instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 56 235k | output int64 0 1 | __index_level_0__ int64 0 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void brcmf_set_join_pref(struct brcmf_if *ifp,
struct cfg80211_bss_selection *bss_select)
{
struct brcmf_join_pref_params join_pref_params[2];
enum nl80211_band band;
int err, i = 0;
join_pref_params[i].len = 2;
join_pref_params[i].rssi_gain = 0;
if (bss_select->behaviour != NL80211_BSS_SELECT_ATTR_BAND_PREF)
brcmf_fil_cmd_int_set(ifp, BRCMF_C_SET_ASSOC_PREFER, WLC_BAND_AUTO);
switch (bss_select->behaviour) {
case __NL80211_BSS_SELECT_ATTR_INVALID:
brcmf_c_set_joinpref_default(ifp);
return;
case NL80211_BSS_SELECT_ATTR_BAND_PREF:
join_pref_params[i].type = BRCMF_JOIN_PREF_BAND;
band = bss_select->param.band_pref;
join_pref_params[i].band = nl80211_band_to_fwil(band);
i++;
break;
case NL80211_BSS_SELECT_ATTR_RSSI_ADJUST:
join_pref_params[i].type = BRCMF_JOIN_PREF_RSSI_DELTA;
band = bss_select->param.adjust.band;
join_pref_params[i].band = nl80211_band_to_fwil(band);
join_pref_params[i].rssi_gain = bss_select->param.adjust.delta;
i++;
break;
case NL80211_BSS_SELECT_ATTR_RSSI:
default:
break;
}
join_pref_params[i].type = BRCMF_JOIN_PREF_RSSI;
join_pref_params[i].len = 2;
join_pref_params[i].rssi_gain = 0;
join_pref_params[i].band = 0;
err = brcmf_fil_iovar_data_set(ifp, "join_pref", join_pref_params,
sizeof(join_pref_params));
if (err)
brcmf_err("Set join_pref error (%d)\n", err);
}
Commit Message: brcmfmac: avoid potential stack overflow in brcmf_cfg80211_start_ap()
User-space can choose to omit NL80211_ATTR_SSID and only provide raw
IE TLV data. When doing so it can provide SSID IE with length exceeding
the allowed size. The driver further processes this IE copying it
into a local variable without checking the length. Hence stack can be
corrupted and used as exploit.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.7
Reported-by: Daxing Guo <freener.gdx@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Hante Meuleman <hante.meuleman@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Pieter-Paul Giesberts <pieter-paul.giesberts@broadcom.com>
Reviewed-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Arend van Spriel <arend.vanspriel@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 49,111 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int atalk_ioctl(struct socket *sock, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{
int rc = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
switch (cmd) {
/* Protocol layer */
case TIOCOUTQ: {
long amount = sk->sk_sndbuf - sk_wmem_alloc_get(sk);
if (amount < 0)
amount = 0;
rc = put_user(amount, (int __user *)argp);
break;
}
case TIOCINQ: {
/*
* These two are safe on a single CPU system as only
* user tasks fiddle here
*/
struct sk_buff *skb = skb_peek(&sk->sk_receive_queue);
long amount = 0;
if (skb)
amount = skb->len - sizeof(struct ddpehdr);
rc = put_user(amount, (int __user *)argp);
break;
}
case SIOCGSTAMP:
rc = sock_get_timestamp(sk, argp);
break;
case SIOCGSTAMPNS:
rc = sock_get_timestampns(sk, argp);
break;
/* Routing */
case SIOCADDRT:
case SIOCDELRT:
rc = -EPERM;
if (capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN))
rc = atrtr_ioctl(cmd, argp);
break;
/* Interface */
case SIOCGIFADDR:
case SIOCSIFADDR:
case SIOCGIFBRDADDR:
case SIOCATALKDIFADDR:
case SIOCDIFADDR:
case SIOCSARP: /* proxy AARP */
case SIOCDARP: /* proxy AARP */
rtnl_lock();
rc = atif_ioctl(cmd, argp);
rtnl_unlock();
break;
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: net: rework recvmsg handler msg_name and msg_namelen logic
This patch now always passes msg->msg_namelen as 0. recvmsg handlers must
set msg_namelen to the proper size <= sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage)
to return msg_name to the user.
This prevents numerous uninitialized memory leaks we had in the
recvmsg handlers and makes it harder for new code to accidentally leak
uninitialized memory.
Optimize for the case recvfrom is called with NULL as address. We don't
need to copy the address at all, so set it to NULL before invoking the
recvmsg handler. We can do so, because all the recvmsg handlers must
cope with the case a plain read() is called on them. read() also sets
msg_name to NULL.
Also document these changes in include/linux/net.h as suggested by David
Miller.
Changes since RFC:
Set msg->msg_name = NULL if user specified a NULL in msg_name but had a
non-null msg_namelen in verify_iovec/verify_compat_iovec. This doesn't
affect sendto as it would bail out earlier while trying to copy-in the
address. It also more naturally reflects the logic by the callers of
verify_iovec.
With this change in place I could remove "
if (!uaddr || msg_sys->msg_namelen == 0)
msg->msg_name = NULL
".
This change does not alter the user visible error logic as we ignore
msg_namelen as long as msg_name is NULL.
Also remove two unnecessary curly brackets in ___sys_recvmsg and change
comments to netdev style.
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 40,316 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void recalloc_sock(struct pool *pool, size_t len)
{
size_t old, new;
old = strlen(pool->sockbuf);
new = old + len + 1;
if (new < pool->sockbuf_size)
return;
new = new + (RBUFSIZE - (new % RBUFSIZE));
pool->sockbuf = realloc(pool->sockbuf, new);
if (!pool->sockbuf)
quithere(1, "Failed to realloc pool sockbuf");
memset(pool->sockbuf + old, 0, new - old);
pool->sockbuf_size = new;
}
Commit Message: Do some random sanity checking for stratum message parsing
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 36,670 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void media_device_unregister(struct media_device *mdev)
{
struct media_entity *entity;
struct media_entity *next;
list_for_each_entry_safe(entity, next, &mdev->entities, list)
media_device_unregister_entity(entity);
device_remove_file(&mdev->devnode.dev, &dev_attr_model);
media_devnode_unregister(&mdev->devnode);
}
Commit Message: [media] media-device: fix infoleak in ioctl media_enum_entities()
This fixes CVE-2014-1739.
Signed-off-by: Salva Peiró <speiro@ai2.upv.es>
Acked-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <m.chehab@samsung.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 39,323 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: nfsd4_decode_lookup(struct nfsd4_compoundargs *argp, struct nfsd4_lookup *lookup)
{
DECODE_HEAD;
READ_BUF(4);
lookup->lo_len = be32_to_cpup(p++);
READ_BUF(lookup->lo_len);
SAVEMEM(lookup->lo_name, lookup->lo_len);
if ((status = check_filename(lookup->lo_name, lookup->lo_len)))
return status;
DECODE_TAIL;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | 0 | 65,758 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::DoDrawArrays(
const char* function_name,
bool instanced,
GLenum mode,
GLint first,
GLsizei count,
GLsizei primcount) {
error::Error error = WillAccessBoundFramebufferForDraw();
if (error != error::kNoError)
return error;
if (!validators_->draw_mode.IsValid(mode)) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR_INVALID_ENUM(function_name, mode, "mode");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (count < 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "count < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (primcount < 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "primcount < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!CheckBoundDrawFramebufferValid(function_name)) {
return error::kNoError;
}
if (first < 0) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "first < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (feature_info_->IsWebGL2OrES3Context()) {
if (!AttribsTypeMatch()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"vertexAttrib function must match shader attrib type");
return error::kNoError;
}
DCHECK(state_.bound_transform_feedback.get());
if (state_.bound_transform_feedback->active() &&
!state_.bound_transform_feedback->paused()) {
if (mode != state_.bound_transform_feedback->primitive_mode()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"mode differs from active transformfeedback's primitiveMode");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLsizei vertices = 0;
bool valid = state_.bound_transform_feedback->GetVerticesNeededForDraw(
mode, count, primcount, &vertices);
if (!valid) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name,
"integer overflow calculating number of vertices "
"for transform feedback");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!buffer_manager()->RequestBuffersAccess(
state_.GetErrorState(), state_.bound_transform_feedback.get(),
state_.current_program->GetTransformFeedbackVaryingSizes(),
vertices, function_name, "transformfeedback buffers")) {
return error::kNoError;
}
}
if (!ValidateUniformBlockBackings(function_name)) {
return error::kNoError;
}
}
if (count == 0 || primcount == 0) {
LOCAL_RENDER_WARNING("Render count or primcount is 0.");
return error::kNoError;
}
base::CheckedNumeric<GLuint> checked_max_vertex = first;
checked_max_vertex += count - 1;
if (!checked_max_vertex.IsValid()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name,
"first + count overflow");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLuint max_vertex_accessed = checked_max_vertex.ValueOrDefault(0);
if (IsDrawValid(function_name, max_vertex_accessed, instanced, primcount)) {
if (!ClearUnclearedTextures()) {
LOCAL_SET_GL_ERROR(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "out of memory");
return error::kNoError;
}
bool simulated_attrib_0 = false;
if (!SimulateAttrib0(
function_name, max_vertex_accessed, &simulated_attrib_0)) {
return error::kNoError;
}
bool simulated_fixed_attribs = false;
if (SimulateFixedAttribs(
function_name, max_vertex_accessed, &simulated_fixed_attribs,
primcount)) {
bool textures_set = !PrepareTexturesForRender();
ApplyDirtyState();
if (!ValidateAndAdjustDrawBuffers(function_name)) {
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!instanced) {
api()->glDrawArraysFn(mode, first, count);
} else {
api()->glDrawArraysInstancedANGLEFn(mode, first, count, primcount);
}
if (state_.bound_transform_feedback.get()) {
state_.bound_transform_feedback->OnVerticesDrawn(mode, count,
primcount);
}
if (textures_set) {
RestoreStateForTextures();
}
if (simulated_fixed_attribs) {
RestoreStateForSimulatedFixedAttribs();
}
}
if (simulated_attrib_0) {
RestoreStateForAttrib(0, false);
}
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Implement immutable texture base/max level clamping
It seems some drivers fail to handle that gracefully, so let's always clamp
to be on the safe side.
BUG=877874
TEST=test case in the bug, gpu_unittests
R=kbr@chromium.org
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:android_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:linux_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:mac_optional_gpu_tests_rel;luci.chromium.try:win_optional_gpu_tests_rel
Change-Id: I6d93cb9389ea70525df4604112223604577582a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1194994
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#587264}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 145,869 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::DocumentAvailableInMainFrame(
RenderViewHost* render_view_host) {
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(WebContentsObserver, observers_,
DocumentAvailableInMainFrame());
}
Commit Message: Cancel JavaScript dialogs when an interstitial appears.
BUG=295695
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/24360011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@225026 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 110,607 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void RenderBox::computePositionedLogicalWidth()
{
if (isReplaced()) {
computePositionedLogicalWidthReplaced();
return;
}
const RenderBoxModelObject* containerBlock = toRenderBoxModelObject(container());
const int containerLogicalWidth = containingBlockLogicalWidthForPositioned(containerBlock);
TextDirection containerDirection = (document()->inQuirksMode()) ? parent()->style()->direction() : containerBlock->style()->direction();
bool isHorizontal = isHorizontalWritingMode();
const int bordersPlusPadding = borderAndPaddingLogicalWidth();
const Length marginLogicalLeft = isHorizontal ? style()->marginLeft() : style()->marginTop();
const Length marginLogicalRight = isHorizontal ? style()->marginRight() : style()->marginBottom();
int& marginLogicalLeftAlias = isHorizontal ? m_marginLeft : m_marginTop;
int& marginLogicalRightAlias = isHorizontal ? m_marginRight : m_marginBottom;
Length logicalLeft = style()->logicalLeft();
Length logicalRight = style()->logicalRight();
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*\
* For the purposes of this section and the next, the term "static position"
* (of an element) refers, roughly, to the position an element would have had
* in the normal flow. More precisely:
*
* * The static position for 'left' is the distance from the left edge of the
* containing block to the left margin edge of a hypothetical box that would
* have been the first box of the element if its 'position' property had
* been 'static' and 'float' had been 'none'. The value is negative if the
* hypothetical box is to the left of the containing block.
* * The static position for 'right' is the distance from the right edge of the
* containing block to the right margin edge of the same hypothetical box as
* above. The value is positive if the hypothetical box is to the left of the
* containing block's edge.
*
* But rather than actually calculating the dimensions of that hypothetical box,
* user agents are free to make a guess at its probable position.
*
* For the purposes of calculating the static position, the containing block of
* fixed positioned elements is the initial containing block instead of the
* viewport, and all scrollable boxes should be assumed to be scrolled to their
* origin.
\*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
computeInlineStaticDistance(logicalLeft, logicalRight, this, containerBlock, containerLogicalWidth, containerDirection);
int logicalWidthResult;
int logicalLeftResult;
computePositionedLogicalWidthUsing(style()->logicalWidth(), containerBlock, containerDirection,
containerLogicalWidth, bordersPlusPadding,
logicalLeft, logicalRight, marginLogicalLeft, marginLogicalRight,
logicalWidthResult, marginLogicalLeftAlias, marginLogicalRightAlias, logicalLeftResult);
setLogicalWidth(logicalWidthResult);
setLogicalLeft(logicalLeftResult);
if (!style()->logicalMaxWidth().isUndefined()) {
int maxLogicalWidth;
int maxMarginLogicalLeft;
int maxMarginLogicalRight;
int maxLogicalLeftPos;
computePositionedLogicalWidthUsing(style()->logicalMaxWidth(), containerBlock, containerDirection,
containerLogicalWidth, bordersPlusPadding,
logicalLeft, logicalRight, marginLogicalLeft, marginLogicalRight,
maxLogicalWidth, maxMarginLogicalLeft, maxMarginLogicalRight, maxLogicalLeftPos);
if (logicalWidth() > maxLogicalWidth) {
setLogicalWidth(maxLogicalWidth);
marginLogicalLeftAlias = maxMarginLogicalLeft;
marginLogicalRightAlias = maxMarginLogicalRight;
setLogicalLeft(maxLogicalLeftPos);
}
}
if (!style()->logicalMinWidth().isZero()) {
int minLogicalWidth;
int minMarginLogicalLeft;
int minMarginLogicalRight;
int minLogicalLeftPos;
computePositionedLogicalWidthUsing(style()->logicalMinWidth(), containerBlock, containerDirection,
containerLogicalWidth, bordersPlusPadding,
logicalLeft, logicalRight, marginLogicalLeft, marginLogicalRight,
minLogicalWidth, minMarginLogicalLeft, minMarginLogicalRight, minLogicalLeftPos);
if (logicalWidth() < minLogicalWidth) {
setLogicalWidth(minLogicalWidth);
marginLogicalLeftAlias = minMarginLogicalLeft;
marginLogicalRightAlias = minMarginLogicalRight;
setLogicalLeft(minLogicalLeftPos);
}
}
if (stretchesToMinIntrinsicLogicalWidth() && logicalWidth() < minPreferredLogicalWidth() - bordersPlusPadding) {
computePositionedLogicalWidthUsing(Length(minPreferredLogicalWidth() - bordersPlusPadding, Fixed), containerBlock, containerDirection,
containerLogicalWidth, bordersPlusPadding,
logicalLeft, logicalRight, marginLogicalLeft, marginLogicalRight,
logicalWidthResult, marginLogicalLeftAlias, marginLogicalRightAlias, logicalLeftResult);
setLogicalWidth(logicalWidthResult);
setLogicalLeft(logicalLeftResult);
}
setLogicalWidth(logicalWidth() + bordersPlusPadding);
}
Commit Message: Source/WebCore: Fix for bug 64046 - Wrong image height in absolutely positioned div in
relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
Test: fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html
* rendering/RenderBox.cpp:
(WebCore::RenderBox::availableLogicalHeightUsing):
LayoutTests: Test to cover absolutely positioned child with percentage height
in relatively positioned parent with bottom padding.
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=64046
Patch by Kulanthaivel Palanichamy <kulanthaivel@codeaurora.org> on 2011-07-21
Reviewed by David Hyatt.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent-expected.txt: Added.
* fast/css/absolute-child-with-percent-height-inside-relative-parent.html: Added.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@91533 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 101,561 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: calc_enc_length (gnutls_session_t session, int data_size,
int hash_size, uint8_t * pad, int random_pad,
unsigned block_algo, unsigned auth_cipher, uint16_t blocksize)
{
uint8_t rnd;
unsigned int length;
int ret;
*pad = 0;
switch (block_algo)
{
case CIPHER_STREAM:
length = data_size + hash_size;
if (auth_cipher)
length += AEAD_EXPLICIT_DATA_SIZE;
break;
case CIPHER_BLOCK:
ret = _gnutls_rnd (GNUTLS_RND_NONCE, &rnd, 1);
if (ret < 0)
return gnutls_assert_val(ret);
/* make rnd a multiple of blocksize */
if (session->security_parameters.version == GNUTLS_SSL3 ||
random_pad == 0)
{
rnd = 0;
}
else
{
rnd = (rnd / blocksize) * blocksize;
/* added to avoid the case of pad calculated 0
* seen below for pad calculation.
*/
if (rnd > blocksize)
rnd -= blocksize;
}
length = data_size + hash_size;
*pad = (uint8_t) (blocksize - (length % blocksize)) + rnd;
length += *pad;
if (_gnutls_version_has_explicit_iv
(session->security_parameters.version))
length += blocksize; /* for the IV */
break;
default:
return gnutls_assert_val(GNUTLS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
}
return length;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 11,307 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: int ip6_send_skb(struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct net *net = sock_net(skb->sk);
struct rt6_info *rt = (struct rt6_info *)skb_dst(skb);
int err;
err = ip6_local_out(net, skb->sk, skb);
if (err) {
if (err > 0)
err = net_xmit_errno(err);
if (err)
IP6_INC_STATS(net, rt->rt6i_idev,
IPSTATS_MIB_OUTDISCARDS);
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: fix out of bound writes in __ip6_append_data()
Andrey Konovalov and idaifish@gmail.com reported crashes caused by
one skb shared_info being overwritten from __ip6_append_data()
Andrey program lead to following state :
copy -4200 datalen 2000 fraglen 2040
maxfraglen 2040 alloclen 2048 transhdrlen 0 offset 0 fraggap 6200
The skb_copy_and_csum_bits(skb_prev, maxfraglen, data + transhdrlen,
fraggap, 0); is overwriting skb->head and skb_shared_info
Since we apparently detect this rare condition too late, move the
code earlier to even avoid allocating skb and risking crashes.
Once again, many thanks to Andrey and syzkaller team.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Tested-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Reported-by: <idaifish@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 64,642 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool OmniboxViewViews::IsCommandIdEnabled(int command_id) const {
if (command_id == IDS_APP_PASTE)
return !read_only() && !GetClipboardText().empty();
if (command_id == IDS_PASTE_AND_GO)
return !read_only() && model()->CanPasteAndGo(GetClipboardText());
return Textfield::IsCommandIdEnabled(command_id) ||
location_bar_view_->command_updater()->IsCommandEnabled(command_id);
}
Commit Message: Strip JavaScript schemas on Linux text drop
When dropping text onto the Omnibox, any leading JavaScript schemes
should be stripped to avoid a "self-XSS" attack. This stripping already
occurs in all cases except when plaintext is dropped on Linux. This CL
corrects that oversight.
Bug: 768910
Change-Id: I43af24ace4a13cf61d15a32eb9382dcdd498a062
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/685638
Reviewed-by: Justin Donnelly <jdonnelly@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Eric Lawrence <elawrence@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#504695}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 150,627 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int cypress_generic_port_probe(struct usb_serial_port *port)
{
struct usb_serial *serial = port->serial;
struct cypress_private *priv;
priv = kzalloc(sizeof(struct cypress_private), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!priv)
return -ENOMEM;
priv->comm_is_ok = !0;
spin_lock_init(&priv->lock);
if (kfifo_alloc(&priv->write_fifo, CYPRESS_BUF_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL)) {
kfree(priv);
return -ENOMEM;
}
/* Skip reset for FRWD device. It is a workaound:
device hangs if it receives SET_CONFIGURE in Configured
state. */
if (!is_frwd(serial->dev))
usb_reset_configuration(serial->dev);
priv->cmd_ctrl = 0;
priv->line_control = 0;
priv->termios_initialized = 0;
priv->rx_flags = 0;
/* Default packet format setting is determined by packet size.
Anything with a size larger then 9 must have a separate
count field since the 3 bit count field is otherwise too
small. Otherwise we can use the slightly more compact
format. This is in accordance with the cypress_m8 serial
converter app note. */
if (port->interrupt_out_size > 9)
priv->pkt_fmt = packet_format_1;
else
priv->pkt_fmt = packet_format_2;
if (interval > 0) {
priv->write_urb_interval = interval;
priv->read_urb_interval = interval;
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - read & write intervals forced to %d\n",
__func__, interval);
} else {
priv->write_urb_interval = port->interrupt_out_urb->interval;
priv->read_urb_interval = port->interrupt_in_urb->interval;
dev_dbg(&port->dev, "%s - intervals: read=%d write=%d\n",
__func__, priv->read_urb_interval,
priv->write_urb_interval);
}
usb_set_serial_port_data(port, priv);
port->port.drain_delay = 256;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: USB: cypress_m8: add endpoint sanity check
An attack using missing endpoints exists.
CVE-2016-3137
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 1 | 167,359 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void Plugin::NexeDidCrash(int32_t pp_error) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::NexeDidCrash (pp_error=%"NACL_PRId32")\n",
pp_error));
if (pp_error != PP_OK) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::NexeDidCrash: CallOnMainThread callback with"
" non-PP_OK arg -- SHOULD NOT HAPPEN\n"));
}
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::NexeDidCrash: crash event!\n"));
int exit_status = main_subprocess_.service_runtime()->exit_status();
if (-1 != exit_status) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF((("Plugin::NexeDidCrash: nexe exited with status %d"
" so this is a \"controlled crash\".\n"),
exit_status));
}
if (nexe_error_reported()) {
PLUGIN_PRINTF(("Plugin::NexeDidCrash: error already reported;"
" suppressing\n"));
return;
}
if (nacl_ready_state() == DONE) {
ReportDeadNexe();
} else {
ErrorInfo error_info;
error_info.SetReport(ERROR_START_PROXY_CRASH, // Not quite right.
"Nexe crashed during startup");
ReportLoadError(error_info);
}
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,375 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int digi_write_oob_command(struct usb_serial_port *port,
unsigned char *buf, int count, int interruptible)
{
int ret = 0;
int len;
struct usb_serial_port *oob_port = (struct usb_serial_port *)((struct digi_serial *)(usb_get_serial_data(port->serial)))->ds_oob_port;
struct digi_port *oob_priv = usb_get_serial_port_data(oob_port);
unsigned long flags = 0;
dev_dbg(&port->dev,
"digi_write_oob_command: TOP: port=%d, count=%d\n",
oob_priv->dp_port_num, count);
spin_lock_irqsave(&oob_priv->dp_port_lock, flags);
while (count > 0) {
while (oob_priv->dp_write_urb_in_use) {
cond_wait_interruptible_timeout_irqrestore(
&oob_port->write_wait, DIGI_RETRY_TIMEOUT,
&oob_priv->dp_port_lock, flags);
if (interruptible && signal_pending(current))
return -EINTR;
spin_lock_irqsave(&oob_priv->dp_port_lock, flags);
}
/* len must be a multiple of 4, so commands are not split */
len = min(count, oob_port->bulk_out_size);
if (len > 4)
len &= ~3;
memcpy(oob_port->write_urb->transfer_buffer, buf, len);
oob_port->write_urb->transfer_buffer_length = len;
ret = usb_submit_urb(oob_port->write_urb, GFP_ATOMIC);
if (ret == 0) {
oob_priv->dp_write_urb_in_use = 1;
count -= len;
buf += len;
}
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&oob_priv->dp_port_lock, flags);
if (ret)
dev_err(&port->dev, "%s: usb_submit_urb failed, ret=%d\n",
__func__, ret);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: USB: digi_acceleport: do sanity checking for the number of ports
The driver can be crashed with devices that expose crafted descriptors
with too few endpoints.
See: http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2016/Mar/61
Signed-off-by: Oliver Neukum <ONeukum@suse.com>
[johan: fix OOB endpoint check and add error messages ]
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 54,179 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static bool cmd_cfa_req_ext_error_code(IDEState *s, uint8_t cmd)
{
s->error = 0x09; /* miscellaneous error */
s->status = READY_STAT | SEEK_STAT;
ide_set_irq(s->bus);
return false;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 6,686 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: status_t MPEG4Extractor::parseQTMetaKey(off64_t offset, size_t size) {
if (size < 8) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t count;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(offset + 4, &count)) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mMetaKeyMap.size() > 0) {
ALOGW("'keys' atom seen again, discarding existing entries");
mMetaKeyMap.clear();
}
off64_t keyOffset = offset + 8;
off64_t stopOffset = offset + size;
for (size_t i = 1; i <= count; i++) {
if (keyOffset + 8 > stopOffset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t keySize;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(keyOffset, &keySize)
|| keySize < 8
|| keyOffset + keySize > stopOffset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t type;
if (!mDataSource->getUInt32(keyOffset + 4, &type)
|| type != FOURCC('m', 'd', 't', 'a')) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
keySize -= 8;
keyOffset += 8;
sp<ABuffer> keyData = new ABuffer(keySize);
if (keyData->data() == NULL) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mDataSource->readAt(
keyOffset, keyData->data(), keySize) < (ssize_t) keySize) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
AString key((const char *)keyData->data(), keySize);
mMetaKeyMap.add(i, key);
keyOffset += keySize;
}
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Check malloc result to avoid NPD
Bug: 28471206
Change-Id: Id5d055d76893d6f53a2e524ff5f282d1ddca3345
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 159,596 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static bool rt_cache_valid(const struct rtable *rt)
{
return rt &&
rt->dst.obsolete == DST_OBSOLETE_FORCE_CHK &&
!rt_is_expired(rt);
}
Commit Message: ipv4: try to cache dst_entries which would cause a redirect
Not caching dst_entries which cause redirects could be exploited by hosts
on the same subnet, causing a severe DoS attack. This effect aggravated
since commit f88649721268999 ("ipv4: fix dst race in sk_dst_get()").
Lookups causing redirects will be allocated with DST_NOCACHE set which
will force dst_release to free them via RCU. Unfortunately waiting for
RCU grace period just takes too long, we can end up with >1M dst_entries
waiting to be released and the system will run OOM. rcuos threads cannot
catch up under high softirq load.
Attaching the flag to emit a redirect later on to the specific skb allows
us to cache those dst_entries thus reducing the pressure on allocation
and deallocation.
This issue was discovered by Marcelo Leitner.
Cc: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: Marcelo Leitner <mleitner@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: Julian Anastasov <ja@ssi.bg>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | 0 | 44,363 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static IntPoint getLocationForKeyboardGeneratedContextMenu(Frame* frame)
{
FrameSelection* selection = frame->selection();
if (!selection->selection().isNonOrphanedCaretOrRange()
|| (selection->selection().isCaret() && !selection->selection().isContentEditable())) {
if (Node* focusedNode = getFocusedNode(frame))
return focusedNode->getRect().location();
return IntPoint(gContextMenuMargin, gContextMenuMargin);
}
IntRect firstRect = frame->editor()->firstRectForRange(selection->selection().firstRange().get());
return IntPoint(firstRect.x(), firstRect.maxY());
}
Commit Message: 2011-06-02 Joone Hur <joone.hur@collabora.co.uk>
Reviewed by Martin Robinson.
[GTK] Only load dictionaries if spell check is enabled
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=32879
We don't need to call enchant if enable-spell-checking is false.
* webkit/webkitwebview.cpp:
(webkit_web_view_update_settings): Skip loading dictionaries when enable-spell-checking is false.
(webkit_web_view_settings_notify): Ditto.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@87925 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 100,499 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: cifs_get_tcp_session(struct smb_vol *volume_info)
{
struct TCP_Server_Info *tcp_ses = NULL;
int rc;
cifs_dbg(FYI, "UNC: %s\n", volume_info->UNC);
/* see if we already have a matching tcp_ses */
tcp_ses = cifs_find_tcp_session(volume_info);
if (tcp_ses)
return tcp_ses;
tcp_ses = kzalloc(sizeof(struct TCP_Server_Info), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tcp_ses) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
goto out_err;
}
rc = cifs_crypto_shash_allocate(tcp_ses);
if (rc) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "could not setup hash structures rc %d\n", rc);
goto out_err;
}
tcp_ses->ops = volume_info->ops;
tcp_ses->vals = volume_info->vals;
cifs_set_net_ns(tcp_ses, get_net(current->nsproxy->net_ns));
tcp_ses->hostname = extract_hostname(volume_info->UNC);
if (IS_ERR(tcp_ses->hostname)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(tcp_ses->hostname);
goto out_err_crypto_release;
}
tcp_ses->noblocksnd = volume_info->noblocksnd;
tcp_ses->noautotune = volume_info->noautotune;
tcp_ses->tcp_nodelay = volume_info->sockopt_tcp_nodelay;
tcp_ses->in_flight = 0;
tcp_ses->credits = 1;
init_waitqueue_head(&tcp_ses->response_q);
init_waitqueue_head(&tcp_ses->request_q);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tcp_ses->pending_mid_q);
mutex_init(&tcp_ses->srv_mutex);
memcpy(tcp_ses->workstation_RFC1001_name,
volume_info->source_rfc1001_name, RFC1001_NAME_LEN_WITH_NULL);
memcpy(tcp_ses->server_RFC1001_name,
volume_info->target_rfc1001_name, RFC1001_NAME_LEN_WITH_NULL);
tcp_ses->session_estab = false;
tcp_ses->sequence_number = 0;
tcp_ses->lstrp = jiffies;
spin_lock_init(&tcp_ses->req_lock);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tcp_ses->tcp_ses_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tcp_ses->smb_ses_list);
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&tcp_ses->echo, cifs_echo_request);
memcpy(&tcp_ses->srcaddr, &volume_info->srcaddr,
sizeof(tcp_ses->srcaddr));
memcpy(&tcp_ses->dstaddr, &volume_info->dstaddr,
sizeof(tcp_ses->dstaddr));
/*
* at this point we are the only ones with the pointer
* to the struct since the kernel thread not created yet
* no need to spinlock this init of tcpStatus or srv_count
*/
tcp_ses->tcpStatus = CifsNew;
++tcp_ses->srv_count;
rc = ip_connect(tcp_ses);
if (rc < 0) {
cifs_dbg(VFS, "Error connecting to socket. Aborting operation.\n");
goto out_err_crypto_release;
}
/*
* since we're in a cifs function already, we know that
* this will succeed. No need for try_module_get().
*/
__module_get(THIS_MODULE);
tcp_ses->tsk = kthread_run(cifs_demultiplex_thread,
tcp_ses, "cifsd");
if (IS_ERR(tcp_ses->tsk)) {
rc = PTR_ERR(tcp_ses->tsk);
cifs_dbg(VFS, "error %d create cifsd thread\n", rc);
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
goto out_err_crypto_release;
}
tcp_ses->tcpStatus = CifsNeedNegotiate;
/* thread spawned, put it on the list */
spin_lock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
list_add(&tcp_ses->tcp_ses_list, &cifs_tcp_ses_list);
spin_unlock(&cifs_tcp_ses_lock);
cifs_fscache_get_client_cookie(tcp_ses);
/* queue echo request delayed work */
queue_delayed_work(cifsiod_wq, &tcp_ses->echo, SMB_ECHO_INTERVAL);
return tcp_ses;
out_err_crypto_release:
cifs_crypto_shash_release(tcp_ses);
put_net(cifs_net_ns(tcp_ses));
out_err:
if (tcp_ses) {
if (!IS_ERR(tcp_ses->hostname))
kfree(tcp_ses->hostname);
if (tcp_ses->ssocket)
sock_release(tcp_ses->ssocket);
kfree(tcp_ses);
}
return ERR_PTR(rc);
}
Commit Message: cifs: fix off-by-one bug in build_unc_path_to_root
commit 839db3d10a (cifs: fix up handling of prefixpath= option) changed
the code such that the vol->prepath no longer contained a leading
delimiter and then fixed up the places that accessed that field to
account for that change.
One spot in build_unc_path_to_root was missed however. When doing the
pointer addition on pos, that patch failed to account for the fact that
we had already incremented "pos" by one when adding the length of the
prepath. This caused a buffer overrun by one byte.
This patch fixes the problem by correcting the handling of "pos".
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v3.8+
Reported-by: Marcus Moeller <marcus.moeller@gmx.ch>
Reported-by: Ken Fallon <ken.fallon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 29,818 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int adf_ctl_is_device_in_use(int id)
{
struct list_head *itr, *head = adf_devmgr_get_head();
list_for_each(itr, head) {
struct adf_accel_dev *dev =
list_entry(itr, struct adf_accel_dev, list);
if (id == dev->accel_id || id == ADF_CFG_ALL_DEVICES) {
if (adf_devmgr_in_reset(dev) || adf_dev_in_use(dev)) {
pr_info("QAT: device qat_dev%d is busy\n",
dev->accel_id);
return -EBUSY;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: crypto: prefix module autoloading with "crypto-"
This prefixes all crypto module loading with "crypto-" so we never run
the risk of exposing module auto-loading to userspace via a crypto API,
as demonstrated by Mathias Krause:
https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/3/4/70
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 47,475 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: RenderFrameHost* WebContentsImpl::GetFocusedFrameIncludingInnerWebContents() {
WebContentsImpl* contents = this;
FrameTreeNode* focused_node = contents->frame_tree_.GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_node)
return nullptr;
while (true) {
contents = contents->node_.GetInnerWebContentsInFrame(focused_node);
if (!contents)
return focused_node->current_frame_host();
focused_node = contents->frame_tree_.GetFocusedFrame();
if (!focused_node)
return contents->GetMainFrame();
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent renderer initiated back navigation to cancel a browser one.
Renderer initiated back/forward navigations must not be able to cancel ongoing
browser initiated navigation if they are not user initiated.
Note: 'normal' renderer initiated navigation uses the
FrameHost::BeginNavigation() path. A code similar to this patch is done
in NavigatorImpl::OnBeginNavigation().
Test:
-----
Added: NavigationBrowserTest.
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnload
* HistoryBackInBeforeUnloadAfterSetTimeout
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationNoUserGesture
* HistoryBackCancelPendingNavigationUserGesture
Fixed:
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_2.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_3.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_4.html
* (WPT) .../the-history-interface/traverse_the_history_5.html
Bug: 879965
Change-Id: I1a9bfaaea1ffc219e6c32f6e676b660e746c578c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1209744
Commit-Queue: Arthur Sonzogni <arthursonzogni@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mustaq Ahmed <mustaq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#592823}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 144,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: cosine_seek_read(wtap *wth, gint64 seek_off, struct wtap_pkthdr *phdr,
Buffer *buf, int *err, gchar **err_info)
{
char line[COSINE_LINE_LENGTH];
if (file_seek(wth->random_fh, seek_off, SEEK_SET, err) == -1)
return FALSE;
if (file_gets(line, COSINE_LINE_LENGTH, wth->random_fh) == NULL) {
*err = file_error(wth->random_fh, err_info);
if (*err == 0) {
*err = WTAP_ERR_SHORT_READ;
}
return FALSE;
}
/* Parse the header and convert the ASCII hex dump to binary data */
return parse_cosine_packet(wth->random_fh, phdr, buf, line, err,
err_info);
}
Commit Message: Don't treat the packet length as unsigned.
The scanf family of functions are as annoyingly bad at handling unsigned
numbers as strtoul() is - both of them are perfectly willing to accept a
value beginning with a negative sign as an unsigned value. When using
strtoul(), you can compensate for this by explicitly checking for a '-'
as the first character of the string, but you can't do that with
sscanf().
So revert to having pkt_len be signed, and scanning it with %d, but
check for a negative value and fail if we see a negative value.
Bug: 12395
Change-Id: I43b458a73b0934e9a5c2c89d34eac5a8f21a7455
Reviewed-on: https://code.wireshark.org/review/15223
Reviewed-by: Guy Harris <guy@alum.mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 51,774 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
unsigned long range_end = mm->brk + 0x02000000;
return randomize_range(mm->brk, range_end, 0) ? : mm->brk;
}
Commit Message: ARM: 7735/2: Preserve the user r/w register TPIDRURW on context switch and fork
Since commit 6a1c53124aa1 the user writeable TLS register was zeroed to
prevent it from being used as a covert channel between two tasks.
There are more and more applications coming to Windows RT,
Wine could support them, but mostly they expect to have
the thread environment block (TEB) in TPIDRURW.
This patch preserves that register per thread instead of clearing it.
Unlike the TPIDRURO, which is already switched, the TPIDRURW
can be updated from userspace so needs careful treatment in the case that we
modify TPIDRURW and call fork(). To avoid this we must always read
TPIDRURW in copy_thread.
Signed-off-by: André Hentschel <nerv@dawncrow.de>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Austin <jonathan.austin@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 58,330 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void VerifyDidPreviewPage(bool generate_draft_pages, int page_number) {
bool msg_found = false;
size_t msg_count = render_thread_.sink().message_count();
for (size_t i = 0; i < msg_count; ++i) {
const IPC::Message* msg = render_thread_.sink().GetMessageAt(i);
if (msg->type() == PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage::ID) {
PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage::Param page_param;
PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewPage::Read(msg, &page_param);
if (page_param.a.page_number == page_number) {
msg_found = true;
if (generate_draft_pages)
EXPECT_NE(0U, page_param.a.data_size);
else
EXPECT_EQ(0U, page_param.a.data_size);
break;
}
}
}
ASSERT_EQ(generate_draft_pages, msg_found);
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 97,551 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void inet6_sk_rx_dst_set(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
{
struct dst_entry *dst = skb_dst(skb);
if (dst && dst_hold_safe(dst)) {
const struct rt6_info *rt = (const struct rt6_info *)dst;
sk->sk_rx_dst = dst;
inet_sk(sk)->rx_dst_ifindex = skb->skb_iif;
inet6_sk(sk)->rx_dst_cookie = rt6_get_cookie(rt);
}
}
Commit Message: tcp: take care of truncations done by sk_filter()
With syzkaller help, Marco Grassi found a bug in TCP stack,
crashing in tcp_collapse()
Root cause is that sk_filter() can truncate the incoming skb,
but TCP stack was not really expecting this to happen.
It probably was expecting a simple DROP or ACCEPT behavior.
We first need to make sure no part of TCP header could be removed.
Then we need to adjust TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq
Many thanks to syzkaller team and Marco for giving us a reproducer.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: Marco Grassi <marco.gra@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 49,283 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: int64_t MetricsLog::GetBuildTime() {
static int64_t integral_build_time = 0;
if (!integral_build_time)
integral_build_time = static_cast<int64_t>(base::GetBuildTime().ToTimeT());
return integral_build_time;
}
Commit Message: Add CPU metrics provider and Add CPU/GPU provider for UKM.
Bug: 907674
Change-Id: I61b88aeac8d2a7ff81d812fa5a267f48203ec7e2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1381376
Commit-Queue: Nik Bhagat <nikunjb@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#618037}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | 0 | 130,448 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static bool decode_paged_results_request(void *mem_ctx, DATA_BLOB in, void *_out)
{
void **out = (void **)_out;
DATA_BLOB cookie;
struct asn1_data *data = asn1_init(mem_ctx);
struct ldb_paged_control *lprc;
if (!data) return false;
if (!asn1_load(data, in)) {
return false;
}
lprc = talloc(mem_ctx, struct ldb_paged_control);
if (!lprc) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_start_tag(data, ASN1_SEQUENCE(0))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_read_Integer(data, &(lprc->size))) {
return false;
}
if (!asn1_read_OctetString(data, mem_ctx, &cookie)) {
return false;
}
lprc->cookie_len = cookie.length;
if (lprc->cookie_len) {
lprc->cookie = talloc_memdup(lprc, cookie.data, cookie.length);
if (!(lprc->cookie)) {
return false;
}
} else {
lprc->cookie = NULL;
}
if (!asn1_end_tag(data)) {
return false;
}
*out = lprc;
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 639 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: int SetFrameFlags(int frame_num, int num_temp_layers) {
int frame_flags = 0;
if (num_temp_layers == 2) {
if (frame_num % 2 == 0) {
frame_flags = VP8_EFLAG_NO_REF_GF | VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_GF |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_ARF;
} else {
frame_flags = VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_ARF | VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_LAST |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_ENTROPY;
}
} else if (num_temp_layers == 3) {
if (frame_num % 4 == 0) {
frame_flags = VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_GF | VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_ARF |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_REF_GF;
} else if ((frame_num - 2) % 4 == 0) {
frame_flags = VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_ARF | VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_LAST;
} else if ((frame_num - 1) % 2 == 0) {
frame_flags = VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_GF | VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_ARF |
VP8_EFLAG_NO_UPD_LAST;
}
}
return frame_flags;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 164,397 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: HTMLInputElement::~HTMLInputElement()
{
setForm(0);
if (isRadioButton())
document().formController()->checkedRadioButtons().removeButton(this);
if (m_hasTouchEventHandler)
document().didRemoveEventTargetNode(this);
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 114,031 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int loop_exit_cb(int id, void *ptr, void *data)
{
struct loop_device *lo = ptr;
loop_remove(lo);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: loop: fix concurrent lo_open/lo_release
范龙飞 reports that KASAN can report a use-after-free in __lock_acquire.
The reason is due to insufficient serialization in lo_release(), which
will continue to use the loop device even after it has decremented the
lo_refcnt to zero.
In the meantime, another process can come in, open the loop device
again as it is being shut down. Confusion ensues.
Reported-by: 范龙飞 <long7573@126.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 84,722 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool has_received_shutdown_request() {
return has_received_shutdown_request_;
}
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,549 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: xfs_icache_free_eofblocks(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
struct xfs_eofblocks *eofb)
{
return __xfs_icache_free_eofblocks(mp, eofb, xfs_inode_free_eofblocks,
XFS_ICI_EOFBLOCKS_TAG);
}
Commit Message: xfs: validate cached inodes are free when allocated
A recent fuzzed filesystem image cached random dcache corruption
when the reproducer was run. This often showed up as panics in
lookup_slow() on a null inode->i_ops pointer when doing pathwalks.
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000000
....
Call Trace:
lookup_slow+0x44/0x60
walk_component+0x3dd/0x9f0
link_path_walk+0x4a7/0x830
path_lookupat+0xc1/0x470
filename_lookup+0x129/0x270
user_path_at_empty+0x36/0x40
path_listxattr+0x98/0x110
SyS_listxattr+0x13/0x20
do_syscall_64+0xf5/0x280
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x42/0xb7
but had many different failure modes including deadlocks trying to
lock the inode that was just allocated or KASAN reports of
use-after-free violations.
The cause of the problem was a corrupt INOBT on a v4 fs where the
root inode was marked as free in the inobt record. Hence when we
allocated an inode, it chose the root inode to allocate, found it in
the cache and re-initialised it.
We recently fixed a similar inode allocation issue caused by inobt
record corruption problem in xfs_iget_cache_miss() in commit
ee457001ed6c ("xfs: catch inode allocation state mismatch
corruption"). This change adds similar checks to the cache-hit path
to catch it, and turns the reproducer into a corruption shutdown
situation.
Reported-by: Wen Xu <wen.xu@gatech.edu>
Signed-Off-By: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
[darrick: fix typos in comment]
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <darrick.wong@oracle.com>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 79,950 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void ScreenOrientationDispatcherHost::ResetCurrentLock() {
if (current_lock_) {
delete current_lock_;
current_lock_ = 0;
}
}
Commit Message: Cleanups in ScreenOrientationDispatcherHost.
BUG=None
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/408213003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@284786 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 111,197 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void Document::SetCompatibilityMode(CompatibilityMode mode) {
if (compatibility_mode_locked_ || mode == compatibility_mode_)
return;
if (compatibility_mode_ == kQuirksMode)
UseCounter::Count(*this, WebFeature::kQuirksModeDocument);
else if (compatibility_mode_ == kLimitedQuirksMode)
UseCounter::Count(*this, WebFeature::kLimitedQuirksModeDocument);
compatibility_mode_ = mode;
GetSelectorQueryCache().Invalidate();
}
Commit Message: Cleanup and remove dead code in SetFocusedElement
This early-out was added in:
https://crrev.com/ce8ea3446283965c7eabab592cbffe223b1cf2bc
Back then, we applied fragment focus in LayoutUpdated() which could
cause this issue. This got cleaned up in:
https://crrev.com/45236fd563e9df53dc45579be1f3d0b4784885a2
so that focus is no longer applied after layout.
+Cleanup: Goto considered harmful
Bug: 795381
Change-Id: Ifeb4d2e03e872fd48cca6720b1d4de36ad1ecbb7
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1524417
Commit-Queue: David Bokan <bokan@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Stefan Zager <szager@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#641101}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 129,855 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void dequantization_int(int x, int y, Jpeg2000Cblk *cblk,
Jpeg2000Component *comp,
Jpeg2000T1Context *t1, Jpeg2000Band *band)
{
int i, j;
int w = cblk->coord[0][1] - cblk->coord[0][0];
for (j = 0; j < (cblk->coord[1][1] - cblk->coord[1][0]); ++j) {
int32_t *datap = &comp->i_data[(comp->coord[0][1] - comp->coord[0][0]) * (y + j) + x];
int *src = t1->data[j];
for (i = 0; i < w; ++i)
datap[i] = (src[i] * band->i_stepsize + (1 << 14)) >> 15;
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/jpeg2000dec: prevent out of array accesses in pixel addressing
Fixes Ticket2921
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 27,995 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: PHP_MINFO_FUNCTION(mb_regex)
{
char buf[32];
php_info_print_table_start();
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Multibyte (japanese) regex support", "enabled");
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d.%d.%d",
ONIGURUMA_VERSION_MAJOR,
ONIGURUMA_VERSION_MINOR,
ONIGURUMA_VERSION_TEENY);
#ifdef PHP_ONIG_BUNDLED
#ifdef USE_COMBINATION_EXPLOSION_CHECK
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Multibyte regex (oniguruma) backtrack check", "On");
#else /* USE_COMBINATION_EXPLOSION_CHECK */
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Multibyte regex (oniguruma) backtrack check", "Off");
#endif /* USE_COMBINATION_EXPLOSION_CHECK */
#endif /* PHP_BUNDLED_ONIG */
php_info_print_table_row(2, "Multibyte regex (oniguruma) version", buf);
php_info_print_table_end();
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 51,389 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void LocalFrame::PropagateInertToChildFrames() {
for (Frame* child = Tree().FirstChild(); child;
child = child->Tree().NextSibling()) {
child->SetIsInert(is_inert_ ||
ToHTMLFrameOwnerElement(child->Owner())->IsInert());
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | 0 | 154,872 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int mp_get_count(struct sb_uart_state *state, struct serial_icounter_struct *icnt)
{
struct serial_icounter_struct icount;
struct sb_uart_icount cnow;
struct sb_uart_port *port = state->port;
spin_lock_irq(&port->lock);
memcpy(&cnow, &port->icount, sizeof(struct sb_uart_icount));
spin_unlock_irq(&port->lock);
icount.cts = cnow.cts;
icount.dsr = cnow.dsr;
icount.rng = cnow.rng;
icount.dcd = cnow.dcd;
icount.rx = cnow.rx;
icount.tx = cnow.tx;
icount.frame = cnow.frame;
icount.overrun = cnow.overrun;
icount.parity = cnow.parity;
icount.brk = cnow.brk;
icount.buf_overrun = cnow.buf_overrun;
return copy_to_user(icnt, &icount, sizeof(icount)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
Commit Message: Staging: sb105x: info leak in mp_get_count()
The icount.reserved[] array isn't initialized so it leaks stack
information to userspace.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 1 | 165,961 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void bubbleSort(double array[])
{
for (int j = 0; j < 3; ++j) {
int kk = j;
for (int k = j + 1; k < 4; ++k) {
if (array[k] < array[kk]) {
kk = k;
}
}
double tmp = array[j];
array[j] = array[kk];
array[kk] = tmp;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 8,068 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void virtio_device_unrealize(DeviceState *dev, Error **errp)
{
VirtIODevice *vdev = VIRTIO_DEVICE(dev);
VirtioDeviceClass *vdc = VIRTIO_DEVICE_GET_CLASS(dev);
Error *err = NULL;
virtio_bus_device_unplugged(vdev);
if (vdc->unrealize != NULL) {
vdc->unrealize(dev, &err);
if (err != NULL) {
error_propagate(errp, err);
return;
}
}
g_free(vdev->bus_name);
vdev->bus_name = NULL;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 9,200 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: ui::AXTreeIDRegistry::AXTreeID RenderFrameHostImpl::GetAXTreeID() {
return ax_tree_id_;
}
Commit Message: If a page calls |window.focus()|, kick it out of fullscreen.
BUG=776418, 800056
Change-Id: I1880fe600e4814c073f247c43b1c1ac80c8fc017
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/852378
Reviewed-by: Nasko Oskov <nasko@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Philip Jägenstedt <foolip@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#533790}
CWE ID: | 0 | 147,625 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: CC_DUP_WARN(ScanEnv *env, OnigCodePoint from ARG_UNUSED, OnigCodePoint to ARG_UNUSED)
{
if (onig_warn == onig_null_warn || !RTEST(ruby_verbose)) return ;
if (IS_SYNTAX_BV(env->syntax, ONIG_SYN_WARN_CC_DUP) &&
!(env->warnings_flag & ONIG_SYN_WARN_CC_DUP)) {
#ifdef WARN_ALL_CC_DUP
onig_syntax_warn(env, "character class has duplicated range: %04x-%04x", from, to);
#else
env->warnings_flag |= ONIG_SYN_WARN_CC_DUP;
onig_syntax_warn(env, "character class has duplicated range");
#endif
}
}
Commit Message: Merge pull request #134 from k-takata/fix-segv-in-error-str
Fix SEGV in onig_error_code_to_str() (Fix #132)
CWE ID: CWE-476 | 0 | 87,861 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void exit_fs(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
struct fs_struct * fs = tsk->fs;
if (fs) {
task_lock(tsk);
tsk->fs = NULL;
task_unlock(tsk);
put_fs_struct(fs);
}
}
Commit Message: Move "exit_robust_list" into mm_release()
We don't want to get rid of the futexes just at exit() time, we want to
drop them when doing an execve() too, since that gets rid of the
previous VM image too.
Doing it at mm_release() time means that we automatically always do it
when we disassociate a VM map from the task.
Reported-by: pageexec@freemail.hu
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>
Cc: Alex Efros <powerman@powerman.name>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 22,110 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void ConvertDoubleToURational(double value, unsigned int *numerator,
unsigned int *denominator) {
float2urat(value, 0xFFFFFFFFU, numerator, denominator);
}
Commit Message: Fix possible out of bounds access
Bug: 28868315
Change-Id: I2b416c662f9ad7f9b3c6cf973a39c6693c66775a
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 159,453 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: acpi_map_lookup(acpi_physical_address phys, acpi_size size)
{
struct acpi_ioremap *map;
list_for_each_entry_rcu(map, &acpi_ioremaps, list)
if (map->phys <= phys &&
phys + size <= map->phys + map->size)
return map;
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: acpi: Disable ACPI table override if securelevel is set
From the kernel documentation (initrd_table_override.txt):
If the ACPI_INITRD_TABLE_OVERRIDE compile option is true, it is possible
to override nearly any ACPI table provided by the BIOS with an
instrumented, modified one.
When securelevel is set, the kernel should disallow any unauthenticated
changes to kernel space. ACPI tables contain code invoked by the kernel, so
do not allow ACPI tables to be overridden if securelevel is set.
Signed-off-by: Linn Crosetto <linn@hpe.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 53,828 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: Node* Range::commonAncestorContainer(Node* containerA, Node* containerB)
{
for (Node* parentA = containerA; parentA; parentA = parentA->parentNode()) {
for (Node* parentB = containerB; parentB; parentB = parentB->parentNode()) {
if (parentA == parentB)
return parentA;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: There are too many poorly named functions to create a fragment from markup
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=87339
Reviewed by Eric Seidel.
Source/WebCore:
Moved all functions that create a fragment from markup to markup.h/cpp.
There should be no behavioral change.
* dom/Range.cpp:
(WebCore::Range::createContextualFragment):
* dom/Range.h: Removed createDocumentFragmentForElement.
* dom/ShadowRoot.cpp:
(WebCore::ShadowRoot::setInnerHTML):
* editing/markup.cpp:
(WebCore::createFragmentFromMarkup):
(WebCore::createFragmentForInnerOuterHTML): Renamed from createFragmentFromSource.
(WebCore::createFragmentForTransformToFragment): Moved from XSLTProcessor.
(WebCore::removeElementPreservingChildren): Moved from Range.
(WebCore::createContextualFragment): Ditto.
* editing/markup.h:
* html/HTMLElement.cpp:
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setInnerHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::setOuterHTML):
(WebCore::HTMLElement::insertAdjacentHTML):
* inspector/DOMPatchSupport.cpp:
(WebCore::DOMPatchSupport::patchNode): Added a FIXME since this code should be using
one of the functions listed in markup.h
* xml/XSLTProcessor.cpp:
(WebCore::XSLTProcessor::transformToFragment):
Source/WebKit/qt:
Replace calls to Range::createDocumentFragmentForElement by calls to
createContextualDocumentFragment.
* Api/qwebelement.cpp:
(QWebElement::appendInside):
(QWebElement::prependInside):
(QWebElement::prependOutside):
(QWebElement::appendOutside):
(QWebElement::encloseContentsWith):
(QWebElement::encloseWith):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@118414 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 100,230 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool QuicStreamSequencerBuffer::HasBytesToRead() const {
return ReadableBytes() > 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix OOB Write in QuicStreamSequencerBuffer::OnStreamData
BUG=778505
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.android:android_cronet_tester;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I1dfd1d26a2c7ee8fe047f7fe6e4ac2e9b97efa52
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/748282
Commit-Queue: Ryan Hamilton <rch@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Zhongyi Shi <zhongyi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513144}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 150,178 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void sdp_disc_server_rsp(tCONN_CB* p_ccb, BT_HDR* p_msg) {
uint8_t *p, rsp_pdu;
bool invalid_pdu = true;
#if (SDP_DEBUG_RAW == TRUE)
SDP_TRACE_WARNING("sdp_disc_server_rsp disc_state:%d", p_ccb->disc_state);
#endif
/* stop inactivity timer when we receive a response */
alarm_cancel(p_ccb->sdp_conn_timer);
/* Got a reply!! Check what we got back */
p = (uint8_t*)(p_msg + 1) + p_msg->offset;
uint8_t* p_end = p + p_msg->len;
BE_STREAM_TO_UINT8(rsp_pdu, p);
p_msg->len--;
switch (rsp_pdu) {
case SDP_PDU_SERVICE_SEARCH_RSP:
if (p_ccb->disc_state == SDP_DISC_WAIT_HANDLES) {
process_service_search_rsp(p_ccb, p, p_end);
invalid_pdu = false;
}
break;
case SDP_PDU_SERVICE_ATTR_RSP:
if (p_ccb->disc_state == SDP_DISC_WAIT_ATTR) {
process_service_attr_rsp(p_ccb, p, p_end);
invalid_pdu = false;
}
break;
case SDP_PDU_SERVICE_SEARCH_ATTR_RSP:
if (p_ccb->disc_state == SDP_DISC_WAIT_SEARCH_ATTR) {
process_service_search_attr_rsp(p_ccb, p, p_end);
invalid_pdu = false;
}
break;
}
if (invalid_pdu) {
SDP_TRACE_WARNING("SDP - Unexp. PDU: %d in state: %d", rsp_pdu,
p_ccb->disc_state);
sdp_disconnect(p_ccb, SDP_GENERIC_ERROR);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix copy length calculation in sdp_copy_raw_data
Test: compilation
Bug: 110216176
Change-Id: Ic4a19c9f0fe8cd592bc6c25dcec7b1da49ff7459
(cherry picked from commit 23aa15743397b345f3d948289fe90efa2a2e2b3e)
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 162,905 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void ChromeContentBrowserClient::RegisterOutOfProcessServices(
OutOfProcessServiceMap* services) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_ISOLATED_XR_SERVICE)
(*services)[device::mojom::kVrIsolatedServiceName] = base::BindRepeating(
&l10n_util::GetStringUTF16, IDS_ISOLATED_XR_PROCESS_NAME);
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINTING)
(*services)[printing::mojom::kServiceName] =
base::BindRepeating(&l10n_util::GetStringUTF16,
IDS_UTILITY_PROCESS_PDF_COMPOSITOR_SERVICE_NAME);
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINT_PREVIEW) || \
(BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINTING) && defined(OS_WIN))
(*services)[printing::mojom::kChromePrintingServiceName] =
base::BindRepeating(&l10n_util::GetStringUTF16,
IDS_UTILITY_PROCESS_PRINTING_SERVICE_NAME);
#endif
(*services)[heap_profiling::mojom::kServiceName] = base::BindRepeating(
&l10n_util::GetStringUTF16, IDS_UTILITY_PROCESS_PROFILING_SERVICE_NAME);
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS) || defined(OS_ANDROID)
(*services)[chrome::mojom::kMediaGalleryUtilServiceName] =
base::BindRepeating(&l10n_util::GetStringUTF16,
IDS_UTILITY_PROCESS_MEDIA_GALLERY_UTILITY_NAME);
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
(*services)[chrome::mojom::kRemovableStorageWriterServiceName] =
base::BindRepeating(&l10n_util::GetStringUTF16,
IDS_UTILITY_PROCESS_IMAGE_WRITER_NAME);
#endif
#if defined(OS_WIN)
(*services)[chrome::mojom::kUtilWinServiceName] = base::BindRepeating(
&l10n_util::GetStringUTF16, IDS_UTILITY_PROCESS_UTILITY_WIN_NAME);
#endif
#if defined(OS_WIN) && BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_EXTENSIONS)
(*services)[chrome::mojom::kWifiUtilWinServiceName] =
base::BindRepeating(&l10n_util::GetStringUTF16,
IDS_UTILITY_PROCESS_WIFI_CREDENTIALS_GETTER_NAME);
#endif
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
(*services)[chrome::mojom::kProfileImportServiceName] = base::BindRepeating(
&l10n_util::GetStringUTF16, IDS_UTILITY_PROCESS_PROFILE_IMPORTER_NAME);
(*services)[proxy_resolver::mojom::kProxyResolverServiceName] =
base::BindRepeating(&l10n_util::GetStringUTF16,
IDS_UTILITY_PROCESS_PROXY_RESOLVER_NAME);
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINTING) && defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
(*services)[chrome::mojom::kCupsIppParserServiceName] =
base::BindRepeating(&l10n_util::GetStringUTF16,
IDS_UTILITY_PROCESS_CUPS_IPP_PARSER_SERVICE_NAME);
#endif
#if defined(FULL_SAFE_BROWSING) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
(*services)[chrome::mojom::kFileUtilServiceName] = base::BindRepeating(
&l10n_util::GetStringUTF16, IDS_UTILITY_PROCESS_FILE_UTILITY_NAME);
#endif
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
(*services)[patch::mojom::kServiceName] = base::BindRepeating(
&l10n_util::GetStringUTF16, IDS_UTILITY_PROCESS_PATCH_NAME);
#endif
(*services)[unzip::mojom::kServiceName] = base::BindRepeating(
&l10n_util::GetStringUTF16, IDS_UTILITY_PROCESS_UNZIP_NAME);
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
ash_service_registry::RegisterOutOfProcessServices(services);
(*services)[chromeos::ime::mojom::kServiceName] = base::BindRepeating(
&l10n_util::GetStringUTF16, IDS_UTILITY_PROCESS_IME_SERVICE_NAME);
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_SIMPLE_BROWSER_SERVICE_OUT_OF_PROCESS)
if (base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kLaunchSimpleBrowserSwitch)) {
(*services)[simple_browser::mojom::kServiceName] =
base::BindRepeating([]() -> base::string16 {
return base::ASCIIToUTF16("Simple Browser");
});
}
#endif
#if !defined(OS_ANDROID)
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(mirroring::features::kMirroringService) &&
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kAudioServiceAudioStreams) &&
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService)) {
(*services)[mirroring::mojom::kServiceName] =
base::BindRepeating(&base::ASCIIToUTF16, "Mirroring Service");
}
#endif
}
Commit Message: [GuestView] - Introduce MimeHandlerViewAttachHelper
This CL is for the most part a mechanical change which extracts almost
all the frame-based MimeHandlerView code out of
ExtensionsGuestViewMessageFilter. This change both removes the current
clutter form EGVMF as well as fixesa race introduced when the
frame-based logic was added to EGVMF. The reason for the race was that
EGVMF is destroyed on IO thread but all the access to it (for
frame-based MHV) are from UI.
TBR=avi@chromium.org,lazyboy@chromium.org
Bug: 659750, 896679, 911161, 918861
Change-Id: I6474b870e4d56daa68be03637bb633665d9f9dda
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1401451
Commit-Queue: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: James MacLean <wjmaclean@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ehsan Karamad <ekaramad@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621155}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | 0 | 152,392 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int list_files(void)
{
sc_path_t path;
int r;
sc_format_path("3F00", &path);
r = enum_dir(path, 0);
return r;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 78,732 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: dump_isodirrec(FILE *out, const unsigned char *isodirrec)
{
fprintf(out, " l %d,",
toi(isodirrec + DR_length_offset, DR_length_size));
fprintf(out, " a %d,",
toi(isodirrec + DR_ext_attr_length_offset, DR_ext_attr_length_size));
fprintf(out, " ext 0x%x,",
toi(isodirrec + DR_extent_offset, DR_extent_size));
fprintf(out, " s %d,",
toi(isodirrec + DR_size_offset, DR_extent_size));
fprintf(out, " f 0x%x,",
toi(isodirrec + DR_flags_offset, DR_flags_size));
fprintf(out, " u %d,",
toi(isodirrec + DR_file_unit_size_offset, DR_file_unit_size_size));
fprintf(out, " ilv %d,",
toi(isodirrec + DR_interleave_offset, DR_interleave_size));
fprintf(out, " seq %d,",
toi(isodirrec + DR_volume_sequence_number_offset,
DR_volume_sequence_number_size));
fprintf(out, " nl %d:",
toi(isodirrec + DR_name_len_offset, DR_name_len_size));
fprintf(out, " `%.*s'",
toi(isodirrec + DR_name_len_offset, DR_name_len_size),
isodirrec + DR_name_offset);
}
Commit Message: Issue 717: Fix integer overflow when computing location of volume descriptor
The multiplication here defaulted to 'int' but calculations
of file positions should always use int64_t. A simple cast
suffices to fix this since the base location is always 32 bits
for ISO, so multiplying by the sector size will never overflow
a 64-bit integer.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 51,194 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void RenderFrameHostImpl::UpdateFrameFrozenState() {
if (!base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kFreezeFramesOnVisibility))
return;
if (is_loading_)
return;
if (visibility_ == blink::mojom::FrameVisibility::kNotRendered) {
frame_->SetLifecycleState(blink::mojom::FrameLifecycleState::kFrozen);
} else if (visibility_ ==
blink::mojom::FrameVisibility::kRenderedOutOfViewport) {
frame_->SetLifecycleState(
blink::mojom::FrameLifecycleState::kFrozenAutoResumeMedia);
} else {
frame_->SetLifecycleState(blink::mojom::FrameLifecycleState::kRunning);
}
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 139,428 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void gd_stderr_error(int priority, const char *format, va_list args)
{
switch (priority) {
case GD_ERROR:
fputs("GD Error: ", stderr);
break;
case GD_WARNING:
fputs("GD Warning: ", stderr);
break;
case GD_NOTICE:
fputs("GD Notice: ", stderr);
break;
case GD_INFO:
fputs("GD Info: ", stderr);
break;
case GD_DEBUG:
fputs("GD Debug: ", stderr);
break;
}
vfprintf(stderr, format, args);
fflush(stderr);
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 73,102 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: skip_to (file_offset file_pos, lin file_line)
{
FILE *i = pfp;
FILE *o = stdout;
int c;
assert(p_base <= file_pos);
if ((verbosity == VERBOSE || !inname) && p_base < file_pos) {
Fseek (i, p_base, SEEK_SET);
say ("The text leading up to this was:\n--------------------------\n");
while (file_tell (i) < file_pos)
{
putc ('|', o);
do
{
if ((c = getc (i)) == EOF)
read_fatal ();
putc (c, o);
}
while (c != '\n');
}
say ("--------------------------\n");
}
else
Fseek (i, file_pos, SEEK_SET);
p_input_line = file_line - 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 2,720 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> ModuleSystem::CallModuleMethod(
const std::string& module_name,
const std::string& method_name,
std::vector<v8::Local<v8::Value>>* args) {
return CallModuleMethod(module_name, method_name, args->size(), args->data());
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Harden against bindings interception
There's more we can do but this is a start.
BUG=590275
BUG=590118
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1748943002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#378621}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 156,327 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: vrrp_vscript_rise_handler(vector_t *strvec)
{
vrrp_script_t *vscript = LIST_TAIL_DATA(vrrp_data->vrrp_script);
unsigned rise;
if (!read_unsigned_strvec(strvec, 1, &rise, 1, INT_MAX, true)) {
report_config_error(CONFIG_GENERAL_ERROR, "(%s): vrrp script rise value '%s' invalid, defaulting to 1", vscript->sname, FMT_STR_VSLOT(strvec, 1));
vscript->rise = 1;
}
else
vscript->rise = rise;
}
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | 0 | 76,060 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::EnableSendQueue() {
is_initialized_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 114,516 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static noinline int cow_file_range(struct inode *inode,
struct page *locked_page,
u64 start, u64 end, int *page_started,
unsigned long *nr_written,
int unlock)
{
struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans;
struct btrfs_root *root = BTRFS_I(inode)->root;
int ret;
trans = btrfs_join_transaction(root);
if (IS_ERR(trans)) {
extent_clear_unlock_delalloc(inode,
&BTRFS_I(inode)->io_tree,
start, end, locked_page,
EXTENT_CLEAR_UNLOCK_PAGE |
EXTENT_CLEAR_UNLOCK |
EXTENT_CLEAR_DELALLOC |
EXTENT_CLEAR_DIRTY |
EXTENT_SET_WRITEBACK |
EXTENT_END_WRITEBACK);
return PTR_ERR(trans);
}
trans->block_rsv = &root->fs_info->delalloc_block_rsv;
ret = __cow_file_range(trans, inode, root, locked_page, start, end,
page_started, nr_written, unlock);
btrfs_end_transaction(trans, root);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Btrfs: fix hash overflow handling
The handling for directory crc hash overflows was fairly obscure,
split_leaf returns EOVERFLOW when we try to extend the item and that is
supposed to bubble up to userland. For a while it did so, but along the
way we added better handling of errors and forced the FS readonly if we
hit IO errors during the directory insertion.
Along the way, we started testing only for EEXIST and the EOVERFLOW case
was dropped. The end result is that we may force the FS readonly if we
catch a directory hash bucket overflow.
This fixes a few problem spots. First I add tests for EOVERFLOW in the
places where we can safely just return the error up the chain.
btrfs_rename is harder though, because it tries to insert the new
directory item only after it has already unlinked anything the rename
was going to overwrite. Rather than adding very complex logic, I added
a helper to test for the hash overflow case early while it is still safe
to bail out.
Snapshot and subvolume creation had a similar problem, so they are using
the new helper now too.
Signed-off-by: Chris Mason <chris.mason@fusionio.com>
Reported-by: Pascal Junod <pascal@junod.info>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 34,373 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool MessageLoop::DeferOrRunPendingTask(PendingTask pending_task) {
if (pending_task.nestable || !run_loop_client_->IsNested()) {
RunTask(&pending_task);
return true;
}
deferred_non_nestable_work_queue_.push(std::move(pending_task));
return false;
}
Commit Message: Introduce RunLoop::Type::NESTABLE_TASKS_ALLOWED to replace MessageLoop::ScopedNestableTaskAllower.
(as well as MessageLoop::SetNestableTasksAllowed())
Surveying usage: the scoped object is always instantiated right before
RunLoop().Run(). The intent is really to allow nestable tasks in that
RunLoop so it's better to explicitly label that RunLoop as such and it
allows us to break the last dependency that forced some RunLoop users
to use MessageLoop APIs.
There's also the odd case of allowing nestable tasks for loops that are
reentrant from a native task (without going through RunLoop), these
are the minority but will have to be handled (after cleaning up the
majority of cases that are RunLoop induced).
As highlighted by robliao@ in https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/600517
(which was merged in this CL).
R=danakj@chromium.org
Bug: 750779
Change-Id: I43d122c93ec903cff3a6fe7b77ec461ea0656448
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/594713
Commit-Queue: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: danakj <danakj@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492263}
CWE ID: | 0 | 126,537 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int count_contiguous_clusters(uint64_t nb_clusters, int cluster_size,
uint64_t *l2_table, uint64_t stop_flags)
{
int i;
uint64_t mask = stop_flags | L2E_OFFSET_MASK | QCOW_OFLAG_COMPRESSED;
uint64_t first_entry = be64_to_cpu(l2_table[0]);
uint64_t offset = first_entry & mask;
if (!offset)
return 0;
assert(qcow2_get_cluster_type(first_entry) != QCOW2_CLUSTER_COMPRESSED);
for (i = 0; i < nb_clusters; i++) {
uint64_t l2_entry = be64_to_cpu(l2_table[i]) & mask;
if (offset + (uint64_t) i * cluster_size != l2_entry) {
break;
}
}
return i;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | 0 | 16,919 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void mxf_read_pixel_layout(AVIOContext *pb, MXFDescriptor *descriptor)
{
int code, value, ofs = 0;
char layout[16] = {0}; /* not for printing, may end up not terminated on purpose */
do {
code = avio_r8(pb);
value = avio_r8(pb);
av_log(NULL, AV_LOG_TRACE, "pixel layout: code %#x\n", code);
if (ofs <= 14) {
layout[ofs++] = code;
layout[ofs++] = value;
} else
break; /* don't read byte by byte on sneaky files filled with lots of non-zeroes */
} while (code != 0); /* SMPTE 377M E.2.46 */
ff_mxf_decode_pixel_layout(layout, &descriptor->pix_fmt);
}
Commit Message: avformat/mxfdec: Fix DoS issues in mxf_read_index_entry_array()
Fixes: 20170829A.mxf
Co-Author: 张洪亮(望初)" <wangchu.zhl@alibaba-inc.com>
Found-by: Xiaohei and Wangchu from Alibaba Security Team
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-834 | 0 | 61,606 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int em_fxsave(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
struct fxregs_state fx_state;
size_t size;
int rc;
rc = check_fxsr(ctxt);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
ctxt->ops->get_fpu(ctxt);
rc = asm_safe("fxsave %[fx]", , [fx] "+m"(fx_state));
ctxt->ops->put_fpu(ctxt);
if (rc != X86EMUL_CONTINUE)
return rc;
if (ctxt->ops->get_cr(ctxt, 4) & X86_CR4_OSFXSR)
size = offsetof(struct fxregs_state, xmm_space[8 * 16/4]);
else
size = offsetof(struct fxregs_state, xmm_space[0]);
return segmented_write_std(ctxt, ctxt->memop.addr.mem, &fx_state, size);
}
Commit Message: KVM: x86: fix emulation of "MOV SS, null selector"
This is CVE-2017-2583. On Intel this causes a failed vmentry because
SS's type is neither 3 nor 7 (even though the manual says this check is
only done for usable SS, and the dmesg splat says that SS is unusable!).
On AMD it's worse: svm.c is confused and sets CPL to 0 in the vmcb.
The fix fabricates a data segment descriptor when SS is set to a null
selector, so that CPL and SS.DPL are set correctly in the VMCS/vmcb.
Furthermore, only allow setting SS to a NULL selector if SS.RPL < 3;
this in turn ensures CPL < 3 because RPL must be equal to CPL.
Thanks to Andy Lutomirski and Willy Tarreau for help in analyzing
the bug and deciphering the manuals.
Reported-by: Xiaohan Zhang <zhangxiaohan1@huawei.com>
Fixes: 79d5b4c3cd809c770d4bf9812635647016c56011
Cc: stable@nongnu.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 69,571 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void RenderThreadImpl::IdleHandler() {
bool run_in_foreground_tab = (widget_count_ > hidden_widget_count_) &&
GetContentClient()->renderer()->
RunIdleHandlerWhenWidgetsHidden();
if (run_in_foreground_tab) {
if (idle_notifications_to_skip_ > 0) {
--idle_notifications_to_skip_;
} else {
ReleaseFreeMemory();
}
ScheduleIdleHandler(kLongIdleHandlerDelayMs);
return;
}
ReleaseFreeMemory();
bool continue_timer = !webkit_shared_timer_suspended_;
if (continue_timer) {
ScheduleIdleHandler(
std::max(kLongIdleHandlerDelayMs,
idle_notification_delay_in_ms_ +
1000000 / (idle_notification_delay_in_ms_ + 2000)));
} else {
idle_timer_.Stop();
}
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.IdleNotification();
}
Commit Message: Roll src/third_party/boringssl/src 664e99a64..696c13bd6
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+log/664e99a6486c293728097c661332f92bf2d847c6..696c13bd6ab78011adfe7b775519c8b7cc82b604
BUG=778101
Change-Id: I8dda4f3db952597148e3c7937319584698d00e1c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/747941
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: David Benjamin <davidben@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Steven Valdez <svaldez@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#513774}
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 150,535 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: RenderFrameHostImpl* RenderFrameHostImpl::FromID(int process_id,
int routing_id) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
RoutingIDFrameMap* frames = g_routing_id_frame_map.Pointer();
RoutingIDFrameMap::iterator it = frames->find(
RenderFrameHostID(process_id, routing_id));
return it == frames->end() ? NULL : it->second;
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | 0 | 127,781 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
{
int al;
long remain;
remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
/*
* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have
* been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left,
* unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes
*/
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER
&& remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1)
|| (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER
&& remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
goto f_err;
}
} else {
if (remain != 0) {
al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,
SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC);
goto f_err;
}
}
/* Check we have a cipher to change to */
if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) {
al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY);
goto f_err;
}
s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1;
if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) {
al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR;
SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto f_err;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ);
if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER)
s->d1->handshake_read_seq++;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP
/*
* Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of
* SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no
* SCTP is used
*/
BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL);
#endif
}
return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING;
f_err:
ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al);
ossl_statem_set_error(s);
return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-400 | 0 | 9,384 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void CLASS kodak_rgb_load_raw()
{
short buf[768], *bp;
int row, col, len, c, i, rgb[3];
ushort *ip=image[0];
for (row=0; row < height; row++)
for (col=0; col < width; col+=256) {
len = MIN (256, width-col);
kodak_65000_decode (buf, len*3);
memset (rgb, 0, sizeof rgb);
for (bp=buf, i=0; i < len; i++, ip+=4)
FORC3 if ((ip[c] = rgb[c] += *bp++) >> 12) derror();
}
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189 | 0 | 43,302 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int caif_seqpkt_sendmsg(struct kiocb *kiocb, struct socket *sock,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct caifsock *cf_sk = container_of(sk, struct caifsock, sk);
int buffer_size;
int ret = 0;
struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
int noblock;
long timeo;
caif_assert(cf_sk);
ret = sock_error(sk);
if (ret)
goto err;
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (msg->msg_flags&MSG_OOB)
goto err;
ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (msg->msg_namelen)
goto err;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (unlikely(msg->msg_iov->iov_base == NULL))
goto err;
noblock = msg->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT;
timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, noblock);
timeo = caif_wait_for_flow_on(container_of(sk, struct caifsock, sk),
1, timeo, &ret);
if (ret)
goto err;
ret = -EPIPE;
if (cf_sk->sk.sk_state != CAIF_CONNECTED ||
sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DEAD) ||
(sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN))
goto err;
/* Error if trying to write more than maximum frame size. */
ret = -EMSGSIZE;
if (len > cf_sk->maxframe && cf_sk->sk.sk_protocol != CAIFPROTO_RFM)
goto err;
buffer_size = len + cf_sk->headroom + cf_sk->tailroom;
ret = -ENOMEM;
skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, buffer_size, noblock, &ret);
if (!skb || skb_tailroom(skb) < buffer_size)
goto err;
skb_reserve(skb, cf_sk->headroom);
ret = memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb, len), msg->msg_iov, len);
if (ret)
goto err;
ret = transmit_skb(skb, cf_sk, noblock, timeo);
if (ret < 0)
/* skb is already freed */
return ret;
return len;
err:
kfree_skb(skb);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: caif: Fix missing msg_namelen update in caif_seqpkt_recvmsg()
The current code does not fill the msg_name member in case it is set.
It also does not set the msg_namelen member to 0 and therefore makes
net/socket.c leak the local, uninitialized sockaddr_storage variable
to userland -- 128 bytes of kernel stack memory.
Fix that by simply setting msg_namelen to 0 as obviously nobody cared
about caif_seqpkt_recvmsg() not filling the msg_name in case it was
set.
Cc: Sjur Braendeland <sjur.brandeland@stericsson.com>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 30,675 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version)
{
Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version);
Identity *id;
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, (version == 1) ?
SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER :
SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, tab->nentries)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &tab->idlist, next) {
if (id->key->type == KEY_RSA1) {
#ifdef WITH_SSH1
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg,
BN_num_bits(id->key->rsa->n))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg,
id->key->rsa->e)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg,
id->key->rsa->n)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
#endif
} else {
u_char *blob;
size_t blen;
if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s", __func__,
ssh_err(r));
continue;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
free(blob);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, id->comment)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
Commit Message: add a whitelist of paths from which ssh-agent will load (via
ssh-pkcs11-helper) a PKCS#11 module; ok markus@
CWE ID: CWE-426 | 0 | 72,356 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void Compositor::SetLayerTreeFrameSink(
std::unique_ptr<cc::LayerTreeFrameSink> layer_tree_frame_sink) {
layer_tree_frame_sink_requested_ = false;
host_->SetLayerTreeFrameSink(std::move(layer_tree_frame_sink));
if (context_factory_private_) {
context_factory_private_->SetDisplayVisible(this, host_->IsVisible());
context_factory_private_->SetDisplayColorSpace(this, blending_color_space_,
output_color_space_);
context_factory_private_->SetDisplayColorMatrix(this,
display_color_matrix_);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix PIP window being blank after minimize/show
DesktopWindowTreeHostX11::SetVisible only made the call into
OnNativeWidgetVisibilityChanged when transitioning from shown
to minimized and not vice versa. This is because this change
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1437263
considered IsVisible to be true when minimized, which made
IsVisible always true in this case. This caused layers to be hidden
but never shown again.
This is a reland of:
https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1580103
Bug: 949199
Change-Id: I2151cd09e537d8ce8781897f43a3b8e9cec75996
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1584617
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: enne <enne@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#654280}
CWE ID: CWE-284 | 0 | 140,491 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: ScopedGLErrorSuppressor::ScopedGLErrorSuppressor(
const char* function_name, ErrorState* error_state)
: function_name_(function_name),
error_state_(error_state) {
ERRORSTATE_COPY_REAL_GL_ERRORS_TO_WRAPPER(error_state_, function_name_);
}
Commit Message: Framebuffer clear() needs to consider the situation some draw buffers are disabled.
This is when we expose DrawBuffers extension.
BUG=376951
TEST=the attached test case, webgl conformance
R=kbr@chromium.org,bajones@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/315283002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@275338 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 121,029 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static size_t WriteCompressionStart(const PSDInfo *psd_info,Image *image,
const Image *next_image,const CompressionType compression,
const ssize_t channels)
{
size_t
length;
ssize_t
i,
y;
if (compression == RLECompression)
{
length=(size_t) WriteBlobShort(image,RLE);
for (i=0; i < channels; i++)
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) next_image->rows; y++)
length+=SetPSDOffset(psd_info,image,0);
}
#ifdef MAGICKCORE_ZLIB_DELEGATE
else if (compression == ZipCompression)
length=(size_t) WriteBlobShort(image,ZipWithoutPrediction);
#endif
else
length=(size_t) WriteBlobShort(image,Raw);
return(length);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1451
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 91,381 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(curl_unescape)
{
char *str = NULL, *out = NULL;
size_t str_len = 0;
int out_len;
zval *zid;
php_curl *ch;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "rs", &zid, &str, &str_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if ((ch = (php_curl*)zend_fetch_resource(Z_RES_P(zid), le_curl_name, le_curl)) == NULL) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (str_len > INT_MAX) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if ((out = curl_easy_unescape(ch->cp, str, str_len, &out_len))) {
RETVAL_STRINGL(out, out_len);
curl_free(out);
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72674 - check both curl_escape and curl_unescape
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 1 | 166,947 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void NaClProcessHost::OnDebugExceptionHandlerLaunchedByBroker(bool success) {
IPC::Message* reply = attach_debug_exception_handler_reply_msg_.release();
NaClProcessMsg_AttachDebugExceptionHandler::WriteReplyParams(reply, success);
Send(reply);
}
Commit Message: Revert 143656 - Add an IPC channel between the NaCl loader process and the renderer.
BUG=116317
TEST=ppapi, nacl tests, manual testing for experimental IPC proxy.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10641016
TBR=bbudge@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10625007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 103,269 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *a,*b,*c,*d,*e;
int i;
a=BN_new();
b=BN_new();
c=BN_new();
d=BN_new();
e=BN_new();
BN_bntest_rand(c,30,0,1); /* must be odd for montgomery */
for (i=0; i<num2; i++)
{
BN_bntest_rand(a,20+i*5,0,0); /**/
BN_bntest_rand(b,2+i,0,0); /**/
if (!BN_mod_exp(d,a,b,c,ctx))
return(0);
if (bp != NULL)
{
if (!results)
{
BN_print(bp,a);
BIO_puts(bp," ^ ");
BN_print(bp,b);
BIO_puts(bp," % ");
BN_print(bp,c);
BIO_puts(bp," - ");
}
BN_print(bp,d);
BIO_puts(bp,"\n");
}
BN_exp(e,a,b,ctx);
BN_sub(e,e,d);
BN_div(a,b,e,c,ctx);
if(!BN_is_zero(b))
{
fprintf(stderr,"Modulo exponentiation test failed!\n");
return 0;
}
}
BN_free(a);
BN_free(b);
BN_free(c);
BN_free(d);
BN_free(e);
return(1);
}
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2014-3570 (with minor bn_asm.c revamp).
Reviewed-by: Emilia Kasper <emilia@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-310 | 0 | 46,514 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int set_wep_tx_idx(struct airo_info *ai, u16 index, int perm, int lock)
{
WepKeyRid wkr;
int rc;
memset(&wkr, 0, sizeof(wkr));
wkr.len = cpu_to_le16(sizeof(wkr));
wkr.kindex = cpu_to_le16(0xffff);
wkr.mac[0] = (char)index;
if (perm) {
ai->defindex = (char)index;
disable_MAC(ai, lock);
}
rc = writeWepKeyRid(ai, &wkr, perm, lock);
if (perm)
enable_MAC(ai, lock);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: net: Audit drivers to identify those needing IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING cleared
After the last patch, We are left in a state in which only drivers calling
ether_setup have IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING set (we assume that drivers touching real
hardware call ether_setup for their net_devices and don't hold any state in
their skbs. There are a handful of drivers that violate this assumption of
course, and need to be fixed up. This patch identifies those drivers, and marks
them as not being able to support the safe transmission of skbs by clearning the
IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag in priv_flags
Signed-off-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Karsten Keil <isdn@linux-pingi.de>
CC: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
CC: Jay Vosburgh <fubar@us.ibm.com>
CC: Andy Gospodarek <andy@greyhouse.net>
CC: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
CC: Krzysztof Halasa <khc@pm.waw.pl>
CC: "John W. Linville" <linville@tuxdriver.com>
CC: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CC: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CC: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | 0 | 24,077 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: GLES2DecoderImpl::GetOrCreateTranslator(GLenum type) {
if (!InitializeShaderTranslator()) {
return nullptr;
}
return GetTranslator(type);
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,478 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: gx_parse_output_file_name(gs_parsed_file_name_t *pfn, const char **pfmt,
const char *fname, uint fnlen, gs_memory_t *memory)
{
int code;
*pfmt = 0;
pfn->memory = 0;
pfn->iodev = NULL;
pfn->fname = NULL; /* irrelevant since length = 0 */
pfn->len = 0;
if (fnlen == 0) /* allow null name */
return 0;
/*
* If the file name begins with a %, it might be either an IODevice
* or a %nnd format. Check (carefully) for this case.
*/
code = gs_parse_file_name(pfn, fname, fnlen, memory);
if (code < 0) {
if (fname[0] == '%') {
/* not a recognized iodev -- may be a leading format descriptor */
pfn->len = fnlen;
pfn->fname = fname;
code = gx_parse_output_format(pfn, pfmt);
}
if (code < 0)
return code;
}
if (!pfn->iodev) {
if ( (pfn->len == 1) && (pfn->fname[0] == '-') ) {
pfn->iodev = gs_findiodevice(memory, (const byte *)"%stdout", 7);
pfn->fname = NULL;
} else if (pfn->fname[0] == '|') {
pfn->iodev = gs_findiodevice(memory, (const byte *)"%pipe", 5);
pfn->fname++, pfn->len--;
} else
pfn->iodev = iodev_default(memory);
if (!pfn->iodev)
return_error(gs_error_undefinedfilename);
}
if (!pfn->fname)
return 0;
code = gx_parse_output_format(pfn, pfmt);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (strlen(pfn->iodev->dname) + pfn->len + code >= gp_file_name_sizeof)
return_error(gs_error_undefinedfilename);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-78 | 0 | 2,825 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int __dccp_rcv_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct dccp_hdr *dh, const unsigned int len)
{
struct dccp_sock *dp = dccp_sk(sk);
switch (dccp_hdr(skb)->dccph_type) {
case DCCP_PKT_DATAACK:
case DCCP_PKT_DATA:
/*
* FIXME: schedule DATA_DROPPED (RFC 4340, 11.7.2) if and when
* - sk_shutdown == RCV_SHUTDOWN, use Code 1, "Not Listening"
* - sk_receive_queue is full, use Code 2, "Receive Buffer"
*/
dccp_enqueue_skb(sk, skb);
return 0;
case DCCP_PKT_ACK:
goto discard;
case DCCP_PKT_RESET:
/*
* Step 9: Process Reset
* If P.type == Reset,
* Tear down connection
* S.state := TIMEWAIT
* Set TIMEWAIT timer
* Drop packet and return
*/
dccp_rcv_reset(sk, skb);
return 0;
case DCCP_PKT_CLOSEREQ:
if (dccp_rcv_closereq(sk, skb))
return 0;
goto discard;
case DCCP_PKT_CLOSE:
if (dccp_rcv_close(sk, skb))
return 0;
goto discard;
case DCCP_PKT_REQUEST:
/* Step 7
* or (S.is_server and P.type == Response)
* or (S.is_client and P.type == Request)
* or (S.state >= OPEN and P.type == Request
* and P.seqno >= S.OSR)
* or (S.state >= OPEN and P.type == Response
* and P.seqno >= S.OSR)
* or (S.state == RESPOND and P.type == Data),
* Send Sync packet acknowledging P.seqno
* Drop packet and return
*/
if (dp->dccps_role != DCCP_ROLE_LISTEN)
goto send_sync;
goto check_seq;
case DCCP_PKT_RESPONSE:
if (dp->dccps_role != DCCP_ROLE_CLIENT)
goto send_sync;
check_seq:
if (dccp_delta_seqno(dp->dccps_osr,
DCCP_SKB_CB(skb)->dccpd_seq) >= 0) {
send_sync:
dccp_send_sync(sk, DCCP_SKB_CB(skb)->dccpd_seq,
DCCP_PKT_SYNC);
}
break;
case DCCP_PKT_SYNC:
dccp_send_sync(sk, DCCP_SKB_CB(skb)->dccpd_seq,
DCCP_PKT_SYNCACK);
/*
* From RFC 4340, sec. 5.7
*
* As with DCCP-Ack packets, DCCP-Sync and DCCP-SyncAck packets
* MAY have non-zero-length application data areas, whose
* contents receivers MUST ignore.
*/
goto discard;
}
DCCP_INC_STATS(DCCP_MIB_INERRS);
discard:
__kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: dccp: fix freeing skb too early for IPV6_RECVPKTINFO
In the current DCCP implementation an skb for a DCCP_PKT_REQUEST packet
is forcibly freed via __kfree_skb in dccp_rcv_state_process if
dccp_v6_conn_request successfully returns.
However, if IPV6_RECVPKTINFO is set on a socket, the address of the skb
is saved to ireq->pktopts and the ref count for skb is incremented in
dccp_v6_conn_request, so skb is still in use. Nevertheless, it gets freed
in dccp_rcv_state_process.
Fix by calling consume_skb instead of doing goto discard and therefore
calling __kfree_skb.
Similar fixes for TCP:
fb7e2399ec17f1004c0e0ccfd17439f8759ede01 [TCP]: skb is unexpectedly freed.
0aea76d35c9651d55bbaf746e7914e5f9ae5a25d tcp: SYN packets are now
simply consumed
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-415 | 0 | 68,272 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool FormAssociatedElement::isFormControlElementWithState() const
{
return false;
}
Commit Message: Fix a crash when a form control is in a past naems map of a demoted form element.
Note that we wanted to add the protector in FormAssociatedElement::setForm(),
but we couldn't do it because it is called from the constructor.
BUG=326854
TEST=automated.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/105693013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@163680 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-287 | 0 | 123,828 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void WebInspectorProxy::platformDidClose()
{
if (m_inspectorView)
g_signal_handlers_disconnect_by_func(m_inspectorView, reinterpret_cast<void*>(inspectorViewDestroyed), this);
m_client.didClose(this);
if (m_inspectorWindow) {
gtk_widget_destroy(m_inspectorWindow);
m_inspectorWindow = 0;
}
m_inspectorView = 0;
}
Commit Message: [GTK] Inspector should set a default attached height before being attached
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=90767
Reviewed by Xan Lopez.
We are currently using the minimum attached height in
WebKitWebViewBase as the default height for the inspector when
attached. It would be easier for WebKitWebViewBase and embedders
implementing attach() if the inspector already had an attached
height set when it's being attached.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/WebKitWebViewBase.cpp:
(webkitWebViewBaseContainerAdd): Don't initialize
inspectorViewHeight.
(webkitWebViewBaseSetInspectorViewHeight): Allow to set the
inspector view height before having an inpector view, but only
queue a resize when the view already has an inspector view.
* UIProcess/API/gtk/tests/TestInspector.cpp:
(testInspectorDefault):
(testInspectorManualAttachDetach):
* UIProcess/gtk/WebInspectorProxyGtk.cpp:
(WebKit::WebInspectorProxy::platformAttach): Set the default
attached height before attach the inspector view.
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@124479 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 108,937 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: PNG_FUNCTION(voidpf /* PRIVATE */,
png_zalloc,(voidpf png_ptr, uInt items, uInt size),PNG_ALLOCATED)
{
png_alloc_size_t num_bytes = size;
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return NULL;
if (items >= (~(png_alloc_size_t)0)/size)
{
png_warning (png_voidcast(png_structrp, png_ptr),
"Potential overflow in png_zalloc()");
return NULL;
}
num_bytes *= items;
return png_malloc_warn(png_voidcast(png_structrp, png_ptr), num_bytes);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | 0 | 160,172 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool HTMLFormControlElement::isRequired() const {
return fastHasAttribute(requiredAttr);
}
Commit Message: Form validation: Do not show validation bubble if the page is invisible.
BUG=673163
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2572813003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#438476}
CWE ID: CWE-1021 | 0 | 139,974 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static void vmx_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3)
{
unsigned long guest_cr3;
u64 eptp;
guest_cr3 = cr3;
if (enable_ept) {
eptp = construct_eptp(vcpu, cr3);
vmcs_write64(EPT_POINTER, eptp);
if (is_paging(vcpu) || is_guest_mode(vcpu))
guest_cr3 = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
else
guest_cr3 = vcpu->kvm->arch.ept_identity_map_addr;
ept_load_pdptrs(vcpu);
}
vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu);
vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR3, guest_cr3);
}
Commit Message: kvm: nVMX: Don't allow L2 to access the hardware CR8
If L1 does not specify the "use TPR shadow" VM-execution control in
vmcs12, then L0 must specify the "CR8-load exiting" and "CR8-store
exiting" VM-execution controls in vmcs02. Failure to do so will give
the L2 VM unrestricted read/write access to the hardware CR8.
This fixes CVE-2017-12154.
Signed-off-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | 0 | 63,056 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: const std::string& InterstitialPageImpl::GetUserAgentOverride() const {
return base::EmptyString();
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 136,105 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: rsvg_acquire_gvfs_data (const char *uri,
const char *base_uri,
char **out_mime_type,
gsize *out_len,
GCancellable *cancellable,
GError **error)
{
GFile *base, *file;
GError *err;
char *data;
gsize len;
char *content_type;
gboolean res;
file = g_file_new_for_uri (uri);
err = NULL;
data = NULL;
if (!(res = g_file_load_contents (file, cancellable, &data, &len, NULL, &err)) &&
g_error_matches (err, G_IO_ERROR, G_IO_ERROR_NOT_FOUND) &&
base_uri != NULL) {
g_clear_error (&err);
g_object_unref (file);
base = g_file_new_for_uri (base_uri);
file = g_file_resolve_relative_path (base, uri);
g_object_unref (base);
res = g_file_load_contents (file, cancellable, &data, &len, NULL, &err);
}
g_object_unref (file);
if (err) {
g_propagate_error (error, err);
return NULL;
}
if (out_mime_type &&
(content_type = g_content_type_guess (uri, (guchar *) data, len, NULL))) {
*out_mime_type = g_content_type_get_mime_type (content_type);
g_free (content_type);
}
*out_len = len;
return data;
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible credentials leaking reported by Alex Birsan.
CWE ID: | 0 | 96,423 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void CL_Disconnect( qboolean showMainMenu ) {
if ( !com_cl_running || !com_cl_running->integer ) {
return;
}
Cvar_Set("r_uiFullScreen", "1");
if ( clc.demorecording ) {
CL_StopRecord_f ();
}
if (clc.download) {
FS_FCloseFile( clc.download );
clc.download = 0;
}
*clc.downloadTempName = *clc.downloadName = 0;
Cvar_Set( "cl_downloadName", "" );
#ifdef USE_MUMBLE
if (cl_useMumble->integer && mumble_islinked()) {
Com_Printf("Mumble: Unlinking from Mumble application\n");
mumble_unlink();
}
#endif
#ifdef USE_VOIP
if (cl_voipSend->integer) {
int tmp = cl_voipUseVAD->integer;
cl_voipUseVAD->integer = 0; // disable this for a moment.
clc.voipOutgoingDataSize = 0; // dump any pending VoIP transmission.
Cvar_Set("cl_voipSend", "0");
CL_CaptureVoip(); // clean up any state...
cl_voipUseVAD->integer = tmp;
}
if (clc.voipCodecInitialized) {
int i;
opus_encoder_destroy(clc.opusEncoder);
for (i = 0; i < MAX_CLIENTS; i++) {
opus_decoder_destroy(clc.opusDecoder[i]);
}
clc.voipCodecInitialized = qfalse;
}
Cmd_RemoveCommand ("voip");
#endif
if ( clc.demofile ) {
FS_FCloseFile( clc.demofile );
clc.demofile = 0;
}
if ( uivm && showMainMenu ) {
VM_Call( uivm, UI_SET_ACTIVE_MENU, UIMENU_NONE );
}
SCR_StopCinematic ();
S_ClearSoundBuffer();
if ( clc.state >= CA_CONNECTED ) {
CL_AddReliableCommand("disconnect", qtrue);
CL_WritePacket();
CL_WritePacket();
CL_WritePacket();
}
FS_PureServerSetLoadedPaks("", "");
FS_PureServerSetReferencedPaks( "", "" );
CL_ClearState ();
Com_Memset( &clc, 0, sizeof( clc ) );
clc.state = CA_DISCONNECTED;
Cvar_Set( "sv_cheats", "1" );
cl_connectedToPureServer = qfalse;
#ifdef USE_VOIP
clc.voipEnabled = qfalse;
#endif
if( CL_VideoRecording( ) ) {
SCR_UpdateScreen( );
CL_CloseAVI( );
}
CL_UpdateGUID( NULL, 0 );
if(!noGameRestart)
CL_OldGame();
else
noGameRestart = qfalse;
}
Commit Message: Don't load .pk3s as .dlls, and don't load user config files from .pk3s.
CWE ID: CWE-269 | 0 | 95,956 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: static int machine_constraints_voltage(struct regulator_dev *rdev,
struct regulation_constraints *constraints)
{
const struct regulator_ops *ops = rdev->desc->ops;
int ret;
/* do we need to apply the constraint voltage */
if (rdev->constraints->apply_uV &&
rdev->constraints->min_uV == rdev->constraints->max_uV) {
int current_uV = _regulator_get_voltage(rdev);
if (current_uV < 0) {
rdev_err(rdev,
"failed to get the current voltage(%d)\n",
current_uV);
return current_uV;
}
if (current_uV < rdev->constraints->min_uV ||
current_uV > rdev->constraints->max_uV) {
ret = _regulator_do_set_voltage(
rdev, rdev->constraints->min_uV,
rdev->constraints->max_uV);
if (ret < 0) {
rdev_err(rdev,
"failed to apply %duV constraint(%d)\n",
rdev->constraints->min_uV, ret);
return ret;
}
}
}
/* constrain machine-level voltage specs to fit
* the actual range supported by this regulator.
*/
if (ops->list_voltage && rdev->desc->n_voltages) {
int count = rdev->desc->n_voltages;
int i;
int min_uV = INT_MAX;
int max_uV = INT_MIN;
int cmin = constraints->min_uV;
int cmax = constraints->max_uV;
/* it's safe to autoconfigure fixed-voltage supplies
and the constraints are used by list_voltage. */
if (count == 1 && !cmin) {
cmin = 1;
cmax = INT_MAX;
constraints->min_uV = cmin;
constraints->max_uV = cmax;
}
/* voltage constraints are optional */
if ((cmin == 0) && (cmax == 0))
return 0;
/* else require explicit machine-level constraints */
if (cmin <= 0 || cmax <= 0 || cmax < cmin) {
rdev_err(rdev, "invalid voltage constraints\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* initial: [cmin..cmax] valid, [min_uV..max_uV] not */
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
int value;
value = ops->list_voltage(rdev, i);
if (value <= 0)
continue;
/* maybe adjust [min_uV..max_uV] */
if (value >= cmin && value < min_uV)
min_uV = value;
if (value <= cmax && value > max_uV)
max_uV = value;
}
/* final: [min_uV..max_uV] valid iff constraints valid */
if (max_uV < min_uV) {
rdev_err(rdev,
"unsupportable voltage constraints %u-%uuV\n",
min_uV, max_uV);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* use regulator's subset of machine constraints */
if (constraints->min_uV < min_uV) {
rdev_dbg(rdev, "override min_uV, %d -> %d\n",
constraints->min_uV, min_uV);
constraints->min_uV = min_uV;
}
if (constraints->max_uV > max_uV) {
rdev_dbg(rdev, "override max_uV, %d -> %d\n",
constraints->max_uV, max_uV);
constraints->max_uV = max_uV;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: regulator: core: Fix regualtor_ena_gpio_free not to access pin after freeing
After freeing pin from regulator_ena_gpio_free, loop can access
the pin. So this patch fixes not to access pin after freeing.
Signed-off-by: Seung-Woo Kim <sw0312.kim@samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 74,468 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void WebPluginProxy::DidPaint() {
waiting_for_paint_ = false;
if (!damaged_rect_.IsEmpty())
InvalidateRect(damaged_rect_);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | 0 | 107,039 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void AcceptMojoConnection(base::ScopedFD handle) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(host_->sequence_checker_);
DCHECK(pending_token_);
pending_token_ = {};
mojo_connection_delegate_->AcceptMojoConnection(std::move(handle));
}
Commit Message: Add a fake DriveFS launcher client.
Using DriveFS requires building and deploying ChromeOS. Add a client for
the fake DriveFS launcher to allow the use of a real DriveFS from a
ChromeOS chroot to be used with a target_os="chromeos" build of chrome.
This connects to the fake DriveFS launcher using mojo over a unix domain
socket named by a command-line flag, using the launcher to create
DriveFS instances.
Bug: 848126
Change-Id: I22dcca154d41bda196dd7c1782bb503f6bcba5b1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1098434
Reviewed-by: Xiyuan Xia <xiyuan@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sam McNally <sammc@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567513}
CWE ID: | 0 | 124,079 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: int OPENSSL_atexit(void (*handler)(void))
{
OPENSSL_INIT_STOP *newhand;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_USE_NODELETE)\
&& !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PINSHARED)
{
union {
void *sym;
void (*func)(void);
} handlersym;
handlersym.func = handler;
# if defined(DSO_WIN32) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
{
HMODULE handle = NULL;
BOOL ret;
/*
* We don't use the DSO route for WIN32 because there is a better
* way
*/
ret = GetModuleHandleEx(GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_FROM_ADDRESS
| GET_MODULE_HANDLE_EX_FLAG_PIN,
handlersym.sym, &handle);
if (!ret)
return 0;
}
# elif !defined(DSO_NONE)
/*
* Deliberately leak a reference to the handler. This will force the
* library/code containing the handler to remain loaded until we run the
* atexit handler. If -znodelete has been used then this is
* unnecessary.
*/
{
DSO *dso = NULL;
ERR_set_mark();
dso = DSO_dsobyaddr(handlersym.sym, DSO_FLAG_NO_UNLOAD_ON_FREE);
# ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr,
"OPENSSL_INIT: OPENSSL_atexit: obtained DSO reference? %s\n",
(dso == NULL ? "No!" : "Yes."));
/* See same code above in ossl_init_base() for an explanation. */
# endif
DSO_free(dso);
ERR_pop_to_mark();
}
# endif
}
#endif
if ((newhand = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*newhand))) == NULL) {
CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_ATEXIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
newhand->handler = handler;
newhand->next = stop_handlers;
stop_handlers = newhand;
return 1;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-330 | 0 | 12,011 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void LoginDisplayHostWebUI::ScheduleFadeOutAnimation(int animation_speed_ms) {
if (!login_window_) {
ShutdownDisplayHost();
return;
}
ui::Layer* layer = login_window_->GetLayer();
ui::ScopedLayerAnimationSettings animation(layer->GetAnimator());
animation.AddObserver(new AnimationObserver(
base::Bind(&LoginDisplayHostWebUI::ShutdownDisplayHost,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr())));
animation.SetTransitionDuration(
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(animation_speed_ms));
layer->SetOpacity(0);
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID: | 0 | 131,652 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void gnrm_del(GF_Box *s)
{
GF_GenericSampleEntryBox *ptr = (GF_GenericSampleEntryBox *)s;
gf_isom_sample_entry_predestroy((GF_SampleEntryBox *)ptr);
if (ptr->data) gf_free(ptr->data);
gf_free(ptr);
}
Commit Message: fixed 2 possible heap overflows (inc. #1088)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | 0 | 80,154 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: compress_task_done (GObject *source_object,
GAsyncResult *res,
gpointer user_data)
{
CompressJob *compress_job = user_data;
if (compress_job->done_callback)
{
compress_job->done_callback (compress_job->output_file,
compress_job->success,
compress_job->done_callback_data);
}
g_object_unref (compress_job->output_file);
g_list_free_full (compress_job->source_files, g_object_unref);
finalize_common ((CommonJob *) compress_job);
nautilus_file_changes_consume_changes (TRUE);
}
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
CWE ID: CWE-20 | 0 | 61,017 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void hns_rcb_get_queue_mode(enum dsaf_mode dsaf_mode, u16 *max_vfn,
u16 *max_q_per_vf)
{
switch (dsaf_mode) {
case DSAF_MODE_DISABLE_6PORT_0VM:
*max_vfn = 1;
*max_q_per_vf = 16;
break;
case DSAF_MODE_DISABLE_FIX:
case DSAF_MODE_DISABLE_SP:
*max_vfn = 1;
*max_q_per_vf = 1;
break;
case DSAF_MODE_DISABLE_2PORT_64VM:
*max_vfn = 64;
*max_q_per_vf = 1;
break;
case DSAF_MODE_DISABLE_6PORT_16VM:
*max_vfn = 16;
*max_q_per_vf = 1;
break;
default:
*max_vfn = 1;
*max_q_per_vf = 16;
break;
}
}
Commit Message: net: hns: fix ethtool_get_strings overflow in hns driver
hns_get_sset_count() returns HNS_NET_STATS_CNT and the data space allocated
is not enough for ethtool_get_strings(), which will cause random memory
corruption.
When SLAB and DEBUG_SLAB are both enabled, memory corruptions like the
the following can be observed without this patch:
[ 43.115200] Slab corruption (Not tainted): Acpi-ParseExt start=ffff801fb0b69030, len=80
[ 43.115206] Redzone: 0x9f911029d006462/0x5f78745f31657070.
[ 43.115208] Last user: [<5f7272655f746b70>](0x5f7272655f746b70)
[ 43.115214] 010: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 00 6b 6b 6b 6b ppe1_tx_pkt.kkkk
[ 43.115217] 030: 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f 70 6b 74 5f 6f 6b 00 6b ppe1_tx_pkt_ok.k
[ 43.115218] Next obj: start=ffff801fb0b69098, len=80
[ 43.115220] Redzone: 0x706d655f6f666966/0x9f911029d74e35b.
[ 43.115229] Last user: [<ffff0000084b11b0>](acpi_os_release_object+0x28/0x38)
[ 43.115231] 000: 74 79 00 6b 6b 6b 6b 6b 70 70 65 31 5f 74 78 5f ty.kkkkkppe1_tx_
[ 43.115232] 010: 70 6b 74 5f 65 72 72 5f 63 73 75 6d 5f 66 61 69 pkt_err_csum_fai
Signed-off-by: Timmy Li <lixiaoping3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | 0 | 85,600 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: void smp_proc_sec_req(tSMP_CB* p_cb, tSMP_INT_DATA* p_data) {
tBTM_LE_AUTH_REQ auth_req = *(tBTM_LE_AUTH_REQ*)p_data;
tBTM_BLE_SEC_REQ_ACT sec_req_act;
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: auth_req=0x%x", __func__, auth_req);
p_cb->cb_evt = 0;
btm_ble_link_sec_check(p_cb->pairing_bda, auth_req, &sec_req_act);
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: sec_req_act=0x%x", __func__, sec_req_act);
switch (sec_req_act) {
case BTM_BLE_SEC_REQ_ACT_ENCRYPT:
SMP_TRACE_DEBUG("%s: BTM_BLE_SEC_REQ_ACT_ENCRYPT", __func__);
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_ENC_REQ_EVT, NULL);
break;
case BTM_BLE_SEC_REQ_ACT_PAIR:
p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required =
(btm_cb.security_mode == BTM_SEC_MODE_SC) ? true : false;
/* respond to non SC pairing request as failure in SC only mode */
if (p_cb->secure_connections_only_mode_required &&
(auth_req & SMP_SC_SUPPORT_BIT) == 0) {
tSMP_INT_DATA smp_int_data;
smp_int_data.status = SMP_PAIR_AUTH_FAIL;
smp_sm_event(p_cb, SMP_AUTH_CMPL_EVT, &smp_int_data);
} else {
/* initialize local i/r key to be default keys */
p_cb->peer_auth_req = auth_req;
p_cb->local_r_key = p_cb->local_i_key = SMP_SEC_DEFAULT_KEY;
p_cb->cb_evt = SMP_SEC_REQUEST_EVT;
}
break;
case BTM_BLE_SEC_REQ_ACT_DISCARD:
p_cb->discard_sec_req = true;
break;
default:
/* do nothing */
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Checks the SMP length to fix OOB read
Bug: 111937065
Test: manual
Change-Id: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
Merged-In: I330880a6e1671d0117845430db4076dfe1aba688
(cherry picked from commit fceb753bda651c4135f3f93a510e5fcb4c7542b8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | 0 | 162,764 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: bool GLES2Implementation::PrepareInstancedPathCommand(
const char* function_name,
GLsizei num_paths,
GLenum path_name_type,
const void* paths,
GLenum transform_type,
const GLfloat* transform_values,
ScopedTransferBufferPtr* buffer,
uint32_t* out_paths_shm_id,
uint32_t* out_paths_offset,
uint32_t* out_transforms_shm_id,
uint32_t* out_transforms_offset) {
if (num_paths < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "numPaths < 0");
return false;
}
uint32_t path_name_size =
GLES2Util::GetGLTypeSizeForGLPathNameType(path_name_type);
if (path_name_size == 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, function_name, "invalid pathNameType");
return false;
}
uint32_t transforms_component_count =
GLES2Util::GetComponentCountForGLTransformType(transform_type);
if (transform_type != GL_NONE && transforms_component_count == 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, function_name, "invalid transformType");
return false;
}
if (num_paths == 0) {
*out_paths_shm_id = 0;
*out_paths_offset = 0;
*out_transforms_shm_id = 0;
*out_transforms_offset = 0;
return true;
}
if (!paths) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "missing paths");
return false;
}
if (transform_type != GL_NONE && !transform_values) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, function_name, "missing transforms");
return false;
}
uint32_t paths_size;
if (!base::CheckMul(path_name_size, num_paths).AssignIfValid(&paths_size)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name, "overflow");
return false;
}
DCHECK_LE(transforms_component_count, 12U);
uint32_t one_transform_size = sizeof(GLfloat) * transforms_component_count;
uint32_t transforms_size;
if (!base::CheckMul(one_transform_size, num_paths)
.AssignIfValid(&transforms_size)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name, "overflow");
return false;
}
uint32_t required_buffer_size;
if (!base::CheckAdd(transforms_size, paths_size)
.AssignIfValid(&required_buffer_size)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION, function_name, "overflow");
return false;
}
buffer->Reset(required_buffer_size);
if (!buffer->valid() || buffer->size() < required_buffer_size) {
SetGLError(GL_OUT_OF_MEMORY, function_name, "too large");
return false;
}
if (transforms_size > 0) {
unsigned char* transforms_addr =
static_cast<unsigned char*>(buffer->address());
memcpy(transforms_addr, transform_values, transforms_size);
*out_transforms_shm_id = buffer->shm_id();
*out_transforms_offset = buffer->offset();
} else {
*out_transforms_shm_id = 0;
*out_transforms_offset = 0;
}
DCHECK_GT(paths_size, 0U);
unsigned char* paths_addr =
static_cast<unsigned char*>(buffer->address()) + transforms_size;
memcpy(paths_addr, paths, paths_size);
*out_paths_shm_id = buffer->shm_id();
*out_paths_offset = buffer->offset() + transforms_size;
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | 0 | 141,099 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: encode_SET_IP_ECN(const struct ofpact_ecn *ip_ecn,
enum ofp_version ofp_version, struct ofpbuf *out)
{
uint8_t ecn = ip_ecn->ecn;
if (ofp_version == OFP10_VERSION) {
struct mf_subfield dst = { .field = mf_from_id(MFF_IP_ECN),
.ofs = 0, .n_bits = 2 };
put_reg_load(out, &dst, ecn);
} else if (ofp_version == OFP11_VERSION) {
put_OFPAT11_SET_NW_ECN(out, ecn);
} else {
put_set_field(out, ofp_version, MFF_IP_ECN, ecn);
}
}
Commit Message: ofp-actions: Avoid buffer overread in BUNDLE action decoding.
Reported-at: https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=9052
Signed-off-by: Ben Pfaff <blp@ovn.org>
Acked-by: Justin Pettit <jpettit@ovn.org>
CWE ID: | 0 | 76,892 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: horizontalAccumulate8abgr(uint16 *wp, int n, int stride, unsigned char *op,
unsigned char *ToLinear8)
{
register unsigned int cr, cg, cb, ca, mask;
register unsigned char t0, t1, t2, t3;
if (n >= stride) {
mask = CODE_MASK;
if (stride == 3) {
op[0] = 0;
t1 = ToLinear8[cb = (wp[2] & mask)];
t2 = ToLinear8[cg = (wp[1] & mask)];
t3 = ToLinear8[cr = (wp[0] & mask)];
op[1] = t1;
op[2] = t2;
op[3] = t3;
n -= 3;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 3;
wp += 3;
op += 4;
op[0] = 0;
t1 = ToLinear8[(cb += wp[2]) & mask];
t2 = ToLinear8[(cg += wp[1]) & mask];
t3 = ToLinear8[(cr += wp[0]) & mask];
op[1] = t1;
op[2] = t2;
op[3] = t3;
}
} else if (stride == 4) {
t0 = ToLinear8[ca = (wp[3] & mask)];
t1 = ToLinear8[cb = (wp[2] & mask)];
t2 = ToLinear8[cg = (wp[1] & mask)];
t3 = ToLinear8[cr = (wp[0] & mask)];
op[0] = t0;
op[1] = t1;
op[2] = t2;
op[3] = t3;
n -= 4;
while (n > 0) {
n -= 4;
wp += 4;
op += 4;
t0 = ToLinear8[(ca += wp[3]) & mask];
t1 = ToLinear8[(cb += wp[2]) & mask];
t2 = ToLinear8[(cg += wp[1]) & mask];
t3 = ToLinear8[(cr += wp[0]) & mask];
op[0] = t0;
op[1] = t1;
op[2] = t2;
op[3] = t3;
}
} else {
REPEAT(stride, *op = ToLinear8[*wp&mask]; wp++; op++)
n -= stride;
while (n > 0) {
REPEAT(stride,
wp[stride] += *wp; *op = ToLinear8[*wp&mask]; wp++; op++)
n -= stride;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: * tools/tiffcrop.c: fix various out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap or stack allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35093,
MSVR 35096 and MSVR 35097. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal
Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* tools/tiff2pdf.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities in
heap allocate buffer in t2p_process_jpeg_strip(). Reported as MSVR
35098. Discovered by Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC
Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c: fix out-of-bounds write vulnerabilities
in heap allocated buffers. Reported as MSVR 35094. Discovered by
Axel Souchet and Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities &
Mitigations team.
* libtiff/tif_write.c: fix issue in error code path of TIFFFlushData1()
that didn't reset the tif_rawcc and tif_rawcp members. I'm not
completely sure if that could happen in practice outside of the odd
behaviour of t2p_seekproc() of tiff2pdf). The report points that a
better fix could be to check the return value of TIFFFlushData1() in
places where it isn't done currently, but it seems this patch is enough.
Reported as MSVR 35095. Discovered by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan &
Suha Can from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations team.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | 0 | 48,317 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: struct sctp_chunk *sctp_make_heartbeat_ack(const struct sctp_association *asoc,
const struct sctp_chunk *chunk,
const void *payload, const size_t paylen)
{
struct sctp_chunk *retval;
retval = sctp_make_control(asoc, SCTP_CID_HEARTBEAT_ACK, 0, paylen);
if (!retval)
goto nodata;
retval->subh.hbs_hdr = sctp_addto_chunk(retval, paylen, payload);
/* RFC 2960 6.4 Multi-homed SCTP Endpoints
*
* An endpoint SHOULD transmit reply chunks (e.g., SACK,
* HEARTBEAT ACK, * etc.) to the same destination transport
* address from which it * received the DATA or control chunk
* to which it is replying.
*
* [HBACK back to where the HEARTBEAT came from.]
*/
if (chunk)
retval->transport = chunk->transport;
nodata:
return retval;
}
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix NULL pointer dereference in af->from_addr_param on malformed packet
An SCTP server doing ASCONF will panic on malformed INIT ping-of-death
in the form of:
------------ INIT[PARAM: SET_PRIMARY_IP] ------------>
While the INIT chunk parameter verification dissects through many things
in order to detect malformed input, it misses to actually check parameters
inside of parameters. E.g. RFC5061, section 4.2.4 proposes a 'set primary
IP address' parameter in ASCONF, which has as a subparameter an address
parameter.
So an attacker may send a parameter type other than SCTP_PARAM_IPV4_ADDRESS
or SCTP_PARAM_IPV6_ADDRESS, param_type2af() will subsequently return 0
and thus sctp_get_af_specific() returns NULL, too, which we then happily
dereference unconditionally through af->from_addr_param().
The trace for the log:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000078
IP: [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
PGD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[...]
Pid: 0, comm: swapper Not tainted 2.6.32-504.el6.x86_64 #1 Bochs Bochs
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa01e9c62>] [<ffffffffa01e9c62>] sctp_process_init+0x492/0x990 [sctp]
[...]
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
[<ffffffffa01f2add>] ? sctp_bind_addr_copy+0x5d/0xe0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e1fcb>] sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init+0x21b/0x340 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e5c09>] ? sctp_endpoint_lookup_assoc+0xc9/0xf0 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01e61f6>] sctp_endpoint_bh_rcv+0x116/0x230 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
[<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
[<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
[<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
[...]
A minimal way to address this is to check for NULL as we do on all
other such occasions where we know sctp_get_af_specific() could
possibly return with NULL.
Fixes: d6de3097592b ("[SCTP]: Add the handling of "Set Primary IP Address" parameter to INIT")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 35,868 |
Analyze the following code, commit message, and CWE ID. Determine whether it has a vulnerability. If it does, return '1'; if it doesn't, return '0'. Remember, I want response in '1' or '0', No explanation. | Code: parse_strength(struct magic_set *ms, struct magic_entry *me, const char *line)
{
const char *l = line;
char *el;
unsigned long factor;
struct magic *m = &me->mp[0];
if (m->factor_op != FILE_FACTOR_OP_NONE) {
file_magwarn(ms,
"Current entry already has a strength type: %c %d",
m->factor_op, m->factor);
return -1;
}
if (m->type == FILE_NAME) {
file_magwarn(ms, "%s: Strength setting is not supported in "
"\"name\" magic entries", m->value.s);
return -1;
}
EATAB;
switch (*l) {
case FILE_FACTOR_OP_NONE:
case FILE_FACTOR_OP_PLUS:
case FILE_FACTOR_OP_MINUS:
case FILE_FACTOR_OP_TIMES:
case FILE_FACTOR_OP_DIV:
m->factor_op = *l++;
break;
default:
file_magwarn(ms, "Unknown factor op `%c'", *l);
return -1;
}
EATAB;
factor = strtoul(l, &el, 0);
if (factor > 255) {
file_magwarn(ms, "Too large factor `%lu'", factor);
goto out;
}
if (*el && !isspace((unsigned char)*el)) {
file_magwarn(ms, "Bad factor `%s'", l);
goto out;
}
m->factor = (uint8_t)factor;
if (m->factor == 0 && m->factor_op == FILE_FACTOR_OP_DIV) {
file_magwarn(ms, "Cannot have factor op `%c' and factor %u",
m->factor_op, m->factor);
goto out;
}
return 0;
out:
m->factor_op = FILE_FACTOR_OP_NONE;
m->factor = 0;
return -1;
}
Commit Message: * Enforce limit of 8K on regex searches that have no limits
* Allow the l modifier for regex to mean line count. Default
to byte count. If line count is specified, assume a max
of 80 characters per line to limit the byte count.
* Don't allow conversions to be used for dates, allowing
the mask field to be used as an offset.
* Bump the version of the magic format so that regex changes
are visible.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | 0 | 37,979 |
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