instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
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int64 0
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int64 0
30k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: views::View* Launcher::GetAppListButtonView() const {
return launcher_view_->GetAppListButtonView();
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,005
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: user_new (Daemon *daemon,
uid_t uid)
{
User *user;
user = g_object_new (TYPE_USER, NULL);
user->daemon = daemon;
accounts_user_set_uid (ACCOUNTS_USER (user), uid);
return user;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 11,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvmppc_ld(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, ulong *eaddr, int size, void *ptr,
bool data)
{
ulong mp_pa = vcpu->arch.magic_page_pa & KVM_PAM & PAGE_MASK;
struct kvmppc_pte pte;
int rc;
vcpu->stat.ld++;
rc = kvmppc_xlate(vcpu, *eaddr, data ? XLATE_DATA : XLATE_INST,
XLATE_READ, &pte);
if (rc)
return rc;
*eaddr = pte.raddr;
if (!pte.may_read)
return -EPERM;
if (!data && !pte.may_execute)
return -ENOEXEC;
/* Magic page override */
if (kvmppc_supports_magic_page(vcpu) && mp_pa &&
((pte.raddr & KVM_PAM & PAGE_MASK) == mp_pa) &&
!(kvmppc_get_msr(vcpu) & MSR_PR)) {
void *magic = vcpu->arch.shared;
magic += pte.eaddr & 0xfff;
memcpy(ptr, magic, size);
return EMULATE_DONE;
}
if (kvm_read_guest(vcpu->kvm, pte.raddr, ptr, size))
return EMULATE_DO_MMIO;
return EMULATE_DONE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: PPC: Fix oops when checking KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM
The following program causes a kernel oops:
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <linux/kvm.h>
main()
{
int fd = open("/dev/kvm", O_RDWR);
ioctl(fd, KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM);
}
This happens because when using the global KVM fd with
KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION, kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension() gets
called with a NULL kvm argument, which gets dereferenced
in is_kvmppc_hv_enabled(). Spotted while reading the code.
Let's use the hv_enabled fallback variable, like everywhere
else in this function.
Fixes: 23528bb21ee2 ("KVM: PPC: Introduce KVM_CAP_PPC_HTM")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7+
Signed-off-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
Reviewed-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Mackerras <paulus@ozlabs.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 29,310
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */
struct sshkey *key;
struct sshbuf *sigbuf;
u_char *p;
u_char *signature;
size_t datlen, siglen;
int r, keyid, is_proof = 0;
const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
debug3("%s", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/*
* Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
* SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
*
* Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey
* proof.
*
* XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too?
* it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather
* than the full kex structure...
*/
if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) {
/*
* Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what
* the client sent us.
*/
if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */
fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu", __func__, datlen);
if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: no hostkey for index %d", __func__, keyid);
if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
session_id2_len) != 0) ||
(r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key "
"proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) ||
memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
__func__, datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
is_proof = 1;
}
/* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
if (session_id2_len == 0) {
session_id2_len = datlen;
session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
}
if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen,
datafellows)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
auth_sock > 0) {
if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
p, datlen, datafellows)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
} else
fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
debug3("%s: %s signature %p(%zu)", __func__,
is_proof ? "KEX" : "hostkey proof", signature, siglen);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(p);
free(signature);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
/* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
return (0);
}
Commit Message: set sshpam_ctxt to NULL after free
Avoids use-after-free in monitor when privsep child is compromised.
Reported by Moritz Jodeit; ok dtucker@
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 10,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: process_mkdir(u_int32_t id)
{
Attrib a;
char *name;
int r, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ?
a.perm & 07777 : 0777;
debug3("request %u: mkdir", id);
logit("mkdir name \"%s\" mode 0%o", name, mode);
r = mkdir(name, mode);
status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
send_status(id, status);
free(name);
}
Commit Message: disallow creation (of empty files) in read-only mode; reported by
Michal Zalewski, feedback & ok deraadt@
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 9,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void crypto_skcipher_exit_tfm(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
{
struct crypto_skcipher *skcipher = __crypto_skcipher_cast(tfm);
struct skcipher_alg *alg = crypto_skcipher_alg(skcipher);
alg->exit(skcipher);
}
Commit Message: crypto: skcipher - Add missing API setkey checks
The API setkey checks for key sizes and alignment went AWOL during the
skcipher conversion. This patch restores them.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 4e6c3df4d729 ("crypto: skcipher - Add low-level skcipher...")
Reported-by: Baozeng <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 15,445
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TrayPower::DestroyDefaultView() {
date_.reset();
power_.reset();
}
Commit Message: ash: Fix right-alignment of power-status text.
It turns out setting ALING_RIGHT on a Label isn't enough to get proper
right-aligned text. Label has to be explicitly told that it is multi-lined.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9918026
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@129898 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 5,744
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SpoolssFCPN_q(tvbuff_t *tvb, int offset, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *tree, dcerpc_info *di, guint8 *drep)
{
/* Parse packet */
offset = dissect_nt_policy_hnd(
tvb, offset, pinfo, tree, di, drep, hf_hnd, NULL, NULL,
FALSE, FALSE);
return offset;
}
Commit Message: SPOOLSS: Try to avoid an infinite loop.
Use tvb_reported_length_remaining in dissect_spoolss_uint16uni. Make
sure our offset always increments in dissect_spoolss_keybuffer.
Change-Id: I7017c9685bb2fa27161d80a03b8fca4ef630e793
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/14687
Reviewed-by: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Petri-Dish: Gerald Combs <gerald@wireshark.org>
Tested-by: Petri Dish Buildbot <buildbot-no-reply@wireshark.org>
Reviewed-by: Michael Mann <mmann78@netscape.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 11,279
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ceph_x_update_authorizer(
struct ceph_auth_client *ac, int peer_type,
struct ceph_auth_handshake *auth)
{
struct ceph_x_authorizer *au;
struct ceph_x_ticket_handler *th;
th = get_ticket_handler(ac, peer_type);
if (IS_ERR(th))
return PTR_ERR(th);
au = (struct ceph_x_authorizer *)auth->authorizer;
if (au->secret_id < th->secret_id) {
dout("ceph_x_update_authorizer service %u secret %llu < %llu\n",
au->service, au->secret_id, th->secret_id);
return ceph_x_build_authorizer(ac, th, au);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: libceph: do not hard code max auth ticket len
We hard code cephx auth ticket buffer size to 256 bytes. This isn't
enough for any moderate setups and, in case tickets themselves are not
encrypted, leads to buffer overflows (ceph_x_decrypt() errors out, but
ceph_decode_copy() doesn't - it's just a memcpy() wrapper). Since the
buffer is allocated dynamically anyway, allocated it a bit later, at
the point where we know how much is going to be needed.
Fixes: http://tracker.ceph.com/issues/8979
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <ilya.dryomov@inktank.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 22,991
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int validate_group(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_event *sibling, *leader = event->group_leader;
struct cpu_hw_events fake_cpuc;
memset(&fake_cpuc, 0, sizeof(fake_cpuc));
if (!validate_event(&fake_cpuc, leader))
return -ENOSPC;
list_for_each_entry(sibling, &leader->sibling_list, group_entry) {
if (!validate_event(&fake_cpuc, sibling))
return -ENOSPC;
}
if (!validate_event(&fake_cpuc, event))
return -ENOSPC;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 14,918
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: lseg_horizontal(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
LSEG *lseg = PG_GETARG_LSEG_P(0);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(FPeq(lseg->p[0].y, lseg->p[1].y));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,077
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API int zend_copy_parameters_array(int param_count, zval *argument_array TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
void **p;
int arg_count;
p = zend_vm_stack_top(TSRMLS_C) - 1;
arg_count = (int)(zend_uintptr_t) *p;
if (param_count>arg_count) {
return FAILURE;
}
while (param_count-->0) {
zval **param = (zval **) p-(arg_count--);
zval_add_ref(param);
add_next_index_zval(argument_array, *param);
}
return SUCCESS;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 12,374
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void apic_clear_irr(int vec, struct kvm_lapic *apic)
{
apic->irr_pending = false;
apic_clear_vector(vec, apic->regs + APIC_IRR);
if (apic_search_irr(apic) != -1)
apic->irr_pending = true;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
A guest can cause a BUG_ON() leading to a host kernel crash.
When the guest writes to the ICR to request an IPI, while in x2apic
mode the following things happen, the destination is read from
ICR2, which is a register that the guest can control.
kvm_irq_delivery_to_apic_fast uses the high 16 bits of ICR2 as the
cluster id. A BUG_ON is triggered, which is a protection against
accessing map->logical_map with an out-of-bounds access and manages
to avoid that anything really unsafe occurs.
The logic in the code is correct from real HW point of view. The problem
is that KVM supports only one cluster with ID 0 in clustered mode, but
the code that has the bug does not take this into account.
Reported-by: Lars Bull <larsbull@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,684
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __init sched_init(void)
{
int i, j;
unsigned long alloc_size = 0, ptr;
#ifdef CONFIG_FAIR_GROUP_SCHED
alloc_size += 2 * nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(void **);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED
alloc_size += 2 * nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(void **);
#endif
if (alloc_size) {
ptr = (unsigned long)kzalloc(alloc_size, GFP_NOWAIT);
#ifdef CONFIG_FAIR_GROUP_SCHED
root_task_group.se = (struct sched_entity **)ptr;
ptr += nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(void **);
root_task_group.cfs_rq = (struct cfs_rq **)ptr;
ptr += nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(void **);
#endif /* CONFIG_FAIR_GROUP_SCHED */
#ifdef CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED
root_task_group.rt_se = (struct sched_rt_entity **)ptr;
ptr += nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(void **);
root_task_group.rt_rq = (struct rt_rq **)ptr;
ptr += nr_cpu_ids * sizeof(void **);
#endif /* CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED */
}
#ifdef CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
per_cpu(load_balance_mask, i) = (cpumask_var_t)kzalloc_node(
cpumask_size(), GFP_KERNEL, cpu_to_node(i));
}
#endif /* CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK */
init_rt_bandwidth(&def_rt_bandwidth,
global_rt_period(), global_rt_runtime());
init_dl_bandwidth(&def_dl_bandwidth,
global_rt_period(), global_rt_runtime());
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
init_defrootdomain();
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED
init_rt_bandwidth(&root_task_group.rt_bandwidth,
global_rt_period(), global_rt_runtime());
#endif /* CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED */
#ifdef CONFIG_CGROUP_SCHED
task_group_cache = KMEM_CACHE(task_group, 0);
list_add(&root_task_group.list, &task_groups);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&root_task_group.children);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&root_task_group.siblings);
autogroup_init(&init_task);
#endif /* CONFIG_CGROUP_SCHED */
for_each_possible_cpu(i) {
struct rq *rq;
rq = cpu_rq(i);
raw_spin_lock_init(&rq->lock);
rq->nr_running = 0;
rq->calc_load_active = 0;
rq->calc_load_update = jiffies + LOAD_FREQ;
init_cfs_rq(&rq->cfs);
init_rt_rq(&rq->rt);
init_dl_rq(&rq->dl);
#ifdef CONFIG_FAIR_GROUP_SCHED
root_task_group.shares = ROOT_TASK_GROUP_LOAD;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rq->leaf_cfs_rq_list);
/*
* How much cpu bandwidth does root_task_group get?
*
* In case of task-groups formed thr' the cgroup filesystem, it
* gets 100% of the cpu resources in the system. This overall
* system cpu resource is divided among the tasks of
* root_task_group and its child task-groups in a fair manner,
* based on each entity's (task or task-group's) weight
* (se->load.weight).
*
* In other words, if root_task_group has 10 tasks of weight
* 1024) and two child groups A0 and A1 (of weight 1024 each),
* then A0's share of the cpu resource is:
*
* A0's bandwidth = 1024 / (10*1024 + 1024 + 1024) = 8.33%
*
* We achieve this by letting root_task_group's tasks sit
* directly in rq->cfs (i.e root_task_group->se[] = NULL).
*/
init_cfs_bandwidth(&root_task_group.cfs_bandwidth);
init_tg_cfs_entry(&root_task_group, &rq->cfs, NULL, i, NULL);
#endif /* CONFIG_FAIR_GROUP_SCHED */
rq->rt.rt_runtime = def_rt_bandwidth.rt_runtime;
#ifdef CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED
init_tg_rt_entry(&root_task_group, &rq->rt, NULL, i, NULL);
#endif
for (j = 0; j < CPU_LOAD_IDX_MAX; j++)
rq->cpu_load[j] = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
rq->sd = NULL;
rq->rd = NULL;
rq->cpu_capacity = rq->cpu_capacity_orig = SCHED_CAPACITY_SCALE;
rq->balance_callback = NULL;
rq->active_balance = 0;
rq->next_balance = jiffies;
rq->push_cpu = 0;
rq->cpu = i;
rq->online = 0;
rq->idle_stamp = 0;
rq->avg_idle = 2*sysctl_sched_migration_cost;
rq->max_idle_balance_cost = sysctl_sched_migration_cost;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&rq->cfs_tasks);
rq_attach_root(rq, &def_root_domain);
#ifdef CONFIG_NO_HZ_COMMON
rq->last_load_update_tick = jiffies;
rq->nohz_flags = 0;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL
rq->last_sched_tick = 0;
#endif
#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */
init_rq_hrtick(rq);
atomic_set(&rq->nr_iowait, 0);
}
set_load_weight(&init_task);
#ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_NOTIFIERS
INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&init_task.preempt_notifiers);
#endif
/*
* The boot idle thread does lazy MMU switching as well:
*/
atomic_inc(&init_mm.mm_count);
enter_lazy_tlb(&init_mm, current);
/*
* During early bootup we pretend to be a normal task:
*/
current->sched_class = &fair_sched_class;
/*
* Make us the idle thread. Technically, schedule() should not be
* called from this thread, however somewhere below it might be,
* but because we are the idle thread, we just pick up running again
* when this runqueue becomes "idle".
*/
init_idle(current, smp_processor_id());
calc_load_update = jiffies + LOAD_FREQ;
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
zalloc_cpumask_var(&sched_domains_tmpmask, GFP_NOWAIT);
/* May be allocated at isolcpus cmdline parse time */
if (cpu_isolated_map == NULL)
zalloc_cpumask_var(&cpu_isolated_map, GFP_NOWAIT);
idle_thread_set_boot_cpu();
set_cpu_rq_start_time(smp_processor_id());
#endif
init_sched_fair_class();
init_schedstats();
scheduler_running = 1;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'stacking-fixes' (vfs stacking fixes from Jann)
Merge filesystem stacking fixes from Jann Horn.
* emailed patches from Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>:
sched: panic on corrupted stack end
ecryptfs: forbid opening files without mmap handler
proc: prevent stacking filesystems on top
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,359
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PrintRenderFrameHelper::PrintPreviewContext::PrintPreviewContext()
: total_page_count_(0),
current_page_index_(0),
generate_draft_pages_(true),
is_modifiable_(true),
print_ready_metafile_page_count_(0),
error_(PREVIEW_ERROR_NONE),
state_(UNINITIALIZED) {}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 19,454
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GpuChannelHost* RenderThreadImpl::EstablishGpuChannelSync(
CauseForGpuLaunch cause_for_gpu_launch) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "RenderThreadImpl::EstablishGpuChannelSync");
if (gpu_channel_.get()) {
if (!gpu_channel_->IsLost())
return gpu_channel_.get();
gpu_channel_ = NULL;
}
int client_id = 0;
IPC::ChannelHandle channel_handle;
gpu::GPUInfo gpu_info;
if (!Send(new GpuHostMsg_EstablishGpuChannel(cause_for_gpu_launch,
&client_id,
&channel_handle,
&gpu_info)) ||
#if defined(OS_POSIX)
channel_handle.socket.fd == -1 ||
#endif
channel_handle.name.empty()) {
return NULL;
}
GetContentClient()->SetGpuInfo(gpu_info);
io_message_loop_proxy_ = ChildProcess::current()->io_message_loop_proxy();
gpu_channel_ = GpuChannelHost::Create(
this, gpu_info, channel_handle,
ChildProcess::current()->GetShutDownEvent());
return gpu_channel_.get();
}
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 3,256
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::FlingingStarted() {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
DCHECK(!disable_pipeline_auto_suspend_);
disable_pipeline_auto_suspend_ = true;
video_decode_stats_reporter_.reset();
ScheduleRestart();
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 22,416
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int enable_snd_device(struct audio_device *adev,
struct audio_usecase *uc_info,
snd_device_t snd_device,
bool update_mixer)
{
struct mixer_card *mixer_card;
struct listnode *node;
const char *snd_device_name = get_snd_device_name(snd_device);
if (snd_device_name == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
adev->snd_dev_ref_cnt[snd_device]++;
if (adev->snd_dev_ref_cnt[snd_device] > 1) {
ALOGV("%s: snd_device(%d: %s) is already active",
__func__, snd_device, snd_device_name);
return 0;
}
ALOGV("%s: snd_device(%d: %s)", __func__,
snd_device, snd_device_name);
list_for_each(node, &uc_info->mixer_list) {
mixer_card = node_to_item(node, struct mixer_card, uc_list_node[uc_info->id]);
audio_route_apply_path(mixer_card->audio_route, snd_device_name);
if (update_mixer)
audio_route_update_mixer(mixer_card->audio_route);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix audio record pre-processing
proc_buf_out consistently initialized.
intermediate scratch buffers consistently initialized.
prevent read failure from overwriting memory.
Test: POC, CTS, camera record
Bug: 62873231
Change-Id: Ie26e12a419a5819c1c5c3a0bcf1876d6d7aca686
(cherry picked from commit 6d7b330c27efba944817e647955da48e54fd74eb)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 10,928
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::FilesSelectedInChooser(
const std::vector<content::FileChooserFileInfo>& files,
FileChooserParams::Mode permissions) {
storage::FileSystemContext* const file_system_context =
BrowserContext::GetStoragePartition(GetProcess()->GetBrowserContext(),
GetSiteInstance())
->GetFileSystemContext();
for (const auto& file : files) {
if (permissions == FileChooserParams::Save) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()->GrantCreateReadWriteFile(
GetProcess()->GetID(), file.file_path);
} else {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()->GrantReadFile(
GetProcess()->GetID(), file.file_path);
}
if (file.file_system_url.is_valid()) {
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance()->GrantReadFileSystem(
GetProcess()->GetID(),
file_system_context->CrackURL(file.file_system_url)
.mount_filesystem_id());
}
}
Send(new FrameMsg_RunFileChooserResponse(routing_id_, files));
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 28,715
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cc::LayerTreeHost* LayerTreeHost() {
return web_widget_client_.layer_tree_view()->layer_tree_host();
}
Commit Message: [BGPT] Add a fast-path for transform-origin changes.
This patch adds a fast-path for updating composited transform-origin
changes without requiring a PaintArtifactCompositor update. This
closely follows the approach of https://crrev.com/651338.
Bug: 952473
Change-Id: I8b82909c1761a7aa16705813207739d29596b0d0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580260
Commit-Queue: Philip Rogers <pdr@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Philip Rogers <pdr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: vmpstr <vmpstr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653749}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 10,980
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Box *clap_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_CleanApertureBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_CLAP);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: prevent dref memleak on invalid input (#1183)
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 7,707
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::updateViewportSize()
{
Q_Q(QQuickWebView);
QSize viewportSize = q->boundingRect().size().toSize();
if (viewportSize.isEmpty() || !interactionEngine)
return;
flickProvider->setViewportSize(viewportSize);
webPageProxy->setViewportSize(viewportSize);
interactionEngine->applyConstraints(computeViewportConstraints());
_q_commitScaleChange();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 14,879
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MojoResult Core::GetMessageContext(MojoMessageHandle message_handle,
uintptr_t* context,
MojoGetMessageContextFlags flags) {
if (!message_handle)
return MOJO_RESULT_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
auto* message = reinterpret_cast<ports::UserMessageEvent*>(message_handle)
->GetMessage<UserMessageImpl>();
if (!message->HasContext())
return MOJO_RESULT_NOT_FOUND;
if (flags & MOJO_GET_MESSAGE_CONTEXT_FLAG_RELEASE)
*context = message->ReleaseContext();
else
*context = message->context();
return MOJO_RESULT_OK;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 8,034
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::SyncSelectionIfRequired() {
base::string16 text;
size_t offset;
gfx::Range range;
#if defined(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
if (render_view_->focused_pepper_plugin_) {
render_view_->focused_pepper_plugin_->GetSurroundingText(&text, &range);
offset = 0; // Pepper API does not support offset reporting.
} else
#endif
{
size_t location, length;
if (!GetRenderWidget()->webwidget()->caretOrSelectionRange(
&location, &length)) {
return;
}
range = gfx::Range(location, location + length);
if (GetRenderWidget()->webwidget()->textInputInfo().type !=
blink::WebTextInputTypeNone) {
if (location > kExtraCharsBeforeAndAfterSelection)
offset = location - kExtraCharsBeforeAndAfterSelection;
else
offset = 0;
length = location + length - offset + kExtraCharsBeforeAndAfterSelection;
WebRange webrange = WebRange::fromDocumentRange(frame_, offset, length);
if (!webrange.isNull())
text = WebRange::fromDocumentRange(
frame_, offset, length).toPlainText();
} else {
offset = location;
text = frame_->selectionAsText();
range.set_end(range.start() + text.length());
}
}
if (selection_text_offset_ != offset ||
selection_range_ != range ||
selection_text_ != text) {
selection_text_ = text;
selection_text_offset_ = offset;
selection_range_ = range;
Send(new ViewHostMsg_SelectionChanged(
GetRenderWidget()->routing_id(), text, offset, range));
}
GetRenderWidget()->UpdateSelectionBounds();
}
Commit Message: Add logging to figure out which IPC we're failing to deserialize in RenderFrame.
BUG=369553
R=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/263833020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268565 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 12,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int crypto_authenc_extractkeys(struct crypto_authenc_keys *keys, const u8 *key,
unsigned int keylen)
{
struct rtattr *rta = (struct rtattr *)key;
struct crypto_authenc_key_param *param;
if (!RTA_OK(rta, keylen))
return -EINVAL;
if (rta->rta_type != CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM)
return -EINVAL;
if (RTA_PAYLOAD(rta) < sizeof(*param))
return -EINVAL;
param = RTA_DATA(rta);
keys->enckeylen = be32_to_cpu(param->enckeylen);
key += RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
keylen -= RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
if (keylen < keys->enckeylen)
return -EINVAL;
keys->authkeylen = keylen - keys->enckeylen;
keys->authkey = key;
keys->enckey = key + keys->authkeylen;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 28,041
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sctp_association_hold(struct sctp_association *asoc)
{
atomic_inc(&asoc->base.refcnt);
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions
Jason reported an oops caused by SCTP on his ARM machine with
SCTP authentication enabled:
Internal error: Oops: 17 [#1] ARM
CPU: 0 PID: 104 Comm: sctp-test Not tainted 3.13.0-68744-g3632f30c9b20-dirty #1
task: c6eefa40 ti: c6f52000 task.ti: c6f52000
PC is at sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0xc4/0x10c
LR is at sg_init_table+0x20/0x38
pc : [<c024bb80>] lr : [<c00f32dc>] psr: 40000013
sp : c6f538e8 ip : 00000000 fp : c6f53924
r10: c6f50d80 r9 : 00000000 r8 : 00010000
r7 : 00000000 r6 : c7be4000 r5 : 00000000 r4 : c6f56254
r3 : c00c8170 r2 : 00000001 r1 : 00000008 r0 : c6f1e660
Flags: nZcv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
Control: 0005397f Table: 06f28000 DAC: 00000015
Process sctp-test (pid: 104, stack limit = 0xc6f521c0)
Stack: (0xc6f538e8 to 0xc6f54000)
[...]
Backtrace:
[<c024babc>] (sctp_auth_calculate_hmac+0x0/0x10c) from [<c0249af8>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x33c/0x5c8)
[<c02497bc>] (sctp_packet_transmit+0x0/0x5c8) from [<c023e96c>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x7fc/0x844)
[<c023e170>] (sctp_outq_flush+0x0/0x844) from [<c023ef78>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x24/0x28)
[<c023ef54>] (sctp_outq_uncork+0x0/0x28) from [<c0234364>] (sctp_side_effects+0x1134/0x1220)
[<c0233230>] (sctp_side_effects+0x0/0x1220) from [<c02330b0>] (sctp_do_sm+0xac/0xd4)
[<c0233004>] (sctp_do_sm+0x0/0xd4) from [<c023675c>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x118/0x160)
[<c0236644>] (sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0x0/0x160) from [<c023d5bc>] (sctp_inq_push+0x6c/0x74)
[<c023d550>] (sctp_inq_push+0x0/0x74) from [<c024a6b0>] (sctp_rcv+0x7d8/0x888)
While we already had various kind of bugs in that area
ec0223ec48a9 ("net: sctp: fix sctp_sf_do_5_1D_ce to verify if
we/peer is AUTH capable") and b14878ccb7fa ("net: sctp: cache
auth_enable per endpoint"), this one is a bit of a different
kind.
Giving a bit more background on why SCTP authentication is
needed can be found in RFC4895:
SCTP uses 32-bit verification tags to protect itself against
blind attackers. These values are not changed during the
lifetime of an SCTP association.
Looking at new SCTP extensions, there is the need to have a
method of proving that an SCTP chunk(s) was really sent by
the original peer that started the association and not by a
malicious attacker.
To cause this bug, we're triggering an INIT collision between
peers; normal SCTP handshake where both sides intent to
authenticate packets contains RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO
parameters that are being negotiated among peers:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
-------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
<-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
RFC4895 says that each endpoint therefore knows its own random
number and the peer's random number *after* the association
has been established. The local and peer's random number along
with the shared key are then part of the secret used for
calculating the HMAC in the AUTH chunk.
Now, in our scenario, we have 2 threads with 1 non-blocking
SEQ_PACKET socket each, setting up common shared SCTP_AUTH_KEY
and SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY properly, and each of them calling
sctp_bindx(3), listen(2) and connect(2) against each other,
thus the handshake looks similar to this, e.g.:
---------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------->
<------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] ---------
<--------- INIT[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -----------
-------- INIT-ACK[RANDOM; CHUNKS; HMAC-ALGO] -------->
...
Since such collisions can also happen with verification tags,
the RFC4895 for AUTH rather vaguely says under section 6.1:
In case of INIT collision, the rules governing the handling
of this Random Number follow the same pattern as those for
the Verification Tag, as explained in Section 5.2.4 of
RFC 2960 [5]. Therefore, each endpoint knows its own Random
Number and the peer's Random Number after the association
has been established.
In RFC2960, section 5.2.4, we're eventually hitting Action B:
B) In this case, both sides may be attempting to start an
association at about the same time but the peer endpoint
started its INIT after responding to the local endpoint's
INIT. Thus it may have picked a new Verification Tag not
being aware of the previous Tag it had sent this endpoint.
The endpoint should stay in or enter the ESTABLISHED
state but it MUST update its peer's Verification Tag from
the State Cookie, stop any init or cookie timers that may
running and send a COOKIE ACK.
In other words, the handling of the Random parameter is the
same as behavior for the Verification Tag as described in
Action B of section 5.2.4.
Looking at the code, we exactly hit the sctp_sf_do_dupcook_b()
case which triggers an SCTP_CMD_UPDATE_ASSOC command to the
side effect interpreter, and in fact it properly copies over
peer_{random, hmacs, chunks} parameters from the newly created
association to update the existing one.
Also, the old asoc_shared_key is being released and based on
the new params, sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() updated.
However, the issue observed in this case is that the previous
asoc->peer.auth_capable was 0, and has *not* been updated, so
that instead of creating a new secret, we're doing an early
return from the function sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key()
leaving asoc->asoc_shared_key as NULL. However, we now have to
authenticate chunks from the updated chunk list (e.g. COOKIE-ACK).
That in fact causes the server side when responding with ...
<------------------ AUTH; COOKIE-ACK -----------------
... to trigger a NULL pointer dereference, since in
sctp_packet_transmit(), it discovers that an AUTH chunk is
being queued for xmit, and thus it calls sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
Since the asoc->active_key_id is still inherited from the
endpoint, and the same as encoded into the chunk, it uses
asoc->asoc_shared_key, which is still NULL, as an asoc_key
and dereferences it in ...
crypto_hash_setkey(desc.tfm, &asoc_key->data[0], asoc_key->len)
... causing an oops. All this happens because sctp_make_cookie_ack()
called with the *new* association has the peer.auth_capable=1
and therefore marks the chunk with auth=1 after checking
sctp_auth_send_cid(), but it is *actually* sent later on over
the then *updated* association's transport that didn't initialize
its shared key due to peer.auth_capable=0. Since control chunks
in that case are not sent by the temporary association which
are scheduled for deletion, they are issued for xmit via
SCTP_CMD_REPLY in the interpreter with the context of the
*updated* association. peer.auth_capable was 0 in the updated
association (which went from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED state),
since all previous processing that performed sctp_process_init()
was being done on temporary associations, that we eventually
throw away each time.
The correct fix is to update to the new peer.auth_capable
value as well in the collision case via sctp_assoc_update(),
so that in case the collision migrated from 0 -> 1,
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() can properly recalculate
the secret. This therefore fixes the observed server panic.
Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
Reported-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 15,036
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: NTSTATUS smb2cli_req_get_sent_iov(struct tevent_req *req,
struct iovec *sent_iov)
{
struct smbXcli_req_state *state =
tevent_req_data(req,
struct smbXcli_req_state);
if (tevent_req_is_in_progress(req)) {
return STATUS_PENDING;
}
sent_iov[0].iov_base = state->smb2.hdr;
sent_iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(state->smb2.hdr);
sent_iov[1].iov_base = discard_const(state->smb2.fixed);
sent_iov[1].iov_len = state->smb2.fixed_len;
if (state->smb2.dyn != NULL) {
sent_iov[2].iov_base = discard_const(state->smb2.dyn);
sent_iov[2].iov_len = state->smb2.dyn_len;
} else {
sent_iov[2].iov_base = NULL;
sent_iov[2].iov_len = 0;
}
return NT_STATUS_OK;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 22,763
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RunClosureWithTrace(const base::Closure& closure,
const char* trace_event_name) {
TRACE_EVENT0("webrtc", trace_event_name);
closure.Run();
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 25,476
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLMediaElement::Repaint() {
if (web_layer_)
web_layer_->Invalidate();
UpdateDisplayState();
if (GetLayoutObject())
GetLayoutObject()->SetShouldDoFullPaintInvalidation();
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 23,171
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderMenuList::computePreferredLogicalWidths()
{
m_minPreferredLogicalWidth = 0;
m_maxPreferredLogicalWidth = 0;
if (style()->width().isFixed() && style()->width().value() > 0)
m_minPreferredLogicalWidth = m_maxPreferredLogicalWidth = computeContentBoxLogicalWidth(style()->width().value());
else
m_maxPreferredLogicalWidth = max(m_optionsWidth, theme()->minimumMenuListSize(style())) + m_innerBlock->paddingLeft() + m_innerBlock->paddingRight();
if (style()->minWidth().isFixed() && style()->minWidth().value() > 0) {
m_maxPreferredLogicalWidth = max(m_maxPreferredLogicalWidth, computeContentBoxLogicalWidth(style()->minWidth().value()));
m_minPreferredLogicalWidth = max(m_minPreferredLogicalWidth, computeContentBoxLogicalWidth(style()->minWidth().value()));
} else if (style()->width().isPercent() || (style()->width().isAuto() && style()->height().isPercent()))
m_minPreferredLogicalWidth = 0;
else
m_minPreferredLogicalWidth = m_maxPreferredLogicalWidth;
if (style()->maxWidth().isFixed()) {
m_maxPreferredLogicalWidth = min(m_maxPreferredLogicalWidth, computeContentBoxLogicalWidth(style()->maxWidth().value()));
m_minPreferredLogicalWidth = min(m_minPreferredLogicalWidth, computeContentBoxLogicalWidth(style()->maxWidth().value()));
}
LayoutUnit toAdd = borderAndPaddingWidth();
m_minPreferredLogicalWidth += toAdd;
m_maxPreferredLogicalWidth += toAdd;
setPreferredLogicalWidthsDirty(false);
}
Commit Message: PopupMenuClient::multiple() should be const
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=76771
Patch by Benjamin Poulain <bpoulain@apple.com> on 2012-01-21
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
* platform/PopupMenuClient.h:
(WebCore::PopupMenuClient::multiple):
* rendering/RenderMenuList.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderMenuList::multiple):
* rendering/RenderMenuList.h:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@105570 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 29,023
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HandleGlobalVar(CompatInfo *info, VarDef *stmt)
{
const char *elem, *field;
ExprDef *ndx;
bool ret;
if (!ExprResolveLhs(info->ctx, stmt->name, &elem, &field, &ndx))
ret = false;
else if (elem && istreq(elem, "interpret"))
ret = SetInterpField(info, &info->default_interp, field, ndx,
stmt->value);
else if (elem && istreq(elem, "indicator"))
ret = SetLedMapField(info, &info->default_led, field, ndx,
stmt->value);
else
ret = SetActionField(info->ctx, info->actions, &info->mods,
elem, field, ndx, stmt->value);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: Don't crash on no-op modmask expressions
If we have an expression of the form 'l1' in an interp section, we
unconditionally try to dereference its args, even if it has none.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Stone <daniels@collabora.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 12,693
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::ByteStringAttributeAttributeGetterCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_byteStringAttribute_Getter");
test_object_v8_internal::ByteStringAttributeAttributeGetter(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserCommandController::RemoveInterstitialObservers(
WebContents* contents) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < interstitial_observers_.size(); i++) {
if (interstitial_observers_[i]->web_contents() != contents)
continue;
delete interstitial_observers_[i];
interstitial_observers_.erase(interstitial_observers_.begin() + i);
return;
}
}
Commit Message: mac: Do not let synthetic events toggle "Allow JavaScript From AppleEvents"
Bug: 891697
Change-Id: I49eb77963515637df739c9d2ce83530d4e21cf15
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1308771
Reviewed-by: Elly Fong-Jones <ellyjones@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604268}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 524
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nfs4_do_close(struct nfs4_state *state, gfp_t gfp_mask, int wait, bool roc)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(state->inode);
struct nfs4_closedata *calldata;
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp = state->owner;
struct rpc_task *task;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_CLOSE],
.rpc_cred = state->owner->so_cred,
};
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.rpc_client = server->client,
.rpc_message = &msg,
.callback_ops = &nfs4_close_ops,
.workqueue = nfsiod_workqueue,
.flags = RPC_TASK_ASYNC,
};
int status = -ENOMEM;
calldata = kzalloc(sizeof(*calldata), gfp_mask);
if (calldata == NULL)
goto out;
nfs41_init_sequence(&calldata->arg.seq_args, &calldata->res.seq_res, 1);
calldata->inode = state->inode;
calldata->state = state;
calldata->arg.fh = NFS_FH(state->inode);
calldata->arg.stateid = &state->open_stateid;
/* Serialization for the sequence id */
calldata->arg.seqid = nfs_alloc_seqid(&state->owner->so_seqid, gfp_mask);
if (calldata->arg.seqid == NULL)
goto out_free_calldata;
calldata->arg.fmode = 0;
calldata->arg.bitmask = server->cache_consistency_bitmask;
calldata->res.fattr = &calldata->fattr;
calldata->res.seqid = calldata->arg.seqid;
calldata->res.server = server;
calldata->roc = roc;
nfs_sb_active(calldata->inode->i_sb);
msg.rpc_argp = &calldata->arg;
msg.rpc_resp = &calldata->res;
task_setup_data.callback_data = calldata;
task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
if (IS_ERR(task))
return PTR_ERR(task);
status = 0;
if (wait)
status = rpc_wait_for_completion_task(task);
rpc_put_task(task);
return status;
out_free_calldata:
kfree(calldata);
out:
if (roc)
pnfs_roc_release(state->inode);
nfs4_put_open_state(state);
nfs4_put_state_owner(sp);
return status;
}
Commit Message: Fix length of buffer copied in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
_copy_from_pages() used to copy data from the temporary buffer to the
user passed buffer is passed the wrong size parameter when copying
data. res.acl_len contains both the bitmap and acl lenghts while
acl_len contains the acl length after adjusting for the bitmap size.
Signed-off-by: Sachin Prabhu <sprabhu@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 27,478
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int http_handshake(URLContext *c)
{
int ret, err, new_location;
HTTPContext *ch = c->priv_data;
URLContext *cl = ch->hd;
switch (ch->handshake_step) {
case LOWER_PROTO:
av_log(c, AV_LOG_TRACE, "Lower protocol\n");
if ((ret = ffurl_handshake(cl)) > 0)
return 2 + ret;
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
ch->handshake_step = READ_HEADERS;
ch->is_connected_server = 1;
return 2;
case READ_HEADERS:
av_log(c, AV_LOG_TRACE, "Read headers\n");
if ((err = http_read_header(c, &new_location)) < 0) {
handle_http_errors(c, err);
return err;
}
ch->handshake_step = WRITE_REPLY_HEADERS;
return 1;
case WRITE_REPLY_HEADERS:
av_log(c, AV_LOG_TRACE, "Reply code: %d\n", ch->reply_code);
if ((err = http_write_reply(c, ch->reply_code)) < 0)
return err;
ch->handshake_step = FINISH;
return 1;
case FINISH:
return 0;
}
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 9,894
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Sdb *store_versioninfo_gnu_verdef(ELFOBJ *bin, Elf_(Shdr) *shdr, int sz) {
const char *section_name = "";
const char *link_section_name = "";
char *end = NULL;
Elf_(Shdr) *link_shdr = NULL;
ut8 dfs[sizeof (Elf_(Verdef))] = {0};
Sdb *sdb;
int cnt, i;
if (shdr->sh_link > bin->ehdr.e_shnum) {
return false;
}
link_shdr = &bin->shdr[shdr->sh_link];
if (shdr->sh_size < 1) {
return false;
}
Elf_(Verdef) *defs = calloc (shdr->sh_size, sizeof (char));
if (!defs) {
return false;
}
if (bin->shstrtab && shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
section_name = &bin->shstrtab[shdr->sh_name];
}
if (link_shdr && bin->shstrtab && link_shdr->sh_name < bin->shstrtab_size) {
link_section_name = &bin->shstrtab[link_shdr->sh_name];
}
if (!defs) {
bprintf ("Warning: Cannot allocate memory (Check Elf_(Verdef))\n");
return NULL;
}
sdb = sdb_new0 ();
end = (char *)defs + shdr->sh_size;
sdb_set (sdb, "section_name", section_name, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "entries", shdr->sh_info, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "addr", shdr->sh_addr, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "offset", shdr->sh_offset, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb, "link", shdr->sh_link, 0);
sdb_set (sdb, "link_section_name", link_section_name, 0);
for (cnt = 0, i = 0; i >= 0 && cnt < shdr->sh_info && ((char *)defs + i < end); ++cnt) {
Sdb *sdb_verdef = sdb_new0 ();
char *vstart = ((char*)defs) + i;
char key[32] = {0};
Elf_(Verdef) *verdef = (Elf_(Verdef)*)vstart;
Elf_(Verdaux) aux = {0};
int j = 0;
int isum = 0;
r_buf_read_at (bin->b, shdr->sh_offset + i, dfs, sizeof (Elf_(Verdef)));
verdef->vd_version = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_flags = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_ndx = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_cnt = READ16 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_hash = READ32 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_aux = READ32 (dfs, j)
verdef->vd_next = READ32 (dfs, j)
vstart += verdef->vd_aux;
if (vstart > end || vstart + sizeof (Elf_(Verdaux)) > end) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
j = 0;
aux.vda_name = READ32 (vstart, j)
aux.vda_next = READ32 (vstart, j)
isum = i + verdef->vd_aux;
if (aux.vda_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "idx", i, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_version", verdef->vd_version, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_ndx", verdef->vd_ndx, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_verdef, "vd_cnt", verdef->vd_cnt, 0);
sdb_set (sdb_verdef, "vda_name", &bin->dynstr[aux.vda_name], 0);
sdb_set (sdb_verdef, "flags", get_ver_flags (verdef->vd_flags), 0);
for (j = 1; j < verdef->vd_cnt; ++j) {
int k;
Sdb *sdb_parent = sdb_new0 ();
isum += aux.vda_next;
vstart += aux.vda_next;
if (vstart > end || vstart + sizeof(Elf_(Verdaux)) > end) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
sdb_free (sdb_parent);
goto out_error;
}
k = 0;
aux.vda_name = READ32 (vstart, k)
aux.vda_next = READ32 (vstart, k)
if (aux.vda_name > bin->dynstr_size) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
sdb_free (sdb_parent);
goto out_error;
}
sdb_num_set (sdb_parent, "idx", isum, 0);
sdb_num_set (sdb_parent, "parent", j, 0);
sdb_set (sdb_parent, "vda_name", &bin->dynstr[aux.vda_name], 0);
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "parent%d", j - 1);
sdb_ns_set (sdb_verdef, key, sdb_parent);
}
snprintf (key, sizeof (key), "verdef%d", cnt);
sdb_ns_set (sdb, key, sdb_verdef);
if (!verdef->vd_next) {
sdb_free (sdb_verdef);
goto out_error;
}
if ((st32)verdef->vd_next < 1) {
eprintf ("Warning: Invalid vd_next in the ELF version\n");
break;
}
i += verdef->vd_next;
}
free (defs);
return sdb;
out_error:
free (defs);
sdb_free (sdb);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8731 - Crash in ELF parser with negative 32bit number
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 3,295
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_process_param(struct sctp_association *asoc,
union sctp_params param,
const union sctp_addr *peer_addr,
gfp_t gfp)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(asoc->base.sk);
union sctp_addr addr;
int i;
__u16 sat;
int retval = 1;
sctp_scope_t scope;
time_t stale;
struct sctp_af *af;
union sctp_addr_param *addr_param;
struct sctp_transport *t;
struct sctp_endpoint *ep = asoc->ep;
/* We maintain all INIT parameters in network byte order all the
* time. This allows us to not worry about whether the parameters
* came from a fresh INIT, and INIT ACK, or were stored in a cookie.
*/
switch (param.p->type) {
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS:
if (PF_INET6 != asoc->base.sk->sk_family)
break;
goto do_addr_param;
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS:
/* v4 addresses are not allowed on v6-only socket */
if (ipv6_only_sock(asoc->base.sk))
break;
do_addr_param:
af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param.p->type));
af->from_addr_param(&addr, param.addr, htons(asoc->peer.port), 0);
scope = sctp_scope(peer_addr);
if (sctp_in_scope(net, &addr, scope))
if (!sctp_assoc_add_peer(asoc, &addr, gfp, SCTP_UNCONFIRMED))
return 0;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_COOKIE_PRESERVATIVE:
if (!net->sctp.cookie_preserve_enable)
break;
stale = ntohl(param.life->lifespan_increment);
/* Suggested Cookie Life span increment's unit is msec,
* (1/1000sec).
*/
asoc->cookie_life = ktime_add_ms(asoc->cookie_life, stale);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_HOST_NAME_ADDRESS:
pr_debug("%s: unimplemented SCTP_HOST_NAME_ADDRESS\n", __func__);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_ADDRESS_TYPES:
/* Turn off the default values first so we'll know which
* ones are really set by the peer.
*/
asoc->peer.ipv4_address = 0;
asoc->peer.ipv6_address = 0;
/* Assume that peer supports the address family
* by which it sends a packet.
*/
if (peer_addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6)
asoc->peer.ipv6_address = 1;
else if (peer_addr->sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
asoc->peer.ipv4_address = 1;
/* Cycle through address types; avoid divide by 0. */
sat = ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t);
if (sat)
sat /= sizeof(__u16);
for (i = 0; i < sat; ++i) {
switch (param.sat->types[i]) {
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS:
asoc->peer.ipv4_address = 1;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS:
if (PF_INET6 == asoc->base.sk->sk_family)
asoc->peer.ipv6_address = 1;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_HOST_NAME_ADDRESS:
asoc->peer.hostname_address = 1;
break;
default: /* Just ignore anything else. */
break;
}
}
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_STATE_COOKIE:
asoc->peer.cookie_len =
ntohs(param.p->length) - sizeof(sctp_paramhdr_t);
asoc->peer.cookie = param.cookie->body;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_HEARTBEAT_INFO:
/* Would be odd to receive, but it causes no problems. */
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_UNRECOGNIZED_PARAMETERS:
/* Rejected during verify stage. */
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_ECN_CAPABLE:
asoc->peer.ecn_capable = 1;
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_ADAPTATION_LAYER_IND:
asoc->peer.adaptation_ind = ntohl(param.aind->adaptation_ind);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_SET_PRIMARY:
if (!net->sctp.addip_enable)
goto fall_through;
addr_param = param.v + sizeof(sctp_addip_param_t);
af = sctp_get_af_specific(param_type2af(param.p->type));
af->from_addr_param(&addr, addr_param,
htons(asoc->peer.port), 0);
/* if the address is invalid, we can't process it.
* XXX: see spec for what to do.
*/
if (!af->addr_valid(&addr, NULL, NULL))
break;
t = sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &addr);
if (!t)
break;
sctp_assoc_set_primary(asoc, t);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_SUPPORTED_EXT:
sctp_process_ext_param(asoc, param);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_FWD_TSN_SUPPORT:
if (net->sctp.prsctp_enable) {
asoc->peer.prsctp_capable = 1;
break;
}
/* Fall Through */
goto fall_through;
case SCTP_PARAM_RANDOM:
if (!ep->auth_enable)
goto fall_through;
/* Save peer's random parameter */
asoc->peer.peer_random = kmemdup(param.p,
ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
if (!asoc->peer.peer_random) {
retval = 0;
break;
}
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_HMAC_ALGO:
if (!ep->auth_enable)
goto fall_through;
/* Save peer's HMAC list */
asoc->peer.peer_hmacs = kmemdup(param.p,
ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
if (!asoc->peer.peer_hmacs) {
retval = 0;
break;
}
/* Set the default HMAC the peer requested*/
sctp_auth_asoc_set_default_hmac(asoc, param.hmac_algo);
break;
case SCTP_PARAM_CHUNKS:
if (!ep->auth_enable)
goto fall_through;
asoc->peer.peer_chunks = kmemdup(param.p,
ntohs(param.p->length), gfp);
if (!asoc->peer.peer_chunks)
retval = 0;
break;
fall_through:
default:
/* Any unrecognized parameters should have been caught
* and handled by sctp_verify_param() which should be
* called prior to this routine. Simply log the error
* here.
*/
pr_debug("%s: ignoring param:%d for association:%p.\n",
__func__, ntohs(param.p->type), asoc);
break;
}
return retval;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in af->from_addr_param on malformed packet
An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death
in the form of:
------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------>
While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things
in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters
inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary
IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address
parameter.
So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS
or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0
and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily
dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param().
The trace for the log:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078
IP: [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e9c62>] [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01f2add>] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e1fcb>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e5c09>] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e61f6>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[...]
A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all
other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could
possibly return with NULL.
Fixes: d6de3097592b ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 27,335
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: TransportDIB::~TransportDIB() {
if (address_ != kInvalidAddress) {
shmdt(address_);
address_ = kInvalidAddress;
}
if (x_shm_) {
DCHECK(display_);
ui::DetachSharedMemory(display_, x_shm_);
}
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 4,853
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void preventCommandAOF(client *c) {
c->flags |= CLIENT_PREVENT_AOF_PROP;
}
Commit Message: Security: Cross Protocol Scripting protection.
This is an attempt at mitigating problems due to cross protocol
scripting, an attack targeting services using line oriented protocols
like Redis that can accept HTTP requests as valid protocol, by
discarding the invalid parts and accepting the payloads sent, for
example, via a POST request.
For this to be effective, when we detect POST and Host: and terminate
the connection asynchronously, the networking code was modified in order
to never process further input. It was later verified that in a
pipelined request containing a POST command, the successive commands are
not executed.
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 21,135
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned uivector_push_back(uivector* p, unsigned c)
{
if(!uivector_resize(p, p->size + 1)) return 0;
p->data[p->size - 1] = c;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed #5645: realloc return handling
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 29,731
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::IsMaximized() const {
return (ui::HasWMSpecProperty(window_properties_,
gfx::GetAtom("_NET_WM_STATE_MAXIMIZED_VERT")) &&
ui::HasWMSpecProperty(window_properties_,
gfx::GetAtom("_NET_WM_STATE_MAXIMIZED_HORZ")));
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 3,181
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void cluster_finish(void)
{
hash_clean(cluster_hash, (void (*)(void *))cluster_free);
hash_free(cluster_hash);
cluster_hash = NULL;
}
Commit Message: bgpd: don't use BGP_ATTR_VNC(255) unless ENABLE_BGP_VNC_ATTR is defined
Signed-off-by: Lou Berger <lberger@labn.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,384
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void iboe_mcast_work_handler(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct iboe_mcast_work *mw = container_of(work, struct iboe_mcast_work, work);
struct cma_multicast *mc = mw->mc;
struct ib_sa_multicast *m = mc->multicast.ib;
mc->multicast.ib->context = mc;
cma_ib_mc_handler(0, m);
kref_put(&mc->mcref, release_mc);
kfree(mw);
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,729
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void writeInt32(int32_t value)
{
append(Int32Tag);
doWriteUint32(ZigZag::encode(static_cast<uint32_t>(value)));
}
Commit Message: Replace further questionable HashMap::add usages in bindings
BUG=390928
R=dcarney@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/411273002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@178823 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,074
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ikev2_TS_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext,
u_int item_len _U_, const u_char *ep _U_,
uint32_t phase _U_, uint32_t doi _U_,
uint32_t proto _U_, int depth _U_)
{
return ikev2_gen_print(ndo, tpay, ext);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 10,103
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnMetadata(PipelineMetadata metadata) {
DVLOG(1) << __func__;
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
time_to_metadata_ = base::TimeTicks::Now() - load_start_time_;
media_metrics_provider_->SetTimeToMetadata(time_to_metadata_);
RecordTimingUMA("Media.TimeToMetadata", time_to_metadata_);
pipeline_metadata_ = metadata;
SetReadyState(WebMediaPlayer::kReadyStateHaveMetadata);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Media.VideoRotation",
metadata.video_decoder_config.video_rotation(),
VIDEO_ROTATION_MAX + 1);
if (HasAudio()) {
RecordEncryptionScheme("Audio",
metadata.audio_decoder_config.encryption_scheme());
}
if (HasVideo()) {
RecordEncryptionScheme("Video",
metadata.video_decoder_config.encryption_scheme());
if (overlay_enabled_) {
if (!always_enable_overlays_ && !DoesOverlaySupportMetadata())
DisableOverlay();
}
if (!surface_layer_for_video_enabled_) {
DCHECK(!video_layer_);
video_layer_ = cc::VideoLayer::Create(
compositor_.get(),
pipeline_metadata_.video_decoder_config.video_rotation());
video_layer_->SetContentsOpaque(opaque_);
client_->SetCcLayer(video_layer_.get());
} else {
DCHECK(!bridge_);
bridge_ = std::move(create_bridge_callback_)
.Run(this, compositor_->GetUpdateSubmissionStateCallback());
bridge_->CreateSurfaceLayer();
vfc_task_runner_->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(
&VideoFrameCompositor::EnableSubmission,
base::Unretained(compositor_.get()), bridge_->GetSurfaceId(),
pipeline_metadata_.video_decoder_config.video_rotation(),
BindToCurrentLoop(base::BindRepeating(
&WebMediaPlayerImpl::OnFrameSinkDestroyed, AsWeakPtr()))));
bridge_->SetContentsOpaque(opaque_);
}
}
if (observer_)
observer_->OnMetadataChanged(pipeline_metadata_);
CreateWatchTimeReporter();
CreateVideoDecodeStatsReporter();
UpdatePlayState();
}
Commit Message: Fix HasSingleSecurityOrigin for HLS
HLS manifests can request segments from a different origin than the
original manifest's origin. We do not inspect HLS manifests within
Chromium, and instead delegate to Android's MediaPlayer. This means we
need to be conservative, and always assume segments might come from a
different origin. HasSingleSecurityOrigin should always return false
when decoding HLS.
Bug: 864283
Change-Id: Ie16849ac6f29ae7eaa9caf342ad0509a226228ef
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1142691
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Thomas Guilbert <tguilbert@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#576378}
CWE ID: CWE-346
| 0
| 28,829
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Box *cprt_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_CopyrightBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_CPRT);
tmp->packedLanguageCode[0] = 'u';
tmp->packedLanguageCode[1] = 'n';
tmp->packedLanguageCode[2] = 'd';
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 18,868
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t __nfs4_get_acl_uncached(struct inode *inode, void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
struct page *pages[NFS4ACL_MAXPAGES] = {NULL, };
struct nfs_getaclargs args = {
.fh = NFS_FH(inode),
.acl_pages = pages,
.acl_len = buflen,
};
struct nfs_getaclres res = {
.acl_len = buflen,
};
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_GETACL],
.rpc_argp = &args,
.rpc_resp = &res,
};
unsigned int npages = DIV_ROUND_UP(buflen, PAGE_SIZE);
int ret = -ENOMEM, i;
/* As long as we're doing a round trip to the server anyway,
* let's be prepared for a page of acl data. */
if (npages == 0)
npages = 1;
if (npages > ARRAY_SIZE(pages))
return -ERANGE;
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
pages[i] = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!pages[i])
goto out_free;
}
/* for decoding across pages */
res.acl_scratch = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL);
if (!res.acl_scratch)
goto out_free;
args.acl_len = npages * PAGE_SIZE;
args.acl_pgbase = 0;
dprintk("%s buf %p buflen %zu npages %d args.acl_len %zu\n",
__func__, buf, buflen, npages, args.acl_len);
ret = nfs4_call_sync(NFS_SERVER(inode)->client, NFS_SERVER(inode),
&msg, &args.seq_args, &res.seq_res, 0);
if (ret)
goto out_free;
/* Handle the case where the passed-in buffer is too short */
if (res.acl_flags & NFS4_ACL_TRUNC) {
/* Did the user only issue a request for the acl length? */
if (buf == NULL)
goto out_ok;
ret = -ERANGE;
goto out_free;
}
nfs4_write_cached_acl(inode, pages, res.acl_data_offset, res.acl_len);
if (buf) {
if (res.acl_len > buflen) {
ret = -ERANGE;
goto out_free;
}
_copy_from_pages(buf, pages, res.acl_data_offset, res.acl_len);
}
out_ok:
ret = res.acl_len;
out_free:
for (i = 0; i < npages; i++)
if (pages[i])
__free_page(pages[i]);
if (res.acl_scratch)
__free_page(res.acl_scratch);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: NFS: Fix a NULL pointer dereference of migration recovery ops for v4.2 client
---Steps to Reproduce--
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
<nfs-client>
# mount -t nfs nfs-server:/nfs/ /mnt/
# ll /mnt/*/
<nfs-server>
# cat /etc/exports
/nfs/referal *(rw,insecure,no_subtree_check,no_root_squash,crossmnt,refer=/nfs/old/@nfs-server)
/nfs/old *(ro,insecure,subtree_check,root_squash,crossmnt)
# service nfs restart
<nfs-client>
# ll /mnt/*/ --->>>>> oops here
[ 5123.102925] BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
[ 5123.103363] IP: [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.103752] PGD 587b9067 PUD 3cbf5067 PMD 0
[ 5123.104131] Oops: 0000 [#1]
[ 5123.104529] Modules linked in: nfsv4(OE) nfs(OE) fscache(E) nfsd(OE) xfs libcrc32c iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi coretemp crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel ppdev vmw_balloon parport_pc parport i2c_piix4 shpchp auth_rpcgss nfs_acl vmw_vmci lockd grace sunrpc vmwgfx drm_kms_helper ttm drm mptspi serio_raw scsi_transport_spi e1000 mptscsih mptbase ata_generic pata_acpi [last unloaded: nfsd]
[ 5123.105887] CPU: 0 PID: 15853 Comm: ::1-manager Tainted: G OE 4.2.0-rc6+ #214
[ 5123.106358] Hardware name: VMware, Inc. VMware Virtual Platform/440BX Desktop Reference Platform, BIOS 6.00 05/20/2014
[ 5123.106860] task: ffff88007620f300 ti: ffff88005877c000 task.ti: ffff88005877c000
[ 5123.107363] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa03ed38b>] [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.107909] RSP: 0018:ffff88005877fdb8 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 5123.108435] RAX: ffff880053f3bc00 RBX: ffff88006ce6c908 RCX: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.108968] RDX: ffffea0000e6d940 RSI: ffff8800399a0000 RDI: ffff88006ce6c908
[ 5123.109503] RBP: ffff88005877fe28 R08: ffffffff81c708a0 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5123.110045] R10: 00000000000001a2 R11: ffff88003ba7f5c8 R12: ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.110618] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff880053a0d240 R15: ffff880053a0d240
[ 5123.111169] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffffff81c27000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5123.111726] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5123.112286] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 0000000054cac000 CR4: 00000000001406f0
[ 5123.112888] Stack:
[ 5123.113458] ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 00000000000167d0 0000000000000000
[ 5123.114049] 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000a7ec82c6
[ 5123.114662] ffff88005877fe18 ffffea0000e6d940 ffff8800399a0000 ffff880054c55800
[ 5123.115264] Call Trace:
[ 5123.115868] [<ffffffffa03fb44b>] nfs4_try_migration+0xbb/0x220 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.116487] [<ffffffffa03fcb3b>] nfs4_run_state_manager+0x4ab/0x7b0 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117104] [<ffffffffa03fc690>] ? nfs4_do_reclaim+0x510/0x510 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.117813] [<ffffffff810a4527>] kthread+0xd7/0xf0
[ 5123.118456] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.119108] [<ffffffff816d9cdf>] ret_from_fork+0x3f/0x70
[ 5123.119723] [<ffffffff810a4450>] ? kthread_worker_fn+0x160/0x160
[ 5123.120329] Code: 4c 8b 6a 58 74 17 eb 52 48 8d 55 a8 89 c6 4c 89 e7 e8 4a b5 ff ff 8b 45 b0 85 c0 74 1c 4c 89 f9 48 8b 55 90 48 8b 75 98 48 89 df <41> ff 55 00 3d e8 d8 ff ff 41 89 c6 74 cf 48 8b 4d c8 65 48 33
[ 5123.121643] RIP [<ffffffffa03ed38b>] nfs4_proc_get_locations+0x9b/0x120 [nfsv4]
[ 5123.122308] RSP <ffff88005877fdb8>
[ 5123.122942] CR2: 0000000000000000
Fixes: ec011fe847 ("NFS: Introduce a vector of migration recovery ops")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.13+
Signed-off-by: Kinglong Mee <kinglongmee@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 26,608
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderFrameImpl* frame() {
return static_cast<RenderFrameImpl*>(view()->GetMainRenderFrame());
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 6,479
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Ins_EQ( FT_Long* args )
{
args[0] = ( args[0] == args[1] );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 6,402
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit adf_unregister_ctl_device_driver(void)
{
adf_chr_drv_destroy();
adf_exit_aer();
qat_crypto_unregister();
qat_algs_exit();
mutex_destroy(&adf_ctl_lock);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 22,129
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::updateViewportSize()
{
if (m_viewportHandler)
m_viewportHandler->viewportItemSizeChanged();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 863
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutomationInternalCustomBindings::SendNodesRemovedEvent(
ui::AXTree* tree,
const std::vector<int>& ids) {
auto iter = axtree_to_tree_cache_map_.find(tree);
if (iter == axtree_to_tree_cache_map_.end())
return;
int tree_id = iter->second->tree_id;
v8::Isolate* isolate = GetIsolate();
v8::HandleScope handle_scope(isolate);
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(context()->v8_context());
v8::Local<v8::Array> args(v8::Array::New(GetIsolate(), 2U));
args->Set(0U, v8::Integer::New(GetIsolate(), tree_id));
v8::Local<v8::Array> nodes(v8::Array::New(GetIsolate(), ids.size()));
args->Set(1U, nodes);
for (size_t i = 0; i < ids.size(); ++i)
nodes->Set(i, v8::Integer::New(GetIsolate(), ids[i]));
context()->DispatchEvent("automationInternal.onNodesRemoved", args);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,850
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebContents* PrintPreviewHandler::preview_web_contents() const {
return web_ui()->GetWebContents();
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 3,035
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int ebt_make_matchname(const struct ebt_entry_match *m,
const char *base, char __user *ubase)
{
char __user *hlp = ubase + ((char *)m - base);
if (copy_to_user(hlp, m->u.match->name, EBT_FUNCTION_MAXNAMELEN))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bridge: netfilter: fix information leak
Struct tmp is copied from userspace. It is not checked whether the "name"
field is NULL terminated. This may lead to buffer overflow and passing
contents of kernel stack as a module name to try_then_request_module() and,
consequently, to modprobe commandline. It would be seen by all userspace
processes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 25,241
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void GetLoadTimes(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& args) {
WebLocalFrame* frame = WebLocalFrame::frameForCurrentContext();
if (frame) {
WebDataSource* data_source = frame->dataSource();
if (data_source) {
DocumentState* document_state =
DocumentState::FromDataSource(data_source);
v8::Isolate* isolate = args.GetIsolate();
v8::Local<v8::Object> load_times = v8::Object::New(isolate);
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "requestTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate,
document_state->request_time().ToDoubleT()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "startLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate,
document_state->start_load_time().ToDoubleT()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "commitLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate,
document_state->commit_load_time().ToDoubleT()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "finishDocumentLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(
isolate,
document_state->finish_document_load_time().ToDoubleT()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "finishLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate,
document_state->finish_load_time().ToDoubleT()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "firstPaintTime"),
v8::Number::New(isolate,
document_state->first_paint_time().ToDoubleT()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "firstPaintAfterLoadTime"),
v8::Number::New(
isolate,
document_state->first_paint_after_load_time().ToDoubleT()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "navigationType"),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(
isolate, GetNavigationType(data_source->navigationType())));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "wasFetchedViaSpdy"),
v8::Boolean::New(isolate, document_state->was_fetched_via_spdy()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "wasNpnNegotiated"),
v8::Boolean::New(isolate, document_state->was_npn_negotiated()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "npnNegotiatedProtocol"),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(
isolate, document_state->npn_negotiated_protocol().c_str()));
load_times->Set(
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "wasAlternateProtocolAvailable"),
v8::Boolean::New(
isolate, document_state->was_alternate_protocol_available()));
load_times->Set(v8::String::NewFromUtf8(isolate, "connectionInfo"),
v8::String::NewFromUtf8(
isolate,
net::HttpResponseInfo::ConnectionInfoToString(
document_state->connection_info()).c_str()));
args.GetReturnValue().Set(load_times);
return;
}
}
args.GetReturnValue().SetNull();
}
Commit Message: Cache all chrome.loadTimes info before passing them to setters.
The setters can invalidate the pointers frame, data_source and document_state.
BUG=549251
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1422753007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#357201}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 21,421
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void kvm_io_bus_destroy(struct kvm_io_bus *bus)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < bus->dev_count; i++) {
struct kvm_io_device *pos = bus->devs[i];
kvm_iodevice_destructor(pos);
}
kfree(bus);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Validate userspace_addr of memslot when registered
This way, we can avoid checking the user space address many times when
we read the guest memory.
Although we can do the same for write if we check which slots are
writable, we do not care write now: reading the guest memory happens
more often than writing.
[avi: change VERIFY_READ to VERIFY_WRITE]
Signed-off-by: Takuya Yoshikawa <yoshikawa.takuya@oss.ntt.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,551
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ShelfLayoutManager::AutoHideState ShelfLayoutManager::CalculateAutoHideState(
VisibilityState visibility_state) const {
if (visibility_state != AUTO_HIDE || !launcher_widget())
return AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
Shell* shell = Shell::GetInstance();
if (shell->GetAppListTargetVisibility())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (shell->system_tray() && shell->system_tray()->should_show_launcher())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (launcher_ && launcher_->IsShowingMenu())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (launcher_widget()->IsActive() || status_->IsActive())
return AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN;
if (event_filter_.get() && event_filter_->in_mouse_drag())
return AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
aura::RootWindow* root = launcher_widget()->GetNativeView()->GetRootWindow();
bool mouse_over_launcher =
launcher_widget()->GetWindowScreenBounds().Contains(
root->last_mouse_location());
return mouse_over_launcher ? AUTO_HIDE_SHOWN : AUTO_HIDE_HIDDEN;
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 5,509
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChromeURLRequestContextGetter::ChromeURLRequestContextGetter(
ChromeURLRequestContextFactory* factory)
: factory_(factory) {
DCHECK(factory);
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 14,404
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleDeletePathsCHROMIUM(
uint32_t immediate_data_size,
const volatile void* cmd_data) {
const volatile gles2::cmds::DeletePathsCHROMIUM& c =
*static_cast<const volatile gles2::cmds::DeletePathsCHROMIUM*>(cmd_data);
if (!features().chromium_path_rendering)
return error::kUnknownCommand;
PathCommandValidatorContext v(this, "glDeletePathsCHROMIUM");
GLsizei range = 0;
if (!v.GetPathRange(c, &range))
return v.error();
if (range == 0)
return error::kNoError;
GLuint first_client_id = c.first_client_id;
if (!DeletePathsCHROMIUMHelper(first_client_id, range))
return error::kInvalidArguments;
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 4,157
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xfs_inode_set_cowblocks_tag(
xfs_inode_t *ip)
{
trace_xfs_inode_set_cowblocks_tag(ip);
return __xfs_inode_set_blocks_tag(ip, xfs_queue_cowblocks,
trace_xfs_perag_set_cowblocks,
XFS_ICI_COWBLOCKS_TAG);
}
Commit Message: xfs: validate cached inodes are free when allocated
A recent fuzzed filesystem image cached random dcache corruption
when the reproducer was run. This often showed up as panics in
lookup_slow() on a null inode->i_ops pointer when doing pathwalks.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
....
Call Trace:
lookup_slow+0x44/0x60
walk_component+0x3dd/0x9f0
link_path_walk+0x4a7/0x830
path_lookupat+0xc1/0x470
filename_lookup+0x129/0x270
user_path_at_empty+0x36/0x40
path_listxattr+0x98/0x110
SyS_listxattr+0x13/0x20
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
but had many different failure modes including deadlocks trying to
lock the inode that was just allocated or KASAN reports of
use-after-free violations.
The cause of the problem was a corrupt INOBT on a v4 fs where the
root inode was marked as free in the inobt record. Hence when we
allocated an inode, it chose the root inode to allocate, found it in
the cache and re-initialised it.
We recently fixed a similar inode allocation issue caused by inobt
record corruption problem in xfs_iget_cache_miss() in commit
ee457001ed6c ("xfs: catch inode allocation state mismatch
corruption"). This change adds similar checks to the cache-hit path
to catch it, and turns the reproducer into a corruption shutdown
situation.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-Off-By: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
[darrick: fix typos in comment]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 22,922
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE omx_video::component_role_enum(OMX_IN OMX_HANDLETYPE hComp,
OMX_OUT OMX_U8* role,
OMX_IN OMX_U32 index)
{
(void)hComp;
OMX_ERRORTYPE eRet = OMX_ErrorNone;
if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if ((0 == index) && role) {
strlcpy((char *)role, "video_decoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("component_role_enum: role %s",role);
} else {
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
} else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if ((0 == index) && role) {
strlcpy((char *)role, "video_decoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("component_role_enum: role %s",role);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: No more roles");
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
} else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if ((0 == index) && role) {
strlcpy((char *)role, "video_decoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("component_role_enum: role %s",role);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: No more roles");
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
} else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.decoder.vc1",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if ((0 == index) && role) {
strlcpy((char *)role, "video_decoder.vc1",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("component_role_enum: role %s",role);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: No more roles");
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
}
if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if ((0 == index) && role) {
strlcpy((char *)role, "video_encoder.mpeg4",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("component_role_enum: role %s",role);
} else {
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
} else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if ((0 == index) && role) {
strlcpy((char *)role, "video_encoder.h263",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("component_role_enum: role %s",role);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: No more roles");
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
} else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if ((0 == index) && role) {
strlcpy((char *)role, "video_encoder.avc",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("component_role_enum: role %s",role);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: No more roles");
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
}
#ifdef _MSM8974_
else if (!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) {
if ((0 == index) && role) {
strlcpy((char *)role, "video_encoder.vp8",OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("component_role_enum: role %s",role);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: No more roles");
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
}
#endif
else if ((!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qcom.video.encoder.hevc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE)) ||
(!strncmp((char*)m_nkind, "OMX.qti.video.encoder.hevc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE))) {
if ((0 == index) && role) {
strlcpy((char *)role, "video_encoder.hevc", OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE);
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("component_role_enum: role %s", role);
} else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: No more roles");
eRet = OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
}
else {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Querying Role on Unknown Component");
eRet = OMX_ErrorInvalidComponentName;
}
return eRet;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 4,919
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void apply_window_int16_c(int16_t *output, const int16_t *input,
const int16_t *window, unsigned int len)
{
int i;
int len2 = len >> 1;
for (i = 0; i < len2; i++) {
int16_t w = window[i];
output[i] = (MUL16(input[i], w) + (1 << 14)) >> 15;
output[len-i-1] = (MUL16(input[len-i-1], w) + (1 << 14)) >> 15;
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,996
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLFormElement::RemoveFromPastNamesMap(HTMLElement& element) {
if (!past_names_map_)
return;
for (auto& it : *past_names_map_) {
if (it.value == &element) {
it.value = nullptr;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Move user activation check to RemoteFrame::Navigate's callers.
Currently RemoteFrame::Navigate is the user of
Frame::HasTransientUserActivation that passes a RemoteFrame*, and
it seems wrong because the user activation (user gesture) needed by
the navigation should belong to the LocalFrame that initiated the
navigation.
Follow-up CLs after this one will update UserActivation code in
Frame to take a LocalFrame* instead of a Frame*, and get rid of
redundant IPCs.
Bug: 811414
Change-Id: I771c1694043edb54374a44213d16715d9c7da704
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914736
Commit-Queue: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536728}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 24,236
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int oem_data_avail_to_receive_msg_avail(struct smi_info *smi_info)
{
smi_info->msg_flags = ((smi_info->msg_flags & ~OEM_DATA_AVAIL) |
RECEIVE_MSG_AVAIL);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 28,562
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int snd_card_locked(int card)
{
int locked;
mutex_lock(&snd_card_mutex);
locked = test_bit(card, snd_cards_lock);
mutex_unlock(&snd_card_mutex);
return locked;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: control: Protect user controls against concurrent access
The user-control put and get handlers as well as the tlv do not protect against
concurrent access from multiple threads. Since the state of the control is not
updated atomically it is possible that either two write operations or a write
and a read operation race against each other. Both can lead to arbitrary memory
disclosure. This patch introduces a new lock that protects user-controls from
concurrent access. Since applications typically access controls sequentially
than in parallel a single lock per card should be fine.
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Acked-by: Jaroslav Kysela <perex@perex.cz>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 21,076
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reflectBooleanAttributeAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* imp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
V8TRYCATCH_VOID(bool, cppValue, jsValue->BooleanValue());
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
imp->setBooleanAttribute(HTMLNames::reflectbooleanattributeAttr, cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 13,918
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ClickElement(const WebDocument& document,
const WebElementDescriptor& element_descriptor) {
WebString web_descriptor = WebString::FromUTF8(element_descriptor.descriptor);
blink::WebElement element;
switch (element_descriptor.retrieval_method) {
case WebElementDescriptor::CSS_SELECTOR: {
element = document.QuerySelector(web_descriptor);
break;
}
case WebElementDescriptor::ID:
element = document.GetElementById(web_descriptor);
break;
case WebElementDescriptor::NONE:
return true;
}
if (element.IsNull()) {
DVLOG(1) << "Could not find "
<< element_descriptor.descriptor
<< " by "
<< RetrievalMethodToString(element_descriptor.retrieval_method)
<< ".";
return false;
}
element.SimulateClick();
return true;
}
Commit Message: [autofill] Pin preview font-family to a system font
Bug: 916838
Change-Id: I4e874105262f2e15a11a7a18a7afd204e5827400
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1423109
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Koji Ishii <kojii@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#640884}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 22,575
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsNameType(const AutofillField& field) {
return field.Type().group() == NAME || field.Type().group() == NAME_BILLING ||
field.Type().GetStorableType() == CREDIT_CARD_NAME_FULL ||
field.Type().GetStorableType() == CREDIT_CARD_NAME_FIRST ||
field.Type().GetStorableType() == CREDIT_CARD_NAME_LAST;
}
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 968
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Pin NO_INLINE jshFindPinForFunction(JshPinFunction functionType, JshPinFunction functionInfo) {
#ifdef OLIMEXINO_STM32
/** Hack, as you can't mix AFs on the STM32F1, and Olimexino reordered the pins
* such that D4(AF1) is before D11(AF0) - and there are no SCK/MISO for AF1! */
if (functionType == JSH_SPI1 && functionInfo==JSH_SPI_MOSI) return JSH_PORTD_OFFSET+11;
#endif
#ifdef PICO
/* On the Pico, A9 is used for sensing when USB power is applied. Is someone types in
* Serial1.setup(9600) it'll get chosen as it's the first pin, but setting it to an output
* totally messes up the STM32 as it's fed with 5V. This ensures that it won't get chosen
* UNLESS it is explicitly selected.
*
* TODO: better way of doing this? A JSH_DONT_DEFAULT flag for pin functions? */
if (functionType == JSH_USART1) {
if (functionInfo==JSH_USART_TX) return JSH_PORTB_OFFSET+6;
if (functionInfo==JSH_USART_RX) return JSH_PORTB_OFFSET+7;
}
#endif
Pin i;
int j;
for (i=0;i<JSH_PIN_COUNT;i++)
for (j=0;j<JSH_PININFO_FUNCTIONS;j++)
if ((pinInfo[i].functions[j]&JSH_MASK_AF) == JSH_AF0 &&
(pinInfo[i].functions[j]&JSH_MASK_TYPE) == functionType &&
(pinInfo[i].functions[j]&JSH_MASK_INFO) == functionInfo)
return i;
for (i=0;i<JSH_PIN_COUNT;i++)
for (j=0;j<JSH_PININFO_FUNCTIONS;j++)
if ((pinInfo[i].functions[j]&JSH_MASK_TYPE) == functionType &&
(pinInfo[i].functions[j]&JSH_MASK_INFO) == functionInfo)
return i;
return PIN_UNDEFINED;
}
Commit Message: Fix strncat/cpy bounding issues (fix #1425)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,742
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool CompositorImpl::IsInitialized() {
return g_initialized;
}
Commit Message: gpu/android : Add support for partial swap with surface control.
Add support for PostSubBuffer to GLSurfaceEGLSurfaceControl. This should
allow the display compositor to draw the minimum sub-rect necessary from
the damage tracking in BufferQueue on the client-side, and also to pass
this damage rect to the framework.
R=piman@chromium.org
Bug: 926020
Change-Id: I73d3320cab68250d4c6865bf21c5531682d8bf61
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1457467
Commit-Queue: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#629852}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 9,109
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err kind_Size(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_KindBox *ptr = (GF_KindBox *)s;
ptr->size += strlen(ptr->schemeURI) + 1;
if (ptr->value) {
ptr->size += strlen(ptr->value) + 1;
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 12,227
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<ScriptProfile> ScriptProfiler::stop(const String& title)
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
v8::CpuProfiler* profiler = isolate->GetCpuProfiler();
if (!profiler)
return 0;
v8::HandleScope handleScope(isolate);
const v8::CpuProfile* profile = profiler->StopCpuProfiling(v8String(title, isolate));
if (!profile)
return 0;
String profileTitle = toWebCoreString(profile->GetTitle());
double idleTime = 0.0;
ProfileNameIdleTimeMap* profileNameIdleTimeMap = ScriptProfiler::currentProfileNameIdleTimeMap();
ProfileNameIdleTimeMap::iterator profileIdleTime = profileNameIdleTimeMap->find(profileTitle);
if (profileIdleTime != profileNameIdleTimeMap->end()) {
idleTime = profileIdleTime->value * 1000.0;
profileNameIdleTimeMap->remove(profileIdleTime);
}
return ScriptProfile::create(profile, idleTime);
}
Commit Message: Fix clobbered build issue.
TBR=jochen@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
BUG=269698
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22425005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155711 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 26,625
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int bond_slave_netdev_event(unsigned long event,
struct net_device *slave_dev)
{
struct net_device *bond_dev = slave_dev->master;
struct bonding *bond = netdev_priv(bond_dev);
switch (event) {
case NETDEV_UNREGISTER:
if (bond_dev) {
if (bond->setup_by_slave)
bond_release_and_destroy(bond_dev, slave_dev);
else
bond_release(bond_dev, slave_dev);
}
break;
case NETDEV_CHANGE:
if (bond->params.mode == BOND_MODE_8023AD || bond_is_lb(bond)) {
struct slave *slave;
slave = bond_get_slave_by_dev(bond, slave_dev);
if (slave) {
u32 old_speed = slave->speed;
u8 old_duplex = slave->duplex;
bond_update_speed_duplex(slave);
if (bond_is_lb(bond))
break;
if (old_speed != slave->speed)
bond_3ad_adapter_speed_changed(slave);
if (old_duplex != slave->duplex)
bond_3ad_adapter_duplex_changed(slave);
}
}
break;
case NETDEV_DOWN:
/*
* ... Or is it this?
*/
break;
case NETDEV_CHANGEMTU:
/*
* TODO: Should slaves be allowed to
* independently alter their MTU? For
* an active-backup bond, slaves need
* not be the same type of device, so
* MTUs may vary. For other modes,
* slaves arguably should have the
* same MTUs. To do this, we'd need to
* take over the slave's change_mtu
* function for the duration of their
* servitude.
*/
break;
case NETDEV_CHANGENAME:
/*
* TODO: handle changing the primary's name
*/
break;
case NETDEV_FEAT_CHANGE:
bond_compute_features(bond);
break;
default:
break;
}
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 14,907
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool CParaNdisTX::DoPendingTasks(bool IsInterrupt)
{
ONPAUSECOMPLETEPROC CallbackToCall = nullptr;
PNET_BUFFER_LIST pNBLFailNow = nullptr;
PNET_BUFFER_LIST pNBLReturnNow = nullptr;
bool bDoKick = false;
DoWithTXLock([&] ()
{
m_VirtQueue.ProcessTXCompletions();
bDoKick = SendMapped(IsInterrupt, pNBLFailNow);
pNBLReturnNow = ProcessWaitingList();
{
CNdisPassiveWriteAutoLock tLock(m_Context->m_PauseLock);
if (!m_VirtQueue.HasPacketsInHW() && m_Context->SendState == srsPausing)
{
CallbackToCall = m_Context->SendPauseCompletionProc;
m_Context->SendPauseCompletionProc = nullptr;
m_Context->SendState = srsDisabled;
}
}
});
if (pNBLFailNow)
{
NdisMSendNetBufferListsComplete(m_Context->MiniportHandle, pNBLFailNow,
NDIS_SEND_COMPLETE_FLAGS_DISPATCH_LEVEL);
}
if (pNBLReturnNow)
{
NdisMSendNetBufferListsComplete(m_Context->MiniportHandle, pNBLReturnNow,
NDIS_SEND_COMPLETE_FLAGS_DISPATCH_LEVEL);
}
if (CallbackToCall != nullptr)
{
CallbackToCall(m_Context);
}
return bDoKick;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,222
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SpiceMarshaller *red_channel_client_get_marshaller(RedChannelClient *rcc)
{
return rcc->send_data.marshaller;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 8,377
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void feh_wm_set_bg_filled(Pixmap pmap, Imlib_Image im, int use_filelist,
int x, int y, int w, int h)
{
int img_w, img_h, cut_x;
int render_w, render_h, render_x, render_y;
if (use_filelist)
feh_wm_load_next(&im);
img_w = gib_imlib_image_get_width(im);
img_h = gib_imlib_image_get_height(im);
cut_x = (((img_w * h) > (img_h * w)) ? 1 : 0);
render_w = ( cut_x ? ((img_h * w) / h) : img_w);
render_h = ( !cut_x ? ((img_w * h) / w) : img_h);
render_x = ( cut_x ? ((img_w - render_w) >> 1) : 0);
render_y = ( !cut_x ? ((img_h - render_h) >> 1) : 0);
gib_imlib_render_image_part_on_drawable_at_size(pmap, im,
render_x, render_y,
render_w, render_h,
x, y, w, h,
1, 0, !opt.force_aliasing);
if (use_filelist)
gib_imlib_free_image_and_decache(im);
return;
}
Commit Message: Fix double-free/OOB-write while receiving IPC data
If a malicious client pretends to be the E17 window manager, it is
possible to trigger an out of boundary heap write while receiving an
IPC message.
The length of the already received message is stored in an unsigned
short, which overflows after receiving 64 KB of data. It's comparably
small amount of data and therefore achievable for an attacker.
When len overflows, realloc() will either be called with a small value
and therefore chars will be appended out of bounds, or len + 1 will be
exactly 0, in which case realloc() behaves like free(). This could be
abused for a later double-free attack as it's even possible to overwrite
the free information -- but this depends on the malloc implementation.
Signed-off-by: Tobias Stoeckmann <tobias@stoeckmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 11,164
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: decode_rfc3361(int dl, const uint8_t *data)
{
uint8_t enc;
unsigned int l;
char *sip = NULL;
struct in_addr addr;
char *p;
if (dl < 2) {
errno = EINVAL;
return 0;
}
enc = *data++;
dl--;
switch (enc) {
case 0:
if ((l = decode_rfc3397(NULL, 0, dl, data)) > 0) {
sip = xmalloc(l);
decode_rfc3397(sip, l, dl, data);
}
break;
case 1:
if (dl == 0 || dl % 4 != 0) {
errno = EINVAL;
break;
}
addr.s_addr = INADDR_BROADCAST;
l = ((dl / sizeof(addr.s_addr)) * ((4 * 4) + 1)) + 1;
sip = p = xmalloc(l);
while (dl != 0) {
memcpy(&addr.s_addr, data, sizeof(addr.s_addr));
data += sizeof(addr.s_addr);
p += snprintf(p, l - (p - sip), "%s ", inet_ntoa(addr));
dl -= sizeof(addr.s_addr);
}
*--p = '\0';
break;
default:
errno = EINVAL;
return 0;
}
return sip;
}
Commit Message: Improve length checks in DHCP Options parsing of dhcpcd.
Bug: 26461634
Change-Id: Ic4c2eb381a6819e181afc8ab13891f3fc58b7deb
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,361
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebBluetoothServiceImpl* RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateWebBluetoothService(
blink::mojom::WebBluetoothServiceRequest request) {
auto web_bluetooth_service =
base::MakeUnique<WebBluetoothServiceImpl>(this, std::move(request));
web_bluetooth_service->SetClientConnectionErrorHandler(
base::Bind(&RenderFrameHostImpl::DeleteWebBluetoothService,
base::Unretained(this), web_bluetooth_service.get()));
web_bluetooth_services_.push_back(std::move(web_bluetooth_service));
return web_bluetooth_services_.back().get();
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 4,257
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static zval *row_prop_read(zval *object, zval *member, int type, const zend_literal *key TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval *return_value;
pdo_stmt_t * stmt = (pdo_stmt_t *) zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
int colno = -1;
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(return_value);
RETVAL_NULL();
if (stmt) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(member) == IS_LONG) {
if (Z_LVAL_P(member) >= 0 && Z_LVAL_P(member) < stmt->column_count) {
fetch_value(stmt, return_value, Z_LVAL_P(member), NULL TSRMLS_CC);
}
} else {
convert_to_string(member);
/* TODO: replace this with a hash of available column names to column
* numbers */
for (colno = 0; colno < stmt->column_count; colno++) {
if (strcmp(stmt->columns[colno].name, Z_STRVAL_P(member)) == 0) {
fetch_value(stmt, return_value, colno, NULL TSRMLS_CC);
Z_SET_REFCOUNT_P(return_value, 0);
Z_UNSET_ISREF_P(return_value);
return return_value;
}
}
if (strcmp(Z_STRVAL_P(member), "queryString") == 0) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&return_value);
return std_object_handlers.read_property(object, member, type, key TSRMLS_CC);
}
}
}
Z_SET_REFCOUNT_P(return_value, 0);
Z_UNSET_ISREF_P(return_value);
return return_value;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 19,648
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nfs4_do_close(struct nfs4_state *state, gfp_t gfp_mask, int wait, bool roc)
{
struct nfs_server *server = NFS_SERVER(state->inode);
struct nfs4_closedata *calldata;
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp = state->owner;
struct rpc_task *task;
struct rpc_message msg = {
.rpc_proc = &nfs4_procedures[NFSPROC4_CLNT_CLOSE],
.rpc_cred = state->owner->so_cred,
};
struct rpc_task_setup task_setup_data = {
.rpc_client = server->client,
.rpc_message = &msg,
.callback_ops = &nfs4_close_ops,
.workqueue = nfsiod_workqueue,
.flags = RPC_TASK_ASYNC,
};
int status = -ENOMEM;
calldata = kzalloc(sizeof(*calldata), gfp_mask);
if (calldata == NULL)
goto out;
calldata->inode = state->inode;
calldata->state = state;
calldata->arg.fh = NFS_FH(state->inode);
calldata->arg.stateid = &state->open_stateid;
/* Serialization for the sequence id */
calldata->arg.seqid = nfs_alloc_seqid(&state->owner->so_seqid, gfp_mask);
if (calldata->arg.seqid == NULL)
goto out_free_calldata;
calldata->arg.fmode = 0;
calldata->arg.bitmask = server->cache_consistency_bitmask;
calldata->res.fattr = &calldata->fattr;
calldata->res.seqid = calldata->arg.seqid;
calldata->res.server = server;
calldata->roc = roc;
nfs_sb_active(calldata->inode->i_sb);
msg.rpc_argp = &calldata->arg;
msg.rpc_resp = &calldata->res;
task_setup_data.callback_data = calldata;
task = rpc_run_task(&task_setup_data);
if (IS_ERR(task))
return PTR_ERR(task);
status = 0;
if (wait)
status = rpc_wait_for_completion_task(task);
rpc_put_task(task);
return status;
out_free_calldata:
kfree(calldata);
out:
if (roc)
pnfs_roc_release(state->inode);
nfs4_put_open_state(state);
nfs4_put_state_owner(sp);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 5,029
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vips_foreign_load_gif_header( VipsForeignLoad *load )
{
VipsObjectClass *class = VIPS_OBJECT_GET_CLASS( load );
VipsForeignLoadGifClass *gif_class =
(VipsForeignLoadGifClass *) VIPS_OBJECT_GET_CLASS( load );
VipsForeignLoadGif *gif = (VipsForeignLoadGif *) load;
GifRecordType record;
if( gif_class->open( gif ) )
return( -1 );
gif->n_pages = 0;
do {
if( DGifGetRecordType( gif->file, &record ) == GIF_ERROR )
continue;
switch( record ) {
case IMAGE_DESC_RECORD_TYPE:
(void) vips_foreign_load_gif_scan_image( gif );
gif->n_pages += 1;
break;
case EXTENSION_RECORD_TYPE:
/* We will need to fetch the extensions to check for
* cmaps and transparency.
*/
(void) vips_foreign_load_gif_scan_extension( gif );
break;
case TERMINATE_RECORD_TYPE:
gif->eof = TRUE;
break;
case SCREEN_DESC_RECORD_TYPE:
case UNDEFINED_RECORD_TYPE:
break;
default:
break;
}
} while( !gif->eof );
if( gif->n == -1 )
gif->n = gif->n_pages - gif->page;
if( gif->page < 0 ||
gif->n <= 0 ||
gif->page + gif->n > gif->n_pages ) {
vips_error( class->nickname, "%s", _( "bad page number" ) );
return( -1 );
}
/* And set the output vips header from what we've learned.
*/
if( vips_foreign_load_gif_set_header( gif, load->out ) )
return( -1 );
return( 0 );
}
Commit Message: fetch map after DGifGetImageDesc()
Earlier refactoring broke GIF map fetch.
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,002
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void remove_full(struct kmem_cache *s, struct page *page)
{
struct kmem_cache_node *n;
if (!(s->flags & SLAB_STORE_USER))
return;
n = get_node(s, page_to_nid(page));
spin_lock(&n->list_lock);
list_del(&page->lru);
spin_unlock(&n->list_lock);
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 21,053
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static CURLcode setup_connection_internals(struct connectdata *conn)
{
const struct Curl_handler * p;
CURLcode result;
conn->socktype = SOCK_STREAM; /* most of them are TCP streams */
/* Perform setup complement if some. */
p = conn->handler;
if(p->setup_connection) {
result = (*p->setup_connection)(conn);
if(result)
return result;
p = conn->handler; /* May have changed. */
}
if(conn->port < 0)
/* we check for -1 here since if proxy was detected already, this
was very likely already set to the proxy port */
conn->port = p->defport;
return CURLE_OK;
}
Commit Message: Curl_close: clear data->multi_easy on free to avoid use-after-free
Regression from b46cfbc068 (7.59.0)
CVE-2018-16840
Reported-by: Brian Carpenter (Geeknik Labs)
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16840.html
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 18,872
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SimulateURLFetch(bool success) {
net::TestURLFetcher* fetcher = url_fetcher_factory_.GetFetcherByID(0);
ASSERT_TRUE(fetcher);
net::URLRequestStatus status;
status.set_status(success ? net::URLRequestStatus::SUCCESS :
net::URLRequestStatus::FAILED);
std::string script = " var google = {};"
"google.translate = (function() {"
" return {"
" TranslateService: function() {"
" return {"
" isAvailable : function() {"
" return true;"
" },"
" restore : function() {"
" return;"
" },"
" getDetectedLanguage : function() {"
" return \"ja\";"
" },"
" translatePage : function(originalLang, targetLang,"
" onTranslateProgress) {"
" document.getElementsByTagName(\"body\")[0].innerHTML = '" +
std::string(kTestFormString) +
" ';"
" onTranslateProgress(100, true, false);"
" }"
" };"
" }"
" };"
"})();"
"cr.googleTranslate.onTranslateElementLoad();";
fetcher->set_url(fetcher->GetOriginalURL());
fetcher->set_status(status);
fetcher->set_response_code(success ? 200 : 500);
fetcher->SetResponseString(script);
fetcher->delegate()->OnURLFetchComplete(fetcher);
}
Commit Message: Disable AutofillInteractiveTest.OnChangeAfterAutofill test.
Failing due to http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=revision&revision=170278.
BUG=353691
TBR=isherman@chromium.org, dbeam@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/216853002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260106 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 13,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ClassicPendingScript::CancelStreaming() {
if (!streamer_)
return;
streamer_->Cancel();
streamer_ = nullptr;
streamer_done_.Reset();
is_currently_streaming_ = false;
DCHECK(!IsCurrentlyStreaming());
}
Commit Message: Check CORS using PassesAccessControlCheck() with supplied SecurityOrigin
Partial revert of https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/535694.
Bug: 799477
Change-Id: I878bb9bcb83afaafe8601293db9aa644fc5929b3
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/898427
Commit-Queue: Hiroshige Hayashizaki <hiroshige@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Takeshi Yoshino <tyoshino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#535176}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 6,375
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int wc_ecc_export_x963_compressed(ecc_key* key, byte* out, word32* outLen)
{
word32 numlen;
int ret = MP_OKAY;
if (key == NULL || out == NULL || outLen == NULL)
return BAD_FUNC_ARG;
if (wc_ecc_is_valid_idx(key->idx) == 0) {
return ECC_BAD_ARG_E;
}
numlen = key->dp->size;
if (*outLen < (1 + numlen)) {
*outLen = 1 + numlen;
return BUFFER_E;
}
#ifdef WOLFSSL_ATECC508A
/* TODO: Implement equiv call to ATECC508A */
ret = BAD_COND_E;
#else
/* store first byte */
out[0] = mp_isodd(key->pubkey.y) == MP_YES ? ECC_POINT_COMP_ODD : ECC_POINT_COMP_EVEN;
/* pad and store x */
XMEMSET(out+1, 0, numlen);
ret = mp_to_unsigned_bin(key->pubkey.x,
out+1 + (numlen - mp_unsigned_bin_size(key->pubkey.x)));
*outLen = 1 + numlen;
#endif /* WOLFSSL_ATECC508A */
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 4,138
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int xen_vbd_translate(struct phys_req *req, struct xen_blkif *blkif,
int operation)
{
struct xen_vbd *vbd = &blkif->vbd;
int rc = -EACCES;
if ((operation != READ) && vbd->readonly)
goto out;
if (likely(req->nr_sects)) {
blkif_sector_t end = req->sector_number + req->nr_sects;
if (unlikely(end < req->sector_number))
goto out;
if (unlikely(end > vbd_sz(vbd)))
goto out;
}
req->dev = vbd->pdevice;
req->bdev = vbd->bdev;
rc = 0;
out:
return rc;
}
Commit Message: xen/blkback: Check device permissions before allowing OP_DISCARD
We need to make sure that the device is not RO or that
the request is not past the number of sectors we want to
issue the DISCARD operation for.
This fixes CVE-2013-2140.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <Ian.Campbell@citrix.com>
[v1: Made it pr_warn instead of pr_debug]
Signed-off-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 19,387
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err tkhd_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_TrackHeaderBox *ptr = (GF_TrackHeaderBox *)s;
if (ptr->version == 1) {
ptr->creationTime = gf_bs_read_u64(bs);
ptr->modificationTime = gf_bs_read_u64(bs);
ptr->trackID = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->reserved1 = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->duration = gf_bs_read_u64(bs);
} else {
ptr->creationTime = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->modificationTime = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->trackID = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->reserved1 = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->duration = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
}
ptr->reserved2[0] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->reserved2[1] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->layer = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
ptr->alternate_group = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
ptr->volume = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
ptr->reserved3 = gf_bs_read_u16(bs);
ptr->matrix[0] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->matrix[1] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->matrix[2] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->matrix[3] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->matrix[4] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->matrix[5] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->matrix[6] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->matrix[7] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->matrix[8] = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->width = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
ptr->height = gf_bs_read_u32(bs);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 6,443
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_xbackup(const char *channel,
const ptrarray_t *list)
{
sasl_callback_t *cb = NULL;
struct backend *backend = NULL;
const char *hostname;
const char *port;
unsigned sync_flags = 0; // FIXME ??
int partial_success = 0;
int mbox_count = 0;
int i, r;
hostname = sync_get_config(channel, "sync_host");
if (!hostname) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "XBACKUP: couldn't find hostname for channel '%s'", channel);
return IMAP_BAD_SERVER;
}
port = sync_get_config(channel, "sync_port");
if (port) csync_protocol.service = port;
cb = mysasl_callbacks(NULL,
sync_get_config(channel, "sync_authname"),
sync_get_config(channel, "sync_realm"),
sync_get_config(channel, "sync_password"));
syslog(LOG_INFO, "XBACKUP: connecting to server '%s' for channel '%s'",
hostname, channel);
backend = backend_connect(NULL, hostname, &csync_protocol, NULL, cb, NULL, -1);
if (!backend) {
syslog(LOG_ERR, "XBACKUP: failed to connect to server '%s' for channel '%s'",
hostname, channel);
return IMAP_SERVER_UNAVAILABLE;
}
free_callbacks(cb);
cb = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < list->count; i++) {
const mbname_t *mbname = ptrarray_nth(list, i);
if (!mbname) continue;
const char *userid = mbname_userid(mbname);
const char *intname = mbname_intname(mbname);
if (userid) {
syslog(LOG_INFO, "XBACKUP: replicating user %s", userid);
r = sync_do_user(userid, NULL, backend, /*channelp*/ NULL, sync_flags);
}
else {
struct sync_name_list *mboxname_list = sync_name_list_create();
syslog(LOG_INFO, "XBACKUP: replicating mailbox %s", intname);
sync_name_list_add(mboxname_list, intname);
r = sync_do_mailboxes(mboxname_list, NULL, backend,
/*channelp*/ NULL, sync_flags);
mbox_count++;
sync_name_list_free(&mboxname_list);
}
if (r) {
prot_printf(imapd_out, "* NO %s %s (%s)\r\n",
userid ? "USER" : "MAILBOX",
userid ? userid : intname,
error_message(r));
}
else {
partial_success++;
prot_printf(imapd_out, "* OK %s %s\r\n",
userid ? "USER" : "MAILBOX",
userid ? userid : intname);
}
prot_flush(imapd_out);
/* send RESTART after each user, or 1000 mailboxes */
if (!r && i < list->count - 1 && (userid || mbox_count >= 1000)) {
mbox_count = 0;
sync_send_restart(backend->out);
r = sync_parse_response("RESTART", backend->in, NULL);
if (r) goto done;
}
}
/* send a final RESTART */
sync_send_restart(backend->out);
sync_parse_response("RESTART", backend->in, NULL);
if (partial_success) r = 0;
done:
backend_disconnect(backend);
free(backend);
return r;
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,336
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PrintRenderFrameHelper::UpdatePrintSettings(
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame,
const blink::WebNode& node,
const base::DictionaryValue& passed_job_settings) {
const base::DictionaryValue* job_settings = &passed_job_settings;
base::DictionaryValue modified_job_settings;
if (job_settings->empty()) {
print_preview_context_.set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_BAD_SETTING);
return false;
}
bool source_is_html = !PrintingNodeOrPdfFrame(frame, node);
if (!source_is_html) {
modified_job_settings.MergeDictionary(job_settings);
modified_job_settings.SetBoolean(kSettingHeaderFooterEnabled, false);
modified_job_settings.SetInteger(kSettingMarginsType, NO_MARGINS);
job_settings = &modified_job_settings;
}
int cookie =
print_pages_params_ ? print_pages_params_->params.document_cookie : 0;
PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params settings;
bool canceled = false;
Send(new PrintHostMsg_UpdatePrintSettings(routing_id(), cookie, *job_settings,
&settings, &canceled));
if (canceled) {
notify_browser_of_print_failure_ = false;
return false;
}
if (!job_settings->GetInteger(kPreviewUIID, &settings.params.preview_ui_id)) {
NOTREACHED();
print_preview_context_.set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_BAD_SETTING);
return false;
}
if (!job_settings->GetInteger(kPreviewRequestID,
&settings.params.preview_request_id) ||
!job_settings->GetBoolean(kIsFirstRequest,
&settings.params.is_first_request)) {
NOTREACHED();
print_preview_context_.set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_BAD_SETTING);
return false;
}
settings.params.print_to_pdf = IsPrintToPdfRequested(*job_settings);
UpdateFrameMarginsCssInfo(*job_settings);
settings.params.print_scaling_option = GetPrintScalingOption(
frame, node, source_is_html, *job_settings, settings.params);
SetPrintPagesParams(settings);
if (PrintMsg_Print_Params_IsValid(settings.params))
return true;
print_preview_context_.set_error(PREVIEW_ERROR_INVALID_PRINTER_SETTINGS);
return false;
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 17,648
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RestackWindow(XID window, XID sibling, bool above) {
XWindowChanges changes;
changes.sibling = sibling;
changes.stack_mode = above ? Above : Below;
XConfigureWindow(GetXDisplay(), window, CWSibling | CWStackMode, &changes);
}
Commit Message: Make shared memory segments writable only by their rightful owners.
BUG=143859
TEST=Chrome's UI still works on Linux and Chrome OS
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854242
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158289 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 10,008
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __cpuinit sched_cpu_inactive(struct notifier_block *nfb,
unsigned long action, void *hcpu)
{
switch (action & ~CPU_TASKS_FROZEN) {
case CPU_DOWN_PREPARE:
set_cpu_active((long)hcpu, false);
return NOTIFY_OK;
default:
return NOTIFY_DONE;
}
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,630
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebMediaPlayerImpl::SetContentDecryptionModule(
blink::WebContentDecryptionModule* cdm,
blink::WebContentDecryptionModuleResult result) {
DVLOG(1) << __func__ << ": cdm = " << cdm;
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (!cdm) {
result.CompleteWithError(
blink::kWebContentDecryptionModuleExceptionInvalidStateError, 0,
"The existing ContentDecryptionModule object cannot be removed at this "
"time.");
return;
}
DCHECK(!set_cdm_result_);
set_cdm_result_.reset(new blink::WebContentDecryptionModuleResult(result));
const bool was_encrypted = is_encrypted_;
is_encrypted_ = true;
if (!was_encrypted) {
media_metrics_provider_->SetIsEME();
if (watch_time_reporter_)
CreateWatchTimeReporter();
}
video_decode_stats_reporter_.reset();
SetCdm(cdm);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 1,796
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CL_ResetPureClientAtServer( void ) {
CL_AddReliableCommand("vdr", qfalse);
}
Commit Message: All: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 22,156
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline uint32_t clipf_c_one(uint32_t a, uint32_t mini,
uint32_t maxi, uint32_t maxisign)
{
if(a > mini) return mini;
else if((a^(1U<<31)) > maxisign) return maxi;
else return a;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 6,005
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WriteFromUrlOperation::DestroyUrlFetcher() { url_fetcher_.reset(); }
Commit Message: Network traffic annotation added to extensions::image_writer::WriteFromUrlOperation.
Network traffic annotation is added to network request of extensions::image_writer::WriteFromUrlOperation.
BUG=656607
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2691963002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#451456}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 4,198
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoClearColor(GLclampf red,
GLclampf green,
GLclampf blue,
GLclampf alpha) {
api()->glClearColorFn(red, green, blue, alpha);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 23,968
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dissect_rpcap_error (tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo,
proto_tree *parent_tree, gint offset)
{
proto_item *ti;
gint len;
len = tvb_captured_length_remaining (tvb, offset);
if (len <= 0)
return;
col_append_fstr (pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, ": %s",
tvb_format_text_wsp (tvb, offset, len));
ti = proto_tree_add_item (parent_tree, hf_error, tvb, offset, len, ENC_ASCII|ENC_NA);
expert_add_info_format(pinfo, ti, &ei_error,
"Error: %s", tvb_format_text_wsp (tvb, offset, len));
}
Commit Message: The WTAP_ENCAP_ETHERNET dissector needs to be passed a struct eth_phdr.
We now require that. Make it so.
Bug: 12440
Change-Id: Iffee520976b013800699bde3c6092a3e86be0d76
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15424
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <guy@alum.mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 23,161
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t ims_pcu_ofn_reg_data_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *dattr,
char *buf)
{
struct usb_interface *intf = to_usb_interface(dev);
struct ims_pcu *pcu = usb_get_intfdata(intf);
int error;
u8 data;
mutex_lock(&pcu->cmd_mutex);
error = ims_pcu_read_ofn_config(pcu, pcu->ofn_reg_addr, &data);
mutex_unlock(&pcu->cmd_mutex);
if (error)
return error;
return scnprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE, "%x\n", data);
}
Commit Message: Input: ims-pcu - sanity check against missing interfaces
A malicious device missing interface can make the driver oops.
Add sanity checking.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 19,727
|
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