instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LogL10toY(int p10) /* compute luminance from 10-bit LogL */
{
if (p10 == 0)
return (0.);
return (exp(M_LN2/64.*(p10+.5) - M_LN2*12.));
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based buffer
overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with
ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample.
The fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind
of issue of PixarLog.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 27,564
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HandleLoadTerminationCancel(
Offliner::CompletionCallback completion_callback,
const SavePageRequest& canceled_request) {
std::move(completion_callback)
.Run(canceled_request, Offliner::RequestStatus::FOREGROUND_CANCELED);
}
Commit Message: Remove unused histograms from the background loader offliner.
Bug: 975512
Change-Id: I87b0a91bed60e3a9e8a1fd9ae9b18cac27a0859f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1683361
Reviewed-by: Cathy Li <chili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Holte <holte@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Williamson <petewil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#675332}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 588
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RunCallbackUntilCallbackInvoked(
bool result, UsbMidiDevice::Devices* devices) {
factory_->callback_.Run(result, devices);
while (!client_->complete_start_session_) {
base::RunLoop run_loop;
run_loop.RunUntilIdle();
}
}
Commit Message: MidiManagerUsb should not trust indices provided by renderer.
MidiManagerUsb::DispatchSendMidiData takes |port_index| parameter. As it is
provided by a renderer possibly under the control of an attacker, we must
validate the given index before using it.
BUG=456516
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/907793002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#315303}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,223
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: test_bson_append_timeval (void)
{
struct timeval tv = {0};
bson_t *b;
bson_t *b2;
tv.tv_sec = 1234567890;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
b = bson_new ();
BSON_ASSERT (bson_append_timeval (b, "time_t", -1, &tv));
b2 = get_bson ("test26.bson");
BSON_ASSERT_BSON_EQUAL (b, b2);
bson_destroy (b);
bson_destroy (b2);
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 21,839
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void rxrpc_remove_user_ID(struct rxrpc_sock *rx, struct rxrpc_call *call)
{
_debug("RELEASE CALL %d", call->debug_id);
if (test_bit(RXRPC_CALL_HAS_USERID, &call->flags)) {
write_lock_bh(&rx->call_lock);
rb_erase(&call->sock_node, &call->socket->calls);
clear_bit(RXRPC_CALL_HAS_USERID, &call->flags);
write_unlock_bh(&rx->call_lock);
}
read_lock_bh(&call->state_lock);
if (!test_bit(RXRPC_CALL_RELEASED, &call->flags) &&
!test_and_set_bit(RXRPC_CALL_RELEASE, &call->events))
rxrpc_queue_call(call);
read_unlock_bh(&call->state_lock);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 19,909
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Con_RunConsole (void) {
if ( Key_GetCatcher( ) & KEYCATCH_CONSOLE )
con.finalFrac = 0.5; // half screen
else
con.finalFrac = 0; // none visible
if (con.finalFrac < con.displayFrac)
{
con.displayFrac -= con_conspeed->value*cls.realFrametime*0.001;
if (con.finalFrac > con.displayFrac)
con.displayFrac = con.finalFrac;
}
else if (con.finalFrac > con.displayFrac)
{
con.displayFrac += con_conspeed->value*cls.realFrametime*0.001;
if (con.finalFrac < con.displayFrac)
con.displayFrac = con.finalFrac;
}
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 20,410
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FileSystemOperation::DoTruncate(const StatusCallback& callback,
int64 length) {
FileSystemFileUtilProxy::Truncate(
&operation_context_, src_util_, src_path_, length,
base::Bind(&FileSystemOperation::DidFinishFileOperation,
base::Owned(this), callback));
}
Commit Message: Crash fix in fileapi::FileSystemOperation::DidGetUsageAndQuotaAndRunTask
https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10008047 introduced delete-with-inflight-tasks in Write sequence but I failed to convert this callback to use WeakPtr().
BUG=128178
TEST=manual test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10408006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137635 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,998
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: INST_HANDLER (inc) { // INC Rd
int d = ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf) | ((buf[1] & 0x1) << 4);
ESIL_A ("1,r%d,+,", d); // ++Rd
ESIL_A ("0,RPICK,0x80,==,vf,=,"); // V
ESIL_A ("0,RPICK,0x80,&,!,!,nf,=,"); // N
ESIL_A ("0,RPICK,!,zf,=,"); // Z
ESIL_A ("vf,nf,^,sf,=,"); // S
ESIL_A ("r%d,=,", d); // Rd = Result
}
Commit Message: Fix #9943 - Invalid free on RAnal.avr
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 22,975
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionInstalledBubble::Observe(
int type,
const content::NotificationSource& source,
const content::NotificationDetails& details) {
if (type == chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_LOADED) {
const Extension* extension =
content::Details<const Extension>(details).ptr();
if (extension == extension_) {
animation_wait_retries_ = 0;
MessageLoopForUI::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ExtensionInstalledBubble::ShowInternal,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
} else if (type == chrome::NOTIFICATION_EXTENSION_UNLOADED) {
const Extension* extension =
content::Details<UnloadedExtensionInfo>(details)->extension;
if (extension == extension_)
extension_ = NULL;
} else {
NOTREACHED() << L"Received unexpected notification";
}
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,162
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JsVar *jspGetStackTrace() {
JsVar *stackTraceName = jsvFindChildFromString(execInfo.hiddenRoot, JSPARSE_STACKTRACE_VAR, false);
if (stackTraceName) {
JsVar *stackTrace = jsvSkipName(stackTraceName);
jsvRemoveChild(execInfo.hiddenRoot, stackTraceName);
jsvUnLock(stackTraceName);
return stackTrace;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug if using an undefined member of an object for for..in (fix #1437)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 24,315
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BindToCurrentThread() {
thread_task_runner_handle_ =
MakeUnique<ThreadTaskRunnerHandle>(simple_task_runner_);
run_loop_client_ = RunLoop::RegisterDelegateForCurrentThread(this);
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,494
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void OnSecondResult(std::unique_ptr<runtime::EvaluateResult> result) {
EXPECT_TRUE(result->GetResult()->HasValue());
EXPECT_EQ(27 * 4, result->GetResult()->GetValue()->GetInt());
FinishAsynchronousTest();
}
Commit Message: Implicitly bypass localhost when proxying requests.
This aligns Chrome's behavior with the Windows and macOS proxy resolvers (but not Firefox).
Concretely:
* localhost names (as determined by net::IsLocalhost) now implicitly bypass the proxy
* link-local IP addresses implicitly bypass the proxy
The implicit rules are handled by ProxyBypassRules, and it is possible to override them when manually configuring proxy settings (but not when using PAC or auto-detect).
This change also adds support for the "<-loopback>" proxy bypass rule, with similar semantics as it has on Windows (removes the implicit bypass rules for localhost and link-local).
The compatibility risk of this change should be low as proxying through localhost was not universally supported. It is however an idiom used in testing (a number of our own tests had such a dependency). Impacted users can use the "<-loopback>" bypass rule as a workaround.
Bug: 413511, 899126, 901896
Change-Id: I263ca21ef9f12d4759a20cb4751dc3261bda6ac0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1303626
Commit-Queue: Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sami Kyöstilä <skyostil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606112}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 9,294
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::OnMsgUpdateIsDelayed() {
if (in_get_backing_store_)
abort_get_backing_store_ = true;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 13,675
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool vfs_init_custom(connection_struct *conn, const char *vfs_object)
{
char *module_path = NULL;
char *module_name = NULL;
char *module_param = NULL, *p;
vfs_handle_struct *handle;
const struct vfs_init_function_entry *entry;
if (!conn||!vfs_object||!vfs_object[0]) {
DEBUG(0, ("vfs_init_custom() called with NULL pointer or "
"empty vfs_object!\n"));
return False;
}
if(!backends) {
static_init_vfs;
}
DEBUG(3, ("Initialising custom vfs hooks from [%s]\n", vfs_object));
module_path = smb_xstrdup(vfs_object);
p = strchr_m(module_path, ':');
if (p) {
*p = 0;
module_param = p+1;
trim_char(module_param, ' ', ' ');
}
trim_char(module_path, ' ', ' ');
module_name = smb_xstrdup(module_path);
if ((module_name[0] == '/') &&
(strcmp(module_path, DEFAULT_VFS_MODULE_NAME) != 0)) {
/*
* Extract the module name from the path. Just use the base
* name of the last path component.
*/
SAFE_FREE(module_name);
module_name = smb_xstrdup(strrchr_m(module_path, '/')+1);
p = strchr_m(module_name, '.');
if (p != NULL) {
*p = '\0';
}
}
/* First, try to load the module with the new module system */
entry = vfs_find_backend_entry(module_name);
if (!entry) {
NTSTATUS status;
DEBUG(5, ("vfs module [%s] not loaded - trying to load...\n",
vfs_object));
status = smb_load_module("vfs", module_path);
if (!NT_STATUS_IS_OK(status)) {
DEBUG(0, ("error probing vfs module '%s': %s\n",
module_path, nt_errstr(status)));
goto fail;
}
entry = vfs_find_backend_entry(module_name);
if (!entry) {
DEBUG(0,("Can't find a vfs module [%s]\n",vfs_object));
goto fail;
}
}
DEBUGADD(5,("Successfully loaded vfs module [%s] with the new modules system\n", vfs_object));
handle = talloc_zero(conn, vfs_handle_struct);
if (!handle) {
DEBUG(0,("TALLOC_ZERO() failed!\n"));
goto fail;
}
handle->conn = conn;
handle->fns = entry->fns;
if (module_param) {
handle->param = talloc_strdup(conn, module_param);
}
DLIST_ADD(conn->vfs_handles, handle);
SAFE_FREE(module_path);
SAFE_FREE(module_name);
return True;
fail:
SAFE_FREE(module_path);
SAFE_FREE(module_name);
return False;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 18,066
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CairoOutputDev::updateStrokeOpacity(GfxState *state) {
stroke_opacity = state->getStrokeOpacity();
cairo_pattern_destroy(stroke_pattern);
stroke_pattern = cairo_pattern_create_rgba(stroke_color.r / 65535.0,
stroke_color.g / 65535.0,
stroke_color.b / 65535.0,
stroke_opacity);
LOG(printf ("stroke opacity: %f\n", stroke_opacity));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 10,391
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::RestoreState(const ContextState* prev_state) {
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 2,484
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: schemes_are_similar_p (enum url_scheme a, enum url_scheme b)
{
if (a == b)
return true;
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
if ((a == SCHEME_HTTP && b == SCHEME_HTTPS)
|| (a == SCHEME_HTTPS && b == SCHEME_HTTP))
return true;
#endif
return false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-93
| 0
| 11,569
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int fpm_stdio_init_child(struct fpm_worker_pool_s *wp) /* {{{ */
{
#ifdef HAVE_SYSLOG_H
if (fpm_globals.error_log_fd == ZLOG_SYSLOG) {
closelog(); /* ensure to close syslog not to interrupt with PHP syslog code */
} else
#endif
/* Notice: child cannot use master error_log
* because not aware when being reopen
* else, should use if (!fpm_use_error_log())
*/
if (fpm_globals.error_log_fd > 0) {
close(fpm_globals.error_log_fd);
}
fpm_globals.error_log_fd = -1;
zlog_set_fd(-1);
if (wp->listening_socket != STDIN_FILENO) {
if (0 > dup2(wp->listening_socket, STDIN_FILENO)) {
zlog(ZLOG_SYSERROR, "failed to init child stdio: dup2()");
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fixed bug #73342
Directly listen on socket, instead of duping it to STDIN and
listening on that.
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 1
| 23,399
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutofillManager::OnShowAutofillDialog() {
Browser* browser = BrowserList::GetLastActive();
if (browser)
browser->ShowOptionsTab(chrome::kAutofillSubPage);
}
Commit Message: Add support for the "uploadrequired" attribute for Autofill query responses
BUG=84693
TEST=unit_tests --gtest_filter=AutofillDownloadTest.QueryAndUploadTest
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6969090
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87729 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 13,896
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int em_test(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
emulate_2op_SrcV(ctxt, "test");
/* Disable writeback. */
ctxt->dst.type = OP_NONE;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 26,504
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int PC4500_accessrid(struct airo_info *ai, u16 rid, u16 accmd)
{
Cmd cmd; /* for issuing commands */
Resp rsp; /* response from commands */
u16 status;
memset(&cmd, 0, sizeof(cmd));
cmd.cmd = accmd;
cmd.parm0 = rid;
status = issuecommand(ai, &cmd, &rsp);
if (status != 0) return status;
if ( (rsp.status & 0x7F00) != 0) {
return (accmd << 8) + (rsp.rsp0 & 0xFF);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 8,863
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vbf_stp_fetchbody(struct worker *wrk, struct busyobj *bo)
{
ssize_t l;
uint8_t *ptr;
enum vfp_status vfps = VFP_ERROR;
ssize_t est;
struct vfp_ctx *vfc;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(bo, BUSYOBJ_MAGIC);
vfc = bo->vfc;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(vfc, VFP_CTX_MAGIC);
AN(vfc->vfp_nxt);
est = bo->htc->content_length;
if (est < 0)
est = 0;
do {
if (vfc->oc->flags & OC_F_ABANDON) {
/*
* A pass object and delivery was terminated
* We don't fail the fetch, in order for hit-for-pass
* objects to be created.
*/
AN(vfc->oc->flags & OC_F_PASS);
VSLb(wrk->vsl, SLT_FetchError,
"Pass delivery abandoned");
bo->htc->doclose = SC_RX_BODY;
break;
}
AZ(vfc->failed);
l = est;
assert(l >= 0);
if (VFP_GetStorage(vfc, &l, &ptr) != VFP_OK) {
bo->htc->doclose = SC_RX_BODY;
break;
}
AZ(vfc->failed);
vfps = VFP_Suck(vfc, ptr, &l);
if (l > 0 && vfps != VFP_ERROR) {
bo->acct.beresp_bodybytes += l;
VFP_Extend(vfc, l);
if (est >= l)
est -= l;
else
est = 0;
}
} while (vfps == VFP_OK);
if (vfc->failed) {
(void)VFP_Error(vfc, "Fetch pipeline failed to process");
bo->htc->doclose = SC_RX_BODY;
VFP_Close(vfc);
VDI_Finish(wrk, bo);
if (!bo->do_stream) {
assert(bo->fetch_objcore->boc->state < BOS_STREAM);
return (F_STP_ERROR);
} else {
wrk->stats->fetch_failed++;
return (F_STP_FAIL);
}
}
ObjTrimStore(wrk, vfc->oc);
return (F_STP_FETCHEND);
}
Commit Message: Avoid buffer read overflow on vcl_error and -sfile
The file stevedore may return a buffer larger than asked for when
requesting storage. Due to lack of check for this condition, the code
to copy the synthetic error memory buffer from vcl_error would overrun
the buffer.
Patch by @shamger
Fixes: #2429
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 22,672
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int init_victim_secmap(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
struct dirty_seglist_info *dirty_i = DIRTY_I(sbi);
unsigned int bitmap_size = f2fs_bitmap_size(MAIN_SECS(sbi));
dirty_i->victim_secmap = f2fs_kvzalloc(bitmap_size, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dirty_i->victim_secmap)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 28,634
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void checkAppendMsg(
IntegrityCk *pCheck,
const char *zFormat,
...
){
va_list ap;
if( !pCheck->mxErr ) return;
pCheck->mxErr--;
pCheck->nErr++;
va_start(ap, zFormat);
if( pCheck->errMsg.nChar ){
sqlite3StrAccumAppend(&pCheck->errMsg, "\n", 1);
}
if( pCheck->zPfx ){
sqlite3XPrintf(&pCheck->errMsg, pCheck->zPfx, pCheck->v1, pCheck->v2);
}
sqlite3VXPrintf(&pCheck->errMsg, zFormat, ap);
va_end(ap);
if( pCheck->errMsg.accError==STRACCUM_NOMEM ){
pCheck->mallocFailed = 1;
}
}
Commit Message: sqlite: safely move pointer values through SQL.
This lands https://www.sqlite.org/src/timeline?c=d6a44b35 in
third_party/sqlite/src/ and
third_party/sqlite/patches/0013-Add-new-interfaces-sqlite3_bind_pointer-sqlite3_resu.patch
and re-generates third_party/sqlite/amalgamation/* using the script at
third_party/sqlite/google_generate_amalgamation.sh.
The CL also adds a layout test that verifies the patch works as intended.
BUG=742407
Change-Id: I2e1a457459cd2e975e6241b630e7b79c82545981
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/572976
Reviewed-by: Chris Mumford <cmumford@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#487275}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,306
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SelectionController::HandlePasteGlobalSelection(
const WebMouseEvent& mouse_event) {
if (mouse_event.GetType() != WebInputEvent::kMouseUp)
return false;
if (!frame_->GetPage())
return false;
Frame* focus_frame =
frame_->GetPage()->GetFocusController().FocusedOrMainFrame();
if (frame_ == focus_frame &&
frame_->GetEditor().Behavior().SupportsGlobalSelection())
return frame_->GetEditor().CreateCommand("PasteGlobalSelection").Execute();
return false;
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 469
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::RestoreAllAttributes() const {
state_.RestoreVertexAttribs();
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,921
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_read_start_row(png_structp png_ptr)
{
#ifdef PNG_READ_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
/* Arrays to facilitate easy interlacing - use pass (0 - 6) as index */
/* Start of interlace block */
PNG_CONST int png_pass_start[7] = {0, 4, 0, 2, 0, 1, 0};
/* Offset to next interlace block */
PNG_CONST int png_pass_inc[7] = {8, 8, 4, 4, 2, 2, 1};
/* Start of interlace block in the y direction */
PNG_CONST int png_pass_ystart[7] = {0, 0, 4, 0, 2, 0, 1};
/* Offset to next interlace block in the y direction */
PNG_CONST int png_pass_yinc[7] = {8, 8, 8, 4, 4, 2, 2};
#endif
int max_pixel_depth;
png_size_t row_bytes;
png_debug(1, "in png_read_start_row");
png_ptr->zstream.avail_in = 0;
png_init_read_transformations(png_ptr);
#ifdef PNG_READ_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->interlaced)
{
if (!(png_ptr->transformations & PNG_INTERLACE))
png_ptr->num_rows = (png_ptr->height + png_pass_yinc[0] - 1 -
png_pass_ystart[0]) / png_pass_yinc[0];
else
png_ptr->num_rows = png_ptr->height;
png_ptr->iwidth = (png_ptr->width +
png_pass_inc[png_ptr->pass] - 1 -
png_pass_start[png_ptr->pass]) /
png_pass_inc[png_ptr->pass];
}
else
#endif /* PNG_READ_INTERLACING_SUPPORTED */
{
png_ptr->num_rows = png_ptr->height;
png_ptr->iwidth = png_ptr->width;
}
max_pixel_depth = png_ptr->pixel_depth;
#ifdef PNG_READ_PACK_SUPPORTED
if ((png_ptr->transformations & PNG_PACK) && png_ptr->bit_depth < 8)
max_pixel_depth = 8;
#endif
#ifdef PNG_READ_EXPAND_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_EXPAND)
{
if (png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
{
if (png_ptr->num_trans)
max_pixel_depth = 32;
else
max_pixel_depth = 24;
}
else if (png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
{
if (max_pixel_depth < 8)
max_pixel_depth = 8;
if (png_ptr->num_trans)
max_pixel_depth *= 2;
}
else if (png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB)
{
if (png_ptr->num_trans)
{
max_pixel_depth *= 4;
max_pixel_depth /= 3;
}
}
}
#endif
#ifdef PNG_READ_FILLER_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->transformations & (PNG_FILLER))
{
if (png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_PALETTE)
max_pixel_depth = 32;
else if (png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY)
{
if (max_pixel_depth <= 8)
max_pixel_depth = 16;
else
max_pixel_depth = 32;
}
else if (png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB)
{
if (max_pixel_depth <= 32)
max_pixel_depth = 32;
else
max_pixel_depth = 64;
}
}
#endif
#ifdef PNG_READ_GRAY_TO_RGB_SUPPORTED
if (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_GRAY_TO_RGB)
{
if (
#ifdef PNG_READ_EXPAND_SUPPORTED
(png_ptr->num_trans && (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_EXPAND)) ||
#endif
#ifdef PNG_READ_FILLER_SUPPORTED
(png_ptr->transformations & (PNG_FILLER)) ||
#endif
png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_GRAY_ALPHA)
{
if (max_pixel_depth <= 16)
max_pixel_depth = 32;
else
max_pixel_depth = 64;
}
else
{
if (max_pixel_depth <= 8)
{
if (png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)
max_pixel_depth = 32;
else
max_pixel_depth = 24;
}
else if (png_ptr->color_type == PNG_COLOR_TYPE_RGB_ALPHA)
max_pixel_depth = 64;
else
max_pixel_depth = 48;
}
}
#endif
#if defined(PNG_READ_USER_TRANSFORM_SUPPORTED) && \
defined(PNG_USER_TRANSFORM_PTR_SUPPORTED)
if (png_ptr->transformations & PNG_USER_TRANSFORM)
{
int user_pixel_depth = png_ptr->user_transform_depth*
png_ptr->user_transform_channels;
if (user_pixel_depth > max_pixel_depth)
max_pixel_depth=user_pixel_depth;
}
#endif
/* Align the width on the next larger 8 pixels. Mainly used
* for interlacing
*/
row_bytes = ((png_ptr->width + 7) & ~((png_uint_32)7));
/* Calculate the maximum bytes needed, adding a byte and a pixel
* for safety's sake
*/
row_bytes = PNG_ROWBYTES(max_pixel_depth, row_bytes) +
1 + ((max_pixel_depth + 7) >> 3);
#ifdef PNG_MAX_MALLOC_64K
if (row_bytes > (png_uint_32)65536L)
png_error(png_ptr, "This image requires a row greater than 64KB");
#endif
if (row_bytes + 64 > png_ptr->old_big_row_buf_size)
{
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->big_row_buf);
if (png_ptr->interlaced)
png_ptr->big_row_buf = (png_bytep)png_calloc(png_ptr,
row_bytes + 64);
else
png_ptr->big_row_buf = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
row_bytes + 64);
png_ptr->old_big_row_buf_size = row_bytes + 64;
/* Use 32 bytes of padding before and after row_buf. */
png_ptr->row_buf = png_ptr->big_row_buf + 32;
png_ptr->old_big_row_buf_size = row_bytes + 64;
}
#ifdef PNG_MAX_MALLOC_64K
if ((png_uint_32)row_bytes + 1 > (png_uint_32)65536L)
png_error(png_ptr, "This image requires a row greater than 64KB");
#endif
if ((png_uint_32)row_bytes > (png_uint_32)(PNG_SIZE_MAX - 1))
png_error(png_ptr, "Row has too many bytes to allocate in memory.");
if (row_bytes + 1 > png_ptr->old_prev_row_size)
{
png_free(png_ptr, png_ptr->prev_row);
png_ptr->prev_row = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr, (png_uint_32)(
row_bytes + 1));
png_memset_check(png_ptr, png_ptr->prev_row, 0, row_bytes + 1);
png_ptr->old_prev_row_size = row_bytes + 1;
}
png_ptr->rowbytes = row_bytes;
png_debug1(3, "width = %lu,", png_ptr->width);
png_debug1(3, "height = %lu,", png_ptr->height);
png_debug1(3, "iwidth = %lu,", png_ptr->iwidth);
png_debug1(3, "num_rows = %lu,", png_ptr->num_rows);
png_debug1(3, "rowbytes = %lu,", png_ptr->rowbytes);
png_debug1(3, "irowbytes = %lu",
PNG_ROWBYTES(png_ptr->pixel_depth, png_ptr->iwidth) + 1);
png_ptr->flags |= PNG_FLAG_ROW_INIT;
}
Commit Message: Pull follow-up tweak from upstream.
BUG=116162
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9546033
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@125311 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 25,147
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pmcraid_suspend(struct pci_dev *pdev, pm_message_t state)
{
struct pmcraid_instance *pinstance = pci_get_drvdata(pdev);
pmcraid_shutdown(pdev);
pmcraid_disable_interrupts(pinstance, ~0);
pmcraid_kill_tasklets(pinstance);
pci_set_drvdata(pinstance->pdev, pinstance);
pmcraid_unregister_interrupt_handler(pinstance);
pci_save_state(pdev);
pci_disable_device(pdev);
pci_set_power_state(pdev, pci_choose_state(pdev, state));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [SCSI] pmcraid: reject negative request size
There's a code path in pmcraid that can be reached via device ioctl that
causes all sorts of ugliness, including heap corruption or triggering the
OOM killer due to consecutive allocation of large numbers of pages.
First, the user can call pmcraid_chr_ioctl(), with a type
PMCRAID_PASSTHROUGH_IOCTL. This calls through to
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough(). Next, a pmcraid_passthrough_ioctl_buffer
is copied in, and the request_size variable is set to
buffer->ioarcb.data_transfer_length, which is an arbitrary 32-bit
signed value provided by the user. If a negative value is provided
here, bad things can happen. For example,
pmcraid_build_passthrough_ioadls() is called with this request_size,
which immediately calls pmcraid_alloc_sglist() with a negative size.
The resulting math on allocating a scatter list can result in an
overflow in the kzalloc() call (if num_elem is 0, the sglist will be
smaller than expected), or if num_elem is unexpectedly large the
subsequent loop will call alloc_pages() repeatedly, a high number of
pages will be allocated and the OOM killer might be invoked.
It looks like preventing this value from being negative in
pmcraid_ioctl_passthrough() would be sufficient.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Parallels.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 27,650
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void compute_bandwidth(void)
{
unsigned bandwidth;
int i;
FFServerStream *stream;
for(stream = config.first_stream; stream; stream = stream->next) {
bandwidth = 0;
for(i=0;i<stream->nb_streams;i++) {
LayeredAVStream *st = stream->streams[i];
switch(st->codec->codec_type) {
case AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO:
case AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO:
bandwidth += st->codec->bit_rate;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
stream->bandwidth = (bandwidth + 999) / 1000;
}
}
Commit Message: ffserver: Check chunk size
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: poc_ffserver.py
Found-by: Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,210
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::Paste() {
Send(new ViewMsg_Paste(GetRoutingID()));
RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("Paste"));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,702
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: make_log_entry( httpd_conn* hc, struct timeval* nowP )
{
char* ru;
char url[305];
char bytes[40];
if ( hc->hs->no_log )
return;
/* This is straight CERN Combined Log Format - the only tweak
** being that if we're using syslog() we leave out the date, because
** syslogd puts it in. The included syslogtocern script turns the
** results into true CERN format.
*/
/* Format remote user. */
if ( hc->remoteuser[0] != '\0' )
ru = hc->remoteuser;
else
ru = "-";
/* If we're vhosting, prepend the hostname to the url. This is
** a little weird, perhaps writing separate log files for
** each vhost would make more sense.
*/
if ( hc->hs->vhost && ! hc->tildemapped )
(void) my_snprintf( url, sizeof(url),
"/%.100s%.200s",
hc->hostname == (char*) 0 ? hc->hs->server_hostname : hc->hostname,
hc->encodedurl );
else
(void) my_snprintf( url, sizeof(url),
"%.200s", hc->encodedurl );
/* Format the bytes. */
if ( hc->bytes_sent >= 0 )
(void) my_snprintf(
bytes, sizeof(bytes), "%lld", (int64_t) hc->bytes_sent );
else
(void) strcpy( bytes, "-" );
/* Logfile or syslog? */
if ( hc->hs->logfp != (FILE*) 0 )
{
time_t now;
struct tm* t;
const char* cernfmt_nozone = "%d/%b/%Y:%H:%M:%S";
char date_nozone[100];
int zone;
char sign;
char date[100];
/* Get the current time, if necessary. */
if ( nowP != (struct timeval*) 0 )
now = nowP->tv_sec;
else
now = time( (time_t*) 0 );
/* Format the time, forcing a numeric timezone (some log analyzers
** are stoooopid about this).
*/
t = localtime( &now );
(void) strftime( date_nozone, sizeof(date_nozone), cernfmt_nozone, t );
zone = t->tm_gmtoff / 60L;
if ( zone >= 0 )
sign = '+';
else
{
sign = '-';
zone = -zone;
}
zone = ( zone / 60 ) * 100 + zone % 60;
(void) my_snprintf( date, sizeof(date),
"%s %c%04d", date_nozone, sign, zone );
/* And write the log entry. */
(void) fprintf( hc->hs->logfp,
"%.80s - %.80s [%s] \"%.80s %.300s %.80s\" %d %s \"%.200s\" \"%.200s\"\n",
httpd_ntoa( &hc->client_addr ), ru, date,
httpd_method_str( hc->method ), url, hc->protocol,
hc->status, bytes, hc->referer, hc->useragent );
#ifdef FLUSH_LOG_EVERY_TIME
(void) fflush( hc->hs->logfp );
#endif
}
else
syslog( LOG_INFO,
"%.80s - %.80s \"%.80s %.200s %.80s\" %d %s \"%.200s\" \"%.200s\"",
httpd_ntoa( &hc->client_addr ), ru,
httpd_method_str( hc->method ), url, hc->protocol,
hc->status, bytes, hc->referer, hc->useragent );
}
Commit Message: Fix heap buffer overflow in de_dotdot
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,211
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: set_permissions_file (SetPermissionsJob *job,
GFile *file,
GFileInfo *info)
{
CommonJob *common;
GFileInfo *child_info;
gboolean free_info;
guint32 current;
guint32 value;
guint32 mask;
GFileEnumerator *enumerator;
GFile *child;
common = (CommonJob *) job;
nautilus_progress_info_pulse_progress (common->progress);
free_info = FALSE;
if (info == NULL)
{
free_info = TRUE;
info = g_file_query_info (file,
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_TYPE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE,
G_FILE_QUERY_INFO_NOFOLLOW_SYMLINKS,
common->cancellable,
NULL);
/* Ignore errors */
if (info == NULL)
{
return;
}
}
if (g_file_info_get_file_type (info) == G_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY)
{
value = job->dir_permissions;
mask = job->dir_mask;
}
else
{
value = job->file_permissions;
mask = job->file_mask;
}
if (!job_aborted (common) &&
g_file_info_has_attribute (info, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE))
{
current = g_file_info_get_attribute_uint32 (info, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE);
if (common->undo_info != NULL)
{
nautilus_file_undo_info_rec_permissions_add_file (NAUTILUS_FILE_UNDO_INFO_REC_PERMISSIONS (common->undo_info),
file, current);
}
current = (current & ~mask) | value;
g_file_set_attribute_uint32 (file, G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE,
current, G_FILE_QUERY_INFO_NOFOLLOW_SYMLINKS,
common->cancellable, NULL);
}
if (!job_aborted (common) &&
g_file_info_get_file_type (info) == G_FILE_TYPE_DIRECTORY)
{
enumerator = g_file_enumerate_children (file,
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_NAME ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_STANDARD_TYPE ","
G_FILE_ATTRIBUTE_UNIX_MODE,
G_FILE_QUERY_INFO_NOFOLLOW_SYMLINKS,
common->cancellable,
NULL);
if (enumerator)
{
while (!job_aborted (common) &&
(child_info = g_file_enumerator_next_file (enumerator, common->cancellable, NULL)) != NULL)
{
child = g_file_get_child (file,
g_file_info_get_name (child_info));
set_permissions_file (job, child, child_info);
g_object_unref (child);
g_object_unref (child_info);
}
g_file_enumerator_close (enumerator, common->cancellable, NULL);
g_object_unref (enumerator);
}
}
if (free_info)
{
g_object_unref (info);
}
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 24,076
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int qeth_is_cq(struct qeth_card *card, unsigned int queue)
{
return card->options.cq == QETH_CQ_ENABLED &&
card->qdio.c_q != NULL &&
queue != 0 &&
queue == card->qdio.no_in_queues - 1;
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,447
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int GahpClient::ec2_ping(const char *service_url, const char * publickeyfile, const char * privatekeyfile)
{
static const char* command = "EC2_VM_STATUS_ALL";
char* esc1 = strdup( escapeGahpString(service_url) );
char* esc2 = strdup( escapeGahpString(publickeyfile) );
char* esc3 = strdup( escapeGahpString(privatekeyfile) );
std::string reqline;
sprintf(reqline, "%s %s %s", esc1, esc2, esc3 );
const char *buf = reqline.c_str();
free( esc1 );
free( esc2 );
free( esc3 );
if ( !is_pending(command,buf) ) {
if ( m_mode == results_only ) {
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_NOT_SUBMITTED;
}
now_pending(command, buf, deleg_proxy);
}
Gahp_Args* result = get_pending_result(command, buf);
if ( result ) {
int rc = atoi(result->argv[1]);
delete result;
return rc;
}
if ( check_pending_timeout(command,buf) ) {
sprintf( error_string, "%s timed out", command );
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_TIMED_OUT;
}
return GAHPCLIENT_COMMAND_PENDING;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 29,983
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::DoBindOrCopyTexImageIfNeeded(Texture* texture,
GLenum textarget,
GLuint texture_unit) {
if (texture && !texture->IsAttachedToFramebuffer()) {
Texture::ImageState image_state;
gl::GLImage* image = texture->GetLevelImage(textarget, 0, &image_state);
if (image && image_state == Texture::UNBOUND) {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(
"GLES2DecoderImpl::DoBindOrCopyTexImageIfNeeded", GetErrorState());
if (texture_unit)
api()->glActiveTextureFn(texture_unit);
api()->glBindTextureFn(textarget, texture->service_id());
if (image->BindTexImage(textarget)) {
image_state = Texture::BOUND;
} else {
DoCopyTexImage(texture, textarget, image);
}
if (!texture_unit) {
RestoreCurrentTextureBindings(&state_, textarget,
state_.active_texture_unit);
return false;
}
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,158
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebRtcAudioRenderer::Stop() {
base::AutoLock auto_lock(lock_);
if (state_ == UNINITIALIZED)
return;
source_->RemoveRenderer(this);
source_ = NULL;
sink_->Stop();
state_ = UNINITIALIZED;
}
Commit Message: Avoids crash in WebRTC audio clients for 96kHz render rate on Mac OSX.
TBR=xians
BUG=166523
TEST=Misc set of WebRTC audio clients on Mac.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11773017
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@175323 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,419
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int usb_dev_prepare(struct device *dev)
{
return 0; /* Implement eventually? */
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 26,366
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebContents* WebContentsAddedObserver::GetWebContents() {
if (web_contents_)
return web_contents_;
runner_ = new MessageLoopRunner();
runner_->Run();
return web_contents_;
}
Commit Message: Apply ExtensionNavigationThrottle filesystem/blob checks to all frames.
BUG=836858
Change-Id: I34333a72501129fd40b5a9aa6378c9f35f1e7fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1028511
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nick Carter <nick@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#553867}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 4,511
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __wait_discard_cmd(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, bool wait_cond)
{
struct discard_cmd_control *dcc = SM_I(sbi)->dcc_info;
struct list_head *wait_list = &(dcc->wait_list);
struct discard_cmd *dc, *tmp;
bool need_wait;
next:
need_wait = false;
mutex_lock(&dcc->cmd_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(dc, tmp, wait_list, list) {
if (!wait_cond || (dc->state == D_DONE && !dc->ref)) {
wait_for_completion_io(&dc->wait);
__remove_discard_cmd(sbi, dc);
} else {
dc->ref++;
need_wait = true;
break;
}
}
mutex_unlock(&dcc->cmd_lock);
if (need_wait) {
__wait_one_discard_bio(sbi, dc);
goto next;
}
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix potential panic during fstrim
As Ju Hyung Park reported:
"When 'fstrim' is called for manual trim, a BUG() can be triggered
randomly with this patch.
I'm seeing this issue on both x86 Desktop and arm64 Android phone.
On x86 Desktop, this was caused during Ubuntu boot-up. I have a
cronjob installed which calls 'fstrim -v /' during boot. On arm64
Android, this was caused during GC looping with 1ms gc_min_sleep_time
& gc_max_sleep_time."
Root cause of this issue is that f2fs_wait_discard_bios can only be
used by f2fs_put_super, because during put_super there must be no
other referrers, so it can ignore discard entry's reference count
when removing the entry, otherwise in other caller we will hit bug_on
in __remove_discard_cmd as there may be other issuer added reference
count in discard entry.
Thread A Thread B
- issue_discard_thread
- f2fs_ioc_fitrim
- f2fs_trim_fs
- f2fs_wait_discard_bios
- __issue_discard_cmd
- __submit_discard_cmd
- __wait_discard_cmd
- dc->ref++
- __wait_one_discard_bio
- __wait_discard_cmd
- __remove_discard_cmd
- f2fs_bug_on(sbi, dc->ref)
Fixes: 969d1b180d987c2be02de890d0fff0f66a0e80de
Reported-by: Ju Hyung Park <qkrwngud825@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,985
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HeadlessWebContentsImpl::CreateTabSocketMojoService(
mojo::ScopedMessagePipeHandle handle) {
headless_tab_socket_->CreateMojoService(TabSocketRequest(std::move(handle)));
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 6,041
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ip_vs_control_cleanup(void)
{
EnterFunction(2);
ip_vs_trash_cleanup();
cancel_rearming_delayed_work(&defense_work);
cancel_work_sync(&defense_work.work);
ip_vs_kill_estimator(&ip_vs_stats);
unregister_sysctl_table(sysctl_header);
proc_net_remove(&init_net, "ip_vs_stats");
proc_net_remove(&init_net, "ip_vs");
ip_vs_genl_unregister();
nf_unregister_sockopt(&ip_vs_sockopts);
LeaveFunction(2);
}
Commit Message: ipvs: Add boundary check on ioctl arguments
The ipvs code has a nifty system for doing the size of ioctl command
copies; it defines an array with values into which it indexes the cmd
to find the right length.
Unfortunately, the ipvs code forgot to check if the cmd was in the
range that the array provides, allowing for an index outside of the
array, which then gives a "garbage" result into the length, which
then gets used for copying into a stack buffer.
Fix this by adding sanity checks on these as well as the copy size.
[ horms@verge.net.au: adjusted limit to IP_VS_SO_GET_MAX ]
Signed-off-by: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Simon Horman <horms@verge.net.au>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,349
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: JPEGImageReader(JPEGImageDecoder* decoder)
: m_decoder(decoder)
, m_bufferLength(0)
, m_bytesToSkip(0)
, m_state(JPEG_HEADER)
, m_samples(0)
#if USE(QCMSLIB)
, m_transform(0)
#endif
{
memset(&m_info, 0, sizeof(jpeg_decompress_struct));
m_info.err = jpeg_std_error(&m_err.pub);
m_err.pub.error_exit = error_exit;
jpeg_create_decompress(&m_info);
decoder_source_mgr* src = 0;
if (!m_info.src) {
src = (decoder_source_mgr*)fastCalloc(sizeof(decoder_source_mgr), 1);
if (!src) {
m_state = JPEG_ERROR;
return;
}
}
m_info.src = (jpeg_source_mgr*)src;
src->pub.init_source = init_source;
src->pub.fill_input_buffer = fill_input_buffer;
src->pub.skip_input_data = skip_input_data;
src->pub.resync_to_restart = jpeg_resync_to_restart;
src->pub.term_source = term_source;
src->decoder = this;
#if USE(ICCJPEG)
setup_read_icc_profile(&m_info);
#endif
jpeg_save_markers(&m_info, exifMarker, 0xFFFF);
}
Commit Message: Progressive JPEG outputScanlines() calls should handle failure
outputScanlines() can fail and delete |this|, so any attempt to access
members thereafter should be avoided. Copy the decoder pointer member,
and use that copy to detect and handle the failure case.
BUG=232763
R=pkasting@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/14844003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@150545 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,561
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static snd_pcm_sframes_t snd_pcm_lib_write1(struct snd_pcm_substream *substream,
unsigned long data,
snd_pcm_uframes_t size,
int nonblock,
transfer_f transfer)
{
struct snd_pcm_runtime *runtime = substream->runtime;
snd_pcm_uframes_t xfer = 0;
snd_pcm_uframes_t offset = 0;
snd_pcm_uframes_t avail;
int err = 0;
if (size == 0)
return 0;
snd_pcm_stream_lock_irq(substream);
switch (runtime->status->state) {
case SNDRV_PCM_STATE_PREPARED:
case SNDRV_PCM_STATE_RUNNING:
case SNDRV_PCM_STATE_PAUSED:
break;
case SNDRV_PCM_STATE_XRUN:
err = -EPIPE;
goto _end_unlock;
case SNDRV_PCM_STATE_SUSPENDED:
err = -ESTRPIPE;
goto _end_unlock;
default:
err = -EBADFD;
goto _end_unlock;
}
runtime->twake = runtime->control->avail_min ? : 1;
if (runtime->status->state == SNDRV_PCM_STATE_RUNNING)
snd_pcm_update_hw_ptr(substream);
avail = snd_pcm_playback_avail(runtime);
while (size > 0) {
snd_pcm_uframes_t frames, appl_ptr, appl_ofs;
snd_pcm_uframes_t cont;
if (!avail) {
if (nonblock) {
err = -EAGAIN;
goto _end_unlock;
}
runtime->twake = min_t(snd_pcm_uframes_t, size,
runtime->control->avail_min ? : 1);
err = wait_for_avail(substream, &avail);
if (err < 0)
goto _end_unlock;
}
frames = size > avail ? avail : size;
cont = runtime->buffer_size - runtime->control->appl_ptr % runtime->buffer_size;
if (frames > cont)
frames = cont;
if (snd_BUG_ON(!frames)) {
runtime->twake = 0;
snd_pcm_stream_unlock_irq(substream);
return -EINVAL;
}
appl_ptr = runtime->control->appl_ptr;
appl_ofs = appl_ptr % runtime->buffer_size;
snd_pcm_stream_unlock_irq(substream);
err = transfer(substream, appl_ofs, data, offset, frames);
snd_pcm_stream_lock_irq(substream);
if (err < 0)
goto _end_unlock;
switch (runtime->status->state) {
case SNDRV_PCM_STATE_XRUN:
err = -EPIPE;
goto _end_unlock;
case SNDRV_PCM_STATE_SUSPENDED:
err = -ESTRPIPE;
goto _end_unlock;
default:
break;
}
appl_ptr += frames;
if (appl_ptr >= runtime->boundary)
appl_ptr -= runtime->boundary;
runtime->control->appl_ptr = appl_ptr;
if (substream->ops->ack)
substream->ops->ack(substream);
offset += frames;
size -= frames;
xfer += frames;
avail -= frames;
if (runtime->status->state == SNDRV_PCM_STATE_PREPARED &&
snd_pcm_playback_hw_avail(runtime) >= (snd_pcm_sframes_t)runtime->start_threshold) {
err = snd_pcm_start(substream);
if (err < 0)
goto _end_unlock;
}
}
_end_unlock:
runtime->twake = 0;
if (xfer > 0 && err >= 0)
snd_pcm_update_state(substream, runtime);
snd_pcm_stream_unlock_irq(substream);
return xfer > 0 ? (snd_pcm_sframes_t)xfer : err;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 26,912
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HandleWebUIReverse(GURL* url, content::BrowserContext* browser_context) {
if (!url->is_valid() || !url->SchemeIs(chrome::kChromeUIScheme))
return false;
return RemoveUberHost(url);
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 14,059
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cf2_getLanguageGroup( CFF_Decoder* decoder )
{
FT_ASSERT( decoder && decoder->current_subfont );
return decoder->current_subfont->private_dict.language_group;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,620
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void qrio_prst(u8 bit, bool en, bool wden)
{
u16 prst;
void __iomem *qrio_base = (void *)CONFIG_SYS_QRIO_BASE;
qrio_wdmask(bit, wden);
prst = in_be16(qrio_base + PRST_OFF);
if (en)
prst &= ~(1 << bit);
else
prst |= (1 << bit);
out_be16(qrio_base + PRST_OFF, prst);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 5,727
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: create_backup (char const *to, struct stat *to_st, int *to_errno,
bool leave_original, bool remember_backup)
{
struct stat tmp_st;
int tmp_errno;
/* When the input to patch modifies the same file more than once, patch only
backs up the initial version of each file.
To figure out which files have already been backed up, patch remembers the
files that replace the original files. Files not known already are backed
up; files already known have already been backed up before, and are
skipped.
When a patch deletes a file, this leaves patch without such a "sentinel"
file. In that case, patch remembers the *backup file* instead; when a
patch creates a file, patch checks if the *backup file* is already known.
This strategy is not fully compatible with numbered backups: when a patch
deletes and later recreates a file with numbered backups, two numbered
backups will be created. */
if (! to_st || ! to_errno)
{
to_st = &tmp_st;
to_errno = &tmp_errno;
}
*to_errno = lstat (to, to_st) == 0 ? 0 : errno;
if (! to_errno && ! (S_ISREG (to_st->st_mode) || S_ISLNK (to_st->st_mode)))
fatal ("File %s is not a %s -- refusing to create backup",
to, S_ISLNK (to_st->st_mode) ? "symbolic link" : "regular file");
if (! *to_errno && file_already_seen (to_st))
{
if (debug & 4)
say ("File %s already seen\n", quotearg (to));
}
else
{
int try_makedirs_errno = 0;
char *bakname;
if (origprae || origbase || origsuff)
{
char const *p = origprae ? origprae : "";
char const *b = origbase ? origbase : "";
char const *s = origsuff ? origsuff : "";
char const *t = to;
size_t plen = strlen (p);
size_t blen = strlen (b);
size_t slen = strlen (s);
size_t tlen = strlen (t);
char const *o;
size_t olen;
for (o = t + tlen, olen = 0;
o > t && ! ISSLASH (*(o - 1));
o--)
/* do nothing */ ;
olen = t + tlen - o;
tlen -= olen;
bakname = xmalloc (plen + tlen + blen + olen + slen + 1);
memcpy (bakname, p, plen);
memcpy (bakname + plen, t, tlen);
memcpy (bakname + plen + tlen, b, blen);
memcpy (bakname + plen + tlen + blen, o, olen);
memcpy (bakname + plen + tlen + blen + olen, s, slen + 1);
if ((origprae
&& (contains_slash (origprae + FILE_SYSTEM_PREFIX_LEN (origprae))
|| contains_slash (to)))
|| (origbase && contains_slash (origbase)))
try_makedirs_errno = ENOENT;
}
else
{
bakname = find_backup_file_name (to, backup_type);
if (!bakname)
xalloc_die ();
}
if (*to_errno)
{
struct stat backup_st;
int fd;
if (lstat (bakname, &backup_st) == 0
&& file_already_seen (&backup_st))
{
if (debug & 4)
say ("File %s already seen\n", quotearg (to));
}
else
{
if (debug & 4)
say ("Creating empty file %s\n", quotearg (bakname));
try_makedirs_errno = ENOENT;
unlink (bakname);
while ((fd = creat (bakname, 0666)) < 0)
{
if (errno != try_makedirs_errno)
pfatal ("Can't create file %s", quotearg (bakname));
makedirs (bakname);
try_makedirs_errno = 0;
}
if (remember_backup && fstat (fd, &backup_st) == 0)
insert_file (&backup_st);
if (close (fd) != 0)
pfatal ("Can't close file %s", quotearg (bakname));
}
}
else if (leave_original)
create_backup_copy (to, bakname, to_st, try_makedirs_errno == 0,
remember_backup);
else
{
if (debug & 4)
say ("Renaming file %s to %s\n",
quotearg_n (0, to), quotearg_n (1, bakname));
while (rename (to, bakname) != 0)
{
if (errno == try_makedirs_errno)
{
makedirs (bakname);
try_makedirs_errno = 0;
}
else if (errno == EXDEV)
{
create_backup_copy (to, bakname, to_st,
try_makedirs_errno == 0,
remember_backup);
unlink (to);
break;
}
else
pfatal ("Can't rename file %s to %s",
quotearg_n (0, to), quotearg_n (1, bakname));
}
if (remember_backup)
insert_file (to_st);
}
free (bakname);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 21,453
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t all_data_cb(const void *ptr, size_t size, size_t nmemb,
void *user_data)
{
struct data_buffer *db = (struct data_buffer *)user_data;
size_t len = size * nmemb;
size_t oldlen, newlen;
void *newmem;
static const unsigned char zero = 0;
oldlen = db->len;
newlen = oldlen + len;
newmem = realloc(db->buf, newlen + 1);
if (!newmem)
return 0;
db->buf = newmem;
db->len = newlen;
memcpy((uint8_t*)db->buf + oldlen, ptr, len);
memcpy((uint8_t*)db->buf + newlen, &zero, 1); /* null terminate */
return len;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,882
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct neighbour *ipv4_neigh_lookup(const struct dst_entry *dst, const void *daddr)
{
struct neigh_table *tbl = &arp_tbl;
static const __be32 inaddr_any = 0;
struct net_device *dev = dst->dev;
const __be32 *pkey = daddr;
struct neighbour *n;
#if defined(CONFIG_ATM_CLIP) || defined(CONFIG_ATM_CLIP_MODULE)
if (dev->type == ARPHRD_ATM)
tbl = clip_tbl_hook;
#endif
if (dev->flags & (IFF_LOOPBACK | IFF_POINTOPOINT))
pkey = &inaddr_any;
n = __ipv4_neigh_lookup(tbl, dev, *(__force u32 *)pkey);
if (n)
return n;
return neigh_create(tbl, pkey, dev);
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,237
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FileEnumerator::GetFindInfo(FindInfo* info) {
DCHECK(info);
if (current_directory_entry_ >= directory_entries_.size())
return;
DirectoryEntryInfo* cur_entry = &directory_entries_[current_directory_entry_];
memcpy(&(info->stat), &(cur_entry->stat), sizeof(info->stat));
info->filename.assign(cur_entry->filename.value());
}
Commit Message: Fix creating target paths in file_util_posix CopyDirectory.
BUG=167840
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11773018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176659 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 6,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ext4_file_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *from)
{
struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;
struct inode *inode = file_inode(iocb->ki_filp);
struct mutex *aio_mutex = NULL;
struct blk_plug plug;
int o_direct = file->f_flags & O_DIRECT;
int overwrite = 0;
size_t length = iov_iter_count(from);
ssize_t ret;
loff_t pos = iocb->ki_pos;
/*
* Unaligned direct AIO must be serialized; see comment above
* In the case of O_APPEND, assume that we must always serialize
*/
if (o_direct &&
ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS) &&
!is_sync_kiocb(iocb) &&
(file->f_flags & O_APPEND ||
ext4_unaligned_aio(inode, from, pos))) {
aio_mutex = ext4_aio_mutex(inode);
mutex_lock(aio_mutex);
ext4_unwritten_wait(inode);
}
mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex);
if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
iocb->ki_pos = pos = i_size_read(inode);
/*
* If we have encountered a bitmap-format file, the size limit
* is smaller than s_maxbytes, which is for extent-mapped files.
*/
if (!(ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_EXTENTS))) {
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
if ((pos > sbi->s_bitmap_maxbytes) ||
(pos == sbi->s_bitmap_maxbytes && length > 0)) {
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
ret = -EFBIG;
goto errout;
}
if (pos + length > sbi->s_bitmap_maxbytes)
iov_iter_truncate(from, sbi->s_bitmap_maxbytes - pos);
}
if (o_direct) {
blk_start_plug(&plug);
iocb->private = &overwrite;
/* check whether we do a DIO overwrite or not */
if (ext4_should_dioread_nolock(inode) && !aio_mutex &&
!file->f_mapping->nrpages && pos + length <= i_size_read(inode)) {
struct ext4_map_blocks map;
unsigned int blkbits = inode->i_blkbits;
int err, len;
map.m_lblk = pos >> blkbits;
map.m_len = (EXT4_BLOCK_ALIGN(pos + length, blkbits) >> blkbits)
- map.m_lblk;
len = map.m_len;
err = ext4_map_blocks(NULL, inode, &map, 0);
/*
* 'err==len' means that all of blocks has
* been preallocated no matter they are
* initialized or not. For excluding
* unwritten extents, we need to check
* m_flags. There are two conditions that
* indicate for initialized extents. 1) If we
* hit extent cache, EXT4_MAP_MAPPED flag is
* returned; 2) If we do a real lookup,
* non-flags are returned. So we should check
* these two conditions.
*/
if (err == len && (map.m_flags & EXT4_MAP_MAPPED))
overwrite = 1;
}
}
ret = __generic_file_write_iter(iocb, from);
mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex);
if (ret > 0) {
ssize_t err;
err = generic_write_sync(file, iocb->ki_pos - ret, ret);
if (err < 0)
ret = err;
}
if (o_direct)
blk_finish_plug(&plug);
errout:
if (aio_mutex)
mutex_unlock(aio_mutex);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 13,270
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void hardware_disable(void *junk)
{
raw_spin_lock(&kvm_lock);
hardware_disable_nolock(junk);
raw_spin_unlock(&kvm_lock);
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,585
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static UPNP_INLINE int get_alias(
/*! [in] request file passed in to be compared with. */
const char *request_file,
/*! [out] xml alias object which has a file name stored. */
struct xml_alias_t *alias,
/*! [out] File information object which will be filled up if the file
* comparison succeeds. */
UpnpFileInfo *info)
{
int cmp = strcmp(alias->name.buf, request_file);
if (cmp == 0) {
UpnpFileInfo_set_FileLength(info, (off_t)alias->doc.length);
UpnpFileInfo_set_IsDirectory(info, FALSE);
UpnpFileInfo_set_IsReadable(info, TRUE);
UpnpFileInfo_set_LastModified(info, alias->last_modified);
}
return cmp == 0;
}
Commit Message: Don't allow unhandled POSTs to write to the filesystem by default
If there's no registered handler for a POST request, the default behaviour
is to write it to the filesystem. Several million deployed devices appear
to have this behaviour, making it possible to (at least) store arbitrary
data on them. Add a configure option that enables this behaviour, and change
the default to just drop POSTs that aren't directly handled.
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 4,952
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void coroutine_fn v9fs_setattr(void *opaque)
{
int err = 0;
int32_t fid;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsIattr v9iattr;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dI", &fid, &v9iattr);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
if (v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_MODE) {
err = v9fs_co_chmod(pdu, &fidp->path, v9iattr.mode);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
}
if (v9iattr.valid & (P9_ATTR_ATIME | P9_ATTR_MTIME)) {
struct timespec times[2];
if (v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_ATIME) {
if (v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_ATIME_SET) {
times[0].tv_sec = v9iattr.atime_sec;
times[0].tv_nsec = v9iattr.atime_nsec;
} else {
times[0].tv_nsec = UTIME_NOW;
}
} else {
times[0].tv_nsec = UTIME_OMIT;
}
if (v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_MTIME) {
if (v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_MTIME_SET) {
times[1].tv_sec = v9iattr.mtime_sec;
times[1].tv_nsec = v9iattr.mtime_nsec;
} else {
times[1].tv_nsec = UTIME_NOW;
}
} else {
times[1].tv_nsec = UTIME_OMIT;
}
err = v9fs_co_utimensat(pdu, &fidp->path, times);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
}
/*
* If the only valid entry in iattr is ctime we can call
* chown(-1,-1) to update the ctime of the file
*/
if ((v9iattr.valid & (P9_ATTR_UID | P9_ATTR_GID)) ||
((v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_CTIME)
&& !((v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_MASK) & ~P9_ATTR_CTIME))) {
if (!(v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_UID)) {
v9iattr.uid = -1;
}
if (!(v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_GID)) {
v9iattr.gid = -1;
}
err = v9fs_co_chown(pdu, &fidp->path, v9iattr.uid,
v9iattr.gid);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
}
if (v9iattr.valid & (P9_ATTR_SIZE)) {
err = v9fs_co_truncate(pdu, &fidp->path, v9iattr.size);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
}
err = offset;
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 29,671
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool CompareData(const CompoundBuffer& buffer, char* data, int size) {
scoped_refptr<IOBuffer> buffer_data = buffer.ToIOBufferWithSize();
return buffer.total_bytes() == size &&
memcmp(buffer_data->data(), data, size) == 0;
}
Commit Message: iwyu: Include callback_old.h where appropriate, final.
BUG=82098
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@85003 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,695
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SWFShape_getLines(SWFShape shape, SWFLineStyle** lines, int* nLines)
{
*lines = shape->lines;
*nLines = shape->nLines;
}
Commit Message: SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,378
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLuint GetSamplerServiceID(GLuint client_id, PassthroughResources* resources) {
return resources->sampler_id_map.GetServiceIDOrInvalid(client_id);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 4,152
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_setsockopt_default_send_param(struct sock *sk,
char __user *optval, int optlen)
{
struct sctp_sndrcvinfo info;
struct sctp_association *asoc;
struct sctp_sock *sp = sctp_sk(sk);
if (optlen != sizeof(struct sctp_sndrcvinfo))
return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_user(&info, optval, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
asoc = sctp_id2assoc(sk, info.sinfo_assoc_id);
if (!asoc && info.sinfo_assoc_id && sctp_style(sk, UDP))
return -EINVAL;
if (asoc) {
asoc->default_stream = info.sinfo_stream;
asoc->default_flags = info.sinfo_flags;
asoc->default_ppid = info.sinfo_ppid;
asoc->default_context = info.sinfo_context;
asoc->default_timetolive = info.sinfo_timetolive;
} else {
sp->default_stream = info.sinfo_stream;
sp->default_flags = info.sinfo_flags;
sp->default_ppid = info.sinfo_ppid;
sp->default_context = info.sinfo_context;
sp->default_timetolive = info.sinfo_timetolive;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <t-fujii@nb.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 29,513
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssize_t AMediaCodec_dequeueOutputBuffer(AMediaCodec *mData,
AMediaCodecBufferInfo *info, int64_t timeoutUs) {
size_t idx;
size_t offset;
size_t size;
uint32_t flags;
int64_t presentationTimeUs;
status_t ret = mData->mCodec->dequeueOutputBuffer(&idx, &offset, &size, &presentationTimeUs,
&flags, timeoutUs);
requestActivityNotification(mData);
switch (ret) {
case OK:
info->offset = offset;
info->size = size;
info->flags = flags;
info->presentationTimeUs = presentationTimeUs;
return idx;
case -EAGAIN:
return AMEDIACODEC_INFO_TRY_AGAIN_LATER;
case android::INFO_FORMAT_CHANGED:
return AMEDIACODEC_INFO_OUTPUT_FORMAT_CHANGED;
case INFO_OUTPUT_BUFFERS_CHANGED:
return AMEDIACODEC_INFO_OUTPUT_BUFFERS_CHANGED;
default:
break;
}
return translate_error(ret);
}
Commit Message: Check for overflow of crypto size
Bug: 111603051
Test: CTS
Change-Id: Ib5b1802b9b35769a25c16e2b977308cf7a810606
(cherry picked from commit d1fd02761236b35a336434367131f71bef7405c9)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 22,046
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void put_mspel8_mc20_c(uint8_t *dst, uint8_t *src, ptrdiff_t stride)
{
wmv2_mspel8_h_lowpass(dst, src, stride, stride, 8);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 8,038
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Layer::OpacityIsAnimating() const {
return layer_animation_controller_->IsAnimatingProperty(Animation::Opacity);
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 15,733
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t uart_mode_store(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, const char *valbuf, size_t count)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port = to_usb_serial_port(dev);
struct edgeport_port *edge_port = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
unsigned int v = simple_strtoul(valbuf, NULL, 0);
dev_dbg(dev, "%s: setting uart_mode = %d\n", __func__, v);
if (v < 256)
edge_port->bUartMode = v;
else
dev_err(dev, "%s - uart_mode %d is invalid\n", __func__, v);
return count;
}
Commit Message: USB: serial: io_ti: fix information leak in completion handler
Add missing sanity check to the bulk-in completion handler to avoid an
integer underflow that can be triggered by a malicious device.
This avoids leaking 128 kB of memory content from after the URB transfer
buffer to user space.
Fixes: 8c209e6782ca ("USB: make actual_length in struct urb field u32")
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 2.6.30
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-191
| 0
| 15,599
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserWindowGtk::InvalidateInfoBarBits() {
gtk_widget_queue_draw(toolbar_border_);
gtk_widget_queue_draw(toolbar_->widget());
if (bookmark_bar_.get() &&
browser_->bookmark_bar_state() != BookmarkBar::DETACHED) {
gtk_widget_queue_draw(bookmark_bar_->widget());
}
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,236
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsFormTextArea(PDFiumPage::Area area, int form_type) {
if (form_type == FPDF_FORMFIELD_UNKNOWN)
return false;
DCHECK_EQ(area, PDFiumPage::FormTypeToArea(form_type));
return area == PDFiumPage::FORM_TEXT_AREA;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 24,787
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vips_foreign_load_gif_load( VipsForeignLoad *load )
{
VipsForeignLoadGifClass *class =
(VipsForeignLoadGifClass *) VIPS_OBJECT_GET_CLASS( load );
VipsForeignLoadGif *gif = (VipsForeignLoadGif *) load;
VipsImage **t = (VipsImage **)
vips_object_local_array( VIPS_OBJECT( load ), 4 );
/* Rewind.
*/
if( class->open( gif ) )
return( -1 );
VIPS_DEBUG_MSG( "vips_foreign_load_gif_load:\n" );
/* Make the memory image we accumulate pixels in. We always accumulate
* to RGBA, then trim down to whatever the output image needs on
* _generate.
*/
gif->frame = vips_image_new_memory();
vips_image_init_fields( gif->frame,
gif->file->SWidth, gif->file->SHeight, 4, VIPS_FORMAT_UCHAR,
VIPS_CODING_NONE, VIPS_INTERPRETATION_sRGB, 1.0, 1.0 );
if( vips_image_write_prepare( gif->frame ) )
return( -1 );
/* A copy of the previous state of the frame, in case we have to
* process a DISPOSE_PREVIOUS.
*/
gif->previous = vips_image_new_memory();
vips_image_init_fields( gif->previous,
gif->file->SWidth, gif->file->SHeight, 4, VIPS_FORMAT_UCHAR,
VIPS_CODING_NONE, VIPS_INTERPRETATION_sRGB, 1.0, 1.0 );
if( vips_image_write_prepare( gif->previous ) )
return( -1 );
/* Make the output pipeline.
*/
t[0] = vips_image_new();
if( vips_foreign_load_gif_set_header( gif, t[0] ) )
return( -1 );
/* Strips 8 pixels high to avoid too many tiny regions.
*/
if( vips_image_generate( t[0],
NULL, vips_foreign_load_gif_generate, NULL, gif, NULL ) ||
vips_sequential( t[0], &t[1],
"tile_height", VIPS__FATSTRIP_HEIGHT,
NULL ) ||
vips_image_write( t[1], load->real ) )
return( -1 );
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: fetch map after DGifGetImageDesc()
Earlier refactoring broke GIF map fetch.
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,627
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NetworkActionPredictor::TransitionalMatch::TransitionalMatch() {
}
Commit Message: Removing dead code from NetworkActionPredictor.
BUG=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358062
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@121926 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,652
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE4(rt_tgsigqueueinfo,
compat_pid_t, tgid,
compat_pid_t, pid,
int, sig,
struct compat_siginfo __user *, uinfo)
{
siginfo_t info = {};
if (copy_siginfo_from_user32(&info, uinfo))
return -EFAULT;
return do_rt_tgsigqueueinfo(tgid, pid, sig, &info);
}
Commit Message: kernel/signal.c: avoid undefined behaviour in kill_something_info
When running kill(72057458746458112, 0) in userspace I hit the following
issue.
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/signal.c:1462:11
negation of -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int':
CPU: 226 PID: 9849 Comm: test Tainted: G B ---- ------- 3.10.0-327.53.58.70.x86_64_ubsan+ #116
Hardware name: Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. RH8100 V3/BC61PBIA, BIOS BLHSV028 11/11/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x19/0x1b
ubsan_epilogue+0xd/0x50
__ubsan_handle_negate_overflow+0x109/0x14e
SYSC_kill+0x43e/0x4d0
SyS_kill+0xe/0x10
system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Add code to avoid the UBSAN detection.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak comment]
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1496670008-59084-1-git-send-email-zhongjiang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: zhongjiang <zhongjiang@huawei.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
Cc: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Cc: Xishi Qiu <qiuxishi@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,815
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API RConfigNode* r_config_set(RConfig *cfg, const char *name, const char *value) {
RConfigNode *node = NULL;
char *ov = NULL;
ut64 oi;
if (!cfg || STRNULL (name)) {
return NULL;
}
node = r_config_node_get (cfg, name);
if (node) {
if (node->flags & CN_RO) {
eprintf ("(error: '%s' config key is read only)\n", name);
return node;
}
oi = node->i_value;
if (node->value) {
ov = strdup (node->value);
if (!ov) {
goto beach;
}
} else {
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup ("");
}
if (node->flags & CN_BOOL) {
bool b = is_true (value);
node->i_value = (ut64) b? 1: 0;
char *value = strdup (r_str_bool (b));
if (value) {
free (node->value);
node->value = value;
}
} else {
if (!value) {
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup ("");
node->i_value = 0;
} else {
if (node->value == value) {
goto beach;
}
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup (value);
if (IS_DIGIT (*value)) {
if (strchr (value, '/')) {
node->i_value = r_num_get (cfg->num, value);
} else {
node->i_value = r_num_math (cfg->num, value);
}
} else {
node->i_value = 0;
}
node->flags |= CN_INT;
}
}
} else { // Create a new RConfigNode
oi = UT64_MAX;
if (!cfg->lock) {
node = r_config_node_new (name, value);
if (node) {
if (value && is_bool (value)) {
node->flags |= CN_BOOL;
node->i_value = is_true (value)? 1: 0;
}
if (cfg->ht) {
ht_insert (cfg->ht, node->name, node);
r_list_append (cfg->nodes, node);
cfg->n_nodes++;
}
} else {
eprintf ("r_config_set: unable to create a new RConfigNode\n");
}
} else {
eprintf ("r_config_set: variable '%s' not found\n", name);
}
}
if (node && node->setter) {
int ret = node->setter (cfg->user, node);
if (ret == false) {
if (oi != UT64_MAX) {
node->i_value = oi;
}
free (node->value);
node->value = strdup (ov? ov: "");
}
}
beach:
free (ov);
return node;
}
Commit Message: Fix #7698 - UAF in r_config_set when loading a dex
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 6,361
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int is_fault_pfn(pfn_t pfn)
{
return pfn == fault_pfn;
}
Commit Message: KVM: unmap pages from the iommu when slots are removed
commit 32f6daad4651a748a58a3ab6da0611862175722f upstream.
We've been adding new mappings, but not destroying old mappings.
This can lead to a page leak as pages are pinned using
get_user_pages, but only unpinned with put_page if they still
exist in the memslots list on vm shutdown. A memslot that is
destroyed while an iommu domain is enabled for the guest will
therefore result in an elevated page reference count that is
never cleared.
Additionally, without this fix, the iommu is only programmed
with the first translation for a gpa. This can result in
peer-to-peer errors if a mapping is destroyed and replaced by a
new mapping at the same gpa as the iommu will still be pointing
to the original, pinned memory address.
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 15,779
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_recv_XMotionEvent(rpc_message_t *message, XEvent *xevent)
{
char is_hint;
int32_t x, y, x_root, y_root, same_screen;
uint32_t root, subwindow, time, state;
int error;
if ((error = do_recv_XAnyEvent(message, xevent)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &root)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &subwindow)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &time)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_int32(message, &x)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_int32(message, &y)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_int32(message, &x_root)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_int32(message, &y_root)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_uint32(message, &state)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_char(message, &is_hint)) < 0)
return error;
if ((error = rpc_message_recv_int32(message, &same_screen)) < 0)
return error;
xevent->xmotion.root = root;
xevent->xmotion.subwindow = subwindow;
xevent->xmotion.time = time;
xevent->xmotion.x = x;
xevent->xmotion.y = y;
xevent->xmotion.x_root = x_root;
xevent->xmotion.y_root = y_root;
xevent->xmotion.state = state;
xevent->xmotion.is_hint = is_hint;
xevent->xmotion.same_screen = same_screen;
return RPC_ERROR_NO_ERROR;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 25,363
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xps_find_sfnt_table(xps_font_t *font, const char *name, int *lengthp)
{
int offset;
int ntables;
int i;
if (font->length < 12)
return -1;
if (!memcmp(font->data, "ttcf", 4))
{
int nfonts = u32(font->data + 8);
if (font->subfontid < 0 || font->subfontid >= nfonts)
{
gs_warn("Invalid subfont ID");
return -1;
}
offset = u32(font->data + 12 + font->subfontid * 4);
}
else
{
offset = 0;
}
ntables = u16(font->data + offset + 4);
if (font->length < offset + 12 + ntables * 16)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < ntables; i++)
{
byte *entry = font->data + offset + 12 + i * 16;
if (!memcmp(entry, name, 4))
{
if (lengthp)
*lengthp = u32(entry + 12);
return u32(entry + 8);
}
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 19,382
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline Eina_Bool _ewk_frame_handle_key_scrolling(WebCore::Frame* frame, const WebCore::PlatformKeyboardEvent& keyEvent)
{
WebCore::ScrollDirection direction;
WebCore::ScrollGranularity granularity;
int keyCode = keyEvent.windowsVirtualKeyCode();
switch (keyCode) {
case VK_SPACE:
granularity = WebCore::ScrollByPage;
if (keyEvent.shiftKey())
direction = WebCore::ScrollUp;
else
direction = WebCore::ScrollDown;
break;
case VK_NEXT:
granularity = WebCore::ScrollByPage;
direction = WebCore::ScrollDown;
break;
case VK_PRIOR:
granularity = WebCore::ScrollByPage;
direction = WebCore::ScrollUp;
break;
case VK_HOME:
granularity = WebCore::ScrollByDocument;
direction = WebCore::ScrollUp;
break;
case VK_END:
granularity = WebCore::ScrollByDocument;
direction = WebCore::ScrollDown;
break;
case VK_LEFT:
granularity = WebCore::ScrollByLine;
direction = WebCore::ScrollLeft;
break;
case VK_RIGHT:
granularity = WebCore::ScrollByLine;
direction = WebCore::ScrollRight;
break;
case VK_UP:
direction = WebCore::ScrollUp;
if (keyEvent.ctrlKey())
granularity = WebCore::ScrollByDocument;
else
granularity = WebCore::ScrollByLine;
break;
case VK_DOWN:
direction = WebCore::ScrollDown;
if (keyEvent.ctrlKey())
granularity = WebCore::ScrollByDocument;
else
granularity = WebCore::ScrollByLine;
break;
default:
return false;
}
if (frame->eventHandler()->scrollOverflow(direction, granularity))
return false;
frame->view()->scroll(direction, granularity);
return true;
}
Commit Message: [EFL] fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html is crashing
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85879
Patch by Mikhail Pozdnyakov <mikhail.pozdnyakov@intel.com> on 2012-05-17
Reviewed by Noam Rosenthal.
Source/WebKit/efl:
_ewk_frame_smart_del() is considering now that the frame can be present in cache.
loader()->detachFromParent() is only applied for the main frame.
loader()->cancelAndClear() is not used anymore.
* ewk/ewk_frame.cpp:
(_ewk_frame_smart_del):
LayoutTests:
* platform/efl/test_expectations.txt: Removed fast/frames/frame-crash-with-page-cache.html.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117409 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 5,628
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::HasPendingQueries() const {
return !pending_queries_.empty();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 2,102
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofproto_type_wait(const char *datapath_type)
{
const struct ofproto_class *class;
datapath_type = ofproto_normalize_type(datapath_type);
class = ofproto_class_find__(datapath_type);
if (class->type_wait) {
class->type_wait(datapath_type);
}
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 8,159
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int floppy_check_events(struct gendisk *disk,
unsigned int clearing)
{
int drive = (long)disk->private_data;
if (test_bit(FD_DISK_CHANGED_BIT, &UDRS->flags) ||
test_bit(FD_VERIFY_BIT, &UDRS->flags))
return DISK_EVENT_MEDIA_CHANGE;
if (time_after(jiffies, UDRS->last_checked + UDP->checkfreq)) {
if (lock_fdc(drive))
return 0;
poll_drive(false, 0);
process_fd_request();
}
if (test_bit(FD_DISK_CHANGED_BIT, &UDRS->flags) ||
test_bit(FD_VERIFY_BIT, &UDRS->flags) ||
test_bit(drive, &fake_change) ||
drive_no_geom(drive))
return DISK_EVENT_MEDIA_CHANGE;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: floppy: fix div-by-zero in setup_format_params
This fixes a divide by zero error in the setup_format_params function of
the floppy driver.
Two consecutive ioctls can trigger the bug: The first one should set the
drive geometry with such .sect and .rate values for the F_SECT_PER_TRACK
to become zero. Next, the floppy format operation should be called.
A floppy disk is not required to be inserted. An unprivileged user
could trigger the bug if the device is accessible.
The patch checks F_SECT_PER_TRACK for a non-zero value in the
set_geometry function. The proper check should involve a reasonable
upper limit for the .sect and .rate fields, but it could change the
UAPI.
The patch also checks F_SECT_PER_TRACK in the setup_format_params, and
cancels the formatting operation in case of zero.
The bug was found by syzkaller.
Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@ispras.ru>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 5,197
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint8_t single_lfe_channel_element(NeAACDecStruct *hDecoder, bitfile *ld,
uint8_t channel, uint8_t *tag)
{
uint8_t retval = 0;
element sce = {0};
ic_stream *ics = &(sce.ics1);
ALIGN int16_t spec_data[1024] = {0};
sce.element_instance_tag = (uint8_t)faad_getbits(ld, LEN_TAG
DEBUGVAR(1,38,"single_lfe_channel_element(): element_instance_tag"));
*tag = sce.element_instance_tag;
sce.channel = channel;
sce.paired_channel = -1;
retval = individual_channel_stream(hDecoder, &sce, ld, ics, 0, spec_data);
if (retval > 0)
return retval;
/* IS not allowed in single channel */
if (ics->is_used)
return 32;
#ifdef SBR_DEC
/* check if next bitstream element is a fill element */
/* if so, read it now so SBR decoding can be done in case of a file with SBR */
if (faad_showbits(ld, LEN_SE_ID) == ID_FIL)
{
faad_flushbits(ld, LEN_SE_ID);
/* one sbr_info describes a channel_element not a channel! */
if ((retval = fill_element(hDecoder, ld, hDecoder->drc, hDecoder->fr_ch_ele)) > 0)
{
return retval;
}
}
#endif
/* noiseless coding is done, spectral reconstruction is done now */
retval = reconstruct_single_channel(hDecoder, ics, &sce, spec_data);
if (retval > 0)
return retval;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix a couple buffer overflows
https://hackerone.com/reports/502816
https://hackerone.com/reports/507858
https://github.com/videolan/vlc/blob/master/contrib/src/faad2/faad2-fix-overflows.patch
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,889
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebRuntimeFeatures::EnableWorkStealingInScriptRunner(bool enable) {
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::SetWorkStealingInScriptRunnerEnabled(enable);
}
Commit Message: Remove RequireCSSExtensionForFile runtime enabled flag.
The feature has long since been stable (since M64) and doesn't seem
to be a need for this flag.
BUG=788936
Change-Id: I666390b869289c328acb4a2daa5bf4154e1702c0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1324143
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Dave Tapuska <dtapuska@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#607329}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 6,095
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t SoftAVC::setParams(size_t stride) {
ivd_ctl_set_config_ip_t s_ctl_ip;
ivd_ctl_set_config_op_t s_ctl_op;
IV_API_CALL_STATUS_T status;
s_ctl_ip.u4_disp_wd = (UWORD32)stride;
s_ctl_ip.e_frm_skip_mode = IVD_SKIP_NONE;
s_ctl_ip.e_frm_out_mode = IVD_DISPLAY_FRAME_OUT;
s_ctl_ip.e_vid_dec_mode = IVD_DECODE_FRAME;
s_ctl_ip.e_cmd = IVD_CMD_VIDEO_CTL;
s_ctl_ip.e_sub_cmd = IVD_CMD_CTL_SETPARAMS;
s_ctl_ip.u4_size = sizeof(ivd_ctl_set_config_ip_t);
s_ctl_op.u4_size = sizeof(ivd_ctl_set_config_op_t);
ALOGV("Set the run-time (dynamic) parameters stride = %zu", stride);
status = ivdec_api_function(mCodecCtx, (void *)&s_ctl_ip, (void *)&s_ctl_op);
if (status != IV_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("Error in setting the run-time parameters: 0x%x",
s_ctl_op.u4_error_code);
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (avc|hevc|mpeg2)dec
Bug: 27833616
Change-Id: Ic4045a3f56f53b08d0b1264b2a91b8f43e91b738
(cherry picked from commit 87fdee0bc9e3ac4d2a88ef0a8e150cfdf08c161d)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,622
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nfsd4_encode_layoutcommit(struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp, __be32 nfserr,
struct nfsd4_layoutcommit *lcp)
{
struct xdr_stream *xdr = &resp->xdr;
__be32 *p;
if (nfserr)
return nfserr;
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 4);
if (!p)
return nfserr_resource;
*p++ = cpu_to_be32(lcp->lc_size_chg);
if (lcp->lc_size_chg) {
p = xdr_reserve_space(xdr, 8);
if (!p)
return nfserr_resource;
p = xdr_encode_hyper(p, lcp->lc_newsize);
}
return nfs_ok;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 11,930
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int main (int argc, char **argv) {
int c;
bool lock_memory = false;
bool do_daemonize = false;
bool preallocate = false;
int maxcore = 0;
char *username = NULL;
char *pid_file = NULL;
struct passwd *pw;
struct rlimit rlim;
char *buf;
char unit = '\0';
int size_max = 0;
int retval = EXIT_SUCCESS;
/* listening sockets */
static int *l_socket = NULL;
/* udp socket */
static int *u_socket = NULL;
bool protocol_specified = false;
bool tcp_specified = false;
bool udp_specified = false;
bool start_lru_maintainer = false;
bool start_lru_crawler = false;
enum hashfunc_type hash_type = JENKINS_HASH;
uint32_t tocrawl;
uint32_t slab_sizes[MAX_NUMBER_OF_SLAB_CLASSES];
bool use_slab_sizes = false;
char *slab_sizes_unparsed = NULL;
bool slab_chunk_size_changed = false;
char *subopts, *subopts_orig;
char *subopts_value;
enum {
MAXCONNS_FAST = 0,
HASHPOWER_INIT,
SLAB_REASSIGN,
SLAB_AUTOMOVE,
TAIL_REPAIR_TIME,
HASH_ALGORITHM,
LRU_CRAWLER,
LRU_CRAWLER_SLEEP,
LRU_CRAWLER_TOCRAWL,
LRU_MAINTAINER,
HOT_LRU_PCT,
WARM_LRU_PCT,
HOT_MAX_AGE,
WARM_MAX_FACTOR,
TEMPORARY_TTL,
IDLE_TIMEOUT,
WATCHER_LOGBUF_SIZE,
WORKER_LOGBUF_SIZE,
SLAB_SIZES,
SLAB_CHUNK_MAX,
TRACK_SIZES,
NO_INLINE_ASCII_RESP,
MODERN
};
char *const subopts_tokens[] = {
[MAXCONNS_FAST] = "maxconns_fast",
[HASHPOWER_INIT] = "hashpower",
[SLAB_REASSIGN] = "slab_reassign",
[SLAB_AUTOMOVE] = "slab_automove",
[TAIL_REPAIR_TIME] = "tail_repair_time",
[HASH_ALGORITHM] = "hash_algorithm",
[LRU_CRAWLER] = "lru_crawler",
[LRU_CRAWLER_SLEEP] = "lru_crawler_sleep",
[LRU_CRAWLER_TOCRAWL] = "lru_crawler_tocrawl",
[LRU_MAINTAINER] = "lru_maintainer",
[HOT_LRU_PCT] = "hot_lru_pct",
[WARM_LRU_PCT] = "warm_lru_pct",
[HOT_MAX_AGE] = "hot_max_age",
[WARM_MAX_FACTOR] = "warm_max_factor",
[TEMPORARY_TTL] = "temporary_ttl",
[IDLE_TIMEOUT] = "idle_timeout",
[WATCHER_LOGBUF_SIZE] = "watcher_logbuf_size",
[WORKER_LOGBUF_SIZE] = "worker_logbuf_size",
[SLAB_SIZES] = "slab_sizes",
[SLAB_CHUNK_MAX] = "slab_chunk_max",
[TRACK_SIZES] = "track_sizes",
[NO_INLINE_ASCII_RESP] = "no_inline_ascii_resp",
[MODERN] = "modern",
NULL
};
if (!sanitycheck()) {
return EX_OSERR;
}
/* handle SIGINT and SIGTERM */
signal(SIGINT, sig_handler);
signal(SIGTERM, sig_handler);
/* init settings */
settings_init();
/* Run regardless of initializing it later */
init_lru_crawler();
init_lru_maintainer();
/* set stderr non-buffering (for running under, say, daemontools) */
setbuf(stderr, NULL);
/* process arguments */
while (-1 != (c = getopt(argc, argv,
"a:" /* access mask for unix socket */
"A" /* enable admin shutdown commannd */
"p:" /* TCP port number to listen on */
"s:" /* unix socket path to listen on */
"U:" /* UDP port number to listen on */
"m:" /* max memory to use for items in megabytes */
"M" /* return error on memory exhausted */
"c:" /* max simultaneous connections */
"k" /* lock down all paged memory */
"hiV" /* help, licence info, version */
"r" /* maximize core file limit */
"v" /* verbose */
"d" /* daemon mode */
"l:" /* interface to listen on */
"u:" /* user identity to run as */
"P:" /* save PID in file */
"f:" /* factor? */
"n:" /* minimum space allocated for key+value+flags */
"t:" /* threads */
"D:" /* prefix delimiter? */
"L" /* Large memory pages */
"R:" /* max requests per event */
"C" /* Disable use of CAS */
"b:" /* backlog queue limit */
"B:" /* Binding protocol */
"I:" /* Max item size */
"S" /* Sasl ON */
"F" /* Disable flush_all */
"X" /* Disable dump commands */
"o:" /* Extended generic options */
))) {
switch (c) {
case 'A':
/* enables "shutdown" command */
settings.shutdown_command = true;
break;
case 'a':
/* access for unix domain socket, as octal mask (like chmod)*/
settings.access= strtol(optarg,NULL,8);
break;
case 'U':
settings.udpport = atoi(optarg);
udp_specified = true;
break;
case 'p':
settings.port = atoi(optarg);
tcp_specified = true;
break;
case 's':
settings.socketpath = optarg;
break;
case 'm':
settings.maxbytes = ((size_t)atoi(optarg)) * 1024 * 1024;
break;
case 'M':
settings.evict_to_free = 0;
break;
case 'c':
settings.maxconns = atoi(optarg);
if (settings.maxconns <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Maximum connections must be greater than 0\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case 'h':
usage();
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
case 'i':
usage_license();
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
case 'V':
printf(PACKAGE " " VERSION "\n");
exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
case 'k':
lock_memory = true;
break;
case 'v':
settings.verbose++;
break;
case 'l':
if (settings.inter != NULL) {
if (strstr(settings.inter, optarg) != NULL) {
break;
}
size_t len = strlen(settings.inter) + strlen(optarg) + 2;
char *p = malloc(len);
if (p == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to allocate memory\n");
return 1;
}
snprintf(p, len, "%s,%s", settings.inter, optarg);
free(settings.inter);
settings.inter = p;
} else {
settings.inter= strdup(optarg);
}
break;
case 'd':
do_daemonize = true;
break;
case 'r':
maxcore = 1;
break;
case 'R':
settings.reqs_per_event = atoi(optarg);
if (settings.reqs_per_event == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Number of requests per event must be greater than 0\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case 'u':
username = optarg;
break;
case 'P':
pid_file = optarg;
break;
case 'f':
settings.factor = atof(optarg);
if (settings.factor <= 1.0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Factor must be greater than 1\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case 'n':
settings.chunk_size = atoi(optarg);
if (settings.chunk_size == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Chunk size must be greater than 0\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case 't':
settings.num_threads = atoi(optarg);
if (settings.num_threads <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Number of threads must be greater than 0\n");
return 1;
}
/* There're other problems when you get above 64 threads.
* In the future we should portably detect # of cores for the
* default.
*/
if (settings.num_threads > 64) {
fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Setting a high number of worker"
"threads is not recommended.\n"
" Set this value to the number of cores in"
" your machine or less.\n");
}
break;
case 'D':
if (! optarg || ! optarg[0]) {
fprintf(stderr, "No delimiter specified\n");
return 1;
}
settings.prefix_delimiter = optarg[0];
settings.detail_enabled = 1;
break;
case 'L' :
if (enable_large_pages() == 0) {
preallocate = true;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot enable large pages on this system\n"
"(There is no Linux support as of this version)\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case 'C' :
settings.use_cas = false;
break;
case 'b' :
settings.backlog = atoi(optarg);
break;
case 'B':
protocol_specified = true;
if (strcmp(optarg, "auto") == 0) {
settings.binding_protocol = negotiating_prot;
} else if (strcmp(optarg, "binary") == 0) {
settings.binding_protocol = binary_prot;
} else if (strcmp(optarg, "ascii") == 0) {
settings.binding_protocol = ascii_prot;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid value for binding protocol: %s\n"
" -- should be one of auto, binary, or ascii\n", optarg);
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
break;
case 'I':
buf = strdup(optarg);
unit = buf[strlen(buf)-1];
if (unit == 'k' || unit == 'm' ||
unit == 'K' || unit == 'M') {
buf[strlen(buf)-1] = '\0';
size_max = atoi(buf);
if (unit == 'k' || unit == 'K')
size_max *= 1024;
if (unit == 'm' || unit == 'M')
size_max *= 1024 * 1024;
settings.item_size_max = size_max;
} else {
settings.item_size_max = atoi(buf);
}
free(buf);
if (settings.item_size_max < 1024) {
fprintf(stderr, "Item max size cannot be less than 1024 bytes.\n");
return 1;
}
if (settings.item_size_max > (settings.maxbytes / 4)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot set item size limit higher than 1/4 of memory max.\n");
return 1;
}
if (settings.item_size_max > (1024 * 1024 * 1024)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot set item size limit higher than a gigabyte.\n");
return 1;
}
if (settings.item_size_max > 1024 * 1024) {
if (!slab_chunk_size_changed) {
settings.slab_chunk_size_max = 524288;
}
}
break;
case 'S': /* set Sasl authentication to true. Default is false */
#ifndef ENABLE_SASL
fprintf(stderr, "This server is not built with SASL support.\n");
exit(EX_USAGE);
#endif
settings.sasl = true;
break;
case 'F' :
settings.flush_enabled = false;
break;
case 'X' :
settings.dump_enabled = false;
break;
case 'o': /* It's sub-opts time! */
subopts_orig = subopts = strdup(optarg); /* getsubopt() changes the original args */
while (*subopts != '\0') {
switch (getsubopt(&subopts, subopts_tokens, &subopts_value)) {
case MAXCONNS_FAST:
settings.maxconns_fast = true;
break;
case HASHPOWER_INIT:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing numeric argument for hashpower\n");
return 1;
}
settings.hashpower_init = atoi(subopts_value);
if (settings.hashpower_init < 12) {
fprintf(stderr, "Initial hashtable multiplier of %d is too low\n",
settings.hashpower_init);
return 1;
} else if (settings.hashpower_init > 64) {
fprintf(stderr, "Initial hashtable multiplier of %d is too high\n"
"Choose a value based on \"STAT hash_power_level\" from a running instance\n",
settings.hashpower_init);
return 1;
}
break;
case SLAB_REASSIGN:
settings.slab_reassign = true;
break;
case SLAB_AUTOMOVE:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
settings.slab_automove = 1;
break;
}
settings.slab_automove = atoi(subopts_value);
if (settings.slab_automove < 0 || settings.slab_automove > 2) {
fprintf(stderr, "slab_automove must be between 0 and 2\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case TAIL_REPAIR_TIME:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing numeric argument for tail_repair_time\n");
return 1;
}
settings.tail_repair_time = atoi(subopts_value);
if (settings.tail_repair_time < 10) {
fprintf(stderr, "Cannot set tail_repair_time to less than 10 seconds\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case HASH_ALGORITHM:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing hash_algorithm argument\n");
return 1;
};
if (strcmp(subopts_value, "jenkins") == 0) {
hash_type = JENKINS_HASH;
} else if (strcmp(subopts_value, "murmur3") == 0) {
hash_type = MURMUR3_HASH;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown hash_algorithm option (jenkins, murmur3)\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case LRU_CRAWLER:
start_lru_crawler = true;
break;
case LRU_CRAWLER_SLEEP:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing lru_crawler_sleep value\n");
return 1;
}
settings.lru_crawler_sleep = atoi(subopts_value);
if (settings.lru_crawler_sleep > 1000000 || settings.lru_crawler_sleep < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "LRU crawler sleep must be between 0 and 1 second\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case LRU_CRAWLER_TOCRAWL:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing lru_crawler_tocrawl value\n");
return 1;
}
if (!safe_strtoul(subopts_value, &tocrawl)) {
fprintf(stderr, "lru_crawler_tocrawl takes a numeric 32bit value\n");
return 1;
}
settings.lru_crawler_tocrawl = tocrawl;
break;
case LRU_MAINTAINER:
start_lru_maintainer = true;
settings.lru_segmented = true;
break;
case HOT_LRU_PCT:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing hot_lru_pct argument\n");
return 1;
}
settings.hot_lru_pct = atoi(subopts_value);
if (settings.hot_lru_pct < 1 || settings.hot_lru_pct >= 80) {
fprintf(stderr, "hot_lru_pct must be > 1 and < 80\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case WARM_LRU_PCT:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing warm_lru_pct argument\n");
return 1;
}
settings.warm_lru_pct = atoi(subopts_value);
if (settings.warm_lru_pct < 1 || settings.warm_lru_pct >= 80) {
fprintf(stderr, "warm_lru_pct must be > 1 and < 80\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case HOT_MAX_AGE:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing hot_max_age argument\n");
return 1;
}
if (!safe_strtoul(subopts_value, &settings.hot_max_age)) {
fprintf(stderr, "invalid argument to hot_max_age\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case WARM_MAX_FACTOR:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing warm_max_factor argument\n");
return 1;
}
settings.warm_max_factor = atof(subopts_value);
if (settings.warm_max_factor <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "warm_max_factor must be > 0\n");
return 1;
}
break;
case TEMPORARY_TTL:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing temporary_ttl argument\n");
return 1;
}
settings.temp_lru = true;
settings.temporary_ttl = atoi(subopts_value);
break;
case IDLE_TIMEOUT:
settings.idle_timeout = atoi(subopts_value);
break;
case WATCHER_LOGBUF_SIZE:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing watcher_logbuf_size argument\n");
return 1;
}
if (!safe_strtoul(subopts_value, &settings.logger_watcher_buf_size)) {
fprintf(stderr, "could not parse argument to watcher_logbuf_size\n");
return 1;
}
settings.logger_watcher_buf_size *= 1024; /* kilobytes */
break;
case WORKER_LOGBUF_SIZE:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing worker_logbuf_size argument\n");
return 1;
}
if (!safe_strtoul(subopts_value, &settings.logger_buf_size)) {
fprintf(stderr, "could not parse argument to worker_logbuf_size\n");
return 1;
}
settings.logger_buf_size *= 1024; /* kilobytes */
case SLAB_SIZES:
slab_sizes_unparsed = subopts_value;
break;
case SLAB_CHUNK_MAX:
if (subopts_value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing slab_chunk_max argument\n");
}
if (!safe_strtol(subopts_value, &settings.slab_chunk_size_max)) {
fprintf(stderr, "could not parse argument to slab_chunk_max\n");
}
slab_chunk_size_changed = true;
break;
case TRACK_SIZES:
item_stats_sizes_init();
break;
case NO_INLINE_ASCII_RESP:
settings.inline_ascii_response = false;
break;
case MODERN:
/* Modernized defaults. Need to add equivalent no_* flags
* before making truly default. */
if (!slab_chunk_size_changed) {
settings.slab_chunk_size_max = 524288;
}
settings.slab_reassign = true;
settings.slab_automove = 1;
settings.maxconns_fast = true;
settings.inline_ascii_response = false;
settings.lru_segmented = true;
hash_type = MURMUR3_HASH;
start_lru_crawler = true;
start_lru_maintainer = true;
break;
default:
printf("Illegal suboption \"%s\"\n", subopts_value);
return 1;
}
}
free(subopts_orig);
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Illegal argument \"%c\"\n", c);
return 1;
}
}
if (settings.slab_chunk_size_max > settings.item_size_max) {
fprintf(stderr, "slab_chunk_max (bytes: %d) cannot be larger than -I (item_size_max %d)\n",
settings.slab_chunk_size_max, settings.item_size_max);
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
if (settings.item_size_max % settings.slab_chunk_size_max != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "-I (item_size_max: %d) must be evenly divisible by slab_chunk_max (bytes: %d)\n",
settings.item_size_max, settings.slab_chunk_size_max);
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
if (settings.slab_page_size % settings.slab_chunk_size_max != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "slab_chunk_max (bytes: %d) must divide evenly into %d (slab_page_size)\n",
settings.slab_chunk_size_max, settings.slab_page_size);
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
/*if (settings.slab_chunk_size_max == 16384 && settings.factor == 1.25) {
settings.factor = 1.08;
}*/
if (slab_sizes_unparsed != NULL) {
if (_parse_slab_sizes(slab_sizes_unparsed, slab_sizes)) {
use_slab_sizes = true;
} else {
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
}
if (settings.hot_lru_pct + settings.warm_lru_pct > 80) {
fprintf(stderr, "hot_lru_pct + warm_lru_pct cannot be more than 80%% combined\n");
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
if (settings.temp_lru && !start_lru_maintainer) {
fprintf(stderr, "temporary_ttl requires lru_maintainer to be enabled\n");
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
if (hash_init(hash_type) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to initialize hash_algorithm!\n");
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
/*
* Use one workerthread to serve each UDP port if the user specified
* multiple ports
*/
if (settings.inter != NULL && strchr(settings.inter, ',')) {
settings.num_threads_per_udp = 1;
} else {
settings.num_threads_per_udp = settings.num_threads;
}
if (settings.sasl) {
if (!protocol_specified) {
settings.binding_protocol = binary_prot;
} else {
if (settings.binding_protocol != binary_prot) {
fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: You cannot allow the ASCII protocol while using SASL.\n");
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
}
}
if (tcp_specified && !udp_specified) {
settings.udpport = settings.port;
} else if (udp_specified && !tcp_specified) {
settings.port = settings.udpport;
}
if (maxcore != 0) {
struct rlimit rlim_new;
/*
* First try raising to infinity; if that fails, try bringing
* the soft limit to the hard.
*/
if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) == 0) {
rlim_new.rlim_cur = rlim_new.rlim_max = RLIM_INFINITY;
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim_new)!= 0) {
/* failed. try raising just to the old max */
rlim_new.rlim_cur = rlim_new.rlim_max = rlim.rlim_max;
(void)setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim_new);
}
}
/*
* getrlimit again to see what we ended up with. Only fail if
* the soft limit ends up 0, because then no core files will be
* created at all.
*/
if ((getrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) != 0) || rlim.rlim_cur == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to ensure corefile creation\n");
exit(EX_OSERR);
}
}
/*
* If needed, increase rlimits to allow as many connections
* as needed.
*/
if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to getrlimit number of files\n");
exit(EX_OSERR);
} else {
rlim.rlim_cur = settings.maxconns;
rlim.rlim_max = settings.maxconns;
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to set rlimit for open files. Try starting as root or requesting smaller maxconns value.\n");
exit(EX_OSERR);
}
}
/* lose root privileges if we have them */
if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
if (username == 0 || *username == '\0') {
fprintf(stderr, "can't run as root without the -u switch\n");
exit(EX_USAGE);
}
if ((pw = getpwnam(username)) == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "can't find the user %s to switch to\n", username);
exit(EX_NOUSER);
}
if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0 || setuid(pw->pw_uid) < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to assume identity of user %s\n", username);
exit(EX_OSERR);
}
}
/* Initialize Sasl if -S was specified */
if (settings.sasl) {
init_sasl();
}
/* daemonize if requested */
/* if we want to ensure our ability to dump core, don't chdir to / */
if (do_daemonize) {
if (sigignore(SIGHUP) == -1) {
perror("Failed to ignore SIGHUP");
}
if (daemonize(maxcore, settings.verbose) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "failed to daemon() in order to daemonize\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
/* lock paged memory if needed */
if (lock_memory) {
#ifdef HAVE_MLOCKALL
int res = mlockall(MCL_CURRENT | MCL_FUTURE);
if (res != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "warning: -k invalid, mlockall() failed: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
}
#else
fprintf(stderr, "warning: -k invalid, mlockall() not supported on this platform. proceeding without.\n");
#endif
}
/* initialize main thread libevent instance */
main_base = event_init();
/* initialize other stuff */
logger_init();
stats_init();
assoc_init(settings.hashpower_init);
conn_init();
slabs_init(settings.maxbytes, settings.factor, preallocate,
use_slab_sizes ? slab_sizes : NULL);
/*
* ignore SIGPIPE signals; we can use errno == EPIPE if we
* need that information
*/
if (sigignore(SIGPIPE) == -1) {
perror("failed to ignore SIGPIPE; sigaction");
exit(EX_OSERR);
}
/* start up worker threads if MT mode */
memcached_thread_init(settings.num_threads);
if (start_assoc_maintenance_thread() == -1) {
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (start_lru_crawler && start_item_crawler_thread() != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to enable LRU crawler thread\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (start_lru_maintainer && start_lru_maintainer_thread() != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to enable LRU maintainer thread\n");
return 1;
}
if (settings.slab_reassign &&
start_slab_maintenance_thread() == -1) {
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (settings.idle_timeout && start_conn_timeout_thread() == -1) {
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
/* initialise clock event */
clock_handler(0, 0, 0);
/* create unix mode sockets after dropping privileges */
if (settings.socketpath != NULL) {
errno = 0;
if (server_socket_unix(settings.socketpath,settings.access)) {
vperror("failed to listen on UNIX socket: %s", settings.socketpath);
exit(EX_OSERR);
}
}
/* create the listening socket, bind it, and init */
if (settings.socketpath == NULL) {
const char *portnumber_filename = getenv("MEMCACHED_PORT_FILENAME");
char *temp_portnumber_filename = NULL;
size_t len;
FILE *portnumber_file = NULL;
if (portnumber_filename != NULL) {
len = strlen(portnumber_filename)+4+1;
temp_portnumber_filename = malloc(len);
snprintf(temp_portnumber_filename,
len,
"%s.lck", portnumber_filename);
portnumber_file = fopen(temp_portnumber_filename, "a");
if (portnumber_file == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open \"%s\": %s\n",
temp_portnumber_filename, strerror(errno));
}
}
errno = 0;
if (settings.port && server_sockets(settings.port, tcp_transport,
portnumber_file)) {
vperror("failed to listen on TCP port %d", settings.port);
exit(EX_OSERR);
}
/*
* initialization order: first create the listening sockets
* (may need root on low ports), then drop root if needed,
* then daemonise if needed, then init libevent (in some cases
* descriptors created by libevent wouldn't survive forking).
*/
/* create the UDP listening socket and bind it */
errno = 0;
if (settings.udpport && server_sockets(settings.udpport, udp_transport,
portnumber_file)) {
vperror("failed to listen on UDP port %d", settings.udpport);
exit(EX_OSERR);
}
if (portnumber_file) {
fclose(portnumber_file);
rename(temp_portnumber_filename, portnumber_filename);
free(temp_portnumber_filename);
}
}
/* Give the sockets a moment to open. I know this is dumb, but the error
* is only an advisory.
*/
usleep(1000);
if (stats_state.curr_conns + stats_state.reserved_fds >= settings.maxconns - 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Maxconns setting is too low, use -c to increase.\n");
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if (pid_file != NULL) {
save_pid(pid_file);
}
/* Drop privileges no longer needed */
drop_privileges();
/* Initialize the uriencode lookup table. */
uriencode_init();
/* enter the event loop */
if (event_base_loop(main_base, 0) != 0) {
retval = EXIT_FAILURE;
}
stop_assoc_maintenance_thread();
/* remove the PID file if we're a daemon */
if (do_daemonize)
remove_pidfile(pid_file);
/* Clean up strdup() call for bind() address */
if (settings.inter)
free(settings.inter);
if (l_socket)
free(l_socket);
if (u_socket)
free(u_socket);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Don't overflow item refcount on get
Counts as a miss if the refcount is too high. ASCII multigets are the only
time refcounts can be held for so long.
doing a dirty read of refcount. is aligned.
trying to avoid adding an extra refcount branch for all calls of item_get due
to performance. might be able to move it in there after logging refactoring
simplifies some of the branches.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 6,287
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bgp_attr_parse (struct peer *peer, struct attr *attr, bgp_size_t size,
struct bgp_nlri *mp_update, struct bgp_nlri *mp_withdraw)
{
int ret;
u_char flag = 0;
u_char type = 0;
bgp_size_t length;
u_char *startp, *endp;
u_char *attr_endp;
u_char seen[BGP_ATTR_BITMAP_SIZE];
/* we need the as4_path only until we have synthesized the as_path with it */
/* same goes for as4_aggregator */
struct aspath *as4_path = NULL;
as_t as4_aggregator = 0;
struct in_addr as4_aggregator_addr = { 0 };
/* Initialize bitmap. */
memset (seen, 0, BGP_ATTR_BITMAP_SIZE);
/* End pointer of BGP attribute. */
endp = BGP_INPUT_PNT (peer) + size;
/* Get attributes to the end of attribute length. */
while (BGP_INPUT_PNT (peer) < endp)
{
/* Check remaining length check.*/
if (endp - BGP_INPUT_PNT (peer) < BGP_ATTR_MIN_LEN)
{
/* XXX warning: long int format, int arg (arg 5) */
zlog (peer->log, LOG_WARNING,
"%s: error BGP attribute length %lu is smaller than min len",
peer->host,
(unsigned long) (endp - STREAM_PNT (BGP_INPUT (peer))));
bgp_notify_send (peer,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ERR,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ATTR_LENG_ERR);
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR;
}
/* Fetch attribute flag and type. */
startp = BGP_INPUT_PNT (peer);
/* "The lower-order four bits of the Attribute Flags octet are
unused. They MUST be zero when sent and MUST be ignored when
received." */
flag = 0xF0 & stream_getc (BGP_INPUT (peer));
type = stream_getc (BGP_INPUT (peer));
/* Check whether Extended-Length applies and is in bounds */
if (CHECK_FLAG (flag, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_EXTLEN)
&& ((endp - startp) < (BGP_ATTR_MIN_LEN + 1)))
{
zlog (peer->log, LOG_WARNING,
"%s: Extended length set, but just %lu bytes of attr header",
peer->host,
(unsigned long) (endp - STREAM_PNT (BGP_INPUT (peer))));
bgp_notify_send (peer,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ERR,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ATTR_LENG_ERR);
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR;
}
/* Check extended attribue length bit. */
if (CHECK_FLAG (flag, BGP_ATTR_FLAG_EXTLEN))
length = stream_getw (BGP_INPUT (peer));
else
length = stream_getc (BGP_INPUT (peer));
/* If any attribute appears more than once in the UPDATE
message, then the Error Subcode is set to Malformed Attribute
List. */
if (CHECK_BITMAP (seen, type))
{
zlog (peer->log, LOG_WARNING,
"%s: error BGP attribute type %d appears twice in a message",
peer->host, type);
bgp_notify_send (peer,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ERR,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_MAL_ATTR);
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR;
}
/* Set type to bitmap to check duplicate attribute. `type' is
unsigned char so it never overflow bitmap range. */
SET_BITMAP (seen, type);
/* Overflow check. */
attr_endp = BGP_INPUT_PNT (peer) + length;
if (attr_endp > endp)
{
zlog (peer->log, LOG_WARNING,
"%s: BGP type %d length %d is too large, attribute total length is %d. attr_endp is %p. endp is %p", peer->host, type, length, size, attr_endp, endp);
bgp_notify_send (peer,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ERR,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ATTR_LENG_ERR);
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR;
}
struct bgp_attr_parser_args attr_args = {
.peer = peer,
.length = length,
.attr = attr,
.type = type,
.flags = flag,
.startp = startp,
.total = attr_endp - startp,
};
/* If any recognized attribute has Attribute Flags that conflict
with the Attribute Type Code, then the Error Subcode is set to
Attribute Flags Error. The Data field contains the erroneous
attribute (type, length and value). */
if (bgp_attr_flag_invalid (&attr_args))
{
bgp_attr_parse_ret_t ret;
ret = bgp_attr_malformed (&attr_args,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ATTR_FLAG_ERR,
attr_args.total);
if (ret == BGP_ATTR_PARSE_PROCEED)
continue;
return ret;
}
/* OK check attribute and store it's value. */
switch (type)
{
case BGP_ATTR_ORIGIN:
ret = bgp_attr_origin (&attr_args);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_AS_PATH:
ret = bgp_attr_aspath (&attr_args);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_AS4_PATH:
ret = bgp_attr_as4_path (&attr_args, &as4_path);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_NEXT_HOP:
ret = bgp_attr_nexthop (&attr_args);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_MULTI_EXIT_DISC:
ret = bgp_attr_med (&attr_args);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_LOCAL_PREF:
ret = bgp_attr_local_pref (&attr_args);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_ATOMIC_AGGREGATE:
ret = bgp_attr_atomic (&attr_args);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_AGGREGATOR:
ret = bgp_attr_aggregator (&attr_args);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_AS4_AGGREGATOR:
ret = bgp_attr_as4_aggregator (&attr_args,
&as4_aggregator,
&as4_aggregator_addr);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_COMMUNITIES:
ret = bgp_attr_community (&attr_args);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_ORIGINATOR_ID:
ret = bgp_attr_originator_id (&attr_args);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_CLUSTER_LIST:
ret = bgp_attr_cluster_list (&attr_args);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_MP_REACH_NLRI:
ret = bgp_mp_reach_parse (&attr_args, mp_update);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_MP_UNREACH_NLRI:
ret = bgp_mp_unreach_parse (&attr_args, mp_withdraw);
break;
case BGP_ATTR_EXT_COMMUNITIES:
ret = bgp_attr_ext_communities (&attr_args);
break;
default:
ret = bgp_attr_unknown (&attr_args);
break;
}
/* If hard error occured immediately return to the caller. */
if (ret == BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR)
{
zlog (peer->log, LOG_WARNING,
"%s: Attribute %s, parse error",
peer->host,
LOOKUP (attr_str, type));
bgp_notify_send (peer,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ERR,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_MAL_ATTR);
if (as4_path)
aspath_unintern (&as4_path);
return ret;
}
if (ret == BGP_ATTR_PARSE_WITHDRAW)
{
zlog (peer->log, LOG_WARNING,
"%s: Attribute %s, parse error - treating as withdrawal",
peer->host,
LOOKUP (attr_str, type));
if (as4_path)
aspath_unintern (&as4_path);
return ret;
}
/* Check the fetched length. */
if (BGP_INPUT_PNT (peer) != attr_endp)
{
zlog (peer->log, LOG_WARNING,
"%s: BGP attribute %s, fetch error",
peer->host, LOOKUP (attr_str, type));
bgp_notify_send (peer,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ERR,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ATTR_LENG_ERR);
if (as4_path)
aspath_unintern (&as4_path);
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR;
}
}
/* Check final read pointer is same as end pointer. */
if (BGP_INPUT_PNT (peer) != endp)
{
zlog (peer->log, LOG_WARNING,
"%s: BGP attribute %s, length mismatch",
peer->host, LOOKUP (attr_str, type));
bgp_notify_send (peer,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ERR,
BGP_NOTIFY_UPDATE_ATTR_LENG_ERR);
if (as4_path)
aspath_unintern (&as4_path);
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR;
}
/*
* At this place we can see whether we got AS4_PATH and/or
* AS4_AGGREGATOR from a 16Bit peer and act accordingly.
* We can not do this before we've read all attributes because
* the as4 handling does not say whether AS4_PATH has to be sent
* after AS_PATH or not - and when AS4_AGGREGATOR will be send
* in relationship to AGGREGATOR.
* So, to be defensive, we are not relying on any order and read
* all attributes first, including these 32bit ones, and now,
* afterwards, we look what and if something is to be done for as4.
*/
if (bgp_attr_munge_as4_attrs (peer, attr, as4_path,
as4_aggregator, &as4_aggregator_addr))
{
if (as4_path)
aspath_unintern (&as4_path);
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_ERROR;
}
/* At this stage, we have done all fiddling with as4, and the
* resulting info is in attr->aggregator resp. attr->aspath
* so we can chuck as4_aggregator and as4_path alltogether in
* order to save memory
*/
if (as4_path)
{
aspath_unintern (&as4_path); /* unintern - it is in the hash */
/* The flag that we got this is still there, but that does not
* do any trouble
*/
}
/*
* The "rest" of the code does nothing with as4_aggregator.
* there is no memory attached specifically which is not part
* of the attr.
* so ignoring just means do nothing.
*/
/*
* Finally do the checks on the aspath we did not do yet
* because we waited for a potentially synthesized aspath.
*/
if (attr->flag & (ATTR_FLAG_BIT(BGP_ATTR_AS_PATH)))
{
ret = bgp_attr_aspath_check (peer, attr);
if (ret != BGP_ATTR_PARSE_PROCEED)
return ret;
}
/* Finally intern unknown attribute. */
if (attr->extra && attr->extra->transit)
attr->extra->transit = transit_intern (attr->extra->transit);
return BGP_ATTR_PARSE_PROCEED;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 26,947
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static input_translation_t *setup_translation_table (exporter_ipfix_domain_t *exporter, uint16_t id) {
input_translation_t *table;
extension_map_t *extension_map;
uint32_t i, ipv6, offset, next_extension;
size_t size_required;
ipv6 = 0;
table = GetTranslationTable(exporter, id);
if ( !table ) {
LogInfo("Process_ipfix: [%u] Add template %u", exporter->info.id, id);
table = add_translation_table(exporter, id);
if ( !table ) {
return NULL;
}
size_required = Max_num_extensions * sizeof(uint16_t) + sizeof(extension_map_t);
size_required = (size_required + 3) &~(size_t)3;
extension_map = malloc(size_required);
if ( !extension_map ) {
LogError("Process_ipfix: Panic! malloc() error in %s line %d: %s", __FILE__, __LINE__, strerror (errno));
return NULL;
}
extension_map->type = ExtensionMapType;
extension_map->size = sizeof(extension_map_t);
extension_map->map_id = INIT_ID;
extension_map->extension_size = 0;
table->extension_info.map = extension_map;
table->extension_map_changed = 1;
table->number_of_sequences = 0;
} else {
extension_map = table->extension_info.map;
extension_map->size = sizeof(extension_map_t);
extension_map->extension_size = 0;
free((void *)table->sequence);
dbg_printf("[%u] Refresh template %u\n", exporter->info.id, id);
}
table->sequence = calloc(cache.max_ipfix_elements, sizeof(sequence_map_t));
if ( !table->sequence ) {
LogError("Process_ipfix: Panic! malloc() error in %s line %d: %s", __FILE__, __LINE__, strerror (errno));
return NULL;
}
table->number_of_sequences = 0;
table->max_number_of_sequences = cache.max_ipfix_elements;
table->updated = time(NULL);
table->flags = 0;
SetFlag(table->flags, FLAG_PKG_64);
SetFlag(table->flags, FLAG_BYTES_64);
table->delta_time = 0;
table->icmpTypeCodeIPv4 = 0;
table->router_ip_offset = 0;
table->received_offset = 0;
dbg_printf("[%u] Build sequence table %u\n", exporter->info.id, id);
table->id = id;
/*
* common data block: The common record is expected in the output stream. If not available
* in the template, fill values with 0
*/
offset = BYTE_OFFSET_first;
if ( cache.lookup_info[IPFIX_flowStartDeltaMicroseconds].found ) {
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_flowStartDeltaMicroseconds, NULL, &table->flow_start);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_flowEndDeltaMicroseconds, NULL, &table->flow_end);
offset = BYTE_OFFSET_first + 8;
table->delta_time = 1;
dbg_printf("Time stamp: flow start/end delta microseconds: %u/%u\n",
IPFIX_flowStartDeltaMicroseconds, IPFIX_flowEndDeltaMicroseconds);
} else if ( cache.lookup_info[IPFIX_flowStartMilliseconds].found ) {
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_flowStartMilliseconds, NULL, &table->flow_start);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_flowEndMilliseconds, NULL, &table->flow_end);
offset = BYTE_OFFSET_first + 8;
dbg_printf("Time stamp: flow start/end absolute milliseconds: %u/%u\n",
IPFIX_flowStartMilliseconds, IPFIX_flowEndMilliseconds);
} else if ( cache.lookup_info[IPFIX_flowStartSysUpTime].found ) {
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_flowStartSysUpTime, NULL, &table->flow_start);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_flowEndSysUpTime, NULL, &table->flow_end);
offset = BYTE_OFFSET_first + 8;
dbg_printf("Time stamp: flow start/end relative milliseconds: %u/%u\n",
IPFIX_flowStartSysUpTime, IPFIX_flowEndSysUpTime);
} else if ( cache.lookup_info[IPFIX_flowStartSeconds].found ) {
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_flowStartSeconds, NULL, &table->flow_start);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_flowEndSeconds, NULL, &table->flow_end);
offset = BYTE_OFFSET_first + 8;
dbg_printf("Time stamp: flow start/end absolute seconds: %u/%u\n",
IPFIX_flowStartSeconds, IPFIX_flowEndSeconds);
}else {
dbg_printf("Time stamp: No known format found\n");
offset = BYTE_OFFSET_first + 8;
}
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_forwardingStatus, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_tcpControlBits, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_protocolIdentifier, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_ipClassOfService, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_SourceTransportPort, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_DestinationTransportPort, &offset, NULL);
offset += 4;
/* IP address record
* This record is expected in the output stream. If not available
* in the template, assume empty v4 address.
*/
if ( cache.lookup_info[IPFIX_SourceIPv4Address].found ) {
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_SourceIPv4Address, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_DestinationIPv4Address, &offset, NULL);
} else if ( cache.lookup_info[IPFIX_SourceIPv6Address].found ) {
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_SourceIPv6Address, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_DestinationIPv6Address, &offset, NULL);
SetFlag(table->flags, FLAG_IPV6_ADDR);
ipv6 = 1;
} else {
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_SourceIPv4Address, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_DestinationIPv4Address, &offset, NULL);
}
if ( cache.lookup_info[IPFIX_packetTotalCount].found )
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_packetTotalCount, &offset, &table->packets);
else
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_packetDeltaCount, &offset, &table->packets);
SetFlag(table->flags, FLAG_PKG_64);
if ( cache.lookup_info[IPFIX_octetTotalCount].found )
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_octetTotalCount, &offset, &table->bytes);
else
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_octetDeltaCount, &offset, &table->bytes);
SetFlag(table->flags, FLAG_BYTES_64);
next_extension = 0;
for (i=4; extension_descriptor[i].id; i++ ) {
uint32_t map_index = i;
if ( cache.common_extensions[i] == 0 )
continue;
switch(i) {
case EX_IO_SNMP_2:
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_ingressInterface, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_egressInterface, &offset, NULL);
break;
case EX_IO_SNMP_4:
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_ingressInterface, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_egressInterface, &offset, NULL);
break;
case EX_AS_2:
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_bgpSourceAsNumber, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_bgpDestinationAsNumber, &offset, NULL);
break;
case EX_AS_4:
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_bgpSourceAsNumber, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_bgpDestinationAsNumber, &offset, NULL);
break;
case EX_MULIPLE:
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_postIpClassOfService, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_flowDirection, &offset, NULL);
if ( ipv6 ) {
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_SourceIPv6PrefixLength, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_DestinationIPv6PrefixLength, &offset, NULL);
} else {
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_SourceIPv4PrefixLength, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_DestinationIPv4PrefixLength, &offset, NULL);
}
break;
case EX_NEXT_HOP_v4:
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_ipNextHopIPv4Address, &offset, NULL);
break;
case EX_NEXT_HOP_v6:
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_ipNextHopIPv6Address, &offset, NULL);
SetFlag(table->flags, FLAG_IPV6_NH);
break;
case EX_NEXT_HOP_BGP_v4:
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_bgpNextHopIPv4Address, &offset, NULL);
break;
case EX_NEXT_HOP_BGP_v6:
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_bgpNextHopIPv6Address, &offset, NULL);
SetFlag(table->flags, FLAG_IPV6_NHB);
break;
case EX_VLAN:
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_vlanId, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_postVlanId, &offset, NULL);
break;
case EX_OUT_PKG_4:
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_postPacketDeltaCount, &offset, NULL);
break;
case EX_OUT_PKG_8:
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_postPacketDeltaCount, &offset, NULL);
break;
case EX_OUT_BYTES_4:
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_postOctetDeltaCount, &offset, NULL);
break;
case EX_OUT_BYTES_8:
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_postOctetDeltaCount, &offset, NULL);
break;
case EX_AGGR_FLOWS_8:
break;
case EX_MAC_1:
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_SourceMacAddress, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_postDestinationMacAddress, &offset, NULL);
break;
case EX_MAC_2:
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_DestinationMacAddress, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_postSourceMacAddress, &offset, NULL);
break;
case EX_MPLS:
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_mplsTopLabelStackSection, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_mplsLabelStackSection2, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_mplsLabelStackSection3, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_mplsLabelStackSection4, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_mplsLabelStackSection5, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_mplsLabelStackSection6, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_mplsLabelStackSection7, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_mplsLabelStackSection8, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_mplsLabelStackSection9, &offset, NULL);
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_mplsLabelStackSection10, &offset, NULL);
break;
case EX_ROUTER_IP_v4:
case EX_ROUTER_IP_v6:
if ( exporter->info.sa_family == PF_INET6 ) {
table->router_ip_offset = offset;
dbg_printf("Router IPv6: offset: %u, olen: %u\n", offset, 16 );
offset += 16;
SetFlag(table->flags, FLAG_IPV6_EXP);
map_index = EX_ROUTER_IP_v6;
} else {
table->router_ip_offset = offset;
dbg_printf("Router IPv4: offset: %u, olen: %u\n", offset, 4 );
offset += 4;
ClearFlag(table->flags, FLAG_IPV6_EXP);
map_index = EX_ROUTER_IP_v4;
}
break;
case EX_ROUTER_ID:
break;
case EX_RECEIVED:
table->received_offset = offset;
dbg_printf("Received offset: %u\n", offset);
offset += 8;
break;
}
extension_map->size += sizeof(uint16_t);
extension_map->extension_size += extension_descriptor[map_index].size;
if ( extension_map->ex_id[next_extension] != map_index ) {
extension_map->ex_id[next_extension] = map_index;
table->extension_map_changed = 1;
}
next_extension++;
}
extension_map->ex_id[next_extension++] = 0;
if ( extension_map->size & 0x3 ) {
extension_map->ex_id[next_extension] = 0;
extension_map->size = ( extension_map->size + 3 ) &~ 0x3;
}
table->output_record_size = offset;
if ( cache.lookup_info[IPFIX_icmpTypeCodeIPv4].found && cache.lookup_info[IPFIX_icmpTypeCodeIPv4].length == 2 ) {
PushSequence( table, IPFIX_icmpTypeCodeIPv4, NULL, &table->icmpTypeCodeIPv4);
}
#ifdef DEVEL
if ( table->extension_map_changed ) {
printf("Extension Map id=%u changed!\n", extension_map->map_id);
} else {
printf("[%u] template %u unchanged\n", exporter->info.id, id);
}
printf("Process_ipfix: Check extension map: id: %d, size: %u, extension_size: %u\n",
extension_map->map_id, extension_map->size, extension_map->extension_size);
{ int i;
for (i=0; i<table->number_of_sequences; i++ ) {
printf("Sequence %i: id: %u, Type: %u, Length: %u, Output offset: %u, stack: %llu\n",
i, table->sequence[i].id, table->sequence[i].type, table->sequence[i].input_length,
table->sequence[i].output_offset, (unsigned long long)table->sequence[i].stack);
}
printf("Flags: 0x%x output record size: %u\n", table->flags, table->output_record_size);
}
PrintExtensionMap(extension_map);
#endif
return table;
} // End of setup_translation_table
Commit Message: Fix potential unsigned integer underflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 7,639
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t OMXCodec::getVideoProfileLevel(
const sp<MetaData>& meta,
const CodecProfileLevel& defaultProfileLevel,
CodecProfileLevel &profileLevel) {
CODEC_LOGV("Default profile: %u, level #x%x",
defaultProfileLevel.mProfile, defaultProfileLevel.mLevel);
int32_t profile, level;
if (!meta->findInt32(kKeyVideoProfile, &profile)) {
profile = defaultProfileLevel.mProfile;
}
if (!meta->findInt32(kKeyVideoLevel, &level)) {
level = defaultProfileLevel.mLevel;
}
CODEC_LOGV("Target profile: %d, level: %d", profile, level);
OMX_VIDEO_PARAM_PROFILELEVELTYPE param;
InitOMXParams(¶m);
param.nPortIndex = kPortIndexOutput;
for (param.nProfileIndex = 0;; ++param.nProfileIndex) {
status_t err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamVideoProfileLevelQuerySupported,
¶m, sizeof(param));
if (err != OK) break;
int32_t supportedProfile = static_cast<int32_t>(param.eProfile);
int32_t supportedLevel = static_cast<int32_t>(param.eLevel);
CODEC_LOGV("Supported profile: %d, level %d",
supportedProfile, supportedLevel);
if (profile == supportedProfile &&
level <= supportedLevel) {
profileLevel.mProfile = profile;
profileLevel.mLevel = level;
return OK;
}
}
CODEC_LOGE("Target profile (%d) and level (%d) is not supported",
profile, level);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Commit Message: OMXCodec: check IMemory::pointer() before using allocation
Bug: 29421811
Change-Id: I0a73ba12bae4122f1d89fc92e5ea4f6a96cd1ed1
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 5,891
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t aio_run_iocb(struct kiocb *req, unsigned opcode,
char __user *buf, bool compat)
{
struct file *file = req->ki_filp;
ssize_t ret;
unsigned long nr_segs;
int rw;
fmode_t mode;
aio_rw_op *rw_op;
struct iovec inline_vec, *iovec = &inline_vec;
switch (opcode) {
case IOCB_CMD_PREAD:
case IOCB_CMD_PREADV:
mode = FMODE_READ;
rw = READ;
rw_op = file->f_op->aio_read;
goto rw_common;
case IOCB_CMD_PWRITE:
case IOCB_CMD_PWRITEV:
mode = FMODE_WRITE;
rw = WRITE;
rw_op = file->f_op->aio_write;
goto rw_common;
rw_common:
if (unlikely(!(file->f_mode & mode)))
return -EBADF;
if (!rw_op)
return -EINVAL;
ret = (opcode == IOCB_CMD_PREADV ||
opcode == IOCB_CMD_PWRITEV)
? aio_setup_vectored_rw(req, rw, buf, &nr_segs,
&iovec, compat)
: aio_setup_single_vector(req, rw, buf, &nr_segs,
iovec);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = rw_verify_area(rw, file, &req->ki_pos, req->ki_nbytes);
if (ret < 0) {
if (iovec != &inline_vec)
kfree(iovec);
return ret;
}
req->ki_nbytes = ret;
/* XXX: move/kill - rw_verify_area()? */
/* This matches the pread()/pwrite() logic */
if (req->ki_pos < 0) {
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (rw == WRITE)
file_start_write(file);
ret = rw_op(req, iovec, nr_segs, req->ki_pos);
if (rw == WRITE)
file_end_write(file);
break;
case IOCB_CMD_FDSYNC:
if (!file->f_op->aio_fsync)
return -EINVAL;
ret = file->f_op->aio_fsync(req, 1);
break;
case IOCB_CMD_FSYNC:
if (!file->f_op->aio_fsync)
return -EINVAL;
ret = file->f_op->aio_fsync(req, 0);
break;
default:
pr_debug("EINVAL: no operation provided\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (iovec != &inline_vec)
kfree(iovec);
if (ret != -EIOCBQUEUED) {
/*
* There's no easy way to restart the syscall since other AIO's
* may be already running. Just fail this IO with EINTR.
*/
if (unlikely(ret == -ERESTARTSYS || ret == -ERESTARTNOINTR ||
ret == -ERESTARTNOHAND ||
ret == -ERESTART_RESTARTBLOCK))
ret = -EINTR;
aio_complete(req, ret, 0);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: aio: prevent double free in ioctx_alloc
ioctx_alloc() calls aio_setup_ring() to allocate a ring. If aio_setup_ring()
fails to do so it would call aio_free_ring() before returning, but
ioctx_alloc() would call aio_free_ring() again causing a double free of
the ring.
This is easily reproducible from userspace.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Benjamin LaHaise <bcrl@kvack.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 22,496
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lua_translate_name_harness(request_rec *r)
{
return lua_request_rec_hook_harness(r, "translate_name", APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
}
Commit Message: Merge r1642499 from trunk:
*) SECURITY: CVE-2014-8109 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: Fix handling of the Require line when a LuaAuthzProvider is
used in multiple Require directives with different arguments.
PR57204 [Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Submitted By: Edward Lu
Committed By: covener
Submitted by: covener
Reviewed/backported by: jim
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1642861 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,156
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: scpio(void *_cnt, size_t s)
{
off_t *cnt = (off_t *)_cnt;
*cnt += s;
if (limit_kbps > 0)
bandwidth_limit(&bwlimit, s);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: upstream: disallow empty incoming filename or ones that refer to the
current directory; based on report/patch from Harry Sintonen
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f27651b30eaee2df49540ab68d030865c04f6de9
CWE ID: CWE-706
| 0
| 9,591
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: compat_do_ip6t_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len)
{
int ret;
if (!ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
switch (cmd) {
case IP6T_SO_GET_INFO:
ret = get_info(sock_net(sk), user, len, 1);
break;
case IP6T_SO_GET_ENTRIES:
ret = compat_get_entries(sock_net(sk), user, len);
break;
default:
ret = do_ip6t_get_ctl(sk, cmd, user, len);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,287
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gst_tag_to_vorbis_tag (const gchar * gst_tag)
{
int i = 0;
g_return_val_if_fail (gst_tag != NULL, NULL);
gst_tag_register_musicbrainz_tags ();
while (tag_matches[i].gstreamer_tag != NULL) {
if (strcmp (gst_tag, tag_matches[i].gstreamer_tag) == 0) {
return tag_matches[i].original_tag;
}
i++;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 12,897
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderProcessHostImpl::Send(IPC::Message* msg) {
if (!channel_.get()) {
if (!is_initialized_) {
queued_messages_.push(msg);
return true;
} else {
delete msg;
return false;
}
}
if (child_process_launcher_.get() && child_process_launcher_->IsStarting()) {
queued_messages_.push(msg);
return true;
}
return channel_->Send(msg);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 9,714
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ContextualSearchFieldTrial::IsSendBasePageURLDisabled() {
return GetBooleanParam(kContextualSearchSendURLDisabledParamName,
&is_send_base_page_url_disabled_cached_,
&is_send_base_page_url_disabled_);
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,571
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TestInterceptor()
: intercept_main_request_(false), restart_main_request_(false),
cancel_main_request_(false), cancel_then_restart_main_request_(false),
simulate_main_network_error_(false),
intercept_redirect_(false), cancel_redirect_request_(false),
intercept_final_response_(false), cancel_final_request_(false),
did_intercept_main_(false), did_restart_main_(false),
did_cancel_main_(false), did_cancel_then_restart_main_(false),
did_simulate_error_main_(false),
did_intercept_redirect_(false), did_cancel_redirect_(false),
did_intercept_final_(false), did_cancel_final_(false) {
URLRequest::Deprecated::RegisterRequestInterceptor(this);
}
Commit Message: Tests were marked as Flaky.
BUG=151811,151810
TBR=droger@chromium.org,shalev@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10968052
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158204 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 25,711
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: poppler_page_get_text_page (PopplerPage *page)
{
if (page->text == NULL) {
cairo_t *cr;
cairo_surface_t *surface;
surface = cairo_image_surface_create (CAIRO_FORMAT_RGB24, 1, 1);
cr = cairo_create (surface);
poppler_page_render (page, cr);
cairo_destroy (cr);
cairo_surface_destroy (surface);
}
return page->text;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 20,507
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t AppendDataInBuilder(BlobDataBuilder* builder,
size_t index,
disk_cache::Entry* cache_entry) {
size_t size = 0;
if (index % 2 != 0) {
builder->AppendFutureData(5u);
size += 5u;
if (index % 3 == 1) {
builder->AppendData("abcdefghij", 4u);
size += 4u;
}
if (index % 3 == 0) {
builder->AppendFutureData(1u);
size += 1u;
}
} else if (index % 3 == 0) {
builder->AppendFutureFile(0lu, 3lu, 0);
size += 3u;
}
if (index % 5 != 0) {
builder->AppendFile(
base::FilePath::FromUTF8Unsafe(base::SizeTToString(index)), 0ul, 20ul,
base::Time::Max());
size += 20u;
}
if (index % 3 != 0) {
scoped_refptr<BlobDataBuilder::DataHandle> disk_cache_data_handle =
new EmptyDataHandle();
builder->AppendDiskCacheEntry(disk_cache_data_handle, cache_entry,
kTestDiskCacheStreamIndex);
size += strlen(kTestDiskCacheData);
}
return size;
}
Commit Message: [BlobStorage] Fixing potential overflow
Bug: 779314
Change-Id: I74612639d20544e4c12230569c7b88fbe669ec03
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747725
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#512977}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 23,775
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hugetlb_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff, unsigned long flags)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
struct vm_area_struct *vma;
unsigned long start_addr;
struct hstate *h = hstate_file(file);
if (len & ~huge_page_mask(h))
return -EINVAL;
if (len > TASK_SIZE)
return -ENOMEM;
if (flags & MAP_FIXED) {
if (prepare_hugepage_range(file, addr, len))
return -EINVAL;
return addr;
}
if (addr) {
addr = ALIGN(addr, huge_page_size(h));
vma = find_vma(mm, addr);
if (TASK_SIZE - len >= addr &&
(!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start))
return addr;
}
if (len > mm->cached_hole_size)
start_addr = mm->free_area_cache;
else {
start_addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
}
full_search:
addr = ALIGN(start_addr, huge_page_size(h));
for (vma = find_vma(mm, addr); ; vma = vma->vm_next) {
/* At this point: (!vma || addr < vma->vm_end). */
if (TASK_SIZE - len < addr) {
/*
* Start a new search - just in case we missed
* some holes.
*/
if (start_addr != TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE) {
start_addr = TASK_UNMAPPED_BASE;
mm->cached_hole_size = 0;
goto full_search;
}
return -ENOMEM;
}
if (!vma || addr + len <= vma->vm_start) {
mm->free_area_cache = addr + len;
return addr;
}
if (addr + mm->cached_hole_size < vma->vm_start)
mm->cached_hole_size = vma->vm_start - addr;
addr = ALIGN(vma->vm_end, huge_page_size(h));
}
}
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <abarry@cray.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,278
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void airo_process_scan_results (struct airo_info *ai) {
union iwreq_data wrqu;
BSSListRid bss;
int rc;
BSSListElement * loop_net;
BSSListElement * tmp_net;
/* Blow away current list of scan results */
list_for_each_entry_safe (loop_net, tmp_net, &ai->network_list, list) {
list_move_tail (&loop_net->list, &ai->network_free_list);
/* Don't blow away ->list, just BSS data */
memset (loop_net, 0, sizeof (loop_net->bss));
}
/* Try to read the first entry of the scan result */
rc = PC4500_readrid(ai, ai->bssListFirst, &bss, ai->bssListRidLen, 0);
if((rc) || (bss.index == cpu_to_le16(0xffff))) {
/* No scan results */
goto out;
}
/* Read and parse all entries */
tmp_net = NULL;
while((!rc) && (bss.index != cpu_to_le16(0xffff))) {
/* Grab a network off the free list */
if (!list_empty(&ai->network_free_list)) {
tmp_net = list_entry(ai->network_free_list.next,
BSSListElement, list);
list_del(ai->network_free_list.next);
}
if (tmp_net != NULL) {
memcpy(tmp_net, &bss, sizeof(tmp_net->bss));
list_add_tail(&tmp_net->list, &ai->network_list);
tmp_net = NULL;
}
/* Read next entry */
rc = PC4500_readrid(ai, ai->bssListNext,
&bss, ai->bssListRidLen, 0);
}
out:
ai->scan_timeout = 0;
clear_bit(JOB_SCAN_RESULTS, &ai->jobs);
up(&ai->sem);
/* Send an empty event to user space.
* We don't send the received data on
* the event because it would require
* us to do complex transcoding, and
* we want to minimise the work done in
* the irq handler. Use a request to
* extract the data - Jean II */
wrqu.data.length = 0;
wrqu.data.flags = 0;
wireless_send_event(ai->dev, SIOCGIWSCAN, &wrqu, NULL);
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 16,527
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplDoublyLinkedList, offsetGet)
{
zval *zindex;
zend_long index;
spl_dllist_object *intern;
spl_ptr_llist_element *element;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "z", &zindex) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern = Z_SPLDLLIST_P(getThis());
index = spl_offset_convert_to_long(zindex);
if (index < 0 || index >= intern->llist->count) {
zend_throw_exception(spl_ce_OutOfRangeException, "Offset invalid or out of range", 0);
return;
}
element = spl_ptr_llist_offset(intern->llist, index, intern->flags & SPL_DLLIST_IT_LIFO);
if (element != NULL) {
zval *value = &element->data;
ZVAL_DEREF(value);
ZVAL_COPY(return_value, value);
} else {
zend_throw_exception(spl_ce_OutOfRangeException, "Offset invalid", 0);
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void SplDoublyLinkedList::offsetSet(mixed index, mixed newval)
Commit Message: Fix bug #71735: Double-free in SplDoublyLinkedList::offsetSet
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 23,386
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintRenderFrameHelper::PrintPreviewContext::ClearContext() {
prep_frame_view_.reset();
metafile_.reset();
pages_to_render_.clear();
error_ = PREVIEW_ERROR_NONE;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 12,160
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeClientImpl::MainFrameScrollOffsetChanged() const {
web_view_->MainFrameScrollOffsetChanged();
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 19,604
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ptrace_notify(int exit_code)
{
siginfo_t info;
BUG_ON((exit_code & (0x7f | ~0xffff)) != SIGTRAP);
memset(&info, 0, sizeof info);
info.si_signo = SIGTRAP;
info.si_code = exit_code;
info.si_pid = task_pid_vnr(current);
info.si_uid = current_uid();
/* Let the debugger run. */
spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
ptrace_stop(exit_code, 1, &info);
spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
}
Commit Message: Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo from spoofing the signal code
Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a
signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.
Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to
send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it
from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a
SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.
Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate
SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses
anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.
So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative
value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out
there that might depend on using other si_code values.
Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,646
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: content::ResourceRequestInfo::WebContentsGetter GetWebContentsGetter(
content::WebContents* web_contents) {
int frame_tree_node_id = web_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetFrameTreeNodeId();
if (frame_tree_node_id != -1) {
return base::Bind(content::WebContents::FromFrameTreeNodeId,
frame_tree_node_id);
}
return base::Bind(&GetWebContentsByFrameID,
web_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetProcess()->GetID(),
web_contents->GetMainFrame()->GetRoutingID());
}
Commit Message: Open Offline Pages in CCT from Downloads Home.
When the respective feature flag is enabled, offline pages opened from
the Downloads Home will use CCT instead of normal tabs.
Bug: 824807
Change-Id: I6d968b8b0c51aaeb7f26332c7ada9f927e151a65
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/977321
Commit-Queue: Carlos Knippschild <carlosk@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ted Choc <tedchoc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Bernhard Bauer <bauerb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jian Li <jianli@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#546545}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 9,077
|
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