instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 64
129k
| output
int64 0
1
| __index_level_0__
int64 0
30k
|
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int in_set_parameters(struct audio_stream *stream, const char *kvpairs)
{
UNUSED(stream);
UNUSED(kvpairs);
FNLOG();
return 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 10,106
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool hex2bin(unsigned char *p, const char *hexstr, size_t len)
{
int nibble1, nibble2;
unsigned char idx;
bool ret = false;
while (*hexstr && len) {
if (unlikely(!hexstr[1])) {
applog(LOG_ERR, "hex2bin str truncated");
return ret;
}
idx = *hexstr++;
nibble1 = hex2bin_tbl[idx];
idx = *hexstr++;
nibble2 = hex2bin_tbl[idx];
if (unlikely((nibble1 < 0) || (nibble2 < 0))) {
applog(LOG_ERR, "hex2bin scan failed");
return ret;
}
*p++ = (((unsigned char)nibble1) << 4) | ((unsigned char)nibble2);
--len;
}
if (likely(len == 0 && *hexstr == 0))
ret = true;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: stratum: parse_notify(): Don't die on malformed bbversion/prev_hash/nbit/ntime.
Might have introduced a memory leak, don't have time to check. :(
Should the other hex2bin()'s be checked?
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick.dejavusecurity.com> for finding this.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 28,336
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ShellAuraPlatformData::ShellAuraPlatformData() {
aura::TestScreen* screen = aura::TestScreen::Create();
gfx::Screen::SetScreenInstance(gfx::SCREEN_TYPE_NATIVE, screen);
root_window_.reset(screen->CreateRootWindowForPrimaryDisplay());
root_window_->host()->Show();
root_window_->window()->SetLayoutManager(new FillLayout(root_window_.get()));
focus_client_.reset(new aura::test::TestFocusClient());
aura::client::SetFocusClient(root_window_->window(), focus_client_.get());
activation_client_.reset(
new aura::client::DefaultActivationClient(root_window_->window()));
capture_client_.reset(
new aura::client::DefaultCaptureClient(root_window_->window()));
window_tree_client_.reset(
new aura::test::TestWindowTreeClient(root_window_->window()));
ime_filter_.reset(new MinimalInputEventFilter(root_window_.get()));
}
Commit Message: shell_aura: Set child to root window size, not host size
The host size is in pixels and the root window size is in scaled pixels.
So, using the pixel size may make the child window much larger than the
root window (and screen). Fix this by matching the root window size.
BUG=335713
TEST=ozone content_shell with --force-device-scale-factor=2
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/141853003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@246389 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 5,864
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void QQuickWebView::reload()
{
Q_D(QQuickWebView);
WebFrameProxy* mainFrame = d->webPageProxy->mainFrame();
if (mainFrame && !mainFrame->unreachableURL().isEmpty() && mainFrame->url() != blankURL()) {
d->webPageProxy->loadURL(mainFrame->unreachableURL());
return;
}
const bool reloadFromOrigin = true;
d->webPageProxy->reload(reloadFromOrigin);
}
Commit Message: [Qt][WK2] There's no way to test the gesture tap on WTR
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=92895
Reviewed by Kenneth Rohde Christiansen.
Source/WebKit2:
Add an instance of QtViewportHandler to QQuickWebViewPrivate, so it's
now available on mobile and desktop modes, as a side effect gesture tap
events can now be created and sent to WebCore.
This is needed to test tap gestures and to get tap gestures working
when you have a WebView (in desktop mode) on notebooks equipped with
touch screens.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview.cpp:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate::onComponentComplete): Implementation
moved to QQuickWebViewPrivate::onComponentComplete.
* UIProcess/API/qt/qquickwebview_p_p.h:
(QQuickWebViewPrivate):
(QQuickWebViewFlickablePrivate):
Tools:
WTR doesn't create the QQuickItem from C++, not from QML, so a call
to componentComplete() was added to mimic the QML behaviour.
* WebKitTestRunner/qt/PlatformWebViewQt.cpp:
(WTR::PlatformWebView::PlatformWebView):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124625 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 24,037
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PrintPreviewHandler::GetNumberFormatAndMeasurementSystem(
base::DictionaryValue* settings) {
UErrorCode errorCode = U_ZERO_ERROR;
const char* locale = g_browser_process->GetApplicationLocale().c_str();
UMeasurementSystem system = ulocdata_getMeasurementSystem(locale, &errorCode);
if (errorCode > U_ZERO_ERROR || system == UMS_LIMIT)
system = UMS_SI;
settings->SetString(kNumberFormat, base::FormatDouble(123456.78, 2));
settings->SetInteger(kMeasurementSystem, system);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 9,004
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int avr_custom_spm_page_write(RAnalEsil *esil) {
CPU_MODEL *cpu;
char *t = NULL;
ut64 addr, page_size_bits, tmp_page;
if (!esil || !esil->anal || !esil->anal->reg) {
return false;
}
if (!__esil_pop_argument (esil, &addr)) {
return false;
}
cpu = get_cpu_model (esil->anal->cpu);
page_size_bits = const_get_value (const_by_name (cpu, CPU_CONST_PARAM, "page_size"));
r_anal_esil_reg_read (esil, "_page", &tmp_page, NULL);
addr &= (~(MASK (page_size_bits)) & CPU_PC_MASK (cpu));
if (!(t = malloc (1 << page_size_bits))) {
eprintf ("Cannot alloc a buffer for copying the temporary page.\n");
return false;
}
r_anal_esil_mem_read (esil, tmp_page, (ut8 *) t, 1 << page_size_bits);
r_anal_esil_mem_write (esil, addr, (ut8 *) t, 1 << page_size_bits);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix #9943 - Invalid free on RAnal.avr
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 3,565
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PdfCompositorClient::~PdfCompositorClient() {}
Commit Message: Correct mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle usage
Fixes some incorrect uses of mojo::WrapSharedMemoryHandle which
were assuming that the call actually has any control over the memory
protection applied to a handle when mapped.
Where fixing usage is infeasible for this CL, TODOs are added to
annotate follow-up work.
Also updates the API and documentation to (hopefully) improve clarity
and avoid similar mistakes from being made in the future.
BUG=792900
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I0578aaa9ca3bfcb01aaf2451315d1ede95458477
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/818282
Reviewed-by: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Abd-El-Malek <jam@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Sadrul Chowdhury <sadrul@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuzhu Shen <yzshen@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Rockot <rockot@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#530268}
CWE ID: CWE-787
| 0
| 29,483
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int local_unlinkat_common(FsContext *ctx, int dirfd, const char *name,
int flags)
{
int ret = -1;
if (ctx->export_flags & V9FS_SM_MAPPED_FILE) {
int map_dirfd;
if (flags == AT_REMOVEDIR) {
int fd;
fd = openat_dir(dirfd, name);
if (fd == -1) {
goto err_out;
}
/*
* If directory remove .virtfs_metadata contained in the
* directory
*/
ret = unlinkat(fd, VIRTFS_META_DIR, AT_REMOVEDIR);
close_preserve_errno(fd);
if (ret < 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
/*
* We didn't had the .virtfs_metadata file. May be file created
* in non-mapped mode ?. Ignore ENOENT.
*/
goto err_out;
}
}
/*
* Now remove the name from parent directory
* .virtfs_metadata directory.
*/
map_dirfd = openat_dir(dirfd, VIRTFS_META_DIR);
ret = unlinkat(map_dirfd, name, 0);
close_preserve_errno(map_dirfd);
if (ret < 0 && errno != ENOENT) {
/*
* We didn't had the .virtfs_metadata file. May be file created
* in non-mapped mode ?. Ignore ENOENT.
*/
goto err_out;
}
}
ret = unlinkat(dirfd, name, flags);
err_out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 24,177
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int fwnet_add_peer(struct fwnet_device *dev,
struct fw_unit *unit, struct fw_device *device)
{
struct fwnet_peer *peer;
peer = kmalloc(sizeof(*peer), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!peer)
return -ENOMEM;
dev_set_drvdata(&unit->device, peer);
peer->dev = dev;
peer->guid = (u64)device->config_rom[3] << 32 | device->config_rom[4];
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&peer->pd_list);
peer->pdg_size = 0;
peer->datagram_label = 0;
peer->speed = device->max_speed;
peer->max_payload = fwnet_max_payload(device->max_rec, peer->speed);
peer->generation = device->generation;
smp_rmb();
peer->node_id = device->node_id;
spin_lock_irq(&dev->lock);
list_add_tail(&peer->peer_link, &dev->peer_list);
dev->peer_count++;
set_carrier_state(dev);
spin_unlock_irq(&dev->lock);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: firewire: net: guard against rx buffer overflows
The IP-over-1394 driver firewire-net lacked input validation when
handling incoming fragmented datagrams. A maliciously formed fragment
with a respectively large datagram_offset would cause a memcpy past the
datagram buffer.
So, drop any packets carrying a fragment with offset + length larger
than datagram_size.
In addition, ensure that
- GASP header, unfragmented encapsulation header, or fragment
encapsulation header actually exists before we access it,
- the encapsulated datagram or fragment is of nonzero size.
Reported-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Eyal Itkin <eyal.itkin@gmail.com>
Fixes: CVE 2016-8633
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Richter <stefanr@s5r6.in-berlin.de>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 360
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: IntRect PopupContainer::layoutAndCalculateWidgetRect(int targetControlHeight, const IntPoint& popupInitialCoordinate)
{
m_listBox->setMaxHeight(kMaxHeight);
m_listBox->setMaxWidth(std::numeric_limits<int>::max());
int rtlOffset = layoutAndGetRTLOffset();
bool isRTL = this->isRTL();
int rightOffset = isRTL ? rtlOffset : 0;
IntSize targetSize(m_listBox->width() + kBorderSize * 2,
m_listBox->height() + kBorderSize * 2);
IntRect widgetRect;
ChromeClientChromium* chromeClient = chromeClientChromium();
if (chromeClient) {
FloatRect screen = screenAvailableRect(m_frameView.get());
widgetRect = chromeClient->rootViewToScreen(IntRect(popupInitialCoordinate.x() + rightOffset, popupInitialCoordinate.y(), targetSize.width(), targetSize.height()));
FloatRect windowRect = chromeClient->windowRect();
if (windowRect.x() >= screen.x() && windowRect.maxX() <= screen.maxX() && (widgetRect.x() < screen.x() || widgetRect.maxX() > screen.maxX())) {
IntRect inverseWidgetRect = chromeClient->rootViewToScreen(IntRect(popupInitialCoordinate.x() + (isRTL ? 0 : rtlOffset), popupInitialCoordinate.y(), targetSize.width(), targetSize.height()));
IntRect enclosingScreen = enclosingIntRect(screen);
unsigned originalCutoff = max(enclosingScreen.x() - widgetRect.x(), 0) + max(widgetRect.maxX() - enclosingScreen.maxX(), 0);
unsigned inverseCutoff = max(enclosingScreen.x() - inverseWidgetRect.x(), 0) + max(inverseWidgetRect.maxX() - enclosingScreen.maxX(), 0);
if (inverseCutoff < originalCutoff)
widgetRect = inverseWidgetRect;
if (widgetRect.x() < screen.x()) {
unsigned widgetRight = widgetRect.maxX();
widgetRect.setWidth(widgetRect.maxX() - screen.x());
widgetRect.setX(widgetRight - widgetRect.width());
listBox()->setMaxWidthAndLayout(max(widgetRect.width() - kBorderSize * 2, 0));
} else if (widgetRect.maxX() > screen.maxX()) {
widgetRect.setWidth(screen.maxX() - widgetRect.x());
listBox()->setMaxWidthAndLayout(max(widgetRect.width() - kBorderSize * 2, 0));
}
}
if (widgetRect.maxY() > static_cast<int>(screen.maxY())) {
if (widgetRect.y() - widgetRect.height() - targetControlHeight > 0) {
widgetRect.move(0, -(widgetRect.height() + targetControlHeight));
} else {
int spaceAbove = widgetRect.y() - targetControlHeight;
int spaceBelow = screen.maxY() - widgetRect.y();
if (spaceAbove > spaceBelow)
m_listBox->setMaxHeight(spaceAbove);
else
m_listBox->setMaxHeight(spaceBelow);
layoutAndGetRTLOffset();
IntRect frameInScreen = chromeClient->rootViewToScreen(frameRect());
widgetRect.setY(frameInScreen.y());
widgetRect.setHeight(frameInScreen.height());
if (spaceAbove > spaceBelow)
widgetRect.move(0, -(widgetRect.height() + targetControlHeight));
}
}
}
return widgetRect;
}
Commit Message: [REGRESSION] Refreshed autofill popup renders garbage
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=83255
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=118374
The code used to update only the PopupContainer coordinates as if they were the coordinates relative
to the root view. Instead, a WebWidget positioned relative to the screen origin holds the PopupContainer,
so it is the WebWidget that should be positioned in PopupContainer::refresh(), and the PopupContainer's
location should be (0, 0) (and their sizes should always be equal).
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
No new tests, as the popup appearance is not testable in WebKit.
* platform/chromium/PopupContainer.cpp:
(WebCore::PopupContainer::layoutAndCalculateWidgetRect): Variable renamed.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::showPopup): Use m_originalFrameRect rather than frameRect()
for passing into chromeClient.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::showInRect): Set up the correct frameRect() for the container.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::refresh): Resize the container and position the WebWidget correctly.
* platform/chromium/PopupContainer.h:
(PopupContainer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@113418 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 25,197
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void ffs_func_suspend(struct usb_function *f)
{
ENTER();
ffs_event_add(ffs_func_from_usb(f)->ffs, FUNCTIONFS_SUSPEND);
}
Commit Message: usb: gadget: f_fs: Fix use-after-free
When using asynchronous read or write operations on the USB endpoints the
issuer of the IO request is notified by calling the ki_complete() callback
of the submitted kiocb when the URB has been completed.
Calling this ki_complete() callback will free kiocb. Make sure that the
structure is no longer accessed beyond that point, otherwise undefined
behaviour might occur.
Fixes: 2e4c7553cd6f ("usb: gadget: f_fs: add aio support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.15+
Signed-off-by: Lars-Peter Clausen <lars@metafoo.de>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 25,041
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::ModifyEventMovementAndCoords(
WebKit::WebMouseEvent* event) {
if (event->type == WebKit::WebInputEvent::MouseEnter ||
event->type == WebKit::WebInputEvent::MouseLeave)
global_mouse_position_.SetPoint(event->globalX, event->globalY);
event->movementX = event->globalX - global_mouse_position_.x();
event->movementY = event->globalY - global_mouse_position_.y();
global_mouse_position_.SetPoint(event->globalX, event->globalY);
if (mouse_locked_) {
event->x = unlocked_mouse_position_.x();
event->y = unlocked_mouse_position_.y();
event->windowX = unlocked_mouse_position_.x();
event->windowY = unlocked_mouse_position_.y();
event->globalX = unlocked_global_mouse_position_.x();
event->globalY = unlocked_global_mouse_position_.y();
} else {
unlocked_mouse_position_.SetPoint(event->windowX, event->windowY);
unlocked_global_mouse_position_.SetPoint(event->globalX, event->globalY);
}
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 14,163
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int wc_ecc_get_curve_size_from_id(int curve_id)
{
int curve_idx = wc_ecc_get_curve_idx(curve_id);
if (curve_idx == ECC_CURVE_INVALID)
return ECC_BAD_ARG_E;
return ecc_sets[curve_idx].size;
}
Commit Message: Change ECDSA signing to use blinding.
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 25,257
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BufferMeta(size_t size)
: mSize(size),
mIsBackup(false) {
}
Commit Message: IOMX: Enable buffer ptr to buffer id translation for arm32
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: Iac9eac3cb251eccd9bbad5df7421a07edc21da0c
(cherry picked from commit 2d6b6601743c3c6960c6511a2cb774ef902759f4)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,702
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GLuint GetServiceId(const OBJECT_TYPE* object) {
return object ? object->service_id() : 0;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 2,165
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SkBitmap* BrowserNonClientFrameViewAura::GetCustomBitmap(
int bitmap_id,
int fallback_bitmap_id) const {
ui::ThemeProvider* tp = GetThemeProvider();
if (tp->HasCustomImage(bitmap_id))
return tp->GetBitmapNamed(bitmap_id);
return tp->GetBitmapNamed(fallback_bitmap_id);
}
Commit Message: Ash: Fix fullscreen window bounds
I was computing the non-client frame top border height incorrectly for fullscreen windows, so it was trying to draw a few pixels of transparent non-client border.
BUG=118774
TEST=visual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9810014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@128014 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 1,805
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static sctp_disposition_t sctp_sf_violation_ctsn(
struct net *net,
const struct sctp_endpoint *ep,
const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const sctp_subtype_t type,
void *arg,
sctp_cmd_seq_t *commands)
{
static const char err_str[]="The cumulative tsn ack beyond the max tsn currently sent:";
return sctp_sf_abort_violation(net, ep, asoc, arg, commands, err_str,
sizeof(err_str));
}
Commit Message: sctp: Use correct sideffect command in duplicate cookie handling
When SCTP is done processing a duplicate cookie chunk, it tries
to delete a newly created association. For that, it has to set
the right association for the side-effect processing to work.
However, when it uses the SCTP_CMD_NEW_ASOC command, that performs
more work then really needed (like hashing the associationa and
assigning it an id) and there is no point to do that only to
delete the association as a next step. In fact, it also creates
an impossible condition where an association may be found by
the getsockopt() call, and that association is empty. This
causes a crash in some sctp getsockopts.
The solution is rather simple. We simply use SCTP_CMD_SET_ASOC
command that doesn't have all the overhead and does exactly
what we need.
Reported-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Karl Heiss <kheiss@gmail.com>
CC: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 15,413
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: kvm_pfn_t gfn_to_pfn(struct kvm *kvm, gfn_t gfn)
{
return gfn_to_pfn_memslot(gfn_to_memslot(kvm, gfn), gfn);
}
Commit Message: KVM: use after free in kvm_ioctl_create_device()
We should move the ops->destroy(dev) after the list_del(&dev->vm_node)
so that we don't use "dev" after freeing it.
Fixes: a28ebea2adc4 ("KVM: Protect device ops->create and list_add with kvm->lock")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 6,128
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void nfs4_destroy_session(struct nfs4_session *session)
{
struct rpc_xprt *xprt;
struct rpc_cred *cred;
cred = nfs4_get_exchange_id_cred(session->clp);
nfs4_proc_destroy_session(session, cred);
if (cred)
put_rpccred(cred);
rcu_read_lock();
xprt = rcu_dereference(session->clp->cl_rpcclient->cl_xprt);
rcu_read_unlock();
dprintk("%s Destroy backchannel for xprt %p\n",
__func__, xprt);
xprt_destroy_backchannel(xprt, NFS41_BC_MIN_CALLBACKS);
nfs4_destroy_slot_tables(session);
kfree(session);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Check for buffer length in __nfs4_get_acl_uncached
Commit 1f1ea6c "NFSv4: Fix buffer overflow checking in
__nfs4_get_acl_uncached" accidently dropped the checking for too small
result buffer length.
If someone uses getxattr on "system.nfs4_acl" on an NFSv4 mount
supporting ACLs, the ACL has not been cached and the buffer suplied is
too short, we still copy the complete ACL, resulting in kernel and user
space memory corruption.
Signed-off-by: Sven Wegener <sven.wegener@stealer.net>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 625
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void GraphicsContext::scale(const FloatSize& scale)
{
#if USE(WXGC)
if (m_data->context) {
wxGraphicsContext* gc = m_data->context->GetGraphicsContext();
gc->Scale(scale.width(), scale.height());
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: Reviewed by Kevin Ollivier.
[wx] Fix strokeArc and fillRoundedRect drawing, and add clipPath support.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=60847
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@86502 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 6,834
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: MagickExport const PixelPacket *GetVirtualPixelQueue(const Image *image)
{
CacheInfo
*magick_restrict cache_info;
const int
id = GetOpenMPThreadId();
assert(image != (const Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image->cache != (Cache) NULL);
cache_info=(CacheInfo *) image->cache;
assert(cache_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (cache_info->methods.get_virtual_pixels_handler !=
(GetVirtualPixelsHandler) NULL)
return(cache_info->methods.get_virtual_pixels_handler(image));
assert(id < (int) cache_info->number_threads);
return(GetVirtualPixelsNexus(cache_info,cache_info->nexus_info[id]));
}
Commit Message: http://www.imagemagick.org/discourse-server/viewtopic.php?f=2&t=28946
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 13,715
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int x86_decode_insn(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, void *insn, int insn_len)
{
int rc = X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
int mode = ctxt->mode;
int def_op_bytes, def_ad_bytes, goffset, simd_prefix;
bool op_prefix = false;
bool has_seg_override = false;
struct opcode opcode;
ctxt->memop.type = OP_NONE;
ctxt->memopp = NULL;
ctxt->_eip = ctxt->eip;
ctxt->fetch.ptr = ctxt->fetch.data;
ctxt->fetch.end = ctxt->fetch.data + insn_len;
ctxt->opcode_len = 1;
if (insn_len > 0)
memcpy(ctxt->fetch.data, insn, insn_len);
else {
rc = __do_insn_fetch_bytes(ctxt, 1);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
}
switch (mode) {
case X86EMUL_MODE_REAL:
case X86EMUL_MODE_VM86:
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16:
def_op_bytes = def_ad_bytes = 2;
break;
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT32:
def_op_bytes = def_ad_bytes = 4;
break;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
case X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64:
def_op_bytes = 4;
def_ad_bytes = 8;
break;
#endif
default:
return EMULATION_FAILED;
}
ctxt->op_bytes = def_op_bytes;
ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes;
/* Legacy prefixes. */
for (;;) {
switch (ctxt->b = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt)) {
case 0x66: /* operand-size override */
op_prefix = true;
/* switch between 2/4 bytes */
ctxt->op_bytes = def_op_bytes ^ 6;
break;
case 0x67: /* address-size override */
if (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
/* switch between 4/8 bytes */
ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes ^ 12;
else
/* switch between 2/4 bytes */
ctxt->ad_bytes = def_ad_bytes ^ 6;
break;
case 0x26: /* ES override */
case 0x2e: /* CS override */
case 0x36: /* SS override */
case 0x3e: /* DS override */
has_seg_override = true;
ctxt->seg_override = (ctxt->b >> 3) & 3;
break;
case 0x64: /* FS override */
case 0x65: /* GS override */
has_seg_override = true;
ctxt->seg_override = ctxt->b & 7;
break;
case 0x40 ... 0x4f: /* REX */
if (mode != X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
goto done_prefixes;
ctxt->rex_prefix = ctxt->b;
continue;
case 0xf0: /* LOCK */
ctxt->lock_prefix = 1;
break;
case 0xf2: /* REPNE/REPNZ */
case 0xf3: /* REP/REPE/REPZ */
ctxt->rep_prefix = ctxt->b;
break;
default:
goto done_prefixes;
}
/* Any legacy prefix after a REX prefix nullifies its effect. */
ctxt->rex_prefix = 0;
}
done_prefixes:
/* REX prefix. */
if (ctxt->rex_prefix & 8)
ctxt->op_bytes = 8; /* REX.W */
/* Opcode byte(s). */
opcode = opcode_table[ctxt->b];
/* Two-byte opcode? */
if (ctxt->b == 0x0f) {
ctxt->opcode_len = 2;
ctxt->b = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt);
opcode = twobyte_table[ctxt->b];
/* 0F_38 opcode map */
if (ctxt->b == 0x38) {
ctxt->opcode_len = 3;
ctxt->b = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt);
opcode = opcode_map_0f_38[ctxt->b];
}
}
ctxt->d = opcode.flags;
if (ctxt->d & ModRM)
ctxt->modrm = insn_fetch(u8, ctxt);
/* vex-prefix instructions are not implemented */
if (ctxt->opcode_len == 1 && (ctxt->b == 0xc5 || ctxt->b == 0xc4) &&
(mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 ||
(mode >= X86EMUL_MODE_PROT16 && (ctxt->modrm & 0x80)))) {
ctxt->d = NotImpl;
}
while (ctxt->d & GroupMask) {
switch (ctxt->d & GroupMask) {
case Group:
goffset = (ctxt->modrm >> 3) & 7;
opcode = opcode.u.group[goffset];
break;
case GroupDual:
goffset = (ctxt->modrm >> 3) & 7;
if ((ctxt->modrm >> 6) == 3)
opcode = opcode.u.gdual->mod3[goffset];
else
opcode = opcode.u.gdual->mod012[goffset];
break;
case RMExt:
goffset = ctxt->modrm & 7;
opcode = opcode.u.group[goffset];
break;
case Prefix:
if (ctxt->rep_prefix && op_prefix)
return EMULATION_FAILED;
simd_prefix = op_prefix ? 0x66 : ctxt->rep_prefix;
switch (simd_prefix) {
case 0x00: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_no; break;
case 0x66: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_66; break;
case 0xf2: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_f2; break;
case 0xf3: opcode = opcode.u.gprefix->pfx_f3; break;
}
break;
case Escape:
if (ctxt->modrm > 0xbf)
opcode = opcode.u.esc->high[ctxt->modrm - 0xc0];
else
opcode = opcode.u.esc->op[(ctxt->modrm >> 3) & 7];
break;
default:
return EMULATION_FAILED;
}
ctxt->d &= ~(u64)GroupMask;
ctxt->d |= opcode.flags;
}
/* Unrecognised? */
if (ctxt->d == 0)
return EMULATION_FAILED;
ctxt->execute = opcode.u.execute;
if (unlikely(ctxt->ud) && likely(!(ctxt->d & EmulateOnUD)))
return EMULATION_FAILED;
if (unlikely(ctxt->d &
(NotImpl|Stack|Op3264|Sse|Mmx|Intercept|CheckPerm))) {
/*
* These are copied unconditionally here, and checked unconditionally
* in x86_emulate_insn.
*/
ctxt->check_perm = opcode.check_perm;
ctxt->intercept = opcode.intercept;
if (ctxt->d & NotImpl)
return EMULATION_FAILED;
if (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64 && (ctxt->d & Stack))
ctxt->op_bytes = 8;
if (ctxt->d & Op3264) {
if (mode == X86EMUL_MODE_PROT64)
ctxt->op_bytes = 8;
else
ctxt->op_bytes = 4;
}
if (ctxt->d & Sse)
ctxt->op_bytes = 16;
else if (ctxt->d & Mmx)
ctxt->op_bytes = 8;
}
/* ModRM and SIB bytes. */
if (ctxt->d & ModRM) {
rc = decode_modrm(ctxt, &ctxt->memop);
if (!has_seg_override) {
has_seg_override = true;
ctxt->seg_override = ctxt->modrm_seg;
}
} else if (ctxt->d & MemAbs)
rc = decode_abs(ctxt, &ctxt->memop);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
if (!has_seg_override)
ctxt->seg_override = VCPU_SREG_DS;
ctxt->memop.addr.mem.seg = ctxt->seg_override;
/*
* Decode and fetch the source operand: register, memory
* or immediate.
*/
rc = decode_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->src, (ctxt->d >> SrcShift) & OpMask);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
/*
* Decode and fetch the second source operand: register, memory
* or immediate.
*/
rc = decode_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->src2, (ctxt->d >> Src2Shift) & OpMask);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
goto done;
/* Decode and fetch the destination operand: register or memory. */
rc = decode_operand(ctxt, &ctxt->dst, (ctxt->d >> DstShift) & OpMask);
done:
if (ctxt->rip_relative)
ctxt->memopp->addr.mem.ea += ctxt->_eip;
return (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE) ? EMULATION_FAILED : EMULATION_OK;
}
Commit Message: KVM: emulate: avoid accessing NULL ctxt->memopp
A failure to decode the instruction can cause a NULL pointer access.
This is fixed simply by moving the "done" label as close as possible
to the return.
This fixes CVE-2014-8481.
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 41061cdb98a0bec464278b4db8e894a3121671f5
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 1
| 16,533
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: av_cold void ff_dsputil_init(DSPContext* c, AVCodecContext *avctx)
{
ff_check_alignment();
#if CONFIG_ENCODERS
if (avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 10) {
c->fdct = ff_jpeg_fdct_islow_10;
c->fdct248 = ff_fdct248_islow_10;
} else {
if(avctx->dct_algo==FF_DCT_FASTINT) {
c->fdct = ff_fdct_ifast;
c->fdct248 = ff_fdct_ifast248;
}
else if(avctx->dct_algo==FF_DCT_FAAN) {
c->fdct = ff_faandct;
c->fdct248 = ff_faandct248;
}
else {
c->fdct = ff_jpeg_fdct_islow_8; //slow/accurate/default
c->fdct248 = ff_fdct248_islow_8;
}
}
#endif //CONFIG_ENCODERS
if(avctx->lowres==1){
c->idct_put= ff_jref_idct4_put;
c->idct_add= ff_jref_idct4_add;
c->idct = ff_j_rev_dct4;
c->idct_permutation_type= FF_NO_IDCT_PERM;
}else if(avctx->lowres==2){
c->idct_put= ff_jref_idct2_put;
c->idct_add= ff_jref_idct2_add;
c->idct = ff_j_rev_dct2;
c->idct_permutation_type= FF_NO_IDCT_PERM;
}else if(avctx->lowres==3){
c->idct_put= ff_jref_idct1_put;
c->idct_add= ff_jref_idct1_add;
c->idct = ff_j_rev_dct1;
c->idct_permutation_type= FF_NO_IDCT_PERM;
}else{
if (avctx->bits_per_raw_sample == 10) {
c->idct_put = ff_simple_idct_put_10;
c->idct_add = ff_simple_idct_add_10;
c->idct = ff_simple_idct_10;
c->idct_permutation_type = FF_NO_IDCT_PERM;
} else {
if(avctx->idct_algo==FF_IDCT_INT){
c->idct_put= jref_idct_put;
c->idct_add= jref_idct_add;
c->idct = ff_j_rev_dct;
c->idct_permutation_type= FF_LIBMPEG2_IDCT_PERM;
}else if(avctx->idct_algo==FF_IDCT_FAAN){
c->idct_put= ff_faanidct_put;
c->idct_add= ff_faanidct_add;
c->idct = ff_faanidct;
c->idct_permutation_type= FF_NO_IDCT_PERM;
}else{ //accurate/default
c->idct_put = ff_simple_idct_put_8;
c->idct_add = ff_simple_idct_add_8;
c->idct = ff_simple_idct_8;
c->idct_permutation_type= FF_NO_IDCT_PERM;
}
}
}
c->diff_pixels = diff_pixels_c;
c->put_pixels_clamped = put_pixels_clamped_c;
c->put_signed_pixels_clamped = put_signed_pixels_clamped_c;
c->add_pixels_clamped = add_pixels_clamped_c;
c->sum_abs_dctelem = sum_abs_dctelem_c;
c->gmc1 = gmc1_c;
c->gmc = ff_gmc_c;
c->pix_sum = pix_sum_c;
c->pix_norm1 = pix_norm1_c;
c->fill_block_tab[0] = fill_block16_c;
c->fill_block_tab[1] = fill_block8_c;
/* TODO [0] 16 [1] 8 */
c->pix_abs[0][0] = pix_abs16_c;
c->pix_abs[0][1] = pix_abs16_x2_c;
c->pix_abs[0][2] = pix_abs16_y2_c;
c->pix_abs[0][3] = pix_abs16_xy2_c;
c->pix_abs[1][0] = pix_abs8_c;
c->pix_abs[1][1] = pix_abs8_x2_c;
c->pix_abs[1][2] = pix_abs8_y2_c;
c->pix_abs[1][3] = pix_abs8_xy2_c;
c->put_tpel_pixels_tab[ 0] = put_tpel_pixels_mc00_c;
c->put_tpel_pixels_tab[ 1] = put_tpel_pixels_mc10_c;
c->put_tpel_pixels_tab[ 2] = put_tpel_pixels_mc20_c;
c->put_tpel_pixels_tab[ 4] = put_tpel_pixels_mc01_c;
c->put_tpel_pixels_tab[ 5] = put_tpel_pixels_mc11_c;
c->put_tpel_pixels_tab[ 6] = put_tpel_pixels_mc21_c;
c->put_tpel_pixels_tab[ 8] = put_tpel_pixels_mc02_c;
c->put_tpel_pixels_tab[ 9] = put_tpel_pixels_mc12_c;
c->put_tpel_pixels_tab[10] = put_tpel_pixels_mc22_c;
c->avg_tpel_pixels_tab[ 0] = avg_tpel_pixels_mc00_c;
c->avg_tpel_pixels_tab[ 1] = avg_tpel_pixels_mc10_c;
c->avg_tpel_pixels_tab[ 2] = avg_tpel_pixels_mc20_c;
c->avg_tpel_pixels_tab[ 4] = avg_tpel_pixels_mc01_c;
c->avg_tpel_pixels_tab[ 5] = avg_tpel_pixels_mc11_c;
c->avg_tpel_pixels_tab[ 6] = avg_tpel_pixels_mc21_c;
c->avg_tpel_pixels_tab[ 8] = avg_tpel_pixels_mc02_c;
c->avg_tpel_pixels_tab[ 9] = avg_tpel_pixels_mc12_c;
c->avg_tpel_pixels_tab[10] = avg_tpel_pixels_mc22_c;
#define dspfunc(PFX, IDX, NUM) \
c->PFX ## _pixels_tab[IDX][ 0] = PFX ## NUM ## _mc00_c; \
c->PFX ## _pixels_tab[IDX][ 1] = PFX ## NUM ## _mc10_c; \
c->PFX ## _pixels_tab[IDX][ 2] = PFX ## NUM ## _mc20_c; \
c->PFX ## _pixels_tab[IDX][ 3] = PFX ## NUM ## _mc30_c; \
c->PFX ## _pixels_tab[IDX][ 4] = PFX ## NUM ## _mc01_c; \
c->PFX ## _pixels_tab[IDX][ 5] = PFX ## NUM ## _mc11_c; \
c->PFX ## _pixels_tab[IDX][ 6] = PFX ## NUM ## _mc21_c; \
c->PFX ## _pixels_tab[IDX][ 7] = PFX ## NUM ## _mc31_c; \
c->PFX ## _pixels_tab[IDX][ 8] = PFX ## NUM ## _mc02_c; \
c->PFX ## _pixels_tab[IDX][ 9] = PFX ## NUM ## _mc12_c; \
c->PFX ## _pixels_tab[IDX][10] = PFX ## NUM ## _mc22_c; \
c->PFX ## _pixels_tab[IDX][11] = PFX ## NUM ## _mc32_c; \
c->PFX ## _pixels_tab[IDX][12] = PFX ## NUM ## _mc03_c; \
c->PFX ## _pixels_tab[IDX][13] = PFX ## NUM ## _mc13_c; \
c->PFX ## _pixels_tab[IDX][14] = PFX ## NUM ## _mc23_c; \
c->PFX ## _pixels_tab[IDX][15] = PFX ## NUM ## _mc33_c
dspfunc(put_qpel, 0, 16);
dspfunc(put_no_rnd_qpel, 0, 16);
dspfunc(avg_qpel, 0, 16);
/* dspfunc(avg_no_rnd_qpel, 0, 16); */
dspfunc(put_qpel, 1, 8);
dspfunc(put_no_rnd_qpel, 1, 8);
dspfunc(avg_qpel, 1, 8);
/* dspfunc(avg_no_rnd_qpel, 1, 8); */
#undef dspfunc
c->put_mspel_pixels_tab[0]= ff_put_pixels8x8_c;
c->put_mspel_pixels_tab[1]= put_mspel8_mc10_c;
c->put_mspel_pixels_tab[2]= put_mspel8_mc20_c;
c->put_mspel_pixels_tab[3]= put_mspel8_mc30_c;
c->put_mspel_pixels_tab[4]= put_mspel8_mc02_c;
c->put_mspel_pixels_tab[5]= put_mspel8_mc12_c;
c->put_mspel_pixels_tab[6]= put_mspel8_mc22_c;
c->put_mspel_pixels_tab[7]= put_mspel8_mc32_c;
#define SET_CMP_FUNC(name) \
c->name[0]= name ## 16_c;\
c->name[1]= name ## 8x8_c;
SET_CMP_FUNC(hadamard8_diff)
c->hadamard8_diff[4]= hadamard8_intra16_c;
c->hadamard8_diff[5]= hadamard8_intra8x8_c;
SET_CMP_FUNC(dct_sad)
SET_CMP_FUNC(dct_max)
#if CONFIG_GPL
SET_CMP_FUNC(dct264_sad)
#endif
c->sad[0]= pix_abs16_c;
c->sad[1]= pix_abs8_c;
c->sse[0]= sse16_c;
c->sse[1]= sse8_c;
c->sse[2]= sse4_c;
SET_CMP_FUNC(quant_psnr)
SET_CMP_FUNC(rd)
SET_CMP_FUNC(bit)
c->vsad[0]= vsad16_c;
c->vsad[4]= vsad_intra16_c;
c->vsad[5]= vsad_intra8_c;
c->vsse[0]= vsse16_c;
c->vsse[4]= vsse_intra16_c;
c->vsse[5]= vsse_intra8_c;
c->nsse[0]= nsse16_c;
c->nsse[1]= nsse8_c;
#if CONFIG_SNOW_DECODER || CONFIG_SNOW_ENCODER
ff_dsputil_init_dwt(c);
#endif
c->ssd_int8_vs_int16 = ssd_int8_vs_int16_c;
c->add_bytes= add_bytes_c;
c->diff_bytes= diff_bytes_c;
c->add_hfyu_median_prediction= add_hfyu_median_prediction_c;
c->sub_hfyu_median_prediction= sub_hfyu_median_prediction_c;
c->add_hfyu_left_prediction = add_hfyu_left_prediction_c;
c->add_hfyu_left_prediction_bgr32 = add_hfyu_left_prediction_bgr32_c;
c->bswap_buf= bswap_buf;
c->bswap16_buf = bswap16_buf;
if (CONFIG_H263_DECODER || CONFIG_H263_ENCODER) {
c->h263_h_loop_filter= h263_h_loop_filter_c;
c->h263_v_loop_filter= h263_v_loop_filter_c;
}
c->try_8x8basis= try_8x8basis_c;
c->add_8x8basis= add_8x8basis_c;
c->vector_clipf = vector_clipf_c;
c->scalarproduct_int16 = scalarproduct_int16_c;
c->scalarproduct_and_madd_int16 = scalarproduct_and_madd_int16_c;
c->apply_window_int16 = apply_window_int16_c;
c->vector_clip_int32 = vector_clip_int32_c;
c->shrink[0]= av_image_copy_plane;
c->shrink[1]= ff_shrink22;
c->shrink[2]= ff_shrink44;
c->shrink[3]= ff_shrink88;
c->add_pixels8 = add_pixels8_c;
#undef FUNC
#undef FUNCC
#define FUNC(f, depth) f ## _ ## depth
#define FUNCC(f, depth) f ## _ ## depth ## _c
c->draw_edges = FUNCC(draw_edges, 8);
c->clear_block = FUNCC(clear_block, 8);
c->clear_blocks = FUNCC(clear_blocks, 8);
#define BIT_DEPTH_FUNCS(depth) \
c->get_pixels = FUNCC(get_pixels, depth);
switch (avctx->bits_per_raw_sample) {
case 9:
case 10:
case 12:
case 14:
BIT_DEPTH_FUNCS(16);
break;
default:
if(avctx->bits_per_raw_sample<=8 || avctx->codec_type != AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO) {
BIT_DEPTH_FUNCS(8);
}
break;
}
if (ARCH_ALPHA)
ff_dsputil_init_alpha(c, avctx);
if (ARCH_ARM)
ff_dsputil_init_arm(c, avctx);
if (ARCH_BFIN)
ff_dsputil_init_bfin(c, avctx);
if (ARCH_PPC)
ff_dsputil_init_ppc(c, avctx);
if (ARCH_SH4)
ff_dsputil_init_sh4(c, avctx);
if (HAVE_VIS)
ff_dsputil_init_vis(c, avctx);
if (ARCH_X86)
ff_dsputil_init_x86(c, avctx);
ff_init_scantable_permutation(c->idct_permutation,
c->idct_permutation_type);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dsputil: fix signedness in sizeof() comparissions
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 9,425
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE4(sendmmsg, int, fd, struct mmsghdr __user *, mmsg,
unsigned int, vlen, unsigned int, flags)
{
if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)
return -EINVAL;
return __sys_sendmmsg(fd, mmsg, vlen, flags);
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,851
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void perf_sched_delayed(struct work_struct *work)
{
mutex_lock(&perf_sched_mutex);
if (atomic_dec_and_test(&perf_sched_count))
static_branch_disable(&perf_sched_events);
mutex_unlock(&perf_sched_mutex);
}
Commit Message: perf/core: Fix concurrent sys_perf_event_open() vs. 'move_group' race
Di Shen reported a race between two concurrent sys_perf_event_open()
calls where both try and move the same pre-existing software group
into a hardware context.
The problem is exactly that described in commit:
f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
... where, while we wait for a ctx->mutex acquisition, the event->ctx
relation can have changed under us.
That very same commit failed to recognise sys_perf_event_context() as an
external access vector to the events and thereby didn't apply the
established locking rules correctly.
So while one sys_perf_event_open() call is stuck waiting on
mutex_lock_double(), the other (which owns said locks) moves the group
about. So by the time the former sys_perf_event_open() acquires the
locks, the context we've acquired is stale (and possibly dead).
Apply the established locking rules as per perf_event_ctx_lock_nested()
to the mutex_lock_double() for the 'move_group' case. This obviously means
we need to validate state after we acquire the locks.
Reported-by: Di Shen (Keen Lab)
Tested-by: John Dias <joaodias@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Min Chong <mchong@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Fixes: f63a8daa5812 ("perf: Fix event->ctx locking")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170106131444.GZ3174@twins.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 4,487
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline int __normal_prio(struct task_struct *p)
{
return p->static_prio;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 28,698
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ZEND_API void zend_object_store_ctor_failed(zval *zobject TSRMLS_DC)
{
zend_object_handle handle = Z_OBJ_HANDLE_P(zobject);
zend_object_store_bucket *obj_bucket = &EG(objects_store).object_buckets[handle];
obj_bucket->bucket.obj.handlers = Z_OBJ_HT_P(zobject);;
obj_bucket->destructor_called = 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #73052 - Memory Corruption in During Deserialized-object Destruction
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 1
| 15,539
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void EglRenderingVDAClient::NotifyFlushDone() {
if (decoder_deleted())
return;
SetState(CS_FLUSHED);
--remaining_play_throughs_;
DCHECK_GE(remaining_play_throughs_, 0);
if (decoder_deleted())
return;
decoder_->Reset();
SetState(CS_RESETTING);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 1,519
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int flags() const { return flags_; }
Commit Message: Pass ui::LatencyInfo correct with unified gesture detector on Aura.
BUG=379812
TEST=GestureRecognizerTest.LatencyPassedFromTouchEvent
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/309823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@274602 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 26,130
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: gplotSimpleXY2(NUMA *nax,
NUMA *nay1,
NUMA *nay2,
l_int32 plotstyle,
l_int32 outformat,
const char *outroot,
const char *title)
{
GPLOT *gplot;
PROCNAME("gplotSimpleXY2");
if (!nay1 || !nay2)
return ERROR_INT("nay1 and nay2 not both defined", procName, 1);
if (plotstyle < 0 || plotstyle >= NUM_GPLOT_STYLES)
return ERROR_INT("invalid plotstyle", procName, 1);
if (outformat != GPLOT_PNG && outformat != GPLOT_PS &&
outformat != GPLOT_EPS && outformat != GPLOT_LATEX)
return ERROR_INT("invalid outformat", procName, 1);
if (!outroot)
return ERROR_INT("outroot not specified", procName, 1);
if ((gplot = gplotCreate(outroot, outformat, title, NULL, NULL)) == 0)
return ERROR_INT("gplot not made", procName, 1);
gplotAddPlot(gplot, nax, nay1, plotstyle, NULL);
gplotAddPlot(gplot, nax, nay2, plotstyle, NULL);
gplotMakeOutput(gplot);
gplotDestroy(&gplot);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Security fixes: expect final changes for release 1.75.3.
* Fixed a debian security issue with fscanf() reading a string with
possible buffer overflow.
* There were also a few similar situations with sscanf().
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 20,823
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::SetScreenOrientationForTesting(
uint16_t angle,
ScreenOrientationValues type) {
screen_orientation_angle_for_testing_ = angle;
screen_orientation_type_for_testing_ = type;
SynchronizeVisualProperties();
}
Commit Message: Start rendering timer after first navigation
Currently the new content rendering timer in the browser process,
which clears an old page's contents 4 seconds after a navigation if the
new page doesn't draw in that time, is not set on the first navigation
for a top-level frame.
This is problematic because content can exist before the first
navigation, for instance if it was created by a javascript: URL.
This CL removes the code that skips the timer activation on the first
navigation.
Bug: 844881
Change-Id: I19b3ad1ff62c69ded3a5f7b1c0afde191aaf4584
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1188589
Reviewed-by: Fady Samuel <fsamuel@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: ccameron <ccameron@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#586913}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 27,482
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bt_status_t btif_dm_start_discovery(void)
{
tBTA_DM_INQ inq_params;
tBTA_SERVICE_MASK services = 0;
tBTA_DM_BLE_PF_FILT_PARAMS adv_filt_param;
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("%s", __FUNCTION__);
#if (defined(BLE_INCLUDED) && (BLE_INCLUDED == TRUE))
memset(&adv_filt_param, 0, sizeof(tBTA_DM_BLE_PF_FILT_PARAMS));
/* Cleanup anything remaining on index 0 */
BTA_DmBleScanFilterSetup(BTA_DM_BLE_SCAN_COND_DELETE, 0, &adv_filt_param, NULL,
bte_scan_filt_param_cfg_evt, 0);
/* Add an allow-all filter on index 0*/
adv_filt_param.dely_mode = IMMEDIATE_DELY_MODE;
adv_filt_param.feat_seln = ALLOW_ALL_FILTER;
adv_filt_param.filt_logic_type = BTA_DM_BLE_PF_FILT_LOGIC_OR;
adv_filt_param.list_logic_type = BTA_DM_BLE_PF_LIST_LOGIC_OR;
adv_filt_param.rssi_low_thres = LOWEST_RSSI_VALUE;
adv_filt_param.rssi_high_thres = LOWEST_RSSI_VALUE;
BTA_DmBleScanFilterSetup(BTA_DM_BLE_SCAN_COND_ADD, 0, &adv_filt_param, NULL,
bte_scan_filt_param_cfg_evt, 0);
/* TODO: Do we need to handle multiple inquiries at the same time? */
/* Set inquiry params and call API */
inq_params.mode = BTA_DM_GENERAL_INQUIRY|BTA_BLE_GENERAL_INQUIRY;
#if (defined(BTA_HOST_INTERLEAVE_SEARCH) && BTA_HOST_INTERLEAVE_SEARCH == TRUE)
inq_params.intl_duration[0]= BTIF_DM_INTERLEAVE_DURATION_BR_ONE;
inq_params.intl_duration[1]= BTIF_DM_INTERLEAVE_DURATION_LE_ONE;
inq_params.intl_duration[2]= BTIF_DM_INTERLEAVE_DURATION_BR_TWO;
inq_params.intl_duration[3]= BTIF_DM_INTERLEAVE_DURATION_LE_TWO;
#endif
#else
inq_params.mode = BTA_DM_GENERAL_INQUIRY;
#endif
inq_params.duration = BTIF_DM_DEFAULT_INQ_MAX_DURATION;
inq_params.max_resps = BTIF_DM_DEFAULT_INQ_MAX_RESULTS;
inq_params.report_dup = TRUE;
inq_params.filter_type = BTA_DM_INQ_CLR;
/* TODO: Filter device by BDA needs to be implemented here */
/* Will be enabled to TRUE once inquiry busy level has been received */
btif_dm_inquiry_in_progress = FALSE;
/* find nearby devices */
BTA_DmSearch(&inq_params, services, bte_search_devices_evt);
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 21,874
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostImpl::DisableResizeAckCheckForTesting() {
g_check_for_pending_resize_ack = false;
}
Commit Message: Check that RWHI isn't deleted manually while owned by a scoped_ptr in RVHI
BUG=590284
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1747183002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378844}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 3,405
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void smb2_reconnect_server(struct work_struct *work)
{
struct TCP_Server_Info *server = container_of(work,
struct TCP_Server_Info, reconnect.work);
struct cifs_ses *ses;
struct cifs_tcon *tcon, *tcon2;
struct list_head tmp_list;
int tcon_exist = false;
/* Prevent simultaneous reconnects that can corrupt tcon->rlist list */
mutex_lock(&server->reconnect_mutex);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tmp_list);
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Need negotiate, reconnecting tcons\n");
spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
list_for_each_entry(ses, &server->smb_ses_list, smb_ses_list) {
list_for_each_entry(tcon, &ses->tcon_list, tcon_list) {
if (tcon->need_reconnect || tcon->need_reopen_files) {
tcon->tc_count++;
list_add_tail(&tcon->rlist, &tmp_list);
tcon_exist = true;
}
}
}
/*
* Get the reference to server struct to be sure that the last call of
* cifs_put_tcon() in the loop below won't release the server pointer.
*/
if (tcon_exist)
server->srv_count++;
spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
list_for_each_entry_safe(tcon, tcon2, &tmp_list, rlist) {
if (!smb2_reconnect(SMB2_INTERNAL_CMD, tcon))
cifs_reopen_persistent_handles(tcon);
list_del_init(&tcon->rlist);
cifs_put_tcon(tcon);
}
cifs_dbg(FYI, "Reconnecting tcons finished\n");
mutex_unlock(&server->reconnect_mutex);
/* now we can safely release srv struct */
if (tcon_exist)
cifs_put_tcp_session(server, 1);
}
Commit Message: CIFS: Enable encryption during session setup phase
In order to allow encryption on SMB connection we need to exchange
a session key and generate encryption and decryption keys.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <pshilov@microsoft.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 1,392
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static bool __init sparc64_has_sha512_opcode(void)
{
unsigned long cfr;
if (!(sparc64_elf_hwcap & HWCAP_SPARC_CRYPTO))
return false;
__asm__ __volatile__("rd %%asr26, %0" : "=r" (cfr));
if (!(cfr & CFR_SHA512))
return false;
return true;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 956
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmx_set_rvi(int vector)
{
u16 status;
u8 old;
status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
old = (u8)status & 0xff;
if ((u8)vector != old) {
status &= ~0xff;
status |= (u8)vector;
vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status);
}
}
Commit Message: x86,kvm,vmx: Preserve CR4 across VM entry
CR4 isn't constant; at least the TSD and PCE bits can vary.
TBH, treating CR0 and CR3 as constant scares me a bit, too, but it looks
like it's correct.
This adds a branch and a read from cr4 to each vm entry. Because it is
extremely likely that consecutive entries into the same vcpu will have
the same host cr4 value, this fixes up the vmcs instead of restoring cr4
after the fact. A subsequent patch will add a kernel-wide cr4 shadow,
reducing the overhead in the common case to just two memory reads and a
branch.
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Acked-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Gleb Natapov <gleb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 1,177
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bt_status_t btif_disable_service(tBTA_SERVICE_ID service_id)
{
tBTA_SERVICE_ID *p_id = &service_id;
/* If BT is enabled, we need to switch to BTIF context and trigger the
* disable for that profile so that the appropriate uuid_property_changed will
* be triggerred. Otherwise, we just need to clear the service_id in the mask
*/
btif_enabled_services &= (tBTA_SERVICE_MASK)(~(1<<service_id));
BTIF_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: Current Services:0x%x", __FUNCTION__, btif_enabled_services);
if (btif_is_enabled())
{
btif_transfer_context(btif_dm_execute_service_request,
BTIF_DM_DISABLE_SERVICE,
(char*)p_id, sizeof(tBTA_SERVICE_ID), NULL);
}
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284
| 0
| 3,128
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: Document::~Document()
{
ASSERT(!renderer());
ASSERT(m_ranges.isEmpty());
ASSERT(!m_parentTreeScope);
ASSERT(!hasGuardRefCount());
if (m_templateDocument)
m_templateDocument->setTemplateDocumentHost(0); // balanced in templateDocument().
if (Document* ownerDocument = this->ownerDocument())
ownerDocument->didRemoveEventTargetNode(this);
m_scriptRunner.clear();
removeAllEventListeners();
ASSERT(!m_parser || m_parser->refCount() == 1);
detachParser();
if (this == topDocument())
clearAXObjectCache();
setDecoder(PassRefPtr<TextResourceDecoder>());
if (m_styleSheetList)
m_styleSheetList->detachFromDocument();
if (m_import) {
m_import->wasDetachedFromDocument();
m_import = 0;
}
m_styleEngine.clear();
if (m_elemSheet)
m_elemSheet->clearOwnerNode();
clearStyleResolver(); // We need to destory CSSFontSelector before destroying m_fetcher.
if (m_fetcher->document() == this)
m_fetcher->setDocument(0);
m_fetcher.clear();
if (hasRareData())
clearRareData();
ASSERT(!m_listsInvalidatedAtDocument.size());
for (unsigned i = 0; i < WTF_ARRAY_LENGTH(m_nodeListCounts); i++)
ASSERT(!m_nodeListCounts[i]);
clearDocumentScope();
setClient(0);
InspectorCounters::decrementCounter(InspectorCounters::DocumentCounter);
}
Commit Message: Refactoring: Move m_mayDisplaySeamlesslyWithParent down to Document
The member is used only in Document, thus no reason to
stay in SecurityContext.
TEST=none
BUG=none
R=haraken@chromium.org, abarth, haraken, hayato
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/27615003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@159829 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 20,693
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void xsltDebugSetDefaultTrace(xsltDebugTraceCodes val) {
xsltDefaultTrace = val;
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 16,237
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: megasas_build_dcdb(struct megasas_instance *instance, struct scsi_cmnd *scp,
struct megasas_cmd *cmd)
{
u32 is_logical;
u32 device_id;
u16 flags = 0;
struct megasas_pthru_frame *pthru;
is_logical = MEGASAS_IS_LOGICAL(scp->device);
device_id = MEGASAS_DEV_INDEX(scp);
pthru = (struct megasas_pthru_frame *)cmd->frame;
if (scp->sc_data_direction == DMA_TO_DEVICE)
flags = MFI_FRAME_DIR_WRITE;
else if (scp->sc_data_direction == DMA_FROM_DEVICE)
flags = MFI_FRAME_DIR_READ;
else if (scp->sc_data_direction == DMA_NONE)
flags = MFI_FRAME_DIR_NONE;
if (instance->flag_ieee == 1) {
flags |= MFI_FRAME_IEEE;
}
/*
* Prepare the DCDB frame
*/
pthru->cmd = (is_logical) ? MFI_CMD_LD_SCSI_IO : MFI_CMD_PD_SCSI_IO;
pthru->cmd_status = 0x0;
pthru->scsi_status = 0x0;
pthru->target_id = device_id;
pthru->lun = scp->device->lun;
pthru->cdb_len = scp->cmd_len;
pthru->timeout = 0;
pthru->pad_0 = 0;
pthru->flags = cpu_to_le16(flags);
pthru->data_xfer_len = cpu_to_le32(scsi_bufflen(scp));
memcpy(pthru->cdb, scp->cmnd, scp->cmd_len);
/*
* If the command is for the tape device, set the
* pthru timeout to the os layer timeout value.
*/
if (scp->device->type == TYPE_TAPE) {
if ((scp->request->timeout / HZ) > 0xFFFF)
pthru->timeout = cpu_to_le16(0xFFFF);
else
pthru->timeout = cpu_to_le16(scp->request->timeout / HZ);
}
/*
* Construct SGL
*/
if (instance->flag_ieee == 1) {
pthru->flags |= cpu_to_le16(MFI_FRAME_SGL64);
pthru->sge_count = megasas_make_sgl_skinny(instance, scp,
&pthru->sgl);
} else if (IS_DMA64) {
pthru->flags |= cpu_to_le16(MFI_FRAME_SGL64);
pthru->sge_count = megasas_make_sgl64(instance, scp,
&pthru->sgl);
} else
pthru->sge_count = megasas_make_sgl32(instance, scp,
&pthru->sgl);
if (pthru->sge_count > instance->max_num_sge) {
dev_err(&instance->pdev->dev, "DCDB too many SGE NUM=%x\n",
pthru->sge_count);
return 0;
}
/*
* Sense info specific
*/
pthru->sense_len = SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE;
pthru->sense_buf_phys_addr_hi =
cpu_to_le32(upper_32_bits(cmd->sense_phys_addr));
pthru->sense_buf_phys_addr_lo =
cpu_to_le32(lower_32_bits(cmd->sense_phys_addr));
/*
* Compute the total number of frames this command consumes. FW uses
* this number to pull sufficient number of frames from host memory.
*/
cmd->frame_count = megasas_get_frame_count(instance, pthru->sge_count,
PTHRU_FRAME);
return cmd->frame_count;
}
Commit Message: scsi: megaraid_sas: return error when create DMA pool failed
when create DMA pool for cmd frames failed, we should return -ENOMEM,
instead of 0.
In some case in:
megasas_init_adapter_fusion()
-->megasas_alloc_cmds()
-->megasas_create_frame_pool
create DMA pool failed,
--> megasas_free_cmds() [1]
-->megasas_alloc_cmds_fusion()
failed, then goto fail_alloc_cmds.
-->megasas_free_cmds() [2]
we will call megasas_free_cmds twice, [1] will kfree cmd_list,
[2] will use cmd_list.it will cause a problem:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address
00000000
pgd = ffffffc000f70000
[00000000] *pgd=0000001fbf893003, *pud=0000001fbf893003,
*pmd=0000001fbf894003, *pte=006000006d000707
Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [#1] SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 18 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted
task: ffffffdfb9290000 ti: ffffffdfb923c000 task.ti: ffffffdfb923c000
PC is at megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
LR is at megasas_free_cmds+0x24/0x70
...
Call trace:
[<ffffffc0005b779c>] megasas_free_cmds+0x30/0x70
[<ffffffc0005bca74>] megasas_init_adapter_fusion+0x2f4/0x4d8
[<ffffffc0005b926c>] megasas_init_fw+0x2dc/0x760
[<ffffffc0005b9ab0>] megasas_probe_one+0x3c0/0xcd8
[<ffffffc0004a5abc>] local_pci_probe+0x4c/0xb4
[<ffffffc0004a5c40>] pci_device_probe+0x11c/0x14c
[<ffffffc00053a5e4>] driver_probe_device+0x1ec/0x430
[<ffffffc00053a92c>] __driver_attach+0xa8/0xb0
[<ffffffc000538178>] bus_for_each_dev+0x74/0xc8
[<ffffffc000539e88>] driver_attach+0x28/0x34
[<ffffffc000539a18>] bus_add_driver+0x16c/0x248
[<ffffffc00053b234>] driver_register+0x6c/0x138
[<ffffffc0004a5350>] __pci_register_driver+0x5c/0x6c
[<ffffffc000ce3868>] megasas_init+0xc0/0x1a8
[<ffffffc000082a58>] do_one_initcall+0xe8/0x1ec
[<ffffffc000ca7be8>] kernel_init_freeable+0x1c8/0x284
[<ffffffc0008d90b8>] kernel_init+0x1c/0xe4
Signed-off-by: Jason Yan <yanaijie@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Sumit Saxena <sumit.saxena@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 1,433
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int main( int /*argc*/, char ** argv)
{
InitializeMagick(*argv);
int failures=0;
try {
string srcdir("");
if(getenv("SRCDIR") != 0)
srcdir = getenv("SRCDIR");
list<Image> imageList;
readImages( &imageList, srcdir + "test_image_anim.miff" );
Image appended;
appendImages( &appended, imageList.begin(), imageList.end() );
if (( appended.signature() != "3a90bb0bb8f69f6788ab99e9e25598a0d6c5cdbbb797f77ad68011e0a8b1689d" ) &&
( appended.signature() != "c15fcd1e739b73638dc4e36837bdb53f7087359544664caf7b1763928129f3c7" ) &&
( appended.signature() != "229ff72f812e5f536245dc3b4502a0bc2ab2363f67c545863a85ab91ebfbfb83" ) &&
( appended.signature() != "b98c42c55fc4e661cb3684154256809c03c0c6b53da2738b6ce8066e1b6ddef0" ))
{
++failures;
cout << "Line: " << __LINE__
<< " Horizontal append failed, signature = "
<< appended.signature() << endl;
appended.write("appendImages_horizontal_out.miff");
}
appendImages( &appended, imageList.begin(), imageList.end(), true );
if (( appended.signature() != "d73d25ccd6011936d08b6d0d89183b7a61790544c2195269aff4db2f782ffc08" ) &&
( appended.signature() != "0909f7ffa7c6ea410fb2ebfdbcb19d61b19c4bd271851ce3bd51662519dc2b58" ) &&
( appended.signature() != "11b97ba6ac1664aa1c2faed4c86195472ae9cce2ed75402d975bb4ffcf1de751" ) &&
( appended.signature() != "cae4815eeb3cb689e73b94d897a9957d3414d1d4f513e8b5e52579b05d164bfe" ))
{
++failures;
cout << "Line: " << __LINE__
<< " Vertical append failed, signature = "
<< appended.signature() << endl;
appended.write("appendImages_vertical_out.miff");
}
}
catch( Exception &error_ )
{
cout << "Caught exception: " << error_.what() << endl;
return 1;
}
catch( exception &error_ )
{
cout << "Caught exception: " << error_.what() << endl;
return 1;
}
if ( failures )
{
cout << failures << " failures" << endl;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix signature mismatch
CWE ID: CWE-369
| 1
| 27,806
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static struct nfc_dev *__get_device_from_cb(struct netlink_callback *cb)
{
struct nlattr **attrbuf = genl_family_attrbuf(&nfc_genl_family);
struct nfc_dev *dev;
int rc;
u32 idx;
rc = nlmsg_parse_deprecated(cb->nlh,
GENL_HDRLEN + nfc_genl_family.hdrsize,
attrbuf, nfc_genl_family.maxattr,
nfc_genl_policy, NULL);
if (rc < 0)
return ERR_PTR(rc);
if (!attrbuf[NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX])
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
idx = nla_get_u32(attrbuf[NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX]);
dev = nfc_get_device(idx);
if (!dev)
return ERR_PTR(-ENODEV);
return dev;
}
Commit Message: nfc: Ensure presence of required attributes in the deactivate_target handler
Check that the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX attributes (in addition to
NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX) are provided by the netlink client prior to
accessing them. This prevents potential unhandled NULL pointer dereference
exceptions which can be triggered by malicious user-mode programs,
if they omit one or both of these attributes.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 16,055
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static uint32_t hpet_in_legacy_mode(HPETState *s)
{
return s->config & HPET_CFG_LEGACY;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 2,631
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void WebPage::blockZoomAnimationFinished()
{
d->zoomBlock();
}
Commit Message: [BlackBerry] Adapt to new BlackBerry::Platform::TouchPoint API
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105143
RIM PR 171941
Reviewed by Rob Buis.
Internally reviewed by George Staikos.
Source/WebCore:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
No change in behavior, no new tests.
* platform/blackberry/PlatformTouchPointBlackBerry.cpp:
(WebCore::PlatformTouchPoint::PlatformTouchPoint):
Source/WebKit/blackberry:
TouchPoint instances now provide document coordinates for the viewport
and content position of the touch event. The pixel coordinates stored
in the TouchPoint should no longer be needed in WebKit. One exception
is when passing events to a full screen plugin.
Also adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data
members.
* Api/WebPage.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPage::touchPointAsMouseEvent):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchEventToFullScreenPlugin):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::WebPagePrivate::dispatchTouchPointAsMouseEventToFullScreenPlugin):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::InputHandler::shouldRequestSpellCheckingOptionsForPoint):
* WebKitSupport/InputHandler.h:
(InputHandler):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.cpp:
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::doFatFingers):
(BlackBerry::WebKit::TouchEventHandler::handleTouchPoint):
* WebKitSupport/TouchEventHandler.h:
(TouchEventHandler):
Tools:
Adapt to new method names and encapsulation of TouchPoint data members.
* DumpRenderTree/blackberry/EventSender.cpp:
(addTouchPointCallback):
(updateTouchPointCallback):
(touchEndCallback):
(releaseTouchPointCallback):
(sendTouchEvent):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@137880 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,546
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void vmx_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3)
{
unsigned long guest_cr3;
u64 eptp;
guest_cr3 = cr3;
if (enable_ept) {
eptp = construct_eptp(vcpu, cr3);
vmcs_write64(EPT_POINTER, eptp);
if (enable_unrestricted_guest || is_paging(vcpu) ||
is_guest_mode(vcpu))
guest_cr3 = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
else
guest_cr3 = to_kvm_vmx(vcpu->kvm)->ept_identity_map_addr;
ept_load_pdptrs(vcpu);
}
vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, true);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR3, guest_cr3);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Enforce cpl=0 for VMX instructions
VMX instructions executed inside a L1 VM will always trigger a VM exit
even when executed with cpl 3. This means we must perform the
privilege check in software.
Fixes: 70f3aac964ae("kvm: nVMX: Remove superfluous VMX instruction fault checks")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 27,133
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: VaapiPicture* VaapiVideoDecodeAccelerator::PictureById(
int32_t picture_buffer_id) {
Pictures::iterator it = pictures_.find(picture_buffer_id);
if (it == pictures_.end()) {
VLOGF(4) << "Picture id " << picture_buffer_id << " does not exist";
return NULL;
}
return it->second.get();
}
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 28,270
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static Image *ReadJPEGImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
value[MagickPathExtent];
const char
*dct_method,
*option;
ErrorManager
error_manager;
Image
*image;
JSAMPLE
*volatile jpeg_pixels;
JSAMPROW
scanline[1];
MagickBooleanType
debug,
status;
MagickSizeType
number_pixels;
MemoryInfo
*memory_info;
Quantum
index;
register ssize_t
i;
struct jpeg_decompress_struct
jpeg_info;
struct jpeg_error_mgr
jpeg_error;
struct jpeg_progress_mgr
jpeg_progress;
register JSAMPLE
*p;
size_t
units;
ssize_t
y;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
debug=IsEventLogging();
(void) debug;
image=AcquireImage(image_info,exception);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Verify that file size large enough to contain a JPEG datastream.
*/
if (GetBlobSize(image) < 107)
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
/*
Initialize JPEG parameters.
*/
(void) memset(&error_manager,0,sizeof(error_manager));
(void) memset(&jpeg_info,0,sizeof(jpeg_info));
(void) memset(&jpeg_error,0,sizeof(jpeg_error));
(void) memset(&jpeg_progress,0,sizeof(jpeg_progress));
jpeg_info.err=jpeg_std_error(&jpeg_error);
jpeg_info.err->emit_message=(void (*)(j_common_ptr,int)) JPEGWarningHandler;
jpeg_info.err->error_exit=(void (*)(j_common_ptr)) JPEGErrorHandler;
memory_info=(MemoryInfo *) NULL;
error_manager.exception=exception;
error_manager.image=image;
if (setjmp(error_manager.error_recovery) != 0)
{
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
if (error_manager.profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
error_manager.profile=DestroyStringInfo(error_manager.profile);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if (number_pixels != 0)
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
return(DestroyImage(image));
}
jpeg_info.client_data=(void *) &error_manager;
jpeg_create_decompress(&jpeg_info);
if (GetMaxMemoryRequest() != ~0UL)
jpeg_info.mem->max_memory_to_use=(long) GetMaxMemoryRequest();
jpeg_progress.progress_monitor=(void (*)(j_common_ptr)) JPEGProgressHandler;
jpeg_info.progress=(&jpeg_progress);
JPEGSourceManager(&jpeg_info,image);
jpeg_set_marker_processor(&jpeg_info,JPEG_COM,ReadComment);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"profile:skip");
if (IsOptionMember("ICC",option) == MagickFalse)
jpeg_set_marker_processor(&jpeg_info,ICC_MARKER,ReadICCProfile);
if (IsOptionMember("IPTC",option) == MagickFalse)
jpeg_set_marker_processor(&jpeg_info,IPTC_MARKER,ReadIPTCProfile);
for (i=1; i < 16; i++)
if ((i != 2) && (i != 13) && (i != 14))
if (IsOptionMember("APP",option) == MagickFalse)
jpeg_set_marker_processor(&jpeg_info,(int) (JPEG_APP0+i),ReadProfile);
i=(ssize_t) jpeg_read_header(&jpeg_info,TRUE);
if ((image_info->colorspace == YCbCrColorspace) ||
(image_info->colorspace == Rec601YCbCrColorspace) ||
(image_info->colorspace == Rec709YCbCrColorspace))
jpeg_info.out_color_space=JCS_YCbCr;
/*
Set image resolution.
*/
units=0;
if ((jpeg_info.saw_JFIF_marker != 0) && (jpeg_info.X_density != 1) &&
(jpeg_info.Y_density != 1))
{
image->resolution.x=(double) jpeg_info.X_density;
image->resolution.y=(double) jpeg_info.Y_density;
units=(size_t) jpeg_info.density_unit;
}
if (units == 1)
image->units=PixelsPerInchResolution;
if (units == 2)
image->units=PixelsPerCentimeterResolution;
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jpeg:size");
if ((option != (const char *) NULL) &&
(jpeg_info.out_color_space != JCS_YCbCr))
{
double
scale_factor;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
MagickStatusType
flags;
/*
Scale the image.
*/
flags=ParseGeometry(option,&geometry_info);
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
geometry_info.sigma=geometry_info.rho;
jpeg_calc_output_dimensions(&jpeg_info);
image->magick_columns=jpeg_info.output_width;
image->magick_rows=jpeg_info.output_height;
scale_factor=1.0;
if (geometry_info.rho != 0.0)
scale_factor=jpeg_info.output_width/geometry_info.rho;
if ((geometry_info.sigma != 0.0) &&
(scale_factor > (jpeg_info.output_height/geometry_info.sigma)))
scale_factor=jpeg_info.output_height/geometry_info.sigma;
jpeg_info.scale_num=1U;
jpeg_info.scale_denom=(unsigned int) scale_factor;
jpeg_calc_output_dimensions(&jpeg_info);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Scale factor: %.20g",(double) scale_factor);
}
#if (JPEG_LIB_VERSION >= 61) && defined(D_PROGRESSIVE_SUPPORTED)
#if defined(D_LOSSLESS_SUPPORTED)
image->interlace=jpeg_info.process == JPROC_PROGRESSIVE ?
JPEGInterlace : NoInterlace;
image->compression=jpeg_info.process == JPROC_LOSSLESS ?
LosslessJPEGCompression : JPEGCompression;
if (jpeg_info.data_precision > 8)
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"12-bit JPEG not supported. Reducing pixel data to 8 bits","`%s'",
image->filename);
if (jpeg_info.data_precision == 16)
jpeg_info.data_precision=12;
#else
image->interlace=jpeg_info.progressive_mode != 0 ? JPEGInterlace :
NoInterlace;
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
#endif
#else
image->compression=JPEGCompression;
image->interlace=JPEGInterlace;
#endif
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jpeg:colors");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
{
/*
Let the JPEG library quantize the image.
*/
jpeg_info.quantize_colors=TRUE;
jpeg_info.desired_number_of_colors=(int) StringToUnsignedLong(option);
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jpeg:block-smoothing");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
jpeg_info.do_block_smoothing=IsStringTrue(option) != MagickFalse ? TRUE :
FALSE;
dct_method=GetImageOption(image_info,"jpeg:dct-method");
if (dct_method != (const char *) NULL)
switch (*dct_method)
{
case 'D':
case 'd':
{
if (LocaleCompare(dct_method,"default") == 0)
jpeg_info.dct_method=JDCT_DEFAULT;
break;
}
case 'F':
case 'f':
{
if (LocaleCompare(dct_method,"fastest") == 0)
jpeg_info.dct_method=JDCT_FASTEST;
if (LocaleCompare(dct_method,"float") == 0)
jpeg_info.dct_method=JDCT_FLOAT;
break;
}
case 'I':
case 'i':
{
if (LocaleCompare(dct_method,"ifast") == 0)
jpeg_info.dct_method=JDCT_IFAST;
if (LocaleCompare(dct_method,"islow") == 0)
jpeg_info.dct_method=JDCT_ISLOW;
break;
}
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jpeg:fancy-upsampling");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
jpeg_info.do_fancy_upsampling=IsStringTrue(option) != MagickFalse ? TRUE :
FALSE;
jpeg_calc_output_dimensions(&jpeg_info);
image->columns=jpeg_info.output_width;
image->rows=jpeg_info.output_height;
image->depth=(size_t) jpeg_info.data_precision;
switch (jpeg_info.out_color_space)
{
case JCS_RGB:
default:
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace,exception);
break;
}
case JCS_GRAYSCALE:
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,GRAYColorspace,exception);
break;
}
case JCS_YCbCr:
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,YCbCrColorspace,exception);
break;
}
case JCS_CMYK:
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,CMYKColorspace,exception);
break;
}
}
if (IsITUFaxImage(image) != MagickFalse)
{
(void) SetImageColorspace(image,LabColorspace,exception);
jpeg_info.out_color_space=JCS_YCbCr;
}
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"jpeg:colors");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,StringToUnsignedLong(option),exception) == MagickFalse)
{
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
if ((jpeg_info.output_components == 1) && (jpeg_info.quantize_colors == 0))
{
size_t
colors;
colors=(size_t) GetQuantumRange(image->depth)+1;
if (AcquireImageColormap(image,colors,exception) == MagickFalse)
{
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
}
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
{
if (image->interlace != NoInterlace)
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Interlace: progressive");
else
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),
"Interlace: nonprogressive");
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Data precision: %d",
(int) jpeg_info.data_precision);
(void) LogMagickEvent(CoderEvent,GetMagickModule(),"Geometry: %dx%d",
(int) jpeg_info.output_width,(int) jpeg_info.output_height);
}
JPEGSetImageQuality(&jpeg_info,image);
JPEGSetImageSamplingFactor(&jpeg_info,image,exception);
(void) FormatLocaleString(value,MagickPathExtent,"%.20g",(double)
jpeg_info.out_color_space);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"jpeg:colorspace",value,exception);
#if defined(D_ARITH_CODING_SUPPORTED)
if (jpeg_info.arith_code == TRUE)
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"jpeg:coding","arithmetic",exception);
#endif
if (image_info->ping != MagickFalse)
{
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
status=SetImageExtent(image,image->columns,image->rows,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
return(DestroyImageList(image));
}
(void) jpeg_start_decompress(&jpeg_info);
if ((jpeg_info.output_components != 1) &&
(jpeg_info.output_components != 3) && (jpeg_info.output_components != 4))
{
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImageTypeNotSupported");
}
memory_info=AcquireVirtualMemory((size_t) image->columns,
jpeg_info.output_components*sizeof(*jpeg_pixels));
if (memory_info == (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
{
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
ThrowReaderException(ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed");
}
jpeg_pixels=(JSAMPLE *) GetVirtualMemoryBlob(memory_info);
(void) memset(jpeg_pixels,0,image->columns*
jpeg_info.output_components*sizeof(*jpeg_pixels));
/*
Convert JPEG pixels to pixel packets.
*/
if (setjmp(error_manager.error_recovery) != 0)
{
if (memory_info != (MemoryInfo *) NULL)
memory_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(memory_info);
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
number_pixels=(MagickSizeType) image->columns*image->rows;
if (number_pixels != 0)
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
return(DestroyImage(image));
}
if (jpeg_info.quantize_colors != 0)
{
image->colors=(size_t) jpeg_info.actual_number_of_colors;
if (jpeg_info.out_color_space == JCS_GRAYSCALE)
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(
jpeg_info.colormap[0][i]);
image->colormap[i].green=image->colormap[i].red;
image->colormap[i].blue=image->colormap[i].red;
image->colormap[i].alpha=(MagickRealType) OpaqueAlpha;
}
else
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image->colors; i++)
{
image->colormap[i].red=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(
jpeg_info.colormap[0][i]);
image->colormap[i].green=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(
jpeg_info.colormap[1][i]);
image->colormap[i].blue=(double) ScaleCharToQuantum(
jpeg_info.colormap[2][i]);
image->colormap[i].alpha=(MagickRealType) OpaqueAlpha;
}
}
scanline[0]=(JSAMPROW) jpeg_pixels;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
register ssize_t
x;
register Quantum
*magick_restrict q;
if (jpeg_read_scanlines(&jpeg_info,scanline,1) != 1)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
CorruptImageWarning,"SkipToSyncByte","`%s'",image->filename);
continue;
}
p=jpeg_pixels;
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
if (jpeg_info.data_precision > 8)
{
unsigned short
scale;
scale=65535/(unsigned short) GetQuantumRange((size_t)
jpeg_info.data_precision);
if (jpeg_info.output_components == 1)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
ssize_t
pixel;
pixel=(ssize_t) (scale*GETJSAMPLE(*p));
index=(Quantum) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,pixel,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
else
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) (scale*GETJSAMPLE(*p++))),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) (scale*GETJSAMPLE(*p++))),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) (scale*GETJSAMPLE(*p++))),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
else
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelCyan(image,QuantumRange-ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) (scale*GETJSAMPLE(*p++))),q);
SetPixelMagenta(image,QuantumRange-ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) (scale*GETJSAMPLE(*p++))),q);
SetPixelYellow(image,QuantumRange-ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) (scale*GETJSAMPLE(*p++))),q);
SetPixelBlack(image,QuantumRange-ScaleShortToQuantum(
(unsigned short) (scale*GETJSAMPLE(*p++))),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
else
if (jpeg_info.output_components == 1)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
ssize_t
pixel;
pixel=(ssize_t) GETJSAMPLE(*p);
index=(Quantum) ConstrainColormapIndex(image,pixel,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
SetPixelViaPixelInfo(image,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index,q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
else
if (image->colorspace != CMYKColorspace)
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
GETJSAMPLE(*p++)),q);
SetPixelGreen(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
GETJSAMPLE(*p++)),q);
SetPixelBlue(image,ScaleCharToQuantum((unsigned char)
GETJSAMPLE(*p++)),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
else
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelCyan(image,QuantumRange-ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) GETJSAMPLE(*p++)),q);
SetPixelMagenta(image,QuantumRange-ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) GETJSAMPLE(*p++)),q);
SetPixelYellow(image,QuantumRange-ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) GETJSAMPLE(*p++)),q);
SetPixelBlack(image,QuantumRange-ScaleCharToQuantum(
(unsigned char) GETJSAMPLE(*p++)),q);
SetPixelAlpha(image,OpaqueAlpha,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
jpeg_abort_decompress(&jpeg_info);
break;
}
}
if (status != MagickFalse)
{
error_manager.finished=MagickTrue;
if (setjmp(error_manager.error_recovery) == 0)
(void) jpeg_finish_decompress(&jpeg_info);
}
/*
Free jpeg resources.
*/
jpeg_destroy_decompress(&jpeg_info);
memory_info=RelinquishVirtualMemory(memory_info);
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1641
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,804
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void PresentationConnectionProxy::close() const {
DCHECK(target_connection_ptr_);
target_connection_ptr_->OnClose();
}
Commit Message: [Presentation API] Add layout test for connection.close() and fix test failures
Add layout test.
1-UA connection.close() hits NOTREACHED() in PresentationConnection::didChangeState(). Use PresentationConnection::didClose() instead.
BUG=697719
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730123003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455225}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 2,196
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int Height() const { return GET_PARAM(1); }
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 11,434
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PanoramiXRenderReset(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < RenderNumberRequests; i++)
ProcRenderVector[i] = PanoramiXSaveRenderVector[i];
RenderErrBase = 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 17,711
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int crypto_rfc4309_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
{
if (req->assoclen != 16 && req->assoclen != 20)
return -EINVAL;
req = crypto_rfc4309_crypt(req);
return crypto_aead_decrypt(req);
}
Commit Message: crypto: ccm - move cbcmac input off the stack
Commit f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
refactored the CCM driver to allow separate implementations of the
underlying MAC to be provided by a platform. However, in doing so, it
moved some data from the linear region to the stack, which violates the
SG constraints when the stack is virtually mapped.
So move idata/odata back to the request ctx struct, of which we can
reasonably expect that it has been allocated using kmalloc() et al.
Reported-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Fixes: f15f05b0a5de ("crypto: ccm - switch to separate cbcmac driver")
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 19,654
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static unsigned int br_nf_post_routing(unsigned int hook, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct net_device *in,
const struct net_device *out,
int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
{
struct nf_bridge_info *nf_bridge = skb->nf_bridge;
struct net_device *realoutdev = bridge_parent(skb->dev);
u_int8_t pf;
if (!nf_bridge || !(nf_bridge->mask & BRNF_BRIDGED))
return NF_ACCEPT;
if (!realoutdev)
return NF_DROP;
if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP) || IS_VLAN_IP(skb) ||
IS_PPPOE_IP(skb))
pf = PF_INET;
else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6) || IS_VLAN_IPV6(skb) ||
IS_PPPOE_IPV6(skb))
pf = PF_INET6;
else
return NF_ACCEPT;
/* We assume any code from br_dev_queue_push_xmit onwards doesn't care
* about the value of skb->pkt_type. */
if (skb->pkt_type == PACKET_OTHERHOST) {
skb->pkt_type = PACKET_HOST;
nf_bridge->mask |= BRNF_PKT_TYPE;
}
nf_bridge_pull_encap_header(skb);
nf_bridge_save_header(skb);
if (pf == PF_INET)
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IP);
else
skb->protocol = htons(ETH_P_IPV6);
NF_HOOK(pf, NF_INET_POST_ROUTING, skb, NULL, realoutdev,
br_nf_dev_queue_xmit);
return NF_STOLEN;
}
Commit Message: bridge: reset IPCB in br_parse_ip_options
Commit 462fb2af9788a82 (bridge : Sanitize skb before it enters the IP
stack), missed one IPCB init before calling ip_options_compile()
Thanks to Scot Doyle for his tests and bug reports.
Reported-by: Scot Doyle <lkml@scotdoyle.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Hiroaki SHIMODA <shimoda.hiroaki@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Bandan Das <bandan.das@stratus.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Hemminger <shemminger@vyatta.com>
Cc: Jan Lübbe <jluebbe@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 16,974
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _PUBLIC_ int strcasecmp_m(const char *s1, const char *s2)
{
struct smb_iconv_handle *iconv_handle = get_iconv_handle();
return strcasecmp_m_handle(iconv_handle, s1, s2);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200
| 0
| 8,170
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int64_t mxf_timestamp_to_int64(uint64_t timestamp)
{
struct tm time = { 0 };
time.tm_year = (timestamp >> 48) - 1900;
time.tm_mon = (timestamp >> 40 & 0xFF) - 1;
time.tm_mday = (timestamp >> 32 & 0xFF);
time.tm_hour = (timestamp >> 24 & 0xFF);
time.tm_min = (timestamp >> 16 & 0xFF);
time.tm_sec = (timestamp >> 8 & 0xFF);
/* msvcrt versions of strftime calls the invalid parameter handler
* (aborting the process if one isn't set) if the parameters are out
* of range. */
time.tm_mon = av_clip(time.tm_mon, 0, 11);
time.tm_mday = av_clip(time.tm_mday, 1, 31);
time.tm_hour = av_clip(time.tm_hour, 0, 23);
time.tm_min = av_clip(time.tm_min, 0, 59);
time.tm_sec = av_clip(time.tm_sec, 0, 59);
return (int64_t)av_timegm(&time) * 1000000;
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix DoS issues in mxf_read_index_entry_array()
Fixes: 20170829A.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <wangchu.zhl@alibaba-inc.com>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834
| 0
| 4,218
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int BuildLoadFlagsForRequest(const ResourceHostMsg_Request& request_data,
int child_id, bool is_sync_load) {
int load_flags = request_data.load_flags;
load_flags |= net::LOAD_VERIFY_EV_CERT;
if (request_data.resource_type == ResourceType::MAIN_FRAME) {
load_flags |= net::LOAD_MAIN_FRAME;
} else if (request_data.resource_type == ResourceType::SUB_FRAME) {
load_flags |= net::LOAD_SUB_FRAME;
} else if (request_data.resource_type == ResourceType::PREFETCH) {
load_flags |= (net::LOAD_PREFETCH | net::LOAD_DO_NOT_PROMPT_FOR_LOGIN);
} else if (request_data.resource_type == ResourceType::FAVICON) {
load_flags |= net::LOAD_DO_NOT_PROMPT_FOR_LOGIN;
}
if (is_sync_load)
load_flags |= net::LOAD_IGNORE_LIMITS;
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl* policy =
ChildProcessSecurityPolicyImpl::GetInstance();
if (!policy->CanUseCookiesForOrigin(child_id, request_data.url)) {
load_flags |= (net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SEND_COOKIES |
net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SEND_AUTH_DATA |
net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SAVE_COOKIES);
}
if ((load_flags & net::LOAD_REPORT_RAW_HEADERS)
&& !policy->CanReadRawCookies(child_id)) {
VLOG(1) << "Denied unauthorized request for raw headers";
load_flags &= ~net::LOAD_REPORT_RAW_HEADERS;
}
return load_flags;
}
Commit Message: Make chrome.appWindow.create() provide access to the child window at a predictable time.
When you first create a window with chrome.appWindow.create(), it won't have
loaded any resources. So, at create time, you are guaranteed that:
child_window.location.href == 'about:blank'
child_window.document.documentElement.outerHTML ==
'<html><head></head><body></body></html>'
This is in line with the behaviour of window.open().
BUG=131735
TEST=browser_tests:PlatformAppBrowserTest.WindowsApi
Committed: http://src.chromium.org/viewvc/chrome?view=rev&revision=144072
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10644006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@144356 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 1,228
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ShouldCoalesceMouseWheelEvents(const WebMouseWheelEvent& last_event,
const WebMouseWheelEvent& new_event) {
return last_event.modifiers == new_event.modifiers &&
last_event.scrollByPage == new_event.scrollByPage &&
last_event.hasPreciseScrollingDeltas
== new_event.hasPreciseScrollingDeltas &&
last_event.phase == new_event.phase &&
last_event.momentumPhase == new_event.momentumPhase;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 10,967
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static ssize_t regulator_opmode_show(struct device *dev,
struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
{
struct regulator_dev *rdev = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
return regulator_print_opmode(buf, _regulator_get_mode(rdev));
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 0
| 16,493
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: add_ctype_to_cc_by_range_limit(CClassNode* cc, int ctype ARG_UNUSED, int not,
OnigEncoding enc ARG_UNUSED,
OnigCodePoint sb_out,
const OnigCodePoint mbr[], OnigCodePoint limit)
{
int i, r;
OnigCodePoint j;
OnigCodePoint from;
OnigCodePoint to;
int n = ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_NUM(mbr);
if (not == 0) {
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
for (j = ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_FROM(mbr, i);
j <= ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_TO(mbr, i); j++) {
if (j > limit) goto end;
if (j >= sb_out) {
if (j > ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_FROM(mbr, i)) {
to = ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_TO(mbr, i);
if (to > limit) to = limit;
r = add_code_range_to_buf(&(cc->mbuf), j, to);
if (r != 0) return r;
i++;
}
goto sb_end;
}
BITSET_SET_BIT(cc->bs, j);
}
}
sb_end:
for ( ; i < n; i++) {
from = ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_FROM(mbr, i);
to = ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_TO(mbr, i);
if (from > limit) break;
if (to > limit) to = limit;
r = add_code_range_to_buf(&(cc->mbuf), from, to);
if (r != 0) return r;
}
}
else {
OnigCodePoint prev = 0;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
from = ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_FROM(mbr, i);
if (from > limit) {
for (j = prev; j < sb_out; j++) {
BITSET_SET_BIT(cc->bs, j);
}
goto sb_end2;
}
for (j = prev; j < from; j++) {
if (j >= sb_out) goto sb_end2;
BITSET_SET_BIT(cc->bs, j);
}
prev = ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_TO(mbr, i);
if (prev > limit) prev = limit;
prev++;
if (prev == 0) goto end;
}
for (j = prev; j < sb_out; j++) {
BITSET_SET_BIT(cc->bs, j);
}
sb_end2:
prev = sb_out;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
from = ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_FROM(mbr, i);
if (from > limit) goto last;
if (prev < from) {
r = add_code_range_to_buf(&(cc->mbuf), prev, from - 1);
if (r != 0) return r;
}
prev = ONIGENC_CODE_RANGE_TO(mbr, i);
if (prev > limit) prev = limit;
prev++;
if (prev == 0) goto end;
}
last:
r = add_code_range_to_buf(&(cc->mbuf), prev, MAX_CODE_POINT);
if (r != 0) return r;
}
end:
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fix #147: Stack Exhaustion Problem caused by some parsing functions in regcomp.c making recursive calls to themselves.
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 9,446
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: BubbleHeaderView::~BubbleHeaderView() {}
Commit Message: Desktop Page Info/Harmony: Show close button for internal pages.
The Harmony version of Page Info for internal Chrome pages (chrome://,
chrome-extension:// and view-source:// pages) show a close button. Update the
code to match this.
This patch also adds TestBrowserDialog tests for the latter two cases described
above (internal extension and view source pages).
See screenshot -
https://drive.google.com/file/d/18RZnMiHCu-rCX9N6DLUpu4mkFWguh1xm/view?usp=sharing
Bug: 535074
Change-Id: I55e5f1aa682fd4ec85f7b65ac88f5a4f5906fe53
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/759624
Commit-Queue: Patti <patricialor@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Trent Apted <tapted@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#516624}
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 9,587
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::NotifyNavigationEntryCommitted(
LoadCommittedDetails* details) {
details->entry = GetLastCommittedEntry();
ssl_manager_.DidCommitProvisionalLoad(*details);
delegate_->NotifyNavigationStateChanged(INVALIDATE_TYPE_ALL);
delegate_->NotifyNavigationEntryCommitted(*details);
NotificationDetails notification_details =
Details<LoadCommittedDetails>(details);
NotificationService::current()->Notify(
NOTIFICATION_NAV_ENTRY_COMMITTED,
Source<NavigationController>(this),
notification_details);
}
Commit Message: Add DumpWithoutCrashing in RendererDidNavigateToExistingPage
This is intended to be reverted after investigating the linked bug.
BUG=688425
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2701523004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450900}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 19,358
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ResolveStateAndPredicate(ExprDef *expr, enum xkb_match_operation *pred_rtrn,
xkb_mod_mask_t *mods_rtrn, CompatInfo *info)
{
if (expr == NULL) {
*pred_rtrn = MATCH_ANY_OR_NONE;
*mods_rtrn = MOD_REAL_MASK_ALL;
return true;
}
*pred_rtrn = MATCH_EXACTLY;
if (expr->expr.op == EXPR_ACTION_DECL) {
const char *pred_txt = xkb_atom_text(info->ctx, expr->action.name);
if (!LookupString(symInterpretMatchMaskNames, pred_txt, pred_rtrn)) {
log_err(info->ctx,
"Illegal modifier predicate \"%s\"; Ignored\n", pred_txt);
return false;
}
expr = expr->action.args;
}
else if (expr->expr.op == EXPR_IDENT) {
const char *pred_txt = xkb_atom_text(info->ctx, expr->ident.ident);
if (pred_txt && istreq(pred_txt, "any")) {
*pred_rtrn = MATCH_ANY;
*mods_rtrn = MOD_REAL_MASK_ALL;
return true;
}
}
return ExprResolveModMask(info->ctx, expr, MOD_REAL, &info->mods,
mods_rtrn);
}
Commit Message: xkbcomp: Don't crash on no-op modmask expressions
If we have an expression of the form 'l1' in an interp section, we
unconditionally try to dereference its args, even if it has none.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Stone <daniels@collabora.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 1
| 7,277
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ScriptObject ScriptProfiler::objectByHeapObjectId(unsigned id)
{
v8::Isolate* isolate = v8::Isolate::GetCurrent();
v8::HeapProfiler* profiler = isolate->GetHeapProfiler();
if (!profiler)
return ScriptObject();
const v8::HeapGraphNode* node = 0;
for (int i = 0, l = profiler->GetSnapshotCount(); i < l; ++i) {
const v8::HeapSnapshot* snapshot = profiler->GetHeapSnapshot(i);
node = snapshot->GetNodeById(id);
if (node)
break;
}
if (!node)
return ScriptObject();
v8::HandleScope handleScope(isolate);
v8::Handle<v8::Value> value = node->GetHeapValue();
if (!value->IsObject())
return ScriptObject();
v8::Handle<v8::Object> object = value.As<v8::Object>();
if (object->InternalFieldCount() >= v8DefaultWrapperInternalFieldCount) {
v8::Handle<v8::Value> wrapper = object->GetInternalField(v8DOMWrapperObjectIndex);
if (!wrapper.IsEmpty() && wrapper->IsUndefined())
return ScriptObject();
}
ScriptState* scriptState = ScriptState::forContext(object->CreationContext());
return ScriptObject(scriptState, object);
}
Commit Message: Fix clobbered build issue.
TBR=jochen@chromium.org
NOTRY=true
BUG=269698
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22425005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155711 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID:
| 0
| 11,631
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewGuest::SetIsLoading(bool is_loading) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED();
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID:
| 0
| 12,497
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: ReadUserLogStateAccess::isValid( void ) const
{
return m_state->isValid( );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-134
| 0
| 24,104
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GURL ReplaceURLHostAndPath(const GURL& url,
const std::string& host,
const std::string& path) {
url_canon::Replacements<char> replacements;
replacements.SetHost(host.c_str(),
url_parse::Component(0, host.length()));
replacements.SetPath(path.c_str(),
url_parse::Component(0, path.length()));
return url.ReplaceComponents(replacements);
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 13,314
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Smb4KGlobal::openShare(Smb4KShare *share, OpenWith openWith)
{
if (!share || share->isInaccessible())
{
return;
}
switch (openWith)
{
case FileManager:
{
QUrl url = QUrl::fromLocalFile(share->canonicalPath());
(void) new KRun(url, 0);
break;
}
case Konsole:
{
QString konsole = QStandardPaths::findExecutable("konsole");
if (konsole.isEmpty())
{
Smb4KNotification::commandNotFound("konsole");
}
else
{
KRun::runCommand(konsole+" --workdir "+KShell::quoteArg(share->canonicalPath()), 0);
}
break;
}
default:
{
break;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 16,142
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: const gfx::ImageSkia PageInfoUI::GetPermissionIcon(const PermissionInfo& info,
SkColor related_text_color) {
const gfx::VectorIcon* icon = &gfx::kNoneIcon;
switch (info.type) {
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_COOKIES:
icon = &kCookieIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_IMAGES:
icon = &kPhotoIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_JAVASCRIPT:
icon = &kCodeIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_POPUPS:
icon = &kLaunchIcon;
break;
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PLUGINS)
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PLUGINS:
icon = &kExtensionIcon;
break;
#endif
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_GEOLOCATION:
icon = &vector_icons::kLocationOnIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_NOTIFICATIONS:
icon = &vector_icons::kNotificationsIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_MIC:
icon = &vector_icons::kMicIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_CAMERA:
icon = &vector_icons::kVideocamIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_AUTOMATIC_DOWNLOADS:
icon = &kFileDownloadIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MIDI_SYSEX:
icon = &vector_icons::kMidiIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_BACKGROUND_SYNC:
icon = &kSyncIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_ADS:
icon = &kAdsIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_SOUND:
icon = &kVolumeUpIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_CLIPBOARD_READ:
icon = &kPageInfoContentPasteIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_SENSORS:
icon = &kSensorsIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_USB_GUARD:
icon = &vector_icons::kUsbIcon;
break;
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_SERIAL_GUARD:
icon = &vector_icons::kSerialPortIcon;
break;
case CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_BLUETOOTH_SCANNING:
icon = &vector_icons::kBluetoothScanningIcon;
break;
#endif
default:
NOTREACHED();
break;
}
ContentSetting setting = info.setting == CONTENT_SETTING_DEFAULT
? info.default_setting
: info.setting;
if (setting == CONTENT_SETTING_BLOCK) {
return gfx::CreateVectorIconWithBadge(
*icon, kVectorIconSize,
color_utils::DeriveDefaultIconColor(related_text_color),
kBlockedBadgeIcon);
}
return gfx::CreateVectorIcon(
*icon, kVectorIconSize,
color_utils::DeriveDefaultIconColor(related_text_color));
}
Commit Message: Revert "PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii."
This reverts commit ee95bc44021230127c7e6e9a8cf9d3820760f77c.
Reason for revert: suspect causing unit_tests failure on Linux MSAN Tests:
https://ci.chromium.org/p/chromium/builders/ci/Linux%20MSan%20Tests/17649
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.EnsureCloseCallback
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.NotificationPermissionRevokeUkm
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.OpenPageInfoBubbleAfterNavigationStart
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfo
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoForUsbGuard
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUsbDevice
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.SetPermissionInfoWithUserAndPolicyUsbDevices
PageInfoBubbleViewTest.UpdatingSiteDataRetainsLayout
https://logs.chromium.org/logs/chromium/buildbucket/cr-buildbucket.appspot.com/8909718923797040064/+/steps/unit_tests/0/logs/Deterministic_failure:_PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered__status_CRASH_/0
[ RUN ] PageInfoBubbleViewTest.ChangingFlashSettingForSiteIsRemembered
==9056==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
#0 0x561baaab15ec in PageInfoUI::GetSecurityDescription(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) const ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info_ui.cc:250:3
#1 0x561bab6a1548 in PageInfoBubbleView::SetIdentityInfo(PageInfoUI::IdentityInfo const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:802:7
#2 0x561baaaab3bb in PageInfo::PresentSiteIdentity() ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:969:8
#3 0x561baaaa0a21 in PageInfo::PageInfo(PageInfoUI*, Profile*, TabSpecificContentSettings*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/page_info/page_info.cc:344:3
#4 0x561bab69b6dd in PageInfoBubbleView::PageInfoBubbleView(views::View*, gfx::Rect const&, aura::Window*, Profile*, content::WebContents*, GURL const&, security_state::SecurityLevel, security_state::VisibleSecurityState const&, base::OnceCallback<void (views::Widget::ClosedReason, bool)>) ./../../chrome/browser/ui/views/page_info/page_info_bubble_view.cc:576:24
...
Original change's description:
> PageInfo: decouple safe browsing and TLS statii.
>
> Previously, the Page Info bubble maintained a single variable to
> identify all reasons that a page might have a non-standard status. This
> lead to the display logic making assumptions about, for instance, the
> validity of a certificate when the page was flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> This CL separates out the Safe Browsing status from the site identity
> status so that the page info bubble can inform the user that the site's
> certificate is invalid, even if it's also flagged by Safe Browsing.
>
> Bug: 869925
> Change-Id: I34107225b4206c8f32771ccd75e9367668d0a72b
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1662537
> Reviewed-by: Mustafa Emre Acer <meacer@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
> Auto-Submit: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Commit-Queue: Joe DeBlasio <jdeblasio@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671847}
TBR=meacer@chromium.org,bsep@chromium.org,jdeblasio@chromium.org
Change-Id: I8be652952e7276bcc9266124693352e467159cc4
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
Bug: 869925
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1673985
Reviewed-by: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Commit-Queue: Takashi Sakamoto <tasak@google.com>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#671932}
CWE ID: CWE-311
| 0
| 14,487
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void DatabaseImpl::IDBThreadHelper::CreateTransaction(
int64_t transaction_id,
const std::vector<int64_t>& object_store_ids,
blink::WebIDBTransactionMode mode) {
DCHECK(idb_thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
if (!connection_->IsConnected())
return;
connection_->database()->CreateTransaction(transaction_id, connection_.get(),
object_store_ids, mode);
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fixed transaction use-after-free vuln
Bug: 725032
Change-Id: I689ded6c74d5563403587b149c3f3e02e807e4aa
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/518483
Reviewed-by: Joshua Bell <jsbell@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#475952}
CWE ID: CWE-416
| 1
| 7,549
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool WebMediaPlayerImpl::HasVideo() const {
DCHECK(main_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
return pipeline_metadata_.has_video;
}
Commit Message: Simplify "WouldTaintOrigin" concept in media/blink
Currently WebMediaPlayer has three predicates:
- DidGetOpaqueResponseFromServiceWorker
- HasSingleSecurityOrigin
- DidPassCORSAccessCheck
. These are used to determine whether the response body is available
for scripts. They are known to be confusing, and actually
MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::WouldTaintOrigin misuses them.
This CL merges the three predicates to one, WouldTaintOrigin, to remove
the confusion. Now the "response type" concept is available and we
don't need a custom CORS check, so this CL removes
BaseAudioContext::WouldTaintOrigin. This CL also renames
URLData::has_opaque_data_ and its (direct and indirect) data accessors
to match the spec.
Bug: 849942, 875153
Change-Id: I6acf50169d7445c4ff614e80ac606f79ee577d2a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1238098
Reviewed-by: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#598258}
CWE ID: CWE-732
| 0
| 29,882
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void FetchContext::AddWarningConsoleMessage(const String&, LogSource) const {}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 13,282
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void RendererSchedulerImpl::UnregisterTimeDomain(TimeDomain* time_domain) {
helper_.UnregisterTimeDomain(time_domain);
}
Commit Message: [scheduler] Remove implicit fallthrough in switch
Bail out early when a condition in the switch is fulfilled.
This does not change behaviour due to RemoveTaskObserver being no-op when
the task observer is not present in the list.
R=thakis@chromium.org
Bug: 177475
Change-Id: Ibc7772c79f8a8c8a1d63a997dabe1efda5d3a7bd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/891187
Reviewed-by: Nico Weber <thakis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Alexander Timin <altimin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532649}
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 3,383
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline __maybe_unused void h2c_error(struct h2c *h2c, enum h2_err err)
{
h2c->errcode = err;
h2c->st0 = H2_CS_ERROR;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 25,269
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: asmlinkage long compat_sys_sendmsg(int fd, struct compat_msghdr __user *msg, unsigned int flags)
{
if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)
return -EINVAL;
return __sys_sendmsg(fd, (struct msghdr __user *)msg, flags | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT);
}
Commit Message: x86, x32: Correct invalid use of user timespec in the kernel
The x32 case for the recvmsg() timout handling is broken:
asmlinkage long compat_sys_recvmmsg(int fd, struct compat_mmsghdr __user *mmsg,
unsigned int vlen, unsigned int flags,
struct compat_timespec __user *timeout)
{
int datagrams;
struct timespec ktspec;
if (flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT)
return -EINVAL;
if (COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME)
return __sys_recvmmsg(fd, (struct mmsghdr __user *)mmsg, vlen,
flags | MSG_CMSG_COMPAT,
(struct timespec *) timeout);
...
The timeout pointer parameter is provided by userland (hence the __user
annotation) but for x32 syscalls it's simply cast to a kernel pointer
and is passed to __sys_recvmmsg which will eventually directly
dereference it for both reading and writing. Other callers to
__sys_recvmmsg properly copy from userland to the kernel first.
The bug was introduced by commit ee4fa23c4bfc ("compat: Use
COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME in net/compat.c") and should affect all kernels
since 3.4 (and perhaps vendor kernels if they backported x32 support
along with this code).
Note that CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI gets enabled at build time and only if
CONFIG_X86_X32 is enabled and ld can build x32 executables.
Other uses of COMPAT_USE_64BIT_TIME seem fine.
This addresses CVE-2014-0038.
Signed-off-by: PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>
Signed-off-by: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.4+
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 5,343
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SCTP_STATIC int sctp_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr,
int addr_len)
{
int err = 0;
struct sctp_af *af;
sctp_lock_sock(sk);
SCTP_DEBUG_PRINTK("%s - sk: %p, sockaddr: %p, addr_len: %d\n",
__FUNCTION__, sk, addr, addr_len);
/* Validate addr_len before calling common connect/connectx routine. */
af = sctp_get_af_specific(addr->sa_family);
if (!af || addr_len < af->sockaddr_len) {
err = -EINVAL;
} else {
/* Pass correct addr len to common routine (so it knows there
* is only one address being passed.
*/
err = __sctp_connect(sk, addr, af->sockaddr_len);
}
sctp_release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: [SCTP]: Fix assertion (!atomic_read(&sk->sk_rmem_alloc)) failed message
In current implementation, LKSCTP does receive buffer accounting for
data in sctp_receive_queue and pd_lobby. However, LKSCTP don't do
accounting for data in frag_list when data is fragmented. In addition,
LKSCTP doesn't do accounting for data in reasm and lobby queue in
structure sctp_ulpq.
When there are date in these queue, assertion failed message is printed
in inet_sock_destruct because sk_rmem_alloc of oldsk does not become 0
when socket is destroyed.
Signed-off-by: Tsutomu Fujii <t-fujii@nb.jp.nec.com>
Signed-off-by: Vlad Yasevich <vladislav.yasevich@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 9,283
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AgcDisable(preproc_effect_t *effect)
{
ALOGV("AgcDisable");
webrtc::GainControl *agc = static_cast<webrtc::GainControl *>(effect->engine);
agc->Enable(false);
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119
| 0
| 7,145
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: SharedMemoryRegion* shm() const { return shm_.get(); }
Commit Message: vaapi vda: Delete owned objects on worker thread in Cleanup()
This CL adds a SEQUENCE_CHECKER to Vaapi*Accelerator classes, and
posts the destruction of those objects to the appropriate thread on
Cleanup().
Also makes {H264,VP8,VP9}Picture RefCountedThreadSafe, see miu@
comment in
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/794091#message-a64bed985cfaf8a19499a517bb110a7ce581dc0f
TEST=play back VP9/VP8/H264 w/ simplechrome on soraka, Release build
unstripped, let video play for a few seconds then navigate back; no
crashes. Unittests as before:
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp9:320:240:250:250:35:150:12
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.vp8:320:240:250:250:35:150:11
video_decode_accelerator_unittest --test_video_data=test-25fps.h264:320:240:250:258:35:150:1
Bug: 789160
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;master.tryserver.chromium.win:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I7d96aaf89c92bf46f00c8b8b36798e057a842ed2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/794091
Reviewed-by: Pawel Osciak <posciak@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Miguel Casas <mcasas@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523372}
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 8,771
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: GF_Err mdia_Write(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e;
GF_MediaBox *ptr = (GF_MediaBox *)s;
e = gf_isom_box_write_header(s, bs);
if (e) return e;
if (ptr->mediaHeader) {
e = gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box *) ptr->mediaHeader, bs);
if (e) return e;
}
if (ptr->handler) {
e = gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box *) ptr->handler, bs);
if (e) return e;
}
if (ptr->information) {
e = gf_isom_box_write((GF_Box *) ptr->information, bs);
if (e) return e;
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125
| 0
| 7,740
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void Document::getFocusableNodes(Vector<RefPtr<Node> >& nodes)
{
updateLayout();
for (Node* node = firstChild(); node; node = NodeTraversal::next(node)) {
if (node->isFocusable())
nodes.append(node);
}
}
Commit Message: Unreviewed, rolling out r147402.
http://trac.webkit.org/changeset/147402
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=112903
Source/WebCore:
* dom/Document.cpp:
(WebCore::Document::processHttpEquiv):
* loader/DocumentLoader.cpp:
(WebCore::DocumentLoader::responseReceived):
LayoutTests:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny.html:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny.html:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-in-body-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-deny-meta-tag-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-multiple-headers-sameorigin-deny-expected.txt:
* platform/chromium/http/tests/security/XFrameOptions/x-frame-options-parent-same-origin-deny-expected.txt:
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@147450 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 9,475
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
int ret = 0;
int i, t;
insn_state = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!insn_state)
return -ENOMEM;
insn_stack = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!insn_stack) {
kfree(insn_state);
return -ENOMEM;
}
insn_state[0] = DISCOVERED; /* mark 1st insn as discovered */
insn_stack[0] = 0; /* 0 is the first instruction */
cur_stack = 1;
peek_stack:
if (cur_stack == 0)
goto check_state;
t = insn_stack[cur_stack - 1];
if (BPF_CLASS(insns[t].code) == BPF_JMP) {
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insns[t].code);
if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
goto mark_explored;
} else if (opcode == BPF_CALL) {
ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
if (insns[t].src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL) {
env->explored_states[t] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].imm + 1, BRANCH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
}
} else if (opcode == BPF_JA) {
if (BPF_SRC(insns[t].code) != BPF_K) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_free;
}
/* unconditional jump with single edge */
ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1,
FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
/* tell verifier to check for equivalent states
* after every call and jump
*/
if (t + 1 < insn_cnt)
env->explored_states[t + 1] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
} else {
/* conditional jump with two edges */
env->explored_states[t] = STATE_LIST_MARK;
ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
ret = push_insn(t, t + insns[t].off + 1, BRANCH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
}
} else {
/* all other non-branch instructions with single
* fall-through edge
*/
ret = push_insn(t, t + 1, FALLTHROUGH, env);
if (ret == 1)
goto peek_stack;
else if (ret < 0)
goto err_free;
}
mark_explored:
insn_state[t] = EXPLORED;
if (cur_stack-- <= 0) {
verbose(env, "pop stack internal bug\n");
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err_free;
}
goto peek_stack;
check_state:
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++) {
if (insn_state[i] != EXPLORED) {
verbose(env, "unreachable insn %d\n", i);
ret = -EINVAL;
goto err_free;
}
}
ret = 0; /* cfg looks good */
err_free:
kfree(insn_state);
kfree(insn_stack);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix sanitation of alu op with pointer / scalar type from different paths
While 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer
arithmetic") took care of rejecting alu op on pointer when e.g. pointer
came from two different map values with different map properties such as
value size, Jann reported that a case was not covered yet when a given
alu op is used in both "ptr_reg += reg" and "numeric_reg += reg" from
different branches where we would incorrectly try to sanitize based
on the pointer's limit. Catch this corner case and reject the program
instead.
Fixes: 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-189
| 0
| 3,261
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int shmem_show_options(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *root)
{
struct shmem_sb_info *sbinfo = SHMEM_SB(root->d_sb);
if (sbinfo->max_blocks != shmem_default_max_blocks())
seq_printf(seq, ",size=%luk",
sbinfo->max_blocks << (PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT - 10));
if (sbinfo->max_inodes != shmem_default_max_inodes())
seq_printf(seq, ",nr_inodes=%lu", sbinfo->max_inodes);
if (sbinfo->mode != (S_IRWXUGO | S_ISVTX))
seq_printf(seq, ",mode=%03ho", sbinfo->mode);
if (!uid_eq(sbinfo->uid, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID))
seq_printf(seq, ",uid=%u",
from_kuid_munged(&init_user_ns, sbinfo->uid));
if (!gid_eq(sbinfo->gid, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID))
seq_printf(seq, ",gid=%u",
from_kgid_munged(&init_user_ns, sbinfo->gid));
shmem_show_mpol(seq, sbinfo->mpol);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: tmpfs: fix use-after-free of mempolicy object
The tmpfs remount logic preserves filesystem mempolicy if the mpol=M
option is not specified in the remount request. A new policy can be
specified if mpol=M is given.
Before this patch remounting an mpol bound tmpfs without specifying
mpol= mount option in the remount request would set the filesystem's
mempolicy object to a freed mempolicy object.
To reproduce the problem boot a DEBUG_PAGEALLOC kernel and run:
# mkdir /tmp/x
# mount -t tmpfs -o size=100M,mpol=interleave nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=102400k,mpol=interleave:0-3 0 0
# mount -o remount,size=200M nodev /tmp/x
# grep /tmp/x /proc/mounts
nodev /tmp/x tmpfs rw,relatime,size=204800k,mpol=??? 0 0
# note ? garbage in mpol=... output above
# dd if=/dev/zero of=/tmp/x/f count=1
# panic here
Panic:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at (null)
IP: [< (null)>] (null)
[...]
Oops: 0010 [#1] SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Call Trace:
mpol_shared_policy_init+0xa5/0x160
shmem_get_inode+0x209/0x270
shmem_mknod+0x3e/0xf0
shmem_create+0x18/0x20
vfs_create+0xb5/0x130
do_last+0x9a1/0xea0
path_openat+0xb3/0x4d0
do_filp_open+0x42/0xa0
do_sys_open+0xfe/0x1e0
compat_sys_open+0x1b/0x20
cstar_dispatch+0x7/0x1f
Non-debug kernels will not crash immediately because referencing the
dangling mpol will not cause a fault. Instead the filesystem will
reference a freed mempolicy object, which will cause unpredictable
behavior.
The problem boils down to a dropped mpol reference below if
shmem_parse_options() does not allocate a new mpol:
config = *sbinfo
shmem_parse_options(data, &config, true)
mpol_put(sbinfo->mpol)
sbinfo->mpol = config.mpol /* BUG: saves unreferenced mpol */
This patch avoids the crash by not releasing the mempolicy if
shmem_parse_options() doesn't create a new mpol.
How far back does this issue go? I see it in both 2.6.36 and 3.3. I did
not look back further.
Signed-off-by: Greg Thelen <gthelen@google.com>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 36
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void xackCommand(client *c) {
streamCG *group = NULL;
robj *o = lookupKeyRead(c->db,c->argv[1]);
if (o) {
if (checkType(c,o,OBJ_STREAM)) return; /* Type error. */
group = streamLookupCG(o->ptr,c->argv[2]->ptr);
}
/* No key or group? Nothing to ack. */
if (o == NULL || group == NULL) {
addReply(c,shared.czero);
return;
}
int acknowledged = 0;
for (int j = 3; j < c->argc; j++) {
streamID id;
unsigned char buf[sizeof(streamID)];
if (streamParseIDOrReply(c,c->argv[j],&id,0) != C_OK) return;
streamEncodeID(buf,&id);
/* Lookup the ID in the group PEL: it will have a reference to the
* NACK structure that will have a reference to the consumer, so that
* we are able to remove the entry from both PELs. */
streamNACK *nack = raxFind(group->pel,buf,sizeof(buf));
if (nack != raxNotFound) {
raxRemove(group->pel,buf,sizeof(buf),NULL);
raxRemove(nack->consumer->pel,buf,sizeof(buf),NULL);
streamFreeNACK(nack);
acknowledged++;
server.dirty++;
}
}
addReplyLongLong(c,acknowledged);
}
Commit Message: Abort in XGROUP if the key is not a stream
CWE ID: CWE-704
| 0
| 14,557
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int netlink_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct netlink_sock *nlk = nlk_sk(sk);
int len, val, err;
if (level != SOL_NETLINK)
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (len < 0)
return -EINVAL;
switch (optname) {
case NETLINK_PKTINFO:
if (len < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(int);
val = nlk->flags & NETLINK_F_RECV_PKTINFO ? 1 : 0;
if (put_user(len, optlen) ||
put_user(val, optval))
return -EFAULT;
err = 0;
break;
case NETLINK_BROADCAST_ERROR:
if (len < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(int);
val = nlk->flags & NETLINK_F_BROADCAST_SEND_ERROR ? 1 : 0;
if (put_user(len, optlen) ||
put_user(val, optval))
return -EFAULT;
err = 0;
break;
case NETLINK_NO_ENOBUFS:
if (len < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(int);
val = nlk->flags & NETLINK_F_RECV_NO_ENOBUFS ? 1 : 0;
if (put_user(len, optlen) ||
put_user(val, optval))
return -EFAULT;
err = 0;
break;
case NETLINK_LIST_MEMBERSHIPS: {
int pos, idx, shift;
err = 0;
netlink_lock_table();
for (pos = 0; pos * 8 < nlk->ngroups; pos += sizeof(u32)) {
if (len - pos < sizeof(u32))
break;
idx = pos / sizeof(unsigned long);
shift = (pos % sizeof(unsigned long)) * 8;
if (put_user((u32)(nlk->groups[idx] >> shift),
(u32 __user *)(optval + pos))) {
err = -EFAULT;
break;
}
}
if (put_user(ALIGN(nlk->ngroups / 8, sizeof(u32)), optlen))
err = -EFAULT;
netlink_unlock_table();
break;
}
case NETLINK_CAP_ACK:
if (len < sizeof(int))
return -EINVAL;
len = sizeof(int);
val = nlk->flags & NETLINK_F_CAP_ACK ? 1 : 0;
if (put_user(len, optlen) ||
put_user(val, optval))
return -EFAULT;
err = 0;
break;
default:
err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: netlink: Fix dump skb leak/double free
When we free cb->skb after a dump, we do it after releasing the
lock. This means that a new dump could have started in the time
being and we'll end up freeing their skb instead of ours.
This patch saves the skb and module before we unlock so we free
the right memory.
Fixes: 16b304f3404f ("netlink: Eliminate kmalloc in netlink dump operation.")
Reported-by: Baozeng Ding <sploving1@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-415
| 0
| 5,225
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface::finishCreation(JSGlobalData& globalData)
{
Base::finishCreation(globalData);
ASSERT(inherits(&s_info));
}
Commit Message: [JSC] Implement a helper method createNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=85102
Reviewed by Geoffrey Garen.
In bug 84787, kbr@ requested to avoid hard-coding
createTypeError(exec, "Not enough arguments") here and there.
This patch implements createNotEnoughArgumentsError(exec)
and uses it in JSC bindings.
c.f. a corresponding bug for V8 bindings is bug 85097.
Source/JavaScriptCore:
* runtime/Error.cpp:
(JSC::createNotEnoughArgumentsError):
(JSC):
* runtime/Error.h:
(JSC):
Source/WebCore:
Test: bindings/scripts/test/TestObj.idl
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorJS.pm: Modified as described above.
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
* bindings/js/JSDataViewCustom.cpp: Ditto.
(WebCore::getDataViewMember):
(WebCore::setDataViewMember):
* bindings/js/JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDeprecatedPeerConnectionConstructor::constructJSDeprecatedPeerConnection):
* bindings/js/JSDirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getFile):
(WebCore::JSDirectoryEntry::getDirectory):
* bindings/js/JSSharedWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSSharedWorkerConstructor::constructJSSharedWorker):
* bindings/js/JSWebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserverConstructor::constructJSWebKitMutationObserver):
(WebCore::JSWebKitMutationObserver::observe):
* bindings/js/JSWorkerCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::JSWorkerConstructor::constructJSWorker):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSFloat64Array.cpp: Updated run-bindings-tests.
(WebCore::jsFloat64ArrayPrototypeFunctionFoo):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionExcitingFunction):
(WebCore::jsTestActiveDOMObjectPrototypeFunctionPostMessage):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestCustomNamedGetterPrototypeFunctionAnotherFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionItem):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestEventTargetPrototypeFunctionDispatchEvent):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestInterfacePrototypeFunctionSupplementalMethod2):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::jsTestMediaQueryListListenerPrototypeFunctionMethod):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestNamedConstructorNamedConstructor::constructJSTestNamedConstructor):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestObjConstructor::constructJSTestObj):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionVoidMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIntMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionObjMethodWithArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithSequenceArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodReturningSequence):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrows):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionSerializedValue):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionIdbKey):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOptionsObject):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionAddEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionRemoveEventListener):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgs):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArg):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod6):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionOverloadedMethod7):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionClassMethod2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod11):
(WebCore::jsTestObjConstructorFunctionOverloadedMethod12):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionMethodWithUnsignedLongArray):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert1):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert2):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert3):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert4):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionConvert5):
(WebCore::jsTestObjPrototypeFunctionStrictFunction):
* bindings/scripts/test/JS/JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::JSTestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceConstructor::constructJSTestSerializedScriptValueInterface):
(WebCore::jsTestSerializedScriptValueInterfacePrototypeFunctionAcceptTransferList):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@115536 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 2,722
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void AutomationInternalCustomBindings::OnSubtreeWillBeDeleted(
ui::AXTree* tree,
ui::AXNode* node) {
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 463
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void V8TestObject::StaticTestDictionaryMethodMethodCallback(const v8::FunctionCallbackInfo<v8::Value>& info) {
RUNTIME_CALL_TIMER_SCOPE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT(info.GetIsolate(), "Blink_TestObject_staticTestDictionaryMethod");
test_object_v8_internal::StaticTestDictionaryMethodMethod(info);
}
Commit Message: bindings: Support "attribute FrozenArray<T>?"
Adds a quick hack to support a case of "attribute FrozenArray<T>?".
Bug: 1028047
Change-Id: Ib3cecc4beb6bcc0fb0dbc667aca595454cc90c86
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1933866
Reviewed-by: Hitoshi Yoshida <peria@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yuki Shiino <yukishiino@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#718676}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 20,948
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static int pcd_reset(struct pcd_unit *cd)
{
int i, k, flg;
int expect[5] = { 1, 1, 1, 0x14, 0xeb };
pi_connect(cd->pi);
write_reg(cd, 6, 0xa0 + 0x10 * cd->drive);
write_reg(cd, 7, 8);
pcd_sleep(20 * HZ / 1000); /* delay a bit */
k = 0;
while ((k++ < PCD_RESET_TMO) && (status_reg(cd) & IDE_BUSY))
pcd_sleep(HZ / 10);
flg = 1;
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++)
flg &= (read_reg(cd, i + 1) == expect[i]);
if (verbose) {
printk("%s: Reset (%d) signature = ", cd->name, k);
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++)
printk("%3x", read_reg(cd, i + 1));
if (!flg)
printk(" (incorrect)");
printk("\n");
}
pi_disconnect(cd->pi);
return flg - 1;
}
Commit Message: paride/pcd: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference and mem leak
Syzkaller report this:
pcd: pcd version 1.07, major 46, nice 0
pcd0: Autoprobe failed
pcd: No CD-ROM drive found
kasan: CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE enabled
kasan: GPF could be caused by NULL-ptr deref or user memory access
general protection fault: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 4525 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.1.0-rc3+ #8
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.10.2-1ubuntu1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:pcd_init+0x95c/0x1000 [pcd]
Code: c4 ab f7 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 80 3c 28 00 74 08 48 89 df e8 56 a3 da f7 4c 8b 23 49 8d bc 24 80 05 00 00 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <80> 3c 28 00 74 05 e8 39 a3 da f7 49 8b bc 24 80 05 00 00 e8 cc b2
RSP: 0018:ffff8881e84df880 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 00000000000000b0 RBX: ffffffffc155a088 RCX: ffffffffc1508935
RDX: 0000000000040000 RSI: ffffc900014f0000 RDI: 0000000000000580
RBP: dffffc0000000000 R08: ffffed103ee658b8 R09: ffffed103ee658b8
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffed103ee658b7 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffffffffc155a778 R14: ffffffffc155a4a8 R15: 0000000000000003
FS: 00007fe71bee3700(0000) GS:ffff8881f7300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055a7334441a8 CR3: 00000001e9674003 CR4: 00000000007606e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
? 0xffffffffc1508000
? 0xffffffffc1508000
do_one_initcall+0xbc/0x47d init/main.c:901
do_init_module+0x1b5/0x547 kernel/module.c:3456
load_module+0x6405/0x8c10 kernel/module.c:3804
__do_sys_finit_module+0x162/0x190 kernel/module.c:3898
do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x450 arch/x86/entry/common.c:290
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x462e99
Code: f7 d8 64 89 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fe71bee2c58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000073bf00 RCX: 0000000000462e99
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000180 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fe71bee2c70 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fe71bee36bc
R13: 00000000004bcefa R14: 00000000006f6fb0 R15: 0000000000000004
Modules linked in: pcd(+) paride solos_pci atm ts_fsm rtc_mt6397 mac80211 nhc_mobility nhc_udp nhc_ipv6 nhc_hop nhc_dest nhc_fragment nhc_routing 6lowpan rtc_cros_ec memconsole intel_xhci_usb_role_switch roles rtc_wm8350 usbcore industrialio_triggered_buffer kfifo_buf industrialio asc7621 dm_era dm_persistent_data dm_bufio dm_mod tpm gnss_ubx gnss_serial serdev gnss max2165 cpufreq_dt hid_penmount hid menf21bmc_wdt rc_core n_tracesink ide_gd_mod cdns_csi2tx v4l2_fwnode videodev media pinctrl_lewisburg pinctrl_intel iptable_security iptable_raw iptable_mangle iptable_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 iptable_filter bpfilter ip6_vti ip_vti ip_gre ipip sit tunnel4 ip_tunnel hsr veth netdevsim vxcan batman_adv cfg80211 rfkill chnl_net caif nlmon dummy team bonding vcan bridge stp llc ip6_gre gre ip6_tunnel tunnel6 tun joydev mousedev ppdev kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel aesni_intel aes_x86_64 crypto_simd
ide_pci_generic piix input_leds cryptd glue_helper psmouse ide_core intel_agp serio_raw intel_gtt ata_generic i2c_piix4 agpgart pata_acpi parport_pc parport floppy rtc_cmos sch_fq_codel ip_tables x_tables sha1_ssse3 sha1_generic ipv6 [last unloaded: bmc150_magn]
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
---[ end trace d873691c3cd69f56 ]---
If alloc_disk fails in pcd_init_units, cd->disk will be
NULL, however in pcd_detect and pcd_exit, it's not check
this before free.It may result a NULL pointer dereference.
Also when register_blkdev failed, blk_cleanup_queue() and
blk_mq_free_tag_set() should be called to free resources.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Fixes: 81b74ac68c28 ("paride/pcd: cleanup queues when detection fails")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 4,156
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: cpu_cgroup_can_attach(struct cgroup_subsys *ss, struct cgroup *cgrp,
struct task_struct *tsk, bool threadgroup)
{
int retval = cpu_cgroup_can_attach_task(cgrp, tsk);
if (retval)
return retval;
if (threadgroup) {
struct task_struct *c;
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(c, &tsk->thread_group, thread_group) {
retval = cpu_cgroup_can_attach_task(cgrp, c);
if (retval) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return retval;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Sched: fix skip_clock_update optimization
idle_balance() drops/retakes rq->lock, leaving the previous task
vulnerable to set_tsk_need_resched(). Clear it after we return
from balancing instead, and in setup_thread_stack() as well, so
no successfully descheduled or never scheduled task has it set.
Need resched confused the skip_clock_update logic, which assumes
that the next call to update_rq_clock() will come nearly immediately
after being set. Make the optimization robust against the waking
a sleeper before it sucessfully deschedules case by checking that
the current task has not been dequeued before setting the flag,
since it is that useless clock update we're trying to save, and
clear unconditionally in schedule() proper instead of conditionally
in put_prev_task().
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Reported-by: Bjoern B. Brandenburg <bbb.lst@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Yong Zhang <yong.zhang0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
LKML-Reference: <1291802742.1417.9.camel@marge.simson.net>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
CWE ID:
| 0
| 4,787
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void release_discard_addrs(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi)
{
struct list_head *head = &(SM_I(sbi)->dcc_info->entry_list);
struct discard_entry *entry, *this;
/* drop caches */
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, this, head, list) {
list_del(&entry->list);
kmem_cache_free(discard_entry_slab, entry);
}
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix a panic caused by NULL flush_cmd_control
Mount fs with option noflush_merge, boot failed for illegal address
fcc in function f2fs_issue_flush:
if (!test_opt(sbi, FLUSH_MERGE)) {
ret = submit_flush_wait(sbi);
atomic_inc(&fcc->issued_flush); -> Here, fcc illegal
return ret;
}
Signed-off-by: Yunlei He <heyunlei@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-476
| 0
| 26,479
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: void __ext4_warning(struct super_block *sb, const char *function,
unsigned int line, const char *fmt, ...)
{
struct va_format vaf;
va_list args;
if (!ext4_warning_ratelimit(sb))
return;
va_start(args, fmt);
vaf.fmt = fmt;
vaf.va = &args;
printk(KERN_WARNING "EXT4-fs warning (device %s): %s:%d: %pV\n",
sb->s_id, function, line, &vaf);
va_end(args);
}
Commit Message: ext4: fix races between page faults and hole punching
Currently, page faults and hole punching are completely unsynchronized.
This can result in page fault faulting in a page into a range that we
are punching after truncate_pagecache_range() has been called and thus
we can end up with a page mapped to disk blocks that will be shortly
freed. Filesystem corruption will shortly follow. Note that the same
race is avoided for truncate by checking page fault offset against
i_size but there isn't similar mechanism available for punching holes.
Fix the problem by creating new rw semaphore i_mmap_sem in inode and
grab it for writing over truncate, hole punching, and other functions
removing blocks from extent tree and for read over page faults. We
cannot easily use i_data_sem for this since that ranks below transaction
start and we need something ranking above it so that it can be held over
the whole truncate / hole punching operation. Also remove various
workarounds we had in the code to reduce race window when page fault
could have created pages with stale mapping information.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 23,207
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: print_syscall_enter(struct trace_iterator *iter, int flags,
struct trace_event *event)
{
struct trace_seq *s = &iter->seq;
struct trace_entry *ent = iter->ent;
struct syscall_trace_enter *trace;
struct syscall_metadata *entry;
int i, ret, syscall;
trace = (typeof(trace))ent;
syscall = trace->nr;
entry = syscall_nr_to_meta(syscall);
if (!entry)
goto end;
if (entry->enter_event->event.type != ent->type) {
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
goto end;
}
ret = trace_seq_printf(s, "%s(", entry->name);
if (!ret)
return TRACE_TYPE_PARTIAL_LINE;
for (i = 0; i < entry->nb_args; i++) {
/* parameter types */
if (trace_flags & TRACE_ITER_VERBOSE) {
ret = trace_seq_printf(s, "%s ", entry->types[i]);
if (!ret)
return TRACE_TYPE_PARTIAL_LINE;
}
/* parameter values */
ret = trace_seq_printf(s, "%s: %lx%s", entry->args[i],
trace->args[i],
i == entry->nb_args - 1 ? "" : ", ");
if (!ret)
return TRACE_TYPE_PARTIAL_LINE;
}
ret = trace_seq_putc(s, ')');
if (!ret)
return TRACE_TYPE_PARTIAL_LINE;
end:
ret = trace_seq_putc(s, '\n');
if (!ret)
return TRACE_TYPE_PARTIAL_LINE;
return TRACE_TYPE_HANDLED;
}
Commit Message: tracing/syscalls: Ignore numbers outside NR_syscalls' range
ARM has some private syscalls (for example, set_tls(2)) which lie
outside the range of NR_syscalls. If any of these are called while
syscall tracing is being performed, out-of-bounds array access will
occur in the ftrace and perf sys_{enter,exit} handlers.
# trace-cmd record -e raw_syscalls:* true && trace-cmd report
...
true-653 [000] 384.675777: sys_enter: NR 192 (0, 1000, 3, 4000022, ffffffff, 0)
true-653 [000] 384.675812: sys_exit: NR 192 = 1995915264
true-653 [000] 384.675971: sys_enter: NR 983045 (76f74480, 76f74000, 76f74b28, 76f74480, 76f76f74, 1)
true-653 [000] 384.675988: sys_exit: NR 983045 = 0
...
# trace-cmd record -e syscalls:* true
[ 17.289329] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address aaaaaace
[ 17.289590] pgd = 9e71c000
[ 17.289696] [aaaaaace] *pgd=00000000
[ 17.289985] Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT SMP ARM
[ 17.290169] Modules linked in:
[ 17.290391] CPU: 0 PID: 704 Comm: true Not tainted 3.18.0-rc2+ #21
[ 17.290585] task: 9f4dab00 ti: 9e710000 task.ti: 9e710000
[ 17.290747] PC is at ftrace_syscall_enter+0x48/0x1f8
[ 17.290866] LR is at syscall_trace_enter+0x124/0x184
Fix this by ignoring out-of-NR_syscalls-bounds syscall numbers.
Commit cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
added the check for less than zero, but it should have also checked
for greater than NR_syscalls.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/p/1414620418-29472-1-git-send-email-rabin@rab.in
Fixes: cd0980fc8add "tracing: Check invalid syscall nr while tracing syscalls"
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 2.6.33+
Signed-off-by: Rabin Vincent <rabin@rab.in>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264
| 0
| 26,173
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: char *file_name_from_path(const char *p) {
char *r;
assert(p);
if ((r = strrchr(p, '/')))
return r + 1;
return (char*) p;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-362
| 0
| 27,821
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: _dbus_generate_random_bytes (DBusString *str,
int n_bytes)
{
int old_len;
int fd;
/* FALSE return means "no memory", if it could
* mean something else then we'd need to return
* a DBusError. So we always fall back to pseudorandom
* if the I/O fails.
*/
old_len = _dbus_string_get_length (str);
fd = -1;
/* note, urandom on linux will fall back to pseudorandom */
fd = open ("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0)
return _dbus_generate_pseudorandom_bytes (str, n_bytes);
_dbus_verbose ("/dev/urandom fd %d opened\n", fd);
if (_dbus_read (fd, str, n_bytes) != n_bytes)
{
_dbus_close (fd, NULL);
_dbus_string_set_length (str, old_len);
return _dbus_generate_pseudorandom_bytes (str, n_bytes);
}
_dbus_verbose ("Read %d bytes from /dev/urandom\n",
n_bytes);
_dbus_close (fd, NULL);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 23,615
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: int nfs_commit_inode(struct inode *inode, int how)
{
LIST_HEAD(head);
struct nfs_commit_info cinfo;
int may_wait = how & FLUSH_SYNC;
int res;
res = nfs_commit_set_lock(NFS_I(inode), may_wait);
if (res <= 0)
goto out_mark_dirty;
nfs_init_cinfo_from_inode(&cinfo, inode);
res = nfs_scan_commit(inode, &head, &cinfo);
if (res) {
int error;
error = nfs_generic_commit_list(inode, &head, how, &cinfo);
if (error < 0)
return error;
if (!may_wait)
goto out_mark_dirty;
error = wait_on_bit(&NFS_I(inode)->flags,
NFS_INO_COMMIT,
nfs_wait_bit_killable,
TASK_KILLABLE);
if (error < 0)
return error;
} else
nfs_commit_clear_lock(NFS_I(inode));
return res;
/* Note: If we exit without ensuring that the commit is complete,
* we must mark the inode as dirty. Otherwise, future calls to
* sync_inode() with the WB_SYNC_ALL flag set will fail to ensure
* that the data is on the disk.
*/
out_mark_dirty:
__mark_inode_dirty(inode, I_DIRTY_DATASYNC);
return res;
}
Commit Message: nfs: always make sure page is up-to-date before extending a write to cover the entire page
We should always make sure the cached page is up-to-date when we're
determining whether we can extend a write to cover the full page -- even
if we've received a write delegation from the server.
Commit c7559663 added logic to skip this check if we have a write
delegation, which can lead to data corruption such as the following
scenario if client B receives a write delegation from the NFS server:
Client A:
# echo 123456789 > /mnt/file
Client B:
# echo abcdefghi >> /mnt/file
# cat /mnt/file
0�D0�abcdefghi
Just because we hold a write delegation doesn't mean that we've read in
the entire page contents.
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.11+
Signed-off-by: Scott Mayhew <smayhew@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@primarydata.com>
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 18,503
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static inline uint32_t uint_clamp(uint32_t val, uint32_t vmin, uint32_t vmax)
{
if (val < vmin) {
return vmin;
}
if (val > vmax) {
return vmax;
}
return val;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-617
| 0
| 6,088
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, loadPhar)
{
char *fname, *alias = NULL, *error;
size_t fname_len, alias_len = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s|s!", &fname, &fname_len, &alias, &alias_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
phar_request_initialize();
RETVAL_BOOL(phar_open_from_filename(fname, fname_len, alias, alias_len, REPORT_ERRORS, NULL, &error) == SUCCESS);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto string Phar::apiVersion()
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 1
| 138
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: add_job_subscriptions(
cupsd_client_t *con, /* I - Client connection */
cupsd_job_t *job) /* I - Newly created job */
{
int i; /* Looping var */
ipp_attribute_t *prev, /* Previous attribute */
*next, /* Next attribute */
*attr; /* Current attribute */
cupsd_subscription_t *sub; /* Subscription object */
const char *recipient, /* notify-recipient-uri */
*pullmethod; /* notify-pull-method */
ipp_attribute_t *user_data; /* notify-user-data */
int interval; /* notify-time-interval */
unsigned mask; /* notify-events */
/*
* Find the first subscription group attribute; return if we have
* none...
*/
for (attr = job->attrs->attrs; attr; attr = attr->next)
if (attr->group_tag == IPP_TAG_SUBSCRIPTION)
break;
if (!attr)
return;
/*
* Process the subscription attributes in the request...
*/
while (attr)
{
recipient = NULL;
pullmethod = NULL;
user_data = NULL;
interval = 0;
mask = CUPSD_EVENT_NONE;
while (attr && attr->group_tag != IPP_TAG_ZERO)
{
if (!strcmp(attr->name, "notify-recipient-uri") &&
attr->value_tag == IPP_TAG_URI)
{
/*
* Validate the recipient scheme against the ServerBin/notifier
* directory...
*/
char notifier[1024], /* Notifier filename */
scheme[HTTP_MAX_URI], /* Scheme portion of URI */
userpass[HTTP_MAX_URI], /* Username portion of URI */
host[HTTP_MAX_URI], /* Host portion of URI */
resource[HTTP_MAX_URI]; /* Resource portion of URI */
int port; /* Port portion of URI */
recipient = attr->values[0].string.text;
if (httpSeparateURI(HTTP_URI_CODING_ALL, recipient,
scheme, sizeof(scheme), userpass, sizeof(userpass),
host, sizeof(host), &port,
resource, sizeof(resource)) < HTTP_URI_OK)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_POSSIBLE,
_("Bad notify-recipient-uri \"%s\"."), recipient);
ippAddInteger(con->response, IPP_TAG_SUBSCRIPTION, IPP_TAG_ENUM,
"notify-status-code", IPP_URI_SCHEME);
return;
}
snprintf(notifier, sizeof(notifier), "%s/notifier/%s", ServerBin,
scheme);
if (access(notifier, X_OK))
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_POSSIBLE,
_("notify-recipient-uri URI \"%s\" uses unknown "
"scheme."), recipient);
ippAddInteger(con->response, IPP_TAG_SUBSCRIPTION, IPP_TAG_ENUM,
"notify-status-code", IPP_URI_SCHEME);
return;
}
if (!strcmp(scheme, "rss") && !check_rss_recipient(recipient))
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_POSSIBLE,
_("notify-recipient-uri URI \"%s\" is already used."),
recipient);
ippAddInteger(con->response, IPP_TAG_SUBSCRIPTION, IPP_TAG_ENUM,
"notify-status-code", IPP_ATTRIBUTES);
return;
}
}
else if (!strcmp(attr->name, "notify-pull-method") &&
attr->value_tag == IPP_TAG_KEYWORD)
{
pullmethod = attr->values[0].string.text;
if (strcmp(pullmethod, "ippget"))
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_NOT_POSSIBLE,
_("Bad notify-pull-method \"%s\"."), pullmethod);
ippAddInteger(con->response, IPP_TAG_SUBSCRIPTION, IPP_TAG_ENUM,
"notify-status-code", IPP_ATTRIBUTES);
return;
}
}
else if (!strcmp(attr->name, "notify-charset") &&
attr->value_tag == IPP_TAG_CHARSET &&
strcmp(attr->values[0].string.text, "us-ascii") &&
strcmp(attr->values[0].string.text, "utf-8"))
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_CHARSET,
_("Character set \"%s\" not supported."),
attr->values[0].string.text);
return;
}
else if (!strcmp(attr->name, "notify-natural-language") &&
(attr->value_tag != IPP_TAG_LANGUAGE ||
strcmp(attr->values[0].string.text, DefaultLanguage)))
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_CHARSET,
_("Language \"%s\" not supported."),
attr->values[0].string.text);
return;
}
else if (!strcmp(attr->name, "notify-user-data") &&
attr->value_tag == IPP_TAG_STRING)
{
if (attr->num_values > 1 || attr->values[0].unknown.length > 63)
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_REQUEST_VALUE,
_("The notify-user-data value is too large "
"(%d > 63 octets)."),
attr->values[0].unknown.length);
return;
}
user_data = attr;
}
else if (!strcmp(attr->name, "notify-events") &&
attr->value_tag == IPP_TAG_KEYWORD)
{
for (i = 0; i < attr->num_values; i ++)
mask |= cupsdEventValue(attr->values[i].string.text);
}
else if (!strcmp(attr->name, "notify-lease-duration"))
{
send_ipp_status(con, IPP_BAD_REQUEST,
_("The notify-lease-duration attribute cannot be "
"used with job subscriptions."));
return;
}
else if (!strcmp(attr->name, "notify-time-interval") &&
attr->value_tag == IPP_TAG_INTEGER)
interval = attr->values[0].integer;
attr = attr->next;
}
if (!recipient && !pullmethod)
break;
if (mask == CUPSD_EVENT_NONE)
mask = CUPSD_EVENT_JOB_COMPLETED;
if ((sub = cupsdAddSubscription(mask, cupsdFindDest(job->dest), job,
recipient, 0)) != NULL)
{
sub->interval = interval;
cupsdSetString(&sub->owner, job->username);
if (user_data)
{
sub->user_data_len = user_data->values[0].unknown.length;
memcpy(sub->user_data, user_data->values[0].unknown.data,
(size_t)sub->user_data_len);
}
ippAddSeparator(con->response);
ippAddInteger(con->response, IPP_TAG_SUBSCRIPTION, IPP_TAG_INTEGER,
"notify-subscription-id", sub->id);
cupsdLogMessage(CUPSD_LOG_DEBUG, "Added subscription %d for job %d",
sub->id, job->id);
}
if (attr)
attr = attr->next;
}
cupsdMarkDirty(CUPSD_DIRTY_SUBSCRIPTIONS);
/*
* Remove all of the subscription attributes from the job request...
*
* TODO: Optimize this since subscription groups have to come at the
* end of the request...
*/
for (attr = job->attrs->attrs, prev = NULL; attr; attr = next)
{
next = attr->next;
if (attr->group_tag == IPP_TAG_SUBSCRIPTION ||
attr->group_tag == IPP_TAG_ZERO)
{
/*
* Free and remove this attribute...
*/
ippDeleteAttribute(NULL, attr);
if (prev)
prev->next = next;
else
job->attrs->attrs = next;
}
else
prev = attr;
}
job->attrs->last = prev;
job->attrs->current = prev;
}
Commit Message: DBUS notifications could crash the scheduler (Issue #5143)
- scheduler/ipp.c: Make sure requesting-user-name string is valid UTF-8.
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 7,580
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: WebUIImpl* RenderFrameHostManager::GetNavigatingWebUI() const {
if (speculative_render_frame_host_)
return speculative_render_frame_host_->web_ui();
return render_frame_host_->pending_web_ui();
}
Commit Message: Fix issue with pending NavigationEntry being discarded incorrectly
This CL fixes an issue where we would attempt to discard a pending
NavigationEntry when a cross-process navigation to this NavigationEntry
is interrupted by another navigation to the same NavigationEntry.
BUG=760342,797656,796135
Change-Id: I204deff1efd4d572dd2e0b20e492592d48d787d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/850877
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#528611}
CWE ID: CWE-20
| 0
| 19,892
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static void proxy_rewinddir(FsContext *ctx, V9fsFidOpenState *fs)
{
rewinddir(fs->dir.stream);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400
| 0
| 1,479
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: bool ShouldTabShowAlertIndicator(int capacity,
bool is_pinned_tab,
bool is_active_tab,
bool has_favicon,
TabAlertState alert_state) {
if (alert_state == TabAlertState::NONE)
return false;
if (ShouldTabShowCloseButton(capacity, is_pinned_tab, is_active_tab))
return capacity >= 2;
return capacity >= 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix nullptr crash in IsSiteMuted
This CL adds a nullptr check in IsSiteMuted to prevent a crash on Mac.
Bug: 797647
Change-Id: Ic36f0fb39f2dbdf49d2bec9e548a4a6e339dc9a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/848245
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuri Wiitala <miu@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Tommy Steimel <steimel@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#526825}
CWE ID:
| 0
| 29,908
|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'.
|
Code: static RenderStyle* renderStyleOfEnclosingTextNode(const Position& position)
{
if (position.anchorType() != Position::PositionIsOffsetInAnchor || !position.containerNode() || !position.containerNode()->isTextNode())
return 0;
return position.containerNode()->renderStyle();
}
Commit Message: Remove false assertion in ApplyBlockElementCommand::formatSelection()
Note: This patch is preparation of fixing issue 294456.
This patch removes false assertion in ApplyBlockElementCommand::formatSelection(), when contents of being indent is modified, e.g. mutation event, |endOfNextParagraph| can hold removed contents.
BUG=294456
TEST=n/a
R=tkent@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/25657004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158701 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399
| 0
| 8,327
|
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