instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: eth_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
uint64_t val64, unsigned int size)
{
struct xlx_ethlite *s = opaque;
unsigned int base = 0;
uint32_t value = val64;
addr >>= 2;
switch (addr)
{
case R_TX_CTRL0:
case R_TX_CTRL1:
if (addr == R_TX_CTRL1)
base = 0x800 / 4;
D(qemu_log("%s addr=" TARGET_FMT_plx " val=%x\n",
__func__, addr * 4, value));
if ((value & (CTRL_P | CTRL_S)) == CTRL_S) {
qemu_send_packet(qemu_get_queue(s->nic),
(void *) &s->regs[base],
s->regs[base + R_TX_LEN0]);
D(qemu_log("eth_tx %d\n", s->regs[base + R_TX_LEN0]));
if (s->regs[base + R_TX_CTRL0] & CTRL_I)
eth_pulse_irq(s);
} else if ((value & (CTRL_P | CTRL_S)) == (CTRL_P | CTRL_S)) {
memcpy(&s->conf.macaddr.a[0], &s->regs[base], 6);
if (s->regs[base + R_TX_CTRL0] & CTRL_I)
eth_pulse_irq(s);
}
/* We are fast and get ready pretty much immediately so
we actually never flip the S nor P bits to one. */
s->regs[addr] = value & ~(CTRL_P | CTRL_S);
break;
/* Keep these native. */
case R_RX_CTRL0:
case R_RX_CTRL1:
if (!(value & CTRL_S)) {
qemu_flush_queued_packets(qemu_get_queue(s->nic));
}
/* fall through */
case R_TX_LEN0:
case R_TX_LEN1:
case R_TX_GIE0:
D(qemu_log("%s addr=" TARGET_FMT_plx " val=%x\n",
__func__, addr * 4, value));
s->regs[addr] = value;
break;
default:
s->regs[addr] = tswap32(value);
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,108
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __setscheduler(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p, int policy, int prio)
{
p->policy = policy;
p->rt_priority = prio;
p->normal_prio = normal_prio(p);
/* we are holding p->pi_lock already */
p->prio = rt_mutex_getprio(p);
if (rt_prio(p->prio))
p->sched_class = &rt_sched_class;
else
p->sched_class = &fair_sched_class;
set_load_weight(p);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,700
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void poll(void *send_info)
{
struct smi_info *smi_info = send_info;
unsigned long flags = 0;
bool run_to_completion = smi_info->run_to_completion;
/*
* Make sure there is some delay in the poll loop so we can
* drive time forward and timeout things.
*/
udelay(10);
if (!run_to_completion)
spin_lock_irqsave(&smi_info->si_lock, flags);
smi_event_handler(smi_info, 10);
if (!run_to_completion)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&smi_info->si_lock, flags);
}
Commit Message: ipmi_si: fix use-after-free of resource->name
When we excute the following commands, we got oops
rmmod ipmi_si
cat /proc/ioports
[ 1623.482380] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.482382] Mem abort info:
[ 1623.482383] ESR = 0x96000007
[ 1623.482385] Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[ 1623.482386] SET = 0, FnV = 0
[ 1623.482387] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[ 1623.482388] Data abort info:
[ 1623.482389] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[ 1623.482390] CM = 0, WnR = 0
[ 1623.482393] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000d7d94a66
[ 1623.482395] [ffff00000901d478] pgd=000000dffbfff003, pud=000000dffbffe003, pmd=0000003f5d06e003, pte=0000000000000000
[ 1623.482399] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[ 1623.487407] Modules linked in: ipmi_si(E) nls_utf8 isofs rpcrdma ib_iser ib_srpt target_core_mod ib_srp scsi_transport_srp ib_ipoib rdma_ucm ib_umad rdma_cm ib_cm dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log iw_cm dm_mod aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher ses ghash_ce sha2_ce enclosure sha256_arm64 sg sha1_ce hisi_sas_v2_hw hibmc_drm sbsa_gwdt hisi_sas_main ip_tables mlx5_ib ib_uverbs marvell ib_core mlx5_core ixgbe mdio hns_dsaf ipmi_devintf hns_enet_drv ipmi_msghandler hns_mdio [last unloaded: ipmi_si]
[ 1623.532410] CPU: 30 PID: 11438 Comm: cat Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 5.0.0-rc3+ #168
[ 1623.541498] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 /BC11SPCD, BIOS 1.37 11/21/2017
[ 1623.548822] pstate: a0000005 (NzCv daif -PAN -UAO)
[ 1623.553684] pc : string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.557040] lr : vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.560837] sp : ffff000013213a80
[ 1623.564191] x29: ffff000013213a80 x28: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.569577] x27: ffff000013213c18 x26: ffff805f67d06049
[ 1623.574963] x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff00001138abb5
[ 1623.580349] x23: 0000000000000fb7 x22: ffff0000117ed000
[ 1623.585734] x21: ffff000011188fd8 x20: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.591119] x19: ffff805f67d06061 x18: ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.596505] x17: 0000000000000200 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.601890] x15: ffff0000117ed748 x14: ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.607276] x13: ffff805f67d0605e x12: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.612661] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000
[ 1623.618046] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 000000000000000f
[ 1623.623432] x7 : ffff805f67d06061 x6 : fffffffffffffffe
[ 1623.628817] x5 : 0000000000000012 x4 : ffff00000901d478
[ 1623.634203] x3 : ffff0a00ffffff04 x2 : ffff805f67d07000
[ 1623.639588] x1 : ffff805f67d07000 x0 : ffffffffffffffff
[ 1623.644974] Process cat (pid: 11438, stack limit = 0x000000008d4cbc10)
[ 1623.651592] Call trace:
[ 1623.654068] string+0x28/0x98
[ 1623.657071] vsnprintf+0x368/0x5e8
[ 1623.660517] seq_vprintf+0x70/0x98
[ 1623.668009] seq_printf+0x7c/0xa0
[ 1623.675530] r_show+0xc8/0xf8
[ 1623.682558] seq_read+0x330/0x440
[ 1623.689877] proc_reg_read+0x78/0xd0
[ 1623.697346] __vfs_read+0x60/0x1a0
[ 1623.704564] vfs_read+0x94/0x150
[ 1623.711339] ksys_read+0x6c/0xd8
[ 1623.717939] __arm64_sys_read+0x24/0x30
[ 1623.725077] el0_svc_common+0x120/0x148
[ 1623.732035] el0_svc_handler+0x30/0x40
[ 1623.738757] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 1623.744520] Code: d1000406 aa0103e2 54000149 b4000080 (39400085)
[ 1623.753441] ---[ end trace f91b6a4937de9835 ]---
[ 1623.760871] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
[ 1623.768935] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 1623.775718] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 1623.781998] CPU features: 0x002,21006008
[ 1623.788777] Memory Limit: none
[ 1623.798329] Starting crashdump kernel...
[ 1623.805202] Bye!
If io_setup is called successful in try_smi_init() but try_smi_init()
goes out_err before calling ipmi_register_smi(), so ipmi_unregister_smi()
will not be called while removing module. It leads to the resource that
allocated in io_setup() can not be freed, but the name(DEVICE_NAME) of
resource is freed while removing the module. It causes use-after-free
when cat /proc/ioports.
Fix this by calling io_cleanup() while try_smi_init() goes to out_err.
and don't call io_cleanup() until io_setup() returns successful to avoid
warning prints.
Fixes: 93c303d2045b ("ipmi_si: Clean up shutdown a bit")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: NuoHan Qiao <qiaonuohan@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Corey Minyard <cminyard@mvista.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 17,060
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void tst_QQuickWebView::cleanup()
{
m_window.reset();
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] Allow transparent WebViews
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=80608
Reviewed by Tor Arne Vestbø.
Added support for transparentBackground in QQuickWebViewExperimental.
This uses the existing drawsTransparentBackground property in WebKit2.
Also, changed LayerTreeHostQt to set the contentsOpaque flag when the root layer changes,
otherwise the change doesn't take effect.
A new API test was added.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::setTransparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::transparentBackground):
(QQuickWebViewExperimental::setTransparentBackground):
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p.h:
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
* UIProcess/API/qt/tests/qquickwebview/tst_qquickwebview.cpp:
(tst_QQuickWebView):
(tst_QQuickWebView::transparentWebViews):
* WebProcess/WebPage/qt/LayerTreeHostQt.cpp:
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::LayerTreeHostQt):
(WebKit::LayerTreeHostQt::setRootCompositingLayer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@110254 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 7,985
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: close_uzbl (WebKitWebView *page, GArray *argv, GString *result) {
(void)page;
(void)argv;
(void)result;
gtk_main_quit ();
}
Commit Message: disable Uzbl javascript object because of security problem.
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 14,728
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void nl80211_send_sta_event(struct cfg80211_registered_device *rdev,
struct net_device *dev, const u8 *mac_addr,
struct station_info *sinfo, gfp_t gfp)
{
struct sk_buff *msg;
msg = nlmsg_new(NLMSG_GOODSIZE, gfp);
if (!msg)
return;
if (nl80211_send_station(msg, 0, 0, 0, dev, mac_addr, sinfo) < 0) {
nlmsg_free(msg);
return;
}
genlmsg_multicast_netns(wiphy_net(&rdev->wiphy), msg, 0,
nl80211_mlme_mcgrp.id, gfp);
}
Commit Message: nl80211: fix check for valid SSID size in scan operations
In both trigger_scan and sched_scan operations, we were checking for
the SSID length before assigning the value correctly. Since the
memory was just kzalloc'ed, the check was always failing and SSID with
over 32 characters were allowed to go through.
This was causing a buffer overflow when copying the actual SSID to the
proper place.
This bug has been there since 2.6.29-rc4.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Luciano Coelho <coelho@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 5,130
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPagePrivate::enterFullscreenForNode(Node* node)
{
#if ENABLE(VIDEO)
if (!node || !node->hasTagName(HTMLNames::videoTag))
return;
MediaPlayer* player = static_cast<HTMLMediaElement*>(node)->player();
if (!player)
return;
MediaPlayerPrivate* mmrPlayer = static_cast<MediaPlayerPrivate*>(player->implementation());
if (!mmrPlayer)
return;
Platform::Graphics::Window* window = mmrPlayer->getWindow();
if (!window)
return;
const char* contextName = mmrPlayer->mmrContextName();
if (!contextName)
return;
mmrPlayer->setFullscreenWebPageClient(m_client);
m_fullscreenVideoNode = node;
m_client->fullscreenStart(contextName, window, mmrPlayer->getWindowScreenRect());
#endif
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 2,179
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ext4_htree_next_block(struct inode *dir, __u32 hash,
struct dx_frame *frame,
struct dx_frame *frames,
__u32 *start_hash)
{
struct dx_frame *p;
struct buffer_head *bh;
int err, num_frames = 0;
__u32 bhash;
p = frame;
/*
* Find the next leaf page by incrementing the frame pointer.
* If we run out of entries in the interior node, loop around and
* increment pointer in the parent node. When we break out of
* this loop, num_frames indicates the number of interior
* nodes need to be read.
*/
while (1) {
if (++(p->at) < p->entries + dx_get_count(p->entries))
break;
if (p == frames)
return 0;
num_frames++;
p--;
}
/*
* If the hash is 1, then continue only if the next page has a
* continuation hash of any value. This is used for readdir
* handling. Otherwise, check to see if the hash matches the
* desired contiuation hash. If it doesn't, return since
* there's no point to read in the successive index pages.
*/
bhash = dx_get_hash(p->at);
if (start_hash)
*start_hash = bhash;
if ((hash & 1) == 0) {
if ((bhash & ~1) != hash)
return 0;
}
/*
* If the hash is HASH_NB_ALWAYS, we always go to the next
* block so no check is necessary
*/
while (num_frames--) {
if (!(bh = ext4_bread(NULL, dir, dx_get_block(p->at),
0, &err))) {
if (!err) {
ext4_error(dir->i_sb,
"Directory hole detected on inode %lu\n",
dir->i_ino);
return -EIO;
}
return err; /* Failure */
}
if (!buffer_verified(bh) &&
!ext4_dx_csum_verify(dir,
(struct ext4_dir_entry *)bh->b_data)) {
ext4_warning(dir->i_sb, "Node failed checksum");
return -EIO;
}
set_buffer_verified(bh);
p++;
brelse(p->bh);
p->bh = bh;
p->at = p->entries = ((struct dx_node *) bh->b_data)->entries;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: ext4: avoid hang when mounting non-journal filesystems with orphan list
When trying to mount a file system which does not contain a journal,
but which does have a orphan list containing an inode which needs to
be truncated, the mount call with hang forever in
ext4_orphan_cleanup() because ext4_orphan_del() will return
immediately without removing the inode from the orphan list, leading
to an uninterruptible loop in kernel code which will busy out one of
the CPU's on the system.
This can be trivially reproduced by trying to mount the file system
found in tests/f_orphan_extents_inode/image.gz from the e2fsprogs
source tree. If a malicious user were to put this on a USB stick, and
mount it on a Linux desktop which has automatic mounts enabled, this
could be considered a potential denial of service attack. (Not a big
deal in practice, but professional paranoids worry about such things,
and have even been known to allocate CVE numbers for such problems.)
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Zheng Liu <wenqing.lz@taobao.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 19,877
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int mbedtls_ecp_tls_read_group( mbedtls_ecp_group *grp, const unsigned char **buf, size_t len )
{
uint16_t tls_id;
const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info;
/*
* We expect at least three bytes (see below)
*/
if( len < 3 )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/*
* First byte is curve_type; only named_curve is handled
*/
if( *(*buf)++ != MBEDTLS_ECP_TLS_NAMED_CURVE )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_BAD_INPUT_DATA );
/*
* Next two bytes are the namedcurve value
*/
tls_id = *(*buf)++;
tls_id <<= 8;
tls_id |= *(*buf)++;
if( ( curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( tls_id ) ) == NULL )
return( MBEDTLS_ERR_ECP_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE );
return mbedtls_ecp_group_load( grp, curve_info->grp_id );
}
Commit Message: Merge remote-tracking branch 'upstream-restricted/pr/549' into mbedtls-2.7-restricted
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 23,318
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ehci_port_write(void *ptr, hwaddr addr,
uint64_t val, unsigned size)
{
EHCIState *s = ptr;
int port = addr >> 2;
uint32_t *portsc = &s->portsc[port];
uint32_t old = *portsc;
USBDevice *dev = s->ports[port].dev;
trace_usb_ehci_portsc_write(addr + s->portscbase, addr >> 2, val);
/* Clear rwc bits */
*portsc &= ~(val & PORTSC_RWC_MASK);
/* The guest may clear, but not set the PED bit */
*portsc &= val | ~PORTSC_PED;
/* POWNER is masked out by RO_MASK as it is RO when we've no companion */
handle_port_owner_write(s, port, val);
/* And finally apply RO_MASK */
val &= PORTSC_RO_MASK;
if ((val & PORTSC_PRESET) && !(*portsc & PORTSC_PRESET)) {
trace_usb_ehci_port_reset(port, 1);
}
if (!(val & PORTSC_PRESET) &&(*portsc & PORTSC_PRESET)) {
trace_usb_ehci_port_reset(port, 0);
if (dev && dev->attached) {
usb_port_reset(&s->ports[port]);
*portsc &= ~PORTSC_CSC;
}
/*
* Table 2.16 Set the enable bit(and enable bit change) to indicate
* to SW that this port has a high speed device attached
*/
if (dev && dev->attached && (dev->speedmask & USB_SPEED_MASK_HIGH)) {
val |= PORTSC_PED;
}
}
if ((val & PORTSC_SUSPEND) && !(*portsc & PORTSC_SUSPEND)) {
trace_usb_ehci_port_suspend(port);
}
if (!(val & PORTSC_FPRES) && (*portsc & PORTSC_FPRES)) {
trace_usb_ehci_port_resume(port);
val &= ~PORTSC_SUSPEND;
}
*portsc &= ~PORTSC_RO_MASK;
*portsc |= val;
trace_usb_ehci_portsc_change(addr + s->portscbase, addr >> 2, *portsc, old);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 18,689
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void trim_quote(std::wstring* string) {
std::wstring::size_type pos1 = string->find_first_not_of(L'"');
std::wstring::size_type pos2 = string->find_last_not_of(L'"');
if (std::wstring::npos == pos1 || std::wstring::npos == pos2)
(*string) = L"";
else
(*string) = string->substr(pos1, pos2 + 1);
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed processes from opening each other
TBR=brettw
BUG=117627
BUG=119150
TEST=sbox_validation_tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9716027
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132477 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 26,698
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int irq, int inc_eip)
{
struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = &vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
int ret;
init_emulate_ctxt(vcpu);
ctxt->op_bytes = 2;
ctxt->ad_bytes = 2;
ctxt->_eip = ctxt->eip + inc_eip;
ret = emulate_int_real(ctxt, irq);
if (ret != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return EMULATE_FAIL;
ctxt->eip = ctxt->_eip;
memcpy(vcpu->arch.regs, ctxt->regs, sizeof ctxt->regs);
kvm_rip_write(vcpu, ctxt->eip);
kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, ctxt->eflags);
if (irq == NMI_VECTOR)
vcpu->arch.nmi_pending = 0;
else
vcpu->arch.interrupt.pending = false;
return EMULATE_DONE;
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 26,216
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: point_right(PG_FUNCTION_ARGS)
{
Point *pt1 = PG_GETARG_POINT_P(0);
Point *pt2 = PG_GETARG_POINT_P(1);
PG_RETURN_BOOL(FPgt(pt1->x, pt2->x));
}
Commit Message: Predict integer overflow to avoid buffer overruns.
Several functions, mostly type input functions, calculated an allocation
size such that the calculation wrapped to a small positive value when
arguments implied a sufficiently-large requirement. Writes past the end
of the inadvertent small allocation followed shortly thereafter.
Coverity identified the path_in() vulnerability; code inspection led to
the rest. In passing, add check_stack_depth() to prevent stack overflow
in related functions.
Back-patch to 8.4 (all supported versions). The non-comment hstore
changes touch code that did not exist in 8.4, so that part stops at 9.0.
Noah Misch and Heikki Linnakangas, reviewed by Tom Lane.
Security: CVE-2014-0064
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 14,891
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: hook_completion_list_add (struct t_gui_completion *completion,
const char *word, int nick_completion,
const char *where)
{
gui_completion_list_add (completion, word, nick_completion, where);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,649
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ssl3_check_client_certificate(SSL *s)
{
unsigned long alg_k;
if (!s->cert || !s->cert->key->x509 || !s->cert->key->privatekey)
return 0;
/* If no suitable signature algorithm can't use certificate */
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !s->cert->key->digest)
return 0;
/*
* If strict mode check suitability of chain before using it. This also
* adjusts suite B digest if necessary.
*/
if (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT &&
!tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, -2))
return 0;
alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey;
/* See if we can use client certificate for fixed DH */
if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHr | SSL_kDHd)) {
SESS_CERT *scert = s->session->sess_cert;
int i = scert->peer_cert_type;
EVP_PKEY *clkey = NULL, *spkey = NULL;
clkey = s->cert->key->privatekey;
/* If client key not DH assume it can be used */
if (EVP_PKEY_id(clkey) != EVP_PKEY_DH)
return 1;
if (i >= 0)
spkey = X509_get_pubkey(scert->peer_pkeys[i].x509);
if (spkey) {
/* Compare server and client parameters */
i = EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(clkey, spkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(spkey);
if (i != 1)
return 0;
}
s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_SKIP_CERT_VERIFY;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 17,483
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::pair<int, int> FrameSelection::LayoutSelectionStartEnd() {
return layout_selection_->SelectionStartEnd();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 18,160
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::XPathNSResolverMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_xPathNSResolverMethod");
test_object_v8_internal::XPathNSResolverMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 390
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int WebContentsImpl::GetCurrentlyPlayingVideoCount() {
return currently_playing_video_count_;
}
Commit Message: If JavaScript shows a dialog, cause the page to lose fullscreen.
BUG=670135, 550017, 726761, 728276
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2906133004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#478884}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,254
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void avi_metadata_creation_time(AVDictionary **metadata, char *date)
{
char month[4], time[9], buffer[64];
int i, day, year;
/* parse standard AVI date format (ie. "Mon Mar 10 15:04:43 2003") */
if (sscanf(date, "%*3s%*[ ]%3s%*[ ]%2d%*[ ]%8s%*[ ]%4d",
month, &day, time, &year) == 4) {
for (i = 0; i < 12; i++)
if (!av_strcasecmp(month, months[i])) {
snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%.4d-%.2d-%.2d %s",
year, i + 1, day, time);
av_dict_set(metadata, "creation_time", buffer, 0);
}
} else if (date[4] == '/' && date[7] == '/') {
date[4] = date[7] = '-';
av_dict_set(metadata, "creation_time", date, 0);
}
}
Commit Message: avformat/avidec: Limit formats in gab2 to srt and ass/ssa
This prevents part of one exploit leading to an information leak
Found-by: Emil Lerner and Pavel Cheremushkin
Reported-by: Thierry Foucu <tfoucu@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 1,789
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: psh_hint_table_find_strong_points( PSH_Hint_Table table,
PSH_Point point,
FT_UInt count,
FT_Int threshold,
FT_Int major_dir )
{
PSH_Hint* sort = table->sort;
FT_UInt num_hints = table->num_hints;
for ( ; count > 0; count--, point++ )
{
FT_Int point_dir = 0;
FT_Pos org_u = point->org_u;
if ( psh_point_is_strong( point ) )
continue;
if ( PSH_DIR_COMPARE( point->dir_in, major_dir ) )
point_dir = point->dir_in;
else if ( PSH_DIR_COMPARE( point->dir_out, major_dir ) )
point_dir = point->dir_out;
if ( point_dir )
{
if ( point_dir == major_dir )
{
FT_UInt nn;
for ( nn = 0; nn < num_hints; nn++ )
{
PSH_Hint hint = sort[nn];
FT_Pos d = org_u - hint->org_pos;
if ( d < threshold && -d < threshold )
{
psh_point_set_strong( point );
point->flags2 |= PSH_POINT_EDGE_MIN;
point->hint = hint;
break;
}
}
}
else if ( point_dir == -major_dir )
{
FT_UInt nn;
for ( nn = 0; nn < num_hints; nn++ )
{
PSH_Hint hint = sort[nn];
FT_Pos d = org_u - hint->org_pos - hint->org_len;
if ( d < threshold && -d < threshold )
{
psh_point_set_strong( point );
point->flags2 |= PSH_POINT_EDGE_MAX;
point->hint = hint;
break;
}
}
}
}
#if 1
else if ( psh_point_is_extremum( point ) )
{
/* treat extrema as special cases for stem edge alignment */
FT_UInt nn, min_flag, max_flag;
if ( major_dir == PSH_DIR_HORIZONTAL )
{
min_flag = PSH_POINT_POSITIVE;
max_flag = PSH_POINT_NEGATIVE;
}
else
{
min_flag = PSH_POINT_NEGATIVE;
max_flag = PSH_POINT_POSITIVE;
}
if ( point->flags2 & min_flag )
{
for ( nn = 0; nn < num_hints; nn++ )
{
PSH_Hint hint = sort[nn];
FT_Pos d = org_u - hint->org_pos;
if ( d < threshold && -d < threshold )
{
point->flags2 |= PSH_POINT_EDGE_MIN;
point->hint = hint;
psh_point_set_strong( point );
break;
}
}
}
else if ( point->flags2 & max_flag )
{
for ( nn = 0; nn < num_hints; nn++ )
{
PSH_Hint hint = sort[nn];
FT_Pos d = org_u - hint->org_pos - hint->org_len;
if ( d < threshold && -d < threshold )
{
point->flags2 |= PSH_POINT_EDGE_MAX;
point->hint = hint;
psh_point_set_strong( point );
break;
}
}
}
if ( point->hint == NULL )
{
for ( nn = 0; nn < num_hints; nn++ )
{
PSH_Hint hint = sort[nn];
if ( org_u >= hint->org_pos &&
org_u <= hint->org_pos + hint->org_len )
{
point->hint = hint;
break;
}
}
}
}
#endif /* 1 */
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 6,480
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ofproto_aa_vlan_get_queue_size(struct ofproto *ofproto)
{
if (!ofproto->ofproto_class->aa_vlan_get_queue_size) {
return EOPNOTSUPP;
}
return ofproto->ofproto_class->aa_vlan_get_queue_size(ofproto);
}
Commit Message: ofproto: Fix OVS crash when reverting old flows in bundle commit
During bundle commit flows which are added in bundle are applied
to ofproto in-order. In case if a flow cannot be added (e.g. flow
action is go-to group id which does not exist), OVS tries to
revert back all previous flows which were successfully applied
from the same bundle. This is possible since OVS maintains list
of old flows which were replaced by flows from the bundle.
While reinserting old flows ovs asserts due to check on rule
state != RULE_INITIALIZED. This will work only for new flows, but
for old flow the rule state will be RULE_REMOVED. This is causing
an assert and OVS crash.
The ovs assert check should be modified to != RULE_INSERTED to prevent
any existing rule being re-inserted and allow new rules and old rules
(in case of revert) to get inserted.
Here is an example to trigger the assert:
$ ovs-vsctl add-br br-test -- set Bridge br-test datapath_type=netdev
$ cat flows.txt
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=NORMAL
flow add table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=NORMAL
$ ovs-ofctl dump-flows -OOpenflow13 br-test
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=2 actions=NORMAL
cookie=0x0, duration=2.465s, table=1, n_packets=0, n_bytes=0, priority=0,in_port=3 actions=NORMAL
$ cat flow-modify.txt
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=2,actions=drop
flow modify table=1,priority=0,in_port=3,actions=group:10
$ ovs-ofctl bundle br-test flow-modify.txt -OOpenflow13
First flow rule will be modified since it is a valid rule. However second
rule is invalid since no group with id 10 exists. Bundle commit tries to
revert (insert) the first rule to old flow which results in ovs_assert at
ofproto_rule_insert__() since old rule->state = RULE_REMOVED.
Signed-off-by: Vishal Deep Ajmera <vishal.deep.ajmera@ericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 16,657
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ikev1_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length,
const u_char *bp2, struct isakmp *base)
{
const struct isakmp *p;
const u_char *ep;
u_char np;
int i;
int phase;
p = (const struct isakmp *)bp;
ep = ndo->ndo_snapend;
phase = (EXTRACT_32BITS(base->msgid) == 0) ? 1 : 2;
if (phase == 1)
ND_PRINT((ndo," phase %d", phase));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," phase %d/others", phase));
i = cookie_find(&base->i_ck);
if (i < 0) {
if (iszero((const u_char *)&base->r_ck, sizeof(base->r_ck))) {
/* the first packet */
ND_PRINT((ndo," I"));
if (bp2)
cookie_record(&base->i_ck, bp2);
} else
ND_PRINT((ndo," ?"));
} else {
if (bp2 && cookie_isinitiator(i, bp2))
ND_PRINT((ndo," I"));
else if (bp2 && cookie_isresponder(i, bp2))
ND_PRINT((ndo," R"));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo," ?"));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo," %s", ETYPESTR(base->etype)));
if (base->flags) {
ND_PRINT((ndo,"[%s%s]", base->flags & ISAKMP_FLAG_E ? "E" : "",
base->flags & ISAKMP_FLAG_C ? "C" : ""));
}
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
const struct isakmp_gen *ext;
ND_PRINT((ndo,":"));
/* regardless of phase... */
if (base->flags & ISAKMP_FLAG_E) {
/*
* encrypted, nothing we can do right now.
* we hope to decrypt the packet in the future...
*/
ND_PRINT((ndo," [encrypted %s]", NPSTR(base->np)));
goto done;
}
CHECKLEN(p + 1, base->np);
np = base->np;
ext = (const struct isakmp_gen *)(p + 1);
ikev1_sub_print(ndo, np, ext, ep, phase, 0, 0, 0);
}
done:
if (ndo->ndo_vflag) {
if (ntohl(base->len) != length) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," (len mismatch: isakmp %u/ip %u)",
(uint32_t)ntohl(base->len), length));
}
}
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 14,277
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_sample_regs_user(struct perf_regs_user *regs_user,
struct pt_regs *regs)
{
if (!user_mode(regs)) {
if (current->mm)
regs = task_pt_regs(current);
else
regs = NULL;
}
if (regs) {
regs_user->regs = regs;
regs_user->abi = perf_reg_abi(current);
}
}
Commit Message: perf: Treat attr.config as u64 in perf_swevent_init()
Trinity discovered that we fail to check all 64 bits of
attr.config passed by user space, resulting to out-of-bounds
access of the perf_swevent_enabled array in
sw_perf_event_destroy().
Introduced in commit b0a873ebb ("perf: Register PMU
implementations").
Signed-off-by: Tommi Rantala <tt.rantala@gmail.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: davej@redhat.com
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1365882554-30259-1-git-send-email-tt.rantala@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 23,668
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xps_identify_font_encoding(fz_font *font, int idx, int *pid, int *eid)
{
FT_Face face = font->ft_face;
*pid = face->charmaps[idx]->platform_id;
*eid = face->charmaps[idx]->encoding_id;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 12,902
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int usb_cypress_load_firmware(struct usb_device *udev, const struct firmware *fw, int type)
{
struct hexline *hx;
u8 reset;
int ret,pos=0;
hx = kmalloc(sizeof(*hx), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!hx)
return -ENOMEM;
/* stop the CPU */
reset = 1;
if ((ret = usb_cypress_writemem(udev,cypress[type].cpu_cs_register,&reset,1)) != 1)
err("could not stop the USB controller CPU.");
while ((ret = dvb_usb_get_hexline(fw, hx, &pos)) > 0) {
deb_fw("writing to address 0x%04x (buffer: 0x%02x %02x)\n", hx->addr, hx->len, hx->chk);
ret = usb_cypress_writemem(udev, hx->addr, hx->data, hx->len);
if (ret != hx->len) {
err("error while transferring firmware (transferred size: %d, block size: %d)",
ret, hx->len);
ret = -EINVAL;
break;
}
}
if (ret < 0) {
err("firmware download failed at %d with %d",pos,ret);
kfree(hx);
return ret;
}
if (ret == 0) {
/* restart the CPU */
reset = 0;
if (ret || usb_cypress_writemem(udev,cypress[type].cpu_cs_register,&reset,1) != 1) {
err("could not restart the USB controller CPU.");
ret = -EINVAL;
}
} else
ret = -EIO;
kfree(hx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: [media] dvb-usb-firmware: don't do DMA on stack
The buffer allocation for the firmware data was changed in
commit 43fab9793c1f ("[media] dvb-usb: don't use stack for firmware load")
but the same applies for the reset value.
Fixes: 43fab9793c1f ("[media] dvb-usb: don't use stack for firmware load")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Brüns <stefan.bruens@rwth-aachen.de>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@s-opensource.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 826
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLInputElement::SetPlaceholderVisibility(bool visible) {
is_placeholder_visible_ = visible;
}
Commit Message: MacViews: Enable secure text input for password Textfields.
In Cocoa the NSTextInputContext automatically enables secure text input
when activated and it's in the secure text entry mode.
RenderWidgetHostViewMac did the similar thing for ages following the
WebKit example.
views::Textfield needs to do the same thing in a fashion that's
sycnrhonized with RenderWidgetHostViewMac, otherwise the race conditions
are possible when the Textfield gets focus, activates the secure text
input mode and the RWHVM loses focus immediately afterwards and disables
the secure text input instead of leaving it in the enabled state.
BUG=818133,677220
Change-Id: I6db6c4b59e4a1a72cbb7f8c7056f71b04a3df08b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/943064
Commit-Queue: Michail Pishchagin <mblsha@yandex-team.ru>
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#542517}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 8,258
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GDataFileSystem::CopyDocumentToDirectory(
const FilePath& dir_path,
const std::string& resource_id,
const FilePath::StringType& new_name,
const FileOperationCallback& callback) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(!callback.is_null());
documents_service_->CopyDocument(resource_id, new_name,
base::Bind(&GDataFileSystem::OnCopyDocumentCompleted,
ui_weak_ptr_,
dir_path,
callback));
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 11,821
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MediaControlTextTrackListElement::refreshTextTrackListMenu() {
if (!mediaElement().hasClosedCaptions() ||
!mediaElement().textTracksAreReady())
return;
EventDispatchForbiddenScope::AllowUserAgentEvents allowEvents;
removeChildren(OmitSubtreeModifiedEvent);
appendChild(createTextTrackListItem(nullptr));
TextTrackList* trackList = mediaElement().textTracks();
for (unsigned i = 0; i < trackList->length(); i++) {
TextTrack* track = trackList->anonymousIndexedGetter(i);
if (!track->canBeRendered())
continue;
appendChild(createTextTrackListItem(track));
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed volume slider element event handling
MediaControlVolumeSliderElement::defaultEventHandler has making
redundant calls to setVolume() & setMuted() on mouse activity. E.g. if
a mouse click changed the slider position, the above calls were made 4
times, once for each of these events: mousedown, input, mouseup,
DOMActive, click. This crack got exposed when PointerEvents are enabled
by default on M55, adding pointermove, pointerdown & pointerup to the
list.
This CL fixes the code to trigger the calls to setVolume() & setMuted()
only when the slider position is changed. Also added pointer events to
certain lists of mouse events in the code.
BUG=677900
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2622273003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#446032}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,377
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PageInfoTest() { SetURL("http://www.example.com"); }
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 18,504
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool IsFusionSensorType(mojom::SensorType type) {
switch (type) {
case mojom::SensorType::LINEAR_ACCELERATION:
case mojom::SensorType::RELATIVE_ORIENTATION_EULER_ANGLES:
case mojom::SensorType::RELATIVE_ORIENTATION_QUATERNION:
return true;
default:
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 19,349
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static enum test_return test_issue_44(void) {
in_port_t port;
pid_t pid = start_server(&port, true, 15);
assert(kill(pid, SIGHUP) == 0);
sleep(1);
assert(kill(pid, SIGTERM) == 0);
return TEST_PASS;
}
Commit Message: Issue 102: Piping null to the server will crash it
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 19,193
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void iscsi_detach_aio_context(BlockDriverState *bs)
{
IscsiLun *iscsilun = bs->opaque;
aio_set_fd_handler(iscsilun->aio_context, iscsi_get_fd(iscsilun->iscsi),
false, NULL, NULL, NULL);
iscsilun->events = 0;
if (iscsilun->nop_timer) {
timer_del(iscsilun->nop_timer);
timer_free(iscsilun->nop_timer);
iscsilun->nop_timer = NULL;
}
if (iscsilun->event_timer) {
timer_del(iscsilun->event_timer);
timer_free(iscsilun->event_timer);
iscsilun->event_timer = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 6,781
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: FileTransfer::DoDownload( filesize_t *total_bytes, ReliSock *s)
{
int rc;
int reply = 0;
filesize_t bytes=0;
MyString filename;;
MyString fullname;
char *tmp_buf = NULL;
int final_transfer = 0;
bool download_success = true;
bool try_again = true;
int hold_code = 0;
int hold_subcode = 0;
MyString error_buf;
int delegation_method = 0; /* 0 means this transfer is not a delegation. 1 means it is.*/
time_t start, elapsed;
bool I_go_ahead_always = false;
bool peer_goes_ahead_always = false;
DCTransferQueue xfer_queue(m_xfer_queue_contact_info);
CondorError errstack;
priv_state saved_priv = PRIV_UNKNOWN;
*total_bytes = 0;
bool want_fsync = ( ((IsClient() && !simple_init) || // starter receiving
(IsServer() && simple_init)) // schedd receiving
&& upload_changed_files );
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"entering FileTransfer::DoDownload sync=%d\n",
want_fsync ? 1 : 0);
s->decode();
bool socket_default_crypto = s->get_encryption();
if( !s->code(final_transfer) ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoDownload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
if( !s->end_of_message() ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoDownload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
if( !final_transfer && IsServer() ) {
SpooledJobFiles::createJobSpoolDirectory(&jobAd,desired_priv_state);
}
for (;;) {
if( !s->code(reply) ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoDownload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
if( !s->end_of_message() ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoDownload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
dprintf( D_SECURITY, "FILETRANSFER: incoming file_command is %i\n", reply);
if( !reply ) {
break;
}
if (reply == 2) {
s->set_crypto_mode(true);
} else if (reply == 3) {
s->set_crypto_mode(false);
}
else {
s->set_crypto_mode(socket_default_crypto);
}
tmp_buf = NULL;
if( !s->code(tmp_buf) ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoDownload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
filename = tmp_buf;
free( tmp_buf );
tmp_buf = NULL;
/*
if we want to change priv states but haven't done so
yet, set it now. we only need to do this once since
we're no longer doing any hard-coded insanity with
PRIV_CONDOR and everything can either be done in our
existing priv state (want_priv_change == FALSE) or in
the priv state we were told to use... Derek, 2005-04-21
*/
if( want_priv_change && saved_priv == PRIV_UNKNOWN ) {
saved_priv = set_priv( desired_priv_state );
}
if( !LegalPathInSandbox(filename.Value(),Iwd) ) {
download_success = false;
try_again = false;
hold_code = CONDOR_HOLD_CODE_DownloadFileError;
hold_subcode = EPERM;
error_buf.sprintf_cat(
" Attempt to write to illegal sandbox path: %s",
filename.Value());
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"DoDownload: attempt to write to illegal sandbox path by our peer %s: %s.\n",
s->peer_description(),
filename.Value());
filename = NULL_FILE;
}
if( !strcmp(filename.Value(),NULL_FILE) ) {
fullname = filename;
}
else if( final_transfer || IsClient() ) {
MyString remap_filename;
if(filename_remap_find(download_filename_remaps.Value(),filename.Value(),remap_filename)) {
if(!is_relative_to_cwd(remap_filename.Value())) {
fullname = remap_filename;
}
else {
fullname.sprintf("%s%c%s",Iwd,DIR_DELIM_CHAR,remap_filename.Value());
}
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"Remapped downloaded file from %s to %s\n",filename.Value(),remap_filename.Value());
}
else {
fullname.sprintf("%s%c%s",Iwd,DIR_DELIM_CHAR,filename.Value());
}
#ifdef WIN32
if ( perm_obj && (perm_obj->write_access(fullname.Value()) != 1) ) {
error_buf.sprintf("Permission denied to write file %s!",
fullname.Value());
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"DoDownload: %s\n",error_buf.Value());
download_success = false;
try_again = false;
hold_code = CONDOR_HOLD_CODE_DownloadFileError;
hold_subcode = EPERM;
fullname = NULL_FILE;
}
#endif
} else {
fullname.sprintf("%s%c%s",TmpSpoolSpace,DIR_DELIM_CHAR,filename.Value());
}
if( PeerDoesGoAhead ) {
if( !s->end_of_message() ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoDownload: failed on eom before GoAhead: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
if( !I_go_ahead_always ) {
if( !ObtainAndSendTransferGoAhead(xfer_queue,true,s,fullname.Value(),I_go_ahead_always) ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoDownload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
}
if( !peer_goes_ahead_always ) {
if( !ReceiveTransferGoAhead(s,fullname.Value(),true,peer_goes_ahead_always) ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "DoDownload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
}
s->decode();
}
start = time(NULL);
if (reply == 999) {
ClassAd file_info;
if (!file_info.initFromStream(*s)) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoDownload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
int subcommand = 0;
if(!file_info.LookupInteger("Result",subcommand)) {
subcommand = -1;
}
if(subcommand == 7) {
MyString rt_src;
MyString rt_dst;
MyString rt_err;
int rt_result = 0;
if(!file_info.LookupInteger("Result",rt_result)) {
rt_result = -1;
}
if(!file_info.LookupString("Filename", rt_src)) {
rt_src = "<null>";
}
if(!file_info.LookupString("OutputDestination", rt_dst)) {
rt_dst = "<null>";
}
if(!file_info.LookupString("ErrorString", rt_err)) {
rt_err = "<null>";
}
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "DoDownload: other side transferred %s to %s and got result %i\n",
rt_src.Value(), rt_dst.Value(), rt_result );
if(rt_result == 0) {
rc = 0;
} else {
rc = 0;
error_buf.sprintf(
"%s at %s failed due to remote transfer hook error: %s",
get_mySubSystem()->getName(),
s->my_ip_str(),fullname.Value());
download_success = false;
try_again = false;
hold_code = CONDOR_HOLD_CODE_DownloadFileError;
hold_subcode = rt_result;
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,
"DoDownload: consuming rest of transfer and failing "
"after encountering the following error: %s\n",
error_buf.Value());
}
} else {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS, "FILETRANSFER: unrecognized subcommand %i! skipping!\n", subcommand);
file_info.dPrint(D_FULLDEBUG);
rc = 0;
}
} else if (reply == 5) {
MyString URL;
if (!s->code(URL)) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoDownload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
dprintf( D_FULLDEBUG, "DoDownload: doing a URL transfer: (%s) to (%s)\n", URL.Value(), fullname.Value());
rc = InvokeFileTransferPlugin(errstack, URL.Value(), fullname.Value(), LocalProxyName.Value());
} else if ( reply == 4 ) {
if ( PeerDoesGoAhead || s->end_of_message() ) {
rc = s->get_x509_delegation( &bytes, fullname.Value() );
dprintf( D_FULLDEBUG,
"DoDownload: get_x509_delegation() returned %d\n",
rc );
if (rc == 0) {
LocalProxyName = fullname;
}
} else {
rc = -1;
}
delegation_method = 1;/* This is a delegation, unseuccessful or not */
} else if( reply == 6 ) { // mkdir
condor_mode_t file_mode = NULL_FILE_PERMISSIONS;
if( !s->code(file_mode) ) {
rc = -1;
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"DoDownload: failed to read mkdir mode.\n");
}
else {
rc = mkdir(fullname.Value(),file_mode);
if( rc == -1 && errno == EEXIST ) {
StatInfo st( fullname.Value() );
if( !st.Error() && st.IsDirectory() ) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"Requested to create directory but using existing one: %s\n",fullname.Value());
rc = 0;
}
else if( !strcmp(fullname.Value(),NULL_FILE) ) {
rc = 0;
}
else {
remove(fullname.Value());
rc = mkdir(fullname.Value(),file_mode);
}
}
if( rc == -1 ) {
rc = 0;
int the_error = errno;
error_buf.sprintf(
"%s at %s failed to create directory %s: %s (errno %d)",
get_mySubSystem()->getName(),
s->my_ip_str(),fullname.Value(),
strerror(the_error),the_error);
download_success = false;
try_again = false;
hold_code = CONDOR_HOLD_CODE_DownloadFileError;
hold_subcode = the_error;
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,
"DoDownload: consuming rest of transfer and failing "
"after encountering the following error: %s\n",
error_buf.Value());
}
}
} else if ( TransferFilePermissions ) {
rc = s->get_file_with_permissions( &bytes, fullname.Value() );
} else {
rc = s->get_file( &bytes, fullname.Value() );
}
elapsed = time(NULL)-start;
if( rc < 0 ) {
int the_error = errno;
error_buf.sprintf("%s at %s failed to receive file %s",
get_mySubSystem()->getName(),
s->my_ip_str(),fullname.Value());
download_success = false;
if(rc == GET_FILE_OPEN_FAILED || rc == GET_FILE_WRITE_FAILED ||
rc == GET_FILE_PLUGIN_FAILED) {
if (rc == GET_FILE_PLUGIN_FAILED) {
error_buf.sprintf_cat(": %s", errstack.getFullText());
} else {
error_buf.replaceString("receive","write to");
error_buf.sprintf_cat(": (errno %d) %s",the_error,strerror(the_error));
}
try_again = false;
hold_code = CONDOR_HOLD_CODE_DownloadFileError;
hold_subcode = the_error;
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,
"DoDownload: consuming rest of transfer and failing "
"after encountering the following error: %s\n",
error_buf.Value());
}
else {
try_again = true;
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"DoDownload: %s\n",error_buf.Value());
SendTransferAck(s,download_success,try_again,hold_code,hold_subcode,error_buf.Value());
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG,"DoDownload: exiting at %d\n",__LINE__);
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
}
if ( want_fsync ) {
struct utimbuf timewrap;
time_t current_time = time(NULL);
timewrap.actime = current_time; // set access time to now
timewrap.modtime = current_time - 180; // set modify time to 3 min ago
utime(fullname.Value(),&timewrap);
}
if( !s->end_of_message() ) {
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
*total_bytes += bytes;
#ifdef HAVE_EXT_POSTGRESQL
file_transfer_record record;
record.fullname = fullname.Value();
record.bytes = bytes;
record.elapsed = elapsed;
char daemon[16]; daemon[15] = '\0';
strncpy(daemon, get_mySubSystem()->getName(), 15);
record.daemon = daemon;
record.sockp =s;
record.transfer_time = start;
record.delegation_method_id = delegation_method;
file_transfer_db(&record, &jobAd);
#else
if (delegation_method) {}
if (elapsed) {}
#endif
}
s->set_crypto_mode(socket_default_crypto);
#ifdef WIN32
bytesRcvd += (float)(signed __int64)(*total_bytes);
#else
bytesRcvd += (*total_bytes);
#endif
bool upload_success = false;
MyString upload_error_buf;
bool upload_try_again = true;
int upload_hold_code = 0;
int upload_hold_subcode = 0;
GetTransferAck(s,upload_success,upload_try_again,upload_hold_code,
upload_hold_subcode,upload_error_buf);
if(!upload_success) {
char const *peer_ip_str = "disconnected socket";
if(s->type() == Stream::reli_sock) {
peer_ip_str = ((Sock *)s)->get_sinful_peer();
}
MyString download_error_buf;
download_error_buf.sprintf("%s failed to receive file(s) from %s",
get_mySubSystem()->getName(),peer_ip_str);
error_buf.sprintf("%s; %s",
upload_error_buf.Value(),
download_error_buf.Value());
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,"DoDownload: %s\n",error_buf.Value());
download_success = false;
SendTransferAck(s,download_success,upload_try_again,upload_hold_code,
upload_hold_subcode,download_error_buf.Value());
Info.error_desc = error_buf.Value();
dprintf( D_FULLDEBUG, "DoDownload: exiting with upload errors\n" );
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
if( !download_success ) {
SendTransferAck(s,download_success,try_again,hold_code,
hold_subcode,error_buf.Value());
dprintf( D_FULLDEBUG, "DoDownload: exiting with download errors\n" );
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
if ( !final_transfer && IsServer() ) {
MyString buf;
int fd;
buf.sprintf("%s%c%s",TmpSpoolSpace,DIR_DELIM_CHAR,COMMIT_FILENAME);
#if defined(WIN32)
if ((fd = safe_open_wrapper_follow(buf.Value(), O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC |
_O_BINARY | _O_SEQUENTIAL, 0644)) < 0)
#else
if ((fd = safe_open_wrapper_follow(buf.Value(), O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644)) < 0)
#endif
{
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,
"FileTransfer::DoDownload failed to write commit file\n");
return_and_resetpriv( -1 );
}
::close(fd);
CommitFiles();
}
download_success = true;
SendTransferAck(s,download_success,try_again,hold_code,hold_subcode,NULL);
return_and_resetpriv( 0 );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 22,612
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ReadUserLogState::LogRecordNo( const ReadUserLog::FileState &state ) const
{
const ReadUserLogFileState::FileState *istate;
if ( ( !convertState(state, istate) ) || ( !istate->m_version ) ) {
return -1;
}
return (filesize_t) istate->m_log_record.asint;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 23,829
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: virDomainMigratePerform3Params(virDomainPtr domain,
const char *dconnuri,
virTypedParameterPtr params,
int nparams,
const char *cookiein,
int cookieinlen,
char **cookieout,
int *cookieoutlen,
unsigned int flags)
{
virConnectPtr conn;
VIR_DOMAIN_DEBUG(domain, "dconnuri=%s, params=%p, nparams=%d, cookiein=%p, "
"cookieinlen=%d, cookieout=%p, cookieoutlen=%p, flags=%x",
NULLSTR(dconnuri), params, nparams, cookiein,
cookieinlen, cookieout, cookieoutlen, flags);
VIR_TYPED_PARAMS_DEBUG(params, nparams);
virResetLastError();
virCheckDomainReturn(domain, -1);
conn = domain->conn;
virCheckReadOnlyGoto(conn->flags, error);
if (conn->driver->domainMigratePerform3Params) {
int ret;
ret = conn->driver->domainMigratePerform3Params(
domain, dconnuri, params, nparams, cookiein, cookieinlen,
cookieout, cookieoutlen, flags);
if (ret < 0)
goto error;
return ret;
}
virReportUnsupportedError();
error:
virDispatchError(domain->conn);
return -1;
}
Commit Message: virDomainGetTime: Deny on RO connections
We have a policy that if API may end up talking to a guest agent
it should require RW connection. We don't obey the rule in
virDomainGetTime().
Signed-off-by: Michal Privoznik <mprivozn@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 22,360
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderView::DidInitiatePaint() {
pepper_delegate_.ViewInitiatedPaint();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,038
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParseNotationDecl(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
const xmlChar *name;
xmlChar *Pubid;
xmlChar *Systemid;
if (CMP10(CUR_PTR, '<', '!', 'N', 'O', 'T', 'A', 'T', 'I', 'O', 'N')) {
xmlParserInputPtr input = ctxt->input;
SHRINK;
SKIP(10);
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(CUR)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space required after '<!NOTATION'\n");
return;
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NOTATION_NOT_STARTED, NULL);
return;
}
if (!IS_BLANK_CH(CUR)) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Space required after the NOTATION name'\n");
return;
}
if (xmlStrchr(name, ':') != NULL) {
xmlNsErr(ctxt, XML_NS_ERR_COLON,
"colons are forbidden from notation names '%s'\n",
name, NULL, NULL);
}
SKIP_BLANKS;
/*
* Parse the IDs.
*/
Systemid = xmlParseExternalID(ctxt, &Pubid, 0);
SKIP_BLANKS;
if (RAW == '>') {
if (input != ctxt->input) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_SPACE_REQUIRED,
"Notation declaration doesn't start and stop in the same entity\n");
}
NEXT;
if ((ctxt->sax != NULL) && (!ctxt->disableSAX) &&
(ctxt->sax->notationDecl != NULL))
ctxt->sax->notationDecl(ctxt->userData, name, Pubid, Systemid);
} else {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_NOTATION_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
}
if (Systemid != NULL) xmlFree(Systemid);
if (Pubid != NULL) xmlFree(Pubid);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: Add validation for eternal enities
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=780691
Bug: 36556310
Change-Id: I9450743e167c3c73af5e4071f3fc85e81d061648
(cherry picked from commit bef9af3d89d241bcb518c20cba6da2a2fd9ba049)
CWE ID: CWE-611
| 0
| 14,036
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nmi_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
return 1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 1,299
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bson_iter_init (bson_iter_t *iter, /* OUT */
const bson_t *bson) /* IN */
{
BSON_ASSERT (iter);
BSON_ASSERT (bson);
if (BSON_UNLIKELY (bson->len < 5)) {
memset (iter, 0, sizeof *iter);
return false;
}
iter->raw = bson_get_data (bson);
iter->len = bson->len;
iter->off = 0;
iter->type = 0;
iter->key = 0;
iter->d1 = 0;
iter->d2 = 0;
iter->d3 = 0;
iter->d4 = 0;
iter->next_off = 4;
iter->err_off = 0;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 7,104
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DiceTurnSyncOnHelper::SigninAndShowSyncConfirmationUI() {
signin_manager_->OnExternalSigninCompleted(account_info_.email);
signin_metrics::LogSigninAccessPointCompleted(signin_access_point_,
signin_promo_action_);
signin_metrics::LogSigninReason(signin_reason_);
base::RecordAction(base::UserMetricsAction("Signin_Signin_Succeed"));
browser_sync::ProfileSyncService* sync_service = GetProfileSyncService();
if (sync_service) {
sync_blocker_ = sync_service->GetSetupInProgressHandle();
bool is_enterprise_user =
!policy::BrowserPolicyConnector::IsNonEnterpriseUser(
account_info_.email);
if (is_enterprise_user &&
SyncStartupTracker::GetSyncServiceState(profile_) ==
SyncStartupTracker::SYNC_STARTUP_PENDING) {
sync_startup_tracker_.reset(new SyncStartupTracker(profile_, this));
return;
}
}
ShowSyncConfirmationUI();
}
Commit Message: [signin] Add metrics to track the source for refresh token updated events
This CL add a source for update and revoke credentials operations. It then
surfaces the source in the chrome://signin-internals page.
This CL also records the following histograms that track refresh token events:
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToValidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenUpdated.ToInvalidToken.Source
* Signin.RefreshTokenRevoked.Source
These histograms are needed to validate the assumptions of how often tokens
are revoked by the browser and the sources for the token revocations.
Bug: 896182
Change-Id: I2fcab80ee8e5699708e695bc3289fa6d34859a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1286464
Reviewed-by: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Roger <droger@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ilya Sherman <isherman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mihai Sardarescu <msarda@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606181}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,846
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int l_channel_eof(lua_State *L) {
int result;
LIBSSH2_CHANNEL **channel = (LIBSSH2_CHANNEL **) lua_touserdata(L, 1);
result = libssh2_channel_eof(*channel);
if (result >= 0)
lua_pushboolean(L, result);
else
return luaL_error(L, "Error checking for EOF");
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Avoid a crash (double-free) when SSH connection fails
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 3,247
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GfxPath::close() {
if (justMoved) {
if (n >= size) {
size += 16;
subpaths = (GfxSubpath **)
greallocn(subpaths, size, sizeof(GfxSubpath *));
}
subpaths[n] = new GfxSubpath(firstX, firstY);
++n;
justMoved = gFalse;
}
subpaths[n-1]->close();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 4,449
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int svc_can_register(const uint16_t *name, size_t name_len, pid_t spid, uid_t uid)
{
const char *perm = "add";
return check_mac_perms_from_lookup(spid, uid, perm, str8(name, name_len)) ? 1 : 0;
}
Commit Message: ServiceManager: Restore basic uid check
Prevent apps from registering services without relying on selinux checks.
Bug: 29431260
Change-Id: I38c6e8bc7f7cba1cbd3568e8fed1ae7ac2054a9b
(cherry picked from commit 2b74d2c1d2a2c1bb6e9c420f7e9b339ba2a95179)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 1
| 29,040
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Automation::CloseTab(int tab_id, Error** error) {
int windex = 0, tab_index = 0;
*error = GetIndicesForTab(tab_id, &windex, &tab_index);
if (*error)
return;
std::string error_msg;
if (!SendCloseTabJSONRequest(automation(), windex, tab_index, &error_msg))
*error = new Error(kUnknownError, error_msg);
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 16,175
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int sc_asn1_decode_bit_string(const u8 * inbuf, size_t inlen,
void *outbuf, size_t outlen)
{
return decode_bit_string(inbuf, inlen, outbuf, outlen, 1);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 3,263
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static char *getname(RBinFile *arch, int type, int idx) {
struct r_bin_dex_obj_t *dex = arch->o->bin_obj;
switch (type) {
case 'm': // methods
return dex_method_fullname (dex, idx);
case 'c': // classes
return dex_class_name_byid (dex, idx);
case 'f': // fields
return dex_field_name (dex, idx);
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: fix #6872
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 28,948
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoUnlockTransferCacheEntryINTERNAL(
GLuint entry_type,
GLuint entry_id) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 2,834
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: __mem_cgroup_uncharge_common(struct page *page, enum charge_type ctype)
{
struct mem_cgroup *memcg = NULL;
unsigned int nr_pages = 1;
struct page_cgroup *pc;
if (mem_cgroup_disabled())
return NULL;
if (PageSwapCache(page))
return NULL;
if (PageTransHuge(page)) {
nr_pages <<= compound_order(page);
VM_BUG_ON(!PageTransHuge(page));
}
/*
* Check if our page_cgroup is valid
*/
pc = lookup_page_cgroup(page);
if (unlikely(!PageCgroupUsed(pc)))
return NULL;
lock_page_cgroup(pc);
memcg = pc->mem_cgroup;
if (!PageCgroupUsed(pc))
goto unlock_out;
switch (ctype) {
case MEM_CGROUP_CHARGE_TYPE_MAPPED:
case MEM_CGROUP_CHARGE_TYPE_DROP:
/* See mem_cgroup_prepare_migration() */
if (page_mapped(page) || PageCgroupMigration(pc))
goto unlock_out;
break;
case MEM_CGROUP_CHARGE_TYPE_SWAPOUT:
if (!PageAnon(page)) { /* Shared memory */
if (page->mapping && !page_is_file_cache(page))
goto unlock_out;
} else if (page_mapped(page)) /* Anon */
goto unlock_out;
break;
default:
break;
}
mem_cgroup_charge_statistics(memcg, PageCgroupCache(pc), -nr_pages);
ClearPageCgroupUsed(pc);
/*
* pc->mem_cgroup is not cleared here. It will be accessed when it's
* freed from LRU. This is safe because uncharged page is expected not
* to be reused (freed soon). Exception is SwapCache, it's handled by
* special functions.
*/
unlock_page_cgroup(pc);
/*
* even after unlock, we have memcg->res.usage here and this memcg
* will never be freed.
*/
memcg_check_events(memcg, page);
if (do_swap_account && ctype == MEM_CGROUP_CHARGE_TYPE_SWAPOUT) {
mem_cgroup_swap_statistics(memcg, true);
mem_cgroup_get(memcg);
}
if (!mem_cgroup_is_root(memcg))
mem_cgroup_do_uncharge(memcg, nr_pages, ctype);
return memcg;
unlock_out:
unlock_page_cgroup(pc);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 6,296
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void remote_socket_close(asocket* s) {
if (s->peer) {
s->peer->peer = 0;
D("RS(%d) peer->close()ing peer->id=%d peer->fd=%d", s->id, s->peer->id, s->peer->fd);
s->peer->close(s->peer);
}
D("entered remote_socket_close RS(%d) CLOSE fd=%d peer->fd=%d", s->id, s->fd,
s->peer ? s->peer->fd : -1);
D("RS(%d): closed", s->id);
free(s);
}
Commit Message: adb: use asocket's close function when closing.
close_all_sockets was assuming that all registered local sockets used
local_socket_close as their close function. However, this is not true
for JDWP sockets.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I40a1174845cd33f15f30ce70828a7081cd5a087e
(cherry picked from commit 53eb31d87cb84a4212f4850bf745646e1fb12814)
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,759
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void MediaStreamManager::StopMediaStreamFromBrowser(const std::string& label) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::IO);
DeviceRequest* request = FindRequest(label);
if (!request)
return;
if (request->device_stopped_cb) {
for (const MediaStreamDevice& device : request->devices) {
request->device_stopped_cb.Run(label, device);
}
}
CancelRequest(label);
IncrementDesktopCaptureCounter(DESKTOP_CAPTURE_NOTIFICATION_STOP);
}
Commit Message: Make MediaStreamDispatcherHost per-request instead of per-frame.
Instead of having RenderFrameHost own a single MSDH to handle all
requests from a frame, MSDH objects will be owned by a strong binding.
A consequence of this is that an additional requester ID is added to
requests to MediaStreamManager, so that an MSDH is able to cancel only
requests generated by it.
In practice, MSDH will continue to be per frame in most cases since
each frame normally makes a single request for an MSDH object.
This fixes a lifetime issue caused by the IO thread executing tasks
after the RenderFrameHost dies.
Drive-by: Fix some minor lint issues.
Bug: 912520
Change-Id: I52742ffc98b9fc57ce8e6f5093a61aed86d3e516
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1369799
Reviewed-by: Emircan Uysaler <emircan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Olga Sharonova <olka@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Guido Urdaneta <guidou@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616347}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 24,758
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GpuChannelHost* RenderThread::GetGpuChannel() {
if (!gpu_channel_.get())
return NULL;
if (gpu_channel_->state() != GpuChannelHost::kConnected)
return NULL;
return gpu_channel_.get();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move DevToolsAgent/Client into content.
BUG=84078
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7461019
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93596 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,895
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static size_t php_stream_memory_write(php_stream *stream, const char *buf, size_t count TSRMLS_DC)
{
php_stream_memory_data *ms = (php_stream_memory_data*)stream->abstract;
assert(ms != NULL);
if (ms->mode & TEMP_STREAM_READONLY) {
return 0;
}
if (ms->fpos + count > ms->fsize) {
char *tmp;
if (!ms->data) {
tmp = emalloc(ms->fpos + count);
} else {
tmp = erealloc(ms->data, ms->fpos + count);
}
if (!tmp) {
count = ms->fsize - ms->fpos + 1;
} else {
ms->data = tmp;
ms->fsize = ms->fpos + count;
}
}
if (!ms->data)
count = 0;
if (count) {
assert(buf!= NULL);
memcpy(ms->data+ms->fpos, (char*)buf, count);
ms->fpos += count;
}
return count;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 15,707
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::EnsureAgent() {
DCHECK_EQ(WORKER_READY, state_);
DCHECK(worker_host_);
if (!agent_ptr_)
worker_host_->BindDevToolsAgent(mojo::MakeRequest(&agent_ptr_));
return agent_ptr_;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,382
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int sctp_skb_pull(struct sk_buff *skb, int len)
{
struct sk_buff *list;
int skb_len = skb_headlen(skb);
int rlen;
if (len <= skb_len) {
__skb_pull(skb, len);
return 0;
}
len -= skb_len;
__skb_pull(skb, skb_len);
skb_walk_frags(skb, list) {
rlen = sctp_skb_pull(list, len);
skb->len -= (len-rlen);
skb->data_len -= (len-rlen);
if (!rlen)
return 0;
len = rlen;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: net/sctp: Validate parameter size for SCTP_GET_ASSOC_STATS
Building sctp may fail with:
In function ‘copy_from_user’,
inlined from ‘sctp_getsockopt_assoc_stats’ at
net/sctp/socket.c:5656:20:
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_32.h:211:26: error: call to
‘copy_from_user_overflow’ declared with attribute error: copy_from_user()
buffer size is not provably correct
if built with W=1 due to a missing parameter size validation
before the call to copy_from_user.
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 19,890
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PlatformSensorProviderAndroid* PlatformSensorProviderAndroid::GetInstance() {
return base::Singleton<
PlatformSensorProviderAndroid,
base::LeakySingletonTraits<PlatformSensorProviderAndroid>>::get();
}
Commit Message: android: Fix sensors in device service.
This patch fixes a bug that prevented more than one sensor data
to be available at once when using the device motion/orientation
API.
The issue was introduced by this other patch [1] which fixed
some security-related issues in the way shared memory region
handles are managed throughout Chromium (more details at
https://crbug.com/789959).
The device service´s sensor implementation doesn´t work
correctly because it assumes it is possible to create a
writable mapping of a given shared memory region at any
time. This assumption is not correct on Android, once an
Ashmem region has been turned read-only, such mappings
are no longer possible.
To fix the implementation, this CL changes the following:
- PlatformSensor used to require moving a
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping into the newly-created
instance. Said mapping being owned by and destroyed
with the PlatformSensor instance.
With this patch, the constructor instead takes a single
pointer to the corresponding SensorReadingSharedBuffer,
i.e. the area in memory where the sensor-specific
reading data is located, and can be either updated
or read-from.
Note that the PlatformSensor does not own the mapping
anymore.
- PlatformSensorProviderBase holds the *single* writable
mapping that is used to store all SensorReadingSharedBuffer
buffers. It is created just after the region itself,
and thus can be used even after the region's access
mode has been changed to read-only.
Addresses within the mapping will be passed to
PlatformSensor constructors, computed from the
mapping's base address plus a sensor-specific
offset.
The mapping is now owned by the
PlatformSensorProviderBase instance.
Note that, security-wise, nothing changes, because all
mojo::ScopedSharedBufferMapping before the patch actually
pointed to the same writable-page in memory anyway.
Since unit or integration tests didn't catch the regression
when [1] was submitted, this patch was tested manually by
running a newly-built Chrome apk in the Android emulator
and on a real device running Android O.
[1] https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/805238
BUG=805146
R=mattcary@chromium.org,alexilin@chromium.org,juncai@chromium.org,reillyg@chromium.org
Change-Id: I7d60a1cad278f48c361d2ece5a90de10eb082b44
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891180
Commit-Queue: David Turner <digit@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Reilly Grant <reillyg@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Cary <mattcary@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandr Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532607}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 2,754
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void net_drop_ns(void *p)
{
struct net *ns = p;
if (ns && refcount_dec_and_test(&ns->passive))
net_free(ns);
}
Commit Message: net: Fix double free and memory corruption in get_net_ns_by_id()
(I can trivially verify that that idr_remove in cleanup_net happens
after the network namespace count has dropped to zero --EWB)
Function get_net_ns_by_id() does not check for net::count
after it has found a peer in netns_ids idr.
It may dereference a peer, after its count has already been
finaly decremented. This leads to double free and memory
corruption:
put_net(peer) rtnl_lock()
atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0] ...
__put_net(peer) get_net_ns_by_id(net, id)
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
queue_work() peer = idr_find(&net->netns_ids, id)
| get_net(peer) [count=1]
| ...
| (use after final put)
v ...
cleanup_net() ...
spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..) ...
spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock) ...
... ...
... put_net(peer)
... atomic_dec_and_test(&peer->count) [count=0]
... spin_lock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... list_add(&net->cleanup_list, &cleanup_list)
... spin_unlock(&cleanup_list_lock)
... queue_work()
... rtnl_unlock()
rtnl_lock() ...
for_each_net(tmp) { ...
id = __peernet2id(tmp, peer) ...
spin_lock_irq(&tmp->nsid_lock) ...
idr_remove(&tmp->netns_ids, id) ...
... ...
net_drop_ns() ...
net_free(peer) ...
} ...
|
v
cleanup_net()
...
(Second free of peer)
Also, put_net() on the right cpu may reorder with left's cpu
list_replace_init(&cleanup_list, ..), and then cleanup_list
will be corrupted.
Since cleanup_net() is executed in worker thread, while
put_net(peer) can happen everywhere, there should be
enough time for concurrent get_net_ns_by_id() to pick
the peer up, and the race does not seem to be unlikely.
The patch fixes the problem in standard way.
(Also, there is possible problem in peernet2id_alloc(), which requires
check for net::count under nsid_lock and maybe_get_net(peer), but
in current stable kernel it's used under rtnl_lock() and it has to be
safe. Openswitch begun to use peernet2id_alloc(), and possibly it should
be fixed too. While this is not in stable kernel yet, so I'll send
a separate message to netdev@ later).
Cc: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: Kirill Tkhai <ktkhai@virtuozzo.com>
Fixes: 0c7aecd4bde4 "netns: add rtnl cmd to add and get peer netns ids"
Reviewed-by: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Reviewed-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Nicolas Dichtel <nicolas.dichtel@6wind.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 23,676
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int opvmclear(RAsm *a, ut8 *data, const Opcode *op) {
int l = 0;
switch (op->operands_count) {
case 1:
if ( op->operands[0].type & OT_MEMORY &&
op->operands[0].type & OT_QWORD
) {
data[l++] = 0x66;
data[l++] = 0x0f;
data[l++] = 0xc7;
data[l++] = 0x30 | op->operands[0].regs[0];
} else {
return -1;
}
break;
default:
return -1;
}
return l;
}
Commit Message: Fix #12372 and #12373 - Crash in x86 assembler (#12380)
0 ,0,[bP-bL-bP-bL-bL-r-bL-bP-bL-bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
leA ,0,[bP-bL-bL-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
leA ,0,[bP-bL-r-bP-bL-bP-bL-60@bL-
mov ,0,[ax+Bx-ax+Bx-ax+ax+Bx-ax+Bx--
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 8,606
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::DoInvalidateFramebuffer(
GLenum target,
GLsizei count,
const volatile GLenum* attachments) {
if (count < 0) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "count cannot be negative.");
return error::kNoError;
}
std::vector<GLenum> attachments_copy(attachments, attachments + count);
if (IsEmulatedFramebufferBound(target)) {
if (!ModifyAttachmentsForEmulatedFramebuffer(&attachments_copy)) {
InsertError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, "Invalid attachment.");
return error::kNoError;
}
}
api()->glInvalidateFramebufferFn(target, count, attachments_copy.data());
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 3,977
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int vmcs12_read_any(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
unsigned long field, u64 *ret)
{
short offset = vmcs_field_to_offset(field);
char *p;
if (offset < 0)
return offset;
p = ((char *)(get_vmcs12(vcpu))) + offset;
switch (vmcs_field_type(field)) {
case VMCS_FIELD_TYPE_NATURAL_WIDTH:
*ret = *((natural_width *)p);
return 0;
case VMCS_FIELD_TYPE_U16:
*ret = *((u16 *)p);
return 0;
case VMCS_FIELD_TYPE_U32:
*ret = *((u32 *)p);
return 0;
case VMCS_FIELD_TYPE_U64:
*ret = *((u64 *)p);
return 0;
default:
WARN_ON(1);
return -ENOENT;
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: work around infinite loop in microcode when #AC is delivered
It was found that a guest can DoS a host by triggering an infinite
stream of "alignment check" (#AC) exceptions. This causes the
microcode to enter an infinite loop where the core never receives
another interrupt. The host kernel panics pretty quickly due to the
effects (CVE-2015-5307).
Signed-off-by: Eric Northup <digitaleric@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 10,158
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void HTMLSelectElement::listBoxSelectItem(int listIndex, bool allowMultiplySelections, bool shift, bool fireOnChangeNow)
{
if (!multiple())
optionSelectedByUser(listToOptionIndex(listIndex), fireOnChangeNow, false);
else {
updateSelectedState(listIndex, allowMultiplySelections, shift);
setNeedsValidityCheck();
if (fireOnChangeNow)
listBoxOnChange();
}
}
Commit Message: SelectElement should remove an option when null is assigned by indexed setter
Fix bug embedded in r151449
see
http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/blink?revision=151449&view=revision
R=haraken@chromium.org, tkent@chromium.org, eseidel@chromium.org
BUG=262365
TEST=fast/forms/select/select-assign-null.html
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/19947008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@154743 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 89
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: horizontalDifferenceF(float *ip, int n, int stride, uint16 *wp, uint16 *FromLT2)
{
int32 r1, g1, b1, a1, r2, g2, b2, a2, mask;
float fltsize = Fltsize;
#define CLAMP(v) ( (v<(float)0.) ? 0 \
: (v<(float)2.) ? FromLT2[(int)(v*fltsize)] \
: (v>(float)24.2) ? 2047 \
: LogK1*log(v*LogK2) + 0.5 )
mask = CODE_MASK;
if (n >= stride) {
if (stride == 3) {
r2 = wp[0] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[0]);
g2 = wp[1] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[2]);
n -= 3;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 3;
wp += 3;
ip += 3;
r1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[0]); wp[0] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[1]); wp[1] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[2]); wp[2] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
}
} else if (stride == 4) {
r2 = wp[0] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[0]);
g2 = wp[1] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[1]);
b2 = wp[2] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[2]);
a2 = wp[3] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[3]);
n -= 4;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 4;
wp += 4;
ip += 4;
r1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[0]); wp[0] = (uint16)((r1-r2) & mask); r2 = r1;
g1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[1]); wp[1] = (uint16)((g1-g2) & mask); g2 = g1;
b1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[2]); wp[2] = (uint16)((b1-b2) & mask); b2 = b1;
a1 = (int32) CLAMP(ip[3]); wp[3] = (uint16)((a1-a2) & mask); a2 = a1;
}
} else {
ip += n - 1; /* point to last one */
wp += n - 1; /* point to last one */
n -= stride;
while (n > 0) {
REPEAT(stride, wp[0] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[0]);
wp[stride] -= wp[0];
wp[stride] &= mask;
wp--; ip--)
n -= stride;
}
REPEAT(stride, wp[0] = (uint16) CLAMP(ip[0]); wp--; ip--)
}
}
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix potential buffer write overrun in
PixarLogDecode() on corrupted/unexpected images (reported by Mathias Svensson)
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 10,863
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mov_write_source_reference_tag(AVIOContext *pb, MOVTrack *track, const char *reel_name)
{
uint64_t str_size =strlen(reel_name);
int64_t pos = avio_tell(pb);
if (str_size >= UINT16_MAX){
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_ERROR, "reel_name length %"PRIu64" is too large\n", str_size);
avio_wb16(pb, 0);
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
avio_wb32(pb, 0); /* size */
ffio_wfourcc(pb, "name"); /* Data format */
avio_wb16(pb, str_size); /* string size */
avio_wb16(pb, track->language); /* langcode */
avio_write(pb, reel_name, str_size); /* reel name */
return update_size(pb,pos);
}
Commit Message: avformat/movenc: Write version 2 of audio atom if channels is not known
The version 1 needs the channel count and would divide by 0
Fixes: division by 0
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_1.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_2.ogg
Fixes: fpe_movenc.c_1108_3.wav
Found-by: #CHEN HONGXU# <HCHEN017@e.ntu.edu.sg>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 0
| 26,620
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CommitMessageOrderReverser(
WebContents* web_contents,
const GURL& deferred_url,
DidStartDeferringCommitCallback deferred_url_triggered_action)
: DidCommitProvisionalLoadInterceptor(web_contents),
deferred_url_(deferred_url),
deferred_url_triggered_action_(
std::move(deferred_url_triggered_action)) {}
Commit Message: Add a check for disallowing remote frame navigations to local resources.
Previously, RemoteFrame navigations did not perform any renderer-side
checks and relied solely on the browser-side logic to block disallowed
navigations via mechanisms like FilterURL. This means that blocked
remote frame navigations were silently navigated to about:blank
without any console error message.
This CL adds a CanDisplay check to the remote navigation path to match
an equivalent check done for local frame navigations. This way, the
renderer can consistently block disallowed navigations in both cases
and output an error message.
Bug: 894399
Change-Id: I172f68f77c1676f6ca0172d2a6c78f7edc0e3b7a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1282390
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601022}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 21,000
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void CameraClient::handleGenericData(int32_t msgType,
const sp<IMemory>& dataPtr, camera_frame_metadata_t *metadata) {
sp<ICameraClient> c = mRemoteCallback;
mLock.unlock();
if (c != 0) {
c->dataCallback(msgType, dataPtr, metadata);
}
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 25,479
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int is_mergeable_vma(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
struct file *file, unsigned long vm_flags,
struct vm_userfaultfd_ctx vm_userfaultfd_ctx)
{
/*
* VM_SOFTDIRTY should not prevent from VMA merging, if we
* match the flags but dirty bit -- the caller should mark
* merged VMA as dirty. If dirty bit won't be excluded from
* comparison, we increase pressure on the memory system forcing
* the kernel to generate new VMAs when old one could be
* extended instead.
*/
if ((vma->vm_flags ^ vm_flags) & ~VM_SOFTDIRTY)
return 0;
if (vma->vm_file != file)
return 0;
if (vma->vm_ops && vma->vm_ops->close)
return 0;
if (!is_mergeable_vm_userfaultfd_ctx(vma, vm_userfaultfd_ctx))
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: coredump: fix race condition between mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and core dumping
The core dumping code has always run without holding the mmap_sem for
writing, despite that is the only way to ensure that the entire vma
layout will not change from under it. Only using some signal
serialization on the processes belonging to the mm is not nearly enough.
This was pointed out earlier. For example in Hugh's post from Jul 2017:
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.LSU.2.11.1707191716030.2055@eggly.anvils
"Not strictly relevant here, but a related note: I was very surprised
to discover, only quite recently, how handle_mm_fault() may be called
without down_read(mmap_sem) - when core dumping. That seems a
misguided optimization to me, which would also be nice to correct"
In particular because the growsdown and growsup can move the
vm_start/vm_end the various loops the core dump does around the vma will
not be consistent if page faults can happen concurrently.
Pretty much all users calling mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm() and then
taking the mmap_sem had the potential to introduce unexpected side
effects in the core dumping code.
Adding mmap_sem for writing around the ->core_dump invocation is a
viable long term fix, but it requires removing all copy user and page
faults and to replace them with get_dump_page() for all binary formats
which is not suitable as a short term fix.
For the time being this solution manually covers the places that can
confuse the core dump either by altering the vma layout or the vma flags
while it runs. Once ->core_dump runs under mmap_sem for writing the
function mmget_still_valid() can be dropped.
Allowing mmap_sem protected sections to run in parallel with the
coredump provides some minor parallelism advantage to the swapoff code
(which seems to be safe enough by never mangling any vma field and can
keep doing swapins in parallel to the core dumping) and to some other
corner case.
In order to facilitate the backporting I added "Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6"
however the side effect of this same race condition in /proc/pid/mem
should be reproducible since before 2.6.12-rc2 so I couldn't add any
other "Fixes:" because there's no hash beyond the git genesis commit.
Because find_extend_vma() is the only location outside of the process
context that could modify the "mm" structures under mmap_sem for
reading, by adding the mmget_still_valid() check to it, all other cases
that take the mmap_sem for reading don't need the new check after
mmget_not_zero()/get_task_mm(). The expand_stack() in page fault
context also doesn't need the new check, because all tasks under core
dumping are frozen.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190325224949.11068-1-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: 86039bd3b4e6 ("userfaultfd: add new syscall to provide memory externalization")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Suggested-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 12,770
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void mem_cgroup_uncharge_start(void)
{
current->memcg_batch.do_batch++;
/* We can do nest. */
if (current->memcg_batch.do_batch == 1) {
current->memcg_batch.memcg = NULL;
current->memcg_batch.nr_pages = 0;
current->memcg_batch.memsw_nr_pages = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: mm: thp: fix pmd_bad() triggering in code paths holding mmap_sem read mode
commit 1a5a9906d4e8d1976b701f889d8f35d54b928f25 upstream.
In some cases it may happen that pmd_none_or_clear_bad() is called with
the mmap_sem hold in read mode. In those cases the huge page faults can
allocate hugepmds under pmd_none_or_clear_bad() and that can trigger a
false positive from pmd_bad() that will not like to see a pmd
materializing as trans huge.
It's not khugepaged causing the problem, khugepaged holds the mmap_sem
in write mode (and all those sites must hold the mmap_sem in read mode
to prevent pagetables to go away from under them, during code review it
seems vm86 mode on 32bit kernels requires that too unless it's
restricted to 1 thread per process or UP builds). The race is only with
the huge pagefaults that can convert a pmd_none() into a
pmd_trans_huge().
Effectively all these pmd_none_or_clear_bad() sites running with
mmap_sem in read mode are somewhat speculative with the page faults, and
the result is always undefined when they run simultaneously. This is
probably why it wasn't common to run into this. For example if the
madvise(MADV_DONTNEED) runs zap_page_range() shortly before the page
fault, the hugepage will not be zapped, if the page fault runs first it
will be zapped.
Altering pmd_bad() not to error out if it finds hugepmds won't be enough
to fix this, because zap_pmd_range would then proceed to call
zap_pte_range (which would be incorrect if the pmd become a
pmd_trans_huge()).
The simplest way to fix this is to read the pmd in the local stack
(regardless of what we read, no need of actual CPU barriers, only
compiler barrier needed), and be sure it is not changing under the code
that computes its value. Even if the real pmd is changing under the
value we hold on the stack, we don't care. If we actually end up in
zap_pte_range it means the pmd was not none already and it was not huge,
and it can't become huge from under us (khugepaged locking explained
above).
All we need is to enforce that there is no way anymore that in a code
path like below, pmd_trans_huge can be false, but pmd_none_or_clear_bad
can run into a hugepmd. The overhead of a barrier() is just a compiler
tweak and should not be measurable (I only added it for THP builds). I
don't exclude different compiler versions may have prevented the race
too by caching the value of *pmd on the stack (that hasn't been
verified, but it wouldn't be impossible considering
pmd_none_or_clear_bad, pmd_bad, pmd_trans_huge, pmd_none are all inlines
and there's no external function called in between pmd_trans_huge and
pmd_none_or_clear_bad).
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
if (next-addr != HPAGE_PMD_SIZE) {
VM_BUG_ON(!rwsem_is_locked(&tlb->mm->mmap_sem));
split_huge_page_pmd(vma->vm_mm, pmd);
} else if (zap_huge_pmd(tlb, vma, pmd, addr))
continue;
/* fall through */
}
if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
Because this race condition could be exercised without special
privileges this was reported in CVE-2012-1179.
The race was identified and fully explained by Ulrich who debugged it.
I'm quoting his accurate explanation below, for reference.
====== start quote =======
mapcount 0 page_mapcount 1
kernel BUG at mm/huge_memory.c:1384!
At some point prior to the panic, a "bad pmd ..." message similar to the
following is logged on the console:
mm/memory.c:145: bad pmd ffff8800376e1f98(80000000314000e7).
The "bad pmd ..." message is logged by pmd_clear_bad() before it clears
the page's PMD table entry.
143 void pmd_clear_bad(pmd_t *pmd)
144 {
-> 145 pmd_ERROR(*pmd);
146 pmd_clear(pmd);
147 }
After the PMD table entry has been cleared, there is an inconsistency
between the actual number of PMD table entries that are mapping the page
and the page's map count (_mapcount field in struct page). When the page
is subsequently reclaimed, __split_huge_page() detects this inconsistency.
1381 if (mapcount != page_mapcount(page))
1382 printk(KERN_ERR "mapcount %d page_mapcount %d\n",
1383 mapcount, page_mapcount(page));
-> 1384 BUG_ON(mapcount != page_mapcount(page));
The root cause of the problem is a race of two threads in a multithreaded
process. Thread B incurs a page fault on a virtual address that has never
been accessed (PMD entry is zero) while Thread A is executing an madvise()
system call on a virtual address within the same 2 MB (huge page) range.
virtual address space
.---------------------.
| |
| |
.-|---------------------|
| | |
| | |<-- B(fault)
| | |
2 MB | |/////////////////////|-.
huge < |/////////////////////| > A(range)
page | |/////////////////////|-'
| | |
| | |
'-|---------------------|
| |
| |
'---------------------'
- Thread A is executing an madvise(..., MADV_DONTNEED) system call
on the virtual address range "A(range)" shown in the picture.
sys_madvise
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem)
...
madvise_vma
switch (behavior)
case MADV_DONTNEED:
madvise_dontneed
zap_page_range
unmap_vmas
unmap_page_range
zap_pud_range
zap_pmd_range
//
// Assume that this huge page has never been accessed.
// I.e. content of the PMD entry is zero (not mapped).
//
if (pmd_trans_huge(*pmd)) {
// We don't get here due to the above assumption.
}
//
// Assume that Thread B incurred a page fault and
.---------> // sneaks in here as shown below.
| //
| if (pmd_none_or_clear_bad(pmd))
| {
| if (unlikely(pmd_bad(*pmd)))
| pmd_clear_bad
| {
| pmd_ERROR
| // Log "bad pmd ..." message here.
| pmd_clear
| // Clear the page's PMD entry.
| // Thread B incremented the map count
| // in page_add_new_anon_rmap(), but
| // now the page is no longer mapped
| // by a PMD entry (-> inconsistency).
| }
| }
|
v
- Thread B is handling a page fault on virtual address "B(fault)" shown
in the picture.
...
do_page_fault
__do_page_fault
// Acquire the semaphore in shared mode.
down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem)
...
handle_mm_fault
if (pmd_none(*pmd) && transparent_hugepage_enabled(vma))
// We get here due to the above assumption (PMD entry is zero).
do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
alloc_hugepage_vma
// Allocate a new transparent huge page here.
...
__do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page
...
spin_lock(&mm->page_table_lock)
...
page_add_new_anon_rmap
// Here we increment the page's map count (starts at -1).
atomic_set(&page->_mapcount, 0)
set_pmd_at
// Here we set the page's PMD entry which will be cleared
// when Thread A calls pmd_clear_bad().
...
spin_unlock(&mm->page_table_lock)
The mmap_sem does not prevent the race because both threads are acquiring
it in shared mode (down_read). Thread B holds the page_table_lock while
the page's map count and PMD table entry are updated. However, Thread A
does not synchronize on that lock.
====== end quote =======
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: checkpatch fixes]
Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Mark Salter <msalter@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 24,275
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static authz_status ssl_authz_verify_client_check(request_rec *r,
const char *require_line,
const void *parsed)
{
SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection);
SSL *ssl = sslconn ? sslconn->ssl : NULL;
if (!ssl)
return AUTHZ_DENIED;
if (sslconn->verify_error == NULL &&
sslconn->verify_info == NULL &&
SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) == X509_V_OK)
{
X509 *xs = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl);
if (xs) {
X509_free(xs);
return AUTHZ_GRANTED;
}
else {
X509_free(xs);
}
}
return AUTHZ_DENIED;
}
Commit Message: modssl: reset client-verify state when renegotiation is aborted
git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/trunk@1750779 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 20,754
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void BrowserPpapiHostImpl::OnThrottleStateChanged(PP_Instance instance,
bool is_throttled) {
auto it = instance_map_.find(instance);
if (it != instance_map_.end()) {
it->second->is_throttled = is_throttled;
for (auto& observer : it->second->observer_list)
observer.OnThrottleStateChanged(is_throttled);
}
}
Commit Message: Validate in-process plugin instance messages.
Bug: 733548, 733549
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Ie5572c7bcafa05399b09c44425ddd5ce9b9e4cba
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/538908
Commit-Queue: Bill Budge <bbudge@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480696}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 13,179
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool emulator_bad_iopl(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
int iopl;
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_REAL)
return false;
if (ctxt->mode == X86EMUL_MODE_VM86)
return true;
iopl = (ctxt->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_IOPL) >> IOPL_SHIFT;
return ctxt->ops->cpl(ctxt) > iopl;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix missing checks in syscall emulation
On hosts without this patch, 32bit guests will crash (and 64bit guests
may behave in a wrong way) for example by simply executing following
nasm-demo-application:
[bits 32]
global _start
SECTION .text
_start: syscall
(I tested it with winxp and linux - both always crashed)
Disassembly of section .text:
00000000 <_start>:
0: 0f 05 syscall
The reason seems a missing "invalid opcode"-trap (int6) for the
syscall opcode "0f05", which is not available on Intel CPUs
within non-longmodes, as also on some AMD CPUs within legacy-mode.
(depending on CPU vendor, MSR_EFER and cpuid)
Because previous mentioned OSs may not engage corresponding
syscall target-registers (STAR, LSTAR, CSTAR), they remain
NULL and (non trapping) syscalls are leading to multiple
faults and finally crashs.
Depending on the architecture (AMD or Intel) pretended by
guests, various checks according to vendor's documentation
are implemented to overcome the current issue and behave
like the CPUs physical counterparts.
[mtosatti: cleanup/beautify code]
Signed-off-by: Stephan Baerwolf <stephan.baerwolf@tu-ilmenau.de>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,938
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m)
{
char *response;
int authok;
if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__);
if (authctxt->as == NULL)
fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL);
authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
authctxt->as = NULL;
debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
free(response);
buffer_clear(m);
buffer_put_int(m, authok);
debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
return (authok != 0);
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,445
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool isValidMIMEType(const String& type)
{
size_t slashPosition = type.find('/');
if (slashPosition == notFound || !slashPosition || slashPosition == type.length() - 1)
return false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < type.length(); ++i) {
if (!isRFC2616TokenCharacter(type[i]) && i != slashPosition)
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,459
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void setJSTestObjShortAttr(ExecState* exec, JSObject* thisObject, JSValue value)
{
JSTestObj* castedThis = jsCast<JSTestObj*>(thisObject);
TestObj* impl = static_cast<TestObj*>(castedThis->impl());
impl->setShortAttr(value.toInt32(exec));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,515
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int snmp_helper(void *context, size_t hdrlen, unsigned char tag,
const void *data, size_t datalen)
{
struct snmp_ctx *ctx = (struct snmp_ctx *)context;
__be32 *pdata = (__be32 *)data;
if (*pdata == ctx->from) {
pr_debug("%s: %pI4 to %pI4\n", __func__,
(void *)&ctx->from, (void *)&ctx->to);
if (*ctx->check)
fast_csum(ctx, (unsigned char *)data - ctx->begin);
*pdata = ctx->to;
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: nf_nat_snmp_basic: add missing length checks in ASN.1 cbs
The generic ASN.1 decoder infrastructure doesn't guarantee that callbacks
will get as much data as they expect; callbacks have to check the `datalen`
parameter before looking at `data`. Make sure that snmp_version() and
snmp_helper() don't read/write beyond the end of the packet data.
(Also move the assignment to `pdata` down below the check to make it clear
that it isn't necessarily a pointer we can use before the `datalen` check.)
Fixes: cc2d58634e0f ("netfilter: nf_nat_snmp_basic: use asn1 decoder library")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-129
| 1
| 22,434
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void rpc_killall_tasks(struct rpc_clnt *clnt)
{
struct rpc_task *rovr;
if (list_empty(&clnt->cl_tasks))
return;
dprintk("RPC: killing all tasks for client %p\n", clnt);
/*
* Spin lock all_tasks to prevent changes...
*/
spin_lock(&clnt->cl_lock);
list_for_each_entry(rovr, &clnt->cl_tasks, tk_task) {
if (!RPC_IS_ACTIVATED(rovr))
continue;
if (!(rovr->tk_flags & RPC_TASK_KILLED)) {
rovr->tk_flags |= RPC_TASK_KILLED;
rpc_exit(rovr, -EIO);
if (RPC_IS_QUEUED(rovr))
rpc_wake_up_queued_task(rovr->tk_waitqueue,
rovr);
}
}
spin_unlock(&clnt->cl_lock);
}
Commit Message: NLM: Don't hang forever on NLM unlock requests
If the NLM daemon is killed on the NFS server, we can currently end up
hanging forever on an 'unlock' request, instead of aborting. Basically,
if the rpcbind request fails, or the server keeps returning garbage, we
really want to quit instead of retrying.
Tested-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 920
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: LockContentsView::~LockContentsView() {
Shell::Get()->accelerator_controller()->UnregisterAll(this);
data_dispatcher_->RemoveObserver(this);
Shell::Get()->login_screen_controller()->RemoveObserver(this);
keyboard::KeyboardController::Get()->RemoveObserver(this);
Shell::Get()->system_tray_notifier()->RemoveSystemTrayFocusObserver(this);
if (unlock_attempt_ > 0) {
Shell::Get()->metrics()->login_metrics_recorder()->RecordNumLoginAttempts(
unlock_attempt_, false /*success*/);
}
chromeos::DBusThreadManager::Get()->GetPowerManagerClient()->RemoveObserver(
this);
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,214
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs4_xdr_dec_setclientid(struct rpc_rqst *req,
struct xdr_stream *xdr,
struct nfs4_setclientid_res *res)
{
struct compound_hdr hdr;
int status;
status = decode_compound_hdr(xdr, &hdr);
if (!status)
status = decode_setclientid(xdr, res);
return status;
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: include bitmap in nfsv4 get acl data
The NFSv4 bitmap size is unbounded: a server can return an arbitrary
sized bitmap in an FATTR4_WORD0_ACL request. Replace using the
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz as a guess to the maximum bitmask returned by a server
with the inclusion of the bitmap (xdr length plus bitmasks) and the acl data
xdr length to the (cached) acl page data.
This is a general solution to commit e5012d1f "NFSv4.1: update
nfs4_fattr_bitmap_maxsz" and fixes hitting a BUG_ON in xdr_shrink_bufhead
when getting ACLs.
Fix a bug in decode_getacl that returned -EINVAL on ACLs > page when getxattr
was called with a NULL buffer, preventing ACL > PAGE_SIZE from being retrieved.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andy Adamson <andros@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 364
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API void *zend_object_store_get_object_by_handle(zend_object_handle handle TSRMLS_DC)
{
return EG(objects_store).object_buckets[handle].bucket.obj.object;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73052 - Memory Corruption in During Deserialized-object Destruction
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 24,759
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void deprecatedStaticReadOnlyAttrAttributeGetter(const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info)
{
v8SetReturnValueInt(info, TestObject::deprecatedStaticReadOnlyAttr());
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 18,669
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void lite_font_map( wmfAPI* API, wmfFont* font)
{
wmfFontData
*font_data;
wmf_magick_font_t
*magick_font;
wmf_magick_t
*ddata = WMF_MAGICK_GetData(API);
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
const TypeInfo
*type_info,
*type_info_base;
const char
*wmf_font_name;
if (font == 0)
return;
font_data = (wmfFontData*)API->font_data;
font->user_data = font_data->user_data;
magick_font = (wmf_magick_font_t*)font->user_data;
wmf_font_name = WMF_FONT_NAME(font);
if (magick_font->ps_name != (char *) NULL)
magick_font->ps_name=DestroyString(magick_font->ps_name);
exception=AcquireExceptionInfo();
type_info_base=GetTypeInfo("*",exception);
if (type_info_base == 0)
{
InheritException(&ddata->image->exception,exception);
(void) DestroyExceptionInfo(exception);
return;
}
/* Certain short-hand font names are not the proper Windows names
and should be promoted to the proper names */
if (LocaleCompare(wmf_font_name,"Times") == 0)
wmf_font_name = "Times New Roman";
else if (LocaleCompare(wmf_font_name,"Courier") == 0)
wmf_font_name = "Courier New";
/* Look for a family-based best-match */
if (!magick_font->ps_name)
{
int
target_weight;
if (WMF_FONT_WEIGHT(font) == 0)
target_weight = 400;
else
target_weight = WMF_FONT_WEIGHT(font);
type_info=GetTypeInfoByFamily(wmf_font_name,AnyStyle,AnyStretch,
target_weight,exception);
if (type_info == (const TypeInfo *) NULL)
type_info=GetTypeInfoByFamily(wmf_font_name,AnyStyle,AnyStretch,0,
exception);
if (type_info != (const TypeInfo *) NULL)
CloneString(&magick_font->ps_name,type_info->name);
}
(void) DestroyExceptionInfo(exception);
/* Now let's try simple substitution mappings from WMFFontMap */
if (!magick_font->ps_name)
{
char
target[MaxTextExtent];
int
target_weight = 400,
want_italic = MagickFalse,
want_bold = MagickFalse,
i;
if ( WMF_FONT_WEIGHT(font) != 0 )
target_weight = WMF_FONT_WEIGHT(font);
if ( (target_weight > 550) || ((strstr(wmf_font_name,"Bold") ||
strstr(wmf_font_name,"Heavy") ||
strstr(wmf_font_name,"Black"))) )
want_bold = MagickTrue;
if ( (WMF_FONT_ITALIC(font)) || ((strstr(wmf_font_name,"Italic") ||
strstr(wmf_font_name,"Oblique"))) )
want_italic = MagickTrue;
(void) CopyMagickString(target,"Times",MaxTextExtent);
for( i=0; SubFontMap[i].name != NULL; i++ )
{
if (LocaleCompare(wmf_font_name, SubFontMap[i].name) == 0)
{
(void) CopyMagickString(target,SubFontMap[i].mapping,
MaxTextExtent);
break;
}
}
for( i=0; WMFFontMap[i].name != NULL; i++ )
{
if (LocaleNCompare(WMFFontMap[i].name,target,strlen(WMFFontMap[i].name)) == 0)
{
if (want_bold && want_italic)
CloneString(&magick_font->ps_name,WMFFontMap[i].bolditalic);
else if (want_italic)
CloneString(&magick_font->ps_name,WMFFontMap[i].italic);
else if (want_bold)
CloneString(&magick_font->ps_name,WMFFontMap[i].bold);
else
CloneString(&magick_font->ps_name,WMFFontMap[i].normal);
}
}
}
#if 0
printf("\nlite_font_map\n");
printf("WMF_FONT_NAME = \"%s\"\n", WMF_FONT_NAME(font));
printf("WMF_FONT_WEIGHT = %i\n", WMF_FONT_WEIGHT(font));
printf("WMF_FONT_PSNAME = \"%s\"\n", WMF_FONT_PSNAME(font));
fflush(stdout);
#endif
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,428
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int __init vmx_init(void)
{
int r;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
/*
* Enlightened VMCS usage should be recommended and the host needs
* to support eVMCS v1 or above. We can also disable eVMCS support
* with module parameter.
*/
if (enlightened_vmcs &&
ms_hyperv.hints & HV_X64_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS_RECOMMENDED &&
(ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS_VERSION) >=
KVM_EVMCS_VERSION) {
int cpu;
/* Check that we have assist pages on all online CPUs */
for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
if (!hv_get_vp_assist_page(cpu)) {
enlightened_vmcs = false;
break;
}
}
if (enlightened_vmcs) {
pr_info("KVM: vmx: using Hyper-V Enlightened VMCS\n");
static_branch_enable(&enable_evmcs);
}
} else {
enlightened_vmcs = false;
}
#endif
r = kvm_init(&vmx_x86_ops, sizeof(struct vcpu_vmx),
__alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx), THIS_MODULE);
if (r)
return r;
#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
rcu_assign_pointer(crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss,
crash_vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss);
#endif
vmx_check_vmcs12_offsets();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 18,876
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void kvm_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
{
kvm_x86_ops->set_segment(vcpu, var, seg);
}
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 7,428
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void prefix_line(FILE *ofd, int prefix)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < prefix; i++)
fprintf(ofd, " ");
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 26,022
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool TaskManagerView::CanResize() const {
return true;
}
Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 19,584
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void snd_usbmidi_output_standard_packet(struct urb *urb, uint8_t p0,
uint8_t p1, uint8_t p2,
uint8_t p3)
{
uint8_t *buf =
(uint8_t *)urb->transfer_buffer + urb->transfer_buffer_length;
buf[0] = p0;
buf[1] = p1;
buf[2] = p2;
buf[3] = p3;
urb->transfer_buffer_length += 4;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: usb-audio: avoid freeing umidi object twice
The 'umidi' object will be free'd on the error path by snd_usbmidi_free()
when tearing down the rawmidi interface. So we shouldn't try to free it
in snd_usbmidi_create() after having registered the rawmidi interface.
Found by KASAN.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Clemens Ladisch <clemens@ladisch.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 7,114
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
struct msr_data apic_base_msr;
vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 0;
vmx->soft_vnmi_blocked = 0;
vmx->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] = get_rdx_init_val();
kvm_set_cr8(&vmx->vcpu, 0);
apic_base_msr.data = APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE | MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE;
if (kvm_vcpu_is_bsp(&vmx->vcpu))
apic_base_msr.data |= MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BSP;
apic_base_msr.host_initiated = true;
kvm_set_apic_base(&vmx->vcpu, &apic_base_msr);
vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_CS);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_CS_SELECTOR, 0xf000);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_CS_BASE, 0xffff0000);
seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_DS);
seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_ES);
seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_FS);
seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_GS);
seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_SS);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_TR_SELECTOR, 0);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_TR_BASE, 0);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES, 0x008b);
vmcs_write16(GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR, 0);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_LDTR_BASE, 0);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_LDTR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_LDTR_AR_BYTES, 0x00082);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, 0);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, 0);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, 0);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, 0x02);
kvm_rip_write(vcpu, 0xfff0);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, 0);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, 0);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE, GUEST_ACTIVITY_ACTIVE);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, 0);
vmcs_write32(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS, 0);
/* Special registers */
vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, 0);
setup_msrs(vmx);
vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, 0); /* 22.2.1 */
if (cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow()) {
vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR, 0);
if (vm_need_tpr_shadow(vmx->vcpu.kvm))
vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR,
__pa(vmx->vcpu.arch.apic->regs));
vmcs_write32(TPR_THRESHOLD, 0);
}
kvm_vcpu_reload_apic_access_page(vcpu);
if (vmx_vm_has_apicv(vcpu->kvm))
memset(&vmx->pi_desc, 0, sizeof(struct pi_desc));
if (vmx->vpid != 0)
vmcs_write16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID, vmx->vpid);
vmx->vcpu.arch.cr0 = X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_ET;
vmx_set_cr0(&vmx->vcpu, kvm_read_cr0(vcpu)); /* enter rmode */
vmx_set_cr4(&vmx->vcpu, 0);
vmx_set_efer(&vmx->vcpu, 0);
vmx_fpu_activate(&vmx->vcpu);
update_exception_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu);
vpid_sync_context(vmx);
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,977
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int spacePop(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
int ret;
if (ctxt->spaceNr <= 0) return(0);
ctxt->spaceNr--;
if (ctxt->spaceNr > 0)
ctxt->space = &ctxt->spaceTab[ctxt->spaceNr - 1];
else
ctxt->space = &ctxt->spaceTab[0];
ret = ctxt->spaceTab[ctxt->spaceNr];
ctxt->spaceTab[ctxt->spaceNr] = -1;
return(ret);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 12,360
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PermissionsAPIUnitTest() {}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Have URLPattern::Contains() properly check schemes
Have URLPattern::Contains() properly check the schemes of the patterns
when evaluating if one pattern contains another. This is important in
order to prevent extensions from requesting chrome:-scheme permissions
via the permissions API when <all_urls> is specified as an optional
permission.
Bug: 859600,918470
Change-Id: If04d945ad0c939e84a80d83502c0f84b6ef0923d
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1396561
Commit-Queue: Devlin <rdevlin.cronin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Karan Bhatia <karandeepb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621410}
CWE ID: CWE-79
| 0
| 11,458
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int coolkey_match_card(sc_card_t *card)
{
int r;
SC_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_VERBOSE);
/* Since we send an APDU, the card's logout function may be called...
* however it may be in dirty memory */
card->ops->logout = NULL;
r = coolkey_select_applet(card);
return (r >= SC_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 26,476
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t MetadataRetrieverClient::setDataSource(
const sp<IMediaHTTPService> &httpService,
const char *url,
const KeyedVector<String8, String8> *headers)
{
ALOGV("setDataSource(%s)", url);
Mutex::Autolock lock(mLock);
if (url == NULL) {
return UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
player_type playerType =
MediaPlayerFactory::getPlayerType(NULL /* client */, url);
ALOGV("player type = %d", playerType);
sp<MediaMetadataRetrieverBase> p = createRetriever(playerType);
if (p == NULL) return NO_INIT;
status_t ret = p->setDataSource(httpService, url, headers);
if (ret == NO_ERROR) mRetriever = p;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Clear unused pointer field when sending across binder
Bug: 28377502
Change-Id: Iad5ebfb0a9ef89f09755bb332579dbd3534f9c98
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 11,048
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CGaiaCredentialBase::~CGaiaCredentialBase() {}
Commit Message: [GCPW] Disallow sign in of consumer accounts when mdm is enabled.
Unless the registry key "mdm_aca" is explicitly set to 1, always
fail sign in of consumer accounts when mdm enrollment is enabled.
Consumer accounts are defined as accounts with gmail.com or
googlemail.com domain.
Bug: 944049
Change-Id: Icb822f3737d90931de16a8d3317616dd2b159edd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1532903
Commit-Queue: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Roger Tawa <rogerta@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#646278}
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 5,971
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: pch_newfirst (void)
{
return p_newfirst;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 28,626
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: parse_set_vlan_vid(char *arg, struct ofpbuf *ofpacts, bool push_vlan_if_needed)
{
struct ofpact_vlan_vid *vlan_vid;
uint16_t vid;
char *error;
error = str_to_u16(arg, "VLAN VID", &vid);
if (error) {
return error;
}
if (vid & ~VLAN_VID_MASK) {
return xasprintf("%s: not a valid VLAN VID", arg);
}
vlan_vid = ofpact_put_SET_VLAN_VID(ofpacts);
vlan_vid->vlan_vid = vid;
vlan_vid->push_vlan_if_needed = push_vlan_if_needed;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 4,548
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static _INLINE_ void check_modem_status(struct mp_port *mtpt)
{
int status;
status = serial_in(mtpt, UART_MSR);
if ((status & UART_MSR_ANY_DELTA) == 0)
return;
if (status & UART_MSR_TERI)
mtpt->port.icount.rng++;
if (status & UART_MSR_DDSR)
mtpt->port.icount.dsr++;
if (status & UART_MSR_DDCD)
sb_uart_handle_dcd_change(&mtpt->port, status & UART_MSR_DCD);
if (status & UART_MSR_DCTS)
sb_uart_handle_cts_change(&mtpt->port, status & UART_MSR_CTS);
wake_up_interruptible(&mtpt->port.info->delta_msr_wait);
}
Commit Message: Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 8,015
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void jpc_qcc_destroyparms(jpc_ms_t *ms)
{
jpc_qcc_t *qcc = &ms->parms.qcc;
jpc_qcx_destroycompparms(&qcc->compparms);
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 18,079
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: read_data(struct archive_read *a, const void **buff, size_t *size,
int64_t *offset)
{
size_t bytes_to_read;
ssize_t bytes_read;
struct mtree *mtree;
mtree = (struct mtree *)(a->format->data);
if (mtree->fd < 0) {
*buff = NULL;
*offset = 0;
*size = 0;
return (ARCHIVE_EOF);
}
if (mtree->buff == NULL) {
mtree->buffsize = 64 * 1024;
mtree->buff = malloc(mtree->buffsize);
if (mtree->buff == NULL) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate memory");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
}
*buff = mtree->buff;
*offset = mtree->offset;
if ((int64_t)mtree->buffsize > mtree->cur_size - mtree->offset)
bytes_to_read = (size_t)(mtree->cur_size - mtree->offset);
else
bytes_to_read = mtree->buffsize;
bytes_read = read(mtree->fd, mtree->buff, bytes_to_read);
if (bytes_read < 0) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, errno, "Can't read");
return (ARCHIVE_WARN);
}
if (bytes_read == 0) {
*size = 0;
return (ARCHIVE_EOF);
}
mtree->offset += bytes_read;
*size = bytes_read;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Commit Message: Fix libarchive/archive_read_support_format_mtree.c:1388:11: error: array subscript is above array bounds
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,997
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int graybasecolor(i_ctx_t * i_ctx_p, ref *space, int base, int *stage, int *cont, int *stack_depth)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
float Gray, RGB[3];
*cont = 0;
*stage = 0;
check_op(1);
if (!r_has_type(op, t_integer)) {
if (r_has_type(op, t_real)) {
Gray = op->value.realval;
} else
return_error(gs_error_typecheck);
} else
Gray = (float)op->value.intval;
if (Gray < 0 || Gray > 1)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
switch (base) {
case 0:
/* Requested space is DeviceGray, just use the value */
make_real(op, Gray);
break;
case 1:
/* Requested space is HSB */
case 2:
/* Requested space is RGB, set all the components
* to the gray value
*/
push(2);
RGB[0] = RGB[1] = RGB[2] = Gray;
if (base == 1)
/* If the requested space is HSB, convert the RGB to HSB */
rgb2hsb((float *)&RGB);
make_real(&op[-2], RGB[0]);
make_real(&op[-1], RGB[1]);
make_real(op, RGB[2]);
break;
case 3:
/* Requested space is CMYK, use the gray value to set the
* black channel.
*/
push(3);
make_real(&op[-3], (float)0);
make_real(&op[-2], (float)0);
make_real(&op[-1], (float)0);
make_real(op, (float)1.0 - Gray);
break;
default:
return_error(gs_error_undefined);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 23,033
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmxnet3_fill_stats(VMXNET3State *s)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < s->txq_num; i++) {
cpu_physical_memory_write(s->txq_descr[i].tx_stats_pa,
&s->txq_descr[i].txq_stats,
sizeof(s->txq_descr[i].txq_stats));
}
for (i = 0; i < s->rxq_num; i++) {
cpu_physical_memory_write(s->rxq_descr[i].rx_stats_pa,
&s->rxq_descr[i].rxq_stats,
sizeof(s->rxq_descr[i].rxq_stats));
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 4,655
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ParamTraits<std::vector<unsigned char> >::Write(Message* m,
const param_type& p) {
if (p.empty()) {
m->WriteData(NULL, 0);
} else {
m->WriteData(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&p.front()),
static_cast<int>(p.size()));
}
}
Commit Message: Validate that paths don't contain embedded NULLs at deserialization.
BUG=166867
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11743009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@174935 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 843
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::DispatchUnloadEvents() {
PluginScriptForbiddenScope forbid_plugin_destructor_scripting;
if (parser_)
parser_->StopParsing();
if (load_event_progress_ == kLoadEventNotRun)
return;
if (load_event_progress_ <= kUnloadEventInProgress) {
Element* current_focused_element = FocusedElement();
if (auto* input = ToHTMLInputElementOrNull(current_focused_element))
input->EndEditing();
if (load_event_progress_ < kPageHideInProgress) {
load_event_progress_ = kPageHideInProgress;
if (LocalDOMWindow* window = domWindow()) {
const double pagehide_event_start = MonotonicallyIncreasingTime();
window->DispatchEvent(
PageTransitionEvent::Create(EventTypeNames::pagehide, false), this);
const double pagehide_event_end = MonotonicallyIncreasingTime();
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(
CustomCountHistogram, pagehide_histogram,
("DocumentEventTiming.PageHideDuration", 0, 10000000, 50));
pagehide_histogram.Count((pagehide_event_end - pagehide_event_start) *
1000000.0);
}
if (!frame_)
return;
PageVisibilityState visibility_state = GetPageVisibilityState();
load_event_progress_ = kUnloadVisibilityChangeInProgress;
if (visibility_state != kPageVisibilityStateHidden) {
const double pagevisibility_hidden_event_start =
MonotonicallyIncreasingTime();
DispatchEvent(Event::CreateBubble(EventTypeNames::visibilitychange));
const double pagevisibility_hidden_event_end =
MonotonicallyIncreasingTime();
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(CustomCountHistogram, pagevisibility_histogram,
("DocumentEventTiming.PageVibilityHiddenDuration",
0, 10000000, 50));
pagevisibility_histogram.Count((pagevisibility_hidden_event_end -
pagevisibility_hidden_event_start) *
1000000.0);
DispatchEvent(
Event::CreateBubble(EventTypeNames::webkitvisibilitychange));
}
if (!frame_)
return;
DocumentLoader* document_loader =
frame_->Loader().GetProvisionalDocumentLoader();
load_event_progress_ = kUnloadEventInProgress;
Event* unload_event(Event::Create(EventTypeNames::unload));
if (document_loader && !document_loader->GetTiming().UnloadEventStart() &&
!document_loader->GetTiming().UnloadEventEnd()) {
DocumentLoadTiming& timing = document_loader->GetTiming();
DCHECK(timing.NavigationStart());
const double unload_event_start = MonotonicallyIncreasingTime();
timing.MarkUnloadEventStart(unload_event_start);
frame_->DomWindow()->DispatchEvent(unload_event, this);
const double unload_event_end = MonotonicallyIncreasingTime();
DEFINE_STATIC_LOCAL(
CustomCountHistogram, unload_histogram,
("DocumentLoadTiming.UnloadDuration", 0, 10000000, 50));
unload_histogram.Count((unload_event_end - unload_event_start) *
1000000.0);
timing.MarkUnloadEventEnd(unload_event_end);
} else {
frame_->DomWindow()->DispatchEvent(unload_event, frame_->GetDocument());
}
}
load_event_progress_ = kUnloadEventHandled;
}
if (!frame_)
return;
bool keep_event_listeners =
frame_->Loader().GetProvisionalDocumentLoader() &&
frame_->ShouldReuseDefaultView(
frame_->Loader().GetProvisionalDocumentLoader()->Url());
if (!keep_event_listeners)
RemoveAllEventListenersRecursively();
}
Commit Message: Inherit referrer and policy when creating a nested browsing context
BUG=763194
R=estark@chromium.org
Change-Id: Ide3950269adf26ba221f573dfa088e95291ab676
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/732652
Reviewed-by: Emily Stark <estark@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jochen Eisinger <jochen@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511211}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 6,823
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ALWAYS_INLINE JsVar *jsvLockAgain(JsVar *var) {
assert(var);
assert(jsvGetLocks(var) < JSV_LOCK_MAX);
var->flags += JSV_LOCK_ONE;
return var;
}
Commit Message: fix jsvGetString regression
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 4,528
|
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