = NULL;
block_t end = lstart + len;
mutex_lock(&dcc->cmd_lock);
dc = (struct discard_cmd *)__lookup_rb_tree_ret(&dcc->root,
NULL, lstart,
(struct rb_entry **)&prev_dc,
(struct rb_entry **)&next_dc,
&insert_p, &insert_parent, true);
if (dc)
prev_dc = dc;
if (!prev_dc) {
di.lstart = lstart;
di.len = next_dc ? next_dc->lstart - lstart : len;
di.len = min(di.len, len);
di.start = start;
}
while (1) {
struct rb_node *node;
bool merged = false;
struct discard_cmd *tdc = NULL;
if (prev_dc) {
di.lstart = prev_dc->lstart + prev_dc->len;
if (di.lstart < lstart)
di.lstart = lstart;
if (di.lstart >= end)
break;
if (!next_dc || next_dc->lstart > end)
di.len = end - di.lstart;
else
di.len = next_dc->lstart - di.lstart;
di.start = start + di.lstart - lstart;
}
if (!di.len)
goto next;
if (prev_dc && prev_dc->state == D_PREP &&
prev_dc->bdev == bdev &&
__is_discard_back_mergeable(&di, &prev_dc->di)) {
prev_dc->di.len += di.len;
dcc->undiscard_blks += di.len;
__relocate_discard_cmd(dcc, prev_dc);
di = prev_dc->di;
tdc = prev_dc;
merged = true;
}
if (next_dc && next_dc->state == D_PREP &&
next_dc->bdev == bdev &&
__is_discard_front_mergeable(&di, &next_dc->di)) {
next_dc->di.lstart = di.lstart;
next_dc->di.len += di.len;
next_dc->di.start = di.start;
dcc->undiscard_blks += di.len;
__relocate_discard_cmd(dcc, next_dc);
if (tdc)
__remove_discard_cmd(sbi, tdc);
merged = true;
}
if (!merged) {
__insert_discard_tree(sbi, bdev, di.lstart, di.start,
di.len, NULL, NULL);
}
next:
prev_dc = next_dc;
if (!prev_dc)
break;
node = rb_next(&prev_dc->rb_node);
next_dc = rb_entry_safe(node, struct discard_cmd, rb_node);
}
mutex_unlock(&dcc->cmd_lock);
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 24,771
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void methodWithCallbackInterfaceAndOptionalArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMMethod");
TestObjectV8Internal::methodWithCallbackInterfaceAndOptionalArgMethod(info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 29,039
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u16 tcm_loop_set_fabric_sense_len(struct se_cmd *se_cmd, u32 sense_length)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: loopback: off by one in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg()
This is an off by one 'tgpt' check in tcm_loop_make_naa_tpg() that could result
in memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <error27@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas A. Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,408
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *certs;
X509 *xtmp = NULL;
int i;
/* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */
certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x));
if (certs == NULL)
return NULL;
/* Look for exact match */
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) {
xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x))
break;
}
if (i < sk_X509_num(certs))
CRYPTO_add(&xtmp->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
else
xtmp = NULL;
sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free);
return xtmp;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 6,562
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintPreviewMessageHandler::OnInvalidPrinterSettings(int document_cookie) {
StopWorker(document_cookie);
PrintPreviewUI* print_preview_ui = GetPrintPreviewUI();
if (!print_preview_ui)
return;
print_preview_ui->OnInvalidPrinterSettings();
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 10,753
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OfflinePageModelTaskified::MarkPageAccessed(int64_t offline_id) {
auto task = base::MakeUnique<MarkPageAccessedTask>(store_.get(), offline_id,
GetCurrentTime());
task_queue_.AddTask(std::move(task));
}
Commit Message: Add the method to check if offline archive is in internal dir
Bug: 758690
Change-Id: I8bb4283fc40a87fa7a87df2c7e513e2e16903290
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/828049
Reviewed-by: Filip Gorski <fgorski@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#524232}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 10,461
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __u8 map_line_status(__u8 ti_lsr)
{
__u8 lsr = 0;
#define MAP_FLAG(flagUmp, flagUart) \
if (ti_lsr & flagUmp) \
lsr |= flagUart;
MAP_FLAG(UMP_UART_LSR_OV_MASK, LSR_OVER_ERR) /* overrun */
MAP_FLAG(UMP_UART_LSR_PE_MASK, LSR_PAR_ERR) /* parity error */
MAP_FLAG(UMP_UART_LSR_FE_MASK, LSR_FRM_ERR) /* framing error */
MAP_FLAG(UMP_UART_LSR_BR_MASK, LSR_BREAK) /* break detected */
MAP_FLAG(UMP_UART_LSR_RX_MASK, LSR_RX_AVAIL) /* rx data available */
MAP_FLAG(UMP_UART_LSR_TX_MASK, LSR_TX_EMPTY) /* tx hold reg empty */
#undef MAP_FLAG
return lsr;
}
Commit Message: USB: io_ti: Fix NULL dereference in chase_port()
The tty is NULL when the port is hanging up.
chase_port() needs to check for this.
This patch is intended for stable series.
The behavior was observed and tested in Linux 3.2 and 3.7.1.
Johan Hovold submitted a more elaborate patch for the mainline kernel.
[ 56.277883] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - nonzero read bulk status received: -84
[ 56.278811] usb 1-1: USB disconnect, device number 3
[ 56.278856] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - stopping read!
[ 56.279562] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001c8
[ 56.280536] IP: [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.281212] PGD 1dc1b067 PUD 1e0f7067 PMD 0
[ 56.282085] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[ 56.282744] Modules linked in:
[ 56.283512] CPU 1
[ 56.283512] Pid: 25, comm: khubd Not tainted 3.7.1 #1 innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox
[ 56.283512] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8144e62a>] [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP: 0018:ffff88001fa99ab0 EFLAGS: 00010046
[ 56.283512] RAX: 0000000000000046 RBX: 00000000000001c8 RCX: 0000000000640064
[ 56.283512] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: ffff88001fa99b20 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] RBP: ffff88001fa99b20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff812fcb4c R12: ffff88001ddf53c0
[ 56.283512] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000000001c8 R15: ffff88001e19b9f4
[ 56.283512] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88001fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8 CR3: 000000001dc51000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 56.283512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 56.283512] Process khubd (pid: 25, threadinfo ffff88001fa98000, task ffff88001fa94f80)
[ 56.283512] Stack:
[ 56.283512] 0000000000000046 00000000000001c8 ffffffff810578ec ffffffff812fcb4c
[ 56.283512] ffff88001e19b980 0000000000002710 ffffffff812ffe81 0000000000000001
[ 56.283512] ffff88001fa94f80 0000000000000202 ffffffff00000001 0000000000000296
[ 56.283512] Call Trace:
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810578ec>] ? add_wait_queue+0x12/0x3c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ffe81>] ? chase_port+0x84/0x2d6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81063f27>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x199/0x199
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81263a5c>] ? tty_ldisc_hangup+0x222/0x298
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81300171>] ? edge_close+0x64/0x129
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810612f7>] ? __wake_up+0x35/0x46
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8106135b>] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81264916>] ? tty_port_shutdown+0x39/0x44
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8125d38c>] ? __tty_hangup+0x307/0x351
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e6ddc>] ? usb_hcd_flush_endpoint+0xde/0xed
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144e625>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x14/0x35
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fd361>] ? usb_serial_disconnect+0x57/0xc2
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ea99b>] ? usb_unbind_interface+0x5c/0x131
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d738>] ? __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xd5
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d9cd>] ? device_release_driver+0x1a/0x25
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d393>] ? bus_remove_device+0xd2/0xe7
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128b7a3>] ? device_del+0x119/0x167
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e8d9d>] ? usb_disable_device+0x6a/0x180
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e2ae0>] ? usb_disconnect+0x81/0xe6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e4435>] ? hub_thread+0x577/0xe82
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144daa7>] ? __schedule+0x490/0x4be
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8105798f>] ? abort_exclusive_wait+0x79/0x79
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810570b4>] ? kthread+0x81/0x89
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8145387c>] ? ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] Code: 8b 7c 24 08 e8 17 0b c3 ff 48 8b 04 24 48 83 c4 10 c3 53 48 89 fb 41 50 e8 e0 0a c3 ff 48 89 04 24 e8 e7 0a c3 ff ba 00 00 01 00
<f0> 0f c1 13 48 8b 04 24 89 d1 c1 ea 10 66 39 d1 74 07 f3 90 66
[ 56.283512] RIP [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP <ffff88001fa99ab0>
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] ---[ end trace 49714df27e1679ce ]---
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Frisch <wfpub@roembden.net>
Cc: Johan Hovold <jhovold@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 4,153
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void _exception(int signr, struct pt_regs *regs, int code, unsigned long addr)
{
siginfo_t info;
if (!user_mode(regs)) {
if (die("Exception in kernel mode", regs, signr))
return;
}
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
info.si_signo = signr;
info.si_code = code;
info.si_addr = (void __user *) addr;
force_sig_info(signr, &info, current);
/*
* Init gets no signals that it doesn't have a handler for.
* That's all very well, but if it has caused a synchronous
* exception and we ignore the resulting signal, it will just
* generate the same exception over and over again and we get
* nowhere. Better to kill it and let the kernel panic.
*/
if (current->pid == 1) {
__sighandler_t handler;
spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
handler = current->sighand->action[signr-1].sa.sa_handler;
spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
if (handler == SIG_DFL) {
/* init has generated a synchronous exception
and it doesn't have a handler for the signal */
printk(KERN_CRIT "init has generated signal %d "
"but has no handler for it\n", signr);
do_exit(signr);
}
}
}
Commit Message: [POWERPC] Never panic when taking altivec exceptions from userspace
At the moment we rely on a cpu feature bit or a firmware property to
detect altivec. If we dont have either of these and the cpu does in fact
support altivec we can cause a panic from userspace.
It seems safer to always send a signal if we manage to get an 0xf20
exception from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 12,462
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HFSForkReadStream::~HFSForkReadStream() {}
Commit Message: Add the SandboxedDMGParser and wire it up to the DownloadProtectionService.
BUG=496898,464083
R=isherman@chromium.org, kenrb@chromium.org, mattm@chromium.org, thestig@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1299223006 .
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344876}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,036
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *set_use_canonical_phys_port(cmd_parms *cmd, void *d_,
const char *arg)
{
core_dir_config *d = d_;
if (ap_cstr_casecmp(arg, "on") == 0) {
d->use_canonical_phys_port = USE_CANONICAL_PHYS_PORT_ON;
}
else if (ap_cstr_casecmp(arg, "off") == 0) {
d->use_canonical_phys_port = USE_CANONICAL_PHYS_PORT_OFF;
}
else {
return "parameter must be 'on' or 'off'";
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: core: Disallow Methods' registration at run time (.htaccess), they may be
used only if registered at init time (httpd.conf).
Calling ap_method_register() in children processes is not the right scope
since it won't be shared for all requests.
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1807655 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 12,560
|
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