instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
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| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SVGDocumentExtensions::registerPendingSVGFontFaceElementsForRemoval(PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<SVGFontFaceElement> font)
{
m_pendingSVGFontFaceElementsForRemoval.add(font);
}
Commit Message: SVG: Moving animating <svg> to other iframe should not crash.
Moving SVGSVGElement with its SMILTimeContainer already started caused crash before this patch.
|SVGDocumentExtentions::startAnimations()| calls begin() against all SMILTimeContainers in the document, but the SMILTimeContainer for <svg> moved from other document may be already started.
BUG=369860
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/290353002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@174338 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,651
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mcryptd_hash_enqueue(struct ahash_request *req,
crypto_completion_t complete)
{
int ret;
struct mcryptd_hash_request_ctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx(req);
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
struct mcryptd_queue *queue =
mcryptd_get_queue(crypto_ahash_tfm(tfm));
rctx->complete = req->base.complete;
req->base.complete = complete;
ret = mcryptd_enqueue_request(queue, &req->base, rctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 12,478
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
/* Kernel starts us with all fd's closed.
* But it's dangerous:
* fprintf(stderr) can dump messages into random fds, etc.
* Ensure that if any of fd 0,1,2 is closed, we open it to /dev/null.
*/
int fd = xopen("/dev/null", O_RDWR);
while (fd < 2)
fd = xdup(fd);
if (fd > 2)
close(fd);
if (argc < 8)
{
/* percent specifier: %s %c %p %u %g %t %e %h */
/* argv: [0] [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]*/
error_msg_and_die("Usage: %s SIGNO CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID UID GID TIME BINARY_NAME [HOSTNAME]", argv[0]);
}
/* Not needed on 2.6.30.
* At least 2.6.18 has a bug where
* argv[1] = "SIGNO CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID ..."
* argv[2] = "CORE_SIZE_LIMIT PID ..."
* and so on. Fixing it:
*/
if (strchr(argv[1], ' '))
{
int i;
for (i = 1; argv[i]; i++)
{
strchrnul(argv[i], ' ')[0] = '\0';
}
}
logmode = LOGMODE_JOURNAL;
/* Parse abrt.conf */
load_abrt_conf();
/* ... and plugins/CCpp.conf */
bool setting_MakeCompatCore;
bool setting_SaveBinaryImage;
{
map_string_t *settings = new_map_string();
load_abrt_plugin_conf_file("CCpp.conf", settings);
const char *value;
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "MakeCompatCore");
setting_MakeCompatCore = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "SaveBinaryImage");
setting_SaveBinaryImage = value && string_to_bool(value);
value = get_map_string_item_or_NULL(settings, "VerboseLog");
if (value)
g_verbose = xatoi_positive(value);
free_map_string(settings);
}
errno = 0;
const char* signal_str = argv[1];
int signal_no = xatoi_positive(signal_str);
off_t ulimit_c = strtoull(argv[2], NULL, 10);
if (ulimit_c < 0) /* unlimited? */
{
/* set to max possible >0 value */
ulimit_c = ~((off_t)1 << (sizeof(off_t)*8-1));
}
const char *pid_str = argv[3];
pid_t pid = xatoi_positive(argv[3]);
uid_t uid = xatoi_positive(argv[4]);
if (errno || pid <= 0)
{
perror_msg_and_die("PID '%s' or limit '%s' is bogus", argv[3], argv[2]);
}
{
char *s = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose(VAR_RUN"/abrt/saved_core_pattern");
/* If we have a saved pattern and it's not a "|PROG ARGS" thing... */
if (s && s[0] != '|')
core_basename = s;
else
free(s);
}
struct utsname uts;
if (!argv[8]) /* no HOSTNAME? */
{
uname(&uts);
argv[8] = uts.nodename;
}
char path[PATH_MAX];
int src_fd_binary = -1;
char *executable = get_executable(pid, setting_SaveBinaryImage ? &src_fd_binary : NULL);
if (executable && strstr(executable, "/abrt-hook-ccpp"))
{
error_msg_and_die("PID %lu is '%s', not dumping it to avoid recursion",
(long)pid, executable);
}
user_pwd = get_cwd(pid);
log_notice("user_pwd:'%s'", user_pwd);
sprintf(path, "/proc/%lu/status", (long)pid);
proc_pid_status = xmalloc_xopen_read_close(path, /*maxsz:*/ NULL);
uid_t fsuid = uid;
uid_t tmp_fsuid = get_fsuid();
int suid_policy = dump_suid_policy();
if (tmp_fsuid != uid)
{
/* use root for suided apps unless it's explicitly set to UNSAFE */
fsuid = 0;
if (suid_policy == DUMP_SUID_UNSAFE)
fsuid = tmp_fsuid;
else
{
g_user_core_flags = O_EXCL;
g_need_nonrelative = 1;
}
}
/* Open a fd to compat coredump, if requested and is possible */
if (setting_MakeCompatCore && ulimit_c != 0)
/* note: checks "user_pwd == NULL" inside; updates core_basename */
user_core_fd = open_user_core(uid, fsuid, pid, &argv[1]);
if (executable == NULL)
{
/* readlink on /proc/$PID/exe failed, don't create abrt dump dir */
error_msg("Can't read /proc/%lu/exe link", (long)pid);
goto create_user_core;
}
const char *signame = NULL;
switch (signal_no)
{
case SIGILL : signame = "ILL" ; break;
case SIGFPE : signame = "FPE" ; break;
case SIGSEGV: signame = "SEGV"; break;
case SIGBUS : signame = "BUS" ; break; //Bus error (bad memory access)
case SIGABRT: signame = "ABRT"; break; //usually when abort() was called
case SIGTRAP: signame = "TRAP"; break; //Trace/breakpoint trap
default: goto create_user_core; // not a signal we care about
}
if (!daemon_is_ok())
{
/* not an error, exit with exit code 0 */
log("abrtd is not running. If it crashed, "
"/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern contains a stale value, "
"consider resetting it to 'core'"
);
goto create_user_core;
}
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
/* If free space is less than 1/4 of MaxCrashReportsSize... */
if (low_free_space(g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize, g_settings_dump_location))
goto create_user_core;
}
/* Check /var/tmp/abrt/last-ccpp marker, do not dump repeated crashes
* if they happen too often. Else, write new marker value.
*/
snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/last-ccpp", g_settings_dump_location);
if (check_recent_crash_file(path, executable))
{
/* It is a repeating crash */
goto create_user_core;
}
const char *last_slash = strrchr(executable, '/');
if (last_slash && strncmp(++last_slash, "abrt", 4) == 0)
{
/* If abrtd/abrt-foo crashes, we don't want to create a _directory_,
* since that can make new copy of abrtd to process it,
* and maybe crash again...
* Unlike dirs, mere files are ignored by abrtd.
*/
if (snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/%s-coredump", g_settings_dump_location, last_slash) >= sizeof(path))
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s': truncated long file path", path);
int abrt_core_fd = xopen3(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600);
off_t core_size = copyfd_eof(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (core_size < 0 || fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0)
{
unlink(path);
/* copyfd_eof logs the error including errno string,
* but it does not log file name */
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
log("Saved core dump of pid %lu (%s) to %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, executable, path, (long long)core_size);
if (proc_cwd != NULL)
closedir(proc_cwd);
return 0;
}
unsigned path_len = snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "%s/ccpp-%s-%lu.new",
g_settings_dump_location, iso_date_string(NULL), (long)pid);
if (path_len >= (sizeof(path) - sizeof("/"FILENAME_COREDUMP)))
{
goto create_user_core;
}
/* use fsuid instead of uid, so we don't expose any sensitive
* information of suided app in /var/tmp/abrt
*
* dd_create_skeleton() creates a new directory and leaves ownership to
* the current user, hence, we have to call dd_reset_ownership() after the
* directory is populated.
*/
dd = dd_create_skeleton(path, fsuid, DEFAULT_DUMP_DIR_MODE, /*no flags*/0);
if (dd)
{
char *rootdir = get_rootdir(pid);
dd_create_basic_files(dd, fsuid, NULL);
char source_filename[sizeof("/proc/%lu/somewhat_long_name") + sizeof(long)*3];
int source_base_ofs = sprintf(source_filename, "/proc/%lu/smaps", (long)pid);
source_base_ofs -= strlen("smaps");
char *dest_filename = concat_path_file(dd->dd_dirname, "also_somewhat_longish_name");
char *dest_base = strrchr(dest_filename, '/') + 1;
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "maps");
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_MAPS);
copy_file_ext(source_filename, dest_filename, 0640, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid, O_RDONLY, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "limits");
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_LIMITS);
copy_file_ext(source_filename, dest_filename, 0640, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid, O_RDONLY, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL);
strcpy(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "cgroup");
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_CGROUP);
copy_file_ext(source_filename, dest_filename, 0640, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid, O_RDONLY, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_EXCL);
strcpy(dest_base, FILENAME_OPEN_FDS);
dump_fd_info(dest_filename, source_filename, source_base_ofs, dd->dd_uid, dd->dd_gid);
free(dest_filename);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ANALYZER, "CCpp");
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_TYPE, "CCpp");
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_EXECUTABLE, executable);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PID, pid_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PROC_PID_STATUS, proc_pid_status);
if (user_pwd)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_PWD, user_pwd);
if (rootdir)
{
if (strcmp(rootdir, "/") != 0)
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ROOTDIR, rootdir);
}
char *reason = xasprintf("%s killed by SIG%s",
last_slash, signame ? signame : signal_str);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_REASON, reason);
free(reason);
char *cmdline = get_cmdline(pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_CMDLINE, cmdline ? : "");
free(cmdline);
char *environ = get_environ(pid);
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ENVIRON, environ ? : "");
free(environ);
char *fips_enabled = xmalloc_fopen_fgetline_fclose("/proc/sys/crypto/fips_enabled");
if (fips_enabled)
{
if (strcmp(fips_enabled, "0") != 0)
dd_save_text(dd, "fips_enabled", fips_enabled);
free(fips_enabled);
}
dd_save_text(dd, FILENAME_ABRT_VERSION, VERSION);
if (src_fd_binary > 0)
{
strcpy(path + path_len, "/"FILENAME_BINARY);
int dst_fd = create_or_die(path);
off_t sz = copyfd_eof(src_fd_binary, dst_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (fsync(dst_fd) != 0 || close(dst_fd) != 0 || sz < 0)
{
dd_delete(dd);
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
close(src_fd_binary);
}
strcpy(path + path_len, "/"FILENAME_COREDUMP);
int abrt_core_fd = create_or_die(path);
/* We write both coredumps at once.
* We can't write user coredump first, since it might be truncated
* and thus can't be copied and used as abrt coredump;
* and if we write abrt coredump first and then copy it as user one,
* then we have a race when process exits but coredump does not exist yet:
* $ echo -e '#include<signal.h>\nmain(){raise(SIGSEGV);}' | gcc -o test -x c -
* $ rm -f core*; ulimit -c unlimited; ./test; ls -l core*
* 21631 Segmentation fault (core dumped) ./test
* ls: cannot access core*: No such file or directory <=== BAD
*/
off_t core_size = copyfd_sparse(STDIN_FILENO, abrt_core_fd, user_core_fd, ulimit_c);
if (fsync(abrt_core_fd) != 0 || close(abrt_core_fd) != 0 || core_size < 0)
{
unlink(path);
dd_delete(dd);
if (user_core_fd >= 0)
unlinkat(dirfd(proc_cwd), core_basename, /*unlink file*/0);
/* copyfd_sparse logs the error including errno string,
* but it does not log file name */
error_msg_and_die("Error writing '%s'", path);
}
if (user_core_fd >= 0
/* error writing user coredump? */
&& (fsync(user_core_fd) != 0 || close(user_core_fd) != 0
/* user coredump is too big? */
|| (ulimit_c == 0 /* paranoia */ || core_size > ulimit_c)
)
) {
/* nuke it (silently) */
unlinkat(dirfd(proc_cwd), core_basename, /*unlink file*/0);
}
/* Because of #1211835 and #1126850 */
#if 0
/* Save JVM crash log if it exists. (JVM's coredump per se
* is nearly useless for JVM developers)
*/
{
char *java_log = xasprintf("/tmp/jvm-%lu/hs_error.log", (long)pid);
int src_fd = open(java_log, O_RDONLY);
free(java_log);
/* If we couldn't open the error log in /tmp directory we can try to
* read the log from the current directory. It may produce AVC, it
* may produce some error log but all these are expected.
*/
if (src_fd < 0)
{
java_log = xasprintf("%s/hs_err_pid%lu.log", user_pwd, (long)pid);
src_fd = open(java_log, O_RDONLY);
free(java_log);
}
if (src_fd >= 0)
{
strcpy(path + path_len, "/hs_err.log");
int dst_fd = create_or_die(path);
off_t sz = copyfd_eof(src_fd, dst_fd, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (close(dst_fd) != 0 || sz < 0)
{
dd_delete(dd);
error_msg_and_die("Error saving '%s'", path);
}
close(src_fd);
}
}
#endif
/* And finally set the right uid and gid */
dd_reset_ownership(dd);
/* We close dumpdir before we start catering for crash storm case.
* Otherwise, delete_dump_dir's from other concurrent
* CCpp's won't be able to delete our dump (their delete_dump_dir
* will wait for us), and we won't be able to delete their dumps.
* Classic deadlock.
*/
dd_close(dd);
path[path_len] = '\0'; /* path now contains only directory name */
char *newpath = xstrndup(path, path_len - (sizeof(".new")-1));
if (rename(path, newpath) == 0)
strcpy(path, newpath);
free(newpath);
log("Saved core dump of pid %lu (%s) to %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, executable, path, (long long)core_size);
notify_new_path(path);
/* rhbz#539551: "abrt going crazy when crashing process is respawned" */
if (g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize > 0)
{
/* x1.25 and round up to 64m: go a bit up, so that usual in-daemon trimming
* kicks in first, and we don't "fight" with it:
*/
unsigned maxsize = g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize + g_settings_nMaxCrashReportsSize / 4;
maxsize |= 63;
trim_problem_dirs(g_settings_dump_location, maxsize * (double)(1024*1024), path);
}
free(rootdir);
if (proc_cwd != NULL)
closedir(proc_cwd);
return 0;
}
/* We didn't create abrt dump, but may need to create compat coredump */
create_user_core:
if (user_core_fd >= 0)
{
off_t core_size = copyfd_size(STDIN_FILENO, user_core_fd, ulimit_c, COPYFD_SPARSE);
if (fsync(user_core_fd) != 0 || close(user_core_fd) != 0 || core_size < 0)
{
/* perror first, otherwise unlink may trash errno */
perror_msg("Error writing '%s' at '%s'", core_basename, user_pwd);
unlinkat(dirfd(proc_cwd), core_basename, /*unlink file*/0);
if (proc_cwd != NULL)
closedir(proc_cwd);
return 1;
}
if (ulimit_c == 0 || core_size > ulimit_c)
{
unlinkat(dirfd(proc_cwd), core_basename, /*unlink file*/0);
if (proc_cwd != NULL)
closedir(proc_cwd);
return 1;
}
log("Saved core dump of pid %lu to %s at %s (%llu bytes)", (long)pid, core_basename, user_pwd, (long long)core_size);
}
if (proc_cwd != NULL)
closedir(proc_cwd);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: make the dump directories owned by root by default
It was discovered that the abrt event scripts create a user-readable
copy of a sosreport file in abrt problem directories, and include
excerpts of /var/log/messages selected by the user-controlled process
name, leading to an information disclosure.
This issue was discovered by Florian Weimer of Red Hat Product Security.
Related: #1212868
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 1
| 5,471
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MockOfflinePageModel* model() const { return model_; }
Commit Message: Remove unused histograms from the background loader offliner.
Bug: 975512
Change-Id: I87b0a91bed60e3a9e8a1fd9ae9b18cac27a0859f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1683361
Reviewed-by: Cathy Li <chili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Steven Holte <holte@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Williamson <petewil@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#675332}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 5,133
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::webkitExitFullscreen()
{
Document* currentDoc = this;
if (m_fullScreenElementStack.isEmpty())
return;
Deque<RefPtr<Document> > descendants;
for (Frame* descendant = frame() ? frame()->tree()->traverseNext() : 0; descendant; descendant = descendant->tree()->traverseNext()) {
if (descendant->document()->webkitFullscreenElement())
descendants.prepend(descendant->document());
}
for (Deque<RefPtr<Document> >::iterator i = descendants.begin(); i != descendants.end(); ++i) {
(*i)->clearFullscreenElementStack();
addDocumentToFullScreenChangeEventQueue(i->get());
}
Element* newTop = 0;
while (currentDoc) {
currentDoc->popFullscreenElementStack();
newTop = currentDoc->webkitFullscreenElement();
if (newTop && (!newTop->inDocument() || newTop->document() != currentDoc))
continue;
addDocumentToFullScreenChangeEventQueue(currentDoc);
if (!newTop && currentDoc->ownerElement()) {
currentDoc = currentDoc->ownerElement()->document();
continue;
}
currentDoc = 0;
}
if (!page())
return;
if (!newTop) {
page()->chrome()->client()->exitFullScreenForElement(m_fullScreenElement.get());
return;
}
page()->chrome()->client()->enterFullScreenForElement(newTop);
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 9,324
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int verify_stack(unsigned long sp)
{
if (sp < PAGE_OFFSET ||
(sp > (unsigned long)high_memory && high_memory != NULL))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <nerv@dawncrow.de>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <jonathan.austin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,269
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: image_transform_png_set_scale_16_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_scale_16(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 1
| 18,448
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct resv_map *vma_resv_map(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
VM_BUG_ON_VMA(!is_vm_hugetlb_page(vma), vma);
if (vma->vm_flags & VM_MAYSHARE) {
struct address_space *mapping = vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
return inode_resv_map(inode);
} else {
return (struct resv_map *)(get_vma_private_data(vma) &
~HPAGE_RESV_MASK);
}
}
Commit Message: userfaultfd: hugetlbfs: prevent UFFDIO_COPY to fill beyond the end of i_size
This oops:
kernel BUG at fs/hugetlbfs/inode.c:484!
RIP: remove_inode_hugepages+0x3d0/0x410
Call Trace:
hugetlbfs_setattr+0xd9/0x130
notify_change+0x292/0x410
do_truncate+0x65/0xa0
do_sys_ftruncate.constprop.3+0x11a/0x180
SyS_ftruncate+0xe/0x10
tracesys+0xd9/0xde
was caused by the lack of i_size check in hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte.
mmap() can still succeed beyond the end of the i_size after vmtruncate
zapped vmas in those ranges, but the faults must not succeed, and that
includes UFFDIO_COPY.
We could differentiate the retval to userland to represent a SIGBUS like
a page fault would do (vs SIGSEGV), but it doesn't seem very useful and
we'd need to pick a random retval as there's no meaningful syscall
retval that would differentiate from SIGSEGV and SIGBUS, there's just
-EFAULT.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20171016223914.2421-2-aarcange@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,309
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool tsk_conn_cong(struct tipc_sock *tsk)
{
return tsk->snt_unacked >= tsk->snd_win;
}
Commit Message: tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <richard.alpe@ericsson.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.cm>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,842
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void vb2_ops_wait_prepare(struct vb2_queue *vq)
{
mutex_unlock(vq->lock);
}
Commit Message: [media] videobuf2-v4l2: Verify planes array in buffer dequeueing
When a buffer is being dequeued using VIDIOC_DQBUF IOCTL, the exact buffer
which will be dequeued is not known until the buffer has been removed from
the queue. The number of planes is specific to a buffer, not to the queue.
This does lead to the situation where multi-plane buffers may be requested
and queued with n planes, but VIDIOC_DQBUF IOCTL may be passed an argument
struct with fewer planes.
__fill_v4l2_buffer() however uses the number of planes from the dequeued
videobuf2 buffer, overwriting kernel memory (the m.planes array allocated
in video_usercopy() in v4l2-ioctl.c) if the user provided fewer
planes than the dequeued buffer had. Oops!
Fixes: b0e0e1f83de3 ("[media] media: videobuf2: Prepare to divide videobuf2")
Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Hans Verkuil <hans.verkuil@cisco.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # for v4.4 and later
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@osg.samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,842
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WallpaperManagerBase::DeleteUserWallpapers(
const AccountId& account_id,
const std::string& path_to_file) {
std::vector<base::FilePath> file_to_remove;
base::FilePath wallpaper_path = GetCustomWallpaperDir(kSmallWallpaperSubDir);
file_to_remove.push_back(wallpaper_path.Append(account_id.GetUserEmail()));
wallpaper_path = wallpaper_path.Append(path_to_file).DirName();
file_to_remove.push_back(wallpaper_path);
wallpaper_path = GetCustomWallpaperDir(kLargeWallpaperSubDir);
file_to_remove.push_back(wallpaper_path.Append(account_id.GetUserEmail()));
wallpaper_path = wallpaper_path.Append(path_to_file);
file_to_remove.push_back(wallpaper_path);
wallpaper_path = GetCustomWallpaperDir(kThumbnailWallpaperSubDir);
file_to_remove.push_back(wallpaper_path.Append(account_id.GetUserEmail()));
wallpaper_path = wallpaper_path.Append(path_to_file);
file_to_remove.push_back(wallpaper_path);
wallpaper_path = GetCustomWallpaperDir(kOriginalWallpaperSubDir);
file_to_remove.push_back(wallpaper_path.Append(account_id.GetUserEmail()));
wallpaper_path = wallpaper_path.Append(path_to_file);
file_to_remove.push_back(wallpaper_path);
base::PostTaskWithTraits(FROM_HERE,
{base::MayBlock(), base::TaskPriority::BACKGROUND,
base::TaskShutdownBehavior::CONTINUE_ON_SHUTDOWN},
base::Bind(&DeleteWallpaperInList, file_to_remove));
}
Commit Message: [reland] Do not set default wallpaper unless it should do so.
TBR=bshe@chromium.org, alemate@chromium.org
Bug: 751382
Change-Id: Id0793dfe467f737526a95b1e66ed01fbb8860bda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/619754
Commit-Queue: Xiaoqian Dai <xdai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Alekseev <alemate@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Biao She <bshe@chromium.org>
Cr-Original-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498325}
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/646430
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#498982}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 29,849
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: node_allows_single_hop_exits(const node_t *node)
{
if (node && node->ri)
return node->ri->allow_single_hop_exits;
else
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Consider the exit family when applying guard restrictions.
When the new path selection logic went into place, I accidentally
dropped the code that considered the _family_ of the exit node when
deciding if the guard was usable, and we didn't catch that during
code review.
This patch makes the guard_restriction_t code consider the exit
family as well, and adds some (hopefully redundant) checks for the
case where we lack a node_t for a guard but we have a bridge_info_t
for it.
Fixes bug 22753; bugfix on 0.3.0.1-alpha. Tracked as TROVE-2016-006
and CVE-2017-0377.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 17,642
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE6(futex, u32 __user *, uaddr, int, op, u32, val,
struct timespec __user *, utime, u32 __user *, uaddr2,
u32, val3)
{
struct timespec ts;
ktime_t t, *tp = NULL;
u32 val2 = 0;
int cmd = op & FUTEX_CMD_MASK;
if (utime && (cmd == FUTEX_WAIT || cmd == FUTEX_LOCK_PI ||
cmd == FUTEX_WAIT_BITSET ||
cmd == FUTEX_WAIT_REQUEUE_PI)) {
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(!(op & FUTEX_PRIVATE_FLAG))))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&ts, utime, sizeof(ts)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
if (!timespec_valid(&ts))
return -EINVAL;
t = timespec_to_ktime(ts);
if (cmd == FUTEX_WAIT)
t = ktime_add_safe(ktime_get(), t);
tp = &t;
}
/*
* requeue parameter in 'utime' if cmd == FUTEX_*_REQUEUE_*.
* number of waiters to wake in 'utime' if cmd == FUTEX_WAKE_OP.
*/
if (cmd == FUTEX_REQUEUE || cmd == FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE ||
cmd == FUTEX_CMP_REQUEUE_PI || cmd == FUTEX_WAKE_OP)
val2 = (u32) (unsigned long) utime;
return do_futex(uaddr, op, val, tp, uaddr2, val2, val3);
}
Commit Message: futex: Prevent overflow by strengthen input validation
UBSAN reports signed integer overflow in kernel/futex.c:
UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in kernel/futex.c:2041:18
signed integer overflow:
0 - -2147483648 cannot be represented in type 'int'
Add a sanity check to catch negative values of nr_wake and nr_requeue.
Signed-off-by: Li Jinyue <lijinyue@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1513242294-31786-1-git-send-email-lijinyue@huawei.com
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 22,519
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned long read_pmc(int idx)
{
unsigned long val;
switch (idx) {
case 1:
val = mfspr(SPRN_PMC1);
break;
case 2:
val = mfspr(SPRN_PMC2);
break;
case 3:
val = mfspr(SPRN_PMC3);
break;
case 4:
val = mfspr(SPRN_PMC4);
break;
case 5:
val = mfspr(SPRN_PMC5);
break;
case 6:
val = mfspr(SPRN_PMC6);
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
case 7:
val = mfspr(SPRN_PMC7);
break;
case 8:
val = mfspr(SPRN_PMC8);
break;
#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64 */
default:
printk(KERN_ERR "oops trying to read PMC%d\n", idx);
val = 0;
}
return val;
}
Commit Message: perf, powerpc: Handle events that raise an exception without overflowing
Events on POWER7 can roll back if a speculative event doesn't
eventually complete. Unfortunately in some rare cases they will
raise a performance monitor exception. We need to catch this to
ensure we reset the PMC. In all cases the PMC will be 256 or less
cycles from overflow.
Signed-off-by: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org> # as far back as it applies cleanly
LKML-Reference: <20110309143842.6c22845e@kryten>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 25,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: person_set_ignore_persons(person_t* person, bool ignoring)
{
person->ignore_all_persons = ignoring;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c (#268)
* Fix integer overflow in layer_resize in map_engine.c
There's a buffer overflow bug in the function layer_resize. It allocates
a buffer `tilemap` with size `x_size * y_size * sizeof(struct map_tile)`.
But it didn't check for integer overflow, so if x_size and y_size are
very large, it's possible that the buffer size is smaller than needed,
causing a buffer overflow later.
PoC: `SetLayerSize(0, 0x7FFFFFFF, 0x7FFFFFFF);`
* move malloc to a separate line
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 29,645
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Ins_MINDEX( INS_ARG )
{
FT_Long L, K;
L = args[0];
if ( L <= 0 || L > CUR.args )
{
CUR.error = TT_Err_Invalid_Reference;
return;
}
K = CUR.stack[CUR.args - L];
FT_ARRAY_MOVE( &CUR.stack[CUR.args - L ],
&CUR.stack[CUR.args - L + 1],
( L - 1 ) );
CUR.stack[CUR.args - 1] = K;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,817
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserPolicyConnector::InitializeDevicePolicySubsystem() {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
if (device_cloud_policy_subsystem_.get()) {
device_cloud_policy_subsystem_->CompleteInitialization(
prefs::kDevicePolicyRefreshRate,
kServiceInitializationStartupDelay);
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: Reset the device policy machinery upon retrying enrollment.
BUG=chromium-os:18208
TEST=See bug description
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7676005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97615 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 5,764
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoReleaseTexImage2DCHROMIUM(
GLenum target, GLint image_id) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GLES2DecoderImpl::DoReleaseTexImage2DCHROMIUM");
TextureRef* texture_ref =
texture_manager()->GetTextureInfoForTargetUnlessDefault(&state_, target);
if (!texture_ref) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glReleaseTexImage2DCHROMIUM", "no texture bound");
return;
}
gl::GLImage* image = image_manager()->LookupImage(image_id);
if (!image) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(
GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glReleaseTexImage2DCHROMIUM", "no image found with the given ID");
return;
}
Texture::ImageState image_state;
if (texture_ref->texture()->GetLevelImage(target, 0, &image_state) != image)
return;
if (image_state == Texture::BOUND) {
ScopedGLErrorSuppressor suppressor(
"GLES2DecoderImpl::DoReleaseTexImage2DCHROMIUM", error_state_.get());
image->ReleaseTexImage(target);
texture_manager()->SetLevelInfo(texture_ref, target, 0, GL_RGBA, 0, 0, 1, 0,
GL_RGBA, GL_UNSIGNED_BYTE, gfx::Rect());
}
texture_manager()->SetLevelImage(texture_ref, target, 0, nullptr,
Texture::UNBOUND);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 5,120
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ftp_quit(ftpbuf_t *ftp)
{
if (ftp == NULL) {
return 0;
}
if (!ftp_putcmd(ftp, "QUIT", NULL)) {
return 0;
}
if (!ftp_getresp(ftp) || ftp->resp != 221) {
return 0;
}
if (ftp->pwd) {
efree(ftp->pwd);
ftp->pwd = NULL;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,201
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void modbus_mapping_free(modbus_mapping_t *mb_mapping)
{
if (mb_mapping == NULL) {
return;
}
free(mb_mapping->tab_input_registers);
free(mb_mapping->tab_registers);
free(mb_mapping->tab_input_bits);
free(mb_mapping->tab_bits);
free(mb_mapping);
}
Commit Message: Fix VD-1301 and VD-1302 vulnerabilities
This patch was contributed by Maor Vermucht and Or Peles from
VDOO Connected Trust.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 22,779
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: UpdateSpriteForScreen(DeviceIntPtr pDev, ScreenPtr pScreen)
{
SpritePtr pSprite = NULL;
WindowPtr win = NULL;
CursorPtr pCursor;
if (!pScreen)
return;
if (!pDev->spriteInfo->sprite)
return;
pSprite = pDev->spriteInfo->sprite;
win = pScreen->root;
pSprite->hotPhys.pScreen = pScreen;
pSprite->hot = pSprite->hotPhys;
pSprite->hotLimits.x2 = pScreen->width;
pSprite->hotLimits.y2 = pScreen->height;
pSprite->win = win;
pCursor = RefCursor(wCursor(win));
if (pSprite->current)
FreeCursor(pSprite->current, 0);
pSprite->current = pCursor;
pSprite->spriteTraceGood = 1;
pSprite->spriteTrace[0] = win;
(*pScreen->CursorLimits) (pDev,
pScreen,
pSprite->current,
&pSprite->hotLimits, &pSprite->physLimits);
pSprite->confined = FALSE;
(*pScreen->ConstrainCursor) (pDev, pScreen, &pSprite->physLimits);
(*pScreen->DisplayCursor) (pDev, pScreen, pSprite->current);
#ifdef PANORAMIX
if (!noPanoramiXExtension) {
pSprite->hotLimits.x1 = -screenInfo.screens[0]->x;
pSprite->hotLimits.y1 = -screenInfo.screens[0]->y;
pSprite->hotLimits.x2 = PanoramiXPixWidth - screenInfo.screens[0]->x;
pSprite->hotLimits.y2 = PanoramiXPixHeight - screenInfo.screens[0]->y;
pSprite->physLimits = pSprite->hotLimits;
pSprite->screen = pScreen;
}
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 22,897
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Track::EOSBlock::EOSBlock() : BlockEntry(NULL, LONG_MIN) {}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 4,048
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void __blk_rq_prep_clone(struct request *dst, struct request *src)
{
dst->cpu = src->cpu;
dst->__sector = blk_rq_pos(src);
dst->__data_len = blk_rq_bytes(src);
if (src->rq_flags & RQF_SPECIAL_PAYLOAD) {
dst->rq_flags |= RQF_SPECIAL_PAYLOAD;
dst->special_vec = src->special_vec;
}
dst->nr_phys_segments = src->nr_phys_segments;
dst->ioprio = src->ioprio;
dst->extra_len = src->extra_len;
}
Commit Message: block: blk_init_allocated_queue() set q->fq as NULL in the fail case
We find the memory use-after-free issue in __blk_drain_queue()
on the kernel 4.14. After read the latest kernel 4.18-rc6 we
think it has the same problem.
Memory is allocated for q->fq in the blk_init_allocated_queue().
If the elevator init function called with error return, it will
run into the fail case to free the q->fq.
Then the __blk_drain_queue() uses the same memory after the free
of the q->fq, it will lead to the unpredictable event.
The patch is to set q->fq as NULL in the fail case of
blk_init_allocated_queue().
Fixes: commit 7c94e1c157a2 ("block: introduce blk_flush_queue to drive flush machinery")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bart.vanassche@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: xiao jin <jin.xiao@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 9,337
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void fbFetchSourcePict(PicturePtr pict, int x, int y, int width, CARD32 *buffer, CARD32 *mask, CARD32 maskBits)
{
SourcePictPtr pGradient = pict->pSourcePict;
GradientWalker walker;
CARD32 *end = buffer + width;
_gradient_walker_init (&walker, pGradient, pict->repeat);
if (pGradient->type == SourcePictTypeSolidFill) {
register CARD32 color = pGradient->solidFill.color;
while (buffer < end) {
WRITE(buffer++, color);
}
} else if (pGradient->type == SourcePictTypeLinear) {
PictVector v, unit;
xFixed_32_32 l;
xFixed_48_16 dx, dy, a, b, off;
/* reference point is the center of the pixel */
v.vector[0] = IntToxFixed(x) + xFixed1/2;
v.vector[1] = IntToxFixed(y) + xFixed1/2;
v.vector[2] = xFixed1;
if (pict->transform) {
if (!PictureTransformPoint3d (pict->transform, &v))
return;
unit.vector[0] = pict->transform->matrix[0][0];
unit.vector[1] = pict->transform->matrix[1][0];
unit.vector[2] = pict->transform->matrix[2][0];
} else {
unit.vector[0] = xFixed1;
unit.vector[1] = 0;
unit.vector[2] = 0;
}
dx = pGradient->linear.p2.x - pGradient->linear.p1.x;
dy = pGradient->linear.p2.y - pGradient->linear.p1.y;
l = dx*dx + dy*dy;
if (l != 0) {
a = (dx << 32) / l;
b = (dy << 32) / l;
off = (-a*pGradient->linear.p1.x - b*pGradient->linear.p1.y)>>16;
}
if (l == 0 || (unit.vector[2] == 0 && v.vector[2] == xFixed1)) {
xFixed_48_16 inc, t;
/* affine transformation only */
if (l == 0) {
t = 0;
inc = 0;
} else {
t = ((a*v.vector[0] + b*v.vector[1]) >> 16) + off;
inc = (a * unit.vector[0] + b * unit.vector[1]) >> 16;
}
if (pGradient->linear.class == SourcePictClassVertical)
{
register CARD32 color;
color = _gradient_walker_pixel( &walker, t );
while (buffer < end)
WRITE(buffer++, color);
}
else
{
if (!mask) {
while (buffer < end)
{
WRITE(buffer, _gradient_walker_pixel (&walker, t));
buffer += 1;
t += inc;
}
} else {
while (buffer < end) {
if (*mask++ & maskBits)
{
WRITE(buffer, _gradient_walker_pixel (&walker, t));
}
buffer += 1;
t += inc;
}
}
}
}
else /* projective transformation */
{
xFixed_48_16 t;
if (pGradient->linear.class == SourcePictClassVertical)
{
register CARD32 color;
if (v.vector[2] == 0)
{
t = 0;
}
else
{
xFixed_48_16 x, y;
x = ((xFixed_48_16) v.vector[0] << 16) / v.vector[2];
y = ((xFixed_48_16) v.vector[1] << 16) / v.vector[2];
t = ((a * x + b * y) >> 16) + off;
}
color = _gradient_walker_pixel( &walker, t );
while (buffer < end)
WRITE(buffer++, color);
}
else
{
while (buffer < end)
{
if (!mask || *mask++ & maskBits)
{
if (v.vector[2] == 0) {
t = 0;
} else {
xFixed_48_16 x, y;
x = ((xFixed_48_16)v.vector[0] << 16) / v.vector[2];
y = ((xFixed_48_16)v.vector[1] << 16) / v.vector[2];
t = ((a*x + b*y) >> 16) + off;
}
WRITE(buffer, _gradient_walker_pixel (&walker, t));
}
++buffer;
v.vector[0] += unit.vector[0];
v.vector[1] += unit.vector[1];
v.vector[2] += unit.vector[2];
}
}
}
} else {
/*
* In the radial gradient problem we are given two circles (c₁,r₁) and
* (c₂,r₂) that define the gradient itself. Then, for any point p, we
* must compute the value(s) of t within [0.0, 1.0] representing the
* circle(s) that would color the point.
*
* There are potentially two values of t since the point p can be
* colored by both sides of the circle, (which happens whenever one
* circle is not entirely contained within the other).
*
* If we solve for a value of t that is outside of [0.0, 1.0] then we
* use the extend mode (NONE, REPEAT, REFLECT, or PAD) to map to a
* value within [0.0, 1.0].
*
* Here is an illustration of the problem:
*
* p₂
* p •
* • ╲
* · ╲r₂
* p₁ · ╲
* • θ╲
* ╲ ╌╌•
* ╲r₁ · c₂
* θ╲ ·
* ╌╌•
* c₁
*
* Given (c₁,r₁), (c₂,r₂) and p, we must find an angle θ such that two
* points p₁ and p₂ on the two circles are collinear with p. Then, the
* desired value of t is the ratio of the length of p₁p to the length
* of p₁p₂.
*
* So, we have six unknown values: (p₁x, p₁y), (p₂x, p₂y), θ and t.
* We can also write six equations that constrain the problem:
*
* Point p₁ is a distance r₁ from c₁ at an angle of θ:
*
* 1. p₁x = c₁x + r₁·cos θ
* 2. p₁y = c₁y + r₁·sin θ
*
* Point p₂ is a distance r₂ from c₂ at an angle of θ:
*
* 3. p₂x = c₂x + r2·cos θ
* 4. p₂y = c₂y + r2·sin θ
*
* Point p lies at a fraction t along the line segment p₁p₂:
*
* 5. px = t·p₂x + (1-t)·p₁x
* 6. py = t·p₂y + (1-t)·p₁y
*
* To solve, first subtitute 1-4 into 5 and 6:
*
* px = t·(c₂x + r₂·cos θ) + (1-t)·(c₁x + r₁·cos θ)
* py = t·(c₂y + r₂·sin θ) + (1-t)·(c₁y + r₁·sin θ)
*
* Then solve each for cos θ and sin θ expressed as a function of t:
*
* cos θ = (-(c₂x - c₁x)·t + (px - c₁x)) / ((r₂-r₁)·t + r₁)
* sin θ = (-(c₂y - c₁y)·t + (py - c₁y)) / ((r₂-r₁)·t + r₁)
*
* To simplify this a bit, we define new variables for several of the
* common terms as shown below:
*
* p₂
* p •
* • ╲
* · ┆ ╲r₂
* p₁ · ┆ ╲
* • pdy┆ ╲
* ╲ ┆ •c₂
* ╲r₁ ┆ · ┆
* ╲ ·┆ ┆cdy
* •╌╌╌╌┴╌╌╌╌╌╌╌┘
* c₁ pdx cdx
*
* cdx = (c₂x - c₁x)
* cdy = (c₂y - c₁y)
* dr = r₂-r₁
* pdx = px - c₁x
* pdy = py - c₁y
*
* Note that cdx, cdy, and dr do not depend on point p at all, so can
* be pre-computed for the entire gradient. The simplifed equations
* are now:
*
* cos θ = (-cdx·t + pdx) / (dr·t + r₁)
* sin θ = (-cdy·t + pdy) / (dr·t + r₁)
*
* Finally, to get a single function of t and eliminate the last
* unknown θ, we use the identity sin²θ + cos²θ = 1. First, square
* each equation, (we knew a quadratic was coming since it must be
* possible to obtain two solutions in some cases):
*
* cos²θ = (cdx²t² - 2·cdx·pdx·t + pdx²) / (dr²·t² + 2·r₁·dr·t + r₁²)
* sin²θ = (cdy²t² - 2·cdy·pdy·t + pdy²) / (dr²·t² + 2·r₁·dr·t + r₁²)
*
* Then add both together, set the result equal to 1, and express as a
* standard quadratic equation in t of the form At² + Bt + C = 0
*
* (cdx² + cdy² - dr²)·t² - 2·(cdx·pdx + cdy·pdy + r₁·dr)·t + (pdx² + pdy² - r₁²) = 0
*
* In other words:
*
* A = cdx² + cdy² - dr²
* B = -2·(pdx·cdx + pdy·cdy + r₁·dr)
* C = pdx² + pdy² - r₁²
*
* And again, notice that A does not depend on p, so can be
* precomputed. From here we just use the quadratic formula to solve
* for t:
*
* t = (-2·B ± ⎷(B² - 4·A·C)) / 2·A
*/
/* radial or conical */
Bool affine = TRUE;
double cx = 1.;
double cy = 0.;
double cz = 0.;
double rx = x + 0.5;
double ry = y + 0.5;
double rz = 1.;
if (pict->transform) {
PictVector v;
/* reference point is the center of the pixel */
v.vector[0] = IntToxFixed(x) + xFixed1/2;
v.vector[1] = IntToxFixed(y) + xFixed1/2;
v.vector[2] = xFixed1;
if (!PictureTransformPoint3d (pict->transform, &v))
return;
cx = pict->transform->matrix[0][0]/65536.;
cy = pict->transform->matrix[1][0]/65536.;
cz = pict->transform->matrix[2][0]/65536.;
rx = v.vector[0]/65536.;
ry = v.vector[1]/65536.;
rz = v.vector[2]/65536.;
affine = pict->transform->matrix[2][0] == 0 && v.vector[2] == xFixed1;
}
if (pGradient->type == SourcePictTypeRadial) {
PictRadialGradient *radial;
radial = &pGradient->radial;
if (affine) {
while (buffer < end) {
if (!mask || *mask++ & maskBits)
{
double pdx, pdy;
double B, C;
double det;
double c1x = radial->c1.x / 65536.0;
double c1y = radial->c1.y / 65536.0;
double r1 = radial->c1.radius / 65536.0;
xFixed_48_16 t;
pdx = rx - c1x;
pdy = ry - c1y;
B = -2 * ( pdx * radial->cdx
+ pdy * radial->cdy
+ r1 * radial->dr);
C = (pdx * pdx + pdy * pdy - r1 * r1);
det = (B * B) - (4 * radial->A * C);
if (det < 0.0)
det = 0.0;
if (radial->A < 0)
t = (xFixed_48_16) ((- B - sqrt(det)) / (2.0 * radial->A) * 65536);
else
t = (xFixed_48_16) ((- B + sqrt(det)) / (2.0 * radial->A) * 65536);
WRITE(buffer, _gradient_walker_pixel (&walker, t));
}
++buffer;
rx += cx;
ry += cy;
}
} else {
/* projective */
while (buffer < end) {
if (!mask || *mask++ & maskBits)
{
double pdx, pdy;
double B, C;
double det;
double c1x = radial->c1.x / 65536.0;
double c1y = radial->c1.y / 65536.0;
double r1 = radial->c1.radius / 65536.0;
xFixed_48_16 t;
double x, y;
if (rz != 0) {
x = rx/rz;
y = ry/rz;
} else {
x = y = 0.;
}
pdx = x - c1x;
pdy = y - c1y;
B = -2 * ( pdx * radial->cdx
+ pdy * radial->cdy
+ r1 * radial->dr);
C = (pdx * pdx + pdy * pdy - r1 * r1);
det = (B * B) - (4 * radial->A * C);
if (det < 0.0)
det = 0.0;
if (radial->A < 0)
t = (xFixed_48_16) ((- B - sqrt(det)) / (2.0 * radial->A) * 65536);
else
t = (xFixed_48_16) ((- B + sqrt(det)) / (2.0 * radial->A) * 65536);
WRITE(buffer, _gradient_walker_pixel (&walker, t));
}
++buffer;
rx += cx;
ry += cy;
rz += cz;
}
}
} else /* SourcePictTypeConical */ {
double a = pGradient->conical.angle/(180.*65536);
if (affine) {
rx -= pGradient->conical.center.x/65536.;
ry -= pGradient->conical.center.y/65536.;
while (buffer < end) {
double angle;
if (!mask || *mask++ & maskBits)
{
xFixed_48_16 t;
angle = atan2(ry, rx) + a;
t = (xFixed_48_16) (angle * (65536. / (2*M_PI)));
WRITE(buffer, _gradient_walker_pixel (&walker, t));
}
++buffer;
rx += cx;
ry += cy;
}
} else {
while (buffer < end) {
double x, y;
double angle;
if (!mask || *mask++ & maskBits)
{
xFixed_48_16 t;
if (rz != 0) {
x = rx/rz;
y = ry/rz;
} else {
x = y = 0.;
}
x -= pGradient->conical.center.x/65536.;
y -= pGradient->conical.center.y/65536.;
angle = atan2(y, x) + a;
t = (xFixed_48_16) (angle * (65536. / (2*M_PI)));
WRITE(buffer, _gradient_walker_pixel (&walker, t));
}
++buffer;
rx += cx;
ry += cy;
rz += cz;
}
}
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 28,100
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nbd_disconnect(int fd)
{
return -ENOTSUP;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 25,250
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: asmlinkage void sparc_lvl15_nmi(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long serr,
unsigned long svaddr, unsigned long aerr,
unsigned long avaddr)
{
sun4c_complete_all_stores();
printk("FAULT: NMI received\n");
printk("SREGS: Synchronous Error %08lx\n", serr);
printk(" Synchronous Vaddr %08lx\n", svaddr);
printk(" Asynchronous Error %08lx\n", aerr);
printk(" Asynchronous Vaddr %08lx\n", avaddr);
if (sun4c_memerr_reg)
printk(" Memory Parity Error %08lx\n", *sun4c_memerr_reg);
printk("REGISTER DUMP:\n");
show_regs(regs);
prom_halt();
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 14,441
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: poolGrow(STRING_POOL *pool) {
if (pool->freeBlocks) {
if (pool->start == 0) {
pool->blocks = pool->freeBlocks;
pool->freeBlocks = pool->freeBlocks->next;
pool->blocks->next = NULL;
pool->start = pool->blocks->s;
pool->end = pool->start + pool->blocks->size;
pool->ptr = pool->start;
return XML_TRUE;
}
if (pool->end - pool->start < pool->freeBlocks->size) {
BLOCK *tem = pool->freeBlocks->next;
pool->freeBlocks->next = pool->blocks;
pool->blocks = pool->freeBlocks;
pool->freeBlocks = tem;
memcpy(pool->blocks->s, pool->start,
(pool->end - pool->start) * sizeof(XML_Char));
pool->ptr = pool->blocks->s + (pool->ptr - pool->start);
pool->start = pool->blocks->s;
pool->end = pool->start + pool->blocks->size;
return XML_TRUE;
}
}
if (pool->blocks && pool->start == pool->blocks->s) {
BLOCK *temp;
int blockSize = (int)((unsigned)(pool->end - pool->start) * 2U);
size_t bytesToAllocate;
/* NOTE: Needs to be calculated prior to calling `realloc`
to avoid dangling pointers: */
const ptrdiff_t offsetInsideBlock = pool->ptr - pool->start;
if (blockSize < 0) {
/* This condition traps a situation where either more than
* INT_MAX/2 bytes have already been allocated. This isn't
* readily testable, since it is unlikely that an average
* machine will have that much memory, so we exclude it from the
* coverage statistics.
*/
return XML_FALSE; /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
}
bytesToAllocate = poolBytesToAllocateFor(blockSize);
if (bytesToAllocate == 0)
return XML_FALSE;
temp = (BLOCK *)pool->mem->realloc_fcn(pool->blocks,
(unsigned)bytesToAllocate);
if (temp == NULL)
return XML_FALSE;
pool->blocks = temp;
pool->blocks->size = blockSize;
pool->ptr = pool->blocks->s + offsetInsideBlock;
pool->start = pool->blocks->s;
pool->end = pool->start + blockSize;
} else {
BLOCK *tem;
int blockSize = (int)(pool->end - pool->start);
size_t bytesToAllocate;
if (blockSize < 0) {
/* This condition traps a situation where either more than
* INT_MAX bytes have already been allocated (which is prevented
* by various pieces of program logic, not least this one, never
* mind the unlikelihood of actually having that much memory) or
* the pool control fields have been corrupted (which could
* conceivably happen in an extremely buggy user handler
* function). Either way it isn't readily testable, so we
* exclude it from the coverage statistics.
*/
return XML_FALSE; /* LCOV_EXCL_LINE */
}
if (blockSize < INIT_BLOCK_SIZE)
blockSize = INIT_BLOCK_SIZE;
else {
/* Detect overflow, avoiding _signed_ overflow undefined behavior */
if ((int)((unsigned)blockSize * 2U) < 0) {
return XML_FALSE;
}
blockSize *= 2;
}
bytesToAllocate = poolBytesToAllocateFor(blockSize);
if (bytesToAllocate == 0)
return XML_FALSE;
tem = (BLOCK *)pool->mem->malloc_fcn(bytesToAllocate);
if (! tem)
return XML_FALSE;
tem->size = blockSize;
tem->next = pool->blocks;
pool->blocks = tem;
if (pool->ptr != pool->start)
memcpy(tem->s, pool->start, (pool->ptr - pool->start) * sizeof(XML_Char));
pool->ptr = tem->s + (pool->ptr - pool->start);
pool->start = tem->s;
pool->end = tem->s + blockSize;
}
return XML_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: xmlparse.c: Deny internal entities closing the doctype
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 7,340
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebMediaPlayerMS::SetGpuMemoryBufferVideoForTesting(
media::GpuMemoryBufferVideoFramePool* gpu_memory_buffer_pool) {
CHECK(frame_deliverer_);
frame_deliverer_->gpu_memory_buffer_pool_.reset(gpu_memory_buffer_pool);
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 22,136
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __must_check ffs_do_descs(unsigned count, char *data, unsigned len,
ffs_entity_callback entity, void *priv)
{
const unsigned _len = len;
unsigned long num = 0;
ENTER();
for (;;) {
int ret;
if (num == count)
data = NULL;
/* Record "descriptor" entity */
ret = entity(FFS_DESCRIPTOR, (u8 *)num, (void *)data, priv);
if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
pr_debug("entity DESCRIPTOR(%02lx); ret = %d\n",
num, ret);
return ret;
}
if (!data)
return _len - len;
ret = ffs_do_single_desc(data, len, entity, priv);
if (unlikely(ret < 0)) {
pr_debug("%s returns %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
len -= ret;
data += ret;
++num;
}
}
Commit Message: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 18,630
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CommandBufferProxyImpl::Flush(int32_t put_offset) {
CheckLock();
base::AutoLock lock(last_state_lock_);
if (last_state_.error != gpu::error::kNoError)
return;
TRACE_EVENT1("gpu", "CommandBufferProxyImpl::Flush", "put_offset",
put_offset);
OrderingBarrierHelper(put_offset);
if (!disconnected_)
channel_->EnsureFlush(last_flush_id_);
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 7,180
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: off_t size_autodetect(int fhandle) {
off_t es;
u64 bytes;
struct stat stat_buf;
int error;
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H
#ifdef BLKGETSIZE64
DEBUG("looking for export size with ioctl BLKGETSIZE64\n");
if (!ioctl(fhandle, BLKGETSIZE64, &bytes) && bytes) {
return (off_t)bytes;
}
#endif /* BLKGETSIZE64 */
#endif /* HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H */
#endif /* HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H */
DEBUG("looking for fhandle size with fstat\n");
stat_buf.st_size = 0;
error = fstat(fhandle, &stat_buf);
if (!error) {
if(stat_buf.st_size > 0)
return (off_t)stat_buf.st_size;
} else {
err("fstat failed: %m");
}
DEBUG("looking for fhandle size with lseek SEEK_END\n");
es = lseek(fhandle, (off_t)0, SEEK_END);
if (es > ((off_t)0)) {
return es;
} else {
DEBUG2("lseek failed: %d", errno==EBADF?1:(errno==ESPIPE?2:(errno==EINVAL?3:4)));
}
err("Could not find size of exported block device: %m");
return OFFT_MAX;
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer size checking
Yes, this means we've re-introduced CVE-2005-3534. Sigh.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,150
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int test_probable_prime_coprime(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
int i, j, ret = 0;
BIGNUM r;
BN_ULONG primes[5] = { 2, 3, 5, 7, 11 };
BN_init(&r);
for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++)
{
if (!bn_probable_prime_dh_coprime(&r, 1024, ctx)) goto err;
for (j = 0; j < 5; j++)
{
if (BN_mod_word(&r, primes[j]) == 0)
{
BIO_printf(bp, "Number generated is not coprime to %ld:\n", primes[j]);
BN_print_fp(stdout, &r);
BIO_printf(bp, "\n");
goto err;
}
}
}
ret = 1;
err:
BN_clear(&r);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2014-3570 (with minor bn_asm.c revamp).
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 10,182
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void OverloadedPerWorldBindingsMethod2MethodForMainWorld(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
ExceptionState exception_state(info.GetIsolate(), ExceptionState::kExecutionContext, "TestObject", "overloadedPerWorldBindingsMethod");
TestObject* impl = V8TestObject::ToImpl(info.Holder());
int32_t long_arg;
long_arg = NativeValueTraits<IDLLong>::NativeValue(info.GetIsolate(), info[0], exception_state);
if (exception_state.HadException())
return;
impl->overloadedPerWorldBindingsMethod(long_arg);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 13,628
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_read_coll(MOVContext *c, AVIOContext *pb, MOVAtom atom)
{
MOVStreamContext *sc;
int version;
if (c->fc->nb_streams < 1)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
sc = c->fc->streams[c->fc->nb_streams - 1]->priv_data;
if (atom.size < 5) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Empty Content Light Level box\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
version = avio_r8(pb);
if (version) {
av_log(c->fc, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Unsupported Content Light Level box version %d\n", version);
return 0;
}
avio_skip(pb, 3); /* flags */
sc->coll = av_content_light_metadata_alloc(&sc->coll_size);
if (!sc->coll)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
sc->coll->MaxCLL = avio_rb16(pb);
sc->coll->MaxFALL = avio_rb16(pb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mov: Fix DoS in read_tfra()
Fixes: Missing EOF check in loop
No testcase
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 9,253
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static vpx_codec_err_t decoder_peek_si_internal(const uint8_t *data,
unsigned int data_sz,
vpx_codec_stream_info_t *si,
int *is_intra_only,
vpx_decrypt_cb decrypt_cb,
void *decrypt_state) {
int intra_only_flag = 0;
uint8_t clear_buffer[9];
if (data + data_sz <= data)
return VPX_CODEC_INVALID_PARAM;
si->is_kf = 0;
si->w = si->h = 0;
if (decrypt_cb) {
data_sz = VPXMIN(sizeof(clear_buffer), data_sz);
decrypt_cb(decrypt_state, data, clear_buffer, data_sz);
data = clear_buffer;
}
{
int show_frame;
int error_resilient;
struct vpx_read_bit_buffer rb = { data, data + data_sz, 0, NULL, NULL };
const int frame_marker = vpx_rb_read_literal(&rb, 2);
const BITSTREAM_PROFILE profile = vp9_read_profile(&rb);
if (frame_marker != VP9_FRAME_MARKER)
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if (profile >= MAX_PROFILES)
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if ((profile >= 2 && data_sz <= 1) || data_sz < 1)
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if (vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb)) { // show an existing frame
vpx_rb_read_literal(&rb, 3); // Frame buffer to show.
return VPX_CODEC_OK;
}
if (data_sz <= 8)
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
si->is_kf = !vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb);
show_frame = vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb);
error_resilient = vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb);
if (si->is_kf) {
if (!vp9_read_sync_code(&rb))
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if (!parse_bitdepth_colorspace_sampling(profile, &rb))
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
vp9_read_frame_size(&rb, (int *)&si->w, (int *)&si->h);
} else {
intra_only_flag = show_frame ? 0 : vpx_rb_read_bit(&rb);
rb.bit_offset += error_resilient ? 0 : 2; // reset_frame_context
if (intra_only_flag) {
if (!vp9_read_sync_code(&rb))
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
if (profile > PROFILE_0) {
if (!parse_bitdepth_colorspace_sampling(profile, &rb))
return VPX_CODEC_UNSUP_BITSTREAM;
}
rb.bit_offset += REF_FRAMES; // refresh_frame_flags
vp9_read_frame_size(&rb, (int *)&si->w, (int *)&si->h);
}
}
}
if (is_intra_only != NULL)
*is_intra_only = intra_only_flag;
return VPX_CODEC_OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE | libvpx: cherry-pick aa1c813 from upstream
Description from upstream:
vp9: Fix potential SEGV in decoder_peek_si_internal
decoder_peek_si_internal could potentially read more bytes than
what actually exists in the input buffer. We check for the buffer
size to be at least 8, but we try to read up to 10 bytes in the
worst case. A well crafted file could thus cause a segfault.
Likely change that introduced this bug was:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/#/c/70439 (git hash:
7c43fb6)
Bug: 30013856
Change-Id: If556414cb5b82472d5673e045bc185cc57bb9af3
(cherry picked from commit bd57d587c2eb743c61b049add18f9fd72bf78c33)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 1,592
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int32_t TestURLLoader::PrepareFileForPost(
const pp::FileRef& file_ref,
const std::string& data,
std::string* message) {
TestCompletionCallback callback(instance_->pp_instance(), callback_type());
pp::FileIO file_io(instance_);
callback.WaitForResult(file_io.Open(file_ref,
PP_FILEOPENFLAG_CREATE |
PP_FILEOPENFLAG_TRUNCATE |
PP_FILEOPENFLAG_WRITE,
callback.GetCallback()));
if (callback.failed()) {
message->assign(callback.errors());
return callback.result();
}
if (callback.result() != PP_OK) {
message->assign("FileIO::Open failed.");
return callback.result();
}
int32_t rv = WriteEntireBuffer(instance_->pp_instance(), &file_io, 0, data,
callback_type());
if (rv != PP_OK) {
message->assign("FileIO::Write failed.");
return rv;
}
return rv;
}
Commit Message: Fix one implicit 64-bit -> 32-bit implicit conversion in a PPAPI test.
../../ppapi/tests/test_url_loader.cc:877:11: warning: implicit conversion loses integer precision: 'int64_t' (aka 'long long') to 'int32_t' (aka 'int') [-Wshorten-64-to-32]
total_bytes_to_be_received);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
BUG=879657
Change-Id: I152f456368131fe7a2891ff0c97bf83f26ef0906
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1220173
Commit-Queue: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#600182}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 7,853
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RunLoop::IsRunningOnCurrentThread() {
Delegate* delegate = tls_delegate.Get().Get();
return delegate && !delegate->active_run_loops_.empty();
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 2,222
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: VirtualKeyboardController::VirtualKeyboardController()
: has_external_keyboard_(false),
has_internal_keyboard_(false),
has_touchscreen_(false),
ignore_external_keyboard_(false) {
Shell::GetInstance()->AddShellObserver(this);
ui::DeviceDataManager::GetInstance()->AddObserver(this);
UpdateDevices();
}
Commit Message: Move smart deploy to tristate.
BUG=
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1149383006
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333058}
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 27,982
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GURL ChromeContentBrowserClient::GetEffectiveURL(
content::BrowserContext* browser_context,
const GURL& url) {
Profile* profile = Profile::FromBrowserContext(browser_context);
if (!profile)
return url;
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (search::ShouldAssignURLToInstantRenderer(url, profile))
return search::GetEffectiveURLForInstant(url, profile);
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
return ChromeContentBrowserClientExtensionsPart::GetEffectiveURL(profile,
url);
#else
return url;
#endif
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,519
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void predictor_decode_mono_3950(APEContext *ctx, int count)
{
APEPredictor *p = &ctx->predictor;
int32_t *decoded0 = ctx->decoded[0];
int32_t predictionA, currentA, A, sign;
ape_apply_filters(ctx, ctx->decoded[0], NULL, count);
currentA = p->lastA[0];
while (count--) {
A = *decoded0;
p->buf[YDELAYA] = currentA;
p->buf[YDELAYA - 1] = p->buf[YDELAYA] - p->buf[YDELAYA - 1];
predictionA = p->buf[YDELAYA ] * p->coeffsA[0][0] +
p->buf[YDELAYA - 1] * p->coeffsA[0][1] +
p->buf[YDELAYA - 2] * p->coeffsA[0][2] +
p->buf[YDELAYA - 3] * p->coeffsA[0][3];
currentA = A + (predictionA >> 10);
p->buf[YADAPTCOEFFSA] = APESIGN(p->buf[YDELAYA ]);
p->buf[YADAPTCOEFFSA - 1] = APESIGN(p->buf[YDELAYA - 1]);
sign = APESIGN(A);
p->coeffsA[0][0] += p->buf[YADAPTCOEFFSA ] * sign;
p->coeffsA[0][1] += p->buf[YADAPTCOEFFSA - 1] * sign;
p->coeffsA[0][2] += p->buf[YADAPTCOEFFSA - 2] * sign;
p->coeffsA[0][3] += p->buf[YADAPTCOEFFSA - 3] * sign;
p->buf++;
/* Have we filled the history buffer? */
if (p->buf == p->historybuffer + HISTORY_SIZE) {
memmove(p->historybuffer, p->buf,
PREDICTOR_SIZE * sizeof(*p->historybuffer));
p->buf = p->historybuffer;
}
p->filterA[0] = currentA + ((p->filterA[0] * 31) >> 5);
*(decoded0++) = p->filterA[0];
}
p->lastA[0] = currentA;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/apedec: Fix integer overflow
Fixes: out of array access
Fixes: PoC.ape and others
Found-by: Bingchang, Liu@VARAS of IIE
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 29,229
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int iwbmp_calc_bitfields_masks(struct iwbmpwcontext *wctx, int num_masks)
{
int k;
int bits[4]; // R, G, B, A
int tot_bits = 0;
for(k=0;k<num_masks;k++) {
bits[k] = iw_max_color_to_bitdepth(wctx->maxcolor[k]);
tot_bits += bits[k];
}
if(tot_bits > 32) {
iw_set_error(wctx->ctx,"Cannot write a BMP image in this color format");
return 0;
}
wctx->bitcount = (tot_bits>16) ? 32 : 16;
wctx->bf_amt_to_shift[0] = bits[1] + bits[2];
wctx->bf_amt_to_shift[1] = bits[2];
wctx->bf_amt_to_shift[2] = 0;
if(num_masks>3) wctx->bf_amt_to_shift[3] = bits[0] + bits[1] + bits[2];
for(k=0;k<num_masks;k++) {
wctx->bf_mask[k] = wctx->maxcolor[k] << wctx->bf_amt_to_shift[k];
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 5,676
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IndexedDBTransaction::IndexedDBTransaction(
int64_t id,
IndexedDBConnection* connection,
const std::set<int64_t>& object_store_ids,
blink::WebIDBTransactionMode mode,
IndexedDBBackingStore::Transaction* backing_store_transaction)
: id_(id),
object_store_ids_(object_store_ids),
mode_(mode),
connection_(connection),
transaction_(backing_store_transaction),
ptr_factory_(this) {
IDB_ASYNC_TRACE_BEGIN("IndexedDBTransaction::lifetime", this);
callbacks_ = connection_->callbacks();
database_ = connection_->database();
diagnostics_.tasks_scheduled = 0;
diagnostics_.tasks_completed = 0;
diagnostics_.creation_time = base::Time::Now();
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID:
| 1
| 15,082
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BackendImpl::FirstEviction() {
DCHECK(data_->header.create_time);
if (!GetEntryCount())
return; // This is just for unit tests.
Time create_time = Time::FromInternalValue(data_->header.create_time);
CACHE_UMA(AGE, "FillupAge", 0, create_time);
int64_t use_time = stats_.GetCounter(Stats::TIMER);
CACHE_UMA(HOURS, "FillupTime", 0, static_cast<int>(use_time / 120));
CACHE_UMA(PERCENTAGE, "FirstHitRatio", 0, stats_.GetHitRatio());
if (!use_time)
use_time = 1;
CACHE_UMA(COUNTS_10000, "FirstEntryAccessRate", 0,
static_cast<int>(data_->header.num_entries / use_time));
CACHE_UMA(COUNTS, "FirstByteIORate", 0,
static_cast<int>((data_->header.num_bytes / 1024) / use_time));
int avg_size = data_->header.num_bytes / GetEntryCount();
CACHE_UMA(COUNTS, "FirstEntrySize", 0, avg_size);
int large_entries_bytes = stats_.GetLargeEntriesSize();
int large_ratio = large_entries_bytes * 100 / data_->header.num_bytes;
CACHE_UMA(PERCENTAGE, "FirstLargeEntriesRatio", 0, large_ratio);
if (new_eviction_) {
CACHE_UMA(PERCENTAGE, "FirstResurrectRatio", 0, stats_.GetResurrectRatio());
CACHE_UMA(PERCENTAGE, "FirstNoUseRatio", 0,
data_->header.lru.sizes[0] * 100 / data_->header.num_entries);
CACHE_UMA(PERCENTAGE, "FirstLowUseRatio", 0,
data_->header.lru.sizes[1] * 100 / data_->header.num_entries);
CACHE_UMA(PERCENTAGE, "FirstHighUseRatio", 0,
data_->header.lru.sizes[2] * 100 / data_->header.num_entries);
}
stats_.ResetRatios();
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 27,556
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int qeth_idx_activate_get_answer(struct qeth_channel *channel,
void (*idx_reply_cb)(struct qeth_channel *,
struct qeth_cmd_buffer *))
{
struct qeth_cmd_buffer *iob;
unsigned long flags;
int rc;
struct qeth_card *card;
QETH_DBF_TEXT(SETUP, 2, "idxanswr");
card = CARD_FROM_CDEV(channel->ccwdev);
iob = qeth_get_buffer(channel);
iob->callback = idx_reply_cb;
memcpy(&channel->ccw, READ_CCW, sizeof(struct ccw1));
channel->ccw.count = QETH_BUFSIZE;
channel->ccw.cda = (__u32) __pa(iob->data);
wait_event(card->wait_q,
atomic_cmpxchg(&channel->irq_pending, 0, 1) == 0);
QETH_DBF_TEXT(SETUP, 6, "noirqpnd");
spin_lock_irqsave(get_ccwdev_lock(channel->ccwdev), flags);
rc = ccw_device_start(channel->ccwdev,
&channel->ccw, (addr_t) iob, 0, 0);
spin_unlock_irqrestore(get_ccwdev_lock(channel->ccwdev), flags);
if (rc) {
QETH_DBF_MESSAGE(2, "Error2 in activating channel rc=%d\n", rc);
QETH_DBF_TEXT_(SETUP, 2, "2err%d", rc);
atomic_set(&channel->irq_pending, 0);
wake_up(&card->wait_q);
return rc;
}
rc = wait_event_interruptible_timeout(card->wait_q,
channel->state == CH_STATE_UP, QETH_TIMEOUT);
if (rc == -ERESTARTSYS)
return rc;
if (channel->state != CH_STATE_UP) {
rc = -ETIME;
QETH_DBF_TEXT_(SETUP, 2, "3err%d", rc);
qeth_clear_cmd_buffers(channel);
} else
rc = 0;
return rc;
}
Commit Message: qeth: avoid buffer overflow in snmp ioctl
Check user-defined length in snmp ioctl request and allow request
only if it fits into a qeth command buffer.
Signed-off-by: Ursula Braun <ursula.braun@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frank Blaschka <frank.blaschka@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heicars2@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,599
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static pdf_creator_t *new_creator(int *n_elements)
{
pdf_creator_t *daddy;
static const pdf_creator_t creator_template[] =
{
{"Title", ""},
{"Author", ""},
{"Subject", ""},
{"Keywords", ""},
{"Creator", ""},
{"Producer", ""},
{"CreationDate", ""},
{"ModDate", ""},
{"Trapped", ""},
};
daddy = malloc(sizeof(creator_template));
memcpy(daddy, creator_template, sizeof(creator_template));
if (n_elements)
*n_elements = sizeof(creator_template) / sizeof(creator_template[0]);
return daddy;
}
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 1
| 16,622
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int null_stdfds(void)
{
int fd, ret = -1;
fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDWR);
if (fd < 0)
return -1;
if (dup2(fd, 0) < 0)
goto err;
if (dup2(fd, 1) < 0)
goto err;
if (dup2(fd, 2) < 0)
goto err;
ret = 0;
err:
close(fd);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2015-1335: Protect container mounts against symlinks
When a container starts up, lxc sets up the container's inital fstree
by doing a bunch of mounting, guided by the container configuration
file. The container config is owned by the admin or user on the host,
so we do not try to guard against bad entries. However, since the
mount target is in the container, it's possible that the container admin
could divert the mount with symbolic links. This could bypass proper
container startup (i.e. confinement of a root-owned container by the
restrictive apparmor policy, by diverting the required write to
/proc/self/attr/current), or bypass the (path-based) apparmor policy
by diverting, say, /proc to /mnt in the container.
To prevent this,
1. do not allow mounts to paths containing symbolic links
2. do not allow bind mounts from relative paths containing symbolic
links.
Details:
Define safe_mount which ensures that the container has not inserted any
symbolic links into any mount targets for mounts to be done during
container setup.
The host's mount path may contain symbolic links. As it is under the
control of the administrator, that's ok. So safe_mount begins the check
for symbolic links after the rootfs->mount, by opening that directory.
It opens each directory along the path using openat() relative to the
parent directory using O_NOFOLLOW. When the target is reached, it
mounts onto /proc/self/fd/<targetfd>.
Use safe_mount() in mount_entry(), when mounting container proc,
and when needed. In particular, safe_mount() need not be used in
any case where:
1. the mount is done in the container's namespace
2. the mount is for the container's rootfs
3. the mount is relative to a tmpfs or proc/sysfs which we have
just safe_mount()ed ourselves
Since we were using proc/net as a temporary placeholder for /proc/sys/net
during container startup, and proc/net is a symbolic link, use proc/tty
instead.
Update the lxc.container.conf manpage with details about the new
restrictions.
Finally, add a testcase to test some symbolic link possibilities.
Reported-by: Roman Fiedler
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Acked-by: Stéphane Graber <stgraber@ubuntu.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59
| 0
| 11,327
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: kex_send_ext_info(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
char *algs;
if ((algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, ',')) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "server-sig-algs")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, algs)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
free(algs);
return r;
}
Commit Message: upstream commit
Unregister the KEXINIT handler after message has been
received. Otherwise an unauthenticated peer can repeat the KEXINIT and cause
allocation of up to 128MB -- until the connection is closed. Reported by
shilei-c at 360.cn
Upstream-ID: 43649ae12a27ef94290db16d1a98294588b75c05
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,593
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool NormalPageArena::IsConsistentForGC() {
for (size_t i = 0; i < kBlinkPageSizeLog2; ++i) {
for (FreeListEntry* free_list_entry = free_list_.free_lists_[i];
free_list_entry; free_list_entry = free_list_entry->Next()) {
if (PagesToBeSweptContains(free_list_entry->GetAddress()))
return false;
}
}
if (HasCurrentAllocationArea()) {
if (PagesToBeSweptContains(CurrentAllocationPoint()))
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 25,865
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ExecutableAllocator::dumpProfile()
{
allocator->dumpProfile();
}
Commit Message: Add missing sys/mman.h include on Mac
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=98089
Patch by Jonathan Liu <net147@gmail.com> on 2013-01-16
Reviewed by Darin Adler.
The madvise function and MADV_FREE constant require sys/mman.h.
* jit/ExecutableAllocatorFixedVMPool.cpp:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@139926 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,925
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool VerifyNumber(const uint8* buffer,
int buffer_size,
int* offset,
int max_digits) {
RCHECK(*offset < buffer_size);
while (isspace(buffer[*offset])) {
++(*offset);
RCHECK(*offset < buffer_size);
}
int numSeen = 0;
while (--max_digits >= 0 && isdigit(buffer[*offset])) {
++numSeen;
++(*offset);
if (*offset >= buffer_size)
return true; // Out of space but seen a digit.
}
return (numSeen > 0);
}
Commit Message: Add extra checks to avoid integer overflow.
BUG=425980
TEST=no crash with ASAN
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/659743004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#301249}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,549
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int snd_usb_gamecon780_boot_quirk(struct usb_device *dev)
{
/* set the initial volume and don't change; other values are either
* too loud or silent due to firmware bug (bko#65251)
*/
u8 buf[2] = { 0x74, 0xe3 };
return snd_usb_ctl_msg(dev, usb_sndctrlpipe(dev, 0), UAC_SET_CUR,
USB_RECIP_INTERFACE | USB_TYPE_CLASS | USB_DIR_OUT,
UAC_FU_VOLUME << 8, 9 << 8, buf, 2);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: Fix NULL dereference in create_fixed_stream_quirk()
create_fixed_stream_quirk() may cause a NULL-pointer dereference by
accessing the non-existing endpoint when a USB device with a malformed
USB descriptor is used.
This patch avoids it simply by adding a sanity check of bNumEndpoints
before the accesses.
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=971125
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 23,518
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void IndexedDBDispatcher::OnComplete(int32 thread_id, int32 transaction_id) {
DCHECK_EQ(thread_id, CurrentWorkerId());
WebIDBTransactionCallbacks* callbacks =
pending_transaction_callbacks_.Lookup(transaction_id);
if (!callbacks)
return;
callbacks->onComplete();
pending_transaction_callbacks_.Remove(transaction_id);
}
Commit Message: Add DCHECK to ensure IndexedDBDispatcher doesn't get re-created.
This could happen if there are IDB objects that survive the call to
didStopWorkerRunLoop.
BUG=121734
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9999035
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@131679 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 1,586
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_dx_csum_verify(struct inode *inode,
struct ext4_dir_entry *dirent)
{
struct dx_countlimit *c;
struct dx_tail *t;
int count_offset, limit, count;
if (!EXT4_HAS_RO_COMPAT_FEATURE(inode->i_sb,
EXT4_FEATURE_RO_COMPAT_METADATA_CSUM))
return 1;
c = get_dx_countlimit(inode, dirent, &count_offset);
if (!c) {
EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode, "dir seems corrupt? Run e2fsck -D.");
return 1;
}
limit = le16_to_cpu(c->limit);
count = le16_to_cpu(c->count);
if (count_offset + (limit * sizeof(struct dx_entry)) >
EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb) - sizeof(struct dx_tail)) {
warn_no_space_for_csum(inode);
return 1;
}
t = (struct dx_tail *)(((struct dx_entry *)c) + limit);
if (t->dt_checksum != ext4_dx_csum(inode, dirent, count_offset,
count, t))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 12,484
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool convert_bpf_extensions(struct sock_filter *fp,
struct sock_filter_int **insnp)
{
struct sock_filter_int *insn = *insnp;
switch (fp->k) {
case SKF_AD_OFF + SKF_AD_PROTOCOL:
BUILD_BUG_ON(FIELD_SIZEOF(struct sk_buff, protocol) != 2);
insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H;
insn->a_reg = A_REG;
insn->x_reg = CTX_REG;
insn->off = offsetof(struct sk_buff, protocol);
insn++;
/* A = ntohs(A) [emitting a nop or swap16] */
insn->code = BPF_ALU | BPF_END | BPF_FROM_BE;
insn->a_reg = A_REG;
insn->imm = 16;
break;
case SKF_AD_OFF + SKF_AD_PKTTYPE:
insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_B;
insn->a_reg = A_REG;
insn->x_reg = CTX_REG;
insn->off = pkt_type_offset();
if (insn->off < 0)
return false;
insn++;
insn->code = BPF_ALU | BPF_AND | BPF_K;
insn->a_reg = A_REG;
insn->imm = PKT_TYPE_MAX;
break;
case SKF_AD_OFF + SKF_AD_IFINDEX:
case SKF_AD_OFF + SKF_AD_HATYPE:
if (FIELD_SIZEOF(struct sk_buff, dev) == 8)
insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW;
else
insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W;
insn->a_reg = TMP_REG;
insn->x_reg = CTX_REG;
insn->off = offsetof(struct sk_buff, dev);
insn++;
insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_JNE | BPF_K;
insn->a_reg = TMP_REG;
insn->imm = 0;
insn->off = 1;
insn++;
insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT;
insn++;
BUILD_BUG_ON(FIELD_SIZEOF(struct net_device, ifindex) != 4);
BUILD_BUG_ON(FIELD_SIZEOF(struct net_device, type) != 2);
insn->a_reg = A_REG;
insn->x_reg = TMP_REG;
if (fp->k == SKF_AD_OFF + SKF_AD_IFINDEX) {
insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W;
insn->off = offsetof(struct net_device, ifindex);
} else {
insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H;
insn->off = offsetof(struct net_device, type);
}
break;
case SKF_AD_OFF + SKF_AD_MARK:
BUILD_BUG_ON(FIELD_SIZEOF(struct sk_buff, mark) != 4);
insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W;
insn->a_reg = A_REG;
insn->x_reg = CTX_REG;
insn->off = offsetof(struct sk_buff, mark);
break;
case SKF_AD_OFF + SKF_AD_RXHASH:
BUILD_BUG_ON(FIELD_SIZEOF(struct sk_buff, hash) != 4);
insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_W;
insn->a_reg = A_REG;
insn->x_reg = CTX_REG;
insn->off = offsetof(struct sk_buff, hash);
break;
case SKF_AD_OFF + SKF_AD_QUEUE:
BUILD_BUG_ON(FIELD_SIZEOF(struct sk_buff, queue_mapping) != 2);
insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H;
insn->a_reg = A_REG;
insn->x_reg = CTX_REG;
insn->off = offsetof(struct sk_buff, queue_mapping);
break;
case SKF_AD_OFF + SKF_AD_VLAN_TAG:
case SKF_AD_OFF + SKF_AD_VLAN_TAG_PRESENT:
BUILD_BUG_ON(FIELD_SIZEOF(struct sk_buff, vlan_tci) != 2);
insn->code = BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_H;
insn->a_reg = A_REG;
insn->x_reg = CTX_REG;
insn->off = offsetof(struct sk_buff, vlan_tci);
insn++;
BUILD_BUG_ON(VLAN_TAG_PRESENT != 0x1000);
if (fp->k == SKF_AD_OFF + SKF_AD_VLAN_TAG) {
insn->code = BPF_ALU | BPF_AND | BPF_K;
insn->a_reg = A_REG;
insn->imm = ~VLAN_TAG_PRESENT;
} else {
insn->code = BPF_ALU | BPF_RSH | BPF_K;
insn->a_reg = A_REG;
insn->imm = 12;
insn++;
insn->code = BPF_ALU | BPF_AND | BPF_K;
insn->a_reg = A_REG;
insn->imm = 1;
}
break;
case SKF_AD_OFF + SKF_AD_PAY_OFFSET:
case SKF_AD_OFF + SKF_AD_NLATTR:
case SKF_AD_OFF + SKF_AD_NLATTR_NEST:
case SKF_AD_OFF + SKF_AD_CPU:
/* arg1 = ctx */
insn->code = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_X;
insn->a_reg = ARG1_REG;
insn->x_reg = CTX_REG;
insn++;
/* arg2 = A */
insn->code = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_X;
insn->a_reg = ARG2_REG;
insn->x_reg = A_REG;
insn++;
/* arg3 = X */
insn->code = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_X;
insn->a_reg = ARG3_REG;
insn->x_reg = X_REG;
insn++;
/* Emit call(ctx, arg2=A, arg3=X) */
insn->code = BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL;
switch (fp->k) {
case SKF_AD_OFF + SKF_AD_PAY_OFFSET:
insn->imm = __skb_get_pay_offset - __bpf_call_base;
break;
case SKF_AD_OFF + SKF_AD_NLATTR:
insn->imm = __skb_get_nlattr - __bpf_call_base;
break;
case SKF_AD_OFF + SKF_AD_NLATTR_NEST:
insn->imm = __skb_get_nlattr_nest - __bpf_call_base;
break;
case SKF_AD_OFF + SKF_AD_CPU:
insn->imm = __get_raw_cpu_id - __bpf_call_base;
break;
}
break;
case SKF_AD_OFF + SKF_AD_ALU_XOR_X:
insn->code = BPF_ALU | BPF_XOR | BPF_X;
insn->a_reg = A_REG;
insn->x_reg = X_REG;
break;
default:
/* This is just a dummy call to avoid letting the compiler
* evict __bpf_call_base() as an optimization. Placed here
* where no-one bothers.
*/
BUG_ON(__bpf_call_base(0, 0, 0, 0, 0) != 0);
return false;
}
*insnp = insn;
return true;
}
Commit Message: filter: prevent nla extensions to peek beyond the end of the message
The BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR and BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST extensions fail to check
for a minimal message length before testing the supplied offset to be
within the bounds of the message. This allows the subtraction of the nla
header to underflow and therefore -- as the data type is unsigned --
allowing far to big offset and length values for the search of the
netlink attribute.
The remainder calculation for the BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST extension is
also wrong. It has the minuend and subtrahend mixed up, therefore
calculates a huge length value, allowing to overrun the end of the
message while looking for the netlink attribute.
The following three BPF snippets will trigger the bugs when attached to
a UNIX datagram socket and parsing a message with length 1, 2 or 3.
,-[ PoC for missing size check in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR ]--
| ld #0x87654321
| ldx #42
| ld #nla
| ret a
`---
,-[ PoC for the same bug in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST ]--
| ld #0x87654321
| ldx #42
| ld #nlan
| ret a
`---
,-[ PoC for wrong remainder calculation in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST ]--
| ; (needs a fake netlink header at offset 0)
| ld #0
| ldx #42
| ld #nlan
| ret a
`---
Fix the first issue by ensuring the message length fulfills the minimal
size constrains of a nla header. Fix the second bug by getting the math
for the remainder calculation right.
Fixes: 4738c1db15 ("[SKFILTER]: Add SKF_ADF_NLATTR instruction")
Fixes: d214c7537b ("filter: add SKF_AD_NLATTR_NEST to look for nested..")
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 11,985
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PPResultAndExceptionToNPResult::~PPResultAndExceptionToNPResult() {
DCHECK(checked_exception_);
ObjectVar::PluginReleasePPVar(exception_);
}
Commit Message: Fix invalid read in ppapi code
BUG=77493
TEST=attached test
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6883059
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@82172 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 22,820
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err mdat_dump(GF_Box *a, FILE * trace)
{
GF_MediaDataBox *p;
const char *name = (a->type==GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_IDAT ? "ItemDataBox" : "MediaDataBox");
p = (GF_MediaDataBox *)a;
gf_isom_box_dump_start(a, name, trace);
fprintf(trace, "dataSize=\""LLD"\">\n", LLD_CAST p->dataSize);
gf_isom_box_dump_done(name, a, trace);
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,079
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int ocfs2_change_file_space(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
struct ocfs2_space_resv *sr)
{
struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct ocfs2_super *osb = OCFS2_SB(inode->i_sb);
int ret;
if ((cmd == OCFS2_IOC_RESVSP || cmd == OCFS2_IOC_RESVSP64) &&
!ocfs2_writes_unwritten_extents(osb))
return -ENOTTY;
else if ((cmd == OCFS2_IOC_UNRESVSP || cmd == OCFS2_IOC_UNRESVSP64) &&
!ocfs2_sparse_alloc(osb))
return -ENOTTY;
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
return -EINVAL;
if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE))
return -EBADF;
ret = mnt_want_write_file(file);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = __ocfs2_change_file_space(file, inode, file->f_pos, cmd, sr, 0);
mnt_drop_write_file(file);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ocfs2: should wait dio before inode lock in ocfs2_setattr()
we should wait dio requests to finish before inode lock in
ocfs2_setattr(), otherwise the following deadlock will happen:
process 1 process 2 process 3
truncate file 'A' end_io of writing file 'A' receiving the bast messages
ocfs2_setattr
ocfs2_inode_lock_tracker
ocfs2_inode_lock_full
inode_dio_wait
__inode_dio_wait
-->waiting for all dio
requests finish
dlm_proxy_ast_handler
dlm_do_local_bast
ocfs2_blocking_ast
ocfs2_generic_handle_bast
set OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED flag
dio_end_io
dio_bio_end_aio
dio_complete
ocfs2_dio_end_io
ocfs2_dio_end_io_write
ocfs2_inode_lock
__ocfs2_cluster_lock
ocfs2_wait_for_mask
-->waiting for OCFS2_LOCK_BLOCKED
flag to be cleared, that is waiting
for 'process 1' unlocking the inode lock
inode_dio_end
-->here dec the i_dio_count, but will never
be called, so a deadlock happened.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/59F81636.70508@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Alex Chen <alex.chen@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Changwei Ge <ge.changwei@h3c.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mfasheh@versity.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 69
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::clear(GLbitfield mask) {
if (isContextLost())
return;
if (mask &
~(GL_COLOR_BUFFER_BIT | GL_DEPTH_BUFFER_BIT | GL_STENCIL_BUFFER_BIT)) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "clear", "invalid mask");
return;
}
const char* reason = "framebuffer incomplete";
if (framebuffer_binding_ && framebuffer_binding_->CheckDepthStencilStatus(
&reason) != GL_FRAMEBUFFER_COMPLETE) {
SynthesizeGLError(GL_INVALID_FRAMEBUFFER_OPERATION, "clear", reason);
return;
}
if (!mask) {
OnErrorMessage(
"Performance warning: clear() called with no buffers in bitmask", 0);
}
ScopedRGBEmulationColorMask emulation_color_mask(this, color_mask_,
drawing_buffer_.get());
if (ClearIfComposited(mask) != kCombinedClear) {
if (!framebuffer_binding_ &&
GetDrawingBuffer()->HasImplicitStencilBuffer() &&
(mask & GL_DEPTH_BUFFER_BIT)) {
mask |= GL_STENCIL_BUFFER_BIT;
}
ContextGL()->Clear(mask);
}
MarkContextChanged(kCanvasChanged);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 14,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DiskCacheBackendTest::BackendEviction() {
const int kMaxSize = 200 * 1024;
const int kMaxEntryCount = 20;
const int kWriteSize = kMaxSize / kMaxEntryCount;
const int kWriteEntryCount = kMaxEntryCount * 2;
static_assert(kWriteEntryCount * kWriteSize > kMaxSize,
"must write more than MaxSize");
SetMaxSize(kMaxSize);
InitSparseCache(nullptr, nullptr);
scoped_refptr<net::IOBuffer> buffer(new net::IOBuffer(kWriteSize));
CacheTestFillBuffer(buffer->data(), kWriteSize, false);
std::string key_prefix("prefix");
for (int i = 0; i < kWriteEntryCount; ++i) {
AddDelay();
disk_cache::Entry* entry = NULL;
ASSERT_THAT(CreateEntry(key_prefix + base::IntToString(i), &entry), IsOk());
disk_cache::ScopedEntryPtr entry_closer(entry);
EXPECT_EQ(kWriteSize,
WriteData(entry, 1, 0, buffer.get(), kWriteSize, false));
}
int size = CalculateSizeOfAllEntries();
EXPECT_GT(kMaxSize, size);
}
Commit Message: Blockfile cache: fix long-standing sparse + evict reentrancy problem
Thanks to nedwilliamson@ (on gmail) for an alternative perspective
plus a reduction to make fixing this much easier.
Bug: 826626, 518908, 537063, 802886
Change-Id: Ibfa01416f9a8e7f7b361e4f93b4b6b134728b85f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/985052
Reviewed-by: Matt Menke <mmenke@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Maks Orlovich <morlovich@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#547103}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 29,559
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static gboolean rpc_event_prepare(GSource *source, gint *timeout)
{
*timeout = -1;
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Support all the new variables added
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 29,398
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_unlink(struct fuse* fuse, struct fuse_handler* handler,
const struct fuse_in_header* hdr, const char* name)
{
struct node* parent_node;
struct node* child_node;
char parent_path[PATH_MAX];
char child_path[PATH_MAX];
pthread_mutex_lock(&fuse->global->lock);
parent_node = lookup_node_and_path_by_id_locked(fuse, hdr->nodeid,
parent_path, sizeof(parent_path));
TRACE("[%d] UNLINK %s @ %"PRIx64" (%s)\n", handler->token,
name, hdr->nodeid, parent_node ? parent_node->name : "?");
pthread_mutex_unlock(&fuse->global->lock);
if (!parent_node || !find_file_within(parent_path, name,
child_path, sizeof(child_path), 1)) {
return -ENOENT;
}
if (!check_caller_access_to_name(fuse, hdr, parent_node, name, W_OK)) {
return -EACCES;
}
if (unlink(child_path) < 0) {
return -errno;
}
pthread_mutex_lock(&fuse->global->lock);
child_node = lookup_child_by_name_locked(parent_node, name);
if (child_node) {
child_node->deleted = true;
}
pthread_mutex_unlock(&fuse->global->lock);
if (parent_node && child_node) {
/* Tell all other views that node is gone */
TRACE("[%d] fuse_notify_delete parent=%"PRIx64", child=%"PRIx64", name=%s\n",
handler->token, (uint64_t) parent_node->nid, (uint64_t) child_node->nid, name);
if (fuse != fuse->global->fuse_default) {
fuse_notify_delete(fuse->global->fuse_default, parent_node->nid, child_node->nid, name);
}
if (fuse != fuse->global->fuse_read) {
fuse_notify_delete(fuse->global->fuse_read, parent_node->nid, child_node->nid, name);
}
if (fuse != fuse->global->fuse_write) {
fuse_notify_delete(fuse->global->fuse_write, parent_node->nid, child_node->nid, name);
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix overflow in path building
An incorrect size was causing an unsigned value
to wrap, causing it to write past the end of
the buffer.
Bug: 28085658
Change-Id: Ie9625c729cca024d514ba2880ff97209d435a165
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,306
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int compute_score(struct sock *sk, struct net *net,
const unsigned short hnum,
const struct in6_addr *daddr,
const int dif)
{
int score = -1;
if (net_eq(sock_net(sk), net) && inet_sk(sk)->inet_num == hnum &&
sk->sk_family == PF_INET6) {
const struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
score = 1;
if (!ipv6_addr_any(&np->rcv_saddr)) {
if (!ipv6_addr_equal(&np->rcv_saddr, daddr))
return -1;
score++;
}
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if) {
if (sk->sk_bound_dev_if != dif)
return -1;
score++;
}
}
return score;
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,551
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Image *OverviewImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*montage_image;
MontageInfo
*montage_info;
register Image
*p;
/*
Create the PCD Overview image.
*/
for (p=image; p != (Image *) NULL; p=p->next)
{
(void) DeleteImageProperty(p,"label");
(void) SetImageProperty(p,"label",DefaultTileLabel,exception);
}
montage_info=CloneMontageInfo(image_info,(MontageInfo *) NULL);
(void) CopyMagickString(montage_info->filename,image_info->filename,
MagickPathExtent);
montage_image=MontageImageList(image_info,montage_info,image,exception);
montage_info=DestroyMontageInfo(montage_info);
if (montage_image == (Image *) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return(montage_image);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1450
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 11,044
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int SocketStream::DoSSLHandleCertError(int result) {
DCHECK_EQ(STATE_NONE, next_state_);
DCHECK(IsCertificateError(result));
result = HandleCertificateError(result);
if (result == OK || result == ERR_IO_PENDING)
next_state_ = STATE_SSL_HANDLE_CERT_ERROR_COMPLETE;
else
next_state_ = STATE_CLOSE;
return result;
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,541
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsZipArchiverPackerEnabled() {
return !base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
kDisableZipArchiverPacker);
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 19,252
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SWFShape_addLineStyle2(SWFShape shape, unsigned short width,
byte r, byte g, byte b, byte a,
int flags, float miterLimit)
{
growLineArray(shape);
SWFShape_useVersion(shape, SWF_SHAPE4);
shape->lines[shape->nLines] = newSWFLineStyle2(width, r, g, b, a, flags, miterLimit);
return ++shape->nLines;
}
Commit Message: SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 21,148
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Ins_FLIPRGON( TT_ExecContext exc,
FT_Long* args )
{
FT_UShort I, K, L;
#ifdef TT_SUPPORT_SUBPIXEL_HINTING_MINIMAL
/* See `ttinterp.h' for details on backward compatibility mode. */
if ( SUBPIXEL_HINTING_MINIMAL &&
exc->backward_compatibility &&
exc->iupx_called &&
exc->iupy_called )
return;
#endif
K = (FT_UShort)args[1];
L = (FT_UShort)args[0];
if ( BOUNDS( K, exc->pts.n_points ) ||
BOUNDS( L, exc->pts.n_points ) )
{
if ( exc->pedantic_hinting )
exc->error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Reference );
return;
}
for ( I = L; I <= K; I++ )
exc->pts.tags[I] |= FT_CURVE_TAG_ON;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 8,287
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t usbip_debug_store(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, const char *buf,
size_t count)
{
if (sscanf(buf, "%lx", &usbip_debug_flag) != 1)
return -EINVAL;
return count;
}
Commit Message: USB: usbip: fix potential out-of-bounds write
Fix potential out-of-bounds write to urb->transfer_buffer
usbip handles network communication directly in the kernel. When receiving a
packet from its peer, usbip code parses headers according to protocol. As
part of this parsing urb->actual_length is filled. Since the input for
urb->actual_length comes from the network, it should be treated as untrusted.
Any entity controlling the network may put any value in the input and the
preallocated urb->transfer_buffer may not be large enough to hold the data.
Thus, the malicious entity is able to write arbitrary data to kernel memory.
Signed-off-by: Ignat Korchagin <ignat.korchagin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,716
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::string16 GetEmailDomains() {
std::vector<wchar_t> email_domains(16);
ULONG length = email_domains.size();
HRESULT hr = GetGlobalFlag(kEmailDomainsKey, &email_domains[0], &length);
if (FAILED(hr)) {
if (hr == HRESULT_FROM_WIN32(ERROR_MORE_DATA)) {
email_domains.resize(length + 1);
length = email_domains.size();
hr = GetGlobalFlag(kEmailDomainsKey, &email_domains[0], &length);
if (FAILED(hr))
email_domains[0] = 0;
}
}
return base::string16(&email_domains[0]);
}
Commit Message: [GCPW] Disallow sign in of consumer accounts when mdm is enabled.
Unless the registry key "mdm_aca" is explicitly set to 1, always
fail sign in of consumer accounts when mdm enrollment is enabled.
Consumer accounts are defined as accounts with gmail.com or
googlemail.com domain.
Bug: 944049
Change-Id: Icb822f3737d90931de16a8d3317616dd2b159edd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1532903
Commit-Queue: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#646278}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 14,312
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_extra(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic_entry *me, const char *line,
off_t off, size_t len, const char *name, const char *extra, int nt)
{
size_t i;
const char *l = line;
struct magic *m = &me->mp[me->cont_count == 0 ? 0 : me->cont_count - 1];
char *buf = (char *)m + off;
if (buf[0] != '\0') {
len = nt ? strlen(buf) : len;
file_magwarn(ms, "Current entry already has a %s type "
"`%.*s', new type `%s'", name, (int)len, buf, l);
return -1;
}
if (*m->desc == '\0') {
file_magwarn(ms, "Current entry does not yet have a "
"description for adding a %s type", name);
return -1;
}
EATAB;
for (i = 0; *l && i < len && goodchar(*l, extra); buf[i++] = *l++)
continue;
if (i == len && *l) {
if (nt)
buf[len - 1] = '\0';
if (ms->flags & MAGIC_CHECK)
file_magwarn(ms, "%s type `%s' truncated %"
SIZE_T_FORMAT "u", name, line, i);
} else {
if (!isspace((unsigned char)*l) && !goodchar(*l, extra))
file_magwarn(ms, "%s type `%s' has bad char '%c'",
name, line, *l);
if (nt)
buf[i] = '\0';
}
if (i > 0)
return 0;
file_magerror(ms, "Bad magic entry '%s'", line);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 22,872
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int OxideQQuickWebView::loadProgress() const {
Q_D(const OxideQQuickWebView);
return d->load_progress_;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,620
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver::ChromeExtensionWebContentsObserver(
content::WebContents* web_contents)
: ExtensionWebContentsObserver(web_contents) {}
Commit Message: This patch implements a mechanism for more granular link URL permissions (filtering on scheme/host). This fixes the bug that allowed PDFs to have working links to any "chrome://" URLs.
BUG=528505,226927
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1362433002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351705}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,716
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err hnti_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
return gf_isom_box_array_read_ex(s, bs, hnti_AddBox, s->type);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 21,534
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::string GetMimeType(const base::FilePath& path) {
std::string mime_type;
net::GetMimeTypeFromFile(path, &mime_type);
return mime_type;
}
Commit Message: Downloads : Fixed an issue of opening incorrect download file
When one download overwrites another completed download, calling download.open in the old download causes the new download to open, which could be dangerous and undesirable. In this CL, we are trying to avoid this by blocking the opening of the old download.
Bug: 793620
Change-Id: Ic948175756700ad7c08489c3cc347330daedb6f8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/826477
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xing Liu <xingliu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Shakti Sahu <shaktisahu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#525810}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,013
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void addrconf_addr_gen(struct inet6_dev *idev, bool prefix_route)
{
if (idev->addr_gen_mode == IN6_ADDR_GEN_MODE_EUI64) {
struct in6_addr addr;
ipv6_addr_set(&addr, htonl(0xFE800000), 0, 0, 0);
/* addrconf_add_linklocal also adds a prefix_route and we
* only need to care about prefix routes if ipv6_generate_eui64
* couldn't generate one.
*/
if (ipv6_generate_eui64(addr.s6_addr + 8, idev->dev) == 0)
addrconf_add_linklocal(idev, &addr);
else if (prefix_route)
addrconf_prefix_route(&addr, 64, idev->dev, 0, 0);
}
}
Commit Message: ipv6: addrconf: validate new MTU before applying it
Currently we don't check if the new MTU is valid or not and this allows
one to configure a smaller than minimum allowed by RFCs or even bigger
than interface own MTU, which is a problem as it may lead to packet
drops.
If you have a daemon like NetworkManager running, this may be exploited
by remote attackers by forging RA packets with an invalid MTU, possibly
leading to a DoS. (NetworkManager currently only validates for values
too small, but not for too big ones.)
The fix is just to make sure the new value is valid. That is, between
IPV6_MIN_MTU and interface's MTU.
Note that similar check is already performed at
ndisc_router_discovery(), for when kernel itself parses the RA.
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 430
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::PageSizeAndMarginsInPixels(int page_index,
DoubleSize& page_size,
int& margin_top,
int& margin_right,
int& margin_bottom,
int& margin_left) {
RefPtr<ComputedStyle> style = StyleForPage(page_index);
double width = page_size.Width();
double height = page_size.Height();
switch (style->PageSizeType()) {
case EPageSizeType::kAuto:
break;
case EPageSizeType::kLandscape:
if (width < height)
std::swap(width, height);
break;
case EPageSizeType::kPortrait:
if (width > height)
std::swap(width, height);
break;
case EPageSizeType::kResolved: {
FloatSize size = style->PageSize();
width = size.Width();
height = size.Height();
break;
}
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
page_size = DoubleSize(width, height);
margin_top = style->MarginTop().IsAuto()
? margin_top
: IntValueForLength(style->MarginTop(), width);
margin_right = style->MarginRight().IsAuto()
? margin_right
: IntValueForLength(style->MarginRight(), width);
margin_bottom = style->MarginBottom().IsAuto()
? margin_bottom
: IntValueForLength(style->MarginBottom(), width);
margin_left = style->MarginLeft().IsAuto()
? margin_left
: IntValueForLength(style->MarginLeft(), width);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 25,210
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int cmd_rev_list(int argc, const char **argv, const char *prefix)
{
struct rev_info revs;
struct rev_list_info info;
int i;
int bisect_list = 0;
int bisect_show_vars = 0;
int bisect_find_all = 0;
int use_bitmap_index = 0;
git_config(git_default_config, NULL);
init_revisions(&revs, prefix);
revs.abbrev = DEFAULT_ABBREV;
revs.commit_format = CMIT_FMT_UNSPECIFIED;
argc = setup_revisions(argc, argv, &revs, NULL);
memset(&info, 0, sizeof(info));
info.revs = &revs;
if (revs.bisect)
bisect_list = 1;
if (DIFF_OPT_TST(&revs.diffopt, QUICK))
info.flags |= REV_LIST_QUIET;
for (i = 1 ; i < argc; i++) {
const char *arg = argv[i];
if (!strcmp(arg, "--header")) {
revs.verbose_header = 1;
continue;
}
if (!strcmp(arg, "--timestamp")) {
info.show_timestamp = 1;
continue;
}
if (!strcmp(arg, "--bisect")) {
bisect_list = 1;
continue;
}
if (!strcmp(arg, "--bisect-all")) {
bisect_list = 1;
bisect_find_all = 1;
info.flags |= BISECT_SHOW_ALL;
revs.show_decorations = 1;
continue;
}
if (!strcmp(arg, "--bisect-vars")) {
bisect_list = 1;
bisect_show_vars = 1;
continue;
}
if (!strcmp(arg, "--use-bitmap-index")) {
use_bitmap_index = 1;
continue;
}
if (!strcmp(arg, "--test-bitmap")) {
test_bitmap_walk(&revs);
return 0;
}
usage(rev_list_usage);
}
if (revs.commit_format != CMIT_FMT_UNSPECIFIED) {
/* The command line has a --pretty */
info.hdr_termination = '\n';
if (revs.commit_format == CMIT_FMT_ONELINE)
info.header_prefix = "";
else
info.header_prefix = "commit ";
}
else if (revs.verbose_header)
/* Only --header was specified */
revs.commit_format = CMIT_FMT_RAW;
if ((!revs.commits &&
(!(revs.tag_objects || revs.tree_objects || revs.blob_objects) &&
!revs.pending.nr)) ||
revs.diff)
usage(rev_list_usage);
if (revs.show_notes)
die(_("rev-list does not support display of notes"));
save_commit_buffer = (revs.verbose_header ||
revs.grep_filter.pattern_list ||
revs.grep_filter.header_list);
if (bisect_list)
revs.limited = 1;
if (use_bitmap_index && !revs.prune) {
if (revs.count && !revs.left_right && !revs.cherry_mark) {
uint32_t commit_count;
if (!prepare_bitmap_walk(&revs)) {
count_bitmap_commit_list(&commit_count, NULL, NULL, NULL);
printf("%d\n", commit_count);
return 0;
}
} else if (revs.tag_objects && revs.tree_objects && revs.blob_objects) {
if (!prepare_bitmap_walk(&revs)) {
traverse_bitmap_commit_list(&show_object_fast);
return 0;
}
}
}
if (prepare_revision_walk(&revs))
die("revision walk setup failed");
if (revs.tree_objects)
mark_edges_uninteresting(&revs, show_edge);
if (bisect_list) {
int reaches = reaches, all = all;
revs.commits = find_bisection(revs.commits, &reaches, &all,
bisect_find_all);
if (bisect_show_vars)
return show_bisect_vars(&info, reaches, all);
}
traverse_commit_list(&revs, show_commit, show_object, &info);
if (revs.count) {
if (revs.left_right && revs.cherry_mark)
printf("%d\t%d\t%d\n", revs.count_left, revs.count_right, revs.count_same);
else if (revs.left_right)
printf("%d\t%d\n", revs.count_left, revs.count_right);
else if (revs.cherry_mark)
printf("%d\t%d\n", revs.count_left + revs.count_right, revs.count_same);
else
printf("%d\n", revs.count_left + revs.count_right);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: list-objects: pass full pathname to callbacks
When we find a blob at "a/b/c", we currently pass this to
our show_object_fn callbacks as two components: "a/b/" and
"c". Callbacks which want the full value then call
path_name(), which concatenates the two. But this is an
inefficient interface; the path is a strbuf, and we could
simply append "c" to it temporarily, then roll back the
length, without creating a new copy.
So we could improve this by teaching the callsites of
path_name() this trick (and there are only 3). But we can
also notice that no callback actually cares about the
broken-down representation, and simply pass each callback
the full path "a/b/c" as a string. The callback code becomes
even simpler, then, as we do not have to worry about freeing
an allocated buffer, nor rolling back our modification to
the strbuf.
This is theoretically less efficient, as some callbacks
would not bother to format the final path component. But in
practice this is not measurable. Since we use the same
strbuf over and over, our work to grow it is amortized, and
we really only pay to memcpy a few bytes.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,671
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: base::string16 GlobalConfirmInfoBar::DelegateProxy::GetMessageText() const {
return global_info_bar_ ? global_info_bar_->delegate_->GetMessageText()
: base::string16();
}
Commit Message: Allow to specify elide behavior for confrim infobar message
Used in "<extension name> is debugging this browser" infobar.
Bug: 823194
Change-Id: Iff6627097c020cccca8f7cc3e21a803a41fd8f2c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1048064
Commit-Queue: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557245}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 3,342
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String PropertyTreeState::ToString() const {
return String::Format("t:%p c:%p e:%p", Transform(), Clip(), Effect());
}
Commit Message: Reland "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
This reverts commit 887383b30842d9d9006e11bb6932660a3cb5b1b7.
Reason for revert: Retry in M69.
Original change's description:
> Revert "[CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted"
>
> This reverts commit 70fc0b018c9517558b7aa2be00edf2debb449123.
>
> Reason for revert: Caused bugs found by clusterfuzz
>
> Original change's description:
> > [CI] Make paint property nodes non-ref-counted
> >
> > Now all paint property nodes are owned by ObjectPaintProperties
> > (and LocalFrameView temporarily before removing non-RLS mode).
> > Others just use raw pointers or references.
> >
> > Bug: 833496
> > Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> > Change-Id: I2d544fe153bb94698623248748df63c8aa2081ae
> > Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1031101
> > Reviewed-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen@chromium.org>
> > Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> > Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554626}
>
> TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
>
> Change-Id: I02bb50d6744cb81a797246a0116b677e80a3c69f
> No-Presubmit: true
> No-Tree-Checks: true
> No-Try: true
> Bug: 833496,837932,837943
> Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1034292
> Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#554653}
TBR=wangxianzhu@chromium.org,trchen@chromium.org,chrishtr@chromium.org
# Not skipping CQ checks because original CL landed > 1 day ago.
Bug: 833496, 837932, 837943
Change-Id: I0b4ef70db1f1f211ba97c30d617225355c750992
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.blink:linux_trusty_blink_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_layout_tests_slimming_paint_v2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1083491
Commit-Queue: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xianzhu Wang <wangxianzhu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#563930}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 2,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SyncManager::SetPassphrase(const std::string& passphrase,
bool is_explicit,
bool user_provided) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
data_->SetPassphrase(passphrase, is_explicit, user_provided);
}
Commit Message: sync: remove Chrome OS specific logic to deal with flimflam shutdown / sync race.
No longer necessary as the ProfileSyncService now aborts sync network traffic on shutdown.
BUG=chromium-os:20841
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9358007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120912 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 15,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: RenderMessageFilter::~RenderMessageFilter() {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::IO));
DCHECK(plugin_host_clients_.empty());
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287
| 0
| 18,565
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void *rdev_get_drvdata(struct regulator_dev *rdev)
{
return rdev->reg_data;
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 19,036
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int generic_delete_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
return 1;
}
Commit Message: fs,userns: Change inode_capable to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid
The kernel has no concept of capabilities with respect to inodes; inodes
exist independently of namespaces. For example, inode_capable(inode,
CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE) would be nonsense.
This patch changes inode_capable to check for uid and gid mappings and
renames it to capable_wrt_inode_uidgid, which should make it more
obvious what it does.
Fixes CVE-2014-4014.
Cc: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 27,795
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_worker(text *json,
char **tpath,
int *ipath,
int npath,
bool normalize_results)
{
JsonLexContext *lex = makeJsonLexContext(json, true);
JsonSemAction *sem = palloc0(sizeof(JsonSemAction));
GetState *state = palloc0(sizeof(GetState));
Assert(npath >= 0);
state->lex = lex;
/* is it "_as_text" variant? */
state->normalize_results = normalize_results;
state->npath = npath;
state->path_names = tpath;
state->path_indexes = ipath;
state->pathok = palloc0(sizeof(bool) * npath);
state->array_cur_index = palloc(sizeof(int) * npath);
if (npath > 0)
state->pathok[0] = true;
sem->semstate = (void *) state;
/*
* Not all variants need all the semantic routines. Only set the ones that
* are actually needed for maximum efficiency.
*/
sem->scalar = get_scalar;
if (npath == 0)
{
sem->object_start = get_object_start;
sem->object_end = get_object_end;
sem->array_start = get_array_start;
sem->array_end = get_array_end;
}
if (tpath != NULL)
{
sem->object_field_start = get_object_field_start;
sem->object_field_end = get_object_field_end;
}
if (ipath != NULL)
{
sem->array_start = get_array_start;
sem->array_element_start = get_array_element_start;
sem->array_element_end = get_array_element_end;
}
pg_parse_json(lex, sem);
return state->tresult;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 8,575
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int jas_image_copycmpt(jas_image_t *dstimage, int dstcmptno,
jas_image_t *srcimage, int srccmptno)
{
jas_image_cmpt_t *newcmpt;
if (dstimage->numcmpts_ >= dstimage->maxcmpts_) {
if (jas_image_growcmpts(dstimage, dstimage->maxcmpts_ + 128)) {
return -1;
}
}
if (!(newcmpt = jas_image_cmpt_copy(srcimage->cmpts_[srccmptno]))) {
return -1;
}
if (dstcmptno < dstimage->numcmpts_) {
memmove(&dstimage->cmpts_[dstcmptno + 1], &dstimage->cmpts_[dstcmptno],
(dstimage->numcmpts_ - dstcmptno) * sizeof(jas_image_cmpt_t *));
}
dstimage->cmpts_[dstcmptno] = newcmpt;
++dstimage->numcmpts_;
jas_image_setbbox(dstimage);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 4,525
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleGenSharedIdsCHROMIUM(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const cmds::GenSharedIdsCHROMIUM& c) {
GLuint namespace_id = static_cast<GLuint>(c.namespace_id);
GLuint id_offset = static_cast<GLuint>(c.id_offset);
GLsizei n = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.n);
uint32 data_size;
if (!SafeMultiplyUint32(n, sizeof(GLuint), &data_size)) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
GLuint* ids = GetSharedMemoryAs<GLuint*>(
c.ids_shm_id, c.ids_shm_offset, data_size);
if (n < 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "GenSharedIdsCHROMIUM", "n < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (ids == NULL) {
return error::kOutOfBounds;
}
DoGenSharedIdsCHROMIUM(namespace_id, id_offset, n, ids);
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,302
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int Com_RealTime(qtime_t *qtime) {
time_t t;
struct tm *tms;
t = time(NULL);
if (!qtime)
return t;
tms = localtime(&t);
if (tms) {
qtime->tm_sec = tms->tm_sec;
qtime->tm_min = tms->tm_min;
qtime->tm_hour = tms->tm_hour;
qtime->tm_mday = tms->tm_mday;
qtime->tm_mon = tms->tm_mon;
qtime->tm_year = tms->tm_year;
qtime->tm_wday = tms->tm_wday;
qtime->tm_yday = tms->tm_yday;
qtime->tm_isdst = tms->tm_isdst;
}
return t;
}
Commit Message: Merge some file writing extension checks from OpenJK.
Thanks Ensiform.
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/05928a57f9e4aae15a3bd0
https://github.com/JACoders/OpenJK/commit/ef124fd0fc48af164581176
CWE ID: CWE-269
| 0
| 9,107
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CompareCharArraysWithHexError(
const string& description,
const char* actual,
const int actual_len,
const char* expected,
const int expected_len) {
const int min_len = min(actual_len, expected_len);
const int max_len = max(actual_len, expected_len);
scoped_array<bool> marks(new bool[max_len]);
bool identical = (actual_len == expected_len);
for (int i = 0; i < min_len; ++i) {
if (actual[i] != expected[i]) {
marks[i] = true;
identical = false;
} else {
marks[i] = false;
}
}
for (int i = min_len; i < max_len; ++i) {
marks[i] = true;
}
if (identical) return;
ADD_FAILURE()
<< "Description:\n"
<< description
<< "\n\nExpected:\n"
<< HexDumpWithMarks(expected, expected_len, marks.get(), max_len)
<< "\nActual:\n"
<< HexDumpWithMarks(actual, actual_len, marks.get(), max_len);
}
Commit Message: Add QuicStream and friends to QUIC code.
Fix bug in tests that caused failures.
Revert 165859
First Landed as 165858
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11367082
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@165864 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,726
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: is_afio_large(const char *h, size_t len)
{
if (len < afiol_header_size)
return (0);
if (h[afiol_ino_m_offset] != 'm'
|| h[afiol_mtime_n_offset] != 'n'
|| h[afiol_xsize_s_offset] != 's'
|| h[afiol_filesize_c_offset] != ':')
return (0);
if (!is_hex(h + afiol_dev_offset, afiol_ino_m_offset - afiol_dev_offset))
return (0);
if (!is_hex(h + afiol_mode_offset, afiol_mtime_n_offset - afiol_mode_offset))
return (0);
if (!is_hex(h + afiol_namesize_offset, afiol_xsize_s_offset - afiol_namesize_offset))
return (0);
if (!is_hex(h + afiol_filesize_offset, afiol_filesize_size))
return (0);
return (1);
}
Commit Message: Reject cpio symlinks that exceed 1MB
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,643
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BOOLEAN check_cod(const bt_bdaddr_t *remote_bdaddr, uint32_t cod)
{
uint32_t remote_cod;
bt_property_t prop_name;
/* check if we already have it in our btif_storage cache */
BTIF_STORAGE_FILL_PROPERTY(&prop_name, BT_PROPERTY_CLASS_OF_DEVICE,
sizeof(uint32_t), &remote_cod);
if (btif_storage_get_remote_device_property((bt_bdaddr_t *)remote_bdaddr, &prop_name) == BT_STATUS_SUCCESS)
{
LOG_INFO("%s remote_cod = 0x%08x cod = 0x%08x", __func__, remote_cod, cod);
if ((remote_cod & 0x7ff) == cod)
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 25,917
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int handle_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
unsigned long exit_qualification;
bool has_error_code = false;
u32 error_code = 0;
u16 tss_selector;
int reason, type, idt_v, idt_index;
idt_v = (vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK);
idt_index = (vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VECTOR_MASK);
type = (vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_TYPE_MASK);
exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
reason = (u32)exit_qualification >> 30;
if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_GATE && idt_v) {
switch (type) {
case INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR:
vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
vmx_set_nmi_mask(vcpu, true);
break;
case INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR:
case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR:
kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
break;
case INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION:
if (vmx->idt_vectoring_info &
VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK) {
has_error_code = true;
error_code =
vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE);
}
/* fall through */
case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION:
kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
tss_selector = exit_qualification;
if (!idt_v || (type != INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION &&
type != INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR &&
type != INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR))
skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
if (kvm_task_switch(vcpu, tss_selector,
type == INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR ? idt_index : -1, reason,
has_error_code, error_code) == EMULATE_FAIL) {
vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0;
return 0;
}
/* clear all local breakpoint enable flags */
vmcs_writel(GUEST_DR7, vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7) & ~55);
/*
* TODO: What about debug traps on tss switch?
* Are we supposed to inject them and update dr6?
*/
return 1;
}
Commit Message: nEPT: Nested INVEPT
If we let L1 use EPT, we should probably also support the INVEPT instruction.
In our current nested EPT implementation, when L1 changes its EPT table
for L2 (i.e., EPT12), L0 modifies the shadow EPT table (EPT02), and in
the course of this modification already calls INVEPT. But if last level
of shadow page is unsync not all L1's changes to EPT12 are intercepted,
which means roots need to be synced when L1 calls INVEPT. Global INVEPT
should not be different since roots are synced by kvm_mmu_load() each
time EPTP02 changes.
Reviewed-by: Xiao Guangrong <xiaoguangrong@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Nadav Har'El <nyh@il.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Xinhao Xu <xinhao.xu@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Zhang <yang.z.zhang@Intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Gleb Natapov <gleb@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: String Notification::permission(ExecutionContext* context)
{
return permissionString(checkPermission(context));
}
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,340
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteMTVImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
char
buffer[MaxTextExtent];
MagickBooleanType
status;
MagickOffsetType
scene;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
register unsigned char
*q;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
*pixels;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
scene=0;
do
{
/*
Allocate memory for pixels.
*/
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((size_t) image->columns,
3UL*sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
ThrowWriterException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
/*
Initialize raster file header.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(buffer,MaxTextExtent,"%.20g %.20g\n",(double)
image->columns,(double) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobString(image,buffer);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
q=pixels;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelRed(p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelGreen(p));
*q++=ScaleQuantumToChar(GetPixelBlue(p));
p++;
}
(void) WriteBlob(image,(size_t) (q-pixels),pixels);
if (image->previous == (Image *) NULL)
{
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
}
pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(pixels);
if (GetNextImageInList(image) == (Image *) NULL)
break;
image=SyncNextImageInList(image);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImagesTag,scene,
GetImageListLength(image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
scene++;
} while (image_info->adjoin != MagickFalse);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 19,478
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: float GetVisualViewportScale(FrameTreeNode* node) {
double scale;
EXPECT_TRUE(ExecuteScriptAndExtractDouble(
node, "window.domAutomationController.send(visualViewport.scale);",
&scale));
return static_cast<float>(scale);
}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 11,645
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ui::Compositor* RenderWidgetHostViewAura::GetCompositor() {
aura::RootWindow* root_window = window_->GetRootWindow();
return root_window ? root_window->compositor() : NULL;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,973
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool virtio_should_notify(VirtIODevice *vdev, VirtQueue *vq)
{
uint16_t old, new;
bool v;
/* We need to expose used array entries before checking used event. */
smp_mb();
/* Always notify when queue is empty (when feature acknowledge) */
if (virtio_vdev_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_F_NOTIFY_ON_EMPTY) &&
!vq->inuse && virtio_queue_empty(vq)) {
return true;
}
if (!virtio_vdev_has_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_RING_F_EVENT_IDX)) {
return !(vring_avail_flags(vq) & VRING_AVAIL_F_NO_INTERRUPT);
}
v = vq->signalled_used_valid;
vq->signalled_used_valid = true;
old = vq->signalled_used;
new = vq->signalled_used = vq->used_idx;
return !v || vring_need_event(vring_get_used_event(vq), new, old);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 26,973
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void gdImageFilledPolygon (gdImagePtr im, gdPointPtr p, int n, int c)
{
int i;
int y;
int miny, maxy, pmaxy;
int x1, y1;
int x2, y2;
int ind1, ind2;
int ints;
int fill_color;
if (n <= 0) {
return;
}
if (overflow2(sizeof(int), n)) {
return;
}
if (c == gdAntiAliased) {
fill_color = im->AA_color;
} else {
fill_color = c;
}
if (!im->polyAllocated) {
im->polyInts = (int *) gdMalloc(sizeof(int) * n);
im->polyAllocated = n;
}
if (im->polyAllocated < n) {
while (im->polyAllocated < n) {
im->polyAllocated *= 2;
}
if (overflow2(sizeof(int), im->polyAllocated)) {
return;
}
im->polyInts = (int *) gdRealloc(im->polyInts, sizeof(int) * im->polyAllocated);
}
miny = p[0].y;
maxy = p[0].y;
for (i = 1; i < n; i++) {
if (p[i].y < miny) {
miny = p[i].y;
}
if (p[i].y > maxy) {
maxy = p[i].y;
}
}
pmaxy = maxy;
/* 2.0.16: Optimization by Ilia Chipitsine -- don't waste time offscreen */
if (miny < 0) {
miny = 0;
}
if (maxy >= gdImageSY(im)) {
maxy = gdImageSY(im) - 1;
}
/* Fix in 1.3: count a vertex only once */
for (y = miny; y <= maxy; y++) {
/*1.4 int interLast = 0; */
/* int dirLast = 0; */
/* int interFirst = 1; */
ints = 0;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (!i) {
ind1 = n - 1;
ind2 = 0;
} else {
ind1 = i - 1;
ind2 = i;
}
y1 = p[ind1].y;
y2 = p[ind2].y;
if (y1 < y2) {
x1 = p[ind1].x;
x2 = p[ind2].x;
} else if (y1 > y2) {
y2 = p[ind1].y;
y1 = p[ind2].y;
x2 = p[ind1].x;
x1 = p[ind2].x;
} else {
continue;
}
/* Do the following math as float intermediately, and round to ensure
* that Polygon and FilledPolygon for the same set of points have the
* same footprint.
*/
if (y >= y1 && y < y2) {
im->polyInts[ints++] = (float) ((y - y1) * (x2 - x1)) / (float) (y2 - y1) + 0.5 + x1;
} else if (y == pmaxy && y == y2) {
im->polyInts[ints++] = x2;
}
}
qsort(im->polyInts, ints, sizeof(int), gdCompareInt);
for (i = 0; i < ints - 1; i += 2) {
gdImageLine(im, im->polyInts[i], y, im->polyInts[i + 1], y, fill_color);
}
}
/* If we are drawing this AA, then redraw the border with AA lines. */
if (c == gdAntiAliased) {
gdImagePolygon(im, p, n, c);
}
}
Commit Message: iFixed bug #72446 - Integer Overflow in gdImagePaletteToTrueColor() resulting in heap overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 9,929
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int is_cgroup_event(struct perf_event *event)
{
return 0;
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,099
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: getnetnum(
const char *num,
sockaddr_u *addr,
int complain,
enum gnn_type a_type /* ignored */
)
{
NTP_REQUIRE(AF_UNSPEC == AF(addr) ||
AF_INET == AF(addr) ||
AF_INET6 == AF(addr));
if (!is_ip_address(num, AF(addr), addr))
return 0;
if (IS_IPV6(addr) && !ipv6_works)
return -1;
# ifdef ISC_PLATFORM_HAVESALEN
addr->sa.sa_len = SIZEOF_SOCKADDR(AF(addr));
# endif
SET_PORT(addr, NTP_PORT);
DPRINTF(2, ("getnetnum given %s, got %s\n", num, stoa(addr)));
return 1;
}
Commit Message: [Bug 1773] openssl not detected during ./configure.
[Bug 1774] Segfaults if cryptostats enabled and built without OpenSSL.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 4,735
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline unsigned long fetch_reg(unsigned int reg, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
struct reg_window32 *win;
if(reg < 16)
return (!reg ? 0 : regs->u_regs[reg]);
/* Ho hum, the slightly complicated case. */
win = (struct reg_window32 *) regs->u_regs[UREG_FP];
return win->locals[reg - 16]; /* yes, I know what this does... */
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 14,406
|
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