instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SetOnAuthRequired(
const base::Callback<void(SocketStreamEvent*)>& callback) {
on_auth_required_ = callback;
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 22,798
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ArthurOutputDev::fill(GfxState *state)
{
m_painter->fillPath( convertPath( state, state->getPath(), Qt::WindingFill ), m_currentBrush );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,719
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int index_entry_create(
git_index_entry **out,
git_repository *repo,
const char *path,
bool from_workdir)
{
size_t pathlen = strlen(path), alloclen;
struct entry_internal *entry;
unsigned int path_valid_flags = GIT_PATH_REJECT_INDEX_DEFAULTS;
/* always reject placing `.git` in the index and directory traversal.
* when requested, disallow platform-specific filenames and upgrade to
* the platform-specific `.git` tests (eg, `git~1`, etc).
*/
if (from_workdir)
path_valid_flags |= GIT_PATH_REJECT_WORKDIR_DEFAULTS;
if (!git_path_isvalid(repo, path, path_valid_flags)) {
giterr_set(GITERR_INDEX, "invalid path: '%s'", path);
return -1;
}
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&alloclen, sizeof(struct entry_internal), pathlen);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC_ADD(&alloclen, alloclen, 1);
entry = git__calloc(1, alloclen);
GITERR_CHECK_ALLOC(entry);
entry->pathlen = pathlen;
memcpy(entry->path, path, pathlen);
entry->entry.path = entry->path;
*out = (git_index_entry *)entry;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: index: convert `read_entry` to return entry size via an out-param
The function `read_entry` does not conform to our usual coding style of
returning stuff via the out parameter and to use the return value for
reporting errors. Due to most of our code conforming to that pattern, it
has become quite natural for us to actually return `-1` in case there is
any error, which has also slipped in with commit 5625d86b9 (index:
support index v4, 2016-05-17). As the function returns an `size_t` only,
though, the return value is wrapped around, causing the caller of
`read_tree` to continue with an invalid index entry. Ultimately, this
can lead to a double-free.
Improve code and fix the bug by converting the function to return the
index entry size via an out parameter and only using the return value to
indicate errors.
Reported-by: Krishna Ram Prakash R <krp@gtux.in>
Reported-by: Vivek Parikh <viv0411.parikh@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 29,790
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: off_t size_autodetect(int fhandle) {
off_t es;
u64 bytes;
struct stat stat_buf;
int error;
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H
#ifdef BLKGETSIZE64
DEBUG("looking for export size with ioctl BLKGETSIZE64\n");
if (!ioctl(fhandle, BLKGETSIZE64, &bytes) && bytes) {
return (off_t)bytes;
}
#endif /* BLKGETSIZE64 */
#endif /* HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H */
#endif /* HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H */
DEBUG("looking for fhandle size with fstat\n");
stat_buf.st_size = 0;
error = fstat(fhandle, &stat_buf);
if (!error) {
if(stat_buf.st_size > 0)
return (off_t)stat_buf.st_size;
} else {
err("fstat failed: %m");
}
DEBUG("looking for fhandle size with lseek SEEK_END\n");
es = lseek(fhandle, (off_t)0, SEEK_END);
if (es > ((off_t)0)) {
return es;
} else {
DEBUG2("lseek failed: %d", errno==EBADF?1:(errno==ESPIPE?2:(errno==EINVAL?3:4)));
}
err("Could not find size of exported block device: %m");
return OFFT_MAX;
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer size checking
Yes, this means we've re-introduced CVE-2005-3534. Sigh.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,329
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void bn_GF2m_mul_1x1(BN_ULONG *r1, BN_ULONG *r0, const BN_ULONG a,
const BN_ULONG b)
{
register BN_ULONG h, l, s;
BN_ULONG tab[16], top3b = a >> 61;
register BN_ULONG a1, a2, a4, a8;
a1 = a & (0x1FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFULL);
a2 = a1 << 1;
a4 = a2 << 1;
a8 = a4 << 1;
tab[0] = 0;
tab[1] = a1;
tab[2] = a2;
tab[3] = a1 ^ a2;
tab[4] = a4;
tab[5] = a1 ^ a4;
tab[6] = a2 ^ a4;
tab[7] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a4;
tab[8] = a8;
tab[9] = a1 ^ a8;
tab[10] = a2 ^ a8;
tab[11] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a8;
tab[12] = a4 ^ a8;
tab[13] = a1 ^ a4 ^ a8;
tab[14] = a2 ^ a4 ^ a8;
tab[15] = a1 ^ a2 ^ a4 ^ a8;
s = tab[b & 0xF];
l = s;
s = tab[b >> 4 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 4;
h = s >> 60;
s = tab[b >> 8 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 8;
h ^= s >> 56;
s = tab[b >> 12 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 12;
h ^= s >> 52;
s = tab[b >> 16 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 16;
h ^= s >> 48;
s = tab[b >> 20 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 20;
h ^= s >> 44;
s = tab[b >> 24 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 24;
h ^= s >> 40;
s = tab[b >> 28 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 28;
h ^= s >> 36;
s = tab[b >> 32 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 32;
h ^= s >> 32;
s = tab[b >> 36 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 36;
h ^= s >> 28;
s = tab[b >> 40 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 40;
h ^= s >> 24;
s = tab[b >> 44 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 44;
h ^= s >> 20;
s = tab[b >> 48 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 48;
h ^= s >> 16;
s = tab[b >> 52 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 52;
h ^= s >> 12;
s = tab[b >> 56 & 0xF];
l ^= s << 56;
h ^= s >> 8;
s = tab[b >> 60];
l ^= s << 60;
h ^= s >> 4;
/* compensate for the top three bits of a */
if (top3b & 01) {
l ^= b << 61;
h ^= b >> 3;
}
if (top3b & 02) {
l ^= b << 62;
h ^= b >> 2;
}
if (top3b & 04) {
l ^= b << 63;
h ^= b >> 1;
}
*r1 = h;
*r0 = l;
}
Commit Message: bn/bn_gf2m.c: avoid infinite loop wich malformed ECParamters.
CVE-2015-1788
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 1,835
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: test_path_simplify (void)
{
static const struct {
const char *test, *result;
enum url_scheme scheme;
bool should_modify;
} tests[] = {
{ "", "", SCHEME_HTTP, false },
{ ".", "", SCHEME_HTTP, true },
{ "./", "", SCHEME_HTTP, true },
{ "..", "", SCHEME_HTTP, true },
{ "../", "", SCHEME_HTTP, true },
{ "..", "..", SCHEME_FTP, false },
{ "../", "../", SCHEME_FTP, false },
{ "foo", "foo", SCHEME_HTTP, false },
{ "foo/bar", "foo/bar", SCHEME_HTTP, false },
{ "foo///bar", "foo///bar", SCHEME_HTTP, false },
{ "foo/.", "foo/", SCHEME_HTTP, true },
{ "foo/./", "foo/", SCHEME_HTTP, true },
{ "foo./", "foo./", SCHEME_HTTP, false },
{ "foo/../bar", "bar", SCHEME_HTTP, true },
{ "foo/../bar/", "bar/", SCHEME_HTTP, true },
{ "foo/bar/..", "foo/", SCHEME_HTTP, true },
{ "foo/bar/../x", "foo/x", SCHEME_HTTP, true },
{ "foo/bar/../x/", "foo/x/", SCHEME_HTTP, true },
{ "foo/..", "", SCHEME_HTTP, true },
{ "foo/../..", "", SCHEME_HTTP, true },
{ "foo/../../..", "", SCHEME_HTTP, true },
{ "foo/../../bar/../../baz", "baz", SCHEME_HTTP, true },
{ "foo/../..", "..", SCHEME_FTP, true },
{ "foo/../../..", "../..", SCHEME_FTP, true },
{ "foo/../../bar/../../baz", "../../baz", SCHEME_FTP, true },
{ "a/b/../../c", "c", SCHEME_HTTP, true },
{ "./a/../b", "b", SCHEME_HTTP, true }
};
unsigned i;
for (i = 0; i < countof (tests); i++)
{
const char *message;
const char *test = tests[i].test;
const char *expected_result = tests[i].result;
enum url_scheme scheme = tests[i].scheme;
bool expected_change = tests[i].should_modify;
message = run_test (test, expected_result, scheme, expected_change);
if (message) return message;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-93
| 0
| 18,032
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int dm_grab_bdev_for_ioctl(struct mapped_device *md,
struct block_device **bdev,
fmode_t *mode)
{
struct dm_target *tgt;
struct dm_table *map;
int srcu_idx, r;
retry:
r = -ENOTTY;
map = dm_get_live_table(md, &srcu_idx);
if (!map || !dm_table_get_size(map))
goto out;
/* We only support devices that have a single target */
if (dm_table_get_num_targets(map) != 1)
goto out;
tgt = dm_table_get_target(map, 0);
if (!tgt->type->prepare_ioctl)
goto out;
if (dm_suspended_md(md)) {
r = -EAGAIN;
goto out;
}
r = tgt->type->prepare_ioctl(tgt, bdev, mode);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
bdgrab(*bdev);
dm_put_live_table(md, srcu_idx);
return r;
out:
dm_put_live_table(md, srcu_idx);
if (r == -ENOTCONN && !fatal_signal_pending(current)) {
msleep(10);
goto retry;
}
return r;
}
Commit Message: dm: fix race between dm_get_from_kobject() and __dm_destroy()
The following BUG_ON was hit when testing repeat creation and removal of
DM devices:
kernel BUG at drivers/md/dm.c:2919!
CPU: 7 PID: 750 Comm: systemd-udevd Not tainted 4.1.44
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81649e8b>] dm_get_from_kobject+0x34/0x3a
[<ffffffff81650ef1>] dm_attr_show+0x2b/0x5e
[<ffffffff817b46d1>] ? mutex_lock+0x26/0x44
[<ffffffff811df7f5>] sysfs_kf_seq_show+0x83/0xcf
[<ffffffff811de257>] kernfs_seq_show+0x23/0x25
[<ffffffff81199118>] seq_read+0x16f/0x325
[<ffffffff811de994>] kernfs_fop_read+0x3a/0x13f
[<ffffffff8117b625>] __vfs_read+0x26/0x9d
[<ffffffff8130eb59>] ? security_file_permission+0x3c/0x44
[<ffffffff8117bdb8>] ? rw_verify_area+0x83/0xd9
[<ffffffff8117be9d>] vfs_read+0x8f/0xcf
[<ffffffff81193e34>] ? __fdget_pos+0x12/0x41
[<ffffffff8117c686>] SyS_read+0x4b/0x76
[<ffffffff817b606e>] system_call_fastpath+0x12/0x71
The bug can be easily triggered, if an extra delay (e.g. 10ms) is added
between the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and dm_get() in
dm_get_from_kobject().
To fix it, we need to ensure the test of DMF_FREEING & DMF_DELETING and
dm_get() are done in an atomic way, so _minor_lock is used.
The other callers of dm_get() have also been checked to be OK: some
callers invoke dm_get() under _minor_lock, some callers invoke it under
_hash_lock, and dm_start_request() invoke it after increasing
md->open_count.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Hou Tao <houtao1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 16,875
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void server_connect_callback_readpipe(SERVER_REC *server)
{
RESOLVED_IP_REC iprec;
IPADDR *ip;
const char *errormsg;
char *servername = NULL;
g_source_remove(server->connect_tag);
server->connect_tag = -1;
net_gethostbyname_return(server->connect_pipe[0], &iprec);
g_io_channel_close(server->connect_pipe[0]);
g_io_channel_unref(server->connect_pipe[0]);
g_io_channel_close(server->connect_pipe[1]);
g_io_channel_unref(server->connect_pipe[1]);
server->connect_pipe[0] = NULL;
server->connect_pipe[1] = NULL;
/* figure out if we should use IPv4 or v6 address */
if (iprec.error != 0) {
/* error */
ip = NULL;
} else if (server->connrec->family == AF_INET) {
/* force IPv4 connection */
ip = iprec.ip4.family == 0 ? NULL : &iprec.ip4;
servername = iprec.host4;
} else if (server->connrec->family == AF_INET6) {
/* force IPv6 connection */
ip = iprec.ip6.family == 0 ? NULL : &iprec.ip6;
servername = iprec.host6;
} else {
/* pick the one that was found, or if both do it like
/SET resolve_prefer_ipv6 says. */
if (iprec.ip4.family == 0 ||
(iprec.ip6.family != 0 &&
settings_get_bool("resolve_prefer_ipv6"))) {
ip = &iprec.ip6;
servername = iprec.host6;
} else {
ip = &iprec.ip4;
servername = iprec.host4;
}
}
if (ip != NULL) {
/* host lookup ok */
if (servername) {
g_free(server->connrec->address);
server->connrec->address = g_strdup(servername);
}
server_real_connect(server, ip, NULL);
errormsg = NULL;
} else {
if (iprec.error == 0 || net_hosterror_notfound(iprec.error)) {
/* IP wasn't found for the host, don't try to
reconnect back to this server */
server->dns_error = TRUE;
}
if (iprec.error == 0) {
/* forced IPv4 or IPv6 address but it wasn't found */
errormsg = server->connrec->family == AF_INET ?
"IPv4 address not found for host" :
"IPv6 address not found for host";
} else {
/* gethostbyname() failed */
errormsg = iprec.errorstr != NULL ? iprec.errorstr :
"Host lookup failed";
}
server->connection_lost = TRUE;
server_connect_failed(server, errormsg);
}
g_free(iprec.errorstr);
g_free(iprec.host4);
g_free(iprec.host6);
}
Commit Message: Check if an SSL certificate matches the hostname of the server we are connecting to
git-svn-id: http://svn.irssi.org/repos/irssi/trunk@5104 dbcabf3a-b0e7-0310-adc4-f8d773084564
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,059
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static sk_sp<SkImage> premulSkImageToUnPremul(SkImage* input) {
SkImageInfo info = SkImageInfo::Make(input->width(), input->height(),
kN32_SkColorType, kUnpremul_SkAlphaType);
RefPtr<Uint8Array> dstPixels = copySkImageData(input, info);
if (!dstPixels)
return nullptr;
return newSkImageFromRaster(
info, std::move(dstPixels),
static_cast<size_t>(input->width()) * info.bytesPerPixel());
}
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 693
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void limitedWithMissingDefaultAttributeAttributeSetterCallback(v8::Local<v8::String>, v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("Blink", "DOMSetter");
CustomElementCallbackDispatcher::CallbackDeliveryScope deliveryScope;
TestObjectV8Internal::limitedWithMissingDefaultAttributeAttributeSetter(jsValue, info);
TRACE_EVENT_SET_SAMPLING_STATE("V8", "V8Execution");
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,554
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::Optional<download::DownloadEntry> DownloadManagerImpl::GetInProgressEntry(
download::DownloadItemImpl* download) {
return in_progress_manager_->GetInProgressEntry(download);
}
Commit Message: Early return if a download Id is already used when creating a download
This is protect against download Id overflow and use-after-free
issue.
BUG=958533
Change-Id: I2c183493cb09106686df9822b3987bfb95bcf720
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1591485
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Min Qin <qinmin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#656910}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,102
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void srpt_release_channel_work(struct work_struct *w)
{
struct srpt_rdma_ch *ch;
struct srpt_device *sdev;
struct se_session *se_sess;
ch = container_of(w, struct srpt_rdma_ch, release_work);
pr_debug("ch = %p; ch->sess = %p; release_done = %p\n", ch, ch->sess,
ch->release_done);
sdev = ch->sport->sdev;
BUG_ON(!sdev);
se_sess = ch->sess;
BUG_ON(!se_sess);
target_wait_for_sess_cmds(se_sess);
transport_deregister_session_configfs(se_sess);
transport_deregister_session(se_sess);
ch->sess = NULL;
ib_destroy_cm_id(ch->cm_id);
srpt_destroy_ch_ib(ch);
srpt_free_ioctx_ring((struct srpt_ioctx **)ch->ioctx_ring,
ch->sport->sdev, ch->rq_size,
ch->rsp_size, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
spin_lock_irq(&sdev->spinlock);
list_del(&ch->list);
spin_unlock_irq(&sdev->spinlock);
if (ch->release_done)
complete(ch->release_done);
wake_up(&sdev->ch_releaseQ);
kfree(ch);
}
Commit Message: IB/srpt: Simplify srpt_handle_tsk_mgmt()
Let the target core check task existence instead of the SRP target
driver. Additionally, let the target core check the validity of the
task management request instead of the ib_srpt driver.
This patch fixes the following kernel crash:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000001
IP: [<ffffffffa0565f37>] srpt_handle_new_iu+0x6d7/0x790 [ib_srpt]
Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP
Call Trace:
[<ffffffffa05660ce>] srpt_process_completion+0xde/0x570 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffffa056669f>] srpt_compl_thread+0x13f/0x160 [ib_srpt]
[<ffffffff8109726f>] kthread+0xcf/0xe0
[<ffffffff81613cfc>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@sandisk.com>
Fixes: 3e4f574857ee ("ib_srpt: Convert TMR path to target_submit_tmr")
Tested-by: Alex Estrin <alex.estrin@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Cc: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagig@mellanox.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 17,701
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::AccessibilityScrollToPoint(
int acc_obj_id, gfx::Point point) {
Send(new AccessibilityMsg_ScrollToPoint(
GetRoutingID(), acc_obj_id, point));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,730
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsZipArchiverUnpackerEnabled() {
return !base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
kDisableZipArchiverUnpacker);
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 20,530
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AudioOutputDevice::PauseOnIOThread(bool flush) {
DCHECK(message_loop()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (stream_id_ && is_started_) {
ipc_->PauseStream(stream_id_);
if (flush)
ipc_->FlushStream(stream_id_);
} else {
play_on_start_ = false;
}
}
Commit Message: Revert r157378 as it caused WebRTC to dereference null pointers when restarting a call.
I've kept my unit test changes intact but disabled until I get a proper fix.
BUG=147499,150805
TBR=henrika
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/10946040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@157626 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 14,017
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cac_apdu_io(sc_card_t *card, int ins, int p1, int p2,
const u8 * sendbuf, size_t sendbuflen, u8 ** recvbuf,
size_t * recvbuflen)
{
int r;
sc_apdu_t apdu;
u8 rbufinitbuf[CAC_MAX_SIZE];
u8 *rbuf;
size_t rbuflen;
unsigned int apdu_case = SC_APDU_CASE_1;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"%02x %02x %02x %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u : %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u\n",
ins, p1, p2, sendbuflen, card->max_send_size,
card->max_recv_size);
rbuf = rbufinitbuf;
rbuflen = sizeof(rbufinitbuf);
/* if caller provided a buffer and length */
if (recvbuf && *recvbuf && recvbuflen && *recvbuflen) {
rbuf = *recvbuf;
rbuflen = *recvbuflen;
}
if (recvbuf) {
if (sendbuf)
apdu_case = SC_APDU_CASE_4_SHORT;
else
apdu_case = SC_APDU_CASE_2_SHORT;
} else if (sendbuf)
apdu_case = SC_APDU_CASE_3_SHORT;
sc_format_apdu(card, &apdu, apdu_case, ins, p1, p2);
apdu.lc = sendbuflen;
apdu.datalen = sendbuflen;
apdu.data = sendbuf;
if (recvbuf) {
apdu.resp = rbuf;
apdu.le = (rbuflen > 255) ? 255 : rbuflen;
apdu.resplen = rbuflen;
} else {
apdu.resp = rbuf;
apdu.le = 0;
apdu.resplen = 0;
}
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"calling sc_transmit_apdu flags=%lx le=%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u, resplen=%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u, resp=%p",
apdu.flags, apdu.le, apdu.resplen, apdu.resp);
/* with new adpu.c and chaining, this actually reads the whole object */
r = sc_transmit_apdu(card, &apdu);
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"result r=%d apdu.resplen=%"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u sw1=%02x sw2=%02x",
r, apdu.resplen, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
if (r < 0) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,"Transmit failed");
goto err;
}
r = sc_check_sw(card, apdu.sw1, apdu.sw2);
if (r < 0) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "Card returned error ");
goto err;
}
if (recvbuflen) {
if (recvbuf && *recvbuf == NULL) {
*recvbuf = malloc(apdu.resplen);
if (*recvbuf == NULL) {
r = SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
goto err;
}
memcpy(*recvbuf, rbuf, apdu.resplen);
}
*recvbuflen = apdu.resplen;
r = *recvbuflen;
}
err:
SC_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, r);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 24,366
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AppListControllerDelegate::UninstallApp(Profile* profile,
const std::string& app_id) {
ExtensionUninstaller* uninstaller =
new ExtensionUninstaller(profile, app_id, this);
uninstaller->Run();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 13,907
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleTexSubImage2DImmediate(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::TexSubImage2DImmediate& c) {
GLboolean internal = static_cast<GLboolean>(c.internal);
if (internal == GL_TRUE && tex_image_2d_failed_)
return error::kNoError;
GLenum target = static_cast<GLenum>(c.target);
GLint level = static_cast<GLint>(c.level);
GLint xoffset = static_cast<GLint>(c.xoffset);
GLint yoffset = static_cast<GLint>(c.yoffset);
GLsizei width = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.width);
GLsizei height = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.height);
GLenum format = static_cast<GLenum>(c.format);
GLenum type = static_cast<GLenum>(c.type);
uint32 data_size;
if (!GLES2Util::ComputeImageDataSizes(
width, height, format, type, unpack_alignment_, &data_size, NULL, NULL)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
const void* pixels = GetImmediateDataAs<const void*>(
c, data_size, immediate_data_size);
if (!validators_->texture_target.IsValid(target)) {
SetGLErrorInvalidEnum("glTexSubImage2D", target, "target");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (width < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glTexSubImage2D", "width < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (height < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glTexSubImage2D", "height < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!validators_->texture_format.IsValid(format)) {
SetGLErrorInvalidEnum("glTexSubImage2D", format, "format");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!validators_->pixel_type.IsValid(type)) {
SetGLErrorInvalidEnum("glTexSubImage2D", type, "type");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (pixels == NULL) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
DoTexSubImage2D(
target, level, xoffset, yoffset, width, height, format, type, pixels);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Fix SafeAdd and SafeMultiply
BUG=145648,145544
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10916165
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@155478 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,205
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameLoader::DidExplicitOpen() {
if (!state_machine_.CommittedFirstRealDocumentLoad())
state_machine_.AdvanceTo(FrameLoaderStateMachine::kCommittedFirstRealLoad);
if (Frame* parent = frame_->Tree().Parent()) {
if ((parent->IsLocalFrame() &&
ToLocalFrame(parent)->GetDocument()->LoadEventStillNeeded()) ||
(parent->IsRemoteFrame() && parent->IsLoading())) {
progress_tracker_->ProgressStarted(document_loader_->LoadType());
}
}
frame_->GetNavigationScheduler().Cancel();
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 18,713
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool DevToolsDownloadManagerDelegate::ShouldOpenDownload(
content::DownloadItem* item,
const content::DownloadOpenDelayedCallback& callback) {
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper* download_helper =
DevToolsDownloadManagerHelper::FromWebContents(item->GetWebContents());
if (download_helper)
return true;
if (proxy_download_delegate_)
return proxy_download_delegate_->ShouldOpenDownload(item, callback);
return false;
}
Commit Message: Always mark content downloaded by devtools delegate as potentially dangerous
Bug: 805445
Change-Id: I7051f519205e178db57e23320ab979f8fa9ce38b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/894782
Commit-Queue: David Vallet <dvallet@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533215}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,105
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HTMLFormControlElement* HTMLFormControlElement::enclosingFormControlElement(Node* node)
{
for (; node; node = node->parentNode()) {
if (node->isElementNode() && toElement(node)->isFormControlElement())
return toHTMLFormControlElement(node);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 732
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Node* HTMLFormElement::elementFromPastNamesMap(const AtomicString& pastName) const
{
if (pastName.isEmpty() || !m_pastNamesMap)
return 0;
Node* node = m_pastNamesMap->get(pastName.impl());
#if !ASSERT_DISABLED
if (!node)
return 0;
ASSERT_WITH_SECURITY_IMPLICATION(toHTMLElement(node)->form() == this);
if (node->hasTagName(imgTag)) {
ASSERT_WITH_SECURITY_IMPLICATION(m_imageElements.find(node) != kNotFound);
} else if (node->hasTagName(objectTag)) {
ASSERT_WITH_SECURITY_IMPLICATION(m_associatedElements.find(toHTMLObjectElement(node)) != kNotFound);
} else {
ASSERT_WITH_SECURITY_IMPLICATION(m_associatedElements.find(toHTMLFormControlElement(node)) != kNotFound);
}
#endif
return node;
}
Commit Message: Fix a crash in HTMLFormElement::prepareForSubmission.
BUG=297478
TEST=automated with ASAN.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24910003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158428 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 15,355
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool venc_dev::venc_set_extradata(OMX_U32 extra_data, OMX_BOOL enable)
{
struct v4l2_control control;
DEBUG_PRINT_HIGH("venc_set_extradata:: %x", (int) extra_data);
if (enable == OMX_FALSE) {
/* No easy way to turn off extradata to the driver
* at the moment */
return false;
}
control.id = V4L2_CID_MPEG_VIDC_VIDEO_EXTRADATA;
switch (extra_data) {
case OMX_ExtraDataVideoEncoderSliceInfo:
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_EXTRADATA_MULTISLICE_INFO;
break;
case OMX_ExtraDataVideoEncoderMBInfo:
control.value = V4L2_MPEG_VIDC_EXTRADATA_METADATA_MBI;
break;
default:
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("Unrecognized extradata index 0x%x", (unsigned int)extra_data);
return false;
}
if (ioctl(m_nDriver_fd, VIDIOC_S_CTRL, &control)) {
DEBUG_PRINT_ERROR("ERROR: Request for setting extradata (%x) failed %d",
(unsigned int)extra_data, errno);
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: venc: add checks before accessing heap pointers
Heap pointers do not point to user virtual addresses in case
of secure session.
Set them to NULL and add checks to avoid accesing them
Bug: 28815329
Bug: 28920116
Change-Id: I94fd5808e753b58654d65e175d3857ef46ffba26
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 29,539
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int frame_worker_hook(void *arg1, void *arg2) {
FrameWorkerData *const frame_worker_data = (FrameWorkerData *)arg1;
const uint8_t *data = frame_worker_data->data;
(void)arg2;
frame_worker_data->result =
vp9_receive_compressed_data(frame_worker_data->pbi,
frame_worker_data->data_size,
&data);
frame_worker_data->data_end = data;
if (frame_worker_data->pbi->frame_parallel_decode) {
if (frame_worker_data->result != 0 ||
frame_worker_data->data + frame_worker_data->data_size - 1 > data) {
VPxWorker *const worker = frame_worker_data->pbi->frame_worker_owner;
BufferPool *const pool = frame_worker_data->pbi->common.buffer_pool;
vp9_frameworker_lock_stats(worker);
frame_worker_data->frame_context_ready = 1;
lock_buffer_pool(pool);
frame_worker_data->pbi->cur_buf->buf.corrupted = 1;
unlock_buffer_pool(pool);
frame_worker_data->pbi->need_resync = 1;
vp9_frameworker_signal_stats(worker);
vp9_frameworker_unlock_stats(worker);
return 0;
}
} else if (frame_worker_data->result != 0) {
frame_worker_data->pbi->cur_buf->buf.corrupted = 1;
frame_worker_data->pbi->need_resync = 1;
}
return !frame_worker_data->result;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE | libvpx: cherry-pick aa1c813 from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp9: Fix potential SEGV in decoder_peek_si_internal
decoder_peek_si_internal could potentially read more bytes than
what actually exists in the input buffer. We check for the buffer
size to be at least 8, but we try to read up to 10 bytes in the
worst case. A well crafted file could thus cause a segfault.
Likely change that introduced this bug was:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/#/c/70439 (git hash:
7c43fb6)
Bug: 30013856
Change-Id: If556414cb5b82472d5673e045bc185cc57bb9af3
(cherry picked from commit bd57d587c2eb743c61b049add18f9fd72bf78c33)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,527
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ViewMsg_Navigate_Type::Value GetNavigationType(
BrowserContext* browser_context, const NavigationEntryImpl& entry,
NavigationController::ReloadType reload_type) {
switch (reload_type) {
case NavigationControllerImpl::RELOAD:
return ViewMsg_Navigate_Type::RELOAD;
case NavigationControllerImpl::RELOAD_IGNORING_CACHE:
return ViewMsg_Navigate_Type::RELOAD_IGNORING_CACHE;
case NavigationControllerImpl::RELOAD_ORIGINAL_REQUEST_URL:
return ViewMsg_Navigate_Type::RELOAD_ORIGINAL_REQUEST_URL;
case NavigationControllerImpl::NO_RELOAD:
break; // Fall through to rest of function.
}
if (entry.restore_type() ==
NavigationEntryImpl::RESTORE_LAST_SESSION_EXITED_CLEANLY) {
if (entry.GetHasPostData())
return ViewMsg_Navigate_Type::RESTORE_WITH_POST;
return ViewMsg_Navigate_Type::RESTORE;
}
return ViewMsg_Navigate_Type::NORMAL;
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,809
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __vmx_load_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
if (!vmx->host_state.loaded)
return;
++vmx->vcpu.stat.host_state_reload;
vmx->host_state.loaded = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if (is_long_mode(&vmx->vcpu))
rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
#endif
if (vmx->host_state.gs_ldt_reload_needed) {
kvm_load_ldt(vmx->host_state.ldt_sel);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
load_gs_index(vmx->host_state.gs_sel);
#else
loadsegment(gs, vmx->host_state.gs_sel);
#endif
}
if (vmx->host_state.fs_reload_needed)
loadsegment(fs, vmx->host_state.fs_sel);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
if (unlikely(vmx->host_state.ds_sel | vmx->host_state.es_sel)) {
loadsegment(ds, vmx->host_state.ds_sel);
loadsegment(es, vmx->host_state.es_sel);
}
#endif
invalidate_tss_limit();
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base);
#endif
if (vmx->host_state.msr_host_bndcfgs)
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, vmx->host_state.msr_host_bndcfgs);
load_fixmap_gdt(raw_smp_processor_id());
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 564
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void fm10k_qv_enable(struct fm10k_q_vector *q_vector)
{
/* Enable auto-mask and clear the current mask */
u32 itr = FM10K_ITR_ENABLE;
/* Update Tx ITR */
fm10k_update_itr(&q_vector->tx);
/* Update Rx ITR */
fm10k_update_itr(&q_vector->rx);
/* Store Tx itr in timer slot 0 */
itr |= (q_vector->tx.itr & FM10K_ITR_MAX);
/* Shift Rx itr to timer slot 1 */
itr |= (q_vector->rx.itr & FM10K_ITR_MAX) << FM10K_ITR_INTERVAL1_SHIFT;
/* Write the final value to the ITR register */
writel(itr, q_vector->itr);
}
Commit Message: fm10k: Fix a potential NULL pointer dereference
Syzkaller report this:
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 0 PID: 4378 Comm: syz-executor.0 Tainted: G C 5.0.0+ #5
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x95b/0x3200 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3573
Code: 00 0f 85 28 1e 00 00 48 81 c4 08 01 00 00 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f c3 4c 89 ea 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 cc 24 00 00 49 81 7d 00 e0 de 03 a6 41 bc 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e3c07a40 EFLAGS: 00010002
RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000080
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff8881e3c07d98 R11: ffff8881c7f21f80 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 0000000000000080 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
FS: 00007fce2252e700(0000) GS:ffff8881f2400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fffc7eb0228 CR3: 00000001e5bea002 CR4: 00000000007606f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
lock_acquire+0xff/0x2c0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:4211
__mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:925 [inline]
__mutex_lock+0xdf/0x1050 kernel/locking/mutex.c:1072
drain_workqueue+0x24/0x3f0 kernel/workqueue.c:2934
destroy_workqueue+0x23/0x630 kernel/workqueue.c:4319
__do_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:1018 [inline]
__se_sys_delete_module kernel/module.c:961 [inline]
__x64_sys_delete_module+0x30c/0x480 kernel/module.c:961
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fce2252dc58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000020000140
RBP: 0000000000000002 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fce2252e6bc
R13: 00000000004bcca9 R14: 00000000006f6b48 R15: 00000000ffffffff
If alloc_workqueue fails, it should return -ENOMEM, otherwise may
trigger this NULL pointer dereference while unloading drivers.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 0a38c17a21a0 ("fm10k: Remove create_workqueue")
Signed-off-by: Yue Haibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Tested-by: Andrew Bowers <andrewx.bowers@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 20,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PPVarArrayFromNPVariantArray::PPVarArrayFromNPVariantArray(
PluginInstance* instance,
size_t size,
const NPVariant* variants)
: size_(size) {
if (size_ > 0) {
array_.reset(new PP_Var[size_]);
for (size_t i = 0; i < size_; i++)
array_[i] = Var::NPVariantToPPVar(instance, &variants[i]);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix invalid read in ppapi code
BUG=77493
TEST=attached test
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6883059
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@82172 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,266
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct ctl_table *find_entry(struct ctl_table_header **phead,
struct ctl_dir *dir, const char *name, int namelen)
{
struct ctl_table_header *head;
struct ctl_table *entry;
struct rb_node *node = dir->root.rb_node;
while (node)
{
struct ctl_node *ctl_node;
const char *procname;
int cmp;
ctl_node = rb_entry(node, struct ctl_node, node);
head = ctl_node->header;
entry = &head->ctl_table[ctl_node - head->node];
procname = entry->procname;
cmp = namecmp(name, namelen, procname, strlen(procname));
if (cmp < 0)
node = node->rb_left;
else if (cmp > 0)
node = node->rb_right;
else {
*phead = head;
return entry;
}
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: sysctl: Drop reference added by grab_header in proc_sys_readdir
Fixes CVE-2016-9191, proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference
added by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path.
It can cause any path called unregister_sysctl_table will
wait forever.
The calltrace of CVE-2016-9191:
[ 5535.960522] Call Trace:
[ 5535.963265] [<ffffffff817cdaaf>] schedule+0x3f/0xa0
[ 5535.968817] [<ffffffff817d33fb>] schedule_timeout+0x3db/0x6f0
[ 5535.975346] [<ffffffff817cf055>] ? wait_for_completion+0x45/0x130
[ 5535.982256] [<ffffffff817cf0d3>] wait_for_completion+0xc3/0x130
[ 5535.988972] [<ffffffff810d1fd0>] ? wake_up_q+0x80/0x80
[ 5535.994804] [<ffffffff8130de64>] drop_sysctl_table+0xc4/0xe0
[ 5536.001227] [<ffffffff8130de17>] drop_sysctl_table+0x77/0xe0
[ 5536.007648] [<ffffffff8130decd>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x4d/0xa0
[ 5536.014654] [<ffffffff8130deff>] unregister_sysctl_table+0x7f/0xa0
[ 5536.021657] [<ffffffff810f57f5>] unregister_sched_domain_sysctl+0x15/0x40
[ 5536.029344] [<ffffffff810d7704>] partition_sched_domains+0x44/0x450
[ 5536.036447] [<ffffffff817d0761>] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x111/0x1f0
[ 5536.043844] [<ffffffff81167684>] rebuild_sched_domains_locked+0x64/0xb0
[ 5536.051336] [<ffffffff8116789d>] update_flag+0x11d/0x210
[ 5536.057373] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.064186] [<ffffffff81167acb>] ? cpuset_css_offline+0x1b/0x60
[ 5536.070899] [<ffffffff810fce3d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0x10
[ 5536.077420] [<ffffffff817cf61f>] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x2df/0x450
[ 5536.084234] [<ffffffff8115a9f5>] ? css_killed_work_fn+0x25/0x220
[ 5536.091049] [<ffffffff81167ae5>] cpuset_css_offline+0x35/0x60
[ 5536.097571] [<ffffffff8115aa2c>] css_killed_work_fn+0x5c/0x220
[ 5536.104207] [<ffffffff810bc83f>] process_one_work+0x1df/0x710
[ 5536.110736] [<ffffffff810bc7c0>] ? process_one_work+0x160/0x710
[ 5536.117461] [<ffffffff810bce9b>] worker_thread+0x12b/0x4a0
[ 5536.123697] [<ffffffff810bcd70>] ? process_one_work+0x710/0x710
[ 5536.130426] [<ffffffff810c3f7e>] kthread+0xfe/0x120
[ 5536.135991] [<ffffffff817d4baf>] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x40
[ 5536.142041] [<ffffffff810c3e80>] ? kthread_create_on_node+0x230/0x230
One cgroup maintainer mentioned that "cgroup is trying to offline
a cpuset css, which takes place under cgroup_mutex. The offlining
ends up trying to drain active usages of a sysctl table which apprently
is not happening."
The real reason is that proc_sys_readdir doesn't drop reference added
by grab_header when return from !dir_emit_dots path. So this cpuset
offline path will wait here forever.
See here for details: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/11/04/13
Fixes: f0c3b5093add ("[readdir] convert procfs")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Yang Shukui <yangshukui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Chengming <zhouchengming1@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 10,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebContentsImpl::SystemDragEnded() {
if (GetRenderViewHost())
GetRenderViewHost()->DragSourceSystemDragEnded();
if (browser_plugin_embedder_.get())
browser_plugin_embedder_->SystemDragEnded();
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 15,449
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ap_query_configuration(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
if (ap_configuration_available()) {
if (!ap_configuration)
ap_configuration =
kzalloc(sizeof(struct ap_config_info),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (ap_configuration)
__ap_query_configuration(ap_configuration);
} else
ap_configuration = NULL;
#else
ap_configuration = NULL;
#endif
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,521
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::Optional<WebGestureEvent> GetAndResetLastForwardedGestureEvent() {
base::Optional<WebGestureEvent> ret;
last_forwarded_gesture_event_.swap(ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,330
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ui::AXTreeIDRegistry::AXTreeID RenderFrameHostImpl::RoutingIDToAXTreeID(
int routing_id) {
RenderFrameHostImpl* rfh = nullptr;
RenderFrameProxyHost* rfph = nullptr;
LookupRenderFrameHostOrProxy(GetProcess()->GetID(), routing_id, &rfh, &rfph);
if (rfph) {
rfh = rfph->frame_tree_node()->current_frame_host();
}
if (!rfh)
return ui::AXTreeIDRegistry::kNoAXTreeID;
return rfh->GetAXTreeID();
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 2,113
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static const ut8 *r_bin_dwarf_parse_attr_value(const ut8 *obuf, int obuf_len,
RBinDwarfAttrSpec *spec, RBinDwarfAttrValue *value,
const RBinDwarfCompUnitHdr *hdr,
const ut8 *debug_str, size_t debug_str_len) {
const ut8 *buf = obuf;
const ut8 *buf_end = obuf + obuf_len;
size_t j;
if (!spec || !value || !hdr || !obuf || obuf_len < 0) {
return NULL;
}
value->form = spec->attr_form;
value->name = spec->attr_name;
value->encoding.block.data = NULL;
value->encoding.str_struct.string = NULL;
value->encoding.str_struct.offset = 0;
switch (spec->attr_form) {
case DW_FORM_addr:
switch (hdr->pointer_size) {
case 1:
value->encoding.address = READ (buf, ut8);
break;
case 2:
value->encoding.address = READ (buf, ut16);
break;
case 4:
value->encoding.address = READ (buf, ut32);
break;
case 8:
value->encoding.address = READ (buf, ut64);
break;
default:
eprintf("DWARF: Unexpected pointer size: %u\n", (unsigned)hdr->pointer_size);
return NULL;
}
break;
case DW_FORM_block2:
value->encoding.block.length = READ (buf, ut16);
if (value->encoding.block.length > 0) {
value->encoding.block.data = calloc (sizeof(ut8), value->encoding.block.length);
for (j = 0; j < value->encoding.block.length; j++) {
value->encoding.block.data[j] = READ (buf, ut8);
}
}
break;
case DW_FORM_block4:
value->encoding.block.length = READ (buf, ut32);
if (value->encoding.block.length > 0) {
ut8 *data = calloc (sizeof (ut8), value->encoding.block.length);
if (data) {
for (j = 0; j < value->encoding.block.length; j++) {
data[j] = READ (buf, ut8);
}
}
value->encoding.block.data = data;
}
break;
//// This causes segfaults to happen
case DW_FORM_data2:
value->encoding.data = READ (buf, ut16);
break;
case DW_FORM_data4:
value->encoding.data = READ (buf, ut32);
break;
case DW_FORM_data8:
value->encoding.data = READ (buf, ut64);
break;
case DW_FORM_string:
value->encoding.str_struct.string = *buf? strdup ((const char*)buf) : NULL;
buf += (strlen ((const char*)buf) + 1);
break;
case DW_FORM_block:
buf = r_uleb128 (buf, buf_end - buf, &value->encoding.block.length);
if (!buf) {
return NULL;
}
value->encoding.block.data = calloc (sizeof(ut8), value->encoding.block.length);
for (j = 0; j < value->encoding.block.length; j++) {
value->encoding.block.data[j] = READ (buf, ut8);
}
break;
case DW_FORM_block1:
value->encoding.block.length = READ (buf, ut8);
value->encoding.block.data = calloc (sizeof (ut8), value->encoding.block.length + 1);
for (j = 0; j < value->encoding.block.length; j++) {
value->encoding.block.data[j] = READ (buf, ut8);
}
break;
case DW_FORM_flag:
value->encoding.flag = READ (buf, ut8);
break;
case DW_FORM_sdata:
buf = r_leb128 (buf, &value->encoding.sdata);
break;
case DW_FORM_strp:
value->encoding.str_struct.offset = READ (buf, ut32);
if (debug_str && value->encoding.str_struct.offset < debug_str_len) {
value->encoding.str_struct.string = strdup (
(const char *)(debug_str +
value->encoding.str_struct.offset));
} else {
value->encoding.str_struct.string = NULL;
}
break;
case DW_FORM_udata:
{
ut64 ndata = 0;
const ut8 *data = (const ut8*)&ndata;
buf = r_uleb128 (buf, R_MIN (sizeof (data), (size_t)(buf_end - buf)), &ndata);
memcpy (&value->encoding.data, data, sizeof (value->encoding.data));
value->encoding.str_struct.string = NULL;
}
break;
case DW_FORM_ref_addr:
value->encoding.reference = READ (buf, ut64); // addr size of machine
break;
case DW_FORM_ref1:
value->encoding.reference = READ (buf, ut8);
break;
case DW_FORM_ref2:
value->encoding.reference = READ (buf, ut16);
break;
case DW_FORM_ref4:
value->encoding.reference = READ (buf, ut32);
break;
case DW_FORM_ref8:
value->encoding.reference = READ (buf, ut64);
break;
case DW_FORM_data1:
value->encoding.data = READ (buf, ut8);
break;
default:
eprintf ("Unknown DW_FORM 0x%02"PFMT64x"\n", spec->attr_form);
value->encoding.data = 0;
return NULL;
}
return buf;
}
Commit Message: Fix #8813 - segfault in dwarf parser
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 1
| 3,940
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char *_unescape_lf(char *str)
{
char *c, *p = str;
gsize len = 0;
while ((c = strchr(p, '\\')) != NULL)
{
if (p != &str[len])
memmove(&str[len], p, c - p);
len += (c - p);
if (c[1] == 'n')
{
str[len++] = '\n';
c++;
}
else if (c != &str[len])
str[len++] = *c;
p = &c[1];
}
if (p != &str[len])
memmove(&str[len], p, strlen(p) + 1);
return str;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 27,794
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ne2000_buffer_full(NE2000State *s)
{
int avail, index, boundary;
index = s->curpag << 8;
boundary = s->boundary << 8;
if (index < boundary)
return 1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 13,101
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderFrameImpl::ForwardMessageToPortalHost(
blink::TransferableMessage message,
const url::Origin& source_origin,
const base::Optional<url::Origin>& target_origin) {
frame_->ForwardMessageToPortalHost(std::move(message), source_origin,
target_origin);
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 25,736
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int really_register_bound_param(struct pdo_bound_param_data *param, pdo_stmt_t *stmt, int is_param TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
HashTable *hash;
struct pdo_bound_param_data *pparam = NULL;
hash = is_param ? stmt->bound_params : stmt->bound_columns;
if (!hash) {
ALLOC_HASHTABLE(hash);
zend_hash_init(hash, 13, NULL, param_dtor, 0);
if (is_param) {
stmt->bound_params = hash;
} else {
stmt->bound_columns = hash;
}
}
if (PDO_PARAM_TYPE(param->param_type) == PDO_PARAM_STR && param->max_value_len <= 0 && ! ZVAL_IS_NULL(param->parameter)) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(param->parameter) == IS_DOUBLE) {
char *p;
int len = spprintf(&p, 0, "%.*H", (int) EG(precision), Z_DVAL_P(param->parameter));
ZVAL_STRINGL(param->parameter, p, len, 0);
} else {
convert_to_string(param->parameter);
}
} else if (PDO_PARAM_TYPE(param->param_type) == PDO_PARAM_INT && Z_TYPE_P(param->parameter) == IS_BOOL) {
convert_to_long(param->parameter);
} else if (PDO_PARAM_TYPE(param->param_type) == PDO_PARAM_BOOL && Z_TYPE_P(param->parameter) == IS_LONG) {
convert_to_boolean(param->parameter);
}
param->stmt = stmt;
param->is_param = is_param;
if (param->driver_params) {
Z_ADDREF_P(param->driver_params);
}
if (!is_param && param->name && stmt->columns) {
/* try to map the name to the column */
int i;
for (i = 0; i < stmt->column_count; i++) {
if (strcmp(stmt->columns[i].name, param->name) == 0) {
param->paramno = i;
break;
}
}
/* if you prepare and then execute passing an array of params keyed by names,
* then this will trigger, and we don't want that */
if (param->paramno == -1) {
char *tmp;
spprintf(&tmp, 0, "Did not find column name '%s' in the defined columns; it will not be bound", param->name);
pdo_raise_impl_error(stmt->dbh, stmt, "HY000", tmp TSRMLS_CC);
efree(tmp);
}
}
if (param->name) {
if (is_param && param->name[0] != ':') {
char *temp = emalloc(++param->namelen + 1);
temp[0] = ':';
memmove(temp+1, param->name, param->namelen);
param->name = temp;
} else {
param->name = estrndup(param->name, param->namelen);
}
}
if (is_param && !rewrite_name_to_position(stmt, param TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (param->name) {
efree(param->name);
param->name = NULL;
}
return 0;
}
/* ask the driver to perform any normalization it needs on the
* parameter name. Note that it is illegal for the driver to take
* a reference to param, as it resides in transient storage only
* at this time. */
if (stmt->methods->param_hook) {
if (!stmt->methods->param_hook(stmt, param, PDO_PARAM_EVT_NORMALIZE
TSRMLS_CC)) {
if (param->name) {
efree(param->name);
param->name = NULL;
}
return 0;
}
}
/* delete any other parameter registered with this number.
* If the parameter is named, it will be removed and correctly
* disposed of by the hash_update call that follows */
if (param->paramno >= 0) {
zend_hash_index_del(hash, param->paramno);
}
/* allocate storage for the parameter, keyed by its "canonical" name */
if (param->name) {
zend_hash_update(hash, param->name, param->namelen, param,
sizeof(*param), (void**)&pparam);
} else {
zend_hash_index_update(hash, param->paramno, param, sizeof(*param),
(void**)&pparam);
}
/* tell the driver we just created a parameter */
if (stmt->methods->param_hook) {
if (!stmt->methods->param_hook(stmt, pparam, PDO_PARAM_EVT_ALLOC
TSRMLS_CC)) {
/* undo storage allocation; the hash will free the parameter
* name if required */
if (pparam->name) {
zend_hash_del(hash, pparam->name, pparam->namelen);
} else {
zend_hash_index_del(hash, pparam->paramno);
}
/* param->parameter is freed by hash dtor */
param->parameter = NULL;
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #73331 - do not try to serialize/unserialize objects wddx can not handle
Proper soltion would be to call serialize/unserialize and deal with the result,
but this requires more work that should be done by wddx maintainer (not me).
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 2,752
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: toomany(struct magic_set *ms, const char *name, uint16_t num)
{
if (file_printf(ms, ", too many %s header sections (%u)", name, num
) == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Stop reporting bad capabilities after the first few.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 17,921
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static v8::Handle<v8::Value> optionsObjectCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.TestObj.optionsObject");
if (args.Length() < 1)
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
TestObj* imp = V8TestObj::toNative(args.Holder());
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(Dictionary, oo, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 0, DefaultIsUndefined));
if (args.Length() > 0 && !oo.isUndefinedOrNull() && !oo.isObject()) {
return V8Proxy::throwTypeError("Not an object.");
}
if (args.Length() <= 1) {
imp->optionsObject(oo);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
EXCEPTION_BLOCK(Dictionary, ooo, MAYBE_MISSING_PARAMETER(args, 1, DefaultIsUndefined));
if (args.Length() > 1 && !ooo.isUndefinedOrNull() && !ooo.isObject()) {
return V8Proxy::throwTypeError("Not an object.");
}
imp->optionsObject(oo, ooo);
return v8::Handle<v8::Value>();
}
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 1
| 29,230
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool brcmf_cfg80211_vif_event_armed(struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg)
{
struct brcmf_cfg80211_vif_event *event = &cfg->vif_event;
bool armed;
spin_lock(&event->vif_event_lock);
armed = event->vif != NULL;
spin_unlock(&event->vif_event_lock);
return armed;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,593
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int HttpBridge::GetResponseContentLength() const {
DCHECK_EQ(MessageLoop::current(), created_on_loop_);
base::AutoLock lock(fetch_state_lock_);
DCHECK(fetch_state_.request_completed);
return fetch_state_.response_content.size();
}
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,942
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gio_read_socket (GIOChannel *gio, GIOCondition condition, gpointer data)
{
struct gio_to_qb_poll *adaptor = (struct gio_to_qb_poll *)data;
gint fd = g_io_channel_unix_get_fd(gio);
crm_trace("%p.%d %d (ref=%d)", data, fd, condition, gio_adapter_refcount(adaptor));
if(condition & G_IO_NVAL) {
crm_trace("Marking failed adaptor %p unused", adaptor);
adaptor->is_used = QB_FALSE;
}
return (adaptor->fn(fd, condition, adaptor->data) == 0);
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 27,761
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool AppCacheDatabase::InsertGroup(const GroupRecord* record) {
if (!LazyOpen(kCreateIfNeeded))
return false;
static const char kSql[] =
"INSERT INTO Groups"
" (group_id, origin, manifest_url, creation_time, last_access_time,"
" last_full_update_check_time, first_evictable_error_time)"
" VALUES(?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)";
sql::Statement statement(db_->GetCachedStatement(SQL_FROM_HERE, kSql));
statement.BindInt64(0, record->group_id);
statement.BindString(1, SerializeOrigin(record->origin));
statement.BindString(2, record->manifest_url.spec());
statement.BindInt64(3, record->creation_time.ToInternalValue());
statement.BindInt64(4, record->last_access_time.ToInternalValue());
statement.BindInt64(5, record->last_full_update_check_time.ToInternalValue());
statement.BindInt64(6, record->first_evictable_error_time.ToInternalValue());
return statement.Run();
}
Commit Message: Reland "AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses."
This is a reland of 85b389caa7d725cdd31f59e9a2b79ff54804b7b7
Initialized CacheRecord::padding_size to 0.
Original change's description:
> AppCache: Add padding to cross-origin responses.
>
> Bug: 918293
> Change-Id: I4f16640f06feac009d6bbbb624951da6d2669f6c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1488059
> Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644624}
Bug: 918293
Change-Id: Ie1d3f99c7e8a854d33255a4d66243da2ce16441c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1539906
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Staphany Park <staphany@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#644719}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 849
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_page_mkwrite(struct vm_area_struct *vma, struct page *page,
unsigned long address)
{
struct vm_fault vmf;
int ret;
vmf.virtual_address = (void __user *)(address & PAGE_MASK);
vmf.pgoff = page->index;
vmf.flags = FAULT_FLAG_WRITE|FAULT_FLAG_MKWRITE;
vmf.page = page;
vmf.cow_page = NULL;
ret = vma->vm_ops->page_mkwrite(vma, &vmf);
if (unlikely(ret & (VM_FAULT_ERROR | VM_FAULT_NOPAGE)))
return ret;
if (unlikely(!(ret & VM_FAULT_LOCKED))) {
lock_page(page);
if (!page->mapping) {
unlock_page(page);
return 0; /* retry */
}
ret |= VM_FAULT_LOCKED;
} else
VM_BUG_ON_PAGE(!PageLocked(page), page);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: mm: avoid setting up anonymous pages into file mapping
Reading page fault handler code I've noticed that under right
circumstances kernel would map anonymous pages into file mappings: if
the VMA doesn't have vm_ops->fault() and the VMA wasn't fully populated
on ->mmap(), kernel would handle page fault to not populated pte with
do_anonymous_page().
Let's change page fault handler to use do_anonymous_page() only on
anonymous VMA (->vm_ops == NULL) and make sure that the VMA is not
shared.
For file mappings without vm_ops->fault() or shred VMA without vm_ops,
page fault on pte_none() entry would lead to SIGBUS.
Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,141
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void account_user_time(struct task_struct *p, cputime_t cputime,
cputime_t cputime_scaled)
{
struct cpu_usage_stat *cpustat = &kstat_this_cpu.cpustat;
cputime64_t tmp;
/* Add user time to process. */
p->utime = cputime_add(p->utime, cputime);
p->utimescaled = cputime_add(p->utimescaled, cputime_scaled);
account_group_user_time(p, cputime);
/* Add user time to cpustat. */
tmp = cputime_to_cputime64(cputime);
if (TASK_NICE(p) > 0)
cpustat->nice = cputime64_add(cpustat->nice, tmp);
else
cpustat->user = cputime64_add(cpustat->user, tmp);
cpuacct_update_stats(p, CPUACCT_STAT_USER, cputime);
/* Account for user time used */
acct_update_integrals(p);
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,010
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __net_init int net_ns_net_init(struct net *net)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_NET_NS
net->ns.ops = &netns_operations;
#endif
return ns_alloc_inum(&net->ns);
}
Commit Message: net: Fix double free and memory corruption in get_net_ns_by_id()
(I can trivially verify that that idr_remove in cleanup_net happens
after the network namespace count has dropped to zero --EWB)
Function get_net_ns_by_id() does not check for net::count
after it has found a peer in netns_ids idr.
It may dereference a peer, after its count has already been
finaly decremented. This leads to double free and memory
corruption:
put_net(peer) rtnl_lock()
atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0] ...
__put_net(peer) get_net_ns_by_id(net, id)
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
queue_work() peer = idr_find(&net->netns_ids, id)
| get_net(peer) [count=1]
| ...
| (use after final put)
v ...
cleanup_net() ...
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..) ...
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
... ...
... put_net(peer)
... atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0]
... spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
... spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... queue_work()
... rtnl_unlock()
rtnl_lock() ...
for_each_net(tmp) { ...
id = __peernet2id(tmp, peer) ...
spin_lock_irq(&tmp->nsid_lock) ...
idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id) ...
... ...
net_drop_ns() ...
net_free(peer) ...
} ...
|
v
cleanup_net()
...
(Second free of peer)
Also, put_net() on the right cpu may reorder with left's cpu
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..), and then cleanup_list
will be corrupted.
Since cleanup_net() is executed in worker thread, while
put_net(peer) can happen everywhere, there should be
enough time for concurrent get_net_ns_by_id() to pick
the peer up, and the race does not seem to be unlikely.
The patch fixes the problem in standard way.
(Also, there is possible problem in peernet2id_alloc(), which requires
check for net::count under nsid_lock and maybe_get_net(peer), but
in current stable kernel it's used under rtnl_lock() and it has to be
safe. Openswitch begun to use peernet2id_alloc(), and possibly it should
be fixed too. While this is not in stable kernel yet, so I'll send
a separate message to netdev@ later).
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Fixes: 0c7aecd4bde4 "netns: add rtnl cmd to add and get peer netns ids"
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 19,274
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebPagePrivate::shouldPluginEnterFullScreen(PluginView* plugin, const char* windowUniquePrefix)
{
return m_client->shouldPluginEnterFullScreen();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,427
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: AP_DECLARE(apr_size_t) ap_send_mmap(apr_mmap_t *mm,
request_rec *r,
apr_size_t offset,
apr_size_t length)
{
conn_rec *c = r->connection;
apr_bucket_brigade *bb = NULL;
apr_bucket *b;
bb = apr_brigade_create(r->pool, c->bucket_alloc);
b = apr_bucket_mmap_create(mm, offset, length, c->bucket_alloc);
APR_BRIGADE_INSERT_TAIL(bb, b);
ap_pass_brigade(r->output_filters, bb);
return mm->size; /* XXX - change API to report apr_status_t? */
}
Commit Message: *) SECURITY: CVE-2015-0253 (cve.mitre.org)
core: Fix a crash introduced in with ErrorDocument 400 pointing
to a local URL-path with the INCLUDES filter active, introduced
in 2.4.11. PR 57531. [Yann Ylavic]
Submitted By: ylavic
Committed By: covener
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1664205 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,062
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExtensionDevToolsClientHost::SendMessageToBackend(
DebuggerSendCommandFunction* function,
const std::string& method,
SendCommand::Params::CommandParams* command_params) {
base::DictionaryValue protocol_request;
int request_id = ++last_request_id_;
pending_requests_[request_id] = function;
protocol_request.SetInteger("id", request_id);
protocol_request.SetString("method", method);
if (command_params) {
protocol_request.Set("params",
command_params->additional_properties.DeepCopy());
}
std::string json_args;
base::JSONWriter::Write(&protocol_request, &json_args);
DevToolsManager::GetInstance()->DispatchOnInspectorBackend(this, json_args);
}
Commit Message: Have the Debugger extension api check that it has access to the tab
Check PermissionsData::CanAccessTab() prior to attaching the debugger.
BUG=367567
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/352523003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@280354 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::TexImageBitmapByGPU(
ImageBitmap* bitmap,
GLenum target,
GLuint target_texture,
GLint xoffset,
GLint yoffset,
const IntRect& source_sub_rect) {
bitmap->BitmapImage()->CopyToTexture(
GetDrawingBuffer()->ContextProvider()->ContextGL(), target,
target_texture, true /* unpack_premultiply_alpha */,
false /* unpack_flip_y_ */, IntPoint(xoffset, yoffset), source_sub_rect);
}
Commit Message: Simplify WebGL error message
The WebGL exception message text contains the full URL of a blocked
cross-origin resource. It should instead contain only a generic notice.
Bug: 799847
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I3a7f00462a4643c41882f2ee7e7767e6d631557e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/854986
Reviewed-by: Brandon Jones <bajones@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528458}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,418
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RegistrationDeletionListener(
scoped_refptr<ServiceWorkerRegistration> registration,
base::OnceClosure callback)
: registration_(std::move(registration)),
callback_(std::move(callback)) {}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 27,268
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline u8 ip6_frag_ecn(const struct ipv6hdr *ipv6h)
{
return 1 << (ipv6_get_dsfield(ipv6h) & INET_ECN_MASK);
}
Commit Message: netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: drop mangled skb on ream error
Dmitry Vyukov reported GPF in network stack that Andrey traced down to
negative nh offset in nf_ct_frag6_queue().
Problem is that all network headers before fragment header are pulled.
Normal ipv6 reassembly will drop the skb when errors occur further down
the line.
netfilter doesn't do this, and instead passed the original fragment
along. That was also fine back when netfilter ipv6 defrag worked with
cloned fragments, as the original, pristine fragment was passed on.
So we either have to undo the pull op, or discard such fragments.
Since they're malformed after all (e.g. overlapping fragment) it seems
preferrable to just drop them.
Same for temporary errors -- it doesn't make sense to accept (and
perhaps forward!) only some fragments of same datagram.
Fixes: 029f7f3b8701cc7ac ("netfilter: ipv6: nf_defrag: avoid/free clone operations")
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Debugged-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Diagnosed-by: Eric Dumazet <Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 20,977
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int brcmf_internal_escan_add_info(struct cfg80211_scan_request *req,
u8 *ssid, u8 ssid_len, u8 channel)
{
struct ieee80211_channel *chan;
enum nl80211_band band;
int freq, i;
if (channel <= CH_MAX_2G_CHANNEL)
band = NL80211_BAND_2GHZ;
else
band = NL80211_BAND_5GHZ;
freq = ieee80211_channel_to_frequency(channel, band);
if (!freq)
return -EINVAL;
chan = ieee80211_get_channel(req->wiphy, freq);
if (!chan)
return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < req->n_channels; i++) {
if (req->channels[i] == chan)
break;
}
if (i == req->n_channels)
req->channels[req->n_channels++] = chan;
for (i = 0; i < req->n_ssids; i++) {
if (req->ssids[i].ssid_len == ssid_len &&
!memcmp(req->ssids[i].ssid, ssid, ssid_len))
break;
}
if (i == req->n_ssids) {
memcpy(req->ssids[req->n_ssids].ssid, ssid, ssid_len);
req->ssids[req->n_ssids++].ssid_len = ssid_len;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: fix possible buffer overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_mgmt_tx()
The lower level nl80211 code in cfg80211 ensures that "len" is between
25 and NL80211_ATTR_FRAME (2304). We subtract DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN (24) from
"len" so thats's max of 2280. However, the action_frame->data[] buffer is
only BRCMF_FIL_ACTION_FRAME_SIZE (1800) bytes long so this memcpy() can
overflow.
memcpy(action_frame->data, &buf[DOT11_MGMT_HDR_LEN],
le16_to_cpu(action_frame->len));
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.9.x
Fixes: 18e2f61db3b70 ("brcmfmac: P2P action frame tx.")
Reported-by: "freenerguo(郭大兴)" <freenerguo@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,356
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static opj_bool pi_next_pcrl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
int compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0;
pi->resno < int_min(pi->poc.resno1, comp->numresolutions); pi->resno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: [MJ2] To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 1
| 13,692
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Element::setChildrenAffectedByFirstChildRules()
{
ensureElementRareData()->setChildrenAffectedByFirstChildRules(true);
}
Commit Message: Set Attr.ownerDocument in Element#setAttributeNode()
Attr objects can move across documents by setAttributeNode().
So It needs to reset ownerDocument through TreeScopeAdoptr::adoptIfNeeded().
BUG=248950
TEST=set-attribute-node-from-iframe.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/17583003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152938 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 20,758
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int vfat_build_slots(struct inode *dir, const unsigned char *name,
int len, int is_dir, int cluster,
struct timespec *ts,
struct msdos_dir_slot *slots, int *nr_slots)
{
struct msdos_sb_info *sbi = MSDOS_SB(dir->i_sb);
struct fat_mount_options *opts = &sbi->options;
struct msdos_dir_slot *ps;
struct msdos_dir_entry *de;
unsigned char cksum, lcase;
unsigned char msdos_name[MSDOS_NAME];
wchar_t *uname;
__le16 time, date;
u8 time_cs;
int err, ulen, usize, i;
loff_t offset;
*nr_slots = 0;
uname = __getname();
if (!uname)
return -ENOMEM;
err = xlate_to_uni(name, len, (unsigned char *)uname, &ulen, &usize,
opts->unicode_xlate, opts->utf8, sbi->nls_io);
if (err)
goto out_free;
err = vfat_is_used_badchars(uname, ulen);
if (err)
goto out_free;
err = vfat_create_shortname(dir, sbi->nls_disk, uname, ulen,
msdos_name, &lcase);
if (err < 0)
goto out_free;
else if (err == 1) {
de = (struct msdos_dir_entry *)slots;
err = 0;
goto shortname;
}
/* build the entry of long file name */
cksum = fat_checksum(msdos_name);
*nr_slots = usize / 13;
for (ps = slots, i = *nr_slots; i > 0; i--, ps++) {
ps->id = i;
ps->attr = ATTR_EXT;
ps->reserved = 0;
ps->alias_checksum = cksum;
ps->start = 0;
offset = (i - 1) * 13;
fatwchar_to16(ps->name0_4, uname + offset, 5);
fatwchar_to16(ps->name5_10, uname + offset + 5, 6);
fatwchar_to16(ps->name11_12, uname + offset + 11, 2);
}
slots[0].id |= 0x40;
de = (struct msdos_dir_entry *)ps;
shortname:
/* build the entry of 8.3 alias name */
(*nr_slots)++;
memcpy(de->name, msdos_name, MSDOS_NAME);
de->attr = is_dir ? ATTR_DIR : ATTR_ARCH;
de->lcase = lcase;
fat_time_unix2fat(sbi, ts, &time, &date, &time_cs);
de->time = de->ctime = time;
de->date = de->cdate = de->adate = date;
de->ctime_cs = time_cs;
de->start = cpu_to_le16(cluster);
de->starthi = cpu_to_le16(cluster >> 16);
de->size = 0;
out_free:
__putname(uname);
return err;
}
Commit Message: NLS: improve UTF8 -> UTF16 string conversion routine
The utf8s_to_utf16s conversion routine needs to be improved. Unlike
its utf16s_to_utf8s sibling, it doesn't accept arguments specifying
the maximum length of the output buffer or the endianness of its
16-bit output.
This patch (as1501) adds the two missing arguments, and adjusts the
only two places in the kernel where the function is called. A
follow-on patch will add a third caller that does utilize the new
capabilities.
The two conversion routines are still annoyingly inconsistent in the
way they handle invalid byte combinations. But that's a subject for a
different patch.
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
CC: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 26,900
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t ACodec::setupAMRCodec(bool encoder, bool isWAMR, int32_t bitrate) {
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = encoder ? kPortIndexOutput : kPortIndexInput;
status_t err =
mOMX->getParameter(mNode, OMX_IndexParamAudioAmr, &def, sizeof(def));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
def.eAMRFrameFormat = OMX_AUDIO_AMRFrameFormatFSF;
def.eAMRBandMode = pickModeFromBitRate(isWAMR, bitrate);
err = mOMX->setParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamAudioAmr, &def, sizeof(def));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
return setupRawAudioFormat(
encoder ? kPortIndexInput : kPortIndexOutput,
isWAMR ? 16000 : 8000 /* sampleRate */,
1 /* numChannels */);
}
Commit Message: Fix initialization of AAC presentation struct
Otherwise the new size checks trip on this.
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I1f8f01097e3a88ff041b69279a6121be842f1766
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,716
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderThreadImpl::WidgetHidden() {
DCHECK_LT(hidden_widget_count_, widget_count_);
hidden_widget_count_++;
if (widget_count_ && hidden_widget_count_ == widget_count_) {
#if !defined(SYSTEM_NATIVELY_SIGNALS_MEMORY_PRESSURE)
#endif
if (GetContentClient()->renderer()->RunIdleHandlerWhenWidgetsHidden())
ScheduleIdleHandler(kInitialIdleHandlerDelayMs);
}
}
Commit Message: Suspend shared timers while blockingly closing databases
BUG=388771
R=michaeln@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/409863002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284785 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 28,863
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cifs_sb_master_tlink(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb)
{
return cifs_sb->master_tlink;
}
Commit Message: cifs: always do is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount
Currently, we skip doing the is_path_accessible check in cifs_mount if
there is no prefixpath. I have a report of at least one server however
that allows a TREE_CONNECT to a share that has a DFS referral at its
root. The reporter in this case was using a UNC that had no prefixpath,
so the is_path_accessible check was not triggered and the box later hit
a BUG() because we were chasing a DFS referral on the root dentry for
the mount.
This patch fixes this by removing the check for a zero-length
prefixpath. That should make the is_path_accessible check be done in
this situation and should allow the client to chase the DFS referral at
mount time instead.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Reported-and-Tested-by: Yogesh Sharma <ysharma@cymer.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,261
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void IndexedDBConnection::VersionChangeIgnored() {
if (!database_.get())
return;
database_->VersionChangeIgnored();
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 20,538
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLImportsController::ShouldBlockScriptExecution(
const Document& document) const {
DCHECK_EQ(document.ImportsController(), this);
if (HTMLImportLoader* loader = LoaderFor(document))
return loader->ShouldBlockScriptExecution();
return root_->GetState().ShouldBlockScriptExecution();
}
Commit Message: Speculative fix for crashes in HTMLImportsController::Dispose().
Copy the loaders_ vector before iterating it.
This CL has no tests because we don't know stable reproduction.
Bug: 843151
Change-Id: I3d5e184657cbce56dcfca0c717d7a0c464e20efe
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1245017
Reviewed-by: Keishi Hattori <keishi@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#594226}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 20,237
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MSG_WriteDeltaKeyFloat( msg_t *msg, int key, float oldV, float newV ) {
floatint_t fi;
if ( oldV == newV ) {
MSG_WriteBits( msg, 0, 1 );
return;
}
fi.f = newV;
MSG_WriteBits( msg, 1, 1 );
MSG_WriteBits( msg, fi.i ^ key, 32 );
}
Commit Message: Fix/improve buffer overflow in MSG_ReadBits/MSG_WriteBits
Prevent reading past end of message in MSG_ReadBits. If read past
end of msg->data buffer (16348 bytes) the engine could SEGFAULT.
Make MSG_WriteBits use an exact buffer overflow check instead of
possibly failing with a few bytes left.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 19,527
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: dwarf_elf_object_access_load_section(void* obj_in,
Dwarf_Half section_index,
Dwarf_Small** section_data,
int* error)
{
dwarf_elf_object_access_internals_t*obj =
(dwarf_elf_object_access_internals_t*)obj_in;
if (section_index == 0) {
return DW_DLV_NO_ENTRY;
}
{
Elf_Scn *scn = 0;
Elf_Data *data = 0;
scn = elf_getscn(obj->elf, section_index);
if (scn == NULL) {
*error = DW_DLE_MDE;
return DW_DLV_ERROR;
}
/* When using libelf as a producer, section data may be stored
in multiple buffers. In libdwarf however, we only use libelf
as a consumer (there is a dwarf producer API, but it doesn't
use libelf). Because of this, this single call to elf_getdata
will retrieve the entire section in a single contiguous
buffer. */
data = elf_getdata(scn, NULL);
if (data == NULL) {
*error = DW_DLE_MDE;
return DW_DLV_ERROR;
}
*section_data = data->d_buf;
}
return DW_DLV_OK;
}
Commit Message: A DWARF related section marked SHT_NOBITS (elf section type)
is an error in the elf object. Now detected.
dwarf_elf_access.c
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 20,668
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void drm_mode_config_init(struct drm_device *dev)
{
mutex_init(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
mutex_init(&dev->mode_config.idr_mutex);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->mode_config.fb_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->mode_config.crtc_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->mode_config.connector_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->mode_config.encoder_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->mode_config.property_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&dev->mode_config.property_blob_list);
idr_init(&dev->mode_config.crtc_idr);
mutex_lock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
drm_mode_create_standard_connector_properties(dev);
mutex_unlock(&dev->mode_config.mutex);
/* Just to be sure */
dev->mode_config.num_fb = 0;
dev->mode_config.num_connector = 0;
dev->mode_config.num_crtc = 0;
dev->mode_config.num_encoder = 0;
}
Commit Message: drm: integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
There is a potential integer overflow in drm_mode_dirtyfb_ioctl()
if userspace passes in a large num_clips. The call to kmalloc would
allocate a small buffer, and the call to fb->funcs->dirty may result
in a memory corruption.
Reported-by: Haogang Chen <haogangchen@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 5,422
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_inode_csum_verify(struct inode *inode, struct ext4_inode *raw,
struct ext4_inode_info *ei)
{
__u32 provided, calculated;
if (EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_es->s_creator_os !=
cpu_to_le32(EXT4_OS_LINUX) ||
!ext4_has_metadata_csum(inode->i_sb))
return 1;
provided = le16_to_cpu(raw->i_checksum_lo);
calculated = ext4_inode_csum(inode, raw, ei);
if (EXT4_INODE_SIZE(inode->i_sb) > EXT4_GOOD_OLD_INODE_SIZE &&
EXT4_FITS_IN_INODE(raw, ei, i_checksum_hi))
provided |= ((__u32)le16_to_cpu(raw->i_checksum_hi)) << 16;
else
calculated &= 0xFFFF;
return provided == calculated;
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 3,761
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool CNBL::IsSendDone()
{
return m_BuffersDone == m_BuffersNumber;
}
Commit Message: NetKVM: BZ#1169718: Checking the length only on read
Signed-off-by: Joseph Hindin <yhindin@rehat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 1,104
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static u32 vmci_transport_peer_rid(u32 peer_cid)
{
if (VMADDR_CID_HYPERVISOR == peer_cid)
return VMCI_TRANSPORT_HYPERVISOR_PACKET_RID;
return VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_RID;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 16,621
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool asn1_pop_tag(struct asn1_data *data)
{
struct nesting *nesting;
size_t len;
nesting = data->nesting;
if (!nesting) {
data->has_error = true;
return false;
}
len = data->ofs - (nesting->start+1);
/* yes, this is ugly. We don't know in advance how many bytes the length
of a tag will take, so we assumed 1 byte. If we were wrong then we
need to correct our mistake */
if (len > 0xFFFFFF) {
data->data[nesting->start] = 0x84;
if (!asn1_write_uint8(data, 0)) return false;
if (!asn1_write_uint8(data, 0)) return false;
if (!asn1_write_uint8(data, 0)) return false;
if (!asn1_write_uint8(data, 0)) return false;
memmove(data->data+nesting->start+5, data->data+nesting->start+1, len);
data->data[nesting->start+1] = (len>>24) & 0xFF;
data->data[nesting->start+2] = (len>>16) & 0xFF;
data->data[nesting->start+3] = (len>>8) & 0xFF;
data->data[nesting->start+4] = len&0xff;
} else if (len > 0xFFFF) {
data->data[nesting->start] = 0x83;
if (!asn1_write_uint8(data, 0)) return false;
if (!asn1_write_uint8(data, 0)) return false;
if (!asn1_write_uint8(data, 0)) return false;
memmove(data->data+nesting->start+4, data->data+nesting->start+1, len);
data->data[nesting->start+1] = (len>>16) & 0xFF;
data->data[nesting->start+2] = (len>>8) & 0xFF;
data->data[nesting->start+3] = len&0xff;
} else if (len > 255) {
data->data[nesting->start] = 0x82;
if (!asn1_write_uint8(data, 0)) return false;
if (!asn1_write_uint8(data, 0)) return false;
memmove(data->data+nesting->start+3, data->data+nesting->start+1, len);
data->data[nesting->start+1] = len>>8;
data->data[nesting->start+2] = len&0xff;
} else if (len > 127) {
data->data[nesting->start] = 0x81;
if (!asn1_write_uint8(data, 0)) return false;
memmove(data->data+nesting->start+2, data->data+nesting->start+1, len);
data->data[nesting->start+1] = len;
} else {
data->data[nesting->start] = len;
}
data->nesting = nesting->next;
talloc_free(nesting);
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,592
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ecb_decrypt(struct blkcipher_desc *desc, struct scatterlist *dst,
struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes)
{
return glue_ecb_crypt_128bit(&serpent_dec, desc, dst, src, nbytes);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 22,941
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GraphicsContext::strokeRect(const FloatRect& rect, float lineWidth)
{
if (paintingDisabled())
return;
if (!isRectSkiaSafe(getCTM(), rect))
return;
SkPaint paint;
platformContext()->setupPaintForStroking(&paint, 0, 0);
paint.setStrokeWidth(WebCoreFloatToSkScalar(lineWidth));
SkRect r(rect);
bool validW = r.width() > 0;
bool validH = r.height() > 0;
SkCanvas* canvas = platformContext()->canvas();
if (validW && validH)
canvas->drawRect(r, paint);
else if (validW || validH) {
SkPath path;
path.moveTo(r.fLeft, r.fTop);
path.lineTo(r.fRight, r.fBottom);
path.close();
canvas->drawPath(path, paint);
}
}
Commit Message: [skia] not all convex paths are convex, so recompute convexity for the problematic ones
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=75960
Reviewed by Stephen White.
No new tests.
See related chrome issue
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=108605
* platform/graphics/skia/GraphicsContextSkia.cpp:
(WebCore::setPathFromConvexPoints):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@104609 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-19
| 0
| 11,881
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int lut_init(AVFilterContext *ctx)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,237
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void update_metadata(HTTPContext *s, char *data)
{
char *key;
char *val;
char *end;
char *next = data;
while (*next) {
key = next;
val = strstr(key, "='");
if (!val)
break;
end = strstr(val, "';");
if (!end)
break;
*val = '\0';
*end = '\0';
val += 2;
av_dict_set(&s->metadata, key, val, 0);
next = end + 2;
}
}
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 5,260
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void bte_av_sink_media_callback(tBTA_AV_EVT event,
tBTA_AV_MEDIA* p_data) {
switch (event) {
case BTA_AV_SINK_MEDIA_DATA_EVT: {
btif_sm_state_t state = btif_sm_get_state(btif_av_cb.sm_handle);
if ((state == BTIF_AV_STATE_STARTED) || (state == BTIF_AV_STATE_OPENED)) {
uint8_t queue_len = btif_a2dp_sink_enqueue_buf((BT_HDR*)p_data);
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: packets in sink queue %d", __func__, queue_len);
}
break;
}
case BTA_AV_SINK_MEDIA_CFG_EVT: {
btif_av_sink_config_req_t config_req;
/* send a command to BT Media Task */
btif_a2dp_sink_update_decoder((uint8_t*)(p_data->avk_config.codec_info));
/* Switch to BTIF context */
config_req.sample_rate =
A2DP_GetTrackSampleRate(p_data->avk_config.codec_info);
if (config_req.sample_rate == -1) {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: cannot get the track frequency", __func__);
break;
}
config_req.channel_count =
A2DP_GetTrackChannelCount(p_data->avk_config.codec_info);
if (config_req.channel_count == -1) {
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("%s: cannot get the channel count", __func__);
break;
}
config_req.peer_bd = p_data->avk_config.bd_addr;
btif_transfer_context(btif_av_handle_event, BTIF_AV_SINK_CONFIG_REQ_EVT,
(char*)&config_req, sizeof(config_req), NULL);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE AVRC: Copy browse.p_browse_data in btif_av_event_deep_copy
p_msg_src->browse.p_browse_data is not copied, but used after the
original pointer is freed
Bug: 109699112
Test: manual
Change-Id: I1d014eb9a8911da6913173a9b11218bf1c89e16e
(cherry picked from commit 1d9a58768e6573899c7e80c2b3f52e22f2d8f58b)
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,860
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void arcmsr_hbaA_message_isr(struct AdapterControlBlock *acb)
{
struct MessageUnit_A __iomem *reg = acb->pmuA;
/*clear interrupt and message state*/
writel(ARCMSR_MU_OUTBOUND_MESSAGE0_INT, ®->outbound_intstatus);
schedule_work(&acb->arcmsr_do_message_isr_bh);
}
Commit Message: scsi: arcmsr: Buffer overflow in arcmsr_iop_message_xfer()
We need to put an upper bound on "user_len" so the memcpy() doesn't
overflow.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Henzl <thenzl@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,843
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t show_slab_objects(struct kmem_cache *s,
char *buf, unsigned long flags)
{
unsigned long total = 0;
int node;
int x;
unsigned long *nodes;
unsigned long *per_cpu;
nodes = kzalloc(2 * sizeof(unsigned long) * nr_node_ids, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!nodes)
return -ENOMEM;
per_cpu = nodes + nr_node_ids;
if (flags & SO_CPU) {
int cpu;
for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
struct kmem_cache_cpu *c = get_cpu_slab(s, cpu);
if (!c || c->node < 0)
continue;
if (c->page) {
if (flags & SO_TOTAL)
x = c->page->objects;
else if (flags & SO_OBJECTS)
x = c->page->inuse;
else
x = 1;
total += x;
nodes[c->node] += x;
}
per_cpu[c->node]++;
}
}
if (flags & SO_ALL) {
for_each_node_state(node, N_NORMAL_MEMORY) {
struct kmem_cache_node *n = get_node(s, node);
if (flags & SO_TOTAL)
x = atomic_long_read(&n->total_objects);
else if (flags & SO_OBJECTS)
x = atomic_long_read(&n->total_objects) -
count_partial(n, count_free);
else
x = atomic_long_read(&n->nr_slabs);
total += x;
nodes[node] += x;
}
} else if (flags & SO_PARTIAL) {
for_each_node_state(node, N_NORMAL_MEMORY) {
struct kmem_cache_node *n = get_node(s, node);
if (flags & SO_TOTAL)
x = count_partial(n, count_total);
else if (flags & SO_OBJECTS)
x = count_partial(n, count_inuse);
else
x = n->nr_partial;
total += x;
nodes[node] += x;
}
}
x = sprintf(buf, "%lu", total);
#ifdef CONFIG_NUMA
for_each_node_state(node, N_NORMAL_MEMORY)
if (nodes[node])
x += sprintf(buf + x, " N%d=%lu",
node, nodes[node]);
#endif
kfree(nodes);
return x + sprintf(buf + x, "\n");
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 15,340
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: set_param_option(char *option)
{
Str tmp = Strnew();
char *p = option, *q;
while (*p && !IS_SPACE(*p) && *p != '=')
Strcat_char(tmp, *p++);
while (*p && IS_SPACE(*p))
p++;
if (*p == '=') {
p++;
while (*p && IS_SPACE(*p))
p++;
}
Strlower(tmp);
if (set_param(tmp->ptr, p))
goto option_assigned;
q = tmp->ptr;
if (!strncmp(q, "no", 2)) { /* -o noxxx, -o no-xxx, -o no_xxx */
q += 2;
if (*q == '-' || *q == '_')
q++;
}
else if (tmp->ptr[0] == '-') /* -o -xxx */
q++;
else
return 0;
if (set_param(q, "0"))
goto option_assigned;
return 0;
option_assigned:
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Make temporary directory safely when ~/.w3m is unwritable
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 17,179
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int StreamTcp4WHSTest03 (void)
{
int ret = 0;
Packet *p = SCMalloc(SIZE_OF_PACKET);
FAIL_IF(unlikely(p == NULL));
Flow f;
ThreadVars tv;
StreamTcpThread stt;
TCPHdr tcph;
memset(p, 0, SIZE_OF_PACKET);
PacketQueue pq;
memset(&pq,0,sizeof(PacketQueue));
memset (&f, 0, sizeof(Flow));
memset(&tv, 0, sizeof (ThreadVars));
memset(&stt, 0, sizeof (StreamTcpThread));
memset(&tcph, 0, sizeof (TCPHdr));
FLOW_INITIALIZE(&f);
p->flow = &f;
StreamTcpUTInit(&stt.ra_ctx);
tcph.th_win = htons(5480);
tcph.th_seq = htonl(10);
tcph.th_ack = 0;
tcph.th_flags = TH_SYN;
p->tcph = &tcph;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1)
goto end;
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(20);
p->tcph->th_ack = 0;
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_SYN;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOCLIENT;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1)
goto end;
if ((!(((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->flags & STREAMTCP_FLAG_4WHS))) {
printf("STREAMTCP_FLAG_4WHS flag not set: ");
goto end;
}
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(30);
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(11);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_SYN|TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOCLIENT;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1)
goto end;
p->tcph->th_seq = htonl(11);
p->tcph->th_ack = htonl(31);
p->tcph->th_flags = TH_ACK;
p->flowflags = FLOW_PKT_TOSERVER;
if (StreamTcpPacket(&tv, p, &stt, &pq) == -1)
goto end;
if (((TcpSession *)(p->flow->protoctx))->state != TCP_ESTABLISHED) {
printf("state is not ESTABLISHED: ");
goto end;
}
ret = 1;
end:
StreamTcpSessionClear(p->flow->protoctx);
SCFree(p);
FLOW_DESTROY(&f);
StreamTcpUTDeinit(stt.ra_ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: stream: support RST getting lost/ignored
In case of a valid RST on a SYN, the state is switched to 'TCP_CLOSED'.
However, the target of the RST may not have received it, or may not
have accepted it. Also, the RST may have been injected, so the supposed
sender may not actually be aware of the RST that was sent in it's name.
In this case the previous behavior was to switch the state to CLOSED and
accept no further TCP updates or stream reassembly.
This patch changes this. It still switches the state to CLOSED, as this
is by far the most likely to be correct. However, it will reconsider
the state if the receiver continues to talk.
To do this on each state change the previous state will be recorded in
TcpSession::pstate. If a non-RST packet is received after a RST, this
TcpSession::pstate is used to try to continue the conversation.
If the (supposed) sender of the RST is also continueing the conversation
as normal, it's highly likely it didn't send the RST. In this case
a stream event is generated.
Ticket: #2501
Reported-By: Kirill Shipulin
CWE ID:
| 0
| 19,901
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: set_description (GsmXSMPClient *client)
{
SmProp *prop;
const char *id;
prop = find_property (client, SmProgram, NULL);
id = gsm_client_peek_startup_id (GSM_CLIENT (client));
g_free (client->priv->description);
if (prop) {
client->priv->description = g_strdup_printf ("%p [%.*s %s]",
client,
prop->vals[0].length,
(char *)prop->vals[0].value,
id);
} else if (id != NULL) {
client->priv->description = g_strdup_printf ("%p [%s]", client, id);
} else {
client->priv->description = g_strdup_printf ("%p", client);
}
}
Commit Message: [gsm] Delay the creation of the GsmXSMPClient until it really exists
We used to create the GsmXSMPClient before the XSMP connection is really
accepted. This can lead to some issues, though. An example is:
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211#c19. Quoting:
"What is happening is that a new client (probably metacity in your
case) is opening an ICE connection in the GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_END_SESSION
phase, which causes a new GsmXSMPClient to be added to the client
store. The GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_EXIT phase then begins before the client
has had a chance to establish a xsmp connection, which means that
client->priv->conn will not be initialized at the point that xsmp_stop
is called on the new unregistered client."
The fix is to create the GsmXSMPClient object when there's a real XSMP
connection. This implies moving the timeout that makes sure we don't
have an empty client to the XSMP server.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 19,187
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: vmnc_handle_hextile_rectangle (GstVMncDec * dec, struct RfbRectangle *rect,
const guint8 * data, int len, gboolean decode)
{
int tilesx = GST_ROUND_UP_16 (rect->width) / 16;
int tilesy = GST_ROUND_UP_16 (rect->height) / 16;
int x, y, z;
int off = 0;
int subrects;
int coloured;
int width, height;
guint32 fg = 0, bg = 0, colour;
guint8 flags;
for (y = 0; y < tilesy; y++) {
if (y == tilesy - 1)
height = rect->height - (tilesy - 1) * 16;
else
height = 16;
for (x = 0; x < tilesx; x++) {
if (x == tilesx - 1)
width = rect->width - (tilesx - 1) * 16;
else
width = 16;
if (off >= len) {
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA;
}
flags = data[off++];
if (flags & 0x1) {
if (off + width * height * dec->format.bytes_per_pixel > len) {
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA;
}
if (decode)
render_raw_tile (dec, data + off, rect->x + x * 16, rect->y + y * 16,
width, height);
off += width * height * dec->format.bytes_per_pixel;
} else {
if (flags & 0x2) {
READ_PIXEL (bg, data, off, len)
}
if (flags & 0x4) {
READ_PIXEL (fg, data, off, len)
}
subrects = 0;
if (flags & 0x8) {
if (off >= len) {
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA;
}
subrects = data[off++];
}
/* Paint background colour on entire tile */
if (decode)
render_subrect (dec, rect->x + x * 16, rect->y + y * 16,
width, height, bg);
coloured = flags & 0x10;
for (z = 0; z < subrects; z++) {
if (coloured) {
READ_PIXEL (colour, data, off, len);
} else
colour = fg;
if (off + 2 > len)
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA;
{
int off_x = (data[off] & 0xf0) >> 4;
int off_y = (data[off] & 0x0f);
int w = ((data[off + 1] & 0xf0) >> 4) + 1;
int h = (data[off + 1] & 0x0f) + 1;
off += 2;
/* Ensure we don't have out of bounds coordinates */
if (off_x + w > width || off_y + h > height) {
GST_WARNING_OBJECT (dec, "Subrect out of bounds: %d-%d x %d-%d "
"extends outside %dx%d", off_x, w, off_y, h, width, height);
return ERROR_INVALID;
}
if (decode)
render_subrect (dec, rect->x + x * 16 + off_x,
rect->y + y * 16 + off_y, w, h, colour);
}
}
}
}
}
return off;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 1,050
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::DidAutoResize(const blink::WebSize& newSize) {
GetWidget()->DidAutoResize(newSize);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 1,558
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IW_IMPL(int) iw_get_sample_size(void)
{
return (int)sizeof(iw_float32);
}
Commit Message: Double-check that the input image's density is valid
Fixes a bug that could result in division by zero, at least for a JPEG
source image.
Fixes issues #19, #20
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 17,543
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void adjust(LayoutSize& offset) const
{
LayoutUnit currLogicalLeftOffset = (m_isHorizontal ? m_colRect.x() : m_colRect.y()) - m_logicalLeft;
offset += m_isHorizontal ? LayoutSize(currLogicalLeftOffset, m_currLogicalTopOffset) : LayoutSize(m_currLogicalTopOffset, currLogicalLeftOffset);
if (m_colInfo->progressionAxis() == ColumnInfo::BlockAxis) {
if (m_isHorizontal)
offset.expand(0, m_colRect.y() - m_block.borderTop() - m_block.paddingTop());
else
offset.expand(m_colRect.x() - m_block.borderLeft() - m_block.paddingLeft(), 0);
}
}
Commit Message: Separate repaint and layout requirements of StyleDifference (Step 1)
Previously StyleDifference was an enum that proximately bigger values
imply smaller values (e.g. StyleDifferenceLayout implies
StyleDifferenceRepaint). This causes unnecessary repaints in some cases
on layout change.
Convert StyleDifference to a structure containing relatively independent
flags.
This change doesn't directly improve the result, but can make further
repaint optimizations possible.
Step 1 doesn't change any functionality. RenderStyle still generate the
legacy StyleDifference enum when comparing styles and convert the result
to the new StyleDifference. Implicit requirements are not handled during
the conversion.
Converted call sites to use the new StyleDifference according to the
following conversion rules:
- diff == StyleDifferenceEqual (&& !context) => diff.hasNoChange()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaintObjectOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff == StyleDifferenceRepaint || diff == StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaint => diff.needsRepaint() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff >= StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsRepaintLayer() || diff.needsLayout()
- diff > StyleDifferenceRepaintLayer => diff.needsLayout()
- diff == StyleDifferencePositionedMovementLayoutOnly => diff.needsPositionedMovementLayoutOnly()
- diff == StyleDifferenceLayout => diff.needsFullLayout()
BUG=358460
TEST=All existing layout tests.
R=eseidel@chromium.org, esprehn@chromium.org, jchaffraix@chromium.org
Committed: https://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?view=rev&revision=171983
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/236203020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172331 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,198
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLES2Implementation::DeferErrorCallbacks::~DeferErrorCallbacks() {
DCHECK_EQ(true, gles2_implementation_->deferring_error_callbacks_);
gles2_implementation_->deferring_error_callbacks_ = false;
gles2_implementation_->CallDeferredErrorCallbacks();
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 4,165
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void mark_ptr_or_null_reg(struct bpf_func_state *state,
struct bpf_reg_state *reg, u32 id,
bool is_null)
{
if (reg_type_may_be_null(reg->type) && reg->id == id) {
/* Old offset (both fixed and variable parts) should
* have been known-zero, because we don't allow pointer
* arithmetic on pointers that might be NULL.
*/
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(reg->smin_value || reg->smax_value ||
!tnum_equals_const(reg->var_off, 0) ||
reg->off)) {
__mark_reg_known_zero(reg);
reg->off = 0;
}
if (is_null) {
reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL) {
if (reg->map_ptr->inner_map_meta) {
reg->type = CONST_PTR_TO_MAP;
reg->map_ptr = reg->map_ptr->inner_map_meta;
} else {
reg->type = PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE;
}
} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_SOCKET_OR_NULL) {
reg->type = PTR_TO_SOCKET;
}
if (is_null || !reg_is_refcounted(reg)) {
/* We don't need id from this point onwards anymore,
* thus we should better reset it, so that state
* pruning has chances to take effect.
*/
reg->id = 0;
}
}
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 16,593
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: brcmf_cfg80211_sched_scan_start(struct wiphy *wiphy,
struct net_device *ndev,
struct cfg80211_sched_scan_request *request)
{
struct brcmf_if *ifp = netdev_priv(ndev);
struct brcmf_cfg80211_info *cfg = wiphy_priv(wiphy);
struct brcmf_pno_net_param_le pfn;
int i;
int ret = 0;
brcmf_dbg(SCAN, "Enter n_match_sets:%d n_ssids:%d\n",
request->n_match_sets, request->n_ssids);
if (test_bit(BRCMF_SCAN_STATUS_BUSY, &cfg->scan_status)) {
brcmf_err("Scanning already: status (%lu)\n", cfg->scan_status);
return -EAGAIN;
}
if (test_bit(BRCMF_SCAN_STATUS_SUPPRESS, &cfg->scan_status)) {
brcmf_err("Scanning suppressed: status (%lu)\n",
cfg->scan_status);
return -EAGAIN;
}
if (!request->n_ssids || !request->n_match_sets) {
brcmf_dbg(SCAN, "Invalid sched scan req!! n_ssids:%d\n",
request->n_ssids);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (request->n_ssids > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < request->n_ssids; i++) {
/* Active scan req for ssids */
brcmf_dbg(SCAN, ">>> Active scan req for ssid (%s)\n",
request->ssids[i].ssid);
/* match_set ssids is a supert set of n_ssid list,
* so we need not add these set separately.
*/
}
}
if (request->n_match_sets > 0) {
/* clean up everything */
ret = brcmf_dev_pno_clean(ndev);
if (ret < 0) {
brcmf_err("failed error=%d\n", ret);
return ret;
}
/* configure pno */
if (brcmf_dev_pno_config(ifp, request))
return -EINVAL;
/* configure each match set */
for (i = 0; i < request->n_match_sets; i++) {
struct cfg80211_ssid *ssid;
u32 ssid_len;
ssid = &request->match_sets[i].ssid;
ssid_len = ssid->ssid_len;
if (!ssid_len) {
brcmf_err("skip broadcast ssid\n");
continue;
}
pfn.auth = cpu_to_le32(WLAN_AUTH_OPEN);
pfn.wpa_auth = cpu_to_le32(BRCMF_PNO_WPA_AUTH_ANY);
pfn.wsec = cpu_to_le32(0);
pfn.infra = cpu_to_le32(1);
pfn.flags = cpu_to_le32(1 << BRCMF_PNO_HIDDEN_BIT);
pfn.ssid.SSID_len = cpu_to_le32(ssid_len);
memcpy(pfn.ssid.SSID, ssid->ssid, ssid_len);
ret = brcmf_fil_iovar_data_set(ifp, "pfn_add", &pfn,
sizeof(pfn));
brcmf_dbg(SCAN, ">>> PNO filter %s for ssid (%s)\n",
ret == 0 ? "set" : "failed", ssid->ssid);
}
/* Enable the PNO */
if (brcmf_fil_iovar_int_set(ifp, "pfn", 1) < 0) {
brcmf_err("PNO enable failed!! ret=%d\n", ret);
return -EINVAL;
}
} else {
return -EINVAL;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,853
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int decode_link(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct nfs4_change_info *cinfo)
{
int status;
status = decode_op_hdr(xdr, OP_LINK);
if (status)
return status;
return decode_change_info(xdr, cinfo);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,767
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free_pmu_context(struct pmu *pmu)
{
mutex_lock(&pmus_lock);
free_percpu(pmu->pmu_cpu_context);
mutex_unlock(&pmus_lock);
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix the perf_cpu_time_max_percent check
Use "proc_dointvec_minmax" instead of "proc_dointvec" to check the input
value from user-space.
If not, we can set a big value and some vars will overflow like
"sysctl_perf_event_sample_rate" which will cause a lot of unexpected
problems.
Signed-off-by: Tan Xiaojun <tanxiaojun@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1487829879-56237-1-git-send-email-tanxiaojun@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 28,394
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int list_locations(struct kmem_cache *s, char *buf,
enum track_item alloc)
{
int len = 0;
unsigned long i;
struct loc_track t = { 0, 0, NULL };
int node;
if (!alloc_loc_track(&t, PAGE_SIZE / sizeof(struct location),
GFP_TEMPORARY))
return sprintf(buf, "Out of memory\n");
/* Push back cpu slabs */
flush_all(s);
for_each_node_state(node, N_NORMAL_MEMORY) {
struct kmem_cache_node *n = get_node(s, node);
unsigned long flags;
struct page *page;
if (!atomic_long_read(&n->nr_slabs))
continue;
spin_lock_irqsave(&n->list_lock, flags);
list_for_each_entry(page, &n->partial, lru)
process_slab(&t, s, page, alloc);
list_for_each_entry(page, &n->full, lru)
process_slab(&t, s, page, alloc);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&n->list_lock, flags);
}
for (i = 0; i < t.count; i++) {
struct location *l = &t.loc[i];
if (len > PAGE_SIZE - 100)
break;
len += sprintf(buf + len, "%7ld ", l->count);
if (l->addr)
len += sprint_symbol(buf + len, (unsigned long)l->addr);
else
len += sprintf(buf + len, "<not-available>");
if (l->sum_time != l->min_time) {
unsigned long remainder;
len += sprintf(buf + len, " age=%ld/%ld/%ld",
l->min_time,
div_long_long_rem(l->sum_time, l->count, &remainder),
l->max_time);
} else
len += sprintf(buf + len, " age=%ld",
l->min_time);
if (l->min_pid != l->max_pid)
len += sprintf(buf + len, " pid=%ld-%ld",
l->min_pid, l->max_pid);
else
len += sprintf(buf + len, " pid=%ld",
l->min_pid);
if (num_online_cpus() > 1 && !cpus_empty(l->cpus) &&
len < PAGE_SIZE - 60) {
len += sprintf(buf + len, " cpus=");
len += cpulist_scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len - 50,
l->cpus);
}
if (num_online_nodes() > 1 && !nodes_empty(l->nodes) &&
len < PAGE_SIZE - 60) {
len += sprintf(buf + len, " nodes=");
len += nodelist_scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len - 50,
l->nodes);
}
len += sprintf(buf + len, "\n");
}
free_loc_track(&t);
if (!t.count)
len += sprintf(buf, "No data\n");
return len;
}
Commit Message: remove div_long_long_rem
x86 is the only arch right now, which provides an optimized for
div_long_long_rem and it has the downside that one has to be very careful that
the divide doesn't overflow.
The API is a little akward, as the arguments for the unsigned divide are
signed. The signed version also doesn't handle a negative divisor and
produces worse code on 64bit archs.
There is little incentive to keep this API alive, so this converts the few
users to the new API.
Signed-off-by: Roman Zippel <zippel@linux-m68k.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: john stultz <johnstul@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 1
| 16,980
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool HTMLInputElement::sizeShouldIncludeDecoration(int& preferredSize) const
{
return m_inputTypeView->sizeShouldIncludeDecoration(defaultSize, preferredSize);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 15,294
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int read_user_stack_64(unsigned long __user *ptr, unsigned long *ret)
{
if ((unsigned long)ptr > TASK_SIZE - sizeof(unsigned long) ||
((unsigned long)ptr & 7))
return -EFAULT;
pagefault_disable();
if (!__get_user_inatomic(*ret, ptr)) {
pagefault_enable();
return 0;
}
pagefault_enable();
return read_user_stack_slow(ptr, ret, 8);
}
Commit Message: powerpc/perf: Cap 64bit userspace backtraces to PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH
We cap 32bit userspace backtraces to PERF_MAX_STACK_DEPTH
(currently 127), but we forgot to do the same for 64bit backtraces.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 27,587
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cnid_to_array(uint32_t cnid, uint8_t array[4])
{
array[3] = (cnid >> 0) & 0xff;
array[2] = (cnid >> 8) & 0xff;
array[1] = (cnid >> 16) & 0xff;
array[0] = (cnid >> 24) & 0xff;
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #1374 from JordyZomer/develop
Fix CVE-2018-19497.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 3,165
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __be32 nfsd4_encode_fattr_to_buf(__be32 **p, int words,
struct svc_fh *fhp, struct svc_export *exp,
struct dentry *dentry, u32 *bmval,
struct svc_rqst *rqstp, int ignore_crossmnt)
{
struct xdr_buf dummy;
struct xdr_stream xdr;
__be32 ret;
svcxdr_init_encode_from_buffer(&xdr, &dummy, *p, words << 2);
ret = nfsd4_encode_fattr(&xdr, fhp, exp, dentry, bmval, rqstp,
ignore_crossmnt);
*p = xdr.p;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404
| 0
| 3,125
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GSList *nicklist_get_same_unique(SERVER_REC *server, void *id)
{
NICKLIST_GET_SAME_UNIQUE_REC rec;
GSList *tmp;
g_return_val_if_fail(IS_SERVER(server), NULL);
g_return_val_if_fail(id != NULL, NULL);
rec.id = id;
rec.list = NULL;
for (tmp = server->channels; tmp != NULL; tmp = tmp->next) {
rec.channel = tmp->data;
g_hash_table_foreach(rec.channel->nicks,
(GHFunc) get_nicks_same_hash_unique,
&rec);
}
return rec.list;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'security' into 'master'
Security
Closes #10
See merge request !17
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 27,445
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int snd_seq_ioctl_set_port_info(struct snd_seq_client *client,
void __user *arg)
{
struct snd_seq_client_port *port;
struct snd_seq_port_info info;
if (copy_from_user(&info, arg, sizeof(info)))
return -EFAULT;
if (info.addr.client != client->number) /* only set our own ports ! */
return -EPERM;
port = snd_seq_port_use_ptr(client, info.addr.port);
if (port) {
snd_seq_set_port_info(port, &info);
snd_seq_port_unlock(port);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix missing NULL check at remove_events ioctl
snd_seq_ioctl_remove_events() calls snd_seq_fifo_clear()
unconditionally even if there is no FIFO assigned, and this leads to
an Oops due to NULL dereference. The fix is just to add a proper NULL
check.
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Tested-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,050
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ContextualSearchDelegate::SendSurroundingText(int max_surrounding_chars) {
const base::string16& surrounding = context_->surrounding_text;
int surrounding_length = surrounding.length(); // Cast to int.
int num_after_characters = std::min(
surrounding_length - context_->end_offset, max_surrounding_chars);
base::string16 after_text = surrounding.substr(
context_->end_offset, num_after_characters);
base::TrimWhitespace(after_text, base::TRIM_ALL, &after_text);
surrounding_callback_.Run(UTF16ToUTF8(after_text));
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 4,209
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void coroutine_fn v9fs_setattr(void *opaque)
{
int err = 0;
int32_t fid;
V9fsFidState *fidp;
size_t offset = 7;
V9fsIattr v9iattr;
V9fsPDU *pdu = opaque;
err = pdu_unmarshal(pdu, offset, "dI", &fid, &v9iattr);
if (err < 0) {
goto out_nofid;
}
fidp = get_fid(pdu, fid);
if (fidp == NULL) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_nofid;
}
if (v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_MODE) {
err = v9fs_co_chmod(pdu, &fidp->path, v9iattr.mode);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
}
if (v9iattr.valid & (P9_ATTR_ATIME | P9_ATTR_MTIME)) {
struct timespec times[2];
if (v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_ATIME) {
if (v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_ATIME_SET) {
times[0].tv_sec = v9iattr.atime_sec;
times[0].tv_nsec = v9iattr.atime_nsec;
} else {
times[0].tv_nsec = UTIME_NOW;
}
} else {
times[0].tv_nsec = UTIME_OMIT;
}
if (v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_MTIME) {
if (v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_MTIME_SET) {
times[1].tv_sec = v9iattr.mtime_sec;
times[1].tv_nsec = v9iattr.mtime_nsec;
} else {
times[1].tv_nsec = UTIME_NOW;
}
} else {
times[1].tv_nsec = UTIME_OMIT;
}
err = v9fs_co_utimensat(pdu, &fidp->path, times);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
}
/*
* If the only valid entry in iattr is ctime we can call
* chown(-1,-1) to update the ctime of the file
*/
if ((v9iattr.valid & (P9_ATTR_UID | P9_ATTR_GID)) ||
((v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_CTIME)
&& !((v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_MASK) & ~P9_ATTR_CTIME))) {
if (!(v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_UID)) {
v9iattr.uid = -1;
}
if (!(v9iattr.valid & P9_ATTR_GID)) {
v9iattr.gid = -1;
}
err = v9fs_co_chown(pdu, &fidp->path, v9iattr.uid,
v9iattr.gid);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
}
if (v9iattr.valid & (P9_ATTR_SIZE)) {
err = v9fs_co_truncate(pdu, &fidp->path, v9iattr.size);
if (err < 0) {
goto out;
}
}
err = offset;
out:
put_fid(pdu, fidp);
out_nofid:
pdu_complete(pdu, err);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 3,071
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t pull_ucs2(char *dest, const void *src, size_t dest_len, size_t src_len, int flags)
{
size_t size = 0;
if (ucs2_align(NULL, src, flags)) {
src = (const void *)((const char *)src + 1);
if (src_len > 0)
src_len--;
}
if (flags & STR_TERMINATE) {
if (src_len == (size_t)-1) {
src_len = utf16_len(src);
} else {
src_len = utf16_len_n(src, src_len);
}
}
/* ucs2 is always a multiple of 2 bytes */
if (src_len != (size_t)-1)
src_len &= ~1;
/* We're ignoring the return here.. */
(void)convert_string(CH_UTF16, CH_UNIX, src, src_len, dest, dest_len, &size);
if (dest_len)
dest[MIN(size, dest_len-1)] = 0;
return src_len;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 16,730
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::LockResources() {
DCHECK(frame_provider_ || !surface_id_.is_null());
delegated_frame_evictor_->LockFrame();
}
Commit Message: repairs CopyFromCompositingSurface in HighDPI
This CL removes the DIP=>Pixel transform in
DelegatedFrameHost::CopyFromCompositingSurface(), because said
transformation seems to be happening later in the copy logic
and is currently being applied twice.
BUG=397708
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/421293002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@286414 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 1,159
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void LiveSyncTest::SetUpCommandLine(CommandLine* cl) {
if (!cl->HasSwitch(switches::kSyncNotificationMethod))
cl->AppendSwitchASCII(switches::kSyncNotificationMethod, "p2p");
if (!cl->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableSyncSessions))
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableSyncSessions);
if (!cl->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableSyncTypedUrls))
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableSyncTypedUrls);
if (!cl->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableBackgroundNetworking))
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kDisableBackgroundNetworking);
}
Commit Message: Use URLFetcher::Create instead of new in http_bridge.cc.
This change modified http_bridge so that it uses a factory to construct
the URLFetcher. Moreover, it modified sync_backend_host_unittest.cc to
use an URLFetcher factory which will prevent access to www.example.com during
the test.
BUG=none
TEST=sync_backend_host_unittest.cc
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7053011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87227 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 23,563
|
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