instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ptrace_has_cap(struct user_namespace *ns, unsigned int mode)
{
if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT)
return has_ns_capability_noaudit(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
else
return has_ns_capability(current, ns, CAP_SYS_PTRACE);
}
Commit Message: exec/ptrace: fix get_dumpable() incorrect tests
The get_dumpable() return value is not boolean. Most users of the
function actually want to be testing for non-SUID_DUMP_USER(1) rather than
SUID_DUMP_DISABLE(0). The SUID_DUMP_ROOT(2) is also considered a
protected state. Almost all places did this correctly, excepting the two
places fixed in this patch.
Wrong logic:
if (dumpable == SUID_DUMP_DISABLE) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable == 0) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (!dumpable) { /* be protective */ }
Correct logic:
if (dumpable != SUID_DUMP_USER) { /* be protective */ }
or
if (dumpable != 1) { /* be protective */ }
Without this patch, if the system had set the sysctl fs/suid_dumpable=2, a
user was able to ptrace attach to processes that had dropped privileges to
that user. (This may have been partially mitigated if Yama was enabled.)
The macros have been moved into the file that declares get/set_dumpable(),
which means things like the ia64 code can see them too.
CVE-2013-2929
Reported-by: Vasily Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "Luck, Tony" <tony.luck@intel.com>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 29,005
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nfs_commit_unstable_pages(struct inode *inode, struct writeback_control *wbc)
{
struct nfs_inode *nfsi = NFS_I(inode);
int flags = FLUSH_SYNC;
int ret = 0;
/* no commits means nothing needs to be done */
if (!nfsi->commit_info.ncommit)
return ret;
if (wbc->sync_mode == WB_SYNC_NONE) {
/* Don't commit yet if this is a non-blocking flush and there
* are a lot of outstanding writes for this mapping.
*/
if (nfsi->commit_info.ncommit <= (nfsi->npages >> 1))
goto out_mark_dirty;
/* don't wait for the COMMIT response */
flags = 0;
}
ret = nfs_commit_inode(inode, flags);
if (ret >= 0) {
if (wbc->sync_mode == WB_SYNC_NONE) {
if (ret < wbc->nr_to_write)
wbc->nr_to_write -= ret;
else
wbc->nr_to_write = 0;
}
return 0;
}
out_mark_dirty:
__mark_inode_dirty(inode, I_DIRTY_DATASYNC);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,212
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void InspectorNetworkAgent::DidFinishXHRLoading(ExecutionContext* context,
XMLHttpRequest* xhr,
ThreadableLoaderClient* client,
const AtomicString& method,
const String& url) {
DidFinishXHRInternal(context, xhr, client, method, url, true);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void IndexedDBTransaction::AddPendingObserver(
int32_t observer_id,
const IndexedDBObserver::Options& options) {
DCHECK_NE(mode(), blink::kWebIDBTransactionModeVersionChange);
pending_observers_.push_back(std::make_unique<IndexedDBObserver>(
observer_id, object_store_ids_, options));
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixing early destruction of connection during forceclose
Patch is as small as possible for merging.
Bug: 842990
Change-Id: I9968ffee1bf3279e61e1ec13e4d541f713caf12f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1062935
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#559383}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 19,857
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebGLRenderingContextBase::uniform1iv(const WebGLUniformLocation* location,
Vector<GLint>& v) {
if (isContextLost() ||
!ValidateUniformParameters("uniform1iv", location, v.data(), v.size(), 1,
0, v.size()))
return;
ContextGL()->Uniform1iv(location->Location(), v.size(), v.data());
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,620
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: nautilus_directory_cancel (NautilusDirectory *directory)
{
/* Arbitrary order (kept alphabetical). */
deep_count_cancel (directory);
directory_count_cancel (directory);
file_info_cancel (directory);
file_list_cancel (directory);
link_info_cancel (directory);
mime_list_cancel (directory);
new_files_cancel (directory);
extension_info_cancel (directory);
thumbnail_cancel (directory);
mount_cancel (directory);
filesystem_info_cancel (directory);
/* We aren't waiting for anything any more. */
if (waiting_directories != NULL)
{
g_hash_table_remove (waiting_directories, directory);
}
/* Check if any directories should wake up. */
async_job_wake_up ();
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 21,685
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool SniffOgg(
const sp<DataSource> &source, String8 *mimeType, float *confidence,
sp<AMessage> *) {
char tmp[4];
if (source->readAt(0, tmp, 4) < 4 || memcmp(tmp, "OggS", 4)) {
return false;
}
mimeType->setTo(MEDIA_MIMETYPE_CONTAINER_OGG);
*confidence = 0.2f;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix memory leak in OggExtractor
Test: added a temporal log and run poc
Bug: 63581671
Change-Id: I436a08e54d5e831f9fbdb33c26d15397ce1fbeba
(cherry picked from commit 63079e7c8e12cda4eb124fbe565213d30b9ea34c)
CWE ID: CWE-772
| 0
| 20,923
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FrameLoader::reload(ReloadPolicy reloadPolicy, const KURL& overrideURL, const String& overrideEncoding)
{
DocumentLoader* documentLoader = activeDocumentLoader();
if (!documentLoader)
return;
if (m_state == FrameStateProvisional)
insertDummyHistoryItem();
frame()->loader()->history()->saveDocumentAndScrollState();
ResourceRequest request = documentLoader->request();
request.setCachePolicy(UseProtocolCachePolicy);
if (!overrideURL.isEmpty())
request.setURL(overrideURL);
else if (!documentLoader->unreachableURL().isEmpty())
request.setURL(documentLoader->unreachableURL());
FrameLoadType type = reloadPolicy == EndToEndReload ? FrameLoadTypeReloadFromOrigin : FrameLoadTypeReload;
NavigationAction action(request, type, request.httpMethod() == "POST");
loadWithNavigationAction(request, action, type, 0, SubstituteData(), overrideEncoding);
}
Commit Message: Don't wait to notify client of spoof attempt if a modal dialog is created.
BUG=281256
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23620020
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157196 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,658
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::setStateForNewFormElements(const Vector<String>& stateVector)
{
if (!stateVector.size() && !m_formController)
return;
formController().setStateForNewFormElements(stateVector);
}
Commit Message: Change Document::detach() to RELEASE_ASSERT all subframes are gone.
BUG=556724,577105
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1667573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#373642}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 19,346
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: QuarantineLinuxTest()
: source_url_("http://www.source.com"),
referrer_url_("http://www.referrer.com"),
is_xattr_supported_(false) {}
Commit Message: Disable setxattr calls from quarantine subsystem on Chrome OS.
BUG=733943
Change-Id: I6e743469a8dc91536e180ecf4ff0df0cf427037c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1380571
Commit-Queue: Will Harris <wfh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Trainor <dtrainor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Thiemo Nagel <tnagel@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#617961}
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 11,209
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void padb_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_PaddingBitsBox *ptr = (GF_PaddingBitsBox *) s;
if (ptr == NULL) return;
if (ptr->padbits) gf_free(ptr->padbits);
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 22,845
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void free(struct crypto_instance *inst)
{
crypto_drop_spawn(crypto_instance_ctx(inst));
kfree(inst);
}
Commit Message: crypto: include crypto- module prefix in template
This adds the module loading prefix "crypto-" to the template lookup
as well.
For example, attempting to load 'vfat(blowfish)' via AF_ALG now correctly
includes the "crypto-" prefix at every level, correctly rejecting "vfat":
net-pf-38
algif-hash
crypto-vfat(blowfish)
crypto-vfat(blowfish)-all
crypto-vfat
Reported-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Acked-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 14,012
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pdf_set_err(struct pdf_doc *doc, int errval,
const char *buffer, ...)
{
va_list ap;
int len;
va_start(ap, buffer);
len = vsnprintf(doc->errstr, sizeof(doc->errstr) - 2, buffer, ap);
va_end(ap);
/* Make sure we're properly terminated */
if (doc->errstr[len] != '\n')
doc->errstr[len] = '\n';
doc->errstr[len] = '\0';
doc->errval = errval;
return errval;
}
Commit Message: jpeg: Fix another possible buffer overrun
Found via the clang libfuzzer
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 4,028
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PDFiumEngine::GetTextRunInfo(int page_index,
int start_char_index,
uint32_t* out_len,
double* out_font_size,
pp::FloatRect* out_bounds) {
DCHECK(page_index >= 0 && page_index < static_cast<int>(pages_.size()));
return pages_[page_index]->GetTextRunInfo(start_char_index, out_len,
out_font_size, out_bounds);
}
Commit Message: [pdf] Defer page unloading in JS callback.
One of the callbacks from PDFium JavaScript into the embedder is to get the
current page number. In Chromium, this will trigger a call to
CalculateMostVisiblePage that method will determine the visible pages and unload
any non-visible pages. But, if the originating JS is on a non-visible page
we'll delete the page and annotations associated with that page. This will
cause issues as we are currently working with those objects when the JavaScript
returns.
This Cl defers the page unloading triggered by getting the most visible page
until the next event is handled by the Chromium embedder.
BUG=chromium:653090
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2418533002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#424781}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 20,829
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: array_param_read(iparam_list * plist, const ref * pkey, iparam_loc * ploc)
{
ref *bot = ((array_param_list *) plist)->bot;
ref *ptr = bot;
ref *top = ((array_param_list *) plist)->top;
for (; ptr < top; ptr += 2) {
if (r_has_type(ptr, t_name) && name_eq(ptr, pkey)) {
ploc->pvalue = ptr + 1;
ploc->presult = &plist->results[ptr - bot];
*ploc->presult = 1;
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 24,459
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: get_policy(kadm5_server_handle_t handle, const char *name,
kadm5_policy_ent_t policy_out, krb5_boolean *have_pol_out)
{
kadm5_ret_t ret;
*have_pol_out = FALSE;
if (name == NULL)
return 0;
ret = kadm5_get_policy(handle->lhandle, (char *)name, policy_out);
if (ret == 0)
*have_pol_out = TRUE;
return (ret == KADM5_UNK_POLICY) ? 0 : ret;
}
Commit Message: Return only new keys in randkey [CVE-2014-5351]
In kadmind's randkey operation, if a client specifies the keepold
flag, do not include the preserved old keys in the response.
CVE-2014-5351:
An authenticated remote attacker can retrieve the current keys for a
service principal when generating a new set of keys for that
principal. The attacker needs to be authenticated as a user who has
the elevated privilege for randomizing the keys of other principals.
Normally, when a Kerberos administrator randomizes the keys of a
service principal, kadmind returns only the new keys. This prevents
an administrator who lacks legitimate privileged access to a service
from forging tickets to authenticate to that service. If the
"keepold" flag to the kadmin randkey RPC operation is true, kadmind
retains the old keys in the KDC database as intended, but also
unexpectedly returns the old keys to the client, which exposes the
service to ticket forgery attacks from the administrator.
A mitigating factor is that legitimate clients of the affected service
will start failing to authenticate to the service once they begin to
receive service tickets encrypted in the new keys. The affected
service will be unable to decrypt the newly issued tickets, possibly
alerting the legitimate administrator of the affected service.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:P/I:N/A:N/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[tlyu@mit.edu: CVE description and CVSS score]
ticket: 8018 (new)
target_version: 1.13
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-255
| 0
| 22,600
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebLocalFrameImpl::IsViewSourceModeEnabled() const {
if (!GetFrame())
return false;
return GetFrame()->InViewSourceMode();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 8,190
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static __inline__ int udpv6_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
return __udp6_lib_rcv(skb, &udp_table, IPPROTO_UDP);
}
Commit Message: ipv6: udp: fix the wrong headroom check
At this point, skb->data points to skb_transport_header.
So, headroom check is wrong.
For some case:bridge(UFO is on) + eth device(UFO is off),
there is no enough headroom for IPv6 frag head.
But headroom check is always false.
This will bring about data be moved to there prior to skb->head,
when adding IPv6 frag header to skb.
Signed-off-by: Shan Wei <shanwei@cn.fujitsu.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 19,332
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xsltFunctionAvailableFunction(xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs){
xmlXPathObjectPtr obj;
xmlChar *prefix, *name;
const xmlChar *nsURI = NULL;
if (nargs != 1) {
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"function-available() : expects one string arg\n");
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_ARITY;
return;
}
xmlXPathStringFunction(ctxt, 1);
if ((ctxt->value == NULL) || (ctxt->value->type != XPATH_STRING)) {
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"function-available() : invalid arg expecting a string\n");
ctxt->error = XPATH_INVALID_TYPE;
return;
}
obj = valuePop(ctxt);
name = xmlSplitQName2(obj->stringval, &prefix);
if (name == NULL) {
name = xmlStrdup(obj->stringval);
} else {
nsURI = xmlXPathNsLookup(ctxt->context, prefix);
if (nsURI == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt), NULL, NULL,
"function-available() : prefix %s is not bound\n", prefix);
}
}
if (xmlXPathFunctionLookupNS(ctxt->context, name, nsURI) != NULL) {
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewBoolean(1));
} else {
valuePush(ctxt, xmlXPathNewBoolean(0));
}
xmlXPathFreeObject(obj);
if (name != NULL)
xmlFree(name);
if (prefix != NULL)
xmlFree(prefix);
}
Commit Message: Fix harmless memory error in generate-id.
BUG=140368
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10823168
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@149998 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 21,312
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pcm_chmap_ctl_info(struct snd_kcontrol *kcontrol,
struct snd_ctl_elem_info *uinfo)
{
struct snd_pcm_chmap *info = snd_kcontrol_chip(kcontrol);
uinfo->type = SNDRV_CTL_ELEM_TYPE_INTEGER;
uinfo->count = 0;
uinfo->count = info->max_channels;
uinfo->value.integer.min = 0;
uinfo->value.integer.max = SNDRV_CHMAP_LAST;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: pcm : Call kill_fasync() in stream lock
Currently kill_fasync() is called outside the stream lock in
snd_pcm_period_elapsed(). This is potentially racy, since the stream
may get released even during the irq handler is running. Although
snd_pcm_release_substream() calls snd_pcm_drop(), this doesn't
guarantee that the irq handler finishes, thus the kill_fasync() call
outside the stream spin lock may be invoked after the substream is
detached, as recently reported by KASAN.
As a quick workaround, move kill_fasync() call inside the stream
lock. The fasync is rarely used interface, so this shouldn't have a
big impact from the performance POV.
Ideally, we should implement some sync mechanism for the proper finish
of stream and irq handler. But this oneliner should suffice for most
cases, so far.
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 26,867
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int main(int argc, char** argv)
{
yr_initialize();
test_boolean_operators();
test_comparison_operators();
test_arithmetic_operators();
test_bitwise_operators();
test_syntax();
test_anonymous_strings();
test_strings();
test_wildcard_strings();
test_hex_strings();
test_count();
test_at();
test_in();
test_offset();
test_length();
test_of();
test_for();
test_re();
test_filesize();
test_comments();
test_modules();
test_integer_functions();
test_entrypoint();
test_global_rules();
#if defined(HASH_MODULE)
test_hash_module();
#endif
test_file_descriptor();
yr_finalize();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 26,938
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static MediaContainerName LookupContainerByFirst4(const uint8* buffer,
int buffer_size) {
if (buffer_size < 12)
return CONTAINER_UNKNOWN;
uint32 first4 = Read32(buffer);
switch (first4) {
case 0x1a45dfa3:
if (CheckWebm(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_WEBM;
break;
case 0x3026b275:
if (StartsWith(buffer,
buffer_size,
kAsfSignature,
sizeof(kAsfSignature))) {
return CONTAINER_ASF;
}
break;
case TAG('#','!','A','M'):
if (StartsWith(buffer, buffer_size, kAmrSignature))
return CONTAINER_AMR;
break;
case TAG('#','E','X','T'):
if (CheckHls(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_HLS;
break;
case TAG('.','R','M','F'):
if (buffer[4] == 0 && buffer[5] == 0)
return CONTAINER_RM;
break;
case TAG('.','r','a','\xfd'):
return CONTAINER_RM;
case TAG('B','I','K','b'):
case TAG('B','I','K','d'):
case TAG('B','I','K','f'):
case TAG('B','I','K','g'):
case TAG('B','I','K','h'):
case TAG('B','I','K','i'):
if (CheckBink(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_BINK;
break;
case TAG('c','a','f','f'):
if (CheckCaf(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_CAF;
break;
case TAG('D','E','X','A'):
if (buffer_size > 15 &&
Read16(buffer + 11) <= 2048 &&
Read16(buffer + 13) <= 2048) {
return CONTAINER_DXA;
}
break;
case TAG('D','T','S','H'):
if (Read32(buffer + 4) == TAG('D','H','D','R'))
return CONTAINER_DTSHD;
break;
case 0x64a30100:
case 0x64a30200:
case 0x64a30300:
case 0x64a30400:
case 0x0001a364:
case 0x0002a364:
case 0x0003a364:
if (Read32(buffer + 4) != 0 && Read32(buffer + 8) != 0)
return CONTAINER_IRCAM;
break;
case TAG('f','L','a','C'):
return CONTAINER_FLAC;
case TAG('F','L','V',0):
case TAG('F','L','V',1):
case TAG('F','L','V',2):
case TAG('F','L','V',3):
case TAG('F','L','V',4):
if (buffer[5] == 0 && Read32(buffer + 5) > 8)
return CONTAINER_FLV;
break;
case TAG('F','O','R','M'):
switch (Read32(buffer + 8)) {
case TAG('A','I','F','F'):
case TAG('A','I','F','C'):
return CONTAINER_AIFF;
}
break;
case TAG('M','A','C',' '):
return CONTAINER_APE;
case TAG('O','N','2',' '):
if (Read32(buffer + 8) == TAG('O','N','2','f'))
return CONTAINER_AVI;
break;
case TAG('O','g','g','S'):
if (buffer[5] <= 7)
return CONTAINER_OGG;
break;
case TAG('R','F','6','4'):
if (buffer_size > 16 && Read32(buffer + 12) == TAG('d','s','6','4'))
return CONTAINER_WAV;
break;
case TAG('R','I','F','F'):
switch (Read32(buffer + 8)) {
case TAG('A','V','I',' '):
case TAG('A','V','I','X'):
case TAG('A','V','I','\x19'):
case TAG('A','M','V',' '):
return CONTAINER_AVI;
case TAG('W','A','V','E'):
return CONTAINER_WAV;
}
break;
case TAG('[','S','c','r'):
if (StartsWith(buffer, buffer_size, kAssSignature))
return CONTAINER_ASS;
break;
case TAG('\xef','\xbb','\xbf','['):
if (StartsWith(buffer, buffer_size, kAssBomSignature))
return CONTAINER_ASS;
break;
case 0x7ffe8001:
case 0xfe7f0180:
case 0x1fffe800:
case 0xff1f00e8:
if (CheckDts(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_DTS;
break;
case 0xb7d80020:
if (StartsWith(buffer,
buffer_size,
kWtvSignature,
sizeof(kWtvSignature))) {
return CONTAINER_WTV;
}
break;
}
uint32 first3 = first4 & 0xffffff00;
switch (first3) {
case TAG('C','W','S',0):
case TAG('F','W','S',0):
return CONTAINER_SWF;
case TAG('I','D','3',0):
if (CheckMp3(buffer, buffer_size, true))
return CONTAINER_MP3;
break;
}
uint32 first2 = Read16(buffer);
switch (first2) {
case kAc3SyncWord:
if (CheckAc3(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_AC3;
if (CheckEac3(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_EAC3;
break;
case 0xfff0:
case 0xfff1:
case 0xfff8:
case 0xfff9:
if (CheckAac(buffer, buffer_size))
return CONTAINER_AAC;
break;
}
if (CheckMp3(buffer, buffer_size, false))
return CONTAINER_MP3;
return CONTAINER_UNKNOWN;
}
Commit Message: Add extra checks to avoid integer overflow.
BUG=425980
TEST=no crash with ASAN
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/659743004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#301249}
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 29,123
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PersistentHistogramAllocatorTest()
: statistics_recorder_(StatisticsRecorder::CreateTemporaryForTesting()) {
CreatePersistentHistogramAllocator();
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 20,084
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int packet_set_ring(struct sock *sk, union tpacket_req_u *req_u,
int closing, int tx_ring)
{
struct pgv *pg_vec = NULL;
struct packet_sock *po = pkt_sk(sk);
int was_running, order = 0;
struct packet_ring_buffer *rb;
struct sk_buff_head *rb_queue;
__be16 num;
int err = -EINVAL;
/* Added to avoid minimal code churn */
struct tpacket_req *req = &req_u->req;
lock_sock(sk);
/* Opening a Tx-ring is NOT supported in TPACKET_V3 */
if (!closing && tx_ring && (po->tp_version > TPACKET_V2)) {
net_warn_ratelimited("Tx-ring is not supported.\n");
goto out;
}
rb = tx_ring ? &po->tx_ring : &po->rx_ring;
rb_queue = tx_ring ? &sk->sk_write_queue : &sk->sk_receive_queue;
err = -EBUSY;
if (!closing) {
if (atomic_read(&po->mapped))
goto out;
if (packet_read_pending(rb))
goto out;
}
if (req->tp_block_nr) {
/* Sanity tests and some calculations */
err = -EBUSY;
if (unlikely(rb->pg_vec))
goto out;
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V1:
po->tp_hdrlen = TPACKET_HDRLEN;
break;
case TPACKET_V2:
po->tp_hdrlen = TPACKET2_HDRLEN;
break;
case TPACKET_V3:
po->tp_hdrlen = TPACKET3_HDRLEN;
break;
}
err = -EINVAL;
if (unlikely((int)req->tp_block_size <= 0))
goto out;
if (unlikely(!PAGE_ALIGNED(req->tp_block_size)))
goto out;
if (po->tp_version >= TPACKET_V3 &&
(int)(req->tp_block_size -
BLK_PLUS_PRIV(req_u->req3.tp_sizeof_priv)) <= 0)
goto out;
if (unlikely(req->tp_frame_size < po->tp_hdrlen +
po->tp_reserve))
goto out;
if (unlikely(req->tp_frame_size & (TPACKET_ALIGNMENT - 1)))
goto out;
rb->frames_per_block = req->tp_block_size / req->tp_frame_size;
if (unlikely(rb->frames_per_block == 0))
goto out;
if (unlikely((rb->frames_per_block * req->tp_block_nr) !=
req->tp_frame_nr))
goto out;
err = -ENOMEM;
order = get_order(req->tp_block_size);
pg_vec = alloc_pg_vec(req, order);
if (unlikely(!pg_vec))
goto out;
switch (po->tp_version) {
case TPACKET_V3:
/* Transmit path is not supported. We checked
* it above but just being paranoid
*/
if (!tx_ring)
init_prb_bdqc(po, rb, pg_vec, req_u);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
/* Done */
else {
err = -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(req->tp_frame_nr))
goto out;
}
/* Detach socket from network */
spin_lock(&po->bind_lock);
was_running = po->running;
num = po->num;
if (was_running) {
po->num = 0;
__unregister_prot_hook(sk, false);
}
spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock);
synchronize_net();
err = -EBUSY;
mutex_lock(&po->pg_vec_lock);
if (closing || atomic_read(&po->mapped) == 0) {
err = 0;
spin_lock_bh(&rb_queue->lock);
swap(rb->pg_vec, pg_vec);
rb->frame_max = (req->tp_frame_nr - 1);
rb->head = 0;
rb->frame_size = req->tp_frame_size;
spin_unlock_bh(&rb_queue->lock);
swap(rb->pg_vec_order, order);
swap(rb->pg_vec_len, req->tp_block_nr);
rb->pg_vec_pages = req->tp_block_size/PAGE_SIZE;
po->prot_hook.func = (po->rx_ring.pg_vec) ?
tpacket_rcv : packet_rcv;
skb_queue_purge(rb_queue);
if (atomic_read(&po->mapped))
pr_err("packet_mmap: vma is busy: %d\n",
atomic_read(&po->mapped));
}
mutex_unlock(&po->pg_vec_lock);
spin_lock(&po->bind_lock);
if (was_running) {
po->num = num;
register_prot_hook(sk);
}
spin_unlock(&po->bind_lock);
if (closing && (po->tp_version > TPACKET_V2)) {
/* Because we don't support block-based V3 on tx-ring */
if (!tx_ring)
prb_shutdown_retire_blk_timer(po, rb_queue);
}
if (pg_vec)
free_pg_vec(pg_vec, order, req->tp_block_nr);
out:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: packet: fix races in fanout_add()
Multiple threads can call fanout_add() at the same time.
We need to grab fanout_mutex earlier to avoid races that could
lead to one thread freeing po->rollover that was set by another thread.
Do the same in fanout_release(), for peace of mind, and to help us
finding lockdep issues earlier.
Fixes: dc99f600698d ("packet: Add fanout support.")
Fixes: 0648ab70afe6 ("packet: rollover prepare: per-socket state")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 26,465
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BpMediaHTTPConnection(const sp<IBinder> &impl)
: BpInterface<IMediaHTTPConnection>(impl) {
}
Commit Message: Add some sanity checks
Bug: 19400722
Change-Id: Ib3afdf73fd4647eeea5721c61c8b72dbba0647f6
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 27,837
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Vector<FileChooserFileInfo> HTMLInputElement::filesFromFileInputFormControlState(const FormControlState& state)
{
return FileInputType::filesFromFormControlState(state);
}
Commit Message: Setting input.x-webkit-speech should not cause focus change
In r150866, we introduced element()->focus() in destroyShadowSubtree()
to retain focus on <input> when its type attribute gets changed.
But when x-webkit-speech attribute is changed, the element is detached
before calling destroyShadowSubtree() and element()->focus() failed
This patch moves detach() after destroyShadowSubtree() to fix the
problem.
BUG=243818
TEST=fast/forms/input-type-change-focusout.html
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16084005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@151444 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 8,318
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: copy_opt_map(OptMap* to, OptMap* from)
{
*to = *from;
}
Commit Message: Fix CVE-2019-13225: problem in converting if-then-else pattern to bytecode.
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 5,357
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: format_prefix(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *prefix, unsigned char plen)
{
static char buf[50];
if(plen >= 96 && memcmp(prefix, v4prefix, 12) == 0)
snprintf(buf, 50, "%s/%u", ipaddr_string(ndo, prefix + 12), plen - 96);
else
snprintf(buf, 50, "%s/%u", ip6addr_string(ndo, prefix), plen);
buf[49] = '\0';
return buf;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14470/Babel: fix an existing length check
In babel_print_v2() the non-verbose branch for an Update TLV compared
the TLV Length against 1 instead of 10 (probably a typo), put it right.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Henri Salo from Nixu
Corporation.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 5,564
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void kvm_resume(void)
{
if (kvm_usage_count) {
WARN_ON(raw_spin_is_locked(&kvm_count_lock));
hardware_enable_nolock(NULL);
}
}
Commit Message: KVM: Improve create VCPU parameter (CVE-2013-4587)
In multiple functions the vcpu_id is used as an offset into a bitfield. Ag
malicious user could specify a vcpu_id greater than 255 in order to set or
clear bits in kernel memory. This could be used to elevate priveges in the
kernel. This patch verifies that the vcpu_id provided is less than 255.
The api documentation already specifies that the vcpu_id must be less than
max_vcpus, but this is currently not checked.
Reported-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Honig <ahonig@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 26,000
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: find_swevent_head_rcu(struct swevent_htable *swhash, u64 type, u32 event_id)
{
struct swevent_hlist *hlist;
hlist = rcu_dereference(swhash->swevent_hlist);
if (!hlist)
return NULL;
return __find_swevent_head(hlist, type, event_id);
}
Commit Message: perf: Remove the nmi parameter from the swevent and overflow interface
The nmi parameter indicated if we could do wakeups from the current
context, if not, we would set some state and self-IPI and let the
resulting interrupt do the wakeup.
For the various event classes:
- hardware: nmi=0; PMI is in fact an NMI or we run irq_work_run from
the PMI-tail (ARM etc.)
- tracepoint: nmi=0; since tracepoint could be from NMI context.
- software: nmi=[0,1]; some, like the schedule thing cannot
perform wakeups, and hence need 0.
As one can see, there is very little nmi=1 usage, and the down-side of
not using it is that on some platforms some software events can have a
jiffy delay in wakeup (when arch_irq_work_raise isn't implemented).
The up-side however is that we can remove the nmi parameter and save a
bunch of conditionals in fast paths.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Michael Cree <mcree@orcon.net.nz>
Cc: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Cc: Deng-Cheng Zhu <dengcheng.zhu@gmail.com>
Cc: Anton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Cc: Eric B Munson <emunson@mgebm.net>
Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Paul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: Jason Wessel <jason.wessel@windriver.com>
Cc: Don Zickus <dzickus@redhat.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/n/tip-agjev8eu666tvknpb3iaj0fg@git.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 14,718
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int hmac_sha256_init(struct ahash_request *req)
{
struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
struct hash_ctx *ctx = crypto_ahash_ctx(tfm);
ctx->config.data_format = HASH_DATA_8_BITS;
ctx->config.algorithm = HASH_ALGO_SHA256;
ctx->config.oper_mode = HASH_OPER_MODE_HMAC;
ctx->digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
return hash_init(req);
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 2,790
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gx_device_set_media_size(gx_device * dev, double media_width, double media_height)
{
dev->MediaSize[0] = media_width;
dev->MediaSize[1] = media_height;
gx_device_set_hwsize_from_media(dev);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78
| 0
| 22,044
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tg3_power_up(struct tg3 *tp)
{
int err;
tg3_enable_register_access(tp);
err = pci_set_power_state(tp->pdev, PCI_D0);
if (!err) {
/* Switch out of Vaux if it is a NIC */
tg3_pwrsrc_switch_to_vmain(tp);
} else {
netdev_err(tp->dev, "Transition to D0 failed\n");
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 23,180
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cmsBool _cmsWriteWCharArray(cmsIOHANDLER* io, cmsUInt32Number n, const wchar_t* Array)
{
cmsUInt32Number i;
_cmsAssert(io != NULL);
_cmsAssert(!(Array == NULL && n > 0));
for (i=0; i < n; i++) {
if (!_cmsWriteUInt16Number(io, (cmsUInt16Number) Array[i])) return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Added an extra check to MLU bounds
Thanks to Ibrahim el-sayed for spotting the bug
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 997
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: std::vector<ExtensionSyncData> ExtensionService::GetSyncDataList(
const SyncBundle& bundle) const {
std::vector<ExtensionSyncData> extension_sync_list;
GetSyncDataListHelper(extensions_, bundle, &extension_sync_list);
GetSyncDataListHelper(disabled_extensions_, bundle, &extension_sync_list);
GetSyncDataListHelper(terminated_extensions_, bundle, &extension_sync_list);
for (std::map<std::string, ExtensionSyncData>::const_iterator i =
bundle.pending_sync_data.begin();
i != bundle.pending_sync_data.end();
++i) {
extension_sync_list.push_back(i->second);
}
return extension_sync_list;
}
Commit Message: Limit extent of webstore app to just chrome.google.com/webstore.
BUG=93497
TEST=Try installing extensions and apps from the webstore, starting both being
initially logged in, and not.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7719003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@97986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 13,651
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: DoGetFBConfigs(__GLXclientState *cl, unsigned screen)
{
ClientPtr client = cl->client;
xGLXGetFBConfigsReply reply;
__GLXscreen *pGlxScreen;
CARD32 buf[__GLX_FBCONFIG_ATTRIBS_LENGTH];
int p, err;
__GLXconfig *modes;
__GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_VARIABLES;
__GLX_DECLARE_SWAP_ARRAY_VARIABLES;
if (!validGlxScreen(cl->client, screen, &pGlxScreen, &err))
return err;
reply.numFBConfigs = pGlxScreen->numFBConfigs;
reply.numAttribs = __GLX_TOTAL_FBCONFIG_ATTRIBS;
reply.length = (__GLX_FBCONFIG_ATTRIBS_LENGTH * reply.numFBConfigs);
reply.type = X_Reply;
reply.sequenceNumber = client->sequence;
if (client->swapped) {
__GLX_SWAP_SHORT(&reply.sequenceNumber);
__GLX_SWAP_INT(&reply.length);
__GLX_SWAP_INT(&reply.numFBConfigs);
__GLX_SWAP_INT(&reply.numAttribs);
}
WriteToClient(client, sz_xGLXGetFBConfigsReply, (char *)&reply);
for (modes = pGlxScreen->fbconfigs; modes != NULL; modes = modes->next) {
p = 0;
#define WRITE_PAIR(tag,value) \
do { buf[p++] = tag ; buf[p++] = value ; } while( 0 )
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_VISUAL_ID, modes->visualID );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_FBCONFIG_ID, modes->fbconfigID );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_X_RENDERABLE, GL_TRUE );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_RGBA,
(modes->renderType & GLX_RGBA_BIT) ? GL_TRUE : GL_FALSE );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_RENDER_TYPE, modes->renderType );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_DOUBLEBUFFER, modes->doubleBufferMode );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_STEREO, modes->stereoMode );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_BUFFER_SIZE, modes->rgbBits );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_LEVEL, modes->level );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_AUX_BUFFERS, modes->numAuxBuffers );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_RED_SIZE, modes->redBits );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_GREEN_SIZE, modes->greenBits );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_BLUE_SIZE, modes->blueBits );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_ALPHA_SIZE, modes->alphaBits );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_ACCUM_RED_SIZE, modes->accumRedBits );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_ACCUM_GREEN_SIZE, modes->accumGreenBits );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_ACCUM_BLUE_SIZE, modes->accumBlueBits );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_ACCUM_ALPHA_SIZE, modes->accumAlphaBits );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_DEPTH_SIZE, modes->depthBits );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_STENCIL_SIZE, modes->stencilBits );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_X_VISUAL_TYPE, modes->visualType );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_CONFIG_CAVEAT, modes->visualRating );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_TRANSPARENT_TYPE, modes->transparentPixel );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_TRANSPARENT_RED_VALUE, modes->transparentRed );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_TRANSPARENT_GREEN_VALUE, modes->transparentGreen );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_TRANSPARENT_BLUE_VALUE, modes->transparentBlue );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_TRANSPARENT_ALPHA_VALUE, modes->transparentAlpha );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_TRANSPARENT_INDEX_VALUE, modes->transparentIndex );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_SWAP_METHOD_OML, modes->swapMethod );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_SAMPLES_SGIS, modes->samples );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_SAMPLE_BUFFERS_SGIS, modes->sampleBuffers );
/* GLX_VISUAL_SELECT_GROUP_SGIX ? */
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_DRAWABLE_TYPE, modes->drawableType );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_BIND_TO_TEXTURE_RGB_EXT, modes->bindToTextureRgb );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_BIND_TO_TEXTURE_RGBA_EXT, modes->bindToTextureRgba );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_BIND_TO_MIPMAP_TEXTURE_EXT, modes->bindToMipmapTexture );
WRITE_PAIR( GLX_BIND_TO_TEXTURE_TARGETS_EXT, modes->bindToTextureTargets );
if (client->swapped) {
__GLX_SWAP_INT_ARRAY(buf, __GLX_FBCONFIG_ATTRIBS_LENGTH);
}
WriteToClient(client, __GLX_SIZE_CARD32 * __GLX_FBCONFIG_ATTRIBS_LENGTH,
(char *)buf);
}
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,934
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void napi_disable(struct napi_struct *n)
{
might_sleep();
set_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state);
while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_SCHED, &n->state))
msleep(1);
while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_NPSVC, &n->state))
msleep(1);
hrtimer_cancel(&n->timer);
clear_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: Don't apply GRO to multiple layers of encapsulation.
When drivers express support for TSO of encapsulated packets, they
only mean that they can do it for one layer of encapsulation.
Supporting additional levels would mean updating, at a minimum,
more IP length fields and they are unaware of this.
No encapsulation device expresses support for handling offloaded
encapsulated packets, so we won't generate these types of frames
in the transmit path. However, GRO doesn't have a check for
multiple levels of encapsulation and will attempt to build them.
UDP tunnel GRO actually does prevent this situation but it only
handles multiple UDP tunnels stacked on top of each other. This
generalizes that solution to prevent any kind of tunnel stacking
that would cause problems.
Fixes: bf5a755f ("net-gre-gro: Add GRE support to the GRO stack")
Signed-off-by: Jesse Gross <jesse@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 9,688
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void sigchld_handler(int s) {
int status;
int* i;
pid_t pid;
while((pid=waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0) {
if(WIFEXITED(status)) {
msg3(LOG_INFO, "Child exited with %d", WEXITSTATUS(status));
}
i=g_hash_table_lookup(children, &pid);
if(!i) {
msg3(LOG_INFO, "SIGCHLD received for an unknown child with PID %ld", (long)pid);
} else {
DEBUG2("Removing %d from the list of children", pid);
g_hash_table_remove(children, &pid);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer size checking
Yes, this means we've re-introduced CVE-2005-3534. Sigh.
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,924
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ChromeDownloadDelegate::OnDangerousDownload(const std::string& filename,
const std::string& guid) {
JNIEnv* env = base::android::AttachCurrentThread();
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jfilename = ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(
env, filename);
ScopedJavaLocalRef<jstring> jguid = ConvertUTF8ToJavaString(env, guid);
Java_ChromeDownloadDelegate_onDangerousDownload(env, java_ref_, jfilename,
jguid);
}
Commit Message: Clean up Android DownloadManager code as most download now go through Chrome Network stack
The only exception is OMA DRM download.
And it only applies to context menu download interception.
Clean up the remaining unused code now.
BUG=647755
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2371773003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#421332}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 26,020
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int cirrus_bitblt_videotocpu(CirrusVGAState * s)
{
/* XXX */
#ifdef DEBUG_BITBLT
printf("cirrus: bitblt (video to cpu) is not implemented yet\n");
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,984
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline ssize_t WritePSDSize(const PSDInfo *psd_info,Image *image,
const MagickSizeType size,const MagickOffsetType offset)
{
MagickOffsetType
current_offset;
ssize_t
result;
current_offset=TellBlob(image);
(void) SeekBlob(image,offset,SEEK_SET);
result=SetPSDSize(psd_info,image,size);
(void) SeekBlob(image,current_offset,SEEK_SET);
return(result);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1451
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 22,327
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static spl_filesystem_object * spl_filesystem_object_create_info(spl_filesystem_object *source, char *file_path, int file_path_len, int use_copy, zend_class_entry *ce, zval *return_value TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern;
zval *arg1;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
if (!file_path || !file_path_len) {
#if defined(PHP_WIN32)
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Cannot create SplFileInfo for empty path");
if (file_path && !use_copy) {
efree(file_path);
}
#else
if (file_path && !use_copy) {
efree(file_path);
}
file_path_len = 1;
file_path = "/";
#endif
return NULL;
}
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_RuntimeException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
ce = ce ? ce : source->info_class;
zend_update_class_constants(ce TSRMLS_CC);
return_value->value.obj = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(ce, &intern TSRMLS_CC);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_OBJECT;
if (ce->constructor->common.scope != spl_ce_SplFileInfo) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(arg1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(arg1, file_path, file_path_len, use_copy);
zend_call_method_with_1_params(&return_value, ce, &ce->constructor, "__construct", NULL, arg1);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg1);
} else {
spl_filesystem_info_set_filename(intern, file_path, file_path_len, use_copy TSRMLS_CC);
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return intern;
} /* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 1
| 29,250
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Browser::TabDeactivated(TabContentsWrapper* contents) {
if (contents == fullscreened_tab_)
ExitTabbedFullscreenModeIfNecessary();
if (instant())
instant()->DestroyPreviewContents();
window_->GetLocationBar()->SaveStateToContents(contents->tab_contents());
}
Commit Message: Implement a bubble that appears at the top of the screen when a tab enters
fullscreen mode via webkitRequestFullScreen(), telling the user how to exit
fullscreen.
This is implemented as an NSView rather than an NSWindow because the floating
chrome that appears in presentation mode should overlap the bubble.
Content-initiated fullscreen mode makes use of 'presentation mode' on the Mac:
the mode in which the UI is hidden, accessible by moving the cursor to the top
of the screen. On Snow Leopard, this mode is synonymous with fullscreen mode.
On Lion, however, fullscreen mode does not imply presentation mode: in
non-presentation fullscreen mode, the chrome is permanently shown. It is
possible to switch between presentation mode and fullscreen mode using the
presentation mode UI control.
When a tab initiates fullscreen mode on Lion, we enter presentation mode if not
in presentation mode already. When the user exits fullscreen mode using Chrome
UI (i.e. keyboard shortcuts, menu items, buttons, switching tabs, etc.) we
return the user to the mode they were in before the tab entered fullscreen.
BUG=14471
TEST=Enter fullscreen mode using webkitRequestFullScreen. You should see a bubble pop down from the top of the screen.
Need to test the Lion logic somehow, with no Lion trybots.
BUG=96883
Original review http://codereview.chromium.org/7890056/
TBR=thakis
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7920024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@101624 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,524
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: perf_event_parse_addr_filter(struct perf_event *event, char *fstr,
struct list_head *filters)
{
struct perf_addr_filter *filter = NULL;
char *start, *orig, *filename = NULL;
struct path path;
substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
int state = IF_STATE_ACTION, token;
unsigned int kernel = 0;
int ret = -EINVAL;
orig = fstr = kstrdup(fstr, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!fstr)
return -ENOMEM;
while ((start = strsep(&fstr, " ,\n")) != NULL) {
ret = -EINVAL;
if (!*start)
continue;
/* filter definition begins */
if (state == IF_STATE_ACTION) {
filter = perf_addr_filter_new(event, filters);
if (!filter)
goto fail;
}
token = match_token(start, if_tokens, args);
switch (token) {
case IF_ACT_FILTER:
case IF_ACT_START:
filter->filter = 1;
case IF_ACT_STOP:
if (state != IF_STATE_ACTION)
goto fail;
state = IF_STATE_SOURCE;
break;
case IF_SRC_KERNELADDR:
case IF_SRC_KERNEL:
kernel = 1;
case IF_SRC_FILEADDR:
case IF_SRC_FILE:
if (state != IF_STATE_SOURCE)
goto fail;
if (token == IF_SRC_FILE || token == IF_SRC_KERNEL)
filter->range = 1;
*args[0].to = 0;
ret = kstrtoul(args[0].from, 0, &filter->offset);
if (ret)
goto fail;
if (filter->range) {
*args[1].to = 0;
ret = kstrtoul(args[1].from, 0, &filter->size);
if (ret)
goto fail;
}
if (token == IF_SRC_FILE || token == IF_SRC_FILEADDR) {
int fpos = filter->range ? 2 : 1;
filename = match_strdup(&args[fpos]);
if (!filename) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto fail;
}
}
state = IF_STATE_END;
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
/*
* Filter definition is fully parsed, validate and install it.
* Make sure that it doesn't contradict itself or the event's
* attribute.
*/
if (state == IF_STATE_END) {
if (kernel && event->attr.exclude_kernel)
goto fail;
if (!kernel) {
if (!filename)
goto fail;
/* look up the path and grab its inode */
ret = kern_path(filename, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path);
if (ret)
goto fail_free_name;
filter->inode = igrab(d_inode(path.dentry));
path_put(&path);
kfree(filename);
filename = NULL;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (!filter->inode ||
!S_ISREG(filter->inode->i_mode))
/* free_filters_list() will iput() */
goto fail;
}
/* ready to consume more filters */
state = IF_STATE_ACTION;
filter = NULL;
}
}
if (state != IF_STATE_ACTION)
goto fail;
kfree(orig);
return 0;
fail_free_name:
kfree(filename);
fail:
free_filters_list(filters);
kfree(orig);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 20,728
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: btrfs_search_dir_index_item(struct btrfs_root *root,
struct btrfs_path *path, u64 dirid,
const char *name, int name_len)
{
struct extent_buffer *leaf;
struct btrfs_dir_item *di;
struct btrfs_key key;
u32 nritems;
int ret;
key.objectid = dirid;
key.type = BTRFS_DIR_INDEX_KEY;
key.offset = 0;
ret = btrfs_search_slot(NULL, root, &key, path, 0, 0);
if (ret < 0)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
leaf = path->nodes[0];
nritems = btrfs_header_nritems(leaf);
while (1) {
if (path->slots[0] >= nritems) {
ret = btrfs_next_leaf(root, path);
if (ret < 0)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
if (ret > 0)
break;
leaf = path->nodes[0];
nritems = btrfs_header_nritems(leaf);
continue;
}
btrfs_item_key_to_cpu(leaf, &key, path->slots[0]);
if (key.objectid != dirid || key.type != BTRFS_DIR_INDEX_KEY)
break;
di = btrfs_match_dir_item_name(root, path, name, name_len);
if (di)
return di;
path->slots[0]++;
}
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310
| 0
| 29,586
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool cmd_read_native_max(IDEState *s, uint8_t cmd)
{
bool lba48 = (cmd == WIN_READ_NATIVE_MAX_EXT);
/* Refuse if no sectors are addressable (e.g. medium not inserted) */
if (s->nb_sectors == 0) {
ide_abort_command(s);
return true;
}
ide_cmd_lba48_transform(s, lba48);
ide_set_sector(s, s->nb_sectors - 1);
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 7,958
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkService::OnConnectionClosed() {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(content::BrowserThread::UI);
highlighter_client_->Detach();
}
Commit Message: arc: add test for blocking incognito windows in screenshot
BUG=778852
TEST=ArcVoiceInteractionFrameworkServiceUnittest.
CapturingScreenshotBlocksIncognitoWindows
Change-Id: I0bfa5a486759783d7c8926a309c6b5da9b02dcc6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/914983
Commit-Queue: Muyuan Li <muyuanli@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Luis Hector Chavez <lhchavez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#536438}
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 10,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int select_cur_seq_no(HLSContext *c, struct playlist *pls)
{
int seq_no;
if (!pls->finished && !c->first_packet &&
av_gettime_relative() - pls->last_load_time >= default_reload_interval(pls))
/* reload the playlist since it was suspended */
parse_playlist(c, pls->url, pls, NULL);
/* If playback is already in progress (we are just selecting a new
* playlist) and this is a complete file, find the matching segment
* by counting durations. */
if (pls->finished && c->cur_timestamp != AV_NOPTS_VALUE) {
find_timestamp_in_playlist(c, pls, c->cur_timestamp, &seq_no);
return seq_no;
}
if (!pls->finished) {
if (!c->first_packet && /* we are doing a segment selection during playback */
c->cur_seq_no >= pls->start_seq_no &&
c->cur_seq_no < pls->start_seq_no + pls->n_segments)
/* While spec 3.4.3 says that we cannot assume anything about the
* content at the same sequence number on different playlists,
* in practice this seems to work and doing it otherwise would
* require us to download a segment to inspect its timestamps. */
return c->cur_seq_no;
/* If this is a live stream, start live_start_index segments from the
* start or end */
if (c->live_start_index < 0)
return pls->start_seq_no + FFMAX(pls->n_segments + c->live_start_index, 0);
else
return pls->start_seq_no + FFMIN(c->live_start_index, pls->n_segments - 1);
}
/* Otherwise just start on the first segment. */
return pls->start_seq_no;
}
Commit Message: avformat/hls: Fix DoS due to infinite loop
Fixes: loop.m3u
The default max iteration count of 1000 is arbitrary and ideas for a better solution are welcome
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Previous version reviewed-by: Steven Liu <lingjiujianke@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 29,544
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: add_xml_comment(xmlNode * parent, xmlNode * target, xmlNode * update)
{
CRM_CHECK(update != NULL, return 0);
CRM_CHECK(update->type == XML_COMMENT_NODE, return 0);
if (target == NULL) {
target = find_xml_comment(parent, update);
}
if (target == NULL) {
add_node_copy(parent, update);
/* We wont reach here currently */
} else if (safe_str_neq((const char *)target->content, (const char *)update->content)) {
xmlFree(target->content);
target->content = xmlStrdup(update->content);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix: acl: Do not delay evaluation of added nodes in some situations
It is not appropriate when the node has no children as it is not a
placeholder
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 25,014
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: unsigned long convert_ip_to_linear(struct task_struct *child, struct pt_regs *regs)
{
unsigned long addr, seg;
addr = regs->ip;
seg = regs->cs & 0xffff;
if (v8086_mode(regs)) {
addr = (addr & 0xffff) + (seg << 4);
return addr;
}
/*
* We'll assume that the code segments in the GDT
* are all zero-based. That is largely true: the
* TLS segments are used for data, and the PNPBIOS
* and APM bios ones we just ignore here.
*/
if ((seg & SEGMENT_TI_MASK) == SEGMENT_LDT) {
struct desc_struct *desc;
unsigned long base;
seg &= ~7UL;
mutex_lock(&child->mm->context.lock);
if (unlikely((seg >> 3) >= child->mm->context.size))
addr = -1L; /* bogus selector, access would fault */
else {
desc = child->mm->context.ldt + seg;
base = get_desc_base(desc);
/* 16-bit code segment? */
if (!desc->d)
addr &= 0xffff;
addr += base;
}
mutex_unlock(&child->mm->context.lock);
}
return addr;
}
Commit Message: ptrace: ensure arch_ptrace/ptrace_request can never race with SIGKILL
putreg() assumes that the tracee is not running and pt_regs_access() can
safely play with its stack. However a killed tracee can return from
ptrace_stop() to the low-level asm code and do RESTORE_REST, this means
that debugger can actually read/modify the kernel stack until the tracee
does SAVE_REST again.
set_task_blockstep() can race with SIGKILL too and in some sense this
race is even worse, the very fact the tracee can be woken up breaks the
logic.
As Linus suggested we can clear TASK_WAKEKILL around the arch_ptrace()
call, this ensures that nobody can ever wakeup the tracee while the
debugger looks at it. Not only this fixes the mentioned problems, we
can do some cleanups/simplifications in arch_ptrace() paths.
Probably ptrace_unfreeze_traced() needs more callers, for example it
makes sense to make the tracee killable for oom-killer before
access_process_vm().
While at it, add the comment into may_ptrace_stop() to explain why
ptrace_stop() still can't rely on SIGKILL and signal_pending_state().
Reported-by: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Reported-by: Suleiman Souhlal <suleiman@google.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 23,707
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int nntp_mbox_check(struct Context *ctx, int *index_hint)
{
int ret = check_mailbox(ctx);
if (ret == 0)
{
struct NntpData *nntp_data = ctx->data;
struct NntpServer *nserv = nntp_data->nserv;
nntp_newsrc_close(nserv);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Add alloc fail check in nntp_fetch_headers
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 19,446
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CallbackType CreateRelayCallback(const CallbackType& callback) {
return base::Bind(&RelayCallback<CallbackType>::Run,
base::MessageLoopProxy::current(),
callback);
}
Commit Message: Remove parent* arg from GDataEntry ctor.
* Remove static FromDocumentEntry from GDataEntry, GDataFile, GDataDirectory. Replace with InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Move common code from GDataFile::InitFromDocumentEntry and GDataDirectory::InitFromDocumentEntry to GDataEntry::InitFromDocumentEntry.
* Add GDataDirectoryService::FromDocumentEntry and use this everywhere.
* Make ctors of GDataFile, GDataDirectory private, so these must be created by GDataDirectoryService's CreateGDataFile and
CreateGDataDirectory. Make GDataEntry ctor protected.
BUG=141494
TEST=unit tests.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10854083
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@151008 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 12,792
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ParamTraits<base::PlatformFileInfo>::Log(const param_type& p,
std::string* l) {
l->append("(");
LogParam(p.size, l);
l->append(",");
LogParam(p.is_directory, l);
l->append(",");
LogParam(p.last_modified.ToDoubleT(), l);
l->append(",");
LogParam(p.last_accessed.ToDoubleT(), l);
l->append(",");
LogParam(p.creation_time.ToDoubleT(), l);
l->append(")");
}
Commit Message: Validate that paths don't contain embedded NULLs at deserialization.
BUG=166867
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11743009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@174935 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,686
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int mp_put_char(struct tty_struct *tty, unsigned char ch)
{
struct sb_uart_state *state = tty->driver_data;
return __mp_put_char(state->port, &state->info->xmit, ch);
}
Commit Message: Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 21,627
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: uint64_t streamDelConsumer(streamCG *cg, sds name) {
streamConsumer *consumer = streamLookupConsumer(cg,name,0);
if (consumer == NULL) return 0;
uint64_t retval = raxSize(consumer->pel);
/* Iterate all the consumer pending messages, deleting every corresponding
* entry from the global entry. */
raxIterator ri;
raxStart(&ri,consumer->pel);
raxSeek(&ri,"^",NULL,0);
while(raxNext(&ri)) {
streamNACK *nack = ri.data;
raxRemove(cg->pel,ri.key,ri.key_len,NULL);
streamFreeNACK(nack);
}
raxStop(&ri);
/* Deallocate the consumer. */
raxRemove(cg->consumers,(unsigned char*)name,sdslen(name),NULL);
streamFreeConsumer(consumer);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Abort in XGROUP if the key is not a stream
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 14,453
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GeolocationServiceContext* WebContentsImpl::GetGeolocationServiceContext() {
return geolocation_service_context_.get();
}
Commit Message: Don't call WebContents::DownloadImage() callback if the WebContents were deleted
BUG=583718
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1685343004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#375700}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,131
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void remove_vq_common(struct virtnet_info *vi)
{
vi->vdev->config->reset(vi->vdev);
/* Free unused buffers in both send and recv, if any. */
free_unused_bufs(vi);
free_receive_bufs(vi);
free_receive_page_frags(vi);
virtnet_del_vqs(vi);
}
Commit Message: virtio-net: drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST
virtio declares support for NETIF_F_FRAGLIST, but assumes
that there are at most MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2 fragments which isn't
always true with a fraglist.
A longer fraglist in the skb will make the call to skb_to_sgvec overflow
the sg array, leading to memory corruption.
Drop NETIF_F_FRAGLIST so we only get what we can handle.
Cc: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 29,061
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t MPEG4Source::parseTrackFragmentRun(off64_t offset, off64_t size) {
ALOGV("MPEG4Extractor::parseTrackFragmentRun");
if (size < 8) {
return -EINVAL;
}
enum {
kDataOffsetPresent = 0x01,
kFirstSampleFlagsPresent = 0x04,
kSampleDurationPresent = 0x100,
kSampleSizePresent = 0x200,
kSampleFlagsPresent = 0x400,
kSampleCompositionTimeOffsetPresent = 0x800,
};
uint32_t flags;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(offset, &flags)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
ALOGV("fragment run flags: %08x", flags);
if (flags & 0xff000000) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if ((flags & kFirstSampleFlagsPresent) && (flags & kSampleFlagsPresent)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
uint32_t sampleCount;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(offset + 4, &sampleCount)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
offset += 8;
size -= 8;
uint64_t dataOffset = mTrackFragmentHeaderInfo.mDataOffset;
uint32_t firstSampleFlags = 0;
if (flags & kDataOffsetPresent) {
if (size < 4) {
return -EINVAL;
}
int32_t dataOffsetDelta;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(offset, (uint32_t*)&dataOffsetDelta)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
dataOffset = mTrackFragmentHeaderInfo.mBaseDataOffset + dataOffsetDelta;
offset += 4;
size -= 4;
}
if (flags & kFirstSampleFlagsPresent) {
if (size < 4) {
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(offset, &firstSampleFlags)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
offset += 4;
size -= 4;
}
uint32_t sampleDuration = 0, sampleSize = 0, sampleFlags = 0,
sampleCtsOffset = 0;
size_t bytesPerSample = 0;
if (flags & kSampleDurationPresent) {
bytesPerSample += 4;
} else if (mTrackFragmentHeaderInfo.mFlags
& TrackFragmentHeaderInfo::kDefaultSampleDurationPresent) {
sampleDuration = mTrackFragmentHeaderInfo.mDefaultSampleDuration;
} else if (mTrex) {
sampleDuration = mTrex->default_sample_duration;
}
if (flags & kSampleSizePresent) {
bytesPerSample += 4;
} else if (mTrackFragmentHeaderInfo.mFlags
& TrackFragmentHeaderInfo::kDefaultSampleSizePresent) {
sampleSize = mTrackFragmentHeaderInfo.mDefaultSampleSize;
} else {
sampleSize = mTrackFragmentHeaderInfo.mDefaultSampleSize;
}
if (flags & kSampleFlagsPresent) {
bytesPerSample += 4;
} else if (mTrackFragmentHeaderInfo.mFlags
& TrackFragmentHeaderInfo::kDefaultSampleFlagsPresent) {
sampleFlags = mTrackFragmentHeaderInfo.mDefaultSampleFlags;
} else {
sampleFlags = mTrackFragmentHeaderInfo.mDefaultSampleFlags;
}
if (flags & kSampleCompositionTimeOffsetPresent) {
bytesPerSample += 4;
} else {
sampleCtsOffset = 0;
}
if (size < (off64_t)(sampleCount * bytesPerSample)) {
return -EINVAL;
}
Sample tmp;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < sampleCount; ++i) {
if (flags & kSampleDurationPresent) {
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(offset, &sampleDuration)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
offset += 4;
}
if (flags & kSampleSizePresent) {
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(offset, &sampleSize)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
offset += 4;
}
if (flags & kSampleFlagsPresent) {
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(offset, &sampleFlags)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
offset += 4;
}
if (flags & kSampleCompositionTimeOffsetPresent) {
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(offset, &sampleCtsOffset)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
offset += 4;
}
ALOGV("adding sample %d at offset 0x%08" PRIx64 ", size %u, duration %u, "
" flags 0x%08x", i + 1,
dataOffset, sampleSize, sampleDuration,
(flags & kFirstSampleFlagsPresent) && i == 0
? firstSampleFlags : sampleFlags);
tmp.offset = dataOffset;
tmp.size = sampleSize;
tmp.duration = sampleDuration;
tmp.compositionOffset = sampleCtsOffset;
mCurrentSamples.add(tmp);
dataOffset += sampleSize;
}
mTrackFragmentHeaderInfo.mDataOffset = dataOffset;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Check malloc result to avoid NPD
Bug: 28471206
Change-Id: Id5d055d76893d6f53a2e524ff5f282d1ddca3345
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,532
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: png_pass_start_col(int pass)
{
int x, y;
++pass;
for (x=0; x<8; ++x) for (y=0; y<8; ++y) if (adam7[y][x] == pass)
return x;
return 0xf;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID:
| 0
| 13,776
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int snd_seq_ioctl_set_client_info(struct snd_seq_client *client,
void *arg)
{
struct snd_seq_client_info *client_info = arg;
/* it is not allowed to set the info fields for an another client */
if (client->number != client_info->client)
return -EPERM;
/* also client type must be set now */
if (client->type != client_info->type)
return -EINVAL;
/* fill the info fields */
if (client_info->name[0])
strlcpy(client->name, client_info->name, sizeof(client->name));
client->filter = client_info->filter;
client->event_lost = client_info->event_lost;
memcpy(client->event_filter, client_info->event_filter, 32);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: ALSA: seq: Fix use-after-free at creating a port
There is a potential race window opened at creating and deleting a
port via ioctl, as spotted by fuzzing. snd_seq_create_port() creates
a port object and returns its pointer, but it doesn't take the
refcount, thus it can be deleted immediately by another thread.
Meanwhile, snd_seq_ioctl_create_port() still calls the function
snd_seq_system_client_ev_port_start() with the created port object
that is being deleted, and this triggers use-after-free like:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq] at addr ffff8801f2241cb1
=============================================================================
BUG kmalloc-512 (Tainted: G B ): kasan: bad access detected
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
INFO: Allocated in snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=3 pid=4511
___slab_alloc+0x425/0x460
__slab_alloc+0x20/0x40
kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0x150/0x190
snd_seq_create_port+0x94/0x9b0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0xd1/0x630 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
INFO: Freed in port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq] age=1 cpu=2 pid=4717
__slab_free+0x204/0x310
kfree+0x15f/0x180
port_delete+0x136/0x1a0 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_delete_port+0x235/0x350 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0xc8/0x180 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
SyS_ioctl+0x79/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x75
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff81b03781>] dump_stack+0x63/0x82
[<ffffffff81531b3b>] print_trailer+0xfb/0x160
[<ffffffff81536db4>] object_err+0x34/0x40
[<ffffffff815392d3>] kasan_report.part.2+0x223/0x520
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff815395fe>] __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x2e/0x30
[<ffffffffa07aadf4>] snd_seq_ioctl_create_port+0x504/0x630 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07aa8f0>] ? snd_seq_ioctl_delete_port+0x180/0x180 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136be50>] ? taskstats_exit+0xbc0/0xbc0
[<ffffffffa07abc5c>] snd_seq_do_ioctl+0x11c/0x190 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffffa07abd10>] snd_seq_ioctl+0x40/0x80 [snd_seq]
[<ffffffff8136d433>] ? acct_account_cputime+0x63/0x80
[<ffffffff815b515b>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x54b/0xda0
.....
We may fix this in a few different ways, and in this patch, it's fixed
simply by taking the refcount properly at snd_seq_create_port() and
letting the caller unref the object after use. Also, there is another
potential use-after-free by sprintf() call in snd_seq_create_port(),
and this is moved inside the lock.
This fix covers CVE-2017-15265.
Reported-and-tested-by: Michael23 Yu <ycqzsy@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 27,933
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: xmlParseEndTag(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlParseEndTag1(ctxt, 0);
}
Commit Message: Detect infinite recursion in parameter entities
When expanding a parameter entity in a DTD, infinite recursion could
lead to an infinite loop or memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Wei Lei for the first of many reports.
Fixes bug 759579.
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 15,980
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void wait_message(time_t tmo)
{
int num = 1, timeout;
size_t ifnum = 0;
struct pollfd pfd[MAX_NUM_IFACES];
struct ifsock *ifs;
LIST_FOREACH(ifs, &il, link) {
if (ifs->out != -1)
continue;
pfd[ifnum].fd = ifs->in;
pfd[ifnum].events = POLLIN | POLLHUP;
ifnum++;
}
while (1) {
size_t i;
timeout = tmo - time(NULL);
if (timeout < 0)
break;
num = poll(pfd, ifnum, timeout * 1000);
if (num < 0) {
if (EINTR == errno)
break;
err(1, "Unrecoverable error");
}
if (num == 0)
break;
for (i = 0; num > 0 && i < ifnum; i++) {
if (pfd[i].revents & POLLIN) {
handle_message(pfd[i].fd);
num--;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #1: Ensure recv buf is always NUL terminated
Signed-off-by: Joachim Nilsson <troglobit@gmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 14,576
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tipc_wait_for_sndmsg(struct socket *sock, long *timeo_p)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct tipc_sock *tsk = tipc_sk(sk);
DEFINE_WAIT(wait);
int done;
do {
int err = sock_error(sk);
if (err)
return err;
if (sock->state == SS_DISCONNECTING)
return -EPIPE;
if (!*timeo_p)
return -EAGAIN;
if (signal_pending(current))
return sock_intr_errno(*timeo_p);
prepare_to_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
done = sk_wait_event(sk, timeo_p, !tsk->link_cong);
finish_wait(sk_sleep(sk), &wait);
} while (!done);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tipc: check nl sock before parsing nested attributes
Make sure the socket for which the user is listing publication exists
before parsing the socket netlink attributes.
Prior to this patch a call without any socket caused a NULL pointer
dereference in tipc_nl_publ_dump().
Tested-and-reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Richard Alpe <richard.alpe@ericsson.com>
Acked-by: Jon Maloy <jon.maloy@ericsson.cm>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 20,724
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int tg3_load_firmware_cpu(struct tg3 *tp, u32 cpu_base,
u32 cpu_scratch_base, int cpu_scratch_size,
struct fw_info *info)
{
int err, lock_err, i;
void (*write_op)(struct tg3 *, u32, u32);
if (cpu_base == TX_CPU_BASE && tg3_flag(tp, 5705_PLUS)) {
netdev_err(tp->dev,
"%s: Trying to load TX cpu firmware which is 5705\n",
__func__);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (tg3_flag(tp, 5705_PLUS))
write_op = tg3_write_mem;
else
write_op = tg3_write_indirect_reg32;
/* It is possible that bootcode is still loading at this point.
* Get the nvram lock first before halting the cpu.
*/
lock_err = tg3_nvram_lock(tp);
err = tg3_halt_cpu(tp, cpu_base);
if (!lock_err)
tg3_nvram_unlock(tp);
if (err)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < cpu_scratch_size; i += sizeof(u32))
write_op(tp, cpu_scratch_base + i, 0);
tw32(cpu_base + CPU_STATE, 0xffffffff);
tw32(cpu_base + CPU_MODE, tr32(cpu_base+CPU_MODE)|CPU_MODE_HALT);
for (i = 0; i < (info->fw_len / sizeof(u32)); i++)
write_op(tp, (cpu_scratch_base +
(info->fw_base & 0xffff) +
(i * sizeof(u32))),
be32_to_cpu(info->fw_data[i]));
err = 0;
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: tg3: fix length overflow in VPD firmware parsing
Commit 184b89044fb6e2a74611dafa69b1dce0d98612c6 ("tg3: Use VPD fw version
when present") introduced VPD parsing that contained a potential length
overflow.
Limit the hardware's reported firmware string length (max 255 bytes) to
stay inside the driver's firmware string length (32 bytes). On overflow,
truncate the formatted firmware string instead of potentially overwriting
portions of the tg3 struct.
http://cansecwest.com/slides/2013/PrivateCore%20CSW%202013.pdf
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reported-by: Oded Horovitz <oded@privatecore.com>
Reported-by: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Matt Carlson <mcarlson@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,511
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void process_bin_flush(conn *c) {
time_t exptime = 0;
protocol_binary_request_flush* req = binary_get_request(c);
if (c->binary_header.request.extlen == sizeof(req->message.body)) {
exptime = ntohl(req->message.body.expiration);
}
set_current_time();
if (exptime > 0) {
settings.oldest_live = realtime(exptime) - 1;
} else {
settings.oldest_live = current_time - 1;
}
item_flush_expired();
pthread_mutex_lock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
c->thread->stats.flush_cmds++;
pthread_mutex_unlock(&c->thread->stats.mutex);
write_bin_response(c, NULL, 0, 0, 0);
}
Commit Message: Use strncmp when checking for large ascii multigets.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 24,562
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void ih264d_parse_pmb_ref_index_cavlc_range1(UWORD32 u4_num_part, /* Number of partitions in MB */
dec_bit_stream_t *ps_bitstrm, /* Pointer to bitstream Structure. */
WORD8 *pi1_ref_idx, /* pointer to reference index array */
UWORD32 u4_num_ref_idx_active_minus1 /* Not used for range 1 */
)
{
UWORD32 u4_i;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstrm_buf = ps_bitstrm->pu4_buffer;
UWORD32 *pu4_bitstream_off = &ps_bitstrm->u4_ofst;
UNUSED(u4_num_ref_idx_active_minus1);
for(u4_i = 0; u4_i < u4_num_part; u4_i++)
{
UWORD32 u4_ref_idx;
u4_ref_idx = ih264d_tev_range1(pu4_bitstream_off, pu4_bitstrm_buf);
/* Storing Reference Idx Information */
pi1_ref_idx[u4_i] = (WORD8)u4_ref_idx;
}
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Fix stack underflow in CAVLC 4x4 parse functions
Bug: 26399350
Change-Id: Id768751672a7b093ab6e53d4fc0b3188d470920e
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,503
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderViewImpl::didScrollWithKeyboard(const blink::WebSize& delta) {
if (delta.height == 0)
return;
BrowserControlsState current = delta.height < 0
? BROWSER_CONTROLS_STATE_SHOWN
: BROWSER_CONTROLS_STATE_HIDDEN;
UpdateBrowserControlsState(top_controls_constraints_, current, true);
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 10,756
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void TraceArcPath(PrimitiveInfo *primitive_info,const PointInfo start,
const PointInfo end,const PointInfo arc,const double angle,
const MagickBooleanType large_arc,const MagickBooleanType sweep)
{
double
alpha,
beta,
delta,
factor,
gamma,
theta;
PointInfo
center,
points[3],
radii;
register double
cosine,
sine;
register PrimitiveInfo
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
arc_segments;
if ((start.x == end.x) && (start.y == end.y))
{
TracePoint(primitive_info,end);
return;
}
radii.x=fabs(arc.x);
radii.y=fabs(arc.y);
if ((radii.x == 0.0) || (radii.y == 0.0))
{
TraceLine(primitive_info,start,end);
return;
}
cosine=cos(DegreesToRadians(fmod((double) angle,360.0)));
sine=sin(DegreesToRadians(fmod((double) angle,360.0)));
center.x=(double) (cosine*(end.x-start.x)/2+sine*(end.y-start.y)/2);
center.y=(double) (cosine*(end.y-start.y)/2-sine*(end.x-start.x)/2);
delta=(center.x*center.x)/(radii.x*radii.x)+(center.y*center.y)/
(radii.y*radii.y);
if (delta < MagickEpsilon)
{
TraceLine(primitive_info,start,end);
return;
}
if (delta > 1.0)
{
radii.x*=sqrt((double) delta);
radii.y*=sqrt((double) delta);
}
points[0].x=(double) (cosine*start.x/radii.x+sine*start.y/radii.x);
points[0].y=(double) (cosine*start.y/radii.y-sine*start.x/radii.y);
points[1].x=(double) (cosine*end.x/radii.x+sine*end.y/radii.x);
points[1].y=(double) (cosine*end.y/radii.y-sine*end.x/radii.y);
alpha=points[1].x-points[0].x;
beta=points[1].y-points[0].y;
factor=PerceptibleReciprocal(alpha*alpha+beta*beta)-0.25;
if (factor <= 0.0)
factor=0.0;
else
{
factor=sqrt((double) factor);
if (sweep == large_arc)
factor=(-factor);
}
center.x=(double) ((points[0].x+points[1].x)/2-factor*beta);
center.y=(double) ((points[0].y+points[1].y)/2+factor*alpha);
alpha=atan2(points[0].y-center.y,points[0].x-center.x);
theta=atan2(points[1].y-center.y,points[1].x-center.x)-alpha;
if ((theta < 0.0) && (sweep != MagickFalse))
theta+=(double) (2.0*MagickPI);
else
if ((theta > 0.0) && (sweep == MagickFalse))
theta-=(double) (2.0*MagickPI);
arc_segments=(size_t) ceil(fabs((double) (theta/(0.5*MagickPI+
MagickEpsilon))));
p=primitive_info;
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) arc_segments; i++)
{
beta=0.5*((alpha+(i+1)*theta/arc_segments)-(alpha+i*theta/arc_segments));
gamma=(8.0/3.0)*sin(fmod((double) (0.5*beta),DegreesToRadians(360.0)))*
sin(fmod((double) (0.5*beta),DegreesToRadians(360.0)))/
sin(fmod((double) beta,DegreesToRadians(360.0)));
points[0].x=(double) (center.x+cos(fmod((double) (alpha+(double) i*theta/
arc_segments),DegreesToRadians(360.0)))-gamma*sin(fmod((double) (alpha+
(double) i*theta/arc_segments),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
points[0].y=(double) (center.y+sin(fmod((double) (alpha+(double) i*theta/
arc_segments),DegreesToRadians(360.0)))+gamma*cos(fmod((double) (alpha+
(double) i*theta/arc_segments),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
points[2].x=(double) (center.x+cos(fmod((double) (alpha+(double) (i+1)*
theta/arc_segments),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
points[2].y=(double) (center.y+sin(fmod((double) (alpha+(double) (i+1)*
theta/arc_segments),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
points[1].x=(double) (points[2].x+gamma*sin(fmod((double) (alpha+(double)
(i+1)*theta/arc_segments),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
points[1].y=(double) (points[2].y-gamma*cos(fmod((double) (alpha+(double)
(i+1)*theta/arc_segments),DegreesToRadians(360.0))));
p->point.x=(p == primitive_info) ? start.x : (p-1)->point.x;
p->point.y=(p == primitive_info) ? start.y : (p-1)->point.y;
(p+1)->point.x=(double) (cosine*radii.x*points[0].x-sine*radii.y*
points[0].y);
(p+1)->point.y=(double) (sine*radii.x*points[0].x+cosine*radii.y*
points[0].y);
(p+2)->point.x=(double) (cosine*radii.x*points[1].x-sine*radii.y*
points[1].y);
(p+2)->point.y=(double) (sine*radii.x*points[1].x+cosine*radii.y*
points[1].y);
(p+3)->point.x=(double) (cosine*radii.x*points[2].x-sine*radii.y*
points[2].y);
(p+3)->point.y=(double) (sine*radii.x*points[2].x+cosine*radii.y*
points[2].y);
if (i == (ssize_t) (arc_segments-1))
(p+3)->point=end;
TraceBezier(p,4);
p+=p->coordinates;
}
primitive_info->coordinates=(size_t) (p-primitive_info);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) primitive_info->coordinates; i++)
{
p->primitive=primitive_info->primitive;
p--;
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent buffer overflow in magick/draw.c
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,881
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: CStarter::RemoteSuspend(int)
{
int retval = this->Suspend();
jic->Suspend();
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 16,891
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int ehci_init_transfer(EHCIPacket *p)
{
uint32_t cpage, offset, bytes, plen;
dma_addr_t page;
cpage = get_field(p->qtd.token, QTD_TOKEN_CPAGE);
bytes = get_field(p->qtd.token, QTD_TOKEN_TBYTES);
offset = p->qtd.bufptr[0] & ~QTD_BUFPTR_MASK;
qemu_sglist_init(&p->sgl, p->queue->ehci->device, 5, p->queue->ehci->as);
while (bytes > 0) {
if (cpage > 4) {
fprintf(stderr, "cpage out of range (%d)\n", cpage);
return -1;
}
page = p->qtd.bufptr[cpage] & QTD_BUFPTR_MASK;
page += offset;
plen = bytes;
if (plen > 4096 - offset) {
plen = 4096 - offset;
offset = 0;
cpage++;
}
qemu_sglist_add(&p->sgl, page, plen);
bytes -= plen;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 28,372
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline __maybe_unused void h2_set_frame_size(void *frame, uint32_t len)
{
uint8_t *out = frame;
*out = len >> 16;
write_n16(out + 1, len);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,885
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MessageService::~MessageService() {
STLDeleteContainerPairSecondPointers(channels_.begin(), channels_.end());
channels_.clear();
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 9,450
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void SiteInstanceImpl::SetSite(const GURL& url) {
TRACE_EVENT2("navigation", "SiteInstanceImpl::SetSite",
"site id", id_, "url", url.possibly_invalid_spec());
DCHECK(!has_site_);
has_site_ = true;
BrowserContext* browser_context = browsing_instance_->browser_context();
site_ = GetSiteForURL(browser_context, url);
original_url_ = url;
browsing_instance_->RegisterSiteInstance(this);
bool should_use_process_per_site =
RenderProcessHost::ShouldUseProcessPerSite(browser_context, site_);
if (should_use_process_per_site) {
process_reuse_policy_ = ProcessReusePolicy::PROCESS_PER_SITE;
}
if (process_) {
LockToOriginIfNeeded();
if (should_use_process_per_site) {
RenderProcessHostImpl::RegisterProcessHostForSite(
browser_context, process_, site_);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
CWE ID: CWE-285
| 0
| 2,852
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline u32 inet_sk_port_offset(const struct sock *sk)
{
const struct inet_sock *inet = inet_sk(sk);
return secure_ipv4_port_ephemeral(inet->inet_rcv_saddr,
inet->inet_daddr,
inet->inet_dport);
}
Commit Message: net: Compute protocol sequence numbers and fragment IDs using MD5.
Computers have become a lot faster since we compromised on the
partial MD4 hash which we use currently for performance reasons.
MD5 is a much safer choice, and is inline with both RFC1948 and
other ISS generators (OpenBSD, Solaris, etc.)
Furthermore, only having 24-bits of the sequence number be truly
unpredictable is a very serious limitation. So the periodic
regeneration and 8-bit counter have been removed. We compute and
use a full 32-bit sequence number.
For ipv6, DCCP was found to use a 32-bit truncated initial sequence
number (it needs 43-bits) and that is fixed here as well.
Reported-by: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
Tested-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,831
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int skinit_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
trace_kvm_skinit(svm->vmcb->save.rip, svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX]);
kvm_queue_exception(&svm->vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 23,094
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int monitor_interception(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
{
printk_once(KERN_WARNING "kvm: MONITOR instruction emulated as NOP!\n");
return nop_interception(svm);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: Check non-canonical addresses upon WRMSR
Upon WRMSR, the CPU should inject #GP if a non-canonical value (address) is
written to certain MSRs. The behavior is "almost" identical for AMD and Intel
(ignoring MSRs that are not implemented in either architecture since they would
anyhow #GP). However, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP cause #GP if
non-canonical address is written on Intel but not on AMD (which ignores the top
32-bits).
Accordingly, this patch injects a #GP on the MSRs which behave identically on
Intel and AMD. To eliminate the differences between the architecutres, the
value which is written to IA32_SYSENTER_ESP and IA32_SYSENTER_EIP is turned to
canonical value before writing instead of injecting a #GP.
Some references from Intel and AMD manuals:
According to Intel SDM description of WRMSR instruction #GP is expected on
WRMSR "If the source register contains a non-canonical address and ECX
specifies one of the following MSRs: IA32_DS_AREA, IA32_FS_BASE, IA32_GS_BASE,
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE, IA32_LSTAR, IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, IA32_SYSENTER_ESP."
According to AMD manual instruction manual:
LSTAR/CSTAR (SYSCALL): "The WRMSR instruction loads the target RIP into the
LSTAR and CSTAR registers. If an RIP written by WRMSR is not in canonical
form, a general-protection exception (#GP) occurs."
IA32_GS_BASE and IA32_FS_BASE (WRFSBASE/WRGSBASE): "The address written to the
base field must be in canonical form or a #GP fault will occur."
IA32_KERNEL_GS_BASE (SWAPGS): "The address stored in the KernelGSbase MSR must
be in canonical form."
This patch fixes CVE-2014-3610.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 17,592
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int jpc_putdata(jas_stream_t *out, jas_stream_t *in, long len)
{
return jas_stream_copy(out, in, len);
}
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
CWE ID: CWE-190
| 0
| 15,071
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateRenderFrame(int proxy_routing_id,
int opener_routing_id,
int parent_routing_id,
int previous_sibling_routing_id) {
TRACE_EVENT0("navigation", "RenderFrameHostImpl::CreateRenderFrame");
DCHECK(!IsRenderFrameLive()) << "Creating frame twice";
if (!GetProcess()->Init())
return false;
DCHECK(GetProcess()->HasConnection());
mojom::CreateFrameParamsPtr params = mojom::CreateFrameParams::New();
params->routing_id = routing_id_;
params->proxy_routing_id = proxy_routing_id;
params->opener_routing_id = opener_routing_id;
params->parent_routing_id = parent_routing_id;
params->previous_sibling_routing_id = previous_sibling_routing_id;
params->replication_state = frame_tree_node()->current_replication_state();
params->replication_state.sandbox_flags =
frame_tree_node()->pending_sandbox_flags();
params->frame_owner_properties =
FrameOwnerProperties(frame_tree_node()->frame_owner_properties());
params->widget_params = mojom::CreateFrameWidgetParams::New();
if (render_widget_host_) {
params->widget_params->routing_id = render_widget_host_->GetRoutingID();
params->widget_params->hidden = render_widget_host_->is_hidden();
} else {
params->widget_params->routing_id = MSG_ROUTING_NONE;
params->widget_params->hidden = true;
}
GetProcess()->GetRendererInterface()->CreateFrame(std::move(params));
if (parent_routing_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE && render_widget_host_) {
RenderWidgetHostView* rwhv =
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame::Create(render_widget_host_);
rwhv->Hide();
}
if (proxy_routing_id != MSG_ROUTING_NONE) {
RenderFrameProxyHost* proxy = RenderFrameProxyHost::FromID(
GetProcess()->GetID(), proxy_routing_id);
proxy->set_render_frame_proxy_created(true);
}
SetRenderFrameCreated(true);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254
| 0
| 8,007
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::SetReadyState(DocumentReadyState ready_state) {
if (ready_state == ready_state_)
return;
switch (ready_state) {
case kLoading:
if (document_timing_.DomLoading().is_null()) {
document_timing_.MarkDomLoading();
}
break;
case kInteractive:
if (document_timing_.DomInteractive().is_null())
document_timing_.MarkDomInteractive();
break;
case kComplete:
if (document_timing_.DomComplete().is_null())
document_timing_.MarkDomComplete();
break;
}
ready_state_ = ready_state;
DispatchEvent(*Event::Create(event_type_names::kReadystatechange));
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 29,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PushMessagingServiceImpl::DidHandleMessage(
const std::string& app_id,
const base::Closure& message_handled_closure) {
auto in_flight_iterator = in_flight_message_deliveries_.find(app_id);
DCHECK(in_flight_iterator != in_flight_message_deliveries_.end());
in_flight_message_deliveries_.erase(in_flight_iterator);
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_BACKGROUND)
if (in_flight_message_deliveries_.empty())
in_flight_keep_alive_.reset();
#endif
message_handled_closure.Run();
if (push_messaging_service_observer_)
push_messaging_service_observer_->OnMessageHandled();
}
Commit Message: Remove some senseless indirection from the Push API code
Four files to call one Java function. Let's just call it directly.
BUG=
Change-Id: I6e988e9a000051dd7e3dd2b517a33a09afc2fff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/749147
Reviewed-by: Anita Woodruff <awdf@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Beverloo <peter@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513464}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 875
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: iperf_set_test_reverse(struct iperf_test *ipt, int reverse)
{
ipt->reverse = reverse;
if (ipt->reverse)
ipt->sender = ! ipt->sender;
check_sender_has_retransmits(ipt);
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 21,891
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void xhci_cap_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, uint64_t val,
unsigned width)
{
/* nothing */
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 18,800
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_event__header_size(struct perf_event *event)
{
struct perf_sample_data *data;
u64 sample_type = event->attr.sample_type;
u16 size = 0;
perf_event__read_size(event);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_IP)
size += sizeof(data->ip);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_ADDR)
size += sizeof(data->addr);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_PERIOD)
size += sizeof(data->period);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_WEIGHT)
size += sizeof(data->weight);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_READ)
size += event->read_size;
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_DATA_SRC)
size += sizeof(data->data_src.val);
if (sample_type & PERF_SAMPLE_TRANSACTION)
size += sizeof(data->txn);
event->header_size = size;
}
Commit Message: perf: Fix event->ctx locking
There have been a few reported issues wrt. the lack of locking around
changing event->ctx. This patch tries to address those.
It avoids the whole rwsem thing; and while it appears to work, please
give it some thought in review.
What I did fail at is sensible runtime checks on the use of
event->ctx, the RCU use makes it very hard.
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150123125834.209535886@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 15,572
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SecurityHandler::SecurityHandler()
: DevToolsDomainHandler(Security::Metainfo::domainName),
enabled_(false),
host_(nullptr) {
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 13,197
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void iwbmp_set_default_bitfields(struct iwbmprcontext *rctx)
{
int k;
if(rctx->bitfields_set) return;
if(rctx->bitcount==16) {
rctx->bf_mask[0]=0x7c00; // 01111100 00000000 (red)
rctx->bf_mask[1]=0x03e0; // 00000011 11100000 (green)
rctx->bf_mask[2]=0x001f; // 00000000 00011111 (blue)
}
else if(rctx->bitcount==32) {
rctx->bf_mask[0]=0x00ff0000;
rctx->bf_mask[1]=0x0000ff00;
rctx->bf_mask[2]=0x000000ff;
}
else {
return;
}
for(k=0;k<3;k++) {
process_bf_mask(rctx,k);
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed a bug that could cause invalid memory to be accessed
The bug could happen when transparency is removed from an image.
Also fixed a semi-related BMP error handling logic bug.
Fixes issue #21
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 25,677
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void d_add(struct dentry *entry, struct inode *inode)
{
if (inode) {
security_d_instantiate(entry, inode);
spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
}
__d_add(entry, inode);
}
Commit Message: dentry name snapshots
take_dentry_name_snapshot() takes a safe snapshot of dentry name;
if the name is a short one, it gets copied into caller-supplied
structure, otherwise an extra reference to external name is grabbed
(those are never modified). In either case the pointer to stable
string is stored into the same structure.
dentry must be held by the caller of take_dentry_name_snapshot(),
but may be freely dropped afterwards - the snapshot will stay
until destroyed by release_dentry_name_snapshot().
Intended use:
struct name_snapshot s;
take_dentry_name_snapshot(&s, dentry);
...
access s.name
...
release_dentry_name_snapshot(&s);
Replaces fsnotify_oldname_...(), gets used in fsnotify to obtain the name
to pass down with event.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 25,229
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void xhci_class_init(ObjectClass *klass, void *data)
{
PCIDeviceClass *k = PCI_DEVICE_CLASS(klass);
DeviceClass *dc = DEVICE_CLASS(klass);
dc->vmsd = &vmstate_xhci;
dc->props = xhci_properties;
dc->reset = xhci_reset;
set_bit(DEVICE_CATEGORY_USB, dc->categories);
k->realize = usb_xhci_realize;
k->exit = usb_xhci_exit;
k->vendor_id = PCI_VENDOR_ID_NEC;
k->device_id = PCI_DEVICE_ID_NEC_UPD720200;
k->class_id = PCI_CLASS_SERIAL_USB;
k->revision = 0x03;
k->is_express = 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835
| 0
| 11,441
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: status_t Camera2Client::removeFrameListener(int32_t minId, int32_t maxId,
wp<camera2::FrameProcessor::FilteredListener> listener) {
return mFrameProcessor->removeListener(minId, maxId, listener);
}
Commit Message: Camera: Disallow dumping clients directly
Camera service dumps should only be initiated through
ICameraService::dump.
Bug: 26265403
Change-Id: If3ca4718ed74bf33ad8a416192689203029e2803
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 17,086
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void remote_device_properties_callback(bt_status_t status, bt_bdaddr_t *bd_addr,
int num_properties, bt_property_t *properties) {
if (!checkCallbackThread()) {
ALOGE("Callback: '%s' is not called on the correct thread", __FUNCTION__);
return;
}
ALOGV("%s: Status is: %d, Properties: %d", __FUNCTION__, status, num_properties);
if (status != BT_STATUS_SUCCESS) {
ALOGE("%s: Status %d is incorrect", __FUNCTION__, status);
return;
}
callbackEnv->PushLocalFrame(ADDITIONAL_NREFS);
jobjectArray props;
jbyteArray addr;
jintArray types;
jbyteArray val;
jclass mclass;
val = (jbyteArray) callbackEnv->NewByteArray(num_properties);
if (val == NULL) {
ALOGE("%s: Error allocating byteArray", __FUNCTION__);
return;
}
mclass = callbackEnv->GetObjectClass(val);
/* Initialize the jobjectArray and jintArray here itself and send the
initialized array pointers alone to get_properties */
props = callbackEnv->NewObjectArray(num_properties, mclass,
NULL);
if (props == NULL) {
ALOGE("%s: Error allocating object Array for properties", __FUNCTION__);
return;
}
types = (jintArray)callbackEnv->NewIntArray(num_properties);
if (types == NULL) {
ALOGE("%s: Error allocating int Array for values", __FUNCTION__);
return;
}
callbackEnv->DeleteLocalRef(mclass);
callbackEnv->DeleteLocalRef(val);
addr = callbackEnv->NewByteArray(sizeof(bt_bdaddr_t));
if (addr == NULL) goto Fail;
if (addr) callbackEnv->SetByteArrayRegion(addr, 0, sizeof(bt_bdaddr_t), (jbyte*)bd_addr);
if (get_properties(num_properties, properties, &types, &props) < 0) {
if (props) callbackEnv->DeleteLocalRef(props);
if (types) callbackEnv->DeleteLocalRef(types);
callbackEnv->PopLocalFrame(NULL);
return;
}
callbackEnv->CallVoidMethod(sJniCallbacksObj, method_devicePropertyChangedCallback, addr,
types, props);
checkAndClearExceptionFromCallback(callbackEnv, __FUNCTION__);
callbackEnv->DeleteLocalRef(props);
callbackEnv->DeleteLocalRef(types);
callbackEnv->DeleteLocalRef(addr);
callbackEnv->PopLocalFrame(NULL);
return;
Fail:
ALOGE("Error while allocation byte array in %s", __FUNCTION__);
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (3/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: If4a8855faf362d7f6de509d7ddc7197d1ac75cee
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 16,858
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int shmem_acct_size(unsigned long flags, loff_t size)
{
return (flags & VM_NORESERVE) ?
0 : security_vm_enough_memory_mm(current->mm, VM_ACCT(size));
}
Commit Message: tmpfs: fix use-after-free of mempolicy object
The tmpfs remount logic preserves filesystem mempolicy if the mpol=M
option is not specified in the remount request. A new policy can be
specified if mpol=M is given.
Before this patch remounting an mpol bound tmpfs without specifying
mpol= mount option in the remount request would set the filesystem's
mempolicy object to a freed mempolicy object.
To reproduce the problem boot a DEBUG_PAGEALLOC kernel and run:
# mkdir /tmp/x
# mount -t tmpfs -o size=100M,mpol=interleave nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=102400k,mpol=interleave:0-3 0 0
# mount -o remount,size=200M nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=204800k,mpol=??? 0 0
# note ? garbage in mpol=... output above
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/x/f count=1
# panic here
Panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[...]
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Call Trace:
mpol_shared_policy_init+0xa5/0x160
shmem_get_inode+0x209/0x270
shmem_mknod+0x3e/0xf0
shmem_create+0x18/0x20
vfs_create+0xb5/0x130
do_last+0x9a1/0xea0
path_openat+0xb3/0x4d0
do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
do_sys_open+0xfe/0x1e0
compat_sys_open+0x1b/0x20
cstar_dispatch+0x7/0x1f
Non-debug kernels will not crash immediately because referencing the
dangling mpol will not cause a fault. Instead the filesystem will
reference a freed mempolicy object, which will cause unpredictable
behavior.
The problem boils down to a dropped mpol reference below if
shmem_parse_options() does not allocate a new mpol:
config = *sbinfo
shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true)
mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol)
sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol /* BUG: saves unreferenced mpol */
This patch avoids the crash by not releasing the mempolicy if
shmem_parse_options() doesn't create a new mpol.
How far back does this issue go? I see it in both 2.6.36 and 3.3. I did
not look back further.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 2,030
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int PrintRenderFrameHelper::PrintPreviewContext::GetNextPageNumber() {
DCHECK_EQ(RENDERING, state_);
if (IsFinalPageRendered())
return -1;
return pages_to_render_[current_page_index_++];
}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 13,010
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int bounds_change_count() const { return bounds_change_count_; }
Commit Message: Ignore updatePipBounds before initial bounds is set
When PIP enter/exit transition happens, window state change and
initial bounds change are committed in the same commit. However,
as state change is applied first in OnPreWidgetCommit and the
bounds is update later, if updatePipBounds is called between the
gap, it ends up returning a wrong bounds based on the previous
bounds.
Currently, there are two callstacks that end up triggering
updatePipBounds between the gap: (i) The state change causes
OnWindowAddedToLayout and updatePipBounds is called in OnWMEvent,
(ii) updatePipBounds is called in UpdatePipState to prevent it
from being placed under some system ui.
As it doesn't make sense to call updatePipBounds before the first
bounds is not set, this CL adds a boolean to defer updatePipBounds.
position.
Bug: b130782006
Test: Got VLC into PIP and confirmed it was placed at the correct
Change-Id: I5b9f3644bfb2533fd3f905bc09d49708a5d08a90
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1578719
Commit-Queue: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Kazuki Takise <takise@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mitsuru Oshima <oshima@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#668724}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 24,708
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: HTTPSRequestTest() : default_context_(true) {
default_context_.set_network_delegate(&default_network_delegate_);
default_context_.Init();
}
Commit Message: Tests were marked as Flaky.
BUG=151811,151810
TBR=droger@chromium.org,shalev@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10968052
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@158204 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 4,998
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void hal_close() {
LOG_INFO("%s", __func__);
eager_reader_free(uart_stream);
vendor->send_command(VENDOR_CLOSE_USERIAL, NULL);
uart_fd = INVALID_FD;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 1,478
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: XcursorLibraryLoadCursors (Display *dpy, const char *file)
{
int size = XcursorGetDefaultSize (dpy);
char *theme = XcursorGetTheme (dpy);
XcursorImages *images = XcursorLibraryLoadImages (file, theme, size);
XcursorCursors *cursors;
if (!file)
return NULL;
if (!images)
{
int id = XcursorLibraryShape (file);
if (id >= 0)
{
cursors = XcursorCursorsCreate (dpy, 1);
if (cursors)
{
cursors->cursors[0] = _XcursorCreateFontCursor (dpy, id);
if (cursors->cursors[0] == None)
{
XcursorCursorsDestroy (cursors);
cursors = NULL;
}
else
cursors->ncursor = 1;
}
}
else
cursors = NULL;
}
else
{
cursors = XcursorImagesLoadCursors (dpy, images);
XcursorImagesDestroy (images);
}
return cursors;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 10,198
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Clipboard::~Clipboard() {
gtk_clipboard_store(clipboard_);
}
Commit Message: Use XFixes to update the clipboard sequence number.
BUG=73478
TEST=manual testing
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8501002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109528 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 17,071
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GLES2DecoderImpl::DoGetFloatv(GLenum pname, GLfloat* params) {
DCHECK(params);
GLsizei num_written = 0;
if (GetHelper(pname, NULL, &num_written)) {
scoped_array<GLint> values(new GLint[num_written]);
GetHelper(pname, values.get(), &num_written);
for (GLsizei ii = 0; ii < num_written; ++ii) {
params[ii] = static_cast<GLfloat>(values[ii]);
}
} else {
glGetFloatv(pname, params);
}
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 28,089
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int bpf_prog_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
{
struct bpf_prog *prog = filp->private_data;
bpf_prog_put_rcu(prog);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 26,410
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int do_make_slave(struct mount *mnt)
{
struct mount *peer_mnt = mnt, *master = mnt->mnt_master;
struct mount *slave_mnt;
/*
* slave 'mnt' to a peer mount that has the
* same root dentry. If none is available then
* slave it to anything that is available.
*/
while ((peer_mnt = next_peer(peer_mnt)) != mnt &&
peer_mnt->mnt.mnt_root != mnt->mnt.mnt_root) ;
if (peer_mnt == mnt) {
peer_mnt = next_peer(mnt);
if (peer_mnt == mnt)
peer_mnt = NULL;
}
if (mnt->mnt_group_id && IS_MNT_SHARED(mnt) &&
list_empty(&mnt->mnt_share))
mnt_release_group_id(mnt);
list_del_init(&mnt->mnt_share);
mnt->mnt_group_id = 0;
if (peer_mnt)
master = peer_mnt;
if (master) {
list_for_each_entry(slave_mnt, &mnt->mnt_slave_list, mnt_slave)
slave_mnt->mnt_master = master;
list_move(&mnt->mnt_slave, &master->mnt_slave_list);
list_splice(&mnt->mnt_slave_list, master->mnt_slave_list.prev);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mnt->mnt_slave_list);
} else {
struct list_head *p = &mnt->mnt_slave_list;
while (!list_empty(p)) {
slave_mnt = list_first_entry(p,
struct mount, mnt_slave);
list_del_init(&slave_mnt->mnt_slave);
slave_mnt->mnt_master = NULL;
}
}
mnt->mnt_master = master;
CLEAR_MNT_SHARED(mnt);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: mnt: Add a per mount namespace limit on the number of mounts
CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com> pointed out that the semantics
of shared subtrees make it possible to create an exponentially
increasing number of mounts in a mount namespace.
mkdir /tmp/1 /tmp/2
mount --make-rshared /
for i in $(seq 1 20) ; do mount --bind /tmp/1 /tmp/2 ; done
Will create create 2^20 or 1048576 mounts, which is a practical problem
as some people have managed to hit this by accident.
As such CVE-2016-6213 was assigned.
Ian Kent <raven@themaw.net> described the situation for autofs users
as follows:
> The number of mounts for direct mount maps is usually not very large because of
> the way they are implemented, large direct mount maps can have performance
> problems. There can be anywhere from a few (likely case a few hundred) to less
> than 10000, plus mounts that have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> Indirect mounts have one autofs mount at the root plus the number of mounts that
> have been triggered and not yet expired.
>
> The number of autofs indirect map entries can range from a few to the common
> case of several thousand and in rare cases up to between 30000 and 50000. I've
> not heard of people with maps larger than 50000 entries.
>
> The larger the number of map entries the greater the possibility for a large
> number of active mounts so it's not hard to expect cases of a 1000 or somewhat
> more active mounts.
So I am setting the default number of mounts allowed per mount
namespace at 100,000. This is more than enough for any use case I
know of, but small enough to quickly stop an exponential increase
in mounts. Which should be perfect to catch misconfigurations and
malfunctioning programs.
For anyone who needs a higher limit this can be changed by writing
to the new /proc/sys/fs/mount-max sysctl.
Tested-by: CAI Qian <caiqian@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 7,991
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmx_complete_atomic_exit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
{
u32 exit_intr_info;
if (!(vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY
|| vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI))
return;
vmx->exit_intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
exit_intr_info = vmx->exit_intr_info;
/* Handle machine checks before interrupts are enabled */
if (is_machine_check(exit_intr_info))
kvm_machine_check();
/* We need to handle NMIs before interrupts are enabled */
if ((exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_INTR_TYPE_MASK) == INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR &&
(exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK)) {
kvm_before_handle_nmi(&vmx->vcpu);
asm("int $2");
kvm_after_handle_nmi(&vmx->vcpu);
}
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 25,295
|
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