instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int postgresTimeStampForTimeString(const char *timestring, char *dest, size_t destsize)
{
int nlength = strlen(timestring);
int timeresolution = msTimeGetResolution(timestring);
int bNoDate = (*timestring == 'T');
if (timeresolution < 0)
return MS_FALSE;
switch(timeresolution) {
case TIME_RESOLUTION_YEAR:
if (timestring[nlength-1] != '-') {
snprintf(dest, destsize,"date '%s-01-01'",timestring);
} else {
snprintf(dest, destsize,"date '%s01-01'",timestring);
}
break;
case TIME_RESOLUTION_MONTH:
if (timestring[nlength-1] != '-') {
snprintf(dest, destsize,"date '%s-01'",timestring);
} else {
snprintf(dest, destsize,"date '%s01'",timestring);
}
break;
case TIME_RESOLUTION_DAY:
snprintf(dest, destsize,"date '%s'",timestring);
break;
case TIME_RESOLUTION_HOUR:
if (timestring[nlength-1] != ':') {
if(bNoDate)
snprintf(dest, destsize,"time '%s:00:00'", timestring);
else
snprintf(dest, destsize,"timestamp '%s:00:00'", timestring);
} else {
if(bNoDate)
snprintf(dest, destsize,"time '%s00:00'", timestring);
else
snprintf(dest, destsize,"timestamp '%s00:00'", timestring);
}
break;
case TIME_RESOLUTION_MINUTE:
if (timestring[nlength-1] != ':') {
if(bNoDate)
snprintf(dest, destsize,"time '%s:00'", timestring);
else
snprintf(dest, destsize,"timestamp '%s:00'", timestring);
} else {
if(bNoDate)
snprintf(dest, destsize,"time '%s00'", timestring);
else
snprintf(dest, destsize,"timestamp '%s00'", timestring);
}
break;
case TIME_RESOLUTION_SECOND:
if(bNoDate)
snprintf(dest, destsize,"time '%s'", timestring);
else
snprintf(dest, destsize,"timestamp '%s'", timestring);
break;
default:
return MS_FAILURE;
}
return MS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix potential SQL Injection with postgis TIME filters (#4834)
CWE ID: CWE-89
| 0
| 4,294
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::RemoveEmbeddedWorkerRoute(int32_t routing_id) {
RemoveRoute(routing_id);
if (devtools_agent_message_filter_.get()) {
devtools_agent_message_filter_->RemoveEmbeddedWorkerRouteOnMainThread(
routing_id);
}
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 5,333
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ipv4_dst_destroy(struct dst_entry *dst)
{
struct dst_metrics *p = (struct dst_metrics *)DST_METRICS_PTR(dst);
struct rtable *rt = (struct rtable *) dst;
if (p != &dst_default_metrics && atomic_dec_and_test(&p->refcnt))
kfree(p);
if (!list_empty(&rt->rt_uncached)) {
struct uncached_list *ul = rt->rt_uncached_list;
spin_lock_bh(&ul->lock);
list_del(&rt->rt_uncached);
spin_unlock_bh(&ul->lock);
}
}
Commit Message: net: check and errout if res->fi is NULL when RTM_F_FIB_MATCH is set
Syzkaller hit 'general protection fault in fib_dump_info' bug on
commit 4.13-rc5..
Guilty file: net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 2808 Comm: syz-executor0 Not tainted 4.13.0-rc5 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS
Ubuntu-1.8.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
task: ffff880078562700 task.stack: ffff880078110000
RIP: 0010:fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314
RSP: 0018:ffff880078117010 EFLAGS: 00010206
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 00000000000000fe RCX: 0000000000000002
RDX: 0000000000000006 RSI: ffff880078117084 RDI: 0000000000000030
RBP: ffff880078117268 R08: 000000000000000c R09: ffff8800780d80c8
R10: 0000000058d629b4 R11: 0000000067fce681 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff8800784bd540 R14: ffff8800780d80b5 R15: ffff8800780d80a4
FS: 00000000022fa940(0000) GS:ffff88007fc00000(0000)
knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00000000004387d0 CR3: 0000000079135000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
inet_rtm_getroute+0xc89/0x1f50 net/ipv4/route.c:2766
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x288/0x680 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4217
netlink_rcv_skb+0x340/0x470 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2397
rtnetlink_rcv+0x28/0x30 net/core/rtnetlink.c:4223
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1265 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x4c4/0x6e0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1291
netlink_sendmsg+0x8c4/0xca0 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1854
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:633 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xca/0x110 net/socket.c:643
___sys_sendmsg+0x779/0x8d0 net/socket.c:2035
__sys_sendmsg+0xd1/0x170 net/socket.c:2069
SYSC_sendmsg net/socket.c:2080 [inline]
SyS_sendmsg+0x2d/0x50 net/socket.c:2076
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x1a/0xa5
RIP: 0033:0x4512e9
RSP: 002b:00007ffc75584cc8 EFLAGS: 00000216 ORIG_RAX:
000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00000000004512e9
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020f2cfc8 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000000000e R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000216 R12: fffffffffffffffe
R13: 0000000000718000 R14: 0000000020c44ff0 R15: 0000000000000000
Code: 00 0f b6 8d ec fd ff ff 48 8b 85 f0 fd ff ff 88 48 17 48 8b 45
28 48 8d 78 30 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03
<0f>
b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e cb 0c 00 00 48 8b 45 28 44
RIP: fib_dump_info+0x388/0x1170 net/ipv4/fib_semantics.c:1314 RSP:
ffff880078117010
---[ end trace 254a7af28348f88b ]---
This patch adds a res->fi NULL check.
example run:
$ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0
broadcast 0.0.0.0 dev lo
cache <local,brd> iif virt1-0
$ip route get 0.0.0.0 iif virt1-0 fibmatch
RTNETLINK answers: No route to host
Reported-by: idaifish <idaifish@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Fixes: b61798130f1b ("net: ipv4: RTM_GETROUTE: return matched fib result when requested")
Signed-off-by: Roopa Prabhu <roopa@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 9,397
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void inet_proto_csum_replace4(__sum16 *sum, struct sk_buff *skb,
__be32 from, __be32 to, int pseudohdr)
{
__be32 diff[] = { ~from, to };
if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_PARTIAL) {
*sum = csum_fold(csum_partial(diff, sizeof(diff),
~csum_unfold(*sum)));
if (skb->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE && pseudohdr)
skb->csum = ~csum_partial(diff, sizeof(diff),
~skb->csum);
} else if (pseudohdr)
*sum = ~csum_fold(csum_partial(diff, sizeof(diff),
csum_unfold(*sum)));
}
Commit Message: net: avoid dependency of net_get_random_once on nop patching
net_get_random_once depends on the static keys infrastructure to patch up
the branch to the slow path during boot. This was realized by abusing the
static keys api and defining a new initializer to not enable the call
site while still indicating that the branch point should get patched
up. This was needed to have the fast path considered likely by gcc.
The static key initialization during boot up normally walks through all
the registered keys and either patches in ideal nops or enables the jump
site but omitted that step on x86 if ideal nops where already placed at
static_key branch points. Thus net_get_random_once branches not always
became active.
This patch switches net_get_random_once to the ordinary static_key
api and thus places the kernel fast path in the - by gcc considered -
unlikely path. Microbenchmarks on Intel and AMD x86-64 showed that
the unlikely path actually beats the likely path in terms of cycle cost
and that different nop patterns did not make much difference, thus this
switch should not be noticeable.
Fixes: a48e42920ff38b ("net: introduce new macro net_get_random_once")
Reported-by: Tuomas Räsänen <tuomasjjrasanen@tjjr.fi>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 10,322
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perWorldAttributeAttributeSetterCallbackForMainWorld(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::perWorldAttributeAttributeSetterForMainWorld(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,821
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionGlobalError::BubbleViewDidClose() {
if (!closed_callback_.is_null()) {
closed_callback_.Run(*this, current_browser_);
}
if (should_delete_self_on_close_) {
delete this;
}
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 19,471
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool StringIsValidForGLES(const std::string& str) {
return str.length() == 0 ||
std::find_if_not(str.begin(), str.end(), CharacterIsValidForGLES) ==
str.end();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 6,288
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::ToStringMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_toString");
test_object_v8_internal::ToStringMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,059
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void iwpvt_default_free(void *userdata, void *mem)
{
free(mem);
}
Commit Message: Trying to fix some invalid left shift operations
Fixes issue #16
CWE ID: CWE-682
| 0
| 23,401
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int jp2_box_put(jp2_box_t *box, jas_stream_t *out)
{
jas_stream_t *tmpstream;
bool extlen;
bool dataflag;
tmpstream = 0;
dataflag = !(box->info->flags & (JP2_BOX_SUPER | JP2_BOX_NODATA));
if (dataflag) {
if (!(tmpstream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
goto error;
}
if (box->ops->putdata) {
if ((*box->ops->putdata)(box, tmpstream)) {
goto error;
}
}
box->len = jas_stream_tell(tmpstream) + JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(false);
jas_stream_rewind(tmpstream);
}
extlen = (box->len >= (((uint_fast64_t)1) << 32)) != 0;
if (jp2_putuint32(out, extlen ? 1 : box->len)) {
goto error;
}
if (jp2_putuint32(out, box->type)) {
goto error;
}
if (extlen) {
if (jp2_putuint64(out, box->len)) {
goto error;
}
}
if (dataflag) {
if (jas_stream_copy(out, tmpstream, box->len - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(false))) {
goto error;
}
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
return 0;
error:
if (tmpstream) {
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed another problem with incorrect cleanup of JP2 box data upon error.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 7,253
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: person_set_xyz(person_t* person, double x, double y, int layer)
{
person->x = x;
person->y = y;
person->layer = layer;
sort_persons();
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 24,660
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool GLES2DecoderImpl::MakeCurrent() {
if (!context_.get())
return false;
if (!context_->MakeCurrent(surface_.get()) || WasContextLost()) {
LOG(ERROR) << " GLES2DecoderImpl: Context lost during MakeCurrent.";
if (workarounds().exit_on_context_lost) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Exiting GPU process because some drivers cannot reset"
<< " a D3D device in the Chrome GPU process sandbox.";
#if defined(OS_WIN)
base::win::SetShouldCrashOnProcessDetach(false);
#endif
exit(0);
}
return false;
}
ProcessFinishedAsyncTransfers();
if (workarounds().unbind_fbo_on_context_switch)
RestoreFramebufferBindings();
framebuffer_state_.clear_state_dirty = true;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,354
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RBinWasmObj *r_bin_wasm_init (RBinFile *arch) {
RBinWasmObj *bin = R_NEW0 (RBinWasmObj);
if (!bin) {
return NULL;
}
if (!(bin->buf = r_buf_new ())) {
free (bin);
return NULL;
}
bin->size = (ut32)arch->buf->length;
if (!r_buf_set_bytes (bin->buf, arch->buf->buf, bin->size)) {
r_bin_wasm_destroy (arch);
free (bin);
return NULL;
}
bin->g_sections = r_bin_wasm_get_sections (bin);
bin->g_types = r_bin_wasm_get_types (bin);
bin->g_imports = r_bin_wasm_get_imports (bin);
bin->g_exports = r_bin_wasm_get_exports (bin);
bin->g_tables = r_bin_wasm_get_tables (bin);
bin->g_memories = r_bin_wasm_get_memories (bin);
bin->g_globals = r_bin_wasm_get_globals (bin);
bin->g_codes = r_bin_wasm_get_codes (bin);
bin->g_datas = r_bin_wasm_get_datas (bin);
bin->entrypoint = r_bin_wasm_get_entrypoint (bin);
return bin;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in fuzzed wasm r2_hoobr_consume_init_expr
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 1,653
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int GpuProcessHost::GetGpuCrashCount() {
return static_cast<int>(base::subtle::NoBarrier_Load(&gpu_crash_count_));
}
Commit Message: Fix GPU process fallback logic.
1. In GpuProcessHost::OnProcessCrashed() record the process crash first.
This means the GPU mode fallback will happen before a new GPU process
is started.
2. Don't call FallBackToNextGpuMode() if GPU process initialization
fails for an unsandboxed GPU process. The unsandboxed GPU is only
used for collect information and it's failure doesn't indicate a need
to change GPU modes.
Bug: 869419
Change-Id: I8bd0a03268f0ea8809f3df8458d4e6a92db9391f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1157164
Reviewed-by: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: kylechar <kylechar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#579625}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,996
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Box *saio_New()
{
ISOM_DECL_BOX_ALLOC(GF_SampleAuxiliaryInfoOffsetBox, GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_SAIO);
return (GF_Box *)tmp;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 28,823
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void kvm_on_user_return(struct user_return_notifier *urn)
{
unsigned slot;
struct kvm_shared_msrs *locals
= container_of(urn, struct kvm_shared_msrs, urn);
struct kvm_shared_msr_values *values;
for (slot = 0; slot < shared_msrs_global.nr; ++slot) {
values = &locals->values[slot];
if (values->host != values->curr) {
wrmsrl(shared_msrs_global.msrs[slot], values->host);
values->curr = values->host;
}
}
locals->registered = false;
user_return_notifier_unregister(urn);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,085
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline unsigned long my_zero_pfn(unsigned long addr)
{
return zero_pfn;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 8,742
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GenerateResponsesV1WithSessionSecurity(
const base::string16& password,
base::span<const uint8_t, kChallengeLen> server_challenge,
base::span<const uint8_t, kChallengeLen> client_challenge,
base::span<uint8_t, kResponseLenV1> lm_response,
base::span<uint8_t, kResponseLenV1> ntlm_response) {
GenerateLMResponseV1WithSessionSecurity(client_challenge, lm_response);
GenerateNtlmResponseV1WithSessionSecurity(password, server_challenge,
client_challenge, ntlm_response);
}
Commit Message: [base] Make dynamic container to static span conversion explicit
This change disallows implicit conversions from dynamic containers to
static spans. This conversion can cause CHECK failures, and thus should
be done carefully. Requiring explicit construction makes it more obvious
when this happens. To aid usability, appropriate base::make_span<size_t>
overloads are added.
Bug: 877931
Change-Id: Id9f526bc57bfd30a52d14df827b0445ca087381d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1189985
Reviewed-by: Ryan Sleevi <rsleevi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586657}
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 14,199
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _kdc_find_etype(krb5_context context, krb5_boolean use_strongest_session_key,
krb5_boolean is_preauth, hdb_entry_ex *princ,
krb5_enctype *etypes, unsigned len,
krb5_enctype *ret_enctype, Key **ret_key)
{
krb5_error_code ret;
krb5_salt def_salt;
krb5_enctype enctype = (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL;
const krb5_enctype *p;
Key *key = NULL;
int i, k;
/* We'll want to avoid keys with v4 salted keys in the pre-auth case... */
ret = krb5_get_pw_salt(context, princ->entry.principal, &def_salt);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
if (use_strongest_session_key) {
/*
* Pick the strongest key that the KDC, target service, and
* client all support, using the local cryptosystem enctype
* list in strongest-to-weakest order to drive the search.
*
* This is not what RFC4120 says to do, but it encourages
* adoption of stronger enctypes. This doesn't play well with
* clients that have multiple Kerberos client implementations
* available with different supported enctype lists.
*/
/* drive the search with local supported enctypes list */
p = krb5_kerberos_enctypes(context);
for (i = 0;
p[i] != (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL && enctype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL;
i++) {
if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, p[i]) != 0 &&
!_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->entry.principal, p[i]))
continue;
/* check that the client supports it too */
for (k = 0; k < len && enctype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL; k++) {
if (p[i] != etypes[k])
continue;
/* check target princ support */
key = NULL;
while (hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, NULL,
p[i], &key) == 0) {
if (key->key.keyvalue.length == 0) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY;
continue;
}
enctype = p[i];
ret = 0;
if (is_preauth && ret_key != NULL &&
!is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
continue;
}
}
}
} else {
/*
* Pick the first key from the client's enctype list that is
* supported by the cryptosystem and by the given principal.
*
* RFC4120 says we SHOULD pick the first _strong_ key from the
* client's list... not the first key... If the admin disallows
* weak enctypes in krb5.conf and selects this key selection
* algorithm, then we get exactly what RFC4120 says.
*/
for(i = 0; ret != 0 && i < len; i++) {
if (krb5_enctype_valid(context, etypes[i]) != 0 &&
!_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->entry.principal, etypes[i]))
continue;
key = NULL;
while (ret != 0 &&
hdb_next_enctype2key(context, &princ->entry, NULL,
etypes[i], &key) == 0) {
if (key->key.keyvalue.length == 0) {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_NULL_KEY;
continue;
}
enctype = etypes[i];
ret = 0;
if (is_preauth && ret_key != NULL &&
!is_default_salt_p(&def_salt, key))
continue;
}
}
}
if (enctype == (krb5_enctype)ETYPE_NULL) {
/*
* if the service principal is one for which there is a known 1DES
* exception and no other enctype matches both the client request and
* the service key list, provide a DES-CBC-CRC key.
*/
if (ret_key == NULL &&
_kdc_is_weak_exception(princ->entry.principal, ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC)) {
ret = 0;
enctype = ETYPE_DES_CBC_CRC;
} else {
ret = KRB5KDC_ERR_ETYPE_NOSUPP;
}
}
if (ret == 0) {
if (ret_enctype != NULL)
*ret_enctype = enctype;
if (ret_key != NULL)
*ret_key = key;
}
krb5_free_salt (context, def_salt);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Security: Avoid NULL structure pointer member dereference
This can happen in the error path when processing malformed AS
requests with a NULL client name. Bug originally introduced on
Fri Feb 13 09:26:01 2015 +0100 in commit:
a873e21d7c06f22943a90a41dc733ae76799390d
kdc: base _kdc_fast_mk_error() on krb5_mk_error_ext()
Original patch by Jeffrey Altman <jaltman@secure-endpoints.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 16,457
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PALETTE_UPDATE* update_read_palette(rdpUpdate* update, wStream* s)
{
int i;
PALETTE_ENTRY* entry;
PALETTE_UPDATE* palette_update = calloc(1, sizeof(PALETTE_UPDATE));
if (!palette_update)
goto fail;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 6)
goto fail;
Stream_Seek_UINT16(s); /* pad2Octets (2 bytes) */
Stream_Read_UINT32(s,
palette_update->number); /* numberColors (4 bytes), must be set to 256 */
if (palette_update->number > 256)
palette_update->number = 256;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < palette_update->number * 3)
goto fail;
/* paletteEntries */
for (i = 0; i < (int) palette_update->number; i++)
{
entry = &palette_update->entries[i];
Stream_Read_UINT8(s, entry->red);
Stream_Read_UINT8(s, entry->green);
Stream_Read_UINT8(s, entry->blue);
}
return palette_update;
fail:
free_palette_update(update->context, palette_update);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8786
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 911
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool CParaNdisTX::Create(PPARANDIS_ADAPTER Context, UINT DeviceQueueIndex)
{
m_Context = Context;
m_queueIndex = (u16)DeviceQueueIndex;
return m_VirtQueue.Create(DeviceQueueIndex,
m_Context->IODevice,
m_Context->MiniportHandle,
m_Context->bDoPublishIndices ? true : false,
m_Context->maxFreeTxDescriptors,
m_Context->nVirtioHeaderSize,
m_Context);
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,656
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Performance::HasObserverFor(
PerformanceEntry::EntryType filter_type) const {
return observer_filter_options_ & filter_type;
}
Commit Message: Fix timing allow check algorithm for service workers
This CL uses the OriginalURLViaServiceWorker() in the timing allow check
algorithm if the response WasFetchedViaServiceWorker(). This way, if a
service worker changes a same origin request to become cross origin,
then the timing allow check algorithm will still fail.
resource-timing-worker.js is changed so it avoids an empty Response,
which is an odd case in terms of same origin checks.
Bug: 837275
Change-Id: I7e497a6fcc2ee14244121b915ca5f5cceded417a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1038229
Commit-Queue: Nicolás Peña Moreno <npm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yoav Weiss <yoav@yoav.ws>
Reviewed-by: Timothy Dresser <tdresser@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#555476}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 28,348
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Automation::MouseButtonUp(int tab_id,
const gfx::Point& p,
Error** error) {
*error = CheckAdvancedInteractionsSupported();
if (*error)
return;
int windex = 0, tab_index = 0;
*error = GetIndicesForTab(tab_id, &windex, &tab_index);
if (*error)
return;
std::string error_msg;
if (!SendMouseButtonUpJSONRequest(
automation(), windex, tab_index, p.x(), p.y(), &error_msg)) {
*error = new Error(kUnknownError, error_msg);
}
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 5,843
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: send_set_info(const unsigned int xid, struct cifs_tcon *tcon,
u64 persistent_fid, u64 volatile_fid, u32 pid, int info_class,
unsigned int num, void **data, unsigned int *size)
{
struct smb2_set_info_req *req;
struct smb2_set_info_rsp *rsp = NULL;
struct kvec *iov;
int rc = 0;
int resp_buftype;
unsigned int i;
struct TCP_Server_Info *server;
struct cifs_ses *ses = tcon->ses;
if (ses && (ses->server))
server = ses->server;
else
return -EIO;
if (!num)
return -EINVAL;
iov = kmalloc(sizeof(struct kvec) * num, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!iov)
return -ENOMEM;
rc = small_smb2_init(SMB2_SET_INFO, tcon, (void **) &req);
if (rc) {
kfree(iov);
return rc;
}
req->hdr.ProcessId = cpu_to_le32(pid);
req->InfoType = SMB2_O_INFO_FILE;
req->FileInfoClass = info_class;
req->PersistentFileId = persistent_fid;
req->VolatileFileId = volatile_fid;
/* 4 for RFC1001 length and 1 for Buffer */
req->BufferOffset =
cpu_to_le16(sizeof(struct smb2_set_info_req) - 1 - 4);
req->BufferLength = cpu_to_le32(*size);
inc_rfc1001_len(req, *size - 1 /* Buffer */);
memcpy(req->Buffer, *data, *size);
iov[0].iov_base = (char *)req;
/* 4 for RFC1001 length */
iov[0].iov_len = get_rfc1002_length(req) + 4;
for (i = 1; i < num; i++) {
inc_rfc1001_len(req, size[i]);
le32_add_cpu(&req->BufferLength, size[i]);
iov[i].iov_base = (char *)data[i];
iov[i].iov_len = size[i];
}
rc = SendReceive2(xid, ses, iov, num, &resp_buftype, 0);
rsp = (struct smb2_set_info_rsp *)iov[0].iov_base;
if (rc != 0)
cifs_stats_fail_inc(tcon, SMB2_SET_INFO_HE);
free_rsp_buf(resp_buftype, rsp);
kfree(iov);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: [CIFS] Possible null ptr deref in SMB2_tcon
As Raphael Geissert pointed out, tcon_error_exit can dereference tcon
and there is one path in which tcon can be null.
Signed-off-by: Steve French <smfrench@gmail.com>
CC: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.7+
Reported-by: Raphael Geissert <geissert@debian.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 4,297
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void kvm_arch_start_assignment(struct kvm *kvm)
{
atomic_inc(&kvm->arch.assigned_device_count);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Reload pit counters for all channels when restoring state
Currently if userspace restores the pit counters with a count of 0
on channels 1 or 2 and the guest attempts to read the count on those
channels, then KVM will perform a mod of 0 and crash. This will ensure
that 0 values are converted to 65536 as per the spec.
This is CVE-2015-7513.
Signed-off-by: Andy Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 19,486
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: eigrp_print(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *pptr, register u_int len)
{
const struct eigrp_common_header *eigrp_com_header;
const struct eigrp_tlv_header *eigrp_tlv_header;
const u_char *tptr,*tlv_tptr;
u_int tlen,eigrp_tlv_len,eigrp_tlv_type,tlv_tlen, byte_length, bit_length;
uint8_t prefix[4];
union {
const struct eigrp_tlv_general_parm_t *eigrp_tlv_general_parm;
const struct eigrp_tlv_sw_version_t *eigrp_tlv_sw_version;
const struct eigrp_tlv_ip_int_t *eigrp_tlv_ip_int;
const struct eigrp_tlv_ip_ext_t *eigrp_tlv_ip_ext;
const struct eigrp_tlv_at_cable_setup_t *eigrp_tlv_at_cable_setup;
const struct eigrp_tlv_at_int_t *eigrp_tlv_at_int;
const struct eigrp_tlv_at_ext_t *eigrp_tlv_at_ext;
} tlv_ptr;
tptr=pptr;
eigrp_com_header = (const struct eigrp_common_header *)pptr;
ND_TCHECK(*eigrp_com_header);
/*
* Sanity checking of the header.
*/
if (eigrp_com_header->version != EIGRP_VERSION) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "EIGRP version %u packet not supported",eigrp_com_header->version));
return;
}
/* in non-verbose mode just lets print the basic Message Type*/
if (ndo->ndo_vflag < 1) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "EIGRP %s, length: %u",
tok2str(eigrp_opcode_values, "unknown (%u)",eigrp_com_header->opcode),
len));
return;
}
/* ok they seem to want to know everything - lets fully decode it */
tlen=len-sizeof(struct eigrp_common_header);
/* FIXME print other header info */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\tEIGRP v%u, opcode: %s (%u), chksum: 0x%04x, Flags: [%s]\n\tseq: 0x%08x, ack: 0x%08x, AS: %u, length: %u",
eigrp_com_header->version,
tok2str(eigrp_opcode_values, "unknown, type: %u",eigrp_com_header->opcode),
eigrp_com_header->opcode,
EXTRACT_16BITS(&eigrp_com_header->checksum),
tok2str(eigrp_common_header_flag_values,
"none",
EXTRACT_32BITS(&eigrp_com_header->flags)),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&eigrp_com_header->seq),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&eigrp_com_header->ack),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&eigrp_com_header->asn),
tlen));
tptr+=sizeof(const struct eigrp_common_header);
while(tlen>0) {
/* did we capture enough for fully decoding the object header ? */
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, sizeof(struct eigrp_tlv_header));
eigrp_tlv_header = (const struct eigrp_tlv_header *)tptr;
eigrp_tlv_len=EXTRACT_16BITS(&eigrp_tlv_header->length);
eigrp_tlv_type=EXTRACT_16BITS(&eigrp_tlv_header->type);
if (eigrp_tlv_len < sizeof(struct eigrp_tlv_header) ||
eigrp_tlv_len > tlen) {
print_unknown_data(ndo,tptr+sizeof(struct eigrp_tlv_header),"\n\t ",tlen);
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t %s TLV (0x%04x), length: %u",
tok2str(eigrp_tlv_values,
"Unknown",
eigrp_tlv_type),
eigrp_tlv_type,
eigrp_tlv_len));
tlv_tptr=tptr+sizeof(struct eigrp_tlv_header);
tlv_tlen=eigrp_tlv_len-sizeof(struct eigrp_tlv_header);
/* did we capture enough for fully decoding the object ? */
ND_TCHECK2(*tptr, eigrp_tlv_len);
switch(eigrp_tlv_type) {
case EIGRP_TLV_GENERAL_PARM:
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_general_parm = (const struct eigrp_tlv_general_parm_t *)tlv_tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t holdtime: %us, k1 %u, k2 %u, k3 %u, k4 %u, k5 %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_general_parm->holdtime),
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_general_parm->k1,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_general_parm->k2,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_general_parm->k3,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_general_parm->k4,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_general_parm->k5));
break;
case EIGRP_TLV_SW_VERSION:
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_sw_version = (const struct eigrp_tlv_sw_version_t *)tlv_tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IOS version: %u.%u, EIGRP version %u.%u",
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_sw_version->ios_major,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_sw_version->ios_minor,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_sw_version->eigrp_major,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_sw_version->eigrp_minor));
break;
case EIGRP_TLV_IP_INT:
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int = (const struct eigrp_tlv_ip_int_t *)tlv_tptr;
bit_length = tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->plen;
if (bit_length > 32) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t illegal prefix length %u",bit_length));
break;
}
byte_length = (bit_length + 7) / 8; /* variable length encoding */
memset(prefix, 0, 4);
memcpy(prefix,&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->destination,byte_length);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv4 prefix: %15s/%u, nexthop: ",
ipaddr_string(ndo, prefix),
bit_length));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->nexthop) == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "self"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, &tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->nexthop)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t delay %u ms, bandwidth %u Kbps, mtu %u, hop %u, reliability %u, load %u",
(EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->delay)/100),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->bandwidth),
EXTRACT_24BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->mtu),
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->hopcount,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->reliability,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_int->load));
break;
case EIGRP_TLV_IP_EXT:
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext = (const struct eigrp_tlv_ip_ext_t *)tlv_tptr;
bit_length = tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->plen;
if (bit_length > 32) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t illegal prefix length %u",bit_length));
break;
}
byte_length = (bit_length + 7) / 8; /* variable length encoding */
memset(prefix, 0, 4);
memcpy(prefix,&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->destination,byte_length);
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t IPv4 prefix: %15s/%u, nexthop: ",
ipaddr_string(ndo, prefix),
bit_length));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->nexthop) == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "self"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s",ipaddr_string(ndo, &tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->nexthop)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t origin-router %s, origin-as %u, origin-proto %s, flags [0x%02x], tag 0x%08x, metric %u",
ipaddr_string(ndo, tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->origin_router),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->origin_as),
tok2str(eigrp_ext_proto_id_values,"unknown",tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->proto_id),
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->flags,
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->tag),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->metric)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t delay %u ms, bandwidth %u Kbps, mtu %u, hop %u, reliability %u, load %u",
(EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->delay)/100),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->bandwidth),
EXTRACT_24BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->mtu),
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->hopcount,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->reliability,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_ip_ext->load));
break;
case EIGRP_TLV_AT_CABLE_SETUP:
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_cable_setup = (const struct eigrp_tlv_at_cable_setup_t *)tlv_tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Cable-range: %u-%u, Router-ID %u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_cable_setup->cable_start),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_cable_setup->cable_end),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_cable_setup->router_id)));
break;
case EIGRP_TLV_AT_INT:
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int = (const struct eigrp_tlv_at_int_t *)tlv_tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Cable-Range: %u-%u, nexthop: ",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->cable_start),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->cable_end)));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->nexthop) == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "self"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u.%u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->nexthop),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->nexthop[2])));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t delay %u ms, bandwidth %u Kbps, mtu %u, hop %u, reliability %u, load %u",
(EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->delay)/100),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->bandwidth),
EXTRACT_24BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->mtu),
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->hopcount,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->reliability,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_int->load));
break;
case EIGRP_TLV_AT_EXT:
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext = (const struct eigrp_tlv_at_ext_t *)tlv_tptr;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t Cable-Range: %u-%u, nexthop: ",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->cable_start),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->cable_end)));
if (EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->nexthop) == 0)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "self"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u.%u",
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->nexthop),
EXTRACT_16BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->nexthop[2])));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t origin-router %u, origin-as %u, origin-proto %s, flags [0x%02x], tag 0x%08x, metric %u",
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->origin_router),
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->origin_as),
tok2str(eigrp_ext_proto_id_values,"unknown",tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->proto_id),
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->flags,
EXTRACT_32BITS(tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->tag),
EXTRACT_16BITS(tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->metric)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t delay %u ms, bandwidth %u Kbps, mtu %u, hop %u, reliability %u, load %u",
(EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->delay)/100),
EXTRACT_32BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->bandwidth),
EXTRACT_24BITS(&tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->mtu),
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->hopcount,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->reliability,
tlv_ptr.eigrp_tlv_at_ext->load));
break;
/*
* FIXME those are the defined TLVs that lack a decoder
* you are welcome to contribute code ;-)
*/
case EIGRP_TLV_AUTH:
case EIGRP_TLV_SEQ:
case EIGRP_TLV_MCAST_SEQ:
case EIGRP_TLV_IPX_INT:
case EIGRP_TLV_IPX_EXT:
default:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag <= 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo,tlv_tptr,"\n\t ",tlv_tlen);
break;
}
/* do we want to see an additionally hexdump ? */
if (ndo->ndo_vflag > 1)
print_unknown_data(ndo,tptr+sizeof(struct eigrp_tlv_header),"\n\t ",
eigrp_tlv_len-sizeof(struct eigrp_tlv_header));
tptr+=eigrp_tlv_len;
tlen-=eigrp_tlv_len;
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "\n\t\t packet exceeded snapshot"));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12901/EIGRP: Do more length checks.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 28,118
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int jas_image_encode(jas_image_t *image, jas_stream_t *out, int fmt, char *optstr)
{
jas_image_fmtinfo_t *fmtinfo;
if (!(fmtinfo = jas_image_lookupfmtbyid(fmt))) {
return -1;
}
return (fmtinfo->ops.encode) ? (*fmtinfo->ops.encode)(image, out,
optstr) : (-1);
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 16,019
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __split_and_process_non_flush(struct clone_info *ci)
{
struct bio *bio = ci->bio;
struct dm_target *ti;
unsigned len;
int r;
if (unlikely(bio_op(bio) == REQ_OP_DISCARD))
return __send_discard(ci);
else if (unlikely(bio_op(bio) == REQ_OP_WRITE_SAME))
return __send_write_same(ci);
else if (unlikely(bio_op(bio) == REQ_OP_WRITE_ZEROES))
return __send_write_zeroes(ci);
ti = dm_table_find_target(ci->map, ci->sector);
if (!dm_target_is_valid(ti))
return -EIO;
if (bio_op(bio) == REQ_OP_ZONE_REPORT)
len = ci->sector_count;
else
len = min_t(sector_t, max_io_len(ci->sector, ti),
ci->sector_count);
r = __clone_and_map_data_bio(ci, ti, ci->sector, &len);
if (r < 0)
return r;
ci->sector += len;
ci->sector_count -= len;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 11,447
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t GraphicBuffer::lock(uint32_t usage, const Rect& rect, void** vaddr)
{
if (rect.left < 0 || rect.right > this->width ||
rect.top < 0 || rect.bottom > this->height) {
ALOGE("locking pixels (%d,%d,%d,%d) outside of buffer (w=%d, h=%d)",
rect.left, rect.top, rect.right, rect.bottom,
this->width, this->height);
return BAD_VALUE;
}
status_t res = getBufferMapper().lock(handle, usage, rect, vaddr);
return res;
}
Commit Message: Fix for corruption when numFds or numInts is too large.
Bug: 18076253
Change-Id: I4c5935440013fc755e1d123049290383f4659fb6
(cherry picked from commit dfd06b89a4b77fc75eb85a3c1c700da3621c0118)
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 28,407
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::postSubBufferCHROMIUM(
int x, int y, int width, int height) {
if (ShouldUseSwapClient())
swap_client_->OnViewContextSwapBuffersPosted();
gl_->PostSubBufferCHROMIUM(x, y, width, height);
command_buffer_->Echo(base::Bind(
&WebGraphicsContext3DCommandBufferImpl::OnSwapBuffersComplete,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,075
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FormAssociatedElement::resetFormAttributeTargetObserver()
{
ASSERT(toHTMLElement(this)->inDocument());
m_formAttributeTargetObserver = FormAttributeTargetObserver::create(toHTMLElement(this)->fastGetAttribute(formAttr), this);
}
Commit Message: Fix a crash when a form control is in a past naems map of a demoted form element.
Note that we wanted to add the protector in FormAssociatedElement::setForm(),
but we couldn't do it because it is called from the constructor.
BUG=326854
TEST=automated.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/105693013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@163680 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 2,416
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GDataFile::ToProto(GDataFileProto* proto) const {
GDataEntry::ToProto(proto->mutable_gdata_entry());
DCHECK(!proto->gdata_entry().file_info().is_directory());
proto->set_kind(kind_);
proto->set_thumbnail_url(thumbnail_url_.spec());
proto->set_alternate_url(alternate_url_.spec());
proto->set_content_mime_type(content_mime_type_);
proto->set_etag(etag_);
proto->set_id(id_);
proto->set_file_md5(file_md5_);
proto->set_document_extension(document_extension_);
proto->set_is_hosted_document(is_hosted_document_);
}
Commit Message: gdata: Define the resource ID for the root directory
Per the spec, the resource ID for the root directory is defined
as "folder:root". Add the resource ID to the root directory in our
file system representation so we can look up the root directory by
the resource ID.
BUG=127697
TEST=add unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332253
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137928 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 19,691
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SplashOutputDev::SplashOutputDev(SplashColorMode colorModeA,
int bitmapRowPadA,
GBool reverseVideoA,
SplashColorPtr paperColorA,
GBool bitmapTopDownA,
GBool allowAntialiasA) {
colorMode = colorModeA;
bitmapRowPad = bitmapRowPadA;
bitmapTopDown = bitmapTopDownA;
allowAntialias = allowAntialiasA;
vectorAntialias = allowAntialias &&
globalParams->getVectorAntialias() &&
colorMode != splashModeMono1;
setupScreenParams(72.0, 72.0);
reverseVideo = reverseVideoA;
splashColorCopy(paperColor, paperColorA);
xref = NULL;
bitmap = new SplashBitmap(1, 1, bitmapRowPad, colorMode,
colorMode != splashModeMono1, bitmapTopDown);
splash = new Splash(bitmap, vectorAntialias, &screenParams);
splash->clear(paperColor, 0);
fontEngine = NULL;
nT3Fonts = 0;
t3GlyphStack = NULL;
font = NULL;
needFontUpdate = gFalse;
textClipPath = NULL;
transpGroupStack = NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 29,841
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(FilesystemIterator, current)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_PATHNAME)) {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
} else if (SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT(intern, SPL_FILE_DIR_CURRENT_AS_FILEINFO)) {
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(intern TSRMLS_CC);
spl_filesystem_object_create_type(0, intern, SPL_FS_INFO, NULL, return_value TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
RETURN_ZVAL(getThis(), 1, 0);
/*RETURN_STRING(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name, 1);*/
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 15,281
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int GetBlockForJpeg(void* param,
unsigned long pos,
unsigned char* buf,
unsigned long size) {
std::vector<uint8_t>* data_vector = static_cast<std::vector<uint8_t>*>(param);
if (pos + size < pos || pos + size > data_vector->size())
return 0;
memcpy(buf, data_vector->data() + pos, size);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 16,930
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_tkill(pid_t tgid, pid_t pid, int sig)
{
struct siginfo info;
info.si_signo = sig;
info.si_errno = 0;
info.si_code = SI_TKILL;
info.si_pid = task_tgid_vnr(current);
info.si_uid = from_kuid_munged(current_user_ns(), current_uid());
return do_send_specific(tgid, pid, sig, &info);
}
Commit Message: signal: always clear sa_restorer on execve
When the new signal handlers are set up, the location of sa_restorer is
not cleared, leaking a parent process's address space location to
children. This allows for a potential bypass of the parent's ASLR by
examining the sa_restorer value returned when calling sigaction().
Based on what should be considered "secret" about addresses, it only
matters across the exec not the fork (since the VMAs haven't changed
until the exec). But since exec sets SIG_DFL and keeps sa_restorer,
this is where it should be fixed.
Given the few uses of sa_restorer, a "set" function was not written
since this would be the only use. Instead, we use
__ARCH_HAS_SA_RESTORER, as already done in other places.
Example of the leak before applying this patch:
$ cat /proc/$$/maps
...
7fb9f3083000-7fb9f3238000 r-xp 00000000 fd:01 404469 .../libc-2.15.so
...
$ ./leak
...
7f278bc74000-7f278be29000 r-xp 00000000 fd:01 404469 .../libc-2.15.so
...
1 0 (nil) 0x7fb9f30b94a0
2 4000000 (nil) 0x7f278bcaa4a0
3 4000000 (nil) 0x7f278bcaa4a0
4 0 (nil) 0x7fb9f30b94a0
...
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use SA_RESTORER for backportability]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: Emese Revfy <re.emese@gmail.com>
Cc: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,704
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int yr_scan_verify_match(
YR_SCAN_CONTEXT* context,
YR_AC_MATCH* ac_match,
uint8_t* data,
size_t data_size,
size_t data_base,
size_t offset)
{
YR_STRING* string = ac_match->string;
#ifdef PROFILING_ENABLED
clock_t start = clock();
#endif
if (data_size - offset <= 0)
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
if (context->flags & SCAN_FLAGS_FAST_MODE &&
STRING_IS_SINGLE_MATCH(string) &&
string->matches[context->tidx].head != NULL)
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
if (STRING_IS_FIXED_OFFSET(string) &&
string->fixed_offset != data_base + offset)
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
if (STRING_IS_LITERAL(string))
{
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_scan_verify_literal_match(
context, ac_match, data, data_size, data_base, offset));
}
else
{
FAIL_ON_ERROR(_yr_scan_verify_re_match(
context, ac_match, data, data_size, data_base, offset));
}
#ifdef PROFILING_ENABLED
string->clock_ticks += clock() - start;
#endif
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer overrun (issue #678). Add assert for detecting this kind of issues earlier.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 23,699
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void release_discard_addrs(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
struct list_head *head = &(SM_I(sbi)->dcc_info->entry_list);
struct discard_entry *entry, *this;
/* drop caches */
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, this, head, list) {
list_del(&entry->list);
kmem_cache_free(discard_entry_slab, entry);
}
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 27,932
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ext4_orphan_del(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode)
{
struct list_head *prev;
struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode);
struct ext4_sb_info *sbi;
__u32 ino_next;
struct ext4_iloc iloc;
int err = 0;
if (!EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_journal)
return 0;
mutex_lock(&EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_orphan_lock);
if (list_empty(&ei->i_orphan))
goto out;
ino_next = NEXT_ORPHAN(inode);
prev = ei->i_orphan.prev;
sbi = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb);
jbd_debug(4, "remove inode %lu from orphan list\n", inode->i_ino);
list_del_init(&ei->i_orphan);
/* If we're on an error path, we may not have a valid
* transaction handle with which to update the orphan list on
* disk, but we still need to remove the inode from the linked
* list in memory. */
if (!handle)
goto out;
err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, inode, &iloc);
if (err)
goto out_err;
if (prev == &sbi->s_orphan) {
jbd_debug(4, "superblock will point to %u\n", ino_next);
BUFFER_TRACE(sbi->s_sbh, "get_write_access");
err = ext4_journal_get_write_access(handle, sbi->s_sbh);
if (err)
goto out_brelse;
sbi->s_es->s_last_orphan = cpu_to_le32(ino_next);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_super(handle, inode->i_sb);
} else {
struct ext4_iloc iloc2;
struct inode *i_prev =
&list_entry(prev, struct ext4_inode_info, i_orphan)->vfs_inode;
jbd_debug(4, "orphan inode %lu will point to %u\n",
i_prev->i_ino, ino_next);
err = ext4_reserve_inode_write(handle, i_prev, &iloc2);
if (err)
goto out_brelse;
NEXT_ORPHAN(i_prev) = ino_next;
err = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, i_prev, &iloc2);
}
if (err)
goto out_brelse;
NEXT_ORPHAN(inode) = 0;
err = ext4_mark_iloc_dirty(handle, inode, &iloc);
out_err:
ext4_std_error(inode->i_sb, err);
out:
mutex_unlock(&EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_orphan_lock);
return err;
out_brelse:
brelse(iloc.bh);
goto out_err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 22,772
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Track::Track(
Segment* pSegment,
long long element_start,
long long element_size) :
m_pSegment(pSegment),
m_element_start(element_start),
m_element_size(element_size),
content_encoding_entries_(NULL),
content_encoding_entries_end_(NULL)
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 9,954
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void HTML_free(HTStructured * me)
{
char *include = NULL;
if (LYMapsOnly && !me->text) {
/*
* We only handled MAP, AREA and BASE tags, and didn't create an HText
* structure for the document nor want one now, so just make sure we
* free anything that might have been allocated. - FM
*/
FREE(me->base_href);
FREE(me->map_address);
clear_objectdata(me);
FREE(me->xinclude);
FREE(me);
return;
}
UPDATE_STYLE; /* Creates empty document here! */
if (me->comment_end)
HTML_put_string(me, me->comment_end);
if (me->text) {
/*
* Emphasis containers, A, FONT, and FORM may be declared SGML_EMPTY in
* HTMLDTD.c, and SGML_character() in SGML.c may check for their end
* tags to call HTML_end_element() directly (with a check in that to
* bypass decrementing of the HTML parser's stack). So if we still
* have the emphasis (Underline) on, or any open A, FONT, or FORM
* containers, turn it off or close them now. - FM & kw
*
* IF those tags are not declared SGML_EMPTY, but we let the SGML.c
* parser take care of correctly stacked ordering, and of correct
* wind-down on end-of-stream (in SGML_free SGML_abort), THEN these and
* other checks here in HTML.c should not be necessary. Still it can't
* hurt to include them. - kw
*/
if (me->inUnderline) {
HText_appendCharacter(me->text, LY_UNDERLINE_END_CHAR);
me->inUnderline = FALSE;
me->Underline_Level = 0;
CTRACE((tfp, "HTML_free: Ending underline\n"));
}
if (me->inA) {
HTML_end_element(me, HTML_A, &include);
me->inA = FALSE;
CTRACE((tfp, "HTML_free: Ending HTML_A\n"));
}
if (me->inFONT) {
HTML_end_element(me, HTML_FONT, &include);
me->inFONT = FALSE;
}
if (me->inFORM) {
HTML_end_element(me, HTML_FORM, &include);
me->inFORM = FALSE;
}
if (me->option.size > 0) {
/*
* If we still have data in the me->option chunk after forcing a
* close of a still-open form, something must have gone very wrong.
* - kw
*/
if (LYBadHTML(me)) {
LYShowBadHTML("Bad HTML: SELECT or OPTION not ended properly *****\n");
}
HTChunkTerminate(&me->option);
/*
* Output the left-over data as text, maybe it was invalid markup
* meant to be shown somewhere. - kw
*/
CTRACE((tfp, "HTML_free: ***** leftover option data: %s\n",
me->option.data));
HTML_put_string(me, me->option.data);
HTChunkClear(&me->option);
}
if (me->textarea.size > 0) {
/*
* If we still have data in the me->textarea chunk after forcing a
* close of a still-open form, something must have gone very wrong.
* - kw
*/
if (LYBadHTML(me)) {
LYShowBadHTML("Bad HTML: TEXTAREA not used properly *****\n");
}
HTChunkTerminate(&me->textarea);
/*
* Output the left-over data as text, maybe it was invalid markup
* meant to be shown somewhere. - kw
*/
CTRACE((tfp, "HTML_free: ***** leftover textarea data: %s\n",
me->textarea.data));
HTML_put_string(me, me->textarea.data);
HTChunkClear(&me->textarea);
}
/*
* If we're interactive and have hidden links but no visible links, add
* a message informing the user about this and suggesting use of the
* 'l'ist command. - FM
*/
if (!dump_output_immediately &&
HText_sourceAnchors(me->text) < 1 &&
HText_HiddenLinkCount(me->text) > 0) {
HTML_start_element(me, HTML_P, 0, 0, -1, &include);
HTML_put_character(me, '[');
HTML_start_element(me, HTML_EM, 0, 0, -1, &include);
HTML_put_string(me,
gettext("Document has only hidden links. Use the 'l'ist command."));
HTML_end_element(me, HTML_EM, &include);
HTML_put_character(me, ']');
HTML_end_element(me, HTML_P, &include);
}
if (me->xinclude) {
HText_appendText(me->text, " *** LYNX ERROR ***\rUnparsed data:\r");
HText_appendText(me->text, me->xinclude);
FREE(me->xinclude);
}
/*
* Now call the cleanup function. - FM
*/
HText_endAppend(me->text);
}
if (me->option.size > 0) {
/*
* If we still have data in the me->option chunk after forcing a close
* of a still-open form, something must have gone very wrong. - kw
*/
if (LYBadHTML(me)) {
LYShowBadHTML("Bad HTML: SELECT or OPTION not ended properly *****\n");
}
if (TRACE) {
HTChunkTerminate(&me->option);
CTRACE((tfp, "HTML_free: ***** leftover option data: %s\n",
me->option.data));
}
HTChunkClear(&me->option);
}
if (me->textarea.size > 0) {
/*
* If we still have data in the me->textarea chunk after forcing a
* close of a still-open form, something must have gone very wrong. -
* kw
*/
if (LYBadHTML(me)) {
LYShowBadHTML("Bad HTML: TEXTAREA not used properly *****\n");
}
if (TRACE) {
HTChunkTerminate(&me->textarea);
CTRACE((tfp, "HTML_free: ***** leftover textarea data: %s\n",
me->textarea.data));
}
HTChunkClear(&me->textarea);
}
if (me->target) {
(*me->targetClass._free) (me->target);
}
if (me->sp && me->sp->style && GetHTStyleName(me->sp->style)) {
if (me->sp->style->id == ST_DivCenter ||
me->sp->style->id == ST_HeadingCenter ||
me->sp->style->id == ST_Heading1) {
me->sp->style->alignment = HT_CENTER;
} else if (me->sp->style->id == ST_DivRight ||
me->sp->style->id == ST_HeadingRight) {
me->sp->style->alignment = HT_RIGHT;
} else {
me->sp->style->alignment = HT_LEFT;
}
styles[HTML_PRE]->alignment = HT_LEFT;
}
FREE(me->base_href);
FREE(me->map_address);
FREE(me->LastOptionValue);
clear_objectdata(me);
FREE(me);
}
Commit Message: snapshot of project "lynx", label v2-8-9dev_15b
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 24,162
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Ins_SFVTCA( INS_ARG )
{
DO_SFVTCA
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,540
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int DevToolsWindow::GetWidth(int container_width) {
if (width_ == -1) {
width_ = profile_->GetPrefs()->
GetInteger(prefs::kDevToolsVSplitLocation);
}
if (width_ == -1)
width_ = container_width / 3;
width_ = std::max(GetMinimumWidth(), width_);
width_ = std::min(container_width - kMinContentsSize, width_);
return width_;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: handle devtools renderer unresponsiveness during beforeunload event interception
This patch fixes the crash which happenes under the following conditions:
1. DevTools window is in undocked state
2. DevTools renderer is unresponsive
3. User attempts to close inspected page
BUG=322380
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/84883002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@237611 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 7,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __init vfs_caches_init(void)
{
names_cachep = kmem_cache_create("names_cache", PATH_MAX, 0,
SLAB_HWCACHE_ALIGN|SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
dcache_init();
inode_init();
files_init();
files_maxfiles_init();
mnt_init();
bdev_cache_init();
chrdev_init();
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 10,610
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeCoordinator::scrollNonCompositedContents(const WebCore::IntRect& scrollRect, const WebCore::IntSize& scrollOffset)
{
setNonCompositedContentsNeedDisplay(scrollRect);
}
Commit Message: [WK2] LayerTreeCoordinator should release unused UpdatedAtlases
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=95072
Reviewed by Jocelyn Turcotte.
Release graphic buffers that haven't been used for a while in order to save memory.
This way we can give back memory to the system when no user interaction happens
after a period of time, for example when we are in the background.
* Shared/ShareableBitmap.h:
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::LayerTreeCoordinator):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::beginContentUpdate):
(WebKit):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::scheduleReleaseInactiveAtlases):
(WebKit::LayerTreeCoordinator::releaseInactiveAtlasesTimerFired):
* WebProcess/WebPage/CoordinatedGraphics/LayerTreeCoordinator.h:
(LayerTreeCoordinator):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.cpp:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::UpdateAtlas):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::didSwapBuffers):
Don't call buildLayoutIfNeeded here. It's enought to call it in beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer
and this way we can track whether this atlas is used with m_areaAllocator.
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::beginPaintingOnAvailableBuffer):
* WebProcess/WebPage/UpdateAtlas.h:
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::addTimeInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInactive):
(WebKit::UpdateAtlas::isInUse):
(UpdateAtlas):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@128473 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,530
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sco_conn_defer_accept(struct hci_conn *conn, u16 setting)
{
struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hdev;
BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
conn->state = BT_CONFIG;
if (!lmp_esco_capable(hdev)) {
struct hci_cp_accept_conn_req cp;
bacpy(&cp.bdaddr, &conn->dst);
cp.role = 0x00; /* Ignored */
hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_ACCEPT_CONN_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
} else {
struct hci_cp_accept_sync_conn_req cp;
bacpy(&cp.bdaddr, &conn->dst);
cp.pkt_type = cpu_to_le16(conn->pkt_type);
cp.tx_bandwidth = cpu_to_le32(0x00001f40);
cp.rx_bandwidth = cpu_to_le32(0x00001f40);
cp.content_format = cpu_to_le16(setting);
switch (setting & SCO_AIRMODE_MASK) {
case SCO_AIRMODE_TRANSP:
if (conn->pkt_type & ESCO_2EV3)
cp.max_latency = cpu_to_le16(0x0008);
else
cp.max_latency = cpu_to_le16(0x000D);
cp.retrans_effort = 0x02;
break;
case SCO_AIRMODE_CVSD:
cp.max_latency = cpu_to_le16(0xffff);
cp.retrans_effort = 0xff;
break;
}
hci_send_cmd(hdev, HCI_OP_ACCEPT_SYNC_CONN_REQ,
sizeof(cp), &cp);
}
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Validate socket address length in sco_sock_bind().
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 4,520
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct cm_id_private * cm_get_id(__be32 local_id, __be32 remote_id)
{
struct cm_id_private *cm_id_priv;
cm_id_priv = idr_find(&cm.local_id_table,
(__force int) (local_id ^ cm.random_id_operand));
if (cm_id_priv) {
if (cm_id_priv->id.remote_id == remote_id)
atomic_inc(&cm_id_priv->refcount);
else
cm_id_priv = NULL;
}
return cm_id_priv;
}
Commit Message: IB/core: Don't resolve passive side RoCE L2 address in CMA REQ handler
The code that resolves the passive side source MAC within the rdma_cm
connection request handler was both redundant and buggy, so remove it.
It was redundant since later, when an RC QP is modified to RTR state,
the resolution will take place in the ib_core module. It was buggy
because this callback also deals with UD SIDR exchange, for which we
incorrectly looked at the REQ member of the CM event and dereferenced
a random value.
Fixes: dd5f03beb4f7 ("IB/core: Ethernet L2 attributes in verbs/cm structures")
Signed-off-by: Moni Shoua <monis@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Or Gerlitz <ogerlitz@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 26,887
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int crypto_ahash_report(struct sk_buff *skb, struct crypto_alg *alg)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
Commit Message: crypto: user - fix info leaks in report API
Three errors resulting in kernel memory disclosure:
1/ The structures used for the netlink based crypto algorithm report API
are located on the stack. As snprintf() does not fill the remainder of
the buffer with null bytes, those stack bytes will be disclosed to users
of the API. Switch to strncpy() to fix this.
2/ crypto_report_one() does not initialize all field of struct
crypto_user_alg. Fix this to fix the heap info leak.
3/ For the module name we should copy only as many bytes as
module_name() returns -- not as much as the destination buffer could
hold. But the current code does not and therefore copies random data
from behind the end of the module name, as the module name is always
shorter than CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME.
Also switch to use strncpy() to copy the algorithm's name and
driver_name. They are strings, after all.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 3,267
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int bluebird_fx2_identify_state(struct usb_device *udev,
struct dvb_usb_device_properties *props,
struct dvb_usb_device_description **desc,
int *cold)
{
int wascold = *cold;
*cold = udev->descriptor.bDeviceClass == 0xff &&
udev->descriptor.bDeviceSubClass == 0xff &&
udev->descriptor.bDeviceProtocol == 0xff;
if (*cold && !wascold)
*desc = NULL;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: [media] cxusb: Use a dma capable buffer also for reading
Commit 17ce039b4e54 ("[media] cxusb: don't do DMA on stack")
added a kmalloc'ed bounce buffer for writes, but missed to do the same
for reads. As the read only happens after the write is finished, we can
reuse the same buffer.
As dvb_usb_generic_rw handles a read length of 0 by itself, avoid calling
it using the dvb_usb_generic_read wrapper function.
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <stefan.bruens@rwth-aachen.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,732
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::OpenOptionsDialog() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("ShowOptions"), profile_);
GURL url(chrome::kChromeUISettingsURL);
browser::NavigateParams params(GetSingletonTabNavigateParams(url));
params.path_behavior = browser::NavigateParams::IGNORE_AND_STAY_PUT;
browser::Navigate(¶ms);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 14,470
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char **load_enc_file(char *enc_name)
{
char buf[ENC_BUF_SIZE], *p, *r;
int i, names_count;
char **glyph_names;
set_cur_file_name(enc_name);
if (!enc_open()) {
pdftex_fail("cannot open encoding file for reading");
}
glyph_names = xtalloc(256, char *);
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
glyph_names[i] = notdef;
t1_log("{");
t1_log(cur_file_name = (char *) nameoffile + 1);
enc_getline();
if (*enc_line != '/' || (r = strchr(enc_line, '[')) == NULL) {
remove_eol(r, enc_line);
pdftex_fail
("invalid encoding vector (a name or `[' missing): `%s'", enc_line);
}
names_count = 0;
r++; /* skip '[' */
skip(r, ' ');
for (;;) {
while (*r == '/') {
for (p = buf, r++;
*r != ' ' && *r != 10 && *r != ']' && *r != '/'; *p++ = *r++);
*p = 0;
skip(r, ' ');
if (names_count > 255)
pdftex_fail("encoding vector contains more than 256 names");
if (strcmp(buf, notdef) != 0)
glyph_names[names_count] = xstrdup(buf);
names_count++;
}
if (*r != 10 && *r != '%') {
if (str_prefix(r, "] def"))
goto done;
else {
remove_eol(r, enc_line);
pdftex_fail
("invalid encoding vector: a name or `] def' expected: `%s'", enc_line);
}
}
enc_getline();
r = enc_line;
}
done:
enc_close();
t1_log("}");
cur_file_name = NULL;
return glyph_names;
}
Commit Message: writet1 protection against buffer overflow
git-svn-id: svn://tug.org/texlive/trunk/Build/source@48697 c570f23f-e606-0410-a88d-b1316a301751
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,689
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: iperf_get_verbose(struct iperf_test *ipt)
{
return ipt->verbose;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 19,408
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_handle_oFFs(png_structrp png_ptr, png_inforp info_ptr, png_uint_32 length)
{
png_byte buf[9];
png_int_32 offset_x, offset_y;
int unit_type;
png_debug(1, "in png_handle_oFFs");
if ((png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IHDR) == 0)
png_chunk_error(png_ptr, "missing IHDR");
else if ((png_ptr->mode & PNG_HAVE_IDAT) != 0)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "out of place");
return;
}
else if (info_ptr != NULL && (info_ptr->valid & PNG_INFO_oFFs) != 0)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "duplicate");
return;
}
if (length != 9)
{
png_crc_finish(png_ptr, length);
png_chunk_benign_error(png_ptr, "invalid");
return;
}
png_crc_read(png_ptr, buf, 9);
if (png_crc_finish(png_ptr, 0) != 0)
return;
offset_x = png_get_int_32(buf);
offset_y = png_get_int_32(buf + 4);
unit_type = buf[8];
png_set_oFFs(png_ptr, info_ptr, offset_x, offset_y, unit_type);
}
Commit Message: [libpng16] Fix the calculation of row_factor in png_check_chunk_length
(Bug report by Thuan Pham, SourceForge issue #278)
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 27,755
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::OnEnableAutoResize(const gfx::Size& min_size,
const gfx::Size& max_size) {
DCHECK(disable_scrollbars_size_limit_.IsEmpty());
if (!webview())
return;
auto_resize_mode_ = true;
webview()->enableAutoResizeMode(min_size, max_size);
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 19,049
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: start (engine_uiserver_t uiserver, const char *command)
{
gpgme_error_t err;
int fdlist[5];
int nfds;
/* We need to know the fd used by assuan for reads. We do this by
using the assumption that the first returned fd from
assuan_get_active_fds() is always this one. */
nfds = assuan_get_active_fds (uiserver->assuan_ctx, 0 /* read fds */,
fdlist, DIM (fdlist));
if (nfds < 1)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL); /* FIXME */
/* We "duplicate" the file descriptor, so we can close it here (we
can't close fdlist[0], as that is closed by libassuan, and
closing it here might cause libassuan to close some unrelated FD
later). Alternatively, we could special case status_fd and
register/unregister it manually as needed, but this increases
code duplication and is more complicated as we can not use the
close notifications etc. A third alternative would be to let
Assuan know that we closed the FD, but that complicates the
Assuan interface. */
uiserver->status_cb.fd = _gpgme_io_dup (fdlist[0]);
if (uiserver->status_cb.fd < 0)
return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
if (_gpgme_io_set_close_notify (uiserver->status_cb.fd,
close_notify_handler, uiserver))
{
_gpgme_io_close (uiserver->status_cb.fd);
uiserver->status_cb.fd = -1;
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_GENERAL);
}
err = add_io_cb (uiserver, &uiserver->status_cb, status_handler);
if (!err && uiserver->input_cb.fd != -1)
err = add_io_cb (uiserver, &uiserver->input_cb, _gpgme_data_outbound_handler);
if (!err && uiserver->output_cb.fd != -1)
err = add_io_cb (uiserver, &uiserver->output_cb, _gpgme_data_inbound_handler);
if (!err && uiserver->message_cb.fd != -1)
err = add_io_cb (uiserver, &uiserver->message_cb, _gpgme_data_outbound_handler);
if (!err)
err = assuan_write_line (uiserver->assuan_ctx, command);
if (!err)
uiserver_io_event (uiserver, GPGME_EVENT_START, NULL);
return err;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 23,018
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: tt_cmap4_char_map_linear( TT_CMap cmap,
FT_UInt32* pcharcode,
FT_Bool next )
{
TT_Face face = (TT_Face)cmap->cmap.charmap.face;
FT_Byte* limit = face->cmap_table + face->cmap_size;
FT_UInt num_segs2, start, end, offset;
FT_Int delta;
FT_UInt i, num_segs;
FT_UInt32 charcode = *pcharcode;
FT_UInt gindex = 0;
FT_Byte* p;
FT_Byte* q;
p = cmap->data + 6;
num_segs2 = FT_PAD_FLOOR( TT_PEEK_USHORT( p ), 2 );
num_segs = num_segs2 >> 1;
if ( !num_segs )
return 0;
if ( next )
charcode++;
if ( charcode > 0xFFFFU )
return 0;
/* linear search */
p = cmap->data + 14; /* ends table */
q = cmap->data + 16 + num_segs2; /* starts table */
for ( i = 0; i < num_segs; i++ )
{
end = TT_NEXT_USHORT( p );
start = TT_NEXT_USHORT( q );
if ( charcode < start )
{
if ( next )
charcode = start;
else
break;
}
Again:
if ( charcode <= end )
{
FT_Byte* r;
r = q - 2 + num_segs2;
delta = TT_PEEK_SHORT( r );
r += num_segs2;
offset = TT_PEEK_USHORT( r );
/* some fonts have an incorrect last segment; */
/* we have to catch it */
if ( i >= num_segs - 1 &&
start == 0xFFFFU && end == 0xFFFFU )
{
if ( offset && r + offset + 2 > limit )
{
delta = 1;
offset = 0;
}
}
if ( offset == 0xFFFFU )
continue;
if ( offset )
{
r += offset + ( charcode - start ) * 2;
/* if r > limit, the whole segment is invalid */
if ( next && r > limit )
continue;
gindex = TT_PEEK_USHORT( r );
if ( gindex )
{
gindex = (FT_UInt)( (FT_Int)gindex + delta ) & 0xFFFFU;
if ( gindex >= (FT_UInt)face->root.num_glyphs )
gindex = 0;
}
}
else
{
gindex = (FT_UInt)( (FT_Int)charcode + delta ) & 0xFFFFU;
if ( next && gindex >= (FT_UInt)face->root.num_glyphs )
{
/* we have an invalid glyph index; if there is an overflow, */
/* we can adjust `charcode', otherwise the whole segment is */
/* invalid */
gindex = 0;
if ( (FT_Int)charcode + delta < 0 &&
(FT_Int)end + delta >= 0 )
charcode = (FT_UInt)( -delta );
else if ( (FT_Int)charcode + delta < 0x10000L &&
(FT_Int)end + delta >= 0x10000L )
charcode = (FT_UInt)( 0x10000L - delta );
else
continue;
}
}
if ( next && !gindex )
{
if ( charcode >= 0xFFFFU )
break;
charcode++;
goto Again;
}
break;
}
}
if ( next )
*pcharcode = charcode;
return gindex;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 12,673
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virDomainGetInfo(virDomainPtr domain, virDomainInfoPtr info)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "info=%p", info);
virResetLastError();
if (info)
memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
virCheckNonNullArgGoto(info, error);
conn = domain->conn;
if (conn->driver->domainGetInfo) {
int ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainGetInfo(domain, info);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(domain->conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 24,470
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmx_cpuid_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best;
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
u32 secondary_exec_ctl = vmx_secondary_exec_control(vmx);
if (vmx_rdtscp_supported()) {
bool rdtscp_enabled = guest_cpuid_has_rdtscp(vcpu);
if (!rdtscp_enabled)
secondary_exec_ctl &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP;
if (nested) {
if (rdtscp_enabled)
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high |=
SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP;
else
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high &=
~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP;
}
}
/* Exposing INVPCID only when PCID is exposed */
best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x7, 0);
if (vmx_invpcid_supported() &&
(!best || !(best->ebx & bit(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID)) ||
!guest_cpuid_has_pcid(vcpu))) {
secondary_exec_ctl &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
if (best)
best->ebx &= ~bit(X86_FEATURE_INVPCID);
}
vmcs_set_secondary_exec_control(secondary_exec_ctl);
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PCOMMIT) && nested) {
if (guest_cpuid_has_pcommit(vcpu))
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high |=
SECONDARY_EXEC_PCOMMIT;
else
vmx->nested.nested_vmx_secondary_ctls_high &=
~SECONDARY_EXEC_PCOMMIT;
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 9,830
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline bool nested_cpu_has_posted_intr(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
return vmcs12->pin_based_vm_exec_control & PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388
| 0
| 16,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SoftHEVC::~SoftHEVC() {
ALOGV("In SoftHEVC::~SoftHEVC");
CHECK_EQ(deInitDecoder(), (status_t)OK);
}
Commit Message: SoftHEVC: Exit gracefully in case of decoder errors
Exit for error in allocation and unsupported resolutions
Bug: 28816956
Change-Id: Ieb830bedeb3a7431d1d21a024927df630f7eda1e
CWE ID: CWE-172
| 0
| 9,393
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void virtio_queue_set_notification(VirtQueue *vq, int enable)
{
vq->notification = enable;
if (virtio_vdev_has_feature(vq->vdev, VIRTIO_RING_F_EVENT_IDX)) {
vring_set_avail_event(vq, vring_avail_idx(vq));
} else if (enable) {
vring_used_flags_unset_bit(vq, VRING_USED_F_NO_NOTIFY);
} else {
vring_used_flags_set_bit(vq, VRING_USED_F_NO_NOTIFY);
}
if (enable) {
/* Expose avail event/used flags before caller checks the avail idx. */
smp_mb();
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 11,052
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, fgets)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (spl_filesystem_file_read(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_STRINGL(intern->u.file.current_line, intern->u.file.current_line_len, 1);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto string SplFileObject::current()
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 7,919
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLElement::addHTMLLengthToStyle(StylePropertySet* style, CSSPropertyID propertyID, const String& value)
{
StringImpl* v = value.impl();
if (v) {
unsigned int l = 0;
while (l < v->length() && (*v)[l] <= ' ')
l++;
for (; l < v->length(); l++) {
UChar cc = (*v)[l];
if (cc > '9')
break;
if (cc < '0') {
if (cc == '%' || cc == '*')
l++;
if (cc != '.')
break;
}
}
if (l != v->length()) {
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, propertyID, v->substring(0, l));
return;
}
}
addPropertyToAttributeStyle(style, propertyID, value);
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 15,831
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: R_API void r_config_restore(RConfigHold *h) {
RListIter *iter;
RConfigHoldChar *hchar;
RConfigHoldNum *hnum;
if (h) {
r_list_foreach (h->list_num, iter, hnum) {
(void)r_config_set_i (h->cfg, hnum->key, hnum->value);
}
r_list_foreach (h->list_char, iter, hchar) {
(void)r_config_set (h->cfg, hchar->key, hchar->value);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #7698 - UAF in r_config_set when loading a dex
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 18,304
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nf_ct_frag6_reasm(struct nf_ct_frag6_queue *fq, struct net_device *dev)
{
struct sk_buff *fp, *op, *head = fq->q.fragments;
int payload_len;
fq_kill(fq);
WARN_ON(head == NULL);
WARN_ON(NFCT_FRAG6_CB(head)->offset != 0);
/* Unfragmented part is taken from the first segment. */
payload_len = ((head->data - skb_network_header(head)) -
sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + fq->q.len -
sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
if (payload_len > IPV6_MAXPLEN) {
pr_debug("payload len is too large.\n");
goto out_oversize;
}
/* Head of list must not be cloned. */
if (skb_cloned(head) && pskb_expand_head(head, 0, 0, GFP_ATOMIC)) {
pr_debug("skb is cloned but can't expand head");
goto out_oom;
}
/* If the first fragment is fragmented itself, we split
* it to two chunks: the first with data and paged part
* and the second, holding only fragments. */
if (skb_has_frags(head)) {
struct sk_buff *clone;
int i, plen = 0;
if ((clone = alloc_skb(0, GFP_ATOMIC)) == NULL) {
pr_debug("Can't alloc skb\n");
goto out_oom;
}
clone->next = head->next;
head->next = clone;
skb_shinfo(clone)->frag_list = skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list;
skb_frag_list_init(head);
for (i=0; i<skb_shinfo(head)->nr_frags; i++)
plen += skb_shinfo(head)->frags[i].size;
clone->len = clone->data_len = head->data_len - plen;
head->data_len -= clone->len;
head->len -= clone->len;
clone->csum = 0;
clone->ip_summed = head->ip_summed;
NFCT_FRAG6_CB(clone)->orig = NULL;
atomic_add(clone->truesize, &nf_init_frags.mem);
}
/* We have to remove fragment header from datagram and to relocate
* header in order to calculate ICV correctly. */
skb_network_header(head)[fq->nhoffset] = skb_transport_header(head)[0];
memmove(head->head + sizeof(struct frag_hdr), head->head,
(head->data - head->head) - sizeof(struct frag_hdr));
head->mac_header += sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
head->network_header += sizeof(struct frag_hdr);
skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list = head->next;
skb_reset_transport_header(head);
skb_push(head, head->data - skb_network_header(head));
atomic_sub(head->truesize, &nf_init_frags.mem);
for (fp=head->next; fp; fp = fp->next) {
head->data_len += fp->len;
head->len += fp->len;
if (head->ip_summed != fp->ip_summed)
head->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_NONE;
else if (head->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE)
head->csum = csum_add(head->csum, fp->csum);
head->truesize += fp->truesize;
atomic_sub(fp->truesize, &nf_init_frags.mem);
}
head->next = NULL;
head->dev = dev;
head->tstamp = fq->q.stamp;
ipv6_hdr(head)->payload_len = htons(payload_len);
/* Yes, and fold redundant checksum back. 8) */
if (head->ip_summed == CHECKSUM_COMPLETE)
head->csum = csum_partial(skb_network_header(head),
skb_network_header_len(head),
head->csum);
fq->q.fragments = NULL;
/* all original skbs are linked into the NFCT_FRAG6_CB(head).orig */
fp = skb_shinfo(head)->frag_list;
if (NFCT_FRAG6_CB(fp)->orig == NULL)
/* at above code, head skb is divided into two skbs. */
fp = fp->next;
op = NFCT_FRAG6_CB(head)->orig;
for (; fp; fp = fp->next) {
struct sk_buff *orig = NFCT_FRAG6_CB(fp)->orig;
op->next = orig;
op = orig;
NFCT_FRAG6_CB(fp)->orig = NULL;
}
return head;
out_oversize:
if (net_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_DEBUG "nf_ct_frag6_reasm: payload len = %d\n", payload_len);
goto out_fail;
out_oom:
if (net_ratelimit())
printk(KERN_DEBUG "nf_ct_frag6_reasm: no memory for reassembly\n");
out_fail:
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_conntrack_reasm: properly handle packets fragmented into a single fragment
When an ICMPV6_PKT_TOOBIG message is received with a MTU below 1280,
all further packets include a fragment header.
Unlike regular defragmentation, conntrack also needs to "reassemble"
those fragments in order to obtain a packet without the fragment
header for connection tracking. Currently nf_conntrack_reasm checks
whether a fragment has either IP6_MF set or an offset != 0, which
makes it ignore those fragments.
Remove the invalid check and make reassembly handle fragment queues
containing only a single fragment.
Reported-and-tested-by: Ulrich Weber <uweber@astaro.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CWE ID:
| 1
| 5,594
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pcmkRegisterNode(xmlNodePtr node)
{
xml_private_t *p = NULL;
switch(node->type) {
case XML_ELEMENT_NODE:
case XML_DOCUMENT_NODE:
case XML_ATTRIBUTE_NODE:
case XML_COMMENT_NODE:
p = calloc(1, sizeof(xml_private_t));
p->check = XML_PRIVATE_MAGIC;
/* Flags will be reset if necessary when tracking is enabled */
p->flags |= (xpf_dirty|xpf_created);
node->_private = p;
break;
case XML_TEXT_NODE:
case XML_DTD_NODE:
break;
default:
/* Ignore */
crm_trace("Ignoring %p %d", node, node->type);
CRM_LOG_ASSERT(node->type == XML_ELEMENT_NODE);
break;
}
if(p && TRACKING_CHANGES(node)) {
/* XML_ELEMENT_NODE doesn't get picked up here, node->doc is
* not hooked up at the point we are called
*/
set_doc_flag(node, xpf_dirty);
__xml_node_dirty(node);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,212
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: psh_glyph_compute_extrema( PSH_Glyph glyph )
{
FT_UInt n;
/* first of all, compute all local extrema */
for ( n = 0; n < glyph->num_contours; n++ )
{
PSH_Point first = glyph->contours[n].start;
PSH_Point point, before, after;
if ( glyph->contours[n].count == 0 )
continue;
point = first;
before = point;
after = point;
do
{
before = before->prev;
if ( before == first )
goto Skip;
} while ( before->org_u == point->org_u );
first = point = before->next;
for (;;)
{
after = point;
do
{
after = after->next;
if ( after == first )
goto Next;
} while ( after->org_u == point->org_u );
if ( before->org_u < point->org_u )
{
if ( after->org_u < point->org_u )
{
/* local maximum */
goto Extremum;
}
}
else /* before->org_u > point->org_u */
{
if ( after->org_u > point->org_u )
{
/* local minimum */
Extremum:
do
{
psh_point_set_extremum( point );
point = point->next;
} while ( point != after );
}
}
before = after->prev;
point = after;
} /* for */
Next:
;
}
/* for each extremum, determine its direction along the */
/* orthogonal axis */
for ( n = 0; n < glyph->num_points; n++ )
{
PSH_Point point, before, after;
point = &glyph->points[n];
before = point;
after = point;
if ( psh_point_is_extremum( point ) )
{
do
{
before = before->prev;
if ( before == point )
goto Skip;
} while ( before->org_v == point->org_v );
do
{
after = after->next;
if ( after == point )
goto Skip;
} while ( after->org_v == point->org_v );
}
if ( before->org_v < point->org_v &&
after->org_v > point->org_v )
{
psh_point_set_positive( point );
}
else if ( before->org_v > point->org_v &&
after->org_v < point->org_v )
{
psh_point_set_negative( point );
}
Skip:
;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,618
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int jpc_dec_tileinit(jpc_dec_t *dec, jpc_dec_tile_t *tile)
{
jpc_dec_tcomp_t *tcomp;
int compno;
int rlvlno;
jpc_dec_rlvl_t *rlvl;
jpc_dec_band_t *band;
jpc_dec_prc_t *prc;
int bndno;
jpc_tsfb_band_t *bnd;
int bandno;
jpc_dec_ccp_t *ccp;
int prccnt;
jpc_dec_cblk_t *cblk;
int cblkcnt;
uint_fast32_t tlprcxstart;
uint_fast32_t tlprcystart;
uint_fast32_t brprcxend;
uint_fast32_t brprcyend;
uint_fast32_t tlcbgxstart;
uint_fast32_t tlcbgystart;
uint_fast32_t brcbgxend;
uint_fast32_t brcbgyend;
uint_fast32_t cbgxstart;
uint_fast32_t cbgystart;
uint_fast32_t cbgxend;
uint_fast32_t cbgyend;
uint_fast32_t tlcblkxstart;
uint_fast32_t tlcblkystart;
uint_fast32_t brcblkxend;
uint_fast32_t brcblkyend;
uint_fast32_t cblkxstart;
uint_fast32_t cblkystart;
uint_fast32_t cblkxend;
uint_fast32_t cblkyend;
uint_fast32_t tmpxstart;
uint_fast32_t tmpystart;
uint_fast32_t tmpxend;
uint_fast32_t tmpyend;
jpc_dec_cp_t *cp;
jpc_tsfb_band_t bnds[64];
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
int pchgno;
jpc_dec_cmpt_t *cmpt;
cp = tile->cp;
tile->realmode = 0;
if (cp->mctid == JPC_MCT_ICT) {
tile->realmode = 1;
}
for (compno = 0, tcomp = tile->tcomps, cmpt = dec->cmpts; compno <
dec->numcomps; ++compno, ++tcomp, ++cmpt) {
ccp = &tile->cp->ccps[compno];
if (ccp->qmfbid == JPC_COX_INS) {
tile->realmode = 1;
}
tcomp->numrlvls = ccp->numrlvls;
if (!(tcomp->rlvls = jas_alloc2(tcomp->numrlvls,
sizeof(jpc_dec_rlvl_t)))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(tcomp->data = jas_seq2d_create(JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xstart,
cmpt->hstep), JPC_CEILDIV(tile->ystart, cmpt->vstep),
JPC_CEILDIV(tile->xend, cmpt->hstep), JPC_CEILDIV(tile->yend,
cmpt->vstep)))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(tcomp->tsfb = jpc_cod_gettsfb(ccp->qmfbid,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1))) {
return -1;
}
{
jpc_tsfb_getbands(tcomp->tsfb, jas_seq2d_xstart(tcomp->data),
jas_seq2d_ystart(tcomp->data), jas_seq2d_xend(tcomp->data),
jas_seq2d_yend(tcomp->data), bnds);
}
for (rlvlno = 0, rlvl = tcomp->rlvls; rlvlno < tcomp->numrlvls;
++rlvlno, ++rlvl) {
rlvl->bands = 0;
rlvl->xstart = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tcomp->xstart,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->ystart = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tcomp->ystart,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->xend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tcomp->xend,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->yend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tcomp->yend,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1 - rlvlno);
rlvl->prcwidthexpn = ccp->prcwidthexpns[rlvlno];
rlvl->prcheightexpn = ccp->prcheightexpns[rlvlno];
tlprcxstart = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(rlvl->xstart,
rlvl->prcwidthexpn) << rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
tlprcystart = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(rlvl->ystart,
rlvl->prcheightexpn) << rlvl->prcheightexpn;
brprcxend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(rlvl->xend,
rlvl->prcwidthexpn) << rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
brprcyend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(rlvl->yend,
rlvl->prcheightexpn) << rlvl->prcheightexpn;
rlvl->numhprcs = (brprcxend - tlprcxstart) >>
rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rlvl->numvprcs = (brprcyend - tlprcystart) >>
rlvl->prcheightexpn;
rlvl->numprcs = rlvl->numhprcs * rlvl->numvprcs;
if (rlvl->xstart >= rlvl->xend || rlvl->ystart >= rlvl->yend) {
rlvl->bands = 0;
rlvl->numprcs = 0;
rlvl->numhprcs = 0;
rlvl->numvprcs = 0;
continue;
}
if (!rlvlno) {
tlcbgxstart = tlprcxstart;
tlcbgystart = tlprcystart;
brcbgxend = brprcxend;
brcbgyend = brprcyend;
rlvl->cbgwidthexpn = rlvl->prcwidthexpn;
rlvl->cbgheightexpn = rlvl->prcheightexpn;
} else {
tlcbgxstart = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tlprcxstart, 1);
tlcbgystart = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(tlprcystart, 1);
brcbgxend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(brprcxend, 1);
brcbgyend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(brprcyend, 1);
rlvl->cbgwidthexpn = rlvl->prcwidthexpn - 1;
rlvl->cbgheightexpn = rlvl->prcheightexpn - 1;
}
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn = JAS_MIN(ccp->cblkwidthexpn,
rlvl->cbgwidthexpn);
rlvl->cblkheightexpn = JAS_MIN(ccp->cblkheightexpn,
rlvl->cbgheightexpn);
rlvl->numbands = (!rlvlno) ? 1 : 3;
if (!(rlvl->bands = jas_alloc2(rlvl->numbands,
sizeof(jpc_dec_band_t)))) {
return -1;
}
for (bandno = 0, band = rlvl->bands;
bandno < rlvl->numbands; ++bandno, ++band) {
bndno = (!rlvlno) ? 0 : (3 * (rlvlno - 1) +
bandno + 1);
bnd = &bnds[bndno];
band->orient = bnd->orient;
band->stepsize = ccp->stepsizes[bndno];
band->analgain = JPC_NOMINALGAIN(ccp->qmfbid,
tcomp->numrlvls - 1, rlvlno, band->orient);
band->absstepsize = jpc_calcabsstepsize(band->stepsize,
cmpt->prec + band->analgain);
band->numbps = ccp->numguardbits +
JPC_QCX_GETEXPN(band->stepsize) - 1;
band->roishift = (ccp->roishift + band->numbps >= JPC_PREC) ?
(JPC_PREC - 1 - band->numbps) : ccp->roishift;
band->data = 0;
band->prcs = 0;
if (bnd->xstart == bnd->xend || bnd->ystart == bnd->yend) {
continue;
}
if (!(band->data = jas_seq2d_create(0, 0, 0, 0))) {
return -1;
}
jas_seq2d_bindsub(band->data, tcomp->data, bnd->locxstart,
bnd->locystart, bnd->locxend, bnd->locyend);
jas_seq2d_setshift(band->data, bnd->xstart, bnd->ystart);
assert(rlvl->numprcs);
if (!(band->prcs = jas_alloc2(rlvl->numprcs,
sizeof(jpc_dec_prc_t)))) {
return -1;
}
/************************************************/
cbgxstart = tlcbgxstart;
cbgystart = tlcbgystart;
for (prccnt = rlvl->numprcs, prc = band->prcs;
prccnt > 0; --prccnt, ++prc) {
cbgxend = cbgxstart + (1 << rlvl->cbgwidthexpn);
cbgyend = cbgystart + (1 << rlvl->cbgheightexpn);
prc->xstart = JAS_MAX(cbgxstart, JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t,
jas_seq2d_xstart(band->data)));
prc->ystart = JAS_MAX(cbgystart, JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t,
jas_seq2d_ystart(band->data)));
prc->xend = JAS_MIN(cbgxend, JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t,
jas_seq2d_xend(band->data)));
prc->yend = JAS_MIN(cbgyend, JAS_CAST(uint_fast32_t,
jas_seq2d_yend(band->data)));
if (prc->xend > prc->xstart && prc->yend > prc->ystart) {
tlcblkxstart = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(prc->xstart,
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn) << rlvl->cblkwidthexpn;
tlcblkystart = JPC_FLOORDIVPOW2(prc->ystart,
rlvl->cblkheightexpn) << rlvl->cblkheightexpn;
brcblkxend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(prc->xend,
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn) << rlvl->cblkwidthexpn;
brcblkyend = JPC_CEILDIVPOW2(prc->yend,
rlvl->cblkheightexpn) << rlvl->cblkheightexpn;
prc->numhcblks = (brcblkxend - tlcblkxstart) >>
rlvl->cblkwidthexpn;
prc->numvcblks = (brcblkyend - tlcblkystart) >>
rlvl->cblkheightexpn;
prc->numcblks = prc->numhcblks * prc->numvcblks;
assert(prc->numcblks > 0);
if (!(prc->incltagtree = jpc_tagtree_create(
prc->numhcblks, prc->numvcblks))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(prc->numimsbstagtree = jpc_tagtree_create(
prc->numhcblks, prc->numvcblks))) {
return -1;
}
if (!(prc->cblks = jas_alloc2(prc->numcblks,
sizeof(jpc_dec_cblk_t)))) {
return -1;
}
cblkxstart = cbgxstart;
cblkystart = cbgystart;
for (cblkcnt = prc->numcblks, cblk = prc->cblks;
cblkcnt > 0;) {
cblkxend = cblkxstart + (1 << rlvl->cblkwidthexpn);
cblkyend = cblkystart + (1 << rlvl->cblkheightexpn);
tmpxstart = JAS_MAX(cblkxstart, prc->xstart);
tmpystart = JAS_MAX(cblkystart, prc->ystart);
tmpxend = JAS_MIN(cblkxend, prc->xend);
tmpyend = JAS_MIN(cblkyend, prc->yend);
if (tmpxend > tmpxstart && tmpyend > tmpystart) {
cblk->firstpassno = -1;
cblk->mqdec = 0;
cblk->nulldec = 0;
cblk->flags = 0;
cblk->numpasses = 0;
cblk->segs.head = 0;
cblk->segs.tail = 0;
cblk->curseg = 0;
cblk->numimsbs = 0;
cblk->numlenbits = 3;
cblk->flags = 0;
if (!(cblk->data = jas_seq2d_create(0, 0, 0,
0))) {
return -1;
}
jas_seq2d_bindsub(cblk->data, band->data,
tmpxstart, tmpystart, tmpxend, tmpyend);
++cblk;
--cblkcnt;
}
cblkxstart += 1 << rlvl->cblkwidthexpn;
if (cblkxstart >= cbgxend) {
cblkxstart = cbgxstart;
cblkystart += 1 << rlvl->cblkheightexpn;
}
}
} else {
prc->cblks = 0;
prc->incltagtree = 0;
prc->numimsbstagtree = 0;
}
cbgxstart += 1 << rlvl->cbgwidthexpn;
if (cbgxstart >= brcbgxend) {
cbgxstart = tlcbgxstart;
cbgystart += 1 << rlvl->cbgheightexpn;
}
}
/********************************************/
}
}
}
if (!(tile->pi = jpc_dec_pi_create(dec, tile))) {
return -1;
}
for (pchgno = 0; pchgno < jpc_pchglist_numpchgs(tile->cp->pchglist);
++pchgno) {
pchg = jpc_pchg_copy(jpc_pchglist_get(tile->cp->pchglist, pchgno));
assert(pchg);
jpc_pi_addpchg(tile->pi, pchg);
}
jpc_pi_init(tile->pi);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed an array overflow problem in the JPC decoder.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 28,149
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ssize_t tcp_sendpage(struct socket *sock, struct page *page, int offset,
size_t size, int flags)
{
ssize_t res;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
if (!(sk->sk_route_caps & NETIF_F_SG) ||
!(sk->sk_route_caps & NETIF_F_ALL_CSUM))
return sock_no_sendpage(sock, page, offset, size, flags);
lock_sock(sk);
TCP_CHECK_TIMER(sk);
res = do_tcp_sendpages(sk, &page, offset, size, flags);
TCP_CHECK_TIMER(sk);
release_sock(sk);
return res;
}
Commit Message: net: Fix oops from tcp_collapse() when using splice()
tcp_read_sock() can have a eat skbs without immediately advancing copied_seq.
This can cause a panic in tcp_collapse() if it is called as a result
of the recv_actor dropping the socket lock.
A userspace program that splices data from a socket to either another
socket or to a file can trigger this bug.
Signed-off-by: Steven J. Magnani <steve@digidescorp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 17,754
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static apr_uint64_t ap_ntoh64(const apr_uint64_t *input)
{
apr_uint64_t rval;
unsigned char *data = (unsigned char *)&rval;
if (APR_IS_BIGENDIAN) {
return *input;
}
data[0] = *input >> 56;
data[1] = *input >> 48;
data[2] = *input >> 40;
data[3] = *input >> 32;
data[4] = *input >> 24;
data[5] = *input >> 16;
data[6] = *input >> 8;
data[7] = *input >> 0;
return rval;
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0228 (cve.mitre.org)
mod_lua: A maliciously crafted websockets PING after a script
calls r:wsupgrade() can cause a child process crash.
[Edward Lu <Chaosed0 gmail.com>]
Discovered by Guido Vranken <guidovranken gmail.com>
Submitted by: Edward Lu
Committed by: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1657261 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,142
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebPagePrivate::dispatchMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin(PluginView* plugin, const Platform::MouseEvent& event)
{
NPEvent npEvent;
NPMouseEvent mouseEvent;
mouseEvent.x = event.screenPosition().x();
mouseEvent.y = event.screenPosition().y();
switch (event.type()) {
case Platform::MouseEvent::MouseButtonDown:
mouseEvent.type = MOUSE_BUTTON_DOWN;
m_pluginMouseButtonPressed = true;
break;
case Platform::MouseEvent::MouseButtonUp:
mouseEvent.type = MOUSE_BUTTON_UP;
m_pluginMouseButtonPressed = false;
break;
case Platform::MouseEvent::MouseMove:
mouseEvent.type = MOUSE_MOTION;
break;
default:
return false;
}
mouseEvent.flags = 0;
mouseEvent.button = m_pluginMouseButtonPressed;
npEvent.type = NP_MouseEvent;
npEvent.data = &mouseEvent;
return plugin->dispatchFullScreenNPEvent(npEvent);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 24,141
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void reschedule_timeout(int drive, const char *message)
{
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&floppy_lock, flags);
__reschedule_timeout(drive, message);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&floppy_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: floppy: don't write kernel-only members to FDRAWCMD ioctl output
Do not leak kernel-only floppy_raw_cmd structure members to userspace.
This includes the linked-list pointer and the pointer to the allocated
DMA space.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattd@bugfuzz.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 16,277
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool PDFiumEngine::HandleDocumentLoad(const pp::URLLoader& loader) {
password_tries_remaining_ = kMaxPasswordTries;
process_when_pending_request_complete_ = true;
auto loader_wrapper =
std::make_unique<URLLoaderWrapperImpl>(GetPluginInstance(), loader);
loader_wrapper->SetResponseHeaders(headers_);
doc_loader_ = std::make_unique<DocumentLoader>(this);
if (doc_loader_->Init(std::move(loader_wrapper), url_)) {
doc_loader_->RequestData(0, 1);
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Use a temporary list when unloading pages
When traversing the |deferred_page_unloads_| list and handling the
unloads it's possible for new pages to get added to the list which will
invalidate the iterator.
This CL swaps the list with an empty list and does the iteration on the
list copy. New items that are unloaded while handling the defers will be
unloaded at a later point.
Bug: 780450
Change-Id: Ic7ced1c82227109784fb536ce19a4dd51b9119ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/758916
Commit-Queue: dsinclair <dsinclair@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#515056}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 1,701
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ahci_unmap_clb_address(AHCIDevice *ad)
{
dma_memory_unmap(ad->hba->as, ad->lst, 1024,
DMA_DIRECTION_FROM_DEVICE, 1024);
ad->lst = NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,361
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void msg_exit_ns(struct ipc_namespace *ns)
{
free_ipcs(ns, &msg_ids(ns), freeque);
idr_destroy(&ns->ids[IPC_MSG_IDS].ipcs_idr);
}
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 19,709
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int coroutine_fn v9fs_do_readdir_with_stat(V9fsPDU *pdu,
V9fsFidState *fidp,
uint32_t max_count)
{
V9fsPath path;
V9fsStat v9stat;
int len, err = 0;
int32_t count = 0;
struct stat stbuf;
off_t saved_dir_pos;
struct dirent *dent;
/* save the directory position */
saved_dir_pos = v9fs_co_telldir(pdu, fidp);
if (saved_dir_pos < 0) {
return saved_dir_pos;
}
while (1) {
v9fs_path_init(&path);
v9fs_readdir_lock(&fidp->fs.dir);
err = v9fs_co_readdir(pdu, fidp, &dent);
if (err || !dent) {
break;
}
err = v9fs_co_name_to_path(pdu, &fidp->path, dent->d_name, &path);
if (err < 0) {
break;
}
err = v9fs_co_lstat(pdu, &path, &stbuf);
if (err < 0) {
break;
}
err = stat_to_v9stat(pdu, &path, &stbuf, &v9stat);
if (err < 0) {
break;
}
/* 11 = 7 + 4 (7 = start offset, 4 = space for storing count) */
len = pdu_marshal(pdu, 11 + count, "S", &v9stat);
v9fs_readdir_unlock(&fidp->fs.dir);
if ((len != (v9stat.size + 2)) || ((count + len) > max_count)) {
/* Ran out of buffer. Set dir back to old position and return */
v9fs_co_seekdir(pdu, fidp, saved_dir_pos);
v9fs_stat_free(&v9stat);
v9fs_path_free(&path);
return count;
}
count += len;
v9fs_stat_free(&v9stat);
v9fs_path_free(&path);
saved_dir_pos = dent->d_off;
}
v9fs_readdir_unlock(&fidp->fs.dir);
v9fs_path_free(&path);
if (err < 0) {
return err;
}
return count;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 6,226
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void WillDispatchTabUpdatedEvent(WebContents* contents,
Profile* profile,
const Extension* extension,
ListValue* event_args) {
DictionaryValue* tab_value = ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
contents, extension);
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 19,342
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void decode_macroblock(VP8D_COMP *pbi, MACROBLOCKD *xd,
unsigned int mb_idx)
{
MB_PREDICTION_MODE mode;
int i;
#if CONFIG_ERROR_CONCEALMENT
int corruption_detected = 0;
#else
(void)mb_idx;
#endif
if (xd->mode_info_context->mbmi.mb_skip_coeff)
{
vp8_reset_mb_tokens_context(xd);
}
else if (!vp8dx_bool_error(xd->current_bc))
{
int eobtotal;
eobtotal = vp8_decode_mb_tokens(pbi, xd);
/* Special case: Force the loopfilter to skip when eobtotal is zero */
xd->mode_info_context->mbmi.mb_skip_coeff = (eobtotal==0);
}
mode = xd->mode_info_context->mbmi.mode;
if (xd->segmentation_enabled)
vp8_mb_init_dequantizer(pbi, xd);
#if CONFIG_ERROR_CONCEALMENT
if(pbi->ec_active)
{
int throw_residual;
/* When we have independent partitions we can apply residual even
* though other partitions within the frame are corrupt.
*/
throw_residual = (!pbi->independent_partitions &&
pbi->frame_corrupt_residual);
throw_residual = (throw_residual || vp8dx_bool_error(xd->current_bc));
if ((mb_idx >= pbi->mvs_corrupt_from_mb || throw_residual))
{
/* MB with corrupt residuals or corrupt mode/motion vectors.
* Better to use the predictor as reconstruction.
*/
pbi->frame_corrupt_residual = 1;
memset(xd->qcoeff, 0, sizeof(xd->qcoeff));
vp8_conceal_corrupt_mb(xd);
corruption_detected = 1;
/* force idct to be skipped for B_PRED and use the
* prediction only for reconstruction
* */
memset(xd->eobs, 0, 25);
}
}
#endif
/* do prediction */
if (xd->mode_info_context->mbmi.ref_frame == INTRA_FRAME)
{
vp8_build_intra_predictors_mbuv_s(xd,
xd->recon_above[1],
xd->recon_above[2],
xd->recon_left[1],
xd->recon_left[2],
xd->recon_left_stride[1],
xd->dst.u_buffer, xd->dst.v_buffer,
xd->dst.uv_stride);
if (mode != B_PRED)
{
vp8_build_intra_predictors_mby_s(xd,
xd->recon_above[0],
xd->recon_left[0],
xd->recon_left_stride[0],
xd->dst.y_buffer,
xd->dst.y_stride);
}
else
{
short *DQC = xd->dequant_y1;
int dst_stride = xd->dst.y_stride;
/* clear out residual eob info */
if(xd->mode_info_context->mbmi.mb_skip_coeff)
memset(xd->eobs, 0, 25);
intra_prediction_down_copy(xd, xd->recon_above[0] + 16);
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
{
BLOCKD *b = &xd->block[i];
unsigned char *dst = xd->dst.y_buffer + b->offset;
B_PREDICTION_MODE b_mode =
xd->mode_info_context->bmi[i].as_mode;
unsigned char *Above = dst - dst_stride;
unsigned char *yleft = dst - 1;
int left_stride = dst_stride;
unsigned char top_left = Above[-1];
vp8_intra4x4_predict(Above, yleft, left_stride, b_mode,
dst, dst_stride, top_left);
if (xd->eobs[i])
{
if (xd->eobs[i] > 1)
{
vp8_dequant_idct_add(b->qcoeff, DQC, dst, dst_stride);
}
else
{
vp8_dc_only_idct_add
(b->qcoeff[0] * DQC[0],
dst, dst_stride,
dst, dst_stride);
memset(b->qcoeff, 0, 2 * sizeof(b->qcoeff[0]));
}
}
}
}
}
else
{
vp8_build_inter_predictors_mb(xd);
}
#if CONFIG_ERROR_CONCEALMENT
if (corruption_detected)
{
return;
}
#endif
if(!xd->mode_info_context->mbmi.mb_skip_coeff)
{
/* dequantization and idct */
if (mode != B_PRED)
{
short *DQC = xd->dequant_y1;
if (mode != SPLITMV)
{
BLOCKD *b = &xd->block[24];
/* do 2nd order transform on the dc block */
if (xd->eobs[24] > 1)
{
vp8_dequantize_b(b, xd->dequant_y2);
vp8_short_inv_walsh4x4(&b->dqcoeff[0],
xd->qcoeff);
memset(b->qcoeff, 0, 16 * sizeof(b->qcoeff[0]));
}
else
{
b->dqcoeff[0] = b->qcoeff[0] * xd->dequant_y2[0];
vp8_short_inv_walsh4x4_1(&b->dqcoeff[0],
xd->qcoeff);
memset(b->qcoeff, 0, 2 * sizeof(b->qcoeff[0]));
}
/* override the dc dequant constant in order to preserve the
* dc components
*/
DQC = xd->dequant_y1_dc;
}
vp8_dequant_idct_add_y_block
(xd->qcoeff, DQC,
xd->dst.y_buffer,
xd->dst.y_stride, xd->eobs);
}
vp8_dequant_idct_add_uv_block
(xd->qcoeff+16*16, xd->dequant_uv,
xd->dst.u_buffer, xd->dst.v_buffer,
xd->dst.uv_stride, xd->eobs+16);
}
}
Commit Message: vp8:fix threading issues
1 - stops de allocating before threads are closed.
2 - limits threads to mb_rows when mb_rows < partitions
BUG=webm:851
Bug: 30436808
Change-Id: Ie017818ed28103ca9d26d57087f31361b642e09b
(cherry picked from commit 70cca742efa20617c70c3209aa614a70f282f90e)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,643
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::DrawingBufferClientRestoreTexture2DBinding() {
if (!ContextGL())
return;
RestoreCurrentTexture2D();
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,883
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int Equalizer_getParameter(EffectContext *pContext,
void *pParam,
uint32_t *pValueSize,
void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int bMute = 0;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;
int32_t param2;
char *name;
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_NUM_BANDS:
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
case EQ_PARAM_GET_NUM_OF_PRESETS:
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
case EQ_PARAM_GET_BAND:
if (*pValueSize < sizeof(int16_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 1 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = sizeof(int16_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_LEVEL_RANGE:
if (*pValueSize < 2 * sizeof(int16_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 2 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = 2 * sizeof(int16_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_FREQ_RANGE:
if (*pValueSize < 2 * sizeof(int32_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 3 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = 2 * sizeof(int32_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_CENTER_FREQ:
if (*pValueSize < sizeof(int32_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 5 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = sizeof(int32_t);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_PRESET_NAME:
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES:
if (*pValueSize < (2 + FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) * sizeof(uint16_t)) {
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 1 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = (2 + FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) * sizeof(uint16_t);
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter unknown param %d", param);
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_NUM_BANDS:
*(uint16_t *)pValue = (uint16_t)FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS;
break;
case EQ_PARAM_LEVEL_RANGE:
*(int16_t *)pValue = -1500;
*((int16_t *)pValue + 1) = 1500;
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
if (param2 >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
*(int16_t *)pValue = (int16_t)EqualizerGetBandLevel(pContext, param2);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_CENTER_FREQ:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
if (param2 >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
*(int32_t *)pValue = EqualizerGetCentreFrequency(pContext, param2);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_FREQ_RANGE:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
if (param2 >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
EqualizerGetBandFreqRange(pContext, param2, (uint32_t *)pValue, ((uint32_t *)pValue + 1));
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_BAND:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
*(uint16_t *)pValue = (uint16_t)EqualizerGetBand(pContext, param2);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
*(uint16_t *)pValue = (uint16_t)EqualizerGetPreset(pContext);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_NUM_OF_PRESETS:
*(uint16_t *)pValue = (uint16_t)EqualizerGetNumPresets();
break;
case EQ_PARAM_GET_PRESET_NAME:
param2 = *pParamTemp;
if (param2 >= EqualizerGetNumPresets()) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
name = (char *)pValue;
strncpy(name, EqualizerGetPresetName(param2), *pValueSize - 1);
name[*pValueSize - 1] = 0;
*pValueSize = strlen(name) + 1;
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES: {
int16_t *p = (int16_t *)pValue;
ALOGV("\tEqualizer_getParameter() EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES");
p[0] = (int16_t)EqualizerGetPreset(pContext);
p[1] = (int16_t)FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS;
for (int i = 0; i < FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS; i++) {
p[2 + i] = (int16_t)EqualizerGetBandLevel(pContext, i);
}
} break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_getParameter() invalid param %d", param);
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Equalizer_getParameter */
int Equalizer_setParameter (EffectContext *pContext, void *pParam, void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int32_t preset;
int32_t band;
int32_t level;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;
switch (param) {
case EQ_PARAM_CUR_PRESET:
preset = (int32_t)(*(uint16_t *)pValue);
if ((preset >= EqualizerGetNumPresets())||(preset < 0)) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
EqualizerSetPreset(pContext, preset);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_BAND_LEVEL:
band = *pParamTemp;
level = (int32_t)(*(int16_t *)pValue);
if (band >= FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
EqualizerSetBandLevel(pContext, band, level);
break;
case EQ_PARAM_PROPERTIES: {
int16_t *p = (int16_t *)pValue;
if ((int)p[0] >= EqualizerGetNumPresets()) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (p[0] >= 0) {
EqualizerSetPreset(pContext, (int)p[0]);
} else {
if ((int)p[1] != FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS) {
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
for (int i = 0; i < FIVEBAND_NUMBANDS; i++) {
EqualizerSetBandLevel(pContext, i, (int)p[2 + i]);
}
}
} break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Equalizer_setParameter() invalid param %d", param);
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Equalizer_setParameter */
int Volume_getParameter(EffectContext *pContext,
void *pParam,
uint32_t *pValueSize,
void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int bMute = 0;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;;
char *name;
switch (param){
case VOLUME_PARAM_LEVEL:
case VOLUME_PARAM_MAXLEVEL:
case VOLUME_PARAM_STEREOPOSITION:
if (*pValueSize != sizeof(int16_t)){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 1 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = sizeof(int16_t);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_MUTE:
case VOLUME_PARAM_ENABLESTEREOPOSITION:
if (*pValueSize < sizeof(int32_t)){
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_getParameter() invalid pValueSize 2 %d", *pValueSize);
return -EINVAL;
}
*pValueSize = sizeof(int32_t);
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_getParameter unknown param %d", param);
return -EINVAL;
}
switch (param){
case VOLUME_PARAM_LEVEL:
status = VolumeGetVolumeLevel(pContext, (int16_t *)(pValue));
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_MAXLEVEL:
*(int16_t *)pValue = 0;
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_STEREOPOSITION:
VolumeGetStereoPosition(pContext, (int16_t *)pValue);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_MUTE:
status = VolumeGetMute(pContext, (uint32_t *)pValue);
ALOGV("\tVolume_getParameter() VOLUME_PARAM_MUTE Value is %d",
*(uint32_t *)pValue);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_ENABLESTEREOPOSITION:
*(int32_t *)pValue = pContext->pBundledContext->bStereoPositionEnabled;
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_getParameter() invalid param %d", param);
status = -EINVAL;
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Volume_getParameter */
int Volume_setParameter (EffectContext *pContext, void *pParam, void *pValue){
int status = 0;
int16_t level;
int16_t position;
uint32_t mute;
uint32_t positionEnabled;
int32_t *pParamTemp = (int32_t *)pParam;
int32_t param = *pParamTemp++;
switch (param){
case VOLUME_PARAM_LEVEL:
level = *(int16_t *)pValue;
status = VolumeSetVolumeLevel(pContext, (int16_t)level);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_MUTE:
mute = *(uint32_t *)pValue;
status = VolumeSetMute(pContext, mute);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_ENABLESTEREOPOSITION:
positionEnabled = *(uint32_t *)pValue;
status = VolumeEnableStereoPosition(pContext, positionEnabled);
status = VolumeSetStereoPosition(pContext, pContext->pBundledContext->positionSaved);
break;
case VOLUME_PARAM_STEREOPOSITION:
position = *(int16_t *)pValue;
status = VolumeSetStereoPosition(pContext, (int16_t)position);
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tLVM_ERROR : Volume_setParameter() invalid param %d", param);
break;
}
return status;
} /* end Volume_setParameter */
/****************************************************************************************
* Name : LVC_ToDB_s32Tos16()
* Input : Signed 32-bit integer
* Output : Signed 16-bit integer
* MSB (16) = sign bit
* (15->05) = integer part
* (04->01) = decimal part
* Returns : Db value with respect to full scale
* Description :
* Remarks :
****************************************************************************************/
LVM_INT16 LVC_ToDB_s32Tos16(LVM_INT32 Lin_fix)
{
LVM_INT16 db_fix;
LVM_INT16 Shift;
LVM_INT16 SmallRemainder;
LVM_UINT32 Remainder = (LVM_UINT32)Lin_fix;
/* Count leading bits, 1 cycle in assembly*/
for (Shift = 0; Shift<32; Shift++)
{
if ((Remainder & 0x80000000U)!=0)
{
break;
}
Remainder = Remainder << 1;
}
/*
* Based on the approximation equation (for Q11.4 format):
*
* dB = -96 * Shift + 16 * (8 * Remainder - 2 * Remainder^2)
*/
db_fix = (LVM_INT16)(-96 * Shift); /* Six dB steps in Q11.4 format*/
SmallRemainder = (LVM_INT16)((Remainder & 0x7fffffff) >> 24);
db_fix = (LVM_INT16)(db_fix + SmallRemainder );
SmallRemainder = (LVM_INT16)(SmallRemainder * SmallRemainder);
db_fix = (LVM_INT16)(db_fix - (LVM_INT16)((LVM_UINT16)SmallRemainder >> 9));
/* Correct for small offset */
db_fix = (LVM_INT16)(db_fix - 5);
return db_fix;
}
int Effect_setEnabled(EffectContext *pContext, bool enabled)
{
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() type %d, enabled %d", pContext->EffectType, enabled);
if (enabled) {
bool tempDisabled = false;
switch (pContext->EffectType) {
case LVM_BASS_BOOST:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bBassEnabled == LVM_TRUE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_BASS_BOOST is already enabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
if(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountBb <= 0){
pContext->pBundledContext->NumberEffectsEnabled++;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountBb =
(LVM_INT32)(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesPerSecond*0.1);
pContext->pBundledContext->bBassEnabled = LVM_TRUE;
tempDisabled = pContext->pBundledContext->bBassTempDisabled;
break;
case LVM_EQUALIZER:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bEqualizerEnabled == LVM_TRUE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_EQUALIZER is already enabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
if(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountEq <= 0){
pContext->pBundledContext->NumberEffectsEnabled++;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountEq =
(LVM_INT32)(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesPerSecond*0.1);
pContext->pBundledContext->bEqualizerEnabled = LVM_TRUE;
break;
case LVM_VIRTUALIZER:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerEnabled == LVM_TRUE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_VIRTUALIZER is already enabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
if(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountVirt <= 0){
pContext->pBundledContext->NumberEffectsEnabled++;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesToExitCountVirt =
(LVM_INT32)(pContext->pBundledContext->SamplesPerSecond*0.1);
pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerEnabled = LVM_TRUE;
tempDisabled = pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerTempDisabled;
break;
case LVM_VOLUME:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bVolumeEnabled == LVM_TRUE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_VOLUME is already enabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->NumberEffectsEnabled++;
pContext->pBundledContext->bVolumeEnabled = LVM_TRUE;
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() invalid effect type");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!tempDisabled) {
LvmEffect_enable(pContext);
}
} else {
switch (pContext->EffectType) {
case LVM_BASS_BOOST:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bBassEnabled == LVM_FALSE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_BASS_BOOST is already disabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bBassEnabled = LVM_FALSE;
break;
case LVM_EQUALIZER:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bEqualizerEnabled == LVM_FALSE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_EQUALIZER is already disabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bEqualizerEnabled = LVM_FALSE;
break;
case LVM_VIRTUALIZER:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerEnabled == LVM_FALSE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_VIRTUALIZER is already disabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bVirtualizerEnabled = LVM_FALSE;
break;
case LVM_VOLUME:
if (pContext->pBundledContext->bVolumeEnabled == LVM_FALSE) {
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() LVM_VOLUME is already disabled");
return -EINVAL;
}
pContext->pBundledContext->bVolumeEnabled = LVM_FALSE;
break;
default:
ALOGV("\tEffect_setEnabled() invalid effect type");
return -EINVAL;
}
LvmEffect_disable(pContext);
}
return 0;
}
int16_t LVC_Convert_VolToDb(uint32_t vol){
int16_t dB;
dB = LVC_ToDB_s32Tos16(vol <<7);
dB = (dB +8)>>4;
dB = (dB <-96) ? -96 : dB ;
return dB;
}
} // namespace
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 23,608
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagepsbbox)
{
zval *fnt;
long sz = 0, sp = 0, wd = 0;
char *str;
int i, space = 0, add_width = 0, char_width, amount_kern;
int cur_x, cur_y, dx, dy;
int x1, y1, x2, y2, x3, y3, x4, y4;
int *f_ind;
int str_len, per_char = 0;
int argc = ZEND_NUM_ARGS();
double angle = 0, sin_a = 0, cos_a = 0;
BBox char_bbox, str_bbox = {0, 0, 0, 0};
if (argc != 3 && argc != 6) {
ZEND_WRONG_PARAM_COUNT();
}
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "srl|lld", &str, &str_len, &fnt, &sz, &sp, &wd, &angle) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (argc == 6) {
space = sp;
add_width = wd;
angle = angle * M_PI / 180;
sin_a = sin(angle);
cos_a = cos(angle);
per_char = add_width || angle ? 1 : 0;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(f_ind, int *, &fnt, -1, "Type 1 font", le_ps_font);
#define max(a, b) (a > b ? a : b)
#define min(a, b) (a < b ? a : b)
#define new_x(a, b) (int) ((a) * cos_a - (b) * sin_a)
#define new_y(a, b) (int) ((a) * sin_a + (b) * cos_a)
if (per_char) {
space += T1_GetCharWidth(*f_ind, ' ');
cur_x = cur_y = 0;
for (i = 0; i < str_len; i++) {
if (str[i] == ' ') {
char_bbox.llx = char_bbox.lly = char_bbox.ury = 0;
char_bbox.urx = char_width = space;
} else {
char_bbox = T1_GetCharBBox(*f_ind, str[i]);
char_width = T1_GetCharWidth(*f_ind, str[i]);
}
amount_kern = i ? T1_GetKerning(*f_ind, str[i - 1], str[i]) : 0;
/* Transfer character bounding box to right place */
x1 = new_x(char_bbox.llx, char_bbox.lly) + cur_x;
y1 = new_y(char_bbox.llx, char_bbox.lly) + cur_y;
x2 = new_x(char_bbox.llx, char_bbox.ury) + cur_x;
y2 = new_y(char_bbox.llx, char_bbox.ury) + cur_y;
x3 = new_x(char_bbox.urx, char_bbox.ury) + cur_x;
y3 = new_y(char_bbox.urx, char_bbox.ury) + cur_y;
x4 = new_x(char_bbox.urx, char_bbox.lly) + cur_x;
y4 = new_y(char_bbox.urx, char_bbox.lly) + cur_y;
/* Find min & max values and compare them with current bounding box */
str_bbox.llx = min(str_bbox.llx, min(x1, min(x2, min(x3, x4))));
str_bbox.lly = min(str_bbox.lly, min(y1, min(y2, min(y3, y4))));
str_bbox.urx = max(str_bbox.urx, max(x1, max(x2, max(x3, x4))));
str_bbox.ury = max(str_bbox.ury, max(y1, max(y2, max(y3, y4))));
/* Move to the next base point */
dx = new_x(char_width + add_width + amount_kern, 0);
dy = new_y(char_width + add_width + amount_kern, 0);
cur_x += dx;
cur_y += dy;
/*
printf("%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\t%d\n", x1, y1, x2, y2, x3, y3, x4, y4, char_bbox.llx, char_bbox.lly, char_bbox.urx, char_bbox.ury, char_width, amount_kern, cur_x, cur_y, dx, dy);
*/
}
} else {
str_bbox = T1_GetStringBBox(*f_ind, str, str_len, space, T1_KERNING);
}
if (T1_errno) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
array_init(return_value);
/*
printf("%d %d %d %d\n", str_bbox.llx, str_bbox.lly, str_bbox.urx, str_bbox.ury);
*/
add_next_index_long(return_value, (int) ceil(((double) str_bbox.llx)*sz/1000));
add_next_index_long(return_value, (int) ceil(((double) str_bbox.lly)*sz/1000));
add_next_index_long(return_value, (int) ceil(((double) str_bbox.urx)*sz/1000));
add_next_index_long(return_value, (int) ceil(((double) str_bbox.ury)*sz/1000));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 21,528
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::ShowAboutConflictsTab() {
UserMetrics::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("AboutConflicts"), profile_);
ShowSingletonTab(GURL(chrome::kChromeUIConflictsURL), false);
}
Commit Message: Rename the TabContentWrapper pieces to be "TabHelper"s. (Except for the PasswordManager... for now.) Also, just pre-create them up-front. It saves us effort, as they're all going to be eventually created anyway, so being lazy saves us nothing and creates headaches since the rules about what can be lazy differ from feature to feature.
BUG=71097
TEST=zero visible change
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6480117
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@75170 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,345
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int qeth_set_access_ctrl_online(struct qeth_card *card, int fallback)
{
int rc = 0;
QETH_CARD_TEXT(card, 4, "setactlo");
if ((card->info.type == QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSD ||
card->info.type == QETH_CARD_TYPE_OSX) &&
qeth_adp_supported(card, IPA_SETADP_SET_ACCESS_CONTROL)) {
rc = qeth_setadpparms_set_access_ctrl(card,
card->options.isolation, fallback);
if (rc) {
QETH_DBF_MESSAGE(3,
"IPA(SET_ACCESS_CTRL,%s,%d) sent failed\n",
card->gdev->dev.kobj.name,
rc);
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
} else if (card->options.isolation != ISOLATION_MODE_NONE) {
card->options.isolation = ISOLATION_MODE_NONE;
dev_err(&card->gdev->dev, "Adapter does not "
"support QDIO data connection isolation\n");
rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,800
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TestBrowserWindow::IsVisible() const {
return true;
}
Commit Message: Mac: turn popups into new tabs while in fullscreen.
It's platform convention to show popups as new tabs while in
non-HTML5 fullscreen. (Popups cause tabs to lose HTML5 fullscreen.)
This was implemented for Cocoa in a BrowserWindow override, but
it makes sense to just stick it into Browser and remove a ton
of override code put in just to support this.
BUG=858929, 868416
TEST=as in bugs
Change-Id: I43471f242813ec1159d9c690bab73dab3e610b7d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1153455
Reviewed-by: Sidney San Martín <sdy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#578755}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 3,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static union _zend_function *row_get_ctor(zval *object TSRMLS_DC)
{
static zend_internal_function ctor = {0};
ctor.type = ZEND_INTERNAL_FUNCTION;
ctor.function_name = "__construct";
ctor.scope = pdo_row_ce;
ctor.handler = ZEND_FN(dbstmt_constructor);
ctor.fn_flags = ZEND_ACC_PUBLIC;
return (union _zend_function*)&ctor;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 29,558
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ptaCopy(PTA *pta)
{
l_int32 i;
l_float32 x, y;
PTA *npta;
PROCNAME("ptaCopy");
if (!pta)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("pta not defined", procName, NULL);
if ((npta = ptaCreate(pta->nalloc)) == NULL)
return (PTA *)ERROR_PTR("npta not made", procName, NULL);
for (i = 0; i < pta->n; i++) {
ptaGetPt(pta, i, &x, &y);
ptaAddPt(npta, x, y);
}
return npta;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 22,226
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int __init __weak arch_probe_nr_irqs(void)
{
return NR_IRQS_LEGACY;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace
Pull tracing fixes from Steven Rostedt:
"This contains a few fixes and a clean up.
- a bad merge caused an "endif" to go in the wrong place in
scripts/Makefile.build
- softirq tracing fix for tracing that corrupts lockdep and causes a
false splat
- histogram documentation typo fixes
- fix a bad memory reference when passing in no filter to the filter
code
- simplify code by using the swap macro instead of open coding the
swap"
* tag 'trace-v4.18-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rostedt/linux-trace:
tracing: Fix SKIP_STACK_VALIDATION=1 build due to bad merge with -mrecord-mcount
tracing: Fix some errors in histogram documentation
tracing: Use swap macro in update_max_tr
softirq: Reorder trace_softirqs_on to prevent lockdep splat
tracing: Check for no filter when processing event filters
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 7,108
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsOffscreenBufferMultisampled() const {
return offscreen_target_samples_ > 0;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 24,071
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: inline void Splash::pipeInit(SplashPipe *pipe, int x, int y,
SplashPattern *pattern, SplashColorPtr cSrc,
SplashCoord aInput, GBool usesShape,
GBool nonIsolatedGroup) {
pipeSetXY(pipe, x, y);
pipe->pattern = NULL;
if (pattern) {
if (pattern->isStatic()) {
pattern->getColor(x, y, pipe->cSrcVal);
} else {
pipe->pattern = pattern;
}
pipe->cSrc = pipe->cSrcVal;
} else {
pipe->cSrc = cSrc;
}
pipe->aInput = aInput;
if (!state->softMask) {
if (usesShape) {
pipe->aInput *= 255;
} else {
pipe->aSrc = (Guchar)splashRound(pipe->aInput * 255);
}
}
pipe->usesShape = usesShape;
if (aInput == 1 && !state->softMask && !usesShape &&
!state->inNonIsolatedGroup) {
pipe->noTransparency = gTrue;
} else {
pipe->noTransparency = gFalse;
}
if (pipe->noTransparency) {
pipe->resultColorCtrl = pipeResultColorNoAlphaBlend[bitmap->mode];
} else if (!state->blendFunc) {
pipe->resultColorCtrl = pipeResultColorAlphaNoBlend[bitmap->mode];
} else {
pipe->resultColorCtrl = pipeResultColorAlphaBlend[bitmap->mode];
}
if (nonIsolatedGroup) {
pipe->nonIsolatedGroup = splashColorModeNComps[bitmap->mode];
} else {
pipe->nonIsolatedGroup = 0;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 12,918
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::ProcessId CoordinatorImpl::GetProcessIdForClientIdentity(
service_manager::Identity identity) const {
DCHECK(identity.IsValid());
return process_map_->GetProcessId(identity);
}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 8,020
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void restore_nameidata(void)
{
struct nameidata *now = current->nameidata, *old = now->saved;
current->nameidata = old;
if (old)
old->total_link_count = now->total_link_count;
if (now->stack != now->internal)
kfree(now->stack);
}
Commit Message: vfs: rename: check backing inode being equal
If a file is renamed to a hardlink of itself POSIX specifies that rename(2)
should do nothing and return success.
This condition is checked in vfs_rename(). However it won't detect hard
links on overlayfs where these are given separate inodes on the overlayfs
layer.
Overlayfs itself detects this condition and returns success without doing
anything, but then vfs_rename() will proceed as if this was a successful
rename (detach_mounts(), d_move()).
The correct thing to do is to detect this condition before even calling
into overlayfs. This patch does this by calling vfs_select_inode() to get
the underlying inodes.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 607
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int register_atmdevice_notifier(struct notifier_block *nb)
{
return atomic_notifier_chain_register(&atm_dev_notify_chain, nb);
}
Commit Message: atm: update msg_namelen in vcc_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about vcc_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was set.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 1,563
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Layer::SetChildren(const LayerList& children) {
DCHECK(IsPropertyChangeAllowed());
if (children == children_)
return;
RemoveAllChildren();
for (size_t i = 0; i < children.size(); ++i)
AddChild(children[i]);
}
Commit Message: Removed pinch viewport scroll offset distribution
The associated change in Blink makes the pinch viewport a proper
ScrollableArea meaning the normal path for synchronizing layer scroll
offsets is used.
This is a 2 sided patch, the other CL:
https://codereview.chromium.org/199253002/
BUG=349941
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/210543002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@260105 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 909
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFlexibleBox::alignFlexLines(Vector<LineContext>& lineContexts)
{
if (!isMultiline() || style()->alignContent() == AlignContentFlexStart)
return;
LayoutUnit availableCrossAxisSpace = crossAxisContentExtent();
for (size_t i = 0; i < lineContexts.size(); ++i)
availableCrossAxisSpace -= lineContexts[i].crossAxisExtent;
RenderBox* child = m_orderIterator.first();
LayoutUnit lineOffset = initialAlignContentOffset(availableCrossAxisSpace, style()->alignContent(), lineContexts.size());
for (unsigned lineNumber = 0; lineNumber < lineContexts.size(); ++lineNumber) {
lineContexts[lineNumber].crossAxisOffset += lineOffset;
for (size_t childNumber = 0; childNumber < lineContexts[lineNumber].numberOfChildren; ++childNumber, child = m_orderIterator.next())
adjustAlignmentForChild(child, lineOffset);
if (style()->alignContent() == AlignContentStretch && availableCrossAxisSpace > 0)
lineContexts[lineNumber].crossAxisExtent += availableCrossAxisSpace / static_cast<unsigned>(lineContexts.size());
lineOffset += alignContentSpaceBetweenChildren(availableCrossAxisSpace, style()->alignContent(), lineContexts.size());
}
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 19,124
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: YY_BUFFER_STATE re_yy_scan_string (yyconst char * yystr , yyscan_t yyscanner)
{
return re_yy_scan_bytes(yystr,strlen(yystr) ,yyscanner);
}
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 13,375
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsAllowedScript(const Extension* extension, const GURL& url) {
return IsAllowedScript(extension, url, -1);
}
Commit Message: Call CanCaptureVisiblePage in page capture API.
Currently the pageCapture permission allows access
to arbitrary local files and chrome:// pages which
can be a security concern. In order to address this,
the page capture API needs to be changed similar to
the captureVisibleTab API. The API will now only allow
extensions to capture otherwise-restricted URLs if the
user has granted activeTab. In addition, file:// URLs are
only capturable with the "Allow on file URLs" option enabled.
Bug: 893087
Change-Id: I6d6225a3efb70fc033e2e1c031c633869afac624
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1330689
Commit-Queue: Bettina Dea <bdea@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Varun Khaneja <vakh@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#615248}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 13,731
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __cpuinit per_cpu_trap_init(void)
{
unsigned int cpu = smp_processor_id();
unsigned int status_set = ST0_CU0;
unsigned int hwrena = cpu_hwrena_impl_bits;
#ifdef CONFIG_MIPS_MT_SMTC
int secondaryTC = 0;
int bootTC = (cpu == 0);
/*
* Only do per_cpu_trap_init() for first TC of Each VPE.
* Note that this hack assumes that the SMTC init code
* assigns TCs consecutively and in ascending order.
*/
if (((read_c0_tcbind() & TCBIND_CURTC) != 0) &&
((read_c0_tcbind() & TCBIND_CURVPE) == cpu_data[cpu - 1].vpe_id))
secondaryTC = 1;
#endif /* CONFIG_MIPS_MT_SMTC */
/*
* Disable coprocessors and select 32-bit or 64-bit addressing
* and the 16/32 or 32/32 FPR register model. Reset the BEV
* flag that some firmware may have left set and the TS bit (for
* IP27). Set XX for ISA IV code to work.
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
status_set |= ST0_FR|ST0_KX|ST0_SX|ST0_UX;
#endif
if (current_cpu_data.isa_level == MIPS_CPU_ISA_IV)
status_set |= ST0_XX;
if (cpu_has_dsp)
status_set |= ST0_MX;
change_c0_status(ST0_CU|ST0_MX|ST0_RE|ST0_FR|ST0_BEV|ST0_TS|ST0_KX|ST0_SX|ST0_UX,
status_set);
if (cpu_has_mips_r2)
hwrena |= 0x0000000f;
if (!noulri && cpu_has_userlocal)
hwrena |= (1 << 29);
if (hwrena)
write_c0_hwrena(hwrena);
#ifdef CONFIG_MIPS_MT_SMTC
if (!secondaryTC) {
#endif /* CONFIG_MIPS_MT_SMTC */
if (cpu_has_veic || cpu_has_vint) {
unsigned long sr = set_c0_status(ST0_BEV);
write_c0_ebase(ebase);
write_c0_status(sr);
/* Setting vector spacing enables EI/VI mode */
change_c0_intctl(0x3e0, VECTORSPACING);
}
if (cpu_has_divec) {
if (cpu_has_mipsmt) {
unsigned int vpflags = dvpe();
set_c0_cause(CAUSEF_IV);
evpe(vpflags);
} else
set_c0_cause(CAUSEF_IV);
}
/*
* Before R2 both interrupt numbers were fixed to 7, so on R2 only:
*
* o read IntCtl.IPTI to determine the timer interrupt
* o read IntCtl.IPPCI to determine the performance counter interrupt
*/
if (cpu_has_mips_r2) {
cp0_compare_irq_shift = CAUSEB_TI - CAUSEB_IP;
cp0_compare_irq = (read_c0_intctl() >> INTCTLB_IPTI) & 7;
cp0_perfcount_irq = (read_c0_intctl() >> INTCTLB_IPPCI) & 7;
if (cp0_perfcount_irq == cp0_compare_irq)
cp0_perfcount_irq = -1;
} else {
cp0_compare_irq = CP0_LEGACY_COMPARE_IRQ;
cp0_compare_irq_shift = cp0_compare_irq;
cp0_perfcount_irq = -1;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_MIPS_MT_SMTC
}
#endif /* CONFIG_MIPS_MT_SMTC */
cpu_data[cpu].asid_cache = ASID_FIRST_VERSION;
atomic_inc(&init_mm.mm_count);
current->active_mm = &init_mm;
BUG_ON(current->mm);
enter_lazy_tlb(&init_mm, current);
#ifdef CONFIG_MIPS_MT_SMTC
if (bootTC) {
#endif /* CONFIG_MIPS_MT_SMTC */
cpu_cache_init();
tlb_init();
#ifdef CONFIG_MIPS_MT_SMTC
} else if (!secondaryTC) {
/*
* First TC in non-boot VPE must do subset of tlb_init()
* for MMU countrol registers.
*/
write_c0_pagemask(PM_DEFAULT_MASK);
write_c0_wired(0);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_MIPS_MT_SMTC */
TLBMISS_HANDLER_SETUP();
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,638
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint16_t read_u16(uint8_t *data, size_t offset)
{
return ((data[offset] & 0xFF) << 8) | (data[offset + 1] & 0xFF);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,967
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ForwardToJavaWebContentsRegistry(
mojo::InterfaceRequest<Interface> request,
content::RenderFrameHost* render_frame_host) {
content::WebContents* contents =
content::WebContents::FromRenderFrameHost(render_frame_host);
if (contents)
contents->GetJavaInterfaces()->GetInterface(std::move(request));
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,972
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t tpm_transmit(struct tpm_chip *chip, const char *buf,
size_t bufsiz)
{
ssize_t rc;
u32 count, ordinal;
unsigned long stop;
count = be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (buf + 2)));
ordinal = be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (buf + 6)));
if (count == 0)
return -ENODATA;
if (count > bufsiz) {
dev_err(chip->dev,
"invalid count value %x %zx \n", count, bufsiz);
return -E2BIG;
}
mutex_lock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
if ((rc = chip->vendor.send(chip, (u8 *) buf, count)) < 0) {
dev_err(chip->dev,
"tpm_transmit: tpm_send: error %zd\n", rc);
goto out;
}
if (chip->vendor.irq)
goto out_recv;
stop = jiffies + tpm_calc_ordinal_duration(chip, ordinal);
do {
u8 status = chip->vendor.status(chip);
if ((status & chip->vendor.req_complete_mask) ==
chip->vendor.req_complete_val)
goto out_recv;
if ((status == chip->vendor.req_canceled)) {
dev_err(chip->dev, "Operation Canceled\n");
rc = -ECANCELED;
goto out;
}
msleep(TPM_TIMEOUT); /* CHECK */
rmb();
} while (time_before(jiffies, stop));
chip->vendor.cancel(chip);
dev_err(chip->dev, "Operation Timed out\n");
rc = -ETIME;
goto out;
out_recv:
rc = chip->vendor.recv(chip, (u8 *) buf, bufsiz);
if (rc < 0)
dev_err(chip->dev,
"tpm_transmit: tpm_recv: error %zd\n", rc);
out:
mutex_unlock(&chip->tpm_mutex);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: char/tpm: Fix unitialized usage of data buffer
This patch fixes information leakage to the userspace by initializing
the data buffer to zero.
Reported-by: Peter Huewe <huewe.external@infineon.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <huewe.external@infineon.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Selhorst <m.selhorst@sirrix.com>
[ Also removed the silly "* sizeof(u8)". If that isn't 1, we have way
deeper problems than a simple multiplication can fix. - Linus ]
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 19,240
|
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