instruction
stringclasses 1
value | input
stringlengths 306
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stringclasses 4
values | __index_level_0__
int64 165k
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|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct page *alloc_huge_page(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
unsigned long addr, int avoid_reserve)
{
struct hstate *h = hstate_vma(vma);
struct page *page;
struct address_space *mapping = vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
struct inode *inode = mapping->host;
long chg;
/*
* Processes that did not create the mapping will have no reserves and
* will not have accounted against quota. Check that the quota can be
* made before satisfying the allocation
* MAP_NORESERVE mappings may also need pages and quota allocated
* if no reserve mapping overlaps.
*/
chg = vma_needs_reservation(h, vma, addr);
if (chg < 0)
return ERR_PTR(-VM_FAULT_OOM);
if (chg)
if (hugetlb_get_quota(inode->i_mapping, chg))
return ERR_PTR(-VM_FAULT_SIGBUS);
spin_lock(&hugetlb_lock);
page = dequeue_huge_page_vma(h, vma, addr, avoid_reserve);
spin_unlock(&hugetlb_lock);
if (!page) {
page = alloc_buddy_huge_page(h, NUMA_NO_NODE);
if (!page) {
hugetlb_put_quota(inode->i_mapping, chg);
return ERR_PTR(-VM_FAULT_SIGBUS);
}
}
set_page_private(page, (unsigned long) mapping);
vma_commit_reservation(h, vma, addr);
return page;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the Linux kernel before 3.3.6, when huge pages are enabled, allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash) or possibly gain privileges by interacting with a hugetlbfs filesystem, as demonstrated by a umount operation that triggers improper handling of quota data.
Commit Message: hugepages: fix use after free bug in "quota" handling
hugetlbfs_{get,put}_quota() are badly named. They don't interact with the
general quota handling code, and they don't much resemble its behaviour.
Rather than being about maintaining limits on on-disk block usage by
particular users, they are instead about maintaining limits on in-memory
page usage (including anonymous MAP_PRIVATE copied-on-write pages)
associated with a particular hugetlbfs filesystem instance.
Worse, they work by having callbacks to the hugetlbfs filesystem code from
the low-level page handling code, in particular from free_huge_page().
This is a layering violation of itself, but more importantly, if the
kernel does a get_user_pages() on hugepages (which can happen from KVM
amongst others), then the free_huge_page() can be delayed until after the
associated inode has already been freed. If an unmount occurs at the
wrong time, even the hugetlbfs superblock where the "quota" limits are
stored may have been freed.
Andrew Barry proposed a patch to fix this by having hugepages, instead of
storing a pointer to their address_space and reaching the superblock from
there, had the hugepages store pointers directly to the superblock,
bumping the reference count as appropriate to avoid it being freed.
Andrew Morton rejected that version, however, on the grounds that it made
the existing layering violation worse.
This is a reworked version of Andrew's patch, which removes the extra, and
some of the existing, layering violation. It works by introducing the
concept of a hugepage "subpool" at the lower hugepage mm layer - that is a
finite logical pool of hugepages to allocate from. hugetlbfs now creates
a subpool for each filesystem instance with a page limit set, and a
pointer to the subpool gets added to each allocated hugepage, instead of
the address_space pointer used now. The subpool has its own lifetime and
is only freed once all pages in it _and_ all other references to it (i.e.
superblocks) are gone.
subpools are optional - a NULL subpool pointer is taken by the code to
mean that no subpool limits are in effect.
Previous discussion of this bug found in: "Fix refcounting in hugetlbfs
quota handling.". See: https://lkml.org/lkml/2011/8/11/28 or
http://marc.info/?l=linux-mm&m=126928970510627&w=1
v2: Fixed a bug spotted by Hillf Danton, and removed the extra parameter to
alloc_huge_page() - since it already takes the vma, it is not necessary.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Barry <abarry@cray.com>
Signed-off-by: David Gibson <david@gibson.dropbear.id.au>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Minchan Kim <minchan.kim@gmail.com>
Cc: Hillf Danton <dhillf@gmail.com>
Cc: Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
High
| 165,608
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int rsa_verify_hash_ex(const unsigned char *sig, unsigned long siglen,
const unsigned char *hash, unsigned long hashlen,
int padding,
int hash_idx, unsigned long saltlen,
int *stat, rsa_key *key)
{
unsigned long modulus_bitlen, modulus_bytelen, x;
int err;
unsigned char *tmpbuf;
LTC_ARGCHK(hash != NULL);
LTC_ARGCHK(sig != NULL);
LTC_ARGCHK(stat != NULL);
LTC_ARGCHK(key != NULL);
/* default to invalid */
*stat = 0;
/* valid padding? */
if ((padding != LTC_PKCS_1_V1_5) &&
(padding != LTC_PKCS_1_PSS)) {
return CRYPT_PK_INVALID_PADDING;
}
if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) {
/* valid hash ? */
if ((err = hash_is_valid(hash_idx)) != CRYPT_OK) {
return err;
}
}
/* get modulus len in bits */
modulus_bitlen = mp_count_bits( (key->N));
/* outlen must be at least the size of the modulus */
modulus_bytelen = mp_unsigned_bin_size( (key->N));
if (modulus_bytelen != siglen) {
return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
}
/* allocate temp buffer for decoded sig */
tmpbuf = XMALLOC(siglen);
if (tmpbuf == NULL) {
return CRYPT_MEM;
}
/* RSA decode it */
x = siglen;
if ((err = ltc_mp.rsa_me(sig, siglen, tmpbuf, &x, PK_PUBLIC, key)) != CRYPT_OK) {
XFREE(tmpbuf);
return err;
}
/* make sure the output is the right size */
if (x != siglen) {
XFREE(tmpbuf);
return CRYPT_INVALID_PACKET;
}
if (padding == LTC_PKCS_1_PSS) {
/* PSS decode and verify it */
if(modulus_bitlen%8 == 1){
err = pkcs_1_pss_decode(hash, hashlen, tmpbuf+1, x-1, saltlen, hash_idx, modulus_bitlen, stat);
}
else{
err = pkcs_1_pss_decode(hash, hashlen, tmpbuf, x, saltlen, hash_idx, modulus_bitlen, stat);
}
} else {
/* PKCS #1 v1.5 decode it */
unsigned char *out;
unsigned long outlen, loid[16];
int decoded;
ltc_asn1_list digestinfo[2], siginfo[2];
/* not all hashes have OIDs... so sad */
if (hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen == 0) {
err = CRYPT_INVALID_ARG;
goto bail_2;
}
/* allocate temp buffer for decoded hash */
outlen = ((modulus_bitlen >> 3) + (modulus_bitlen & 7 ? 1 : 0)) - 3;
out = XMALLOC(outlen);
if (out == NULL) {
err = CRYPT_MEM;
goto bail_2;
}
if ((err = pkcs_1_v1_5_decode(tmpbuf, x, LTC_PKCS_1_EMSA, modulus_bitlen, out, &outlen, &decoded)) != CRYPT_OK) {
XFREE(out);
goto bail_2;
}
/* now we must decode out[0...outlen-1] using ASN.1, test the OID and then test the hash */
/* construct the SEQUENCE
SEQUENCE {
SEQUENCE {hashoid OID
blah NULL
}
hash OCTET STRING
}
*/
LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER, loid, sizeof(loid)/sizeof(loid[0]));
LTC_SET_ASN1(digestinfo, 1, LTC_ASN1_NULL, NULL, 0);
LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo, 0, LTC_ASN1_SEQUENCE, digestinfo, 2);
LTC_SET_ASN1(siginfo, 1, LTC_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, tmpbuf, siglen);
if ((err = der_decode_sequence(out, outlen, siginfo, 2)) != CRYPT_OK) {
XFREE(out);
goto bail_2;
}
/* test OID */
if ((digestinfo[0].size == hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen) &&
(XMEMCMP(digestinfo[0].data, hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OID, sizeof(unsigned long) * hash_descriptor[hash_idx].OIDlen) == 0) &&
(siginfo[1].size == hashlen) &&
(XMEMCMP(siginfo[1].data, hash, hashlen) == 0)) {
*stat = 1;
}
#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
zeromem(out, outlen);
#endif
XFREE(out);
}
bail_2:
#ifdef LTC_CLEAN_STACK
zeromem(tmpbuf, siglen);
#endif
XFREE(tmpbuf);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The rsa_verify_hash_ex function in rsa_verify_hash.c in LibTomCrypt, as used in OP-TEE before 2.2.0, does not validate that the message length is equal to the ASN.1 encoded data length, which makes it easier for remote attackers to forge RSA signatures or public certificates by leveraging a Bleichenbacher signature forgery attack.
Commit Message: rsa_verify_hash: fix possible bleichenbacher signature attack
|
Low
| 168,832
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int ntlm_read_message_fields(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_FIELDS* fields)
{
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 8)
return -1;
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, fields->Len); /* Len (2 bytes) */
Stream_Read_UINT16(s, fields->MaxLen); /* MaxLen (2 bytes) */
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, fields->BufferOffset); /* BufferOffset (4 bytes) */
return 1;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: FreeRDP prior to version 2.0.0-rc4 contains several Out-Of-Bounds Reads in the NTLM Authentication module that results in a Denial of Service (segfault).
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8789
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
|
Low
| 169,276
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int jas_seq2d_output(jas_matrix_t *matrix, FILE *out)
{
#define MAXLINELEN 80
int i;
int j;
jas_seqent_t x;
char buf[MAXLINELEN + 1];
char sbuf[MAXLINELEN + 1];
int n;
fprintf(out, "%"PRIiFAST32" %"PRIiFAST32"\n", jas_seq2d_xstart(matrix),
jas_seq2d_ystart(matrix));
fprintf(out, "%"PRIiFAST32" %"PRIiFAST32"\n", jas_matrix_numcols(matrix),
jas_matrix_numrows(matrix));
buf[0] = '\0';
for (i = 0; i < jas_matrix_numrows(matrix); ++i) {
for (j = 0; j < jas_matrix_numcols(matrix); ++j) {
x = jas_matrix_get(matrix, i, j);
sprintf(sbuf, "%s%4ld", (strlen(buf) > 0) ? " " : "",
JAS_CAST(long, x));
n = JAS_CAST(int, strlen(buf));
if (n + JAS_CAST(int, strlen(sbuf)) > MAXLINELEN) {
fputs(buf, out);
fputs("\n", out);
buf[0] = '\0';
}
strcat(buf, sbuf);
if (j == jas_matrix_numcols(matrix) - 1) {
fputs(buf, out);
fputs("\n", out);
buf[0] = '\0';
}
}
}
fputs(buf, out);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
Medium
| 168,711
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void ldap_encode_response(struct asn1_data *data, struct ldap_Result *result)
{
asn1_write_enumerated(data, result->resultcode);
asn1_write_OctetString(data, result->dn,
(result->dn) ? strlen(result->dn) : 0);
asn1_write_OctetString(data, result->errormessage,
(result->errormessage) ?
strlen(result->errormessage) : 0);
if (result->referral) {
asn1_push_tag(data, ASN1_CONTEXT(3));
asn1_write_OctetString(data, result->referral,
strlen(result->referral));
asn1_pop_tag(data);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The LDAP server in the AD domain controller in Samba 4.x before 4.1.22 does not check return values to ensure successful ASN.1 memory allocation, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption and daemon crash) via crafted packets.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,593
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool ComponentControllerImpl::BindToRequest(
fuchsia::sys::Package package,
fuchsia::sys::StartupInfo startup_info,
fidl::InterfaceRequest<fuchsia::sys::ComponentController>
controller_request) {
DCHECK(!service_directory_);
DCHECK(!view_provider_binding_);
url_ = GURL(*package.resolved_url);
if (!url_.is_valid()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Rejected invalid URL: " << url_;
return false;
}
if (controller_request.is_valid()) {
controller_binding_.Bind(std::move(controller_request));
controller_binding_.set_error_handler(
fit::bind_member(this, &ComponentControllerImpl::Kill));
}
runner_->context()->CreateFrame(frame_observer_binding_.NewBinding(),
frame_.NewRequest());
frame_->GetNavigationController(navigation_controller_.NewRequest());
navigation_controller_->LoadUrl(url_.spec(), nullptr);
service_directory_ = std::make_unique<base::fuchsia::ServiceDirectory>(
std::move(startup_info.launch_info.directory_request));
view_provider_binding_ = std::make_unique<
base::fuchsia::ScopedServiceBinding<fuchsia::ui::viewsv1::ViewProvider>>(
service_directory_.get(), this);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: The PendingScript::notifyFinished function in WebKit/Source/core/dom/PendingScript.cpp in Google Chrome before 49.0.2623.75 relies on memory-cache information about integrity-check occurrences instead of integrity-check successes, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Subresource Integrity (aka SRI) protection mechanism by triggering two loads of the same resource.
Commit Message: [fuchsia] Implement browser tests for WebRunner Context service.
Tests may interact with the WebRunner FIDL services and the underlying
browser objects for end to end testing of service and browser
functionality.
* Add a browser test launcher main() for WebRunner.
* Add some simple navigation tests.
* Wire up GoBack()/GoForward() FIDL calls.
* Add embedded test server resources and initialization logic.
* Add missing deletion & notification calls to BrowserContext dtor.
* Use FIDL events for navigation state changes.
* Bug fixes:
** Move BrowserContext and Screen deletion to PostMainMessageLoopRun(),
so that they may use the MessageLoop during teardown.
** Fix Frame dtor to allow for null WindowTreeHosts (headless case)
** Fix std::move logic in Frame ctor which lead to no WebContents
observer being registered.
Bug: 871594
Change-Id: I36bcbd2436d534d366c6be4eeb54b9f9feadd1ac
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1164539
Commit-Queue: Kevin Marshall <kmarshall@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabrice de Gans-Riberi <fdegans@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Scott Violet <sky@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#584155}
|
Low
| 172,148
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool AXNodeObject::isRequired() const {
Node* n = this->getNode();
if (n && (n->isElementNode() && toElement(n)->isFormControlElement()) &&
hasAttribute(requiredAttr))
return toHTMLFormControlElement(n)->isRequired();
if (equalIgnoringCase(getAttribute(aria_requiredAttr), "true"))
return true;
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: Google Chrome before 44.0.2403.89 does not ensure that the auto-open list omits all dangerous file types, which makes it easier for remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by providing a crafted file and leveraging a user's previous *Always open files of this type* choice, related to download_commands.cc and download_prefs.cc.
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
|
Medium
| 171,919
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool DataReductionProxySettings::IsDataReductionProxyEnabled() const {
if (base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(network::features::kNetworkService) &&
!params::IsEnabledWithNetworkService()) {
return false;
}
return IsDataSaverEnabledByUser();
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An off by one error resulting in an allocation of zero size in FFmpeg in Google Chrome prior to 54.0.2840.98 for Mac, and 54.0.2840.99 for Windows, and 54.0.2840.100 for Linux, and 55.0.2883.84 for Android allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted video file.
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
|
Medium
| 172,554
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xfs_acl_from_disk(struct xfs_acl *aclp)
{
struct posix_acl_entry *acl_e;
struct posix_acl *acl;
struct xfs_acl_entry *ace;
int count, i;
count = be32_to_cpu(aclp->acl_cnt);
if (count > XFS_ACL_MAX_ENTRIES)
return ERR_PTR(-EFSCORRUPTED);
acl = posix_acl_alloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!acl)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
acl_e = &acl->a_entries[i];
ace = &aclp->acl_entry[i];
/*
* The tag is 32 bits on disk and 16 bits in core.
*
* Because every access to it goes through the core
* format first this is not a problem.
*/
acl_e->e_tag = be32_to_cpu(ace->ae_tag);
acl_e->e_perm = be16_to_cpu(ace->ae_perm);
switch (acl_e->e_tag) {
case ACL_USER:
case ACL_GROUP:
acl_e->e_id = be32_to_cpu(ace->ae_id);
break;
case ACL_USER_OBJ:
case ACL_GROUP_OBJ:
case ACL_MASK:
case ACL_OTHER:
acl_e->e_id = ACL_UNDEFINED_ID;
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
return acl;
fail:
posix_acl_release(acl);
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: Integer overflow in the xfs_acl_from_disk function in fs/xfs/xfs_acl.c in the Linux kernel before 3.1.9 allows local users to cause a denial of service (panic) via a filesystem with a malformed ACL, leading to a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: xfs: fix acl count validation in xfs_acl_from_disk()
Commit fa8b18ed didn't prevent the integer overflow and possible
memory corruption. "count" can go negative and bypass the check.
Signed-off-by: Xi Wang <xi.wang@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Myers <bpm@sgi.com>
|
Low
| 169,888
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadPSImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define BoundingBox "BoundingBox:"
#define BeginDocument "BeginDocument:"
#define BeginXMPPacket "<?xpacket begin="
#define EndXMPPacket "<?xpacket end="
#define ICCProfile "BeginICCProfile:"
#define CMYKCustomColor "CMYKCustomColor:"
#define CMYKProcessColor "CMYKProcessColor:"
#define DocumentMedia "DocumentMedia:"
#define DocumentCustomColors "DocumentCustomColors:"
#define DocumentProcessColors "DocumentProcessColors:"
#define EndDocument "EndDocument:"
#define HiResBoundingBox "HiResBoundingBox:"
#define ImageData "ImageData:"
#define PageBoundingBox "PageBoundingBox:"
#define LanguageLevel "LanguageLevel:"
#define PageMedia "PageMedia:"
#define Pages "Pages:"
#define PhotoshopProfile "BeginPhotoshop:"
#define PostscriptLevel "!PS-"
#define RenderPostscriptText " Rendering Postscript... "
#define SpotColor "+ "
char
command[MaxTextExtent],
*density,
filename[MaxTextExtent],
geometry[MaxTextExtent],
input_filename[MaxTextExtent],
message[MaxTextExtent],
*options,
postscript_filename[MaxTextExtent];
const char
*option;
const DelegateInfo
*delegate_info;
GeometryInfo
geometry_info;
Image
*image,
*next,
*postscript_image;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
int
c,
file;
MagickBooleanType
cmyk,
fitPage,
skip,
status;
MagickStatusType
flags;
PointInfo
delta,
resolution;
RectangleInfo
page;
register char
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
SegmentInfo
bounds,
hires_bounds;
short int
hex_digits[256];
size_t
length,
priority;
ssize_t
count;
StringInfo
*profile;
unsigned long
columns,
extent,
language_level,
pages,
rows,
scene,
spotcolor;
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
image=AcquireImage(image_info);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
status=AcquireUniqueSymbolicLink(image_info->filename,input_filename);
if (status == MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,"UnableToCreateTemporaryFile",
image_info->filename);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
/*
Initialize hex values.
*/
(void) memset(hex_digits,0,sizeof(hex_digits));
hex_digits[(int) '0']=0;
hex_digits[(int) '1']=1;
hex_digits[(int) '2']=2;
hex_digits[(int) '3']=3;
hex_digits[(int) '4']=4;
hex_digits[(int) '5']=5;
hex_digits[(int) '6']=6;
hex_digits[(int) '7']=7;
hex_digits[(int) '8']=8;
hex_digits[(int) '9']=9;
hex_digits[(int) 'a']=10;
hex_digits[(int) 'b']=11;
hex_digits[(int) 'c']=12;
hex_digits[(int) 'd']=13;
hex_digits[(int) 'e']=14;
hex_digits[(int) 'f']=15;
hex_digits[(int) 'A']=10;
hex_digits[(int) 'B']=11;
hex_digits[(int) 'C']=12;
hex_digits[(int) 'D']=13;
hex_digits[(int) 'E']=14;
hex_digits[(int) 'F']=15;
/*
Set the page density.
*/
delta.x=DefaultResolution;
delta.y=DefaultResolution;
if ((image->x_resolution == 0.0) || (image->y_resolution == 0.0))
{
flags=ParseGeometry(PSDensityGeometry,&geometry_info);
image->x_resolution=geometry_info.rho;
image->y_resolution=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->y_resolution=image->x_resolution;
}
if (image_info->density != (char *) NULL)
{
flags=ParseGeometry(image_info->density,&geometry_info);
image->x_resolution=geometry_info.rho;
image->y_resolution=geometry_info.sigma;
if ((flags & SigmaValue) == 0)
image->y_resolution=image->x_resolution;
}
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(PSPageGeometry,&page);
if (image_info->page != (char *) NULL)
(void) ParseAbsoluteGeometry(image_info->page,&page);
resolution.x=image->x_resolution;
resolution.y=image->y_resolution;
page.width=(size_t) ceil((double) (page.width*resolution.x/delta.x)-0.5);
page.height=(size_t) ceil((double) (page.height*resolution.y/delta.y)-0.5);
/*
Determine page geometry from the Postscript bounding box.
*/
(void) memset(&bounds,0,sizeof(bounds));
(void) memset(command,0,sizeof(command));
cmyk=image_info->colorspace == CMYKColorspace ? MagickTrue : MagickFalse;
(void) memset(&hires_bounds,0,sizeof(hires_bounds));
priority=0;
columns=0;
rows=0;
extent=0;
spotcolor=0;
language_level=1;
skip=MagickFalse;
pages=(~0UL);
p=command;
for (c=ReadBlobByte(image); c != EOF; c=ReadBlobByte(image))
{
/*
Note document structuring comments.
*/
*p++=(char) c;
if ((strchr("\n\r%",c) == (char *) NULL) &&
((size_t) (p-command) < (MaxTextExtent-1)))
continue;
*p='\0';
p=command;
/*
Skip %%BeginDocument thru %%EndDocument.
*/
if (LocaleNCompare(BeginDocument,command,strlen(BeginDocument)) == 0)
skip=MagickTrue;
if (LocaleNCompare(EndDocument,command,strlen(EndDocument)) == 0)
skip=MagickFalse;
if (skip != MagickFalse)
continue;
if (LocaleNCompare(PostscriptLevel,command,strlen(PostscriptLevel)) == 0)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"ps:Level",command+4);
if (GlobExpression(command,"*EPSF-*",MagickTrue) != MagickFalse)
pages=1;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(LanguageLevel,command,strlen(LanguageLevel)) == 0)
(void) sscanf(command,LanguageLevel " %lu",&language_level);
if (LocaleNCompare(Pages,command,strlen(Pages)) == 0)
(void) sscanf(command,Pages " %lu",&pages);
if (LocaleNCompare(ImageData,command,strlen(ImageData)) == 0)
(void) sscanf(command,ImageData " %lu %lu",&columns,&rows);
/*
Is this a CMYK document?
*/
length=strlen(DocumentProcessColors);
if (LocaleNCompare(DocumentProcessColors,command,length) == 0)
{
if ((GlobExpression(command,"*Cyan*",MagickTrue) != MagickFalse) ||
(GlobExpression(command,"*Magenta*",MagickTrue) != MagickFalse) ||
(GlobExpression(command,"*Yellow*",MagickTrue) != MagickFalse))
cmyk=MagickTrue;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(CMYKCustomColor,command,strlen(CMYKCustomColor)) == 0)
cmyk=MagickTrue;
if (LocaleNCompare(CMYKProcessColor,command,strlen(CMYKProcessColor)) == 0)
cmyk=MagickTrue;
length=strlen(DocumentCustomColors);
if ((LocaleNCompare(DocumentCustomColors,command,length) == 0) ||
(LocaleNCompare(CMYKCustomColor,command,strlen(CMYKCustomColor)) == 0) ||
(LocaleNCompare(SpotColor,command,strlen(SpotColor)) == 0))
{
char
property[MaxTextExtent],
*value;
register char
*p;
/*
Note spot names.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(property,MaxTextExtent,"ps:SpotColor-%.20g",
(double) (spotcolor++));
for (p=command; *p != '\0'; p++)
if (isspace((int) (unsigned char) *p) != 0)
break;
value=ConstantString(p);
(void) SubstituteString(&value,"(","");
(void) SubstituteString(&value,")","");
(void) StripString(value);
if (*value != '\0')
(void) SetImageProperty(image,property,value);
value=DestroyString(value);
continue;
}
if (image_info->page != (char *) NULL)
continue;
/*
Note region defined by bounding box.
*/
count=0;
i=0;
if (LocaleNCompare(BoundingBox,command,strlen(BoundingBox)) == 0)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(command,BoundingBox " %lf %lf %lf %lf",
&bounds.x1,&bounds.y1,&bounds.x2,&bounds.y2);
i=2;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(DocumentMedia,command,strlen(DocumentMedia)) == 0)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(command,DocumentMedia " %lf %lf %lf %lf",
&bounds.x1,&bounds.y1,&bounds.x2,&bounds.y2);
i=1;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(HiResBoundingBox,command,strlen(HiResBoundingBox)) == 0)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(command,HiResBoundingBox " %lf %lf %lf %lf",
&bounds.x1,&bounds.y1,&bounds.x2,&bounds.y2);
i=3;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(PageBoundingBox,command,strlen(PageBoundingBox)) == 0)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(command,PageBoundingBox " %lf %lf %lf %lf",
&bounds.x1,&bounds.y1,&bounds.x2,&bounds.y2);
i=1;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(PageMedia,command,strlen(PageMedia)) == 0)
{
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(command,PageMedia " %lf %lf %lf %lf",
&bounds.x1,&bounds.y1,&bounds.x2,&bounds.y2);
i=1;
}
if ((count != 4) || (i < (ssize_t) priority))
continue;
if ((fabs(bounds.x2-bounds.x1) <= fabs(hires_bounds.x2-hires_bounds.x1)) ||
(fabs(bounds.y2-bounds.y1) <= fabs(hires_bounds.y2-hires_bounds.y1)))
if (i == (ssize_t) priority)
continue;
hires_bounds=bounds;
priority=(size_t) i;
}
if ((fabs(hires_bounds.x2-hires_bounds.x1) >= MagickEpsilon) &&
(fabs(hires_bounds.y2-hires_bounds.y1) >= MagickEpsilon))
{
/*
Set Postscript render geometry.
*/
(void) FormatLocaleString(geometry,MaxTextExtent,"%gx%g%+.15g%+.15g",
hires_bounds.x2-hires_bounds.x1,hires_bounds.y2-hires_bounds.y1,
hires_bounds.x1,hires_bounds.y1);
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"ps:HiResBoundingBox",geometry);
page.width=(size_t) ceil((double) ((hires_bounds.x2-hires_bounds.x1)*
resolution.x/delta.x)-0.5);
page.height=(size_t) ceil((double) ((hires_bounds.y2-hires_bounds.y1)*
resolution.y/delta.y)-0.5);
}
fitPage=MagickFalse;
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"eps:fit-page");
if (option != (char *) NULL)
{
char
*geometry;
MagickStatusType
flags;
geometry=GetPageGeometry(option);
flags=ParseMetaGeometry(geometry,&page.x,&page.y,&page.width,
&page.height);
if (flags == NoValue)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),OptionError,
"InvalidGeometry","`%s'",option);
image=DestroyImage(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
page.width=(size_t) ceil((double) (page.width*image->x_resolution/delta.x)
-0.5);
page.height=(size_t) ceil((double) (page.height*image->y_resolution/
delta.y) -0.5);
geometry=DestroyString(geometry);
fitPage=MagickTrue;
}
if (IssRGBCompatibleColorspace(image_info->colorspace) != MagickFalse)
cmyk=MagickFalse;
/*
Create Ghostscript control file.
*/
file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(postscript_filename);
if (file == -1)
{
ThrowFileException(&image->exception,FileOpenError,"UnableToOpenFile",
image_info->filename);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
(void) CopyMagickString(command,"/setpagedevice {pop} bind 1 index where {"
"dup wcheck {3 1 roll put} {pop def} ifelse} {def} ifelse\n"
"<</UseCIEColor true>>setpagedevice\n",MaxTextExtent);
count=write(file,command,(unsigned int) strlen(command));
if (image_info->page == (char *) NULL)
{
char
translate_geometry[MaxTextExtent];
(void) FormatLocaleString(translate_geometry,MaxTextExtent,
"%g %g translate\n",-hires_bounds.x1,-hires_bounds.y1);
count=write(file,translate_geometry,(unsigned int)
strlen(translate_geometry));
}
file=close(file)-1;
/*
Render Postscript with the Ghostscript delegate.
*/
if (image_info->monochrome != MagickFalse)
delegate_info=GetDelegateInfo("ps:mono",(char *) NULL,exception);
else
if (cmyk != MagickFalse)
delegate_info=GetDelegateInfo("ps:cmyk",(char *) NULL,exception);
else
delegate_info=GetDelegateInfo("ps:alpha",(char *) NULL,exception);
if (delegate_info == (const DelegateInfo *) NULL)
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(postscript_filename);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
density=AcquireString("");
options=AcquireString("");
(void) FormatLocaleString(density,MaxTextExtent,"%gx%g",resolution.x,
resolution.y);
(void) FormatLocaleString(options,MaxTextExtent,"-g%.20gx%.20g ",(double)
page.width,(double) page.height);
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
*read_info->magick='\0';
if (read_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
char
pages[MaxTextExtent];
(void) FormatLocaleString(pages,MaxTextExtent,"-dFirstPage=%.20g "
"-dLastPage=%.20g ",(double) read_info->scene+1,(double)
(read_info->scene+read_info->number_scenes));
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(options,pages,MaxTextExtent);
read_info->number_scenes=0;
if (read_info->scenes != (char *) NULL)
*read_info->scenes='\0';
}
if (*image_info->magick == 'E')
{
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"eps:use-cropbox");
if ((option == (const char *) NULL) ||
(IsStringTrue(option) != MagickFalse))
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(options,"-dEPSCrop ",MaxTextExtent);
if (fitPage != MagickFalse)
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(options,"-dEPSFitPage ",MaxTextExtent);
}
(void) CopyMagickString(filename,read_info->filename,MaxTextExtent);
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(filename);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(filename);
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(filename,"%d",MaxTextExtent);
(void) FormatLocaleString(command,MaxTextExtent,
GetDelegateCommands(delegate_info),
read_info->antialias != MagickFalse ? 4 : 1,
read_info->antialias != MagickFalse ? 4 : 1,density,options,filename,
postscript_filename,input_filename);
options=DestroyString(options);
density=DestroyString(density);
*message='\0';
status=InvokePostscriptDelegate(read_info->verbose,command,message,exception);
(void) InterpretImageFilename(image_info,image,filename,1,
read_info->filename);
if ((status == MagickFalse) ||
(IsPostscriptRendered(read_info->filename) == MagickFalse))
{
(void) ConcatenateMagickString(command," -c showpage",MaxTextExtent);
status=InvokePostscriptDelegate(read_info->verbose,command,message,
exception);
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(postscript_filename);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(input_filename);
postscript_image=(Image *) NULL;
if (status == MagickFalse)
for (i=1; ; i++)
{
(void) InterpretImageFilename(image_info,image,filename,(int) i,
read_info->filename);
if (IsPostscriptRendered(read_info->filename) == MagickFalse)
break;
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
}
else
for (i=1; ; i++)
{
(void) InterpretImageFilename(image_info,image,filename,(int) i,
read_info->filename);
if (IsPostscriptRendered(read_info->filename) == MagickFalse)
break;
read_info->blob=NULL;
read_info->length=0;
next=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
if (next == (Image *) NULL)
break;
AppendImageToList(&postscript_image,next);
}
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
if (postscript_image == (Image *) NULL)
{
if (*message != '\0')
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),DelegateError,
"PostscriptDelegateFailed","`%s'",message);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
if (LocaleCompare(postscript_image->magick,"BMP") == 0)
{
Image
*cmyk_image;
cmyk_image=ConsolidateCMYKImages(postscript_image,exception);
if (cmyk_image != (Image *) NULL)
{
postscript_image=DestroyImageList(postscript_image);
postscript_image=cmyk_image;
}
}
(void) SeekBlob(image,0,SEEK_SET);
for (c=ReadBlobByte(image); c != EOF; c=ReadBlobByte(image))
{
/*
Note document structuring comments.
*/
*p++=(char) c;
if ((strchr("\n\r%",c) == (char *) NULL) &&
((size_t) (p-command) < (MaxTextExtent-1)))
continue;
*p='\0';
p=command;
/*
Skip %%BeginDocument thru %%EndDocument.
*/
if (LocaleNCompare(BeginDocument,command,strlen(BeginDocument)) == 0)
skip=MagickTrue;
if (LocaleNCompare(EndDocument,command,strlen(EndDocument)) == 0)
skip=MagickFalse;
if (skip != MagickFalse)
continue;
if (LocaleNCompare(PostscriptLevel,command,strlen(PostscriptLevel)) == 0)
{
(void) SetImageProperty(image,"ps:Level",command+4);
if (GlobExpression(command,"*EPSF-*",MagickTrue) != MagickFalse)
pages=1;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(LanguageLevel,command,strlen(LanguageLevel)) == 0)
(void) sscanf(command,LanguageLevel " %lu",&language_level);
if (LocaleNCompare(Pages,command,strlen(Pages)) == 0)
(void) sscanf(command,Pages " %lu",&pages);
if (LocaleNCompare(ImageData,command,strlen(ImageData)) == 0)
(void) sscanf(command,ImageData " %lu %lu",&columns,&rows);
if (LocaleNCompare(ICCProfile,command,strlen(ICCProfile)) == 0)
{
unsigned char
*datum;
/*
Read ICC profile.
*/
profile=AcquireStringInfo(MaxTextExtent);
datum=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
for (i=0; (c=ProfileInteger(image,hex_digits)) != EOF; i++)
{
if (i >= (ssize_t) GetStringInfoLength(profile))
{
SetStringInfoLength(profile,(size_t) i << 1);
datum=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
}
datum[i]=(unsigned char) c;
}
SetStringInfoLength(profile,(size_t) i+1);
(void) SetImageProfile(image,"icc",profile);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
continue;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(PhotoshopProfile,command,strlen(PhotoshopProfile)) == 0)
{
unsigned char
*p;
/*
Read Photoshop profile.
*/
count=(ssize_t) sscanf(command,PhotoshopProfile " %lu",&extent);
if (count != 1)
continue;
length=extent;
if ((MagickSizeType) length > GetBlobSize(image))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"InsufficientImageDataInFile");
profile=BlobToStringInfo((const void *) NULL,length);
if (profile != (StringInfo *) NULL)
{
p=GetStringInfoDatum(profile);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) length; i++)
*p++=(unsigned char) ProfileInteger(image,hex_digits);
(void) SetImageProfile(image,"8bim",profile);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
}
continue;
}
if (LocaleNCompare(BeginXMPPacket,command,strlen(BeginXMPPacket)) == 0)
{
register size_t
i;
/*
Read XMP profile.
*/
p=command;
profile=StringToStringInfo(command);
for (i=GetStringInfoLength(profile)-1; c != EOF; i++)
{
SetStringInfoLength(profile,(size_t) (i+1));
c=ReadBlobByte(image);
GetStringInfoDatum(profile)[i]=(unsigned char) c;
*p++=(char) c;
if ((strchr("\n\r%",c) == (char *) NULL) &&
((size_t) (p-command) < (MaxTextExtent-1)))
continue;
*p='\0';
p=command;
if (LocaleNCompare(EndXMPPacket,command,strlen(EndXMPPacket)) == 0)
break;
}
SetStringInfoLength(profile,(size_t) i);
(void) SetImageProfile(image,"xmp",profile);
profile=DestroyStringInfo(profile);
continue;
}
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
{
Image
*clone_image;
register ssize_t
i;
/*
Add place holder images to meet the subimage specification requirement.
*/
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) image_info->scene; i++)
{
clone_image=CloneImage(postscript_image,1,1,MagickTrue,exception);
if (clone_image != (Image *) NULL)
PrependImageToList(&postscript_image,clone_image);
}
}
do
{
(void) CopyMagickString(postscript_image->filename,filename,MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(postscript_image->magick,image->magick,
MaxTextExtent);
if (columns != 0)
postscript_image->magick_columns=columns;
if (rows != 0)
postscript_image->magick_rows=rows;
postscript_image->page=page;
(void) CloneImageProfiles(postscript_image,image);
(void) CloneImageProperties(postscript_image,image);
next=SyncNextImageInList(postscript_image);
if (next != (Image *) NULL)
postscript_image=next;
} while (next != (Image *) NULL);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
scene=0;
for (next=GetFirstImageInList(postscript_image); next != (Image *) NULL; )
{
next->scene=scene++;
next=GetNextImageInList(next);
}
return(GetFirstImageInList(postscript_image));
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: ImageMagick before 7.0.8-50 has a memory leak vulnerability in the function ReadPSImage in coders/ps.c.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1601
|
Medium
| 169,619
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: archive_read_format_zip_cleanup(struct archive_read *a)
{
struct zip *zip;
struct zip_entry *zip_entry, *next_zip_entry;
zip = (struct zip *)(a->format->data);
#ifdef HAVE_ZLIB_H
if (zip->stream_valid)
inflateEnd(&zip->stream);
#endif
#if HAVA_LZMA_H && HAVE_LIBLZMA
if (zip->zipx_lzma_valid) {
lzma_end(&zip->zipx_lzma_stream);
}
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_BZLIB_H
if (zip->bzstream_valid) {
BZ2_bzDecompressEnd(&zip->bzstream);
}
#endif
free(zip->uncompressed_buffer);
if (zip->ppmd8_valid)
__archive_ppmd8_functions.Ppmd8_Free(&zip->ppmd8);
if (zip->zip_entries) {
zip_entry = zip->zip_entries;
while (zip_entry != NULL) {
next_zip_entry = zip_entry->next;
archive_string_free(&zip_entry->rsrcname);
free(zip_entry);
zip_entry = next_zip_entry;
}
}
free(zip->decrypted_buffer);
if (zip->cctx_valid)
archive_decrypto_aes_ctr_release(&zip->cctx);
if (zip->hctx_valid)
archive_hmac_sha1_cleanup(&zip->hctx);
free(zip->iv);
free(zip->erd);
free(zip->v_data);
archive_string_free(&zip->format_name);
free(zip);
(a->format->data) = NULL;
return (ARCHIVE_OK);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: A memory leak in archive_read_format_zip_cleanup in archive_read_support_format_zip.c in libarchive 3.3.4-dev allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted ZIP file because of a HAVE_LZMA_H typo. NOTE: this only affects users who downloaded the development code from GitHub. Users of the product's official releases are unaffected.
Commit Message: Fix typo in preprocessor macro in archive_read_format_zip_cleanup()
Frees lzma_stream on cleanup()
Fixes #1165
|
Medium
| 169,695
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ApplyBlockElementCommand::formatSelection(const VisiblePosition& startOfSelection, const VisiblePosition& endOfSelection)
{
Position start = startOfSelection.deepEquivalent().downstream();
if (isAtUnsplittableElement(start)) {
RefPtr<Element> blockquote = createBlockElement();
insertNodeAt(blockquote, start);
RefPtr<Element> placeholder = createBreakElement(document());
appendNode(placeholder, blockquote);
setEndingSelection(VisibleSelection(positionBeforeNode(placeholder.get()), DOWNSTREAM, endingSelection().isDirectional()));
return;
}
RefPtr<Element> blockquoteForNextIndent;
VisiblePosition endOfCurrentParagraph = endOfParagraph(startOfSelection);
VisiblePosition endAfterSelection = endOfParagraph(endOfParagraph(endOfSelection).next());
m_endOfLastParagraph = endOfParagraph(endOfSelection).deepEquivalent();
bool atEnd = false;
Position end;
while (endOfCurrentParagraph != endAfterSelection && !atEnd) {
if (endOfCurrentParagraph.deepEquivalent() == m_endOfLastParagraph)
atEnd = true;
rangeForParagraphSplittingTextNodesIfNeeded(endOfCurrentParagraph, start, end);
endOfCurrentParagraph = end;
Position afterEnd = end.next();
Node* enclosingCell = enclosingNodeOfType(start, &isTableCell);
VisiblePosition endOfNextParagraph = endOfNextParagrahSplittingTextNodesIfNeeded(endOfCurrentParagraph, start, end);
formatRange(start, end, m_endOfLastParagraph, blockquoteForNextIndent);
if (enclosingCell && enclosingCell != enclosingNodeOfType(endOfNextParagraph.deepEquivalent(), &isTableCell))
blockquoteForNextIndent = 0;
if (endAfterSelection.isNotNull() && !endAfterSelection.deepEquivalent().inDocument())
break;
if (endOfNextParagraph.isNotNull() && !endOfNextParagraph.deepEquivalent().inDocument()) {
ASSERT_NOT_REACHED();
return;
}
endOfCurrentParagraph = endOfNextParagraph;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the IndentOutdentCommand::tryIndentingAsListItem function in core/editing/IndentOutdentCommand.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 30.0.1599.101, allows user-assisted remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to list elements.
Commit Message: Remove false assertion in ApplyBlockElementCommand::formatSelection()
Note: This patch is preparation of fixing issue 294456.
This patch removes false assertion in ApplyBlockElementCommand::formatSelection(), when contents of being indent is modified, e.g. mutation event, |endOfNextParagraph| can hold removed contents.
BUG=294456
TEST=n/a
R=tkent@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/25657004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@158701 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,170
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PatternMatch(char *pat, int patdashes, char *string, int stringdashes)
{
char c,
t;
if (stringdashes < patdashes)
return 0;
for (;;) {
switch (c = *pat++) {
case '*':
if (!(c = *pat++))
return 1;
if (c == XK_minus) {
patdashes--;
for (;;) {
while ((t = *string++) != XK_minus)
if (!t)
return 0;
stringdashes--;
if (PatternMatch(pat, patdashes, string, stringdashes))
return 1;
if (stringdashes == patdashes)
return 0;
}
} else {
for (;;) {
while ((t = *string++) != c) {
if (!t)
return 0;
if (t == XK_minus) {
if (stringdashes-- < patdashes)
return 0;
}
}
if (PatternMatch(pat, patdashes, string, stringdashes))
return 1;
}
}
case '?':
if (*string++ == XK_minus)
stringdashes--;
break;
case '\0':
return (*string == '\0');
patdashes--;
stringdashes--;
break;
}
return 0;
default:
if (c == *string++)
break;
return 0;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: In the PatternMatch function in fontfile/fontdir.c in libXfont through 1.5.2 and 2.x before 2.0.2, an attacker with access to an X connection can cause a buffer over-read during pattern matching of fonts, leading to information disclosure or a crash (denial of service). This occurs because '\0' characters are incorrectly skipped in situations involving ? characters.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,693
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: transform_range_check(png_const_structp pp, unsigned int r, unsigned int g,
unsigned int b, unsigned int a, unsigned int in_digitized, double in,
unsigned int out, png_byte sample_depth, double err, double limit,
PNG_CONST char *name, double digitization_error)
{
/* Compare the scaled, digitzed, values of our local calculation (in+-err)
* with the digitized values libpng produced; 'sample_depth' is the actual
* digitization depth of the libpng output colors (the bit depth except for
* palette images where it is always 8.) The check on 'err' is to detect
* internal errors in pngvalid itself.
*/
unsigned int max = (1U<<sample_depth)-1;
double in_min = ceil((in-err)*max - digitization_error);
double in_max = floor((in+err)*max + digitization_error);
if (err > limit || !(out >= in_min && out <= in_max))
{
char message[256];
size_t pos;
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, 0, name);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, " output value error: rgba(");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, r);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, ",");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, g);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, ",");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, b);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, ",");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, a);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, "): ");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, out);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, " expected: ");
pos = safecatn(message, sizeof message, pos, in_digitized);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, " (");
pos = safecatd(message, sizeof message, pos, (in-err)*max, 3);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, "..");
pos = safecatd(message, sizeof message, pos, (in+err)*max, 3);
pos = safecat(message, sizeof message, pos, ")");
png_error(pp, message);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: +Priv
CWE ID:
Summary: Unspecified vulnerability in libpng before 1.6.20, as used in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-07-01, allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 23265085.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
|
Low
| 173,716
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void xen_netbk_tx_submit(struct xen_netbk *netbk)
{
struct gnttab_copy *gop = netbk->tx_copy_ops;
struct sk_buff *skb;
while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&netbk->tx_queue)) != NULL) {
struct xen_netif_tx_request *txp;
struct xenvif *vif;
u16 pending_idx;
unsigned data_len;
pending_idx = *((u16 *)skb->data);
vif = netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].vif;
txp = &netbk->pending_tx_info[pending_idx].req;
/* Check the remap error code. */
if (unlikely(xen_netbk_tx_check_gop(netbk, skb, &gop))) {
netdev_dbg(vif->dev, "netback grant failed.\n");
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags = 0;
kfree_skb(skb);
continue;
}
data_len = skb->len;
memcpy(skb->data,
(void *)(idx_to_kaddr(netbk, pending_idx)|txp->offset),
data_len);
if (data_len < txp->size) {
/* Append the packet payload as a fragment. */
txp->offset += data_len;
txp->size -= data_len;
} else {
/* Schedule a response immediately. */
xen_netbk_idx_release(netbk, pending_idx);
}
if (txp->flags & XEN_NETTXF_csum_blank)
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL;
else if (txp->flags & XEN_NETTXF_data_validated)
skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_UNNECESSARY;
xen_netbk_fill_frags(netbk, skb);
/*
* If the initial fragment was < PKT_PROT_LEN then
* pull through some bytes from the other fragments to
* increase the linear region to PKT_PROT_LEN bytes.
*/
if (skb_headlen(skb) < PKT_PROT_LEN && skb_is_nonlinear(skb)) {
int target = min_t(int, skb->len, PKT_PROT_LEN);
__pskb_pull_tail(skb, target - skb_headlen(skb));
}
skb->dev = vif->dev;
skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, skb->dev);
if (checksum_setup(vif, skb)) {
netdev_dbg(vif->dev,
"Can't setup checksum in net_tx_action\n");
kfree_skb(skb);
continue;
}
vif->dev->stats.rx_bytes += skb->len;
vif->dev->stats.rx_packets++;
xenvif_receive_skb(vif, skb);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Memory leak in drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c in the Xen netback functionality in the Linux kernel before 3.7.8 allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) by triggering certain error conditions.
Commit Message: xen/netback: don't leak pages on failure in xen_netbk_tx_check_gop.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Daley <mattjd@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ian Campbell <ian.campbell@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Medium
| 166,170
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: file_tryelf(struct magic_set *ms, int fd, const unsigned char *buf,
size_t nbytes)
{
union {
int32_t l;
char c[sizeof (int32_t)];
} u;
int clazz;
int swap;
struct stat st;
off_t fsize;
int flags = 0;
Elf32_Ehdr elf32hdr;
Elf64_Ehdr elf64hdr;
uint16_t type, phnum, shnum;
if (ms->flags & (MAGIC_MIME|MAGIC_APPLE))
return 0;
/*
* ELF executables have multiple section headers in arbitrary
* file locations and thus file(1) cannot determine it from easily.
* Instead we traverse thru all section headers until a symbol table
* one is found or else the binary is stripped.
* Return immediately if it's not ELF (so we avoid pipe2file unless needed).
*/
if (buf[EI_MAG0] != ELFMAG0
|| (buf[EI_MAG1] != ELFMAG1 && buf[EI_MAG1] != OLFMAG1)
|| buf[EI_MAG2] != ELFMAG2 || buf[EI_MAG3] != ELFMAG3)
return 0;
/*
* If we cannot seek, it must be a pipe, socket or fifo.
*/
if((lseek(fd, (off_t)0, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) && (errno == ESPIPE))
fd = file_pipe2file(ms, fd, buf, nbytes);
if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) || st.st_size != 0)
fsize = st.st_size;
else
fsize = SIZE_UNKNOWN;
clazz = buf[EI_CLASS];
switch (clazz) {
case ELFCLASS32:
#undef elf_getu
#define elf_getu(a, b) elf_getu32(a, b)
#undef elfhdr
#define elfhdr elf32hdr
#include "elfclass.h"
case ELFCLASS64:
#undef elf_getu
#define elf_getu(a, b) elf_getu64(a, b)
#undef elfhdr
#define elfhdr elf64hdr
#include "elfclass.h"
default:
if (file_printf(ms, ", unknown class %d", clazz) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The ELF parser in file 5.08 through 5.21 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a large number of notes.
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
|
Low
| 166,780
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: _bson_iter_next_internal (bson_iter_t *iter, /* INOUT */
uint32_t next_keylen, /* IN */
const char **key, /* OUT */
uint32_t *bson_type, /* OUT */
bool *unsupported) /* OUT */
{
const uint8_t *data;
uint32_t o;
unsigned int len;
BSON_ASSERT (iter);
*unsupported = false;
if (!iter->raw) {
*key = NULL;
*bson_type = BSON_TYPE_EOD;
return false;
}
data = iter->raw;
len = iter->len;
iter->off = iter->next_off;
iter->type = iter->off;
iter->key = iter->off + 1;
iter->d1 = 0;
iter->d2 = 0;
iter->d3 = 0;
iter->d4 = 0;
if (next_keylen == 0) {
/* iterate from start to end of NULL-terminated key string */
for (o = iter->key; o < len; o++) {
if (!data[o]) {
iter->d1 = ++o;
goto fill_data_fields;
}
}
} else {
o = iter->key + next_keylen + 1;
iter->d1 = o;
goto fill_data_fields;
}
goto mark_invalid;
fill_data_fields:
*key = bson_iter_key_unsafe (iter);
*bson_type = ITER_TYPE (iter);
switch (*bson_type) {
case BSON_TYPE_DATE_TIME:
case BSON_TYPE_DOUBLE:
case BSON_TYPE_INT64:
case BSON_TYPE_TIMESTAMP:
iter->next_off = o + 8;
break;
case BSON_TYPE_CODE:
case BSON_TYPE_SYMBOL:
case BSON_TYPE_UTF8: {
uint32_t l;
if ((o + 4) >= len) {
iter->err_off = o;
goto mark_invalid;
}
iter->d2 = o + 4;
memcpy (&l, iter->raw + iter->d1, sizeof (l));
l = BSON_UINT32_FROM_LE (l);
if (l > (len - (o + 4))) {
iter->err_off = o;
goto mark_invalid;
}
iter->next_off = o + 4 + l;
/*
* Make sure the string length includes the NUL byte.
*/
if (BSON_UNLIKELY ((l == 0) || (iter->next_off >= len))) {
iter->err_off = o;
goto mark_invalid;
}
/*
* Make sure the last byte is a NUL byte.
*/
if (BSON_UNLIKELY ((iter->raw + iter->d2)[l - 1] != '\0')) {
iter->err_off = o + 4 + l - 1;
goto mark_invalid;
}
} break;
case BSON_TYPE_BINARY: {
bson_subtype_t subtype;
uint32_t l;
if (o >= (len - 4)) {
iter->err_off = o;
goto mark_invalid;
}
iter->d2 = o + 4;
iter->d3 = o + 5;
memcpy (&l, iter->raw + iter->d1, sizeof (l));
l = BSON_UINT32_FROM_LE (l);
if (l >= (len - o)) {
iter->err_off = o;
goto mark_invalid;
}
subtype = *(iter->raw + iter->d2);
if (subtype == BSON_SUBTYPE_BINARY_DEPRECATED) {
int32_t binary_len;
if (l < 4) {
iter->err_off = o;
goto mark_invalid;
}
/* subtype 2 has a redundant length header in the data */
memcpy (&binary_len, (iter->raw + iter->d3), sizeof (binary_len));
binary_len = BSON_UINT32_FROM_LE (binary_len);
if (binary_len + 4 != l) {
iter->err_off = iter->d3;
goto mark_invalid;
}
}
iter->next_off = o + 5 + l;
} break;
case BSON_TYPE_ARRAY:
case BSON_TYPE_DOCUMENT: {
uint32_t l;
if (o >= (len - 4)) {
iter->err_off = o;
goto mark_invalid;
}
memcpy (&l, iter->raw + iter->d1, sizeof (l));
l = BSON_UINT32_FROM_LE (l);
if ((l > len) || (l > (len - o))) {
iter->err_off = o;
goto mark_invalid;
}
iter->next_off = o + l;
} break;
case BSON_TYPE_OID:
iter->next_off = o + 12;
break;
case BSON_TYPE_BOOL: {
char val;
if (iter->d1 >= len) {
iter->err_off = o;
goto mark_invalid;
}
memcpy (&val, iter->raw + iter->d1, 1);
if (val != 0x00 && val != 0x01) {
iter->err_off = o;
goto mark_invalid;
}
iter->next_off = o + 1;
} break;
case BSON_TYPE_REGEX: {
bool eor = false;
bool eoo = false;
for (; o < len; o++) {
if (!data[o]) {
iter->d2 = ++o;
eor = true;
break;
}
}
if (!eor) {
iter->err_off = iter->next_off;
goto mark_invalid;
}
for (; o < len; o++) {
if (!data[o]) {
eoo = true;
break;
}
}
if (!eoo) {
iter->err_off = iter->next_off;
goto mark_invalid;
}
iter->next_off = o + 1;
} break;
case BSON_TYPE_DBPOINTER: {
uint32_t l;
if (o >= (len - 4)) {
iter->err_off = o;
goto mark_invalid;
}
iter->d2 = o + 4;
memcpy (&l, iter->raw + iter->d1, sizeof (l));
l = BSON_UINT32_FROM_LE (l);
/* Check valid string length. l counts '\0' but not 4 bytes for itself. */
if (l == 0 || l > (len - o - 4)) {
iter->err_off = o;
goto mark_invalid;
}
if (*(iter->raw + o + l + 3)) {
/* not null terminated */
iter->err_off = o + l + 3;
goto mark_invalid;
}
iter->d3 = o + 4 + l;
iter->next_off = o + 4 + l + 12;
} break;
case BSON_TYPE_CODEWSCOPE: {
uint32_t l;
uint32_t doclen;
if ((len < 19) || (o >= (len - 14))) {
iter->err_off = o;
goto mark_invalid;
}
iter->d2 = o + 4;
iter->d3 = o + 8;
memcpy (&l, iter->raw + iter->d1, sizeof (l));
l = BSON_UINT32_FROM_LE (l);
if ((l < 14) || (l >= (len - o))) {
iter->err_off = o;
goto mark_invalid;
}
iter->next_off = o + l;
if (iter->next_off >= len) {
iter->err_off = o;
goto mark_invalid;
}
memcpy (&l, iter->raw + iter->d2, sizeof (l));
l = BSON_UINT32_FROM_LE (l);
if (l == 0 || l >= (len - o - 4 - 4)) {
iter->err_off = o;
goto mark_invalid;
}
if ((o + 4 + 4 + l + 4) >= iter->next_off) {
iter->err_off = o + 4;
goto mark_invalid;
}
iter->d4 = o + 4 + 4 + l;
memcpy (&doclen, iter->raw + iter->d4, sizeof (doclen));
doclen = BSON_UINT32_FROM_LE (doclen);
if ((o + 4 + 4 + l + doclen) != iter->next_off) {
iter->err_off = o + 4 + 4 + l;
goto mark_invalid;
}
} break;
case BSON_TYPE_INT32:
iter->next_off = o + 4;
break;
case BSON_TYPE_DECIMAL128:
iter->next_off = o + 16;
break;
case BSON_TYPE_MAXKEY:
case BSON_TYPE_MINKEY:
case BSON_TYPE_NULL:
case BSON_TYPE_UNDEFINED:
iter->next_off = o;
break;
default:
*unsupported = true;
/* FALL THROUGH */
case BSON_TYPE_EOD:
iter->err_off = o;
goto mark_invalid;
}
/*
* Check to see if any of the field locations would overflow the
* current BSON buffer. If so, set the error location to the offset
* of where the field starts.
*/
if (iter->next_off >= len) {
iter->err_off = o;
goto mark_invalid;
}
iter->err_off = 0;
return true;
mark_invalid:
iter->raw = NULL;
iter->len = 0;
iter->next_off = 0;
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: _bson_iter_next_internal in bson-iter.c in libbson 1.12.0, as used in MongoDB mongo-c-driver and other products, has a heap-based buffer over-read via a crafted bson buffer.
Commit Message: Fix for CVE-2018-16790 -- Verify bounds before binary length read.
As reported here: https://jira.mongodb.org/browse/CDRIVER-2819,
a heap overread occurs due a failure to correctly verify data
bounds.
In the original check, len - o returns the data left including the
sizeof(l) we just read. Instead, the comparison should check
against the data left NOT including the binary int32, i.e. just
subtype (byte*) instead of int32 subtype (byte*).
Added in test for corrupted BSON example.
|
Medium
| 169,032
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void MediaElementAudioSourceHandler::SetFormat(size_t number_of_channels,
float source_sample_rate) {
if (number_of_channels != source_number_of_channels_ ||
source_sample_rate != source_sample_rate_) {
if (!number_of_channels ||
number_of_channels > BaseAudioContext::MaxNumberOfChannels() ||
!AudioUtilities::IsValidAudioBufferSampleRate(source_sample_rate)) {
DLOG(ERROR) << "setFormat(" << number_of_channels << ", "
<< source_sample_rate << ") - unhandled format change";
Locker<MediaElementAudioSourceHandler> locker(*this);
source_number_of_channels_ = 0;
source_sample_rate_ = 0;
return;
}
Locker<MediaElementAudioSourceHandler> locker(*this);
source_number_of_channels_ = number_of_channels;
source_sample_rate_ = source_sample_rate;
if (source_sample_rate != Context()->sampleRate()) {
double scale_factor = source_sample_rate / Context()->sampleRate();
multi_channel_resampler_ = std::make_unique<MultiChannelResampler>(
scale_factor, number_of_channels);
} else {
multi_channel_resampler_.reset();
}
{
BaseAudioContext::GraphAutoLocker context_locker(Context());
Output(0).SetNumberOfChannels(number_of_channels);
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Insufficient policy enforcement in Blink in Google Chrome prior to 68.0.3440.75 allowed a remote attacker to bypass same origin policy via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Redirect should not circumvent same-origin restrictions
Check whether we have access to the audio data when the format is set.
At this point we have enough information to determine this. The old approach
based on when the src was changed was incorrect because at the point, we
only know the new src; none of the response headers have been read yet.
This new approach also removes the incorrect message reported in 619114.
Bug: 826552, 619114
Change-Id: I95119b3a1e399c05d0fbd2da71f87967978efff6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1069540
Commit-Queue: Raymond Toy <rtoy@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yutaka Hirano <yhirano@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hongchan Choi <hongchan@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#564313}
|
Medium
| 173,150
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static IMFSample* CreateSampleFromInputBuffer(
const media::BitstreamBuffer& bitstream_buffer,
base::ProcessHandle renderer_process,
DWORD stream_size,
DWORD alignment) {
HANDLE shared_memory_handle = NULL;
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(::DuplicateHandle(renderer_process,
bitstream_buffer.handle(),
base::GetCurrentProcessHandle(),
&shared_memory_handle,
0,
FALSE,
DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS),
"Duplicate handle failed", NULL);
base::SharedMemory shm(shared_memory_handle, true);
RETURN_ON_FAILURE(shm.Map(bitstream_buffer.size()),
"Failed in base::SharedMemory::Map", NULL);
return CreateInputSample(reinterpret_cast<const uint8*>(shm.memory()),
bitstream_buffer.size(),
stream_size,
alignment);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 20.0.1132.43 on Windows does not properly isolate sandboxed processes, which might allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (process interference) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,939
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool AppCacheBackendImpl::MarkAsForeignEntry(
int host_id,
const GURL& document_url,
int64 cache_document_was_loaded_from) {
AppCacheHost* host = GetHost(host_id);
if (!host)
return false;
host->MarkAsForeignEntry(document_url, cache_document_was_loaded_from);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the AppCache implementation in Google Chrome before 47.0.2526.73 allows remote attackers with renderer access to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging incorrect AppCacheUpdateJob behavior associated with duplicate cache selection.
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
|
Low
| 171,735
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool SessionRestore::IsRestoring(const Profile* profile) {
return (profiles_getting_restored &&
profiles_getting_restored->find(profile) !=
profiles_getting_restored->end());
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not properly draw hairlines, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: Lands http://codereview.chromium.org/9316065/ for Marja. I reviewed
this, so I'm using TBR to land it.
Don't crash if multiple SessionRestoreImpl:s refer to the same
Profile.
It shouldn't ever happen but it seems to happen anyway.
BUG=111238
TEST=NONE
TBR=sky@chromium.org
R=marja@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9343005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@120648 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,036
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: _exsltDateTruncateDate (exsltDateValPtr dt, exsltDateType type)
{
if (dt == NULL)
return 1;
if ((type & XS_TIME) != XS_TIME) {
dt->value.date.hour = 0;
dt->value.date.min = 0;
dt->value.date.sec = 0.0;
}
if ((type & XS_GDAY) != XS_GDAY)
dt->value.date.day = 0;
if ((type & XS_GMONTH) != XS_GMONTH)
dt->value.date.mon = 0;
if ((type & XS_GYEAR) != XS_GYEAR)
dt->value.date.year = 0;
dt->type = type;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: numbers.c in libxslt before 1.1.29, as used in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.63, mishandles namespace nodes, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds heap memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
|
High
| 173,290
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: long kvm_arch_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp,
unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
{
struct kvm *kvm = filp->private_data;
void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
int r = -ENOTTY;
/*
* This union makes it completely explicit to gcc-3.x
* that these two variables' stack usage should be
* combined, not added together.
*/
union {
struct kvm_pit_state ps;
struct kvm_pit_state2 ps2;
struct kvm_pit_config pit_config;
} u;
switch (ioctl) {
case KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR:
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_tss_addr(kvm, arg);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
break;
case KVM_SET_IDENTITY_MAP_ADDR: {
u64 ident_addr;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&ident_addr, argp, sizeof ident_addr))
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_identity_map_addr(kvm, ident_addr);
if (r < 0)
goto out;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_NR_MMU_PAGES:
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_nr_mmu_pages(kvm, arg);
if (r)
goto out;
break;
case KVM_GET_NR_MMU_PAGES:
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_nr_mmu_pages(kvm);
break;
case KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP: {
struct kvm_pic *vpic;
mutex_lock(&kvm->lock);
r = -EEXIST;
if (kvm->arch.vpic)
goto create_irqchip_unlock;
r = -ENOMEM;
vpic = kvm_create_pic(kvm);
if (vpic) {
r = kvm_ioapic_init(kvm);
if (r) {
mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS,
&vpic->dev_master);
kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS,
&vpic->dev_slave);
kvm_io_bus_unregister_dev(kvm, KVM_PIO_BUS,
&vpic->dev_eclr);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
kfree(vpic);
goto create_irqchip_unlock;
}
} else
goto create_irqchip_unlock;
smp_wmb();
kvm->arch.vpic = vpic;
smp_wmb();
r = kvm_setup_default_irq_routing(kvm);
if (r) {
mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
mutex_lock(&kvm->irq_lock);
kvm_ioapic_destroy(kvm);
kvm_destroy_pic(kvm);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->irq_lock);
mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
}
create_irqchip_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->lock);
break;
}
case KVM_CREATE_PIT:
u.pit_config.flags = KVM_PIT_SPEAKER_DUMMY;
goto create_pit;
case KVM_CREATE_PIT2:
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&u.pit_config, argp,
sizeof(struct kvm_pit_config)))
goto out;
create_pit:
mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
r = -EEXIST;
if (kvm->arch.vpit)
goto create_pit_unlock;
r = -ENOMEM;
kvm->arch.vpit = kvm_create_pit(kvm, u.pit_config.flags);
if (kvm->arch.vpit)
r = 0;
create_pit_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
break;
case KVM_IRQ_LINE_STATUS:
case KVM_IRQ_LINE: {
struct kvm_irq_level irq_event;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&irq_event, argp, sizeof irq_event))
goto out;
r = -ENXIO;
if (irqchip_in_kernel(kvm)) {
__s32 status;
status = kvm_set_irq(kvm, KVM_USERSPACE_IRQ_SOURCE_ID,
irq_event.irq, irq_event.level);
if (ioctl == KVM_IRQ_LINE_STATUS) {
r = -EFAULT;
irq_event.status = status;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &irq_event,
sizeof irq_event))
goto out;
}
r = 0;
}
break;
}
case KVM_GET_IRQCHIP: {
/* 0: PIC master, 1: PIC slave, 2: IOAPIC */
struct kvm_irqchip *chip;
chip = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*chip));
if (IS_ERR(chip)) {
r = PTR_ERR(chip);
goto out;
}
r = -ENXIO;
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm))
goto get_irqchip_out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_irqchip(kvm, chip);
if (r)
goto get_irqchip_out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, chip, sizeof *chip))
goto get_irqchip_out;
r = 0;
get_irqchip_out:
kfree(chip);
if (r)
goto out;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_IRQCHIP: {
/* 0: PIC master, 1: PIC slave, 2: IOAPIC */
struct kvm_irqchip *chip;
chip = memdup_user(argp, sizeof(*chip));
if (IS_ERR(chip)) {
r = PTR_ERR(chip);
goto out;
}
r = -ENXIO;
if (!irqchip_in_kernel(kvm))
goto set_irqchip_out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_irqchip(kvm, chip);
if (r)
goto set_irqchip_out;
r = 0;
set_irqchip_out:
kfree(chip);
if (r)
goto out;
break;
}
case KVM_GET_PIT: {
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&u.ps, argp, sizeof(struct kvm_pit_state)))
goto out;
r = -ENXIO;
if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit(kvm, &u.ps);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &u.ps, sizeof(struct kvm_pit_state)))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_PIT: {
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&u.ps, argp, sizeof u.ps))
goto out;
r = -ENXIO;
if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit(kvm, &u.ps);
if (r)
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_GET_PIT2: {
r = -ENXIO;
if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_get_pit2(kvm, &u.ps2);
if (r)
goto out;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &u.ps2, sizeof(u.ps2)))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_PIT2: {
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&u.ps2, argp, sizeof(u.ps2)))
goto out;
r = -ENXIO;
if (!kvm->arch.vpit)
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_set_pit2(kvm, &u.ps2);
if (r)
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_REINJECT_CONTROL: {
struct kvm_reinject_control control;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&control, argp, sizeof(control)))
goto out;
r = kvm_vm_ioctl_reinject(kvm, &control);
if (r)
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_XEN_HVM_CONFIG: {
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config, argp,
sizeof(struct kvm_xen_hvm_config)))
goto out;
r = -EINVAL;
if (kvm->arch.xen_hvm_config.flags)
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
case KVM_SET_CLOCK: {
struct kvm_clock_data user_ns;
u64 now_ns;
s64 delta;
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_from_user(&user_ns, argp, sizeof(user_ns)))
goto out;
r = -EINVAL;
if (user_ns.flags)
goto out;
r = 0;
local_irq_disable();
now_ns = get_kernel_ns();
delta = user_ns.clock - now_ns;
local_irq_enable();
kvm->arch.kvmclock_offset = delta;
break;
}
case KVM_GET_CLOCK: {
struct kvm_clock_data user_ns;
u64 now_ns;
local_irq_disable();
now_ns = get_kernel_ns();
user_ns.clock = kvm->arch.kvmclock_offset + now_ns;
local_irq_enable();
user_ns.flags = 0;
memset(&user_ns.pad, 0, sizeof(user_ns.pad));
r = -EFAULT;
if (copy_to_user(argp, &user_ns, sizeof(user_ns)))
goto out;
r = 0;
break;
}
default:
;
}
out:
return r;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The KVM implementation in the Linux kernel before 3.3.6 allows host OS users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and host OS crash) by making a KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP ioctl call after a virtual CPU already exists.
Commit Message: KVM: Ensure all vcpus are consistent with in-kernel irqchip settings
(cherry picked from commit 3e515705a1f46beb1c942bb8043c16f8ac7b1e9e)
If some vcpus are created before KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP, then
irqchip_in_kernel() and vcpu->arch.apic will be inconsistent, leading
to potential NULL pointer dereferences.
Fix by:
- ensuring that no vcpus are installed when KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP is called
- ensuring that a vcpu has an apic if it is installed after KVM_CREATE_IRQCHIP
This is somewhat long winded because vcpu->arch.apic is created without
kvm->lock held.
Based on earlier patch by Michael Ellerman.
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <michael@ellerman.id.au>
Signed-off-by: Avi Kivity <avi@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,620
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: nautilus_file_mark_desktop_file_trusted (GFile *file,
GtkWindow *parent_window,
gboolean interactive,
NautilusOpCallback done_callback,
gpointer done_callback_data)
{
GTask *task;
MarkTrustedJob *job;
job = op_job_new (MarkTrustedJob, parent_window);
job->file = g_object_ref (file);
job->interactive = interactive;
job->done_callback = done_callback;
job->done_callback_data = done_callback_data;
task = g_task_new (NULL, NULL, mark_trusted_task_done, job);
g_task_set_task_data (task, job, NULL);
g_task_run_in_thread (task, mark_trusted_task_thread_func);
g_object_unref (task);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: GNOME Nautilus before 3.23.90 allows attackers to spoof a file type by using the .desktop file extension, as demonstrated by an attack in which a .desktop file's Name field ends in .pdf but this file's Exec field launches a malicious *sh -c* command. In other words, Nautilus provides no UI indication that a file actually has the potentially unsafe .desktop extension; instead, the UI only shows the .pdf extension. One (slightly) mitigating factor is that an attack requires the .desktop file to have execute permission. The solution is to ask the user to confirm that the file is supposed to be treated as a .desktop file, and then remember the user's answer in the metadata::trusted field.
Commit Message: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.
However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.
To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
|
Low
| 167,751
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void FoFiType1::parse() {
char *line, *line1, *p, *p2;
char buf[256];
char c;
int n, code, i, j;
char *tokptr;
for (i = 1, line = (char *)file;
i <= 100 && line && (!name || !encoding);
++i) {
if (!name && !strncmp(line, "/FontName", 9)) {
strncpy(buf, line, 255);
buf[255] = '\0';
if ((p = strchr(buf+9, '/')) &&
(p = strtok_r(p+1, " \t\n\r", &tokptr))) {
name = copyString(p);
}
line = getNextLine(line);
} else if (!encoding &&
!strncmp(line, "/Encoding StandardEncoding def", 30)) {
encoding = fofiType1StandardEncoding;
} else if (!encoding &&
!strncmp(line, "/Encoding 256 array", 19)) {
encoding = (char **)gmallocn(256, sizeof(char *));
for (j = 0; j < 256; ++j) {
encoding[j] = NULL;
}
for (j = 0, line = getNextLine(line);
j < 300 && line && (line1 = getNextLine(line));
++j, line = line1) {
if ((n = line1 - line) > 255) {
error(-1, "FoFiType1::parse a line has more than 255 characters, we don't support this");
n = 255;
}
strncpy(buf, line, n);
buf[n] = '\0';
for (p = buf; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p) ;
if (!strncmp(p, "dup", 3)) {
for (p += 3; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p) ;
for (p2 = p; *p2 >= '0' && *p2 <= '9'; ++p2) ;
if (*p2) {
c = *p2; // store it so we can recover it after atoi
*p2 = '\0'; // terminate p so atoi works
code = atoi(p);
*p2 = c;
if (code == 8 && *p2 == '#') {
code = 0;
for (++p2; *p2 >= '0' && *p2 <= '7'; ++p2) {
code = code * 8 + (*p2 - '0');
code = code * 8 + (*p2 - '0');
}
}
if (code < 256) {
for (p = p2; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p) ;
if (*p == '/') {
++p;
c = *p2; // store it so we can recover it after copyString
*p2 = '\0'; // terminate p so copyString works
encoding[code] = copyString(p);
*p2 = c;
p = p2;
for (; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; ++p); // eat spaces between string and put
if (!strncmp(p, "put", 3)) {
for (p += 3; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t' || *p == '\n' || *p == '\r'; ++p);
if (*p)
{
line1 = &line[p - buf];
}
} else {
error(-1, "FoFiType1::parse no put after dup");
}
}
}
}
} else {
if (strtok_r(buf, " \t", &tokptr) &&
(p = strtok_r(NULL, " \t\n\r", &tokptr)) && !strcmp(p, "def")) {
break;
}
}
}
} else {
line = getNextLine(line);
}
}
parsed = gTrue;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Mem. Corr. Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The FoFiType1::parse function in fofi/FoFiType1.cc in the PDF parser in xpdf before 3.02pl5, poppler 0.8.7 and possibly other versions up to 0.15.1, kdegraphics, and possibly other products allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a PDF file with a crafted PostScript Type1 font that contains a negative array index, which bypasses input validation and triggers memory corruption.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 164,903
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: pax_decode_header (struct tar_sparse_file *file)
{
if (file->stat_info->sparse_major > 0)
{
uintmax_t u;
char nbuf[UINTMAX_STRSIZE_BOUND];
union block *blk;
char *p;
size_t i;
off_t start;
#define COPY_BUF(b,buf,src) do \
{ \
char *endp = b->buffer + BLOCKSIZE; \
char *dst = buf; \
do \
{ \
if (dst == buf + UINTMAX_STRSIZE_BOUND -1) \
{ \
ERROR ((0, 0, _("%s: numeric overflow in sparse archive member"), \
file->stat_info->orig_file_name)); \
return false; \
} \
if (src == endp) \
{ \
set_next_block_after (b); \
b = find_next_block (); \
src = b->buffer; \
endp = b->buffer + BLOCKSIZE; \
} \
while (*dst++ != '\n'); \
dst[-1] = 0; \
} while (0)
start = current_block_ordinal ();
set_next_block_after (current_header);
start = current_block_ordinal ();
set_next_block_after (current_header);
blk = find_next_block ();
p = blk->buffer;
COPY_BUF (blk,nbuf,p);
if (!decode_num (&u, nbuf, TYPE_MAXIMUM (size_t)))
}
file->stat_info->sparse_map_size = u;
file->stat_info->sparse_map = xcalloc (file->stat_info->sparse_map_size,
sizeof (*file->stat_info->sparse_map));
file->stat_info->sparse_map_avail = 0;
for (i = 0; i < file->stat_info->sparse_map_size; i++)
{
struct sp_array sp;
COPY_BUF (blk,nbuf,p);
if (!decode_num (&u, nbuf, TYPE_MAXIMUM (off_t)))
{
ERROR ((0, 0, _("%s: malformed sparse archive member"),
file->stat_info->orig_file_name));
return false;
}
sp.offset = u;
COPY_BUF (blk,nbuf,p);
if (!decode_num (&u, nbuf, TYPE_MAXIMUM (off_t)))
{
ERROR ((0, 0, _("%s: malformed sparse archive member"),
file->stat_info->orig_file_name));
return false;
}
sp.numbytes = u;
sparse_add_map (file->stat_info, &sp);
}
set_next_block_after (blk);
file->dumped_size += BLOCKSIZE * (current_block_ordinal () - start);
}
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: pax_decode_header in sparse.c in GNU Tar before 1.32 had a NULL pointer dereference when parsing certain archives that have malformed extended headers.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,776
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool net_tx_pkt_do_sw_fragmentation(struct NetTxPkt *pkt,
NetClientState *nc)
{
struct iovec fragment[NET_MAX_FRAG_SG_LIST];
size_t fragment_len = 0;
bool more_frags = false;
/* some pointers for shorter code */
void *l2_iov_base, *l3_iov_base;
size_t l2_iov_len, l3_iov_len;
int src_idx = NET_TX_PKT_PL_START_FRAG, dst_idx;
size_t src_offset = 0;
size_t fragment_offset = 0;
l2_iov_base = pkt->vec[NET_TX_PKT_L2HDR_FRAG].iov_base;
l2_iov_len = pkt->vec[NET_TX_PKT_L2HDR_FRAG].iov_len;
l3_iov_base = pkt->vec[NET_TX_PKT_L3HDR_FRAG].iov_base;
l3_iov_len = pkt->vec[NET_TX_PKT_L3HDR_FRAG].iov_len;
/* Copy headers */
fragment[NET_TX_PKT_FRAGMENT_L2_HDR_POS].iov_base = l2_iov_base;
fragment[NET_TX_PKT_FRAGMENT_L2_HDR_POS].iov_len = l2_iov_len;
fragment[NET_TX_PKT_FRAGMENT_L3_HDR_POS].iov_base = l3_iov_base;
fragment[NET_TX_PKT_FRAGMENT_L3_HDR_POS].iov_len = l3_iov_len;
/* Put as much data as possible and send */
do {
fragment_len = net_tx_pkt_fetch_fragment(pkt, &src_idx, &src_offset,
fragment, &dst_idx);
more_frags = (fragment_offset + fragment_len < pkt->payload_len);
eth_setup_ip4_fragmentation(l2_iov_base, l2_iov_len, l3_iov_base,
l3_iov_len, fragment_len, fragment_offset, more_frags);
eth_fix_ip4_checksum(l3_iov_base, l3_iov_len);
net_tx_pkt_sendv(pkt, nc, fragment, dst_idx);
fragment_offset += fragment_len;
} while (more_frags);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The net_tx_pkt_do_sw_fragmentation function in hw/net/net_tx_pkt.c in QEMU (aka Quick Emulator) allows local guest OS administrators to cause a denial of service (infinite loop and QEMU process crash) via a zero length for the current fragment length.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,952
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ProcRenderAddGlyphs (ClientPtr client)
{
GlyphSetPtr glyphSet;
REQUEST(xRenderAddGlyphsReq);
GlyphNewRec glyphsLocal[NLOCALGLYPH];
GlyphNewPtr glyphsBase, glyphs, glyph_new;
int remain, nglyphs;
CARD32 *gids;
xGlyphInfo *gi;
CARD8 *bits;
unsigned int size;
int err;
int i, screen;
PicturePtr pSrc = NULL, pDst = NULL;
PixmapPtr pSrcPix = NULL, pDstPix = NULL;
CARD32 component_alpha;
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xRenderAddGlyphsReq);
err = dixLookupResourceByType((pointer *)&glyphSet, stuff->glyphset, GlyphSetType,
client, DixAddAccess);
if (err != Success)
{
client->errorValue = stuff->glyphset;
return err;
}
err = BadAlloc;
nglyphs = stuff->nglyphs;
if (nglyphs > UINT32_MAX / sizeof(GlyphNewRec))
return BadAlloc;
component_alpha = NeedsComponent (glyphSet->format->format);
if (nglyphs <= NLOCALGLYPH) {
memset (glyphsLocal, 0, sizeof (glyphsLocal));
glyphsBase = glyphsLocal;
}
else
{
glyphsBase = (GlyphNewPtr)calloc(nglyphs, sizeof (GlyphNewRec));
if (!glyphsBase)
return BadAlloc;
}
remain = (client->req_len << 2) - sizeof (xRenderAddGlyphsReq);
glyphs = glyphsBase;
gids = (CARD32 *) (stuff + 1);
gi = (xGlyphInfo *) (gids + nglyphs);
bits = (CARD8 *) (gi + nglyphs);
remain -= (sizeof (CARD32) + sizeof (xGlyphInfo)) * nglyphs;
for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++)
{
size_t padded_width;
size = gi[i].height * padded_width;
if (remain < size)
break;
err = HashGlyph (&gi[i], bits, size, glyph_new->sha1);
if (err)
goto bail;
glyph_new->glyph = FindGlyphByHash (glyph_new->sha1,
glyphSet->fdepth);
if (glyph_new->glyph && glyph_new->glyph != DeletedGlyph)
{
glyph_new->found = TRUE;
}
else
{
GlyphPtr glyph;
glyph_new->found = FALSE;
glyph_new->glyph = glyph = AllocateGlyph (&gi[i], glyphSet->fdepth);
if (! glyph)
{
err = BadAlloc;
goto bail;
}
for (screen = 0; screen < screenInfo.numScreens; screen++)
{
int width = gi[i].width;
int height = gi[i].height;
int depth = glyphSet->format->depth;
ScreenPtr pScreen;
int error;
/* Skip work if it's invisibly small anyway */
if (!width || !height)
break;
pScreen = screenInfo.screens[screen];
pSrcPix = GetScratchPixmapHeader (pScreen,
width, height,
depth, depth,
-1, bits);
if (! pSrcPix)
{
err = BadAlloc;
goto bail;
}
pSrc = CreatePicture (0, &pSrcPix->drawable,
glyphSet->format, 0, NULL,
serverClient, &error);
if (! pSrc)
{
err = BadAlloc;
goto bail;
}
pDstPix = (pScreen->CreatePixmap) (pScreen,
width, height, depth,
CREATE_PIXMAP_USAGE_GLYPH_PICTURE);
if (!pDstPix)
{
err = BadAlloc;
goto bail;
}
GlyphPicture (glyph)[screen] = pDst =
CreatePicture (0, &pDstPix->drawable,
glyphSet->format,
CPComponentAlpha, &component_alpha,
serverClient, &error);
/* The picture takes a reference to the pixmap, so we
drop ours. */
(pScreen->DestroyPixmap) (pDstPix);
pDstPix = NULL;
if (! pDst)
{
err = BadAlloc;
goto bail;
}
CompositePicture (PictOpSrc,
pSrc,
None,
pDst,
0, 0,
0, 0,
0, 0,
width, height);
FreePicture ((pointer) pSrc, 0);
pSrc = NULL;
FreeScratchPixmapHeader (pSrcPix);
pSrcPix = NULL;
}
memcpy (glyph_new->glyph->sha1, glyph_new->sha1, 20);
}
glyph_new->id = gids[i];
if (size & 3)
size += 4 - (size & 3);
bits += size;
remain -= size;
}
if (remain || i < nglyphs)
{
err = BadLength;
goto bail;
}
if (!ResizeGlyphSet (glyphSet, nglyphs))
{
err = BadAlloc;
goto bail;
}
for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++)
AddGlyph (glyphSet, glyphs[i].glyph, glyphs[i].id);
if (glyphsBase != glyphsLocal)
free(glyphsBase);
return Success;
bail:
if (pSrc)
FreePicture ((pointer) pSrc, 0);
if (pSrcPix)
FreeScratchPixmapHeader (pSrcPix);
for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++)
if (glyphs[i].glyph && ! glyphs[i].found)
free(glyphs[i].glyph);
if (glyphsBase != glyphsLocal)
free(glyphsBase);
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The ProcRenderAddGlyphs function in the Render extension (render/render.c) in X.Org xserver 1.7.7 and earlier allows local users to read arbitrary memory and possibly cause a denial of service (server crash) via unspecified vectors related to an "input sanitization flaw."
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,268
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadPWPImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
FILE
*file;
Image
*image,
*next_image,
*pwp_image;
ImageInfo
*read_info;
int
c,
unique_file;
MagickBooleanType
status;
register Image
*p;
register ssize_t
i;
size_t
filesize,
length;
ssize_t
count;
unsigned char
magick[MaxTextExtent];
/*
Open image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
pwp_image=AcquireImage(image_info);
image=pwp_image;
status=OpenBlob(image_info,pwp_image,ReadBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return((Image *) NULL);
count=ReadBlob(pwp_image,5,magick);
if ((count != 5) || (LocaleNCompare((char *) magick,"SFW95",5) != 0))
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
read_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info);
(void) SetImageInfoProgressMonitor(read_info,(MagickProgressMonitor) NULL,
(void *) NULL);
SetImageInfoBlob(read_info,(void *) NULL,0);
unique_file=AcquireUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
for ( ; ; )
{
for (c=ReadBlobByte(pwp_image); c != EOF; c=ReadBlobByte(pwp_image))
{
for (i=0; i < 17; i++)
magick[i]=magick[i+1];
magick[17]=(unsigned char) c;
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) (magick+12),"SFW94A",6) == 0)
break;
}
if (c == EOF)
break;
if (LocaleNCompare((char *) (magick+12),"SFW94A",6) != 0)
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
ThrowReaderException(CorruptImageError,"ImproperImageHeader");
}
/*
Dump SFW image to a temporary file.
*/
file=(FILE *) NULL;
if (unique_file != -1)
file=fdopen(unique_file,"wb");
if ((unique_file == -1) || (file == (FILE *) NULL))
{
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
ThrowFileException(exception,FileOpenError,"UnableToWriteFile",
image->filename);
image=DestroyImageList(image);
return((Image *) NULL);
}
length=fwrite("SFW94A",1,6,file);
(void) length;
filesize=65535UL*magick[2]+256L*magick[1]+magick[0];
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) filesize; i++)
{
c=ReadBlobByte(pwp_image);
(void) fputc(c,file);
}
(void) fclose(file);
next_image=ReadImage(read_info,exception);
if (next_image == (Image *) NULL)
break;
(void) FormatLocaleString(next_image->filename,MaxTextExtent,
"slide_%02ld.sfw",(long) next_image->scene);
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
image=next_image;
else
{
/*
Link image into image list.
*/
for (p=image; p->next != (Image *) NULL; p=GetNextImageInList(p)) ;
next_image->previous=p;
next_image->scene=p->scene+1;
p->next=next_image;
}
if (image_info->number_scenes != 0)
if (next_image->scene >= (image_info->scene+image_info->number_scenes-1))
break;
status=SetImageProgress(image,LoadImagesTag,TellBlob(pwp_image),
GetBlobSize(pwp_image));
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
if (unique_file != -1)
(void) close(unique_file);
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(read_info->filename);
read_info=DestroyImageInfo(read_info);
(void) CloseBlob(pwp_image);
pwp_image=DestroyImage(pwp_image);
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
char
*message;
message=GetExceptionMessage(errno);
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),CorruptImageError,
"UnexpectedEndOfFile","`%s': %s",image->filename,message);
message=DestroyString(message);
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(GetFirstImageInList(image));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-416
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the ReadPWPImage function in coders/pwp.c in ImageMagick 6.9.5-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or have other unspecified impact via a crafted file.
Commit Message: Prevent memory use after free
|
Medium
| 168,639
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PrintViewManagerBase::PrintViewManagerBase(content::WebContents* web_contents)
: PrintManager(web_contents),
printing_rfh_(nullptr),
printing_succeeded_(false),
inside_inner_message_loop_(false),
#if !defined(OS_MACOSX)
expecting_first_page_(true),
#endif
queue_(g_browser_process->print_job_manager()->queue()) {
DCHECK(queue_.get());
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
printing_enabled_.Init(
prefs::kPrintingEnabled, profile->GetPrefs(),
base::Bind(&PrintViewManagerBase::UpdatePrintingEnabled,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-254
Summary: The FrameFetchContext::updateTimingInfoForIFrameNavigation function in core/loader/FrameFetchContext.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 45.0.2454.85, does not properly restrict the availability of IFRAME Resource Timing API times, which allows remote attackers to obtain sensitive information via crafted JavaScript code that leverages a history.back call.
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
|
Low
| 171,893
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static Image *ReadSCREENSHOTImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*image;
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image_info->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",
image_info->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
image=(Image *) NULL;
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_WINGDI32_DELEGATE)
{
BITMAPINFO
bmi;
DISPLAY_DEVICE
device;
HBITMAP
bitmap,
bitmapOld;
HDC
bitmapDC,
hDC;
Image
*screen;
int
i;
register PixelPacket
*q;
register ssize_t
x;
RGBTRIPLE
*p;
ssize_t
y;
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
i=0;
device.cb = sizeof(device);
image=(Image *) NULL;
while(EnumDisplayDevices(NULL,i,&device,0) && ++i)
{
if ((device.StateFlags & DISPLAY_DEVICE_ACTIVE) != DISPLAY_DEVICE_ACTIVE)
continue;
hDC=CreateDC(device.DeviceName,device.DeviceName,NULL,NULL);
if (hDC == (HDC) NULL)
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateDC");
screen=AcquireImage(image_info);
screen->columns=(size_t) GetDeviceCaps(hDC,HORZRES);
screen->rows=(size_t) GetDeviceCaps(hDC,VERTRES);
screen->storage_class=DirectClass;
if (image == (Image *) NULL)
image=screen;
else
AppendImageToList(&image,screen);
bitmapDC=CreateCompatibleDC(hDC);
if (bitmapDC == (HDC) NULL)
{
DeleteDC(hDC);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateDC");
}
(void) ResetMagickMemory(&bmi,0,sizeof(BITMAPINFO));
bmi.bmiHeader.biSize=sizeof(BITMAPINFOHEADER);
bmi.bmiHeader.biWidth=(LONG) screen->columns;
bmi.bmiHeader.biHeight=(-1)*(LONG) screen->rows;
bmi.bmiHeader.biPlanes=1;
bmi.bmiHeader.biBitCount=24;
bmi.bmiHeader.biCompression=BI_RGB;
bitmap=CreateDIBSection(hDC,&bmi,DIB_RGB_COLORS,(void **) &p,NULL,0);
if (bitmap == (HBITMAP) NULL)
{
DeleteDC(hDC);
DeleteDC(bitmapDC);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateBitmap");
}
bitmapOld=(HBITMAP) SelectObject(bitmapDC,bitmap);
if (bitmapOld == (HBITMAP) NULL)
{
DeleteDC(hDC);
DeleteDC(bitmapDC);
DeleteObject(bitmap);
ThrowReaderException(CoderError,"UnableToCreateBitmap");
}
BitBlt(bitmapDC,0,0,(int) screen->columns,(int) screen->rows,hDC,0,0,
SRCCOPY);
(void) SelectObject(bitmapDC,bitmapOld);
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) screen->rows; y++)
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(screen,0,y,screen->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) screen->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(p->rgbtRed));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(p->rgbtGreen));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(p->rgbtBlue));
SetPixelOpacity(q,OpaqueOpacity);
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(screen,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
DeleteDC(hDC);
DeleteDC(bitmapDC);
DeleteObject(bitmap);
}
}
#elif defined(MAGICKCORE_X11_DELEGATE)
{
const char
*option;
XImportInfo
ximage_info;
(void) exception;
XGetImportInfo(&ximage_info);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"x:screen");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
ximage_info.screen=IsMagickTrue(option);
option=GetImageOption(image_info,"x:silent");
if (option != (const char *) NULL)
ximage_info.silent=IsMagickTrue(option);
image=XImportImage(image_info,&ximage_info);
}
#endif
return(image);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Buffer overflow in the ReadVIFFImage function in coders/viff.c in ImageMagick before 6.9.4-5 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message:
|
Medium
| 168,602
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void BrowserContextDestroyer::FinishDestroyContext() {
DCHECK_EQ(pending_hosts_, 0U);
delete context_;
context_ = nullptr;
delete this;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: A malicious webview could install long-lived unload handlers that re-use an incognito BrowserContext that is queued for destruction in versions of Oxide before 1.18.3.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,420
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int dev_forward_skb(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
skb_orphan(skb);
if (!(dev->flags & IFF_UP))
return NET_RX_DROP;
if (skb->len > (dev->mtu + dev->hard_header_len))
return NET_RX_DROP;
skb_set_dev(skb, dev);
skb->tstamp.tv64 = 0;
skb->pkt_type = PACKET_HOST;
skb->protocol = eth_type_trans(skb, dev);
return netif_rx(skb);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The veth (aka virtual Ethernet) driver in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34 does not properly manage skbs during congestion, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (system crash) by leveraging lack of skb consumption in conjunction with a double-free error.
Commit Message: veth: Dont kfree_skb() after dev_forward_skb()
In case of congestion, netif_rx() frees the skb, so we must assume
dev_forward_skb() also consume skb.
Bug introduced by commit 445409602c092
(veth: move loopback logic to common location)
We must change dev_forward_skb() to always consume skb, and veth to not
double free it.
Bug report : http://marc.info/?l=linux-netdev&m=127310770900442&w=3
Reported-by: Martín Ferrari <martin.ferrari@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,089
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: v8::Handle<v8::Value> V8WebSocket::sendCallback(const v8::Arguments& args)
{
INC_STATS("DOM.WebSocket.send()");
if (!args.Length())
return V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError();
WebSocket* webSocket = V8WebSocket::toNative(args.Holder());
v8::Handle<v8::Value> message = args[0];
ExceptionCode ec = 0;
bool result;
if (V8ArrayBuffer::HasInstance(message)) {
ArrayBuffer* arrayBuffer = V8ArrayBuffer::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(message));
ASSERT(arrayBuffer);
result = webSocket->send(arrayBuffer, ec);
} else if (V8Blob::HasInstance(message)) {
Blob* blob = V8Blob::toNative(v8::Handle<v8::Object>::Cast(message));
ASSERT(blob);
result = webSocket->send(blob, ec);
} else {
v8::TryCatch tryCatch;
v8::Handle<v8::String> stringMessage = message->ToString();
if (tryCatch.HasCaught())
return throwError(tryCatch.Exception(), args.GetIsolate());
result = webSocket->send(toWebCoreString(stringMessage), ec);
}
if (ec)
return throwError(ec, args.GetIsolate());
return v8Boolean(result);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The browser native UI in Google Chrome before 17.0.963.83 does not require user confirmation before an unpacked extension installation, which allows user-assisted remote attackers to have an unspecified impact via a crafted extension.
Commit Message: [V8] Pass Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError()
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=86983
Reviewed by Adam Barth.
The objective is to pass Isolate around in V8 bindings.
This patch passes Isolate to throwNotEnoughArgumentsError().
No tests. No change in behavior.
* bindings/scripts/CodeGeneratorV8.pm:
(GenerateArgumentsCountCheck):
(GenerateEventConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8Float64Array.cpp:
(WebCore::Float64ArrayV8Internal::fooCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestActiveDOMObject.cpp:
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::excitingFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::TestActiveDOMObjectV8Internal::postMessageCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestCustomNamedGetter.cpp:
(WebCore::TestCustomNamedGetterV8Internal::anotherFunctionCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestEventConstructor::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestEventTarget.cpp:
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::itemCallback):
(WebCore::TestEventTargetV8Internal::dispatchEventCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestInterfaceV8Internal::supplementalMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::V8TestInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestMediaQueryListListener.cpp:
(WebCore::TestMediaQueryListListenerV8Internal::methodCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestNamedConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8TestNamedConstructorConstructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestObj.cpp:
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::voidMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::intMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::objMethodWithArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithSequenceArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodReturningSequenceCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodThatRequiresAllArgsAndThrowsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::serializedValueCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::idbKeyCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::optionsObjectCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndOptionalArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonOptionalArgAndTwoOptionalArgsCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::methodWithNonCallbackArgAndCallbackArgCallback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod6Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod7Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod11Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::overloadedMethod12Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::enabledAtRuntimeMethod2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert1Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert2Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert3Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert4Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::convert5Callback):
(WebCore::TestObjV8Internal::strictFunctionCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestObj::constructorCallback):
* bindings/scripts/test/V8/V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface.cpp:
(WebCore::TestSerializedScriptValueInterfaceV8Internal::acceptTransferListCallback):
(WebCore::V8TestSerializedScriptValueInterface::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/ScriptController.cpp:
(WebCore::setValueAndClosePopupCallback):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Proxy::throwNotEnoughArgumentsError):
* bindings/v8/V8Proxy.h:
(V8Proxy):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8AudioContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8AudioContext::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DataViewCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DataView::getInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::getUint8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setInt8Callback):
(WebCore::V8DataView::setUint8Callback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8DirectoryEntryCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getDirectoryCallback):
(WebCore::V8DirectoryEntry::getFileCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8IntentConstructor.cpp:
(WebCore::V8Intent::constructorCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8SVGLengthCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8SVGLength::convertToSpecifiedUnitsCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebGLRenderingContextCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::getObjectParameter):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getAttachedShadersCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getExtensionCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getFramebufferAttachmentParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getProgramParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getShaderParameterCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebGLRenderingContext::getUniformCallback):
(WebCore::vertexAttribAndUniformHelperf):
(WebCore::uniformHelperi):
(WebCore::uniformMatrixHelper):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebKitMutationObserverCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebKitMutationObserver::observeCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8WebSocketCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::constructorCallback):
(WebCore::V8WebSocket::sendCallback):
* bindings/v8/custom/V8XMLHttpRequestCustom.cpp:
(WebCore::V8XMLHttpRequest::openCallback):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@117736 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 171,134
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftRaw::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0 && pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mChannelCount;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSampleRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
Medium
| 174,218
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static size_t WritePSDChannels(const PSDInfo *psd_info,
const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,Image *next_image,
MagickOffsetType size_offset,const MagickBooleanType separate,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
Image
*mask;
MagickOffsetType
rows_offset;
size_t
channels,
count,
length,
offset_length;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels;
count=0;
offset_length=0;
rows_offset=0;
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) NULL;
if (next_image->compression == RLECompression)
{
compact_pixels=AcquireCompactPixels(image,exception);
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
return(0);
}
channels=1;
if (separate == MagickFalse)
{
if (next_image->storage_class != PseudoClass)
{
if (IsImageGray(next_image) == MagickFalse)
channels=next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace ? 4 : 3;
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
channels++;
}
rows_offset=TellBlob(image)+2;
count+=WriteCompressionStart(psd_info,image,next_image,channels);
offset_length=(next_image->rows*(psd_info->version == 1 ? 2 : 4));
}
size_offset+=2;
if (next_image->storage_class == PseudoClass)
{
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
IndexQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate,exception);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
}
else
{
if (IsImageGray(next_image) != MagickFalse)
{
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
GrayQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate,exception);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
}
else
{
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
(void) NegateCMYK(next_image,exception);
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
RedQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate,exception);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
GreenQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate,exception);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
BlueQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate,exception);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
{
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
BlackQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate,exception);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
}
}
if (next_image->alpha_trait != UndefinedPixelTrait)
{
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,next_image,
AlphaQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,separate,exception);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
size_offset+=WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset)+2;
else
rows_offset+=offset_length;
count+=length;
}
}
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(compact_pixels);
if (next_image->colorspace == CMYKColorspace)
(void) NegateCMYK(next_image,exception);
if (separate != MagickFalse)
{
const char
*property;
property=GetImageArtifact(next_image,"psd:opacity-mask");
if (property != (const char *) NULL)
{
mask=(Image *) GetImageRegistry(ImageRegistryType,property,
exception);
if (mask != (Image *) NULL)
{
if (mask->compression == RLECompression)
{
compact_pixels=AcquireCompactPixels(mask,exception);
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
return(0);
}
length=WritePSDChannel(psd_info,image_info,image,mask,
RedQuantum,compact_pixels,rows_offset,MagickTrue,exception);
(void) WritePSDSize(psd_info,image,length,size_offset);
count+=length;
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) RelinquishMagickMemory(
compact_pixels);
}
}
}
return(count);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: coders/psd.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to have unspecified impact via a crafted PSD file, which triggers an out-of-bounds write.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/350
|
Medium
| 168,406
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: dophn_core(struct magic_set *ms, int clazz, int swap, int fd, off_t off,
int num, size_t size, off_t fsize, int *flags)
{
Elf32_Phdr ph32;
Elf64_Phdr ph64;
size_t offset, len;
unsigned char nbuf[BUFSIZ];
ssize_t bufsize;
if (size != xph_sizeof) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", corrupted program header size") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/*
* Loop through all the program headers.
*/
for ( ; num; num--) {
if (pread(fd, xph_addr, xph_sizeof, off) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
off += size;
if (fsize != SIZE_UNKNOWN && xph_offset > fsize) {
/* Perhaps warn here */
continue;
}
if (xph_type != PT_NOTE)
continue;
/*
* This is a PT_NOTE section; loop through all the notes
* in the section.
*/
len = xph_filesz < sizeof(nbuf) ? xph_filesz : sizeof(nbuf);
if ((bufsize = pread(fd, nbuf, len, xph_offset)) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
offset = 0;
for (;;) {
if (offset >= (size_t)bufsize)
break;
offset = donote(ms, nbuf, offset, (size_t)bufsize,
clazz, swap, 4, flags);
if (offset == 0)
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: readelf.c in file before 5.22, as used in the Fileinfo component in PHP before 5.4.37, 5.5.x before 5.5.21, and 5.6.x before 5.6.5, does not consider that pread calls sometimes read only a subset of the available data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (uninitialized memory access) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted ELF file.
Commit Message: Bail out on partial reads, from Alexander Cherepanov
|
Low
| 166,767
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static __always_inline ssize_t __mcopy_atomic_hugetlb(struct mm_struct *dst_mm,
struct vm_area_struct *dst_vma,
unsigned long dst_start,
unsigned long src_start,
unsigned long len,
bool zeropage)
{
int vm_alloc_shared = dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED;
int vm_shared = dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED;
ssize_t err;
pte_t *dst_pte;
unsigned long src_addr, dst_addr;
long copied;
struct page *page;
struct hstate *h;
unsigned long vma_hpagesize;
pgoff_t idx;
u32 hash;
struct address_space *mapping;
/*
* There is no default zero huge page for all huge page sizes as
* supported by hugetlb. A PMD_SIZE huge pages may exist as used
* by THP. Since we can not reliably insert a zero page, this
* feature is not supported.
*/
if (zeropage) {
up_read(&dst_mm->mmap_sem);
return -EINVAL;
}
src_addr = src_start;
dst_addr = dst_start;
copied = 0;
page = NULL;
vma_hpagesize = vma_kernel_pagesize(dst_vma);
/*
* Validate alignment based on huge page size
*/
err = -EINVAL;
if (dst_start & (vma_hpagesize - 1) || len & (vma_hpagesize - 1))
goto out_unlock;
retry:
/*
* On routine entry dst_vma is set. If we had to drop mmap_sem and
* retry, dst_vma will be set to NULL and we must lookup again.
*/
if (!dst_vma) {
err = -ENOENT;
dst_vma = find_vma(dst_mm, dst_start);
if (!dst_vma || !is_vm_hugetlb_page(dst_vma))
goto out_unlock;
/*
* Only allow __mcopy_atomic_hugetlb on userfaultfd
* registered ranges.
*/
if (!dst_vma->vm_userfaultfd_ctx.ctx)
goto out_unlock;
if (dst_start < dst_vma->vm_start ||
dst_start + len > dst_vma->vm_end)
goto out_unlock;
err = -EINVAL;
if (vma_hpagesize != vma_kernel_pagesize(dst_vma))
goto out_unlock;
vm_shared = dst_vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED;
}
if (WARN_ON(dst_addr & (vma_hpagesize - 1) ||
(len - copied) & (vma_hpagesize - 1)))
goto out_unlock;
/*
* If not shared, ensure the dst_vma has a anon_vma.
*/
err = -ENOMEM;
if (!vm_shared) {
if (unlikely(anon_vma_prepare(dst_vma)))
goto out_unlock;
}
h = hstate_vma(dst_vma);
while (src_addr < src_start + len) {
pte_t dst_pteval;
BUG_ON(dst_addr >= dst_start + len);
VM_BUG_ON(dst_addr & ~huge_page_mask(h));
/*
* Serialize via hugetlb_fault_mutex
*/
idx = linear_page_index(dst_vma, dst_addr);
mapping = dst_vma->vm_file->f_mapping;
hash = hugetlb_fault_mutex_hash(h, dst_mm, dst_vma, mapping,
idx, dst_addr);
mutex_lock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]);
err = -ENOMEM;
dst_pte = huge_pte_alloc(dst_mm, dst_addr, huge_page_size(h));
if (!dst_pte) {
mutex_unlock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]);
goto out_unlock;
}
err = -EEXIST;
dst_pteval = huge_ptep_get(dst_pte);
if (!huge_pte_none(dst_pteval)) {
mutex_unlock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]);
goto out_unlock;
}
err = hugetlb_mcopy_atomic_pte(dst_mm, dst_pte, dst_vma,
dst_addr, src_addr, &page);
mutex_unlock(&hugetlb_fault_mutex_table[hash]);
vm_alloc_shared = vm_shared;
cond_resched();
if (unlikely(err == -ENOENT)) {
up_read(&dst_mm->mmap_sem);
BUG_ON(!page);
err = copy_huge_page_from_user(page,
(const void __user *)src_addr,
pages_per_huge_page(h), true);
if (unlikely(err)) {
err = -EFAULT;
goto out;
}
down_read(&dst_mm->mmap_sem);
dst_vma = NULL;
goto retry;
} else
BUG_ON(page);
if (!err) {
dst_addr += vma_hpagesize;
src_addr += vma_hpagesize;
copied += vma_hpagesize;
if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
err = -EINTR;
}
if (err)
break;
}
out_unlock:
up_read(&dst_mm->mmap_sem);
out:
if (page) {
/*
* We encountered an error and are about to free a newly
* allocated huge page.
*
* Reservation handling is very subtle, and is different for
* private and shared mappings. See the routine
* restore_reserve_on_error for details. Unfortunately, we
* can not call restore_reserve_on_error now as it would
* require holding mmap_sem.
*
* If a reservation for the page existed in the reservation
* map of a private mapping, the map was modified to indicate
* the reservation was consumed when the page was allocated.
* We clear the PagePrivate flag now so that the global
* reserve count will not be incremented in free_huge_page.
* The reservation map will still indicate the reservation
* was consumed and possibly prevent later page allocation.
* This is better than leaking a global reservation. If no
* reservation existed, it is still safe to clear PagePrivate
* as no adjustments to reservation counts were made during
* allocation.
*
* The reservation map for shared mappings indicates which
* pages have reservations. When a huge page is allocated
* for an address with a reservation, no change is made to
* the reserve map. In this case PagePrivate will be set
* to indicate that the global reservation count should be
* incremented when the page is freed. This is the desired
* behavior. However, when a huge page is allocated for an
* address without a reservation a reservation entry is added
* to the reservation map, and PagePrivate will not be set.
* When the page is freed, the global reserve count will NOT
* be incremented and it will appear as though we have leaked
* reserved page. In this case, set PagePrivate so that the
* global reserve count will be incremented to match the
* reservation map entry which was created.
*
* Note that vm_alloc_shared is based on the flags of the vma
* for which the page was originally allocated. dst_vma could
* be different or NULL on error.
*/
if (vm_alloc_shared)
SetPagePrivate(page);
else
ClearPagePrivate(page);
put_page(page);
}
BUG_ON(copied < 0);
BUG_ON(err > 0);
BUG_ON(!copied && !err);
return copied ? copied : err;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: The userfaultfd implementation in the Linux kernel before 4.19.7 mishandles access control for certain UFFDIO_ ioctl calls, as demonstrated by allowing local users to write data into holes in a tmpfs file (if the user has read-only access to that file, and that file contains holes), related to fs/userfaultfd.c and mm/userfaultfd.c.
Commit Message: userfaultfd: shmem/hugetlbfs: only allow to register VM_MAYWRITE vmas
After the VMA to register the uffd onto is found, check that it has
VM_MAYWRITE set before allowing registration. This way we inherit all
common code checks before allowing to fill file holes in shmem and
hugetlbfs with UFFDIO_COPY.
The userfaultfd memory model is not applicable for readonly files unless
it's a MAP_PRIVATE.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20181126173452.26955-4-aarcange@redhat.com
Fixes: ff62a3421044 ("hugetlb: implement memfd sealing")
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Fixes: 4c27fe4c4c84 ("userfaultfd: shmem: add shmem_mcopy_atomic_pte for userfaultfd support")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>
Cc: Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 169,008
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ResourcePrefetchPredictor::LearnOrigins(
const std::string& host,
const GURL& main_frame_origin,
const std::map<GURL, OriginRequestSummary>& summaries) {
DCHECK_CURRENTLY_ON(BrowserThread::UI);
if (host.size() > ResourcePrefetchPredictorTables::kMaxStringLength)
return;
OriginData data;
bool exists = origin_data_->TryGetData(host, &data);
if (!exists) {
data.set_host(host);
data.set_last_visit_time(base::Time::Now().ToInternalValue());
size_t origins_size = summaries.size();
auto ordered_origins =
std::vector<const OriginRequestSummary*>(origins_size);
for (const auto& kv : summaries) {
size_t index = kv.second.first_occurrence;
DCHECK_LT(index, origins_size);
ordered_origins[index] = &kv.second;
}
for (const OriginRequestSummary* summary : ordered_origins) {
auto* origin_to_add = data.add_origins();
InitializeOriginStatFromOriginRequestSummary(origin_to_add, *summary);
}
} else {
data.set_last_visit_time(base::Time::Now().ToInternalValue());
std::map<GURL, int> old_index;
int old_size = static_cast<int>(data.origins_size());
for (int i = 0; i < old_size; ++i) {
bool is_new =
old_index.insert({GURL(data.origins(i).origin()), i}).second;
DCHECK(is_new);
}
for (int i = 0; i < old_size; ++i) {
auto* old_origin = data.mutable_origins(i);
GURL origin(old_origin->origin());
auto it = summaries.find(origin);
if (it == summaries.end()) {
old_origin->set_number_of_misses(old_origin->number_of_misses() + 1);
old_origin->set_consecutive_misses(old_origin->consecutive_misses() +
1);
} else {
const auto& new_origin = it->second;
old_origin->set_always_access_network(new_origin.always_access_network);
old_origin->set_accessed_network(new_origin.accessed_network);
int position = new_origin.first_occurrence + 1;
int total =
old_origin->number_of_hits() + old_origin->number_of_misses();
old_origin->set_average_position(
((old_origin->average_position() * total) + position) /
(total + 1));
old_origin->set_number_of_hits(old_origin->number_of_hits() + 1);
old_origin->set_consecutive_misses(0);
}
}
for (const auto& kv : summaries) {
if (old_index.find(kv.first) != old_index.end())
continue;
auto* origin_to_add = data.add_origins();
InitializeOriginStatFromOriginRequestSummary(origin_to_add, kv.second);
}
}
ResourcePrefetchPredictorTables::TrimOrigins(&data,
config_.max_consecutive_misses);
ResourcePrefetchPredictorTables::SortOrigins(&data, main_frame_origin.spec());
if (data.origins_size() > static_cast<int>(config_.max_origins_per_entry)) {
data.mutable_origins()->DeleteSubrange(
config_.max_origins_per_entry,
data.origins_size() - config_.max_origins_per_entry);
}
if (data.origins_size() == 0)
origin_data_->DeleteData({host});
else
origin_data_->UpdateData(host, data);
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: Insufficient validation of untrusted input in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 59.0.3071.86 for Linux, Windows, and Mac, and 59.0.3071.92 for Android, allowed a remote attacker to perform an out of bounds memory read via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
|
Medium
| 172,380
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void tty_set_termios_ldisc(struct tty_struct *tty, int num)
{
down_write(&tty->termios_rwsem);
tty->termios.c_line = num;
up_write(&tty->termios_rwsem);
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: The tty_set_termios_ldisc function in drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c in the Linux kernel before 4.5 allows local users to obtain sensitive information from kernel memory by reading a tty data structure.
Commit Message: tty: Prevent ldisc drivers from re-using stale tty fields
Line discipline drivers may mistakenly misuse ldisc-related fields
when initializing. For example, a failure to initialize tty->receive_room
in the N_GIGASET_M101 line discipline was recently found and fixed [1].
Now, the N_X25 line discipline has been discovered accessing the previous
line discipline's already-freed private data [2].
Harden the ldisc interface against misuse by initializing revelant
tty fields before instancing the new line discipline.
[1]
commit fd98e9419d8d622a4de91f76b306af6aa627aa9c
Author: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Date: Tue Jul 14 00:37:13 2015 +0200
isdn/gigaset: reset tty->receive_room when attaching ser_gigaset
[2] Report from Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
[ 634.336761] ==================================================================
[ 634.338226] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in x25_asy_open_tty+0x13d/0x490 at addr ffff8800a743efd0
[ 634.339558] Read of size 4 by task syzkaller_execu/8981
[ 634.340359] =============================================================================
[ 634.341598] BUG kmalloc-512 (Not tainted): kasan: bad access detected
...
[ 634.405018] Call Trace:
[ 634.405277] dump_stack (lib/dump_stack.c:52)
[ 634.405775] print_trailer (mm/slub.c:655)
[ 634.406361] object_err (mm/slub.c:662)
[ 634.406824] kasan_report_error (mm/kasan/report.c:138 mm/kasan/report.c:236)
[ 634.409581] __asan_report_load4_noabort (mm/kasan/report.c:279)
[ 634.411355] x25_asy_open_tty (drivers/net/wan/x25_asy.c:559 (discriminator 1))
[ 634.413997] tty_ldisc_open.isra.2 (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:447)
[ 634.414549] tty_set_ldisc (drivers/tty/tty_ldisc.c:567)
[ 634.415057] tty_ioctl (drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2646 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2879)
[ 634.423524] do_vfs_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:43 fs/ioctl.c:607)
[ 634.427491] SyS_ioctl (fs/ioctl.c:622 fs/ioctl.c:613)
[ 634.427945] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:188)
Cc: Tilman Schmidt <tilman@imap.cc>
Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
|
Medium
| 167,459
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int process_cmd_sock(int h)
{
sock_cmd_t cmd = {-1, 0, 0, 0, 0};
int fd = ts[h].cmd_fdr;
if(recv(fd, &cmd, sizeof(cmd), MSG_WAITALL) != sizeof(cmd))
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("recv cmd errno:%d", errno);
return FALSE;
}
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("cmd.id:%d", cmd.id);
switch(cmd.id)
{
case CMD_ADD_FD:
add_poll(h, cmd.fd, cmd.type, cmd.flags, cmd.user_id);
break;
case CMD_REMOVE_FD:
for (int i = 1; i < MAX_POLL; ++i)
{
poll_slot_t *poll_slot = &ts[h].ps[i];
if (poll_slot->pfd.fd == cmd.fd)
{
remove_poll(h, poll_slot, poll_slot->flags);
break;
}
}
close(cmd.fd);
break;
case CMD_WAKEUP:
break;
case CMD_USER_PRIVATE:
asrt(ts[h].cmd_callback);
if(ts[h].cmd_callback)
ts[h].cmd_callback(fd, cmd.type, cmd.flags, cmd.user_id);
break;
case CMD_EXIT:
return FALSE;
default:
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("unknown cmd: %d", cmd.id);
break;
}
return TRUE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,465
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void svc_rdma_wc_write(struct ib_cq *cq, struct ib_wc *wc)
{
struct ib_cqe *cqe = wc->wr_cqe;
struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt *ctxt;
svc_rdma_send_wc_common_put(cq, wc, "write");
ctxt = container_of(cqe, struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt, cqe);
svc_rdma_unmap_dma(ctxt);
svc_rdma_put_context(ctxt, 0);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-404
Summary: The NFSv4 implementation in the Linux kernel through 4.11.1 allows local users to cause a denial of service (resource consumption) by leveraging improper channel callback shutdown when unmounting an NFSv4 filesystem, aka a *module reference and kernel daemon* leak.
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
|
Low
| 168,184
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static bool ldm_frag_add (const u8 *data, int size, struct list_head *frags)
{
struct frag *f;
struct list_head *item;
int rec, num, group;
BUG_ON (!data || !frags);
if (size < 2 * VBLK_SIZE_HEAD) {
ldm_error("Value of size is to small.");
return false;
}
group = get_unaligned_be32(data + 0x08);
rec = get_unaligned_be16(data + 0x0C);
num = get_unaligned_be16(data + 0x0E);
if ((num < 1) || (num > 4)) {
ldm_error ("A VBLK claims to have %d parts.", num);
return false;
}
if (rec >= num) {
ldm_error("REC value (%d) exceeds NUM value (%d)", rec, num);
return false;
}
list_for_each (item, frags) {
f = list_entry (item, struct frag, list);
if (f->group == group)
goto found;
}
f = kmalloc (sizeof (*f) + size*num, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!f) {
ldm_crit ("Out of memory.");
return false;
}
f->group = group;
f->num = num;
f->rec = rec;
f->map = 0xFF << num;
list_add_tail (&f->list, frags);
found:
if (f->map & (1 << rec)) {
ldm_error ("Duplicate VBLK, part %d.", rec);
f->map &= 0x7F; /* Mark the group as broken */
return false;
}
f->map |= (1 << rec);
data += VBLK_SIZE_HEAD;
size -= VBLK_SIZE_HEAD;
memcpy (f->data+rec*(size-VBLK_SIZE_HEAD)+VBLK_SIZE_HEAD, data, size);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv +Info
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The ldm_frag_add function in fs/partitions/ldm.c in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39.1 does not properly handle memory allocation for non-initial fragments, which might allow local users to conduct buffer overflow attacks, and gain privileges or obtain sensitive information, via a crafted LDM partition table. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2011-1017.
Commit Message: Fix for buffer overflow in ldm_frag_add not sufficient
As Ben Hutchings discovered [1], the patch for CVE-2011-1017 (buffer
overflow in ldm_frag_add) is not sufficient. The original patch in
commit c340b1d64000 ("fs/partitions/ldm.c: fix oops caused by corrupted
partition table") does not consider that, for subsequent fragments,
previously allocated memory is used.
[1] http://lkml.org/lkml/2011/5/6/407
Reported-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Timo Warns <warns@pre-sense.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,872
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftMP3::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
pcmParams->nChannels = mNumChannels;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate = mSamplingRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioMp3:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_MP3TYPE *mp3Params =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_MP3TYPE *)params;
if (mp3Params->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mp3Params->nChannels = mNumChannels;
mp3Params->nBitRate = 0 /* unknown */;
mp3Params->nSampleRate = mSamplingRate;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
Medium
| 174,211
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: get_strings_2_svc(gstrings_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gstrings_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gstrings_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (! cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ) &&
(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_INQUIRE,
arg->princ,
NULL))) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_GET;
log_unauth("kadm5_get_strings", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_strings((void *)handle, arg->princ, &ret.strings,
&ret.count);
if (ret.code != 0)
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_get_strings", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple memory leaks in kadmin/server/server_stubs.c in kadmind in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.13.4 and 1.14.x before 1.14.1 allow remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via a request specifying a NULL principal name.
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
|
Low
| 167,518
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: png_get_asm_flags (png_structp png_ptr)
{
/* Obsolete, to be removed from libpng-1.4.0 */
return (png_ptr? 0L: 0L);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: Multiple buffer overflows in the (1) png_set_PLTE and (2) png_get_PLTE functions in libpng before 1.0.64, 1.1.x and 1.2.x before 1.2.54, 1.3.x and 1.4.x before 1.4.17, 1.5.x before 1.5.24, and 1.6.x before 1.6.19 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a small bit-depth value in an IHDR (aka image header) chunk in a PNG image.
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
|
Low
| 172,165
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ssize_t nbd_wr_syncv(QIOChannel *ioc,
struct iovec *iov,
size_t niov,
size_t length,
bool do_read)
{
ssize_t done = 0;
Error *local_err = NULL;
struct iovec *local_iov = g_new(struct iovec, niov);
struct iovec *local_iov_head = local_iov;
unsigned int nlocal_iov = niov;
nlocal_iov = iov_copy(local_iov, nlocal_iov, iov, niov, 0, length);
while (nlocal_iov > 0) {
ssize_t len;
if (do_read) {
len = qio_channel_readv(ioc, local_iov, nlocal_iov, &local_err);
} else {
len = qio_channel_writev(ioc, local_iov, nlocal_iov, &local_err);
}
if (len == QIO_CHANNEL_ERR_BLOCK) {
if (qemu_in_coroutine()) {
/* XXX figure out if we can create a variant on
* qio_channel_yield() that works with AIO contexts
* and consider using that in this branch */
qemu_coroutine_yield();
} else if (done) {
/* XXX this is needed by nbd_reply_ready. */
qio_channel_wait(ioc,
do_read ? G_IO_IN : G_IO_OUT);
} else {
return -EAGAIN;
}
} else if (done) {
/* XXX this is needed by nbd_reply_ready. */
qio_channel_wait(ioc,
do_read ? G_IO_IN : G_IO_OUT);
} else {
return -EAGAIN;
}
continue;
}
if (len < 0) {
TRACE("I/O error: %s", error_get_pretty(local_err));
error_free(local_err);
/* XXX handle Error objects */
done = -EIO;
goto cleanup;
}
if (do_read && len == 0) {
break;
}
iov_discard_front(&local_iov, &nlocal_iov, len);
done += len;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An assertion-failure flaw was found in Qemu before 2.10.1, in the Network Block Device (NBD) server's initial connection negotiation, where the I/O coroutine was undefined. This could crash the qemu-nbd server if a client sent unexpected data during connection negotiation. A remote user or process could use this flaw to crash the qemu-nbd server resulting in denial of service.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,451
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void copy_fields(const FieldMatchContext *fm, AVFrame *dst,
const AVFrame *src, int field)
{
int plane;
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && src->data[plane]; plane++)
av_image_copy_plane(dst->data[plane] + field*dst->linesize[plane], dst->linesize[plane] << 1,
src->data[plane] + field*src->linesize[plane], src->linesize[plane] << 1,
get_width(fm, src, plane), get_height(fm, src, plane) / 2);
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libavfilter in FFmpeg before 2.0.1 has unspecified impact and remote vectors related to a crafted *plane,* which triggers an out-of-bounds heap write.
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
|
Low
| 165,999
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool ExtensionTtsPlatformImplWin::Speak(
const std::string& src_utterance,
const std::string& language,
const std::string& gender,
double rate,
double pitch,
double volume) {
std::wstring utterance = UTF8ToUTF16(src_utterance);
if (!speech_synthesizer_)
return false;
if (rate >= 0.0) {
speech_synthesizer_->SetRate(static_cast<int32>(rate * 20 - 10));
}
if (pitch >= 0.0) {
std::wstring pitch_value =
base::IntToString16(static_cast<int>(pitch * 20 - 10));
utterance = L"<pitch absmiddle=\"" + pitch_value + L"\">" +
utterance + L"</pitch>";
}
if (volume >= 0.0) {
speech_synthesizer_->SetVolume(static_cast<uint16>(volume * 100));
}
if (paused_) {
speech_synthesizer_->Resume();
paused_ = false;
}
speech_synthesizer_->Speak(
utterance.c_str(), SPF_ASYNC | SPF_PURGEBEFORESPEAK, NULL);
return true;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The PDF implementation in Google Chrome before 13.0.782.215 on Linux does not properly use the memset library function, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,402
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: DisplaySourceCustomBindings::DisplaySourceCustomBindings(ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context),
weak_factory_(this) {
RouteFunction("StartSession",
base::Bind(&DisplaySourceCustomBindings::StartSession,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
RouteFunction("TerminateSession",
base::Bind(&DisplaySourceCustomBindings::TerminateSession,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()));
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: The extensions subsystem in Google Chrome before 51.0.2704.79 does not properly restrict bindings access, which allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via unspecified vectors.
Commit Message: [Extensions] Expand bindings access checks
BUG=601149
BUG=601073
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1866103002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#387710}
|
Medium
| 172,248
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static gboolean prplcb_xfer_new_send_cb(gpointer data, gint fd, b_input_condition cond)
{
PurpleXfer *xfer = data;
struct im_connection *ic = purple_ic_by_pa(xfer->account);
struct prpl_xfer_data *px = xfer->ui_data;
PurpleBuddy *buddy;
const char *who;
buddy = purple_find_buddy(xfer->account, xfer->who);
who = buddy ? purple_buddy_get_name(buddy) : xfer->who;
/* TODO(wilmer): After spreading some more const goodness in BitlBee,
remove the evil cast below. */
px->ft = imcb_file_send_start(ic, (char *) who, xfer->filename, xfer->size);
px->ft->data = px;
px->ft->accept = prpl_xfer_accept;
px->ft->canceled = prpl_xfer_canceled;
px->ft->free = prpl_xfer_free;
px->ft->write_request = prpl_xfer_write_request;
return FALSE;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-476
Summary: bitlbee-libpurple before 3.5.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a file transfer request for a contact that is not in the contact list. NOTE: this vulnerability exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2016-10189.
Commit Message: purple: Fix crash on ft requests from unknown contacts
Followup to 701ab81 (included in 3.5) which was a partial fix which only
improved things for non-libpurple file transfers (that is, just jabber)
|
Low
| 168,380
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool HasPermissionsForFile(const FilePath& file, int permissions) {
FilePath current_path = file.StripTrailingSeparators();
FilePath last_path;
while (current_path != last_path) {
if (file_permissions_.find(current_path) != file_permissions_.end())
return (file_permissions_[current_path] & permissions) == permissions;
last_path = current_path;
current_path = current_path.DirName();
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: Google Chrome before 23.0.1271.95 does not properly handle file paths, which has unspecified impact and attack vectors.
Commit Message: Apply missing kParentDirectory check
BUG=161564
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11414046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@168692 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,673
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void GDataCache::Pin(const std::string& resource_id,
const std::string& md5,
FileOperationType file_operation_type,
base::PlatformFileError* error) {
AssertOnSequencedWorkerPool();
DCHECK(error);
FilePath source_path;
FilePath dest_path;
FilePath symlink_path;
bool create_symlink = true;
int cache_state = CACHE_STATE_PINNED;
CacheSubDirectoryType sub_dir_type = CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT;
scoped_ptr<CacheEntry> cache_entry = GetCacheEntry(resource_id, md5);
if (!cache_entry.get()) { // Entry does not exist in cache.
dest_path = FilePath::FromUTF8Unsafe(util::kSymLinkToDevNull);
source_path = dest_path;
sub_dir_type = CACHE_TYPE_PINNED;
} else { // File exists in cache, determines destination path.
cache_state |= cache_entry->cache_state;
if (cache_entry->IsDirty() || cache_entry->IsMounted()) {
DCHECK_EQ(CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT, cache_entry->sub_dir_type);
dest_path = GetCacheFilePath(resource_id,
md5,
cache_entry->sub_dir_type,
CACHED_FILE_LOCALLY_MODIFIED);
source_path = dest_path;
} else {
source_path = GetCacheFilePath(resource_id,
md5,
cache_entry->sub_dir_type,
CACHED_FILE_FROM_SERVER);
if (cache_entry->sub_dir_type == CACHE_TYPE_PINNED) {
dest_path = source_path;
create_symlink = false;
} else { // File exists, move it to persistent dir.
dest_path = GetCacheFilePath(resource_id,
md5,
CACHE_TYPE_PERSISTENT,
CACHED_FILE_FROM_SERVER);
}
}
}
if (create_symlink) {
symlink_path = GetCacheFilePath(resource_id,
std::string(),
CACHE_TYPE_PINNED,
CACHED_FILE_FROM_SERVER);
}
*error = ModifyCacheState(source_path,
dest_path,
file_operation_type,
symlink_path,
create_symlink);
if (*error == base::PLATFORM_FILE_OK) {
metadata_->UpdateCache(resource_id, md5, sub_dir_type, cache_state);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The PDF functionality in Google Chrome before 22.0.1229.79 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors that trigger out-of-bounds write operations.
Commit Message: Revert 144993 - gdata: Remove invalid files in the cache directories
Broke linux_chromeos_valgrind:
http://build.chromium.org/p/chromium.memory.fyi/builders/Chromium%20OS%20%28valgrind%29%285%29/builds/8628/steps/memory%20test%3A%20unit/logs/stdio
In theory, we shouldn't have any invalid files left in the
cache directories, but things can go wrong and invalid files
may be left if the device shuts down unexpectedly, for instance.
Besides, it's good to be defensive.
BUG=134862
TEST=added unit tests
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10693020
TBR=satorux@chromium.org
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@145029 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Medium
| 170,864
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void ImageFetched(const ContentSuggestion::ID& id,
const GURL& url,
const base::string16& title,
const base::string16& text,
base::Time timeout_at,
const gfx::Image& image) {
if (!ShouldNotifyInState(app_status_listener_.GetState())) {
return; // Became foreground while we were fetching the image; forget it.
}
DVLOG(1) << "Fetched " << image.Size().width() << "x"
<< image.Size().height() << " image for " << url.spec();
if (ContentSuggestionsNotificationHelper::SendNotification(
id, url, title, text, CropSquare(image), timeout_at)) {
RecordContentSuggestionsNotificationImpression(
id.category().IsKnownCategory(KnownCategories::ARTICLES)
? CONTENT_SUGGESTIONS_ARTICLE
: CONTENT_SUGGESTIONS_NONARTICLE);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: The DragImage::create function in platform/DragImage.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 41.0.2272.76, does not initialize memory for image drawing, which allows remote attackers to have an unspecified impact by triggering a failed image decoding, as demonstrated by an image for which the default orientation cannot be used.
Commit Message: NTP: cap number of notifications/day
1 by default; Finch-configurable.
BUG=689465
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2691023002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#450389}
|
Low
| 172,037
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAMR::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAmr:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *amrParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *)params;
if (amrParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
amrParams->nChannels = 1;
amrParams->eAMRDTXMode = OMX_AUDIO_AMRDTXModeOff;
amrParams->eAMRFrameFormat = OMX_AUDIO_AMRFrameFormatFSF;
if (!isConfigured()) {
amrParams->nBitRate = 0;
amrParams->eAMRBandMode = OMX_AUDIO_AMRBandModeUnused;
} else {
amrParams->nBitRate = 0;
amrParams->eAMRBandMode =
mMode == MODE_NARROW
? OMX_AUDIO_AMRBandModeNB0 : OMX_AUDIO_AMRBandModeWB0;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
pcmParams->nChannels = 1;
pcmParams->eNumData = OMX_NumericalDataSigned;
pcmParams->eEndian = OMX_EndianBig;
pcmParams->bInterleaved = OMX_TRUE;
pcmParams->nBitPerSample = 16;
pcmParams->nSamplingRate =
(mMode == MODE_NARROW) ? kSampleRateNB : kSampleRateWB;
pcmParams->ePCMMode = OMX_AUDIO_PCMModeLinear;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[0] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelLF;
pcmParams->eChannelMapping[1] = OMX_AUDIO_ChannelRF;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
Medium
| 174,192
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftOpus::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch ((int)index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_decoder.opus",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAndroidOpus:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_OPUSTYPE *opusParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_ANDROID_OPUSTYPE *)params;
if (opusParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow +Priv
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-06-01 does not validate OMX buffer sizes, which allows attackers to gain privileges via a crafted application, as demonstrated by obtaining Signature or SignatureOrSystem access, aka internal bug 27207275.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
|
Medium
| 174,217
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: xmlParseEntityRef(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
const xmlChar *name;
xmlEntityPtr ent = NULL;
GROW;
if (RAW != '&')
return(NULL);
NEXT;
name = xmlParseName(ctxt);
if (name == NULL) {
xmlFatalErrMsg(ctxt, XML_ERR_NAME_REQUIRED,
"xmlParseEntityRef: no name\n");
return(NULL);
}
if (RAW != ';') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITYREF_SEMICOL_MISSING, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
NEXT;
/*
* Predefined entites override any extra definition
*/
if ((ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLDSAX) == 0) {
ent = xmlGetPredefinedEntity(name);
if (ent != NULL)
return(ent);
}
/*
* Increate the number of entity references parsed
*/
ctxt->nbentities++;
/*
* Ask first SAX for entity resolution, otherwise try the
* entities which may have stored in the parser context.
*/
if (ctxt->sax != NULL) {
if (ctxt->sax->getEntity != NULL)
ent = ctxt->sax->getEntity(ctxt->userData, name);
if ((ctxt->wellFormed == 1 ) && (ent == NULL) &&
(ctxt->options & XML_PARSE_OLDSAX))
ent = xmlGetPredefinedEntity(name);
if ((ctxt->wellFormed == 1 ) && (ent == NULL) &&
(ctxt->userData==ctxt)) {
ent = xmlSAX2GetEntity(ctxt, name);
}
}
/*
* [ WFC: Entity Declared ]
* In a document without any DTD, a document with only an
* internal DTD subset which contains no parameter entity
* references, or a document with "standalone='yes'", the
* Name given in the entity reference must match that in an
* entity declaration, except that well-formed documents
* need not declare any of the following entities: amp, lt,
* gt, apos, quot.
* The declaration of a parameter entity must precede any
* reference to it.
* Similarly, the declaration of a general entity must
* precede any reference to it which appears in a default
* value in an attribute-list declaration. Note that if
* entities are declared in the external subset or in
* external parameter entities, a non-validating processor
* is not obligated to read and process their declarations;
* for such documents, the rule that an entity must be
* declared is a well-formedness constraint only if
* standalone='yes'.
*/
if (ent == NULL) {
if ((ctxt->standalone == 1) ||
((ctxt->hasExternalSubset == 0) &&
(ctxt->hasPErefs == 0))) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"Entity '%s' not defined\n", name);
} else {
xmlErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_WAR_UNDECLARED_ENTITY,
"Entity '%s' not defined\n", name);
if ((ctxt->inSubset == 0) &&
(ctxt->sax != NULL) &&
(ctxt->sax->reference != NULL)) {
ctxt->sax->reference(ctxt->userData, name);
}
}
ctxt->valid = 0;
}
/*
* [ WFC: Parsed Entity ]
* An entity reference must not contain the name of an
* unparsed entity
*/
else if (ent->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_UNPARSED_ENTITY) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_UNPARSED_ENTITY,
"Entity reference to unparsed entity %s\n", name);
}
/*
* [ WFC: No External Entity References ]
* Attribute values cannot contain direct or indirect
* entity references to external entities.
*/
else if ((ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE) &&
(ent->etype == XML_EXTERNAL_GENERAL_PARSED_ENTITY)) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_IS_EXTERNAL,
"Attribute references external entity '%s'\n", name);
}
/*
* [ WFC: No < in Attribute Values ]
* The replacement text of any entity referred to directly or
* indirectly in an attribute value (other than "<") must
* not contain a <.
*/
else if ((ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE) &&
(ent != NULL) && (ent->content != NULL) &&
(ent->etype != XML_INTERNAL_PREDEFINED_ENTITY) &&
(xmlStrchr(ent->content, '<'))) {
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_LT_IN_ATTRIBUTE,
"'<' in entity '%s' is not allowed in attributes values\n", name);
}
/*
* Internal check, no parameter entities here ...
*/
else {
switch (ent->etype) {
case XML_INTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY:
case XML_EXTERNAL_PARAMETER_ENTITY:
xmlFatalErrMsgStr(ctxt, XML_ERR_ENTITY_IS_PARAMETER,
"Attempt to reference the parameter entity '%s'\n",
name);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
/*
* [ WFC: No Recursion ]
* A parsed entity must not contain a recursive reference
* to itself, either directly or indirectly.
* Done somewhere else
*/
return(ent);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: parser.c in libxml2 before 2.9.0, as used in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 and other products, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a document that ends abruptly, related to the lack of certain checks for the XML_PARSER_EOF state.
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,289
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void sctp_assoc_update(struct sctp_association *asoc,
struct sctp_association *new)
{
struct sctp_transport *trans;
struct list_head *pos, *temp;
/* Copy in new parameters of peer. */
asoc->c = new->c;
asoc->peer.rwnd = new->peer.rwnd;
asoc->peer.sack_needed = new->peer.sack_needed;
asoc->peer.auth_capable = new->peer.auth_capable;
asoc->peer.i = new->peer.i;
sctp_tsnmap_init(&asoc->peer.tsn_map, SCTP_TSN_MAP_INITIAL,
asoc->peer.i.initial_tsn, GFP_ATOMIC);
/* Remove any peer addresses not present in the new association. */
list_for_each_safe(pos, temp, &asoc->peer.transport_addr_list) {
trans = list_entry(pos, struct sctp_transport, transports);
if (!sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(new, &trans->ipaddr)) {
sctp_assoc_rm_peer(asoc, trans);
continue;
}
if (asoc->state >= SCTP_STATE_ESTABLISHED)
sctp_transport_reset(trans);
}
/* If the case is A (association restart), use
* initial_tsn as next_tsn. If the case is B, use
* current next_tsn in case data sent to peer
* has been discarded and needs retransmission.
*/
if (asoc->state >= SCTP_STATE_ESTABLISHED) {
asoc->next_tsn = new->next_tsn;
asoc->ctsn_ack_point = new->ctsn_ack_point;
asoc->adv_peer_ack_point = new->adv_peer_ack_point;
/* Reinitialize SSN for both local streams
* and peer's streams.
*/
sctp_ssnmap_clear(asoc->ssnmap);
/* Flush the ULP reassembly and ordered queue.
* Any data there will now be stale and will
* cause problems.
*/
sctp_ulpq_flush(&asoc->ulpq);
/* reset the overall association error count so
* that the restarted association doesn't get torn
* down on the next retransmission timer.
*/
asoc->overall_error_count = 0;
} else {
/* Add any peer addresses from the new association. */
list_for_each_entry(trans, &new->peer.transport_addr_list,
transports) {
if (!sctp_assoc_lookup_paddr(asoc, &trans->ipaddr))
sctp_assoc_add_peer(asoc, &trans->ipaddr,
GFP_ATOMIC, trans->state);
}
asoc->ctsn_ack_point = asoc->next_tsn - 1;
asoc->adv_peer_ack_point = asoc->ctsn_ack_point;
if (!asoc->ssnmap) {
/* Move the ssnmap. */
asoc->ssnmap = new->ssnmap;
new->ssnmap = NULL;
}
if (!asoc->assoc_id) {
/* get a new association id since we don't have one
* yet.
*/
sctp_assoc_set_id(asoc, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
}
/* SCTP-AUTH: Save the peer parameters from the new associations
* and also move the association shared keys over
*/
kfree(asoc->peer.peer_random);
asoc->peer.peer_random = new->peer.peer_random;
new->peer.peer_random = NULL;
kfree(asoc->peer.peer_chunks);
asoc->peer.peer_chunks = new->peer.peer_chunks;
new->peer.peer_chunks = NULL;
kfree(asoc->peer.peer_hmacs);
asoc->peer.peer_hmacs = new->peer.peer_hmacs;
new->peer.peer_hmacs = NULL;
sctp_auth_key_put(asoc->asoc_shared_key);
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(asoc, GFP_ATOMIC);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the sctp_assoc_update function in net/sctp/associola.c in the Linux kernel before 3.18.8 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (slab corruption and panic) or possibly have unspecified other impact by triggering an INIT collision that leads to improper handling of shared-key data.
Commit Message: net: sctp: fix slab corruption from use after free on INIT collisions
When hitting an INIT collision case during the 4WHS with AUTH enabled, as
already described in detail in commit 1be9a950c646 ("net: sctp: inherit
auth_capable on INIT collisions"), it can happen that we occasionally
still remotely trigger the following panic on server side which seems to
have been uncovered after the fix from commit 1be9a950c646 ...
[ 533.876389] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff
[ 533.913657] IP: [<ffffffff811ac385>] __kmalloc+0x95/0x230
[ 533.940559] PGD 5030f2067 PUD 0
[ 533.957104] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 533.974283] Modules linked in: sctp mlx4_en [...]
[ 534.939704] Call Trace:
[ 534.951833] [<ffffffff81294e30>] ? crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0
[ 534.984213] [<ffffffff81294e30>] crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0
[ 535.015025] [<ffffffff8128c8ed>] __crypto_alloc_tfm+0x6d/0x170
[ 535.045661] [<ffffffff8128d12c>] crypto_alloc_base+0x4c/0xb0
[ 535.074593] [<ffffffff8160bd42>] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x12/0x50
[ 535.105239] [<ffffffffa0418c11>] sctp_inet_listen+0x161/0x1e0 [sctp]
[ 535.138606] [<ffffffff814e43bd>] SyS_listen+0x9d/0xb0
[ 535.166848] [<ffffffff816149a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
... or depending on the the application, for example this one:
[ 1370.026490] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff
[ 1370.026506] IP: [<ffffffff811ab455>] kmem_cache_alloc+0x75/0x1d0
[ 1370.054568] PGD 633c94067 PUD 0
[ 1370.070446] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
[ 1370.085010] Modules linked in: sctp kvm_amd kvm [...]
[ 1370.963431] Call Trace:
[ 1370.974632] [<ffffffff8120f7cf>] ? SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960
[ 1371.000863] [<ffffffff8120f7cf>] SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960
[ 1371.027154] [<ffffffff812100d3>] ? anon_inode_getfile+0xd3/0x170
[ 1371.054679] [<ffffffff811e3d67>] ? __alloc_fd+0xa7/0x130
[ 1371.080183] [<ffffffff816149a9>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
With slab debugging enabled, we can see that the poison has been overwritten:
[ 669.826368] BUG kmalloc-128 (Tainted: G W ): Poison overwritten
[ 669.826385] INFO: 0xffff880228b32e50-0xffff880228b32e50. First byte 0x6a instead of 0x6b
[ 669.826414] INFO: Allocated in sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp] age=3 cpu=0 pid=18494
[ 669.826424] __slab_alloc+0x4bf/0x566
[ 669.826433] __kmalloc+0x280/0x310
[ 669.826453] sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp]
[ 669.826471] sctp_auth_asoc_create_secret+0xcb/0x1e0 [sctp]
[ 669.826488] sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key+0x68/0xa0 [sctp]
[ 669.826505] sctp_do_sm+0x29d/0x17c0 [sctp] [...]
[ 669.826629] INFO: Freed in kzfree+0x31/0x40 age=1 cpu=0 pid=18494
[ 669.826635] __slab_free+0x39/0x2a8
[ 669.826643] kfree+0x1d6/0x230
[ 669.826650] kzfree+0x31/0x40
[ 669.826666] sctp_auth_key_put+0x19/0x20 [sctp]
[ 669.826681] sctp_assoc_update+0x1ee/0x2d0 [sctp]
[ 669.826695] sctp_do_sm+0x674/0x17c0 [sctp]
Since this only triggers in some collision-cases with AUTH, the problem at
heart is that sctp_auth_key_put() on asoc->asoc_shared_key is called twice
when having refcnt 1, once directly in sctp_assoc_update() and yet again
from within sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() via sctp_assoc_update() on
the already kzfree'd memory, which is also consistent with the observation
of the poison decrease from 0x6b to 0x6a (note: the overwrite is detected
at a later point in time when poison is checked on new allocation).
Reference counting of auth keys revisited:
Shared keys for AUTH chunks are being stored in endpoints and associations
in endpoint_shared_keys list. On endpoint creation, a null key is being
added; on association creation, all endpoint shared keys are being cached
and thus cloned over to the association. struct sctp_shared_key only holds
a pointer to the actual key bytes, that is, struct sctp_auth_bytes which
keeps track of users internally through refcounting. Naturally, on assoc
or enpoint destruction, sctp_shared_key are being destroyed directly and
the reference on sctp_auth_bytes dropped.
User space can add keys to either list via setsockopt(2) through struct
sctp_authkey and by passing that to sctp_auth_set_key() which replaces or
adds a new auth key. There, sctp_auth_create_key() creates a new sctp_auth_bytes
with refcount 1 and in case of replacement drops the reference on the old
sctp_auth_bytes. A key can be set active from user space through setsockopt()
on the id via sctp_auth_set_active_key(), which iterates through either
endpoint_shared_keys and in case of an assoc, invokes (one of various places)
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key().
sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() computes the actual secret from local's
and peer's random, hmac and shared key parameters and returns a new key
directly as sctp_auth_bytes, that is asoc->asoc_shared_key, plus drops
the reference if there was a previous one. The secret, which where we
eventually double drop the ref comes from sctp_auth_asoc_set_secret() with
intitial refcount of 1, which also stays unchanged eventually in
sctp_assoc_update(). This key is later being used for crypto layer to
set the key for the hash in crypto_hash_setkey() from sctp_auth_calculate_hmac().
To close the loop: asoc->asoc_shared_key is freshly allocated secret
material and independant of the sctp_shared_key management keeping track
of only shared keys in endpoints and assocs. Hence, also commit 4184b2a79a76
("net: sctp: fix memory leak in auth key management") is independant of
this bug here since it concerns a different layer (though same structures
being used eventually). asoc->asoc_shared_key is reference dropped correctly
on assoc destruction in sctp_association_free() and when active keys are
being replaced in sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(), it always has a refcount
of 1. Hence, it's freed prematurely in sctp_assoc_update(). Simple fix is
to remove that sctp_auth_key_put() from there which fixes these panics.
Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing")
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,700
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: gsm_xsmp_client_disconnect (GsmXSMPClient *client)
{
if (client->priv->watch_id > 0) {
g_source_remove (client->priv->watch_id);
}
if (client->priv->conn != NULL) {
SmsCleanUp (client->priv->conn);
}
if (client->priv->ice_connection != NULL) {
IceSetShutdownNegotiation (client->priv->ice_connection, FALSE);
IceCloseConnection (client->priv->ice_connection);
}
if (client->priv->protocol_timeout > 0) {
g_source_remove (client->priv->protocol_timeout);
}
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: Bad reference counting in the context of accept_ice_connection() in gsm-xsmp-server.c in old versions of gnome-session up until version 2.29.92 allows a local attacker to establish ICE connections to gnome-session with invalid authentication data (an invalid magic cookie). Each failed authentication attempt will leak a file descriptor in gnome-session. When the maximum number of file descriptors is exhausted in the gnome-session process, it will enter an infinite loop trying to communicate without success, consuming 100% of the CPU. The graphical session associated with the gnome-session process will stop working correctly, because communication with gnome-session is no longer possible.
Commit Message: [gsm] Delay the creation of the GsmXSMPClient until it really exists
We used to create the GsmXSMPClient before the XSMP connection is really
accepted. This can lead to some issues, though. An example is:
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211#c19. Quoting:
"What is happening is that a new client (probably metacity in your
case) is opening an ICE connection in the GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_END_SESSION
phase, which causes a new GsmXSMPClient to be added to the client
store. The GSM_MANAGER_PHASE_EXIT phase then begins before the client
has had a chance to establish a xsmp connection, which means that
client->priv->conn will not be initialized at the point that xsmp_stop
is called on the new unregistered client."
The fix is to create the GsmXSMPClient object when there's a real XSMP
connection. This implies moving the timeout that makes sure we don't
have an empty client to the XSMP server.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=598211
|
Low
| 168,050
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void InsertRow(Image *image,ssize_t depth,unsigned char *p,ssize_t y,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
size_t bit; ssize_t x;
register Quantum *q;
Quantum index;
index=0;
switch (depth)
{
case 1: /* Convert bitmap scanline. */
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
index=(Quantum) ((((*p) & (0x80 >> bit)) != 0) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
index=(Quantum) ((((*p) & (0x80 >> bit)) != 0) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
p++;
}
(void) SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception);
break;
}
case 2: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 6) & 0x3,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x3,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 2) & 0x3,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p) & 0x3,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 4) != 0)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 6) & 0x3,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
if ((image->columns % 4) >= 1)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x3,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
if ((image->columns % 4) >= 2)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 2) & 0x3,
exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
}
p++;
}
(void) SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception);
break;
}
case 4: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0xf,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p) & 0xf,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0xf,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
p++;
}
(void) SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception);
break;
}
case 8: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (Quantum *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,*p,exception);
SetPixelIndex(image,index,q);
p++;
q+=GetPixelChannels(image);
}
(void) SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception);
break;
}
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: The function InsertRow in coders/cut.c in ImageMagick 7.0.7-37 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted image file due to an out-of-bounds write.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1162
|
Medium
| 169,042
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline void x86_assign_hw_event(struct perf_event *event,
struct cpu_hw_events *cpuc, int i)
{
struct hw_perf_event *hwc = &event->hw;
hwc->idx = cpuc->assign[i];
hwc->last_cpu = smp_processor_id();
hwc->last_tag = ++cpuc->tags[i];
if (hwc->idx == X86_PMC_IDX_FIXED_BTS) {
hwc->config_base = 0;
hwc->event_base = 0;
} else if (hwc->idx >= X86_PMC_IDX_FIXED) {
hwc->config_base = MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_FIXED_CTR_CTRL;
hwc->event_base = MSR_ARCH_PERFMON_FIXED_CTR0;
} else {
hwc->config_base = x86_pmu_config_addr(hwc->idx);
hwc->event_base = x86_pmu_event_addr(hwc->idx);
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The x86_assign_hw_event function in arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event.c in the Performance Events subsystem in the Linux kernel before 2.6.39 does not properly calculate counter values, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (panic) via the perf program.
Commit Message: perf, x86: Fix Intel fixed counters base initialization
The following patch solves the problems introduced by Robert's
commit 41bf498 and reported by Arun Sharma. This commit gets rid
of the base + index notation for reading and writing PMU msrs.
The problem is that for fixed counters, the new calculation for
the base did not take into account the fixed counter indexes,
thus all fixed counters were read/written from fixed counter 0.
Although all fixed counters share the same config MSR, they each
have their own counter register.
Without:
$ task -e unhalted_core_cycles -e instructions_retired -e baclears noploop 1 noploop for 1 seconds
242202299 unhalted_core_cycles (0.00% scaling, ena=1000790892, run=1000790892)
2389685946 instructions_retired (0.00% scaling, ena=1000790892, run=1000790892)
49473 baclears (0.00% scaling, ena=1000790892, run=1000790892)
With:
$ task -e unhalted_core_cycles -e instructions_retired -e baclears noploop 1 noploop for 1 seconds
2392703238 unhalted_core_cycles (0.00% scaling, ena=1000840809, run=1000840809)
2389793744 instructions_retired (0.00% scaling, ena=1000840809, run=1000840809)
47863 baclears (0.00% scaling, ena=1000840809, run=1000840809)
Signed-off-by: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Cc: peterz@infradead.org
Cc: ming.m.lin@intel.com
Cc: robert.richter@amd.com
Cc: asharma@fb.com
Cc: perfmon2-devel@lists.sf.net
LKML-Reference: <20110319172005.GB4978@quad>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
|
Low
| 165,855
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PlatformNotificationData ToPlatformNotificationData(
const WebNotificationData& web_data) {
PlatformNotificationData platform_data;
platform_data.title = web_data.title;
switch (web_data.direction) {
case WebNotificationData::DirectionLeftToRight:
platform_data.direction =
PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_LEFT_TO_RIGHT;
break;
case WebNotificationData::DirectionRightToLeft:
platform_data.direction =
PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_RIGHT_TO_LEFT;
break;
case WebNotificationData::DirectionAuto:
platform_data.direction = PlatformNotificationData::DIRECTION_AUTO;
break;
}
platform_data.lang = base::UTF16ToUTF8(base::StringPiece16(web_data.lang));
platform_data.body = web_data.body;
platform_data.tag = base::UTF16ToUTF8(base::StringPiece16(web_data.tag));
platform_data.icon = blink::WebStringToGURL(web_data.icon.string());
platform_data.vibration_pattern.assign(web_data.vibrate.begin(),
web_data.vibrate.end());
platform_data.timestamp = base::Time::FromJsTime(web_data.timestamp);
platform_data.silent = web_data.silent;
platform_data.require_interaction = web_data.requireInteraction;
platform_data.data.assign(web_data.data.begin(), web_data.data.end());
platform_data.actions.resize(web_data.actions.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < web_data.actions.size(); ++i) {
platform_data.actions[i].action =
base::UTF16ToUTF8(base::StringPiece16(web_data.actions[i].action));
platform_data.actions[i].title = web_data.actions[i].title;
}
return platform_data;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Multiple unspecified vulnerabilities in Google Chrome before 35.0.1916.114 allow attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have other impact via unknown vectors.
Commit Message: Notification actions may have an icon url.
This is behind a runtime flag for two reasons:
* The implementation is incomplete.
* We're still evaluating the API design.
Intent to Implement and Ship: Notification Action Icons
https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/blink-dev/IM0HxOP7HOA/y8tu6iq1CgAJ
BUG=581336
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1644573002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374649}
|
Low
| 171,631
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void jas_seq2d_bindsub(jas_matrix_t *s, jas_matrix_t *s1, int xstart,
int ystart, int xend, int yend)
{
jas_matrix_bindsub(s, s1, ystart - s1->ystart_, xstart - s1->xstart_,
yend - s1->ystart_ - 1, xend - s1->xstart_ - 1);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in jas_image.c in JasPer before 1.900.25 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: The generation of the configuration file jas_config.h has been completely
reworked in order to avoid pollution of the global namespace.
Some problematic types like uchar, ulong, and friends have been replaced
with names with a jas_ prefix.
An option max_samples has been added to the BMP and JPEG decoders to
restrict the maximum size of image that they can decode. This change
was made as a (possibly temporary) fix to address security concerns.
A max_samples command-line option has also been added to imginfo.
Whether an image component (for jas_image_t) is stored in memory or on
disk is now based on the component size (rather than the image size).
Some debug log message were added.
Some new integer overflow checks were added.
Some new safe integer add/multiply functions were added.
More pre-C99 cruft was removed. JasPer has numerous "hacks" to
handle pre-C99 compilers. JasPer now assumes C99 support. So, this
pre-C99 cruft is unnecessary and can be removed.
The regression jasper-doublefree-mem_close.jpg has been re-enabled.
Theoretically, it should work more predictably now.
|
Medium
| 168,707
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int dns_read_name(unsigned char *buffer, unsigned char *bufend,
unsigned char *name, char *destination, int dest_len,
int *offset)
{
int nb_bytes = 0, n = 0;
int label_len;
unsigned char *reader = name;
char *dest = destination;
while (1) {
/* Name compression is in use */
if ((*reader & 0xc0) == 0xc0) {
/* Must point BEFORE current position */
if ((buffer + reader[1]) > reader)
goto err;
n = dns_read_name(buffer, bufend, buffer + reader[1],
dest, dest_len - nb_bytes, offset);
if (n == 0)
goto err;
}
label_len = *reader;
if (label_len == 0)
goto out;
/* Check if:
* - we won't read outside the buffer
* - there is enough place in the destination
*/
if ((reader + label_len >= bufend) || (nb_bytes + label_len >= dest_len))
goto err;
/* +1 to take label len + label string */
label_len++;
memcpy(dest, reader, label_len);
dest += label_len;
nb_bytes += label_len;
reader += label_len;
}
out:
/* offset computation:
* parse from <name> until finding either NULL or a pointer "c0xx"
*/
reader = name;
*offset = 0;
while (reader < bufend) {
if ((reader[0] & 0xc0) == 0xc0) {
*offset += 2;
break;
}
else if (*reader == 0) {
*offset += 1;
break;
}
*offset += 1;
++reader;
}
return nb_bytes;
err:
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-835
Summary: An issue was discovered in dns.c in HAProxy through 1.8.14. In the case of a compressed pointer, a crafted packet can trigger infinite recursion by making the pointer point to itself, or create a long chain of valid pointers resulting in stack exhaustion.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,599
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static inline void set_socket_blocking(int s, int blocking)
{
int opts;
opts = fcntl(s, F_GETFL);
if (opts<0) APPL_TRACE_ERROR("set blocking (%s)", strerror(errno));
if(blocking)
opts &= ~O_NONBLOCK;
else opts |= O_NONBLOCK;
if (fcntl(s, F_SETFL, opts) < 0)
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("set blocking (%s)", strerror(errno));
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: Bluetooth in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, and 6.x before 2016-08-01 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (loss of Bluetooth 911 functionality) via a crafted application that sends a signal to a Bluetooth process, aka internal bug 28885210.
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
|
Medium
| 173,466
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void IBusBusGlobalEngineChangedCallback(
IBusBus* bus, const gchar* engine_name, gpointer user_data) {
DCHECK(engine_name);
DLOG(INFO) << "Global engine is changed to " << engine_name;
g_return_if_fail(user_data);
InputMethodStatusConnection* self
= static_cast<InputMethodStatusConnection*>(user_data);
self->UpdateUI(engine_name);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Google Chrome before 13.0.782.107 does not properly handle nested functions in PDF documents, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (application crash) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted document.
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,538
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: cJSON *cJSON_CreateInt( int64_t num )
{
cJSON *item = cJSON_New_Item();
if ( item ) {
item->type = cJSON_Number;
item->valuefloat = num;
item->valueint = num;
}
return item;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The parse_string function in cjson.c in the cJSON library mishandles UTF8/16 strings, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via a non-hex character in a JSON string, which triggers a heap-based buffer overflow.
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
|
Low
| 167,274
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PassRefPtr<SharedBuffer> readFile(const char* fileName)
{
String filePath = Platform::current()->unitTestSupport()->webKitRootDir();
filePath.append(fileName);
return Platform::current()->unitTestSupport()->readFromFile(filePath);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the GIFImageReader::parseData function in platform/image-decoders/gif/GIFImageReader.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 41.0.2272.76, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted frame size in a GIF image.
Commit Message: Fix handling of broken GIFs with weird frame sizes
Code didn't handle well if a GIF frame has dimension greater than the
"screen" dimension. This will break deferred image decoding.
This change reports the size as final only when the first frame is
encountered.
Added a test to verify this behavior. Frame size reported by the decoder
should be constant.
BUG=437651
R=pkasting@chromium.org, senorblanco@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/813943003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@188423 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Medium
| 172,026
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int dccp_print_option(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *option, u_int hlen)
{
uint8_t optlen, i;
ND_TCHECK(*option);
if (*option >= 32) {
ND_TCHECK(*(option+1));
optlen = *(option +1);
if (optlen < 2) {
if (*option >= 128)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CCID option %u optlen too short", *option));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s optlen too short",
tok2str(dccp_option_values, "Option %u", *option)));
return 0;
}
} else
optlen = 1;
if (hlen < optlen) {
if (*option >= 128)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CCID option %u optlen goes past header length",
*option));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s optlen goes past header length",
tok2str(dccp_option_values, "Option %u", *option)));
return 0;
}
ND_TCHECK2(*option, optlen);
if (*option >= 128) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "CCID option %d", *option));
switch (optlen) {
case 4:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(option + 2)));
break;
case 6:
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
break;
default:
break;
}
} else {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tok2str(dccp_option_values, "Option %u", *option)));
switch (*option) {
case 32:
case 33:
case 34:
case 35:
if (optlen < 3) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " optlen too short"));
return optlen;
}
if (*(option + 2) < 10){
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %s", dccp_feature_nums[*(option + 2)]));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 3; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %d", *(option + 3 + i)));
}
break;
case 36:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
case 37:
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %d", *(option + 2 + i)));
break;
case 38:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
case 39:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
case 40:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " 0x"));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
case 41:
if (optlen == 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " optlen != 4"));
break;
case 42:
if (optlen == 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " optlen != 4"));
break;
case 43:
if (optlen == 6)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_32BITS(option + 2)));
else if (optlen == 4)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " %u", EXTRACT_16BITS(option + 2)));
else
ND_PRINT((ndo, " optlen != 4 or 6"));
break;
case 44:
if (optlen > 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " "));
for (i = 0; i < optlen - 2; i++)
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%02x", *(option + 2 + i)));
}
break;
}
}
return optlen;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The DCCP parser in tcpdump before 4.9.3 has a buffer over-read in print-dccp.c:dccp_print_option().
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-16229/DCCP: Fix printing "Timestamp" and "Timestamp Echo" options
Add some comments.
Moreover:
Put a function definition name at the beginning of the line.
(This change was ported from commit 6df4852 in the master branch.)
Ryan Ackroyd had independently identified this buffer over-read later by
means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture file for the test.
|
Low
| 169,819
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: status_t OMXCodec::allocateBuffersOnPort(OMX_U32 portIndex) {
if (mNativeWindow != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexOutput) {
return allocateOutputBuffersFromNativeWindow();
}
if ((mFlags & kEnableGrallocUsageProtected) && portIndex == kPortIndexOutput) {
ALOGE("protected output buffers must be stent to an ANativeWindow");
return PERMISSION_DENIED;
}
status_t err = OK;
if ((mFlags & kStoreMetaDataInVideoBuffers)
&& portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
err = mOMX->storeMetaDataInBuffers(mNode, kPortIndexInput, OMX_TRUE);
if (err != OK) {
ALOGE("Storing meta data in video buffers is not supported");
return err;
}
}
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE def;
InitOMXParams(&def);
def.nPortIndex = portIndex;
err = mOMX->getParameter(
mNode, OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition, &def, sizeof(def));
if (err != OK) {
return err;
}
CODEC_LOGV("allocating %u buffers of size %u on %s port",
def.nBufferCountActual, def.nBufferSize,
portIndex == kPortIndexInput ? "input" : "output");
if (def.nBufferSize != 0 && def.nBufferCountActual > SIZE_MAX / def.nBufferSize) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
size_t totalSize = def.nBufferCountActual * def.nBufferSize;
mDealer[portIndex] = new MemoryDealer(totalSize, "OMXCodec");
for (OMX_U32 i = 0; i < def.nBufferCountActual; ++i) {
sp<IMemory> mem = mDealer[portIndex]->allocate(def.nBufferSize);
CHECK(mem.get() != NULL);
BufferInfo info;
info.mData = NULL;
info.mSize = def.nBufferSize;
IOMX::buffer_id buffer;
if (portIndex == kPortIndexInput
&& ((mQuirks & kRequiresAllocateBufferOnInputPorts)
|| (mFlags & kUseSecureInputBuffers))) {
if (mOMXLivesLocally) {
mem.clear();
err = mOMX->allocateBuffer(
mNode, portIndex, def.nBufferSize, &buffer,
&info.mData);
} else {
err = mOMX->allocateBufferWithBackup(
mNode, portIndex, mem, &buffer, mem->size());
}
} else if (portIndex == kPortIndexOutput
&& (mQuirks & kRequiresAllocateBufferOnOutputPorts)) {
if (mOMXLivesLocally) {
mem.clear();
err = mOMX->allocateBuffer(
mNode, portIndex, def.nBufferSize, &buffer,
&info.mData);
} else {
err = mOMX->allocateBufferWithBackup(
mNode, portIndex, mem, &buffer, mem->size());
}
} else {
err = mOMX->useBuffer(mNode, portIndex, mem, &buffer, mem->size());
}
if (err != OK) {
ALOGE("allocate_buffer_with_backup failed");
return err;
}
if (mem != NULL) {
info.mData = mem->pointer();
}
info.mBuffer = buffer;
info.mStatus = OWNED_BY_US;
info.mMem = mem;
info.mMediaBuffer = NULL;
if (portIndex == kPortIndexOutput) {
LOG_ALWAYS_FATAL_IF((mOMXLivesLocally
&& (mQuirks & kRequiresAllocateBufferOnOutputPorts)
&& (mQuirks & kDefersOutputBufferAllocation)),
"allocateBuffersOnPort cannot defer buffer allocation");
info.mMediaBuffer = new MediaBuffer(info.mData, info.mSize);
info.mMediaBuffer->setObserver(this);
}
mPortBuffers[portIndex].push(info);
CODEC_LOGV("allocated buffer %u on %s port", buffer,
portIndex == kPortIndexInput ? "input" : "output");
}
if (portIndex == kPortIndexOutput) {
sp<MetaData> meta = mSource->getFormat();
int32_t delay = 0;
if (!meta->findInt32(kKeyEncoderDelay, &delay)) {
delay = 0;
}
int32_t padding = 0;
if (!meta->findInt32(kKeyEncoderPadding, &padding)) {
padding = 0;
}
int32_t numchannels = 0;
if (delay + padding) {
if (mOutputFormat->findInt32(kKeyChannelCount, &numchannels)) {
size_t frameSize = numchannels * sizeof(int16_t);
if (mSkipCutBuffer != NULL) {
size_t prevbuffersize = mSkipCutBuffer->size();
if (prevbuffersize != 0) {
ALOGW("Replacing SkipCutBuffer holding %zu bytes", prevbuffersize);
}
}
mSkipCutBuffer = new SkipCutBuffer(delay * frameSize, padding * frameSize);
}
}
}
if (portIndex == kPortIndexInput && (mFlags & kUseSecureInputBuffers)) {
Vector<MediaBuffer *> buffers;
for (size_t i = 0; i < def.nBufferCountActual; ++i) {
const BufferInfo &info = mPortBuffers[kPortIndexInput].itemAt(i);
MediaBuffer *mbuf = new MediaBuffer(info.mData, info.mSize);
buffers.push(mbuf);
}
status_t err = mSource->setBuffers(buffers);
if (err != OK) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < def.nBufferCountActual; ++i) {
buffers.editItemAt(i)->release();
}
buffers.clear();
CODEC_LOGE(
"Codec requested to use secure input buffers but "
"upstream source didn't support that.");
return err;
}
}
return OK;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-284
Summary: OMXCodec.cpp in libstagefright in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.0.x before 5.0.2, 5.1.x before 5.1.1, 6.x before 2016-09-01, and 7.0 before 2016-09-01 does not validate a certain pointer, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (device hang or reboot) via a crafted media file, aka internal bug 29421811.
Commit Message: OMXCodec: check IMemory::pointer() before using allocation
Bug: 29421811
Change-Id: I0a73ba12bae4122f1d89fc92e5ea4f6a96cd1ed1
|
Medium
| 173,404
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: IntRect PopupContainer::layoutAndCalculateWidgetRect(int targetControlHeight, const IntPoint& popupInitialCoordinate)
{
m_listBox->setMaxHeight(kMaxHeight);
m_listBox->setMaxWidth(std::numeric_limits<int>::max());
int rtlOffset = layoutAndGetRTLOffset();
bool isRTL = this->isRTL();
int rightOffset = isRTL ? rtlOffset : 0;
IntSize targetSize(m_listBox->width() + kBorderSize * 2,
m_listBox->height() + kBorderSize * 2);
IntRect widgetRect;
ChromeClientChromium* chromeClient = chromeClientChromium();
if (chromeClient) {
FloatRect screen = screenAvailableRect(m_frameView.get());
widgetRect = chromeClient->rootViewToScreen(IntRect(popupInitialCoordinate.x() + rightOffset, popupInitialCoordinate.y(), targetSize.width(), targetSize.height()));
FloatRect windowRect = chromeClient->windowRect();
if (windowRect.x() >= screen.x() && windowRect.maxX() <= screen.maxX() && (widgetRect.x() < screen.x() || widgetRect.maxX() > screen.maxX())) {
IntRect inverseWidgetRect = chromeClient->rootViewToScreen(IntRect(popupInitialCoordinate.x() + (isRTL ? 0 : rtlOffset), popupInitialCoordinate.y(), targetSize.width(), targetSize.height()));
IntRect enclosingScreen = enclosingIntRect(screen);
unsigned originalCutoff = max(enclosingScreen.x() - widgetRect.x(), 0) + max(widgetRect.maxX() - enclosingScreen.maxX(), 0);
unsigned inverseCutoff = max(enclosingScreen.x() - inverseWidgetRect.x(), 0) + max(inverseWidgetRect.maxX() - enclosingScreen.maxX(), 0);
if (inverseCutoff < originalCutoff)
widgetRect = inverseWidgetRect;
if (widgetRect.x() < screen.x()) {
unsigned widgetRight = widgetRect.maxX();
widgetRect.setWidth(widgetRect.maxX() - screen.x());
widgetRect.setX(widgetRight - widgetRect.width());
listBox()->setMaxWidthAndLayout(max(widgetRect.width() - kBorderSize * 2, 0));
} else if (widgetRect.maxX() > screen.maxX()) {
widgetRect.setWidth(screen.maxX() - widgetRect.x());
listBox()->setMaxWidthAndLayout(max(widgetRect.width() - kBorderSize * 2, 0));
}
}
if (widgetRect.maxY() > static_cast<int>(screen.maxY())) {
if (widgetRect.y() - widgetRect.height() - targetControlHeight > 0) {
widgetRect.move(0, -(widgetRect.height() + targetControlHeight));
} else {
int spaceAbove = widgetRect.y() - targetControlHeight;
int spaceBelow = screen.maxY() - widgetRect.y();
if (spaceAbove > spaceBelow)
m_listBox->setMaxHeight(spaceAbove);
else
m_listBox->setMaxHeight(spaceBelow);
layoutAndGetRTLOffset();
IntRect frameInScreen = chromeClient->rootViewToScreen(frameRect());
widgetRect.setY(frameInScreen.y());
widgetRect.setHeight(frameInScreen.height());
if (spaceAbove > spaceBelow)
widgetRect.move(0, -(widgetRect.height() + targetControlHeight));
}
}
}
return widgetRect;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Autofill feature in Google Chrome before 19.0.1084.46 does not properly restrict field values, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (UI corruption) and possibly conduct spoofing attacks via vectors involving long values.
Commit Message: [REGRESSION] Refreshed autofill popup renders garbage
https://bugs.webkit.org/show_bug.cgi?id=83255
http://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=118374
The code used to update only the PopupContainer coordinates as if they were the coordinates relative
to the root view. Instead, a WebWidget positioned relative to the screen origin holds the PopupContainer,
so it is the WebWidget that should be positioned in PopupContainer::refresh(), and the PopupContainer's
location should be (0, 0) (and their sizes should always be equal).
Reviewed by Kent Tamura.
No new tests, as the popup appearance is not testable in WebKit.
* platform/chromium/PopupContainer.cpp:
(WebCore::PopupContainer::layoutAndCalculateWidgetRect): Variable renamed.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::showPopup): Use m_originalFrameRect rather than frameRect()
for passing into chromeClient.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::showInRect): Set up the correct frameRect() for the container.
(WebCore::PopupContainer::refresh): Resize the container and position the WebWidget correctly.
* platform/chromium/PopupContainer.h:
(PopupContainer):
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@113418 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
|
Low
| 171,026
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int atusb_get_and_show_build(struct atusb *atusb)
{
struct usb_device *usb_dev = atusb->usb_dev;
char build[ATUSB_BUILD_SIZE + 1];
int ret;
ret = atusb_control_msg(atusb, usb_rcvctrlpipe(usb_dev, 0),
ATUSB_BUILD, ATUSB_REQ_FROM_DEV, 0, 0,
build, ATUSB_BUILD_SIZE, 1000);
if (ret >= 0) {
build[ret] = 0;
dev_info(&usb_dev->dev, "Firmware: build %s\n", build);
}
return ret;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: drivers/net/ieee802154/atusb.c in the Linux kernel 4.9.x before 4.9.6 interacts incorrectly with the CONFIG_VMAP_STACK option, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (system crash or memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging use of more than one virtual page for a DMA scatterlist.
Commit Message: ieee802154: atusb: do not use the stack for buffers to make them DMA able
From 4.9 we should really avoid using the stack here as this will not be DMA
able on various platforms. This changes the buffers already being present in
time of 4.9 being released. This should go into stable as well.
Reported-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Stefan Schmidt <stefan@osg.samsung.com>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
|
Low
| 168,390
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int adjust_scalar_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
struct bpf_reg_state src_reg)
{
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
bool src_known, dst_known;
s64 smin_val, smax_val;
u64 umin_val, umax_val;
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) != BPF_ALU64) {
/* 32-bit ALU ops are (32,32)->64 */
coerce_reg_to_32(dst_reg);
coerce_reg_to_32(&src_reg);
}
smin_val = src_reg.smin_value;
smax_val = src_reg.smax_value;
umin_val = src_reg.umin_value;
umax_val = src_reg.umax_value;
src_known = tnum_is_const(src_reg.var_off);
dst_known = tnum_is_const(dst_reg->var_off);
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_ADD:
if (signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smin_val) ||
signed_add_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smax_val)) {
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value += smin_val;
dst_reg->smax_value += smax_val;
}
if (dst_reg->umin_value + umin_val < umin_val ||
dst_reg->umax_value + umax_val < umax_val) {
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->umin_value += umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value += umax_val;
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_add(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
break;
case BPF_SUB:
if (signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smin_value, smax_val) ||
signed_sub_overflows(dst_reg->smax_value, smin_val)) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value -= smax_val;
dst_reg->smax_value -= smin_val;
}
if (dst_reg->umin_value < umax_val) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
/* Cannot overflow (as long as bounds are consistent) */
dst_reg->umin_value -= umax_val;
dst_reg->umax_value -= umin_val;
}
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_sub(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
break;
case BPF_MUL:
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_mul(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
if (smin_val < 0 || dst_reg->smin_value < 0) {
/* Ain't nobody got time to multiply that sign */
__mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg);
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
}
/* Both values are positive, so we can work with unsigned and
* copy the result to signed (unless it exceeds S64_MAX).
*/
if (umax_val > U32_MAX || dst_reg->umax_value > U32_MAX) {
/* Potential overflow, we know nothing */
__mark_reg_unbounded(dst_reg);
/* (except what we can learn from the var_off) */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
}
dst_reg->umin_value *= umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value *= umax_val;
if (dst_reg->umax_value > S64_MAX) {
/* Overflow possible, we know nothing */
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
break;
case BPF_AND:
if (src_known && dst_known) {
__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value &
src_reg.var_off.value);
break;
}
/* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently
* bitwise. Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima.
*/
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_and(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
dst_reg->umin_value = dst_reg->var_off.value;
dst_reg->umax_value = min(dst_reg->umax_value, umax_val);
if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
/* Lose signed bounds when ANDing negative numbers,
* ain't nobody got time for that.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
/* ANDing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
* cast result into s64.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_OR:
if (src_known && dst_known) {
__mark_reg_known(dst_reg, dst_reg->var_off.value |
src_reg.var_off.value);
break;
}
/* We get our maximum from the var_off, and our minimum is the
* maximum of the operands' minima
*/
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_or(dst_reg->var_off, src_reg.var_off);
dst_reg->umin_value = max(dst_reg->umin_value, umin_val);
dst_reg->umax_value = dst_reg->var_off.value |
dst_reg->var_off.mask;
if (dst_reg->smin_value < 0 || smin_val < 0) {
/* Lose signed bounds when ORing negative numbers,
* ain't nobody got time for that.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
} else {
/* ORing two positives gives a positive, so safe to
* cast result into s64.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = dst_reg->umin_value;
dst_reg->smax_value = dst_reg->umax_value;
}
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_LSH:
if (umax_val > 63) {
/* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined. This includes
* shifts by a negative number.
*/
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
/* We lose all sign bit information (except what we can pick
* up from var_off)
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
/* If we might shift our top bit out, then we know nothing */
if (dst_reg->umax_value > 1ULL << (63 - umax_val)) {
dst_reg->umin_value = 0;
dst_reg->umax_value = U64_MAX;
} else {
dst_reg->umin_value <<= umin_val;
dst_reg->umax_value <<= umax_val;
}
if (src_known)
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(dst_reg->var_off, umin_val);
else
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_lshift(tnum_unknown, umin_val);
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
case BPF_RSH:
if (umax_val > 63) {
/* Shifts greater than 63 are undefined. This includes
* shifts by a negative number.
*/
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
/* BPF_RSH is an unsigned shift. If the value in dst_reg might
* be negative, then either:
* 1) src_reg might be zero, so the sign bit of the result is
* unknown, so we lose our signed bounds
* 2) it's known negative, thus the unsigned bounds capture the
* signed bounds
* 3) the signed bounds cross zero, so they tell us nothing
* about the result
* If the value in dst_reg is known nonnegative, then again the
* unsigned bounts capture the signed bounds.
* Thus, in all cases it suffices to blow away our signed bounds
* and rely on inferring new ones from the unsigned bounds and
* var_off of the result.
*/
dst_reg->smin_value = S64_MIN;
dst_reg->smax_value = S64_MAX;
if (src_known)
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(dst_reg->var_off,
umin_val);
else
dst_reg->var_off = tnum_rshift(tnum_unknown, umin_val);
dst_reg->umin_value >>= umax_val;
dst_reg->umax_value >>= umin_val;
/* We may learn something more from the var_off */
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
break;
default:
mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, insn->dst_reg);
break;
}
__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: kernel/bpf/verifier.c in the Linux kernel through 4.14.8 allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory corruption) or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging register truncation mishandling.
Commit Message: bpf: fix incorrect tracking of register size truncation
Properly handle register truncation to a smaller size.
The old code first mirrors the clearing of the high 32 bits in the bitwise
tristate representation, which is correct. But then, it computes the new
arithmetic bounds as the intersection between the old arithmetic bounds and
the bounds resulting from the bitwise tristate representation. Therefore,
when coerce_reg_to_32() is called on a number with bounds
[0xffff'fff8, 0x1'0000'0007], the verifier computes
[0xffff'fff8, 0xffff'ffff] as bounds of the truncated number.
This is incorrect: The truncated number could also be in the range [0, 7],
and no meaningful arithmetic bounds can be computed in that case apart from
the obvious [0, 0xffff'ffff].
Starting with v4.14, this is exploitable by unprivileged users as long as
the unprivileged_bpf_disabled sysctl isn't set.
Debian assigned CVE-2017-16996 for this issue.
v2:
- flip the mask during arithmetic bounds calculation (Ben Hutchings)
v3:
- add CVE number (Ben Hutchings)
Fixes: b03c9f9fdc37 ("bpf/verifier: track signed and unsigned min/max values")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
|
Low
| 167,657
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int __init init_ext2_fs(void)
{
int err = init_ext2_xattr();
if (err)
return err;
err = init_inodecache();
if (err)
goto out1;
err = register_filesystem(&ext2_fs_type);
if (err)
goto out;
return 0;
out:
destroy_inodecache();
out1:
exit_ext2_xattr();
return err;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: The mbcache feature in the ext2 and ext4 filesystem implementations in the Linux kernel before 4.6 mishandles xattr block caching, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (soft lockup) via filesystem operations in environments that use many attributes, as demonstrated by Ceph and Samba.
Commit Message: ext2: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. We convert filesystem from
a global cache to per-fs one. Similarly to ext4 the tricky part is that
xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed before we
get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether the entry is
still valid after getting the buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
|
Low
| 169,975
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void faad_resetbits(bitfile *ld, int bits)
{
uint32_t tmp;
int words = bits >> 5;
int remainder = bits & 0x1F;
ld->bytes_left = ld->buffer_size - words*4;
if (ld->bytes_left >= 4)
{
tmp = getdword(&ld->start[words]);
ld->bytes_left -= 4;
} else {
tmp = getdword_n(&ld->start[words], ld->bytes_left);
ld->bytes_left = 0;
}
ld->bufa = tmp;
if (ld->bytes_left >= 4)
{
tmp = getdword(&ld->start[words+1]);
ld->bytes_left -= 4;
} else {
tmp = getdword_n(&ld->start[words+1], ld->bytes_left);
ld->bytes_left = 0;
}
ld->bufb = tmp;
ld->bits_left = 32 - remainder;
ld->tail = &ld->start[words+2];
/* recheck for reading too many bytes */
ld->error = 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: An issue was discovered in Freeware Advanced Audio Decoder 2 (FAAD2) 2.8.8. The faad_resetbits function in libfaad/bits.c is affected by a buffer overflow vulnerability. The number of bits to be read is determined by ld->buffer_size - words*4, cast to uint32. If ld->buffer_size - words*4 is negative, a buffer overflow is later performed via getdword_n(&ld->start[words], ld->bytes_left).
Commit Message: Fix a couple buffer overflows
https://hackerone.com/reports/502816
https://hackerone.com/reports/507858
https://github.com/videolan/vlc/blob/master/contrib/src/faad2/faad2-fix-overflows.patch
|
Medium
| 169,535
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int attribute_align_arg avcodec_open2(AVCodecContext *avctx, const AVCodec *codec, AVDictionary **options)
{
int ret = 0;
int codec_init_ok = 0;
AVDictionary *tmp = NULL;
const AVPixFmtDescriptor *pixdesc;
if (avcodec_is_open(avctx))
return 0;
if ((!codec && !avctx->codec)) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "No codec provided to avcodec_open2()\n");
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
if ((codec && avctx->codec && codec != avctx->codec)) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "This AVCodecContext was allocated for %s, "
"but %s passed to avcodec_open2()\n", avctx->codec->name, codec->name);
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
if (!codec)
codec = avctx->codec;
if (avctx->extradata_size < 0 || avctx->extradata_size >= FF_MAX_EXTRADATA_SIZE)
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
if (options)
av_dict_copy(&tmp, *options, 0);
ff_lock_avcodec(avctx, codec);
avctx->internal = av_mallocz(sizeof(*avctx->internal));
if (!avctx->internal) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto end;
}
avctx->internal->pool = av_mallocz(sizeof(*avctx->internal->pool));
if (!avctx->internal->pool) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto free_and_end;
}
avctx->internal->to_free = av_frame_alloc();
if (!avctx->internal->to_free) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto free_and_end;
}
avctx->internal->compat_decode_frame = av_frame_alloc();
if (!avctx->internal->compat_decode_frame) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto free_and_end;
}
avctx->internal->buffer_frame = av_frame_alloc();
if (!avctx->internal->buffer_frame) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto free_and_end;
}
avctx->internal->buffer_pkt = av_packet_alloc();
if (!avctx->internal->buffer_pkt) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto free_and_end;
}
avctx->internal->ds.in_pkt = av_packet_alloc();
if (!avctx->internal->ds.in_pkt) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto free_and_end;
}
avctx->internal->last_pkt_props = av_packet_alloc();
if (!avctx->internal->last_pkt_props) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto free_and_end;
}
avctx->internal->skip_samples_multiplier = 1;
if (codec->priv_data_size > 0) {
if (!avctx->priv_data) {
avctx->priv_data = av_mallocz(codec->priv_data_size);
if (!avctx->priv_data) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto end;
}
if (codec->priv_class) {
*(const AVClass **)avctx->priv_data = codec->priv_class;
av_opt_set_defaults(avctx->priv_data);
}
}
if (codec->priv_class && (ret = av_opt_set_dict(avctx->priv_data, &tmp)) < 0)
goto free_and_end;
} else {
avctx->priv_data = NULL;
}
if ((ret = av_opt_set_dict(avctx, &tmp)) < 0)
goto free_and_end;
if (avctx->codec_whitelist && av_match_list(codec->name, avctx->codec_whitelist, ',') <= 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Codec (%s) not on whitelist \'%s\'\n", codec->name, avctx->codec_whitelist);
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
if (!(avctx->coded_width && avctx->coded_height && avctx->width && avctx->height &&
(avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_H264 || avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_VP6F || avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_DXV))) {
if (avctx->coded_width && avctx->coded_height)
ret = ff_set_dimensions(avctx, avctx->coded_width, avctx->coded_height);
else if (avctx->width && avctx->height)
ret = ff_set_dimensions(avctx, avctx->width, avctx->height);
if (ret < 0)
goto free_and_end;
}
if ((avctx->coded_width || avctx->coded_height || avctx->width || avctx->height)
&& ( av_image_check_size2(avctx->coded_width, avctx->coded_height, avctx->max_pixels, AV_PIX_FMT_NONE, 0, avctx) < 0
|| av_image_check_size2(avctx->width, avctx->height, avctx->max_pixels, AV_PIX_FMT_NONE, 0, avctx) < 0)) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Ignoring invalid width/height values\n");
ff_set_dimensions(avctx, 0, 0);
}
if (avctx->width > 0 && avctx->height > 0) {
if (av_image_check_sar(avctx->width, avctx->height,
avctx->sample_aspect_ratio) < 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "ignoring invalid SAR: %u/%u\n",
avctx->sample_aspect_ratio.num,
avctx->sample_aspect_ratio.den);
avctx->sample_aspect_ratio = (AVRational){ 0, 1 };
}
}
/* if the decoder init function was already called previously,
* free the already allocated subtitle_header before overwriting it */
if (av_codec_is_decoder(codec))
av_freep(&avctx->subtitle_header);
if (avctx->channels > FF_SANE_NB_CHANNELS) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Too many channels: %d\n", avctx->channels);
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
avctx->codec = codec;
if ((avctx->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_UNKNOWN || avctx->codec_type == codec->type) &&
avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_NONE) {
avctx->codec_type = codec->type;
avctx->codec_id = codec->id;
}
if (avctx->codec_id != codec->id || (avctx->codec_type != codec->type
&& avctx->codec_type != AVMEDIA_TYPE_ATTACHMENT)) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Codec type or id mismatches\n");
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
avctx->frame_number = 0;
avctx->codec_descriptor = avcodec_descriptor_get(avctx->codec_id);
if ((avctx->codec->capabilities & AV_CODEC_CAP_EXPERIMENTAL) &&
avctx->strict_std_compliance > FF_COMPLIANCE_EXPERIMENTAL) {
const char *codec_string = av_codec_is_encoder(codec) ? "encoder" : "decoder";
AVCodec *codec2;
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"The %s '%s' is experimental but experimental codecs are not enabled, "
"add '-strict %d' if you want to use it.\n",
codec_string, codec->name, FF_COMPLIANCE_EXPERIMENTAL);
codec2 = av_codec_is_encoder(codec) ? avcodec_find_encoder(codec->id) : avcodec_find_decoder(codec->id);
if (!(codec2->capabilities & AV_CODEC_CAP_EXPERIMENTAL))
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Alternatively use the non experimental %s '%s'.\n",
codec_string, codec2->name);
ret = AVERROR_EXPERIMENTAL;
goto free_and_end;
}
if (avctx->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO &&
(!avctx->time_base.num || !avctx->time_base.den)) {
avctx->time_base.num = 1;
avctx->time_base.den = avctx->sample_rate;
}
if (!HAVE_THREADS)
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Warning: not compiled with thread support, using thread emulation\n");
if (CONFIG_FRAME_THREAD_ENCODER && av_codec_is_encoder(avctx->codec)) {
ff_unlock_avcodec(codec); //we will instantiate a few encoders thus kick the counter to prevent false detection of a problem
ret = ff_frame_thread_encoder_init(avctx, options ? *options : NULL);
ff_lock_avcodec(avctx, codec);
if (ret < 0)
goto free_and_end;
}
if (av_codec_is_decoder(avctx->codec)) {
ret = ff_decode_bsfs_init(avctx);
if (ret < 0)
goto free_and_end;
}
if (HAVE_THREADS
&& !(avctx->internal->frame_thread_encoder && (avctx->active_thread_type&FF_THREAD_FRAME))) {
ret = ff_thread_init(avctx);
if (ret < 0) {
goto free_and_end;
}
}
if (!HAVE_THREADS && !(codec->capabilities & AV_CODEC_CAP_AUTO_THREADS))
avctx->thread_count = 1;
if (avctx->codec->max_lowres < avctx->lowres || avctx->lowres < 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "The maximum value for lowres supported by the decoder is %d\n",
avctx->codec->max_lowres);
avctx->lowres = avctx->codec->max_lowres;
}
if (av_codec_is_encoder(avctx->codec)) {
int i;
#if FF_API_CODED_FRAME
FF_DISABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS
avctx->coded_frame = av_frame_alloc();
if (!avctx->coded_frame) {
ret = AVERROR(ENOMEM);
goto free_and_end;
}
FF_ENABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS
#endif
if (avctx->time_base.num <= 0 || avctx->time_base.den <= 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "The encoder timebase is not set.\n");
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
if (avctx->codec->sample_fmts) {
for (i = 0; avctx->codec->sample_fmts[i] != AV_SAMPLE_FMT_NONE; i++) {
if (avctx->sample_fmt == avctx->codec->sample_fmts[i])
break;
if (avctx->channels == 1 &&
av_get_planar_sample_fmt(avctx->sample_fmt) ==
av_get_planar_sample_fmt(avctx->codec->sample_fmts[i])) {
avctx->sample_fmt = avctx->codec->sample_fmts[i];
break;
}
}
if (avctx->codec->sample_fmts[i] == AV_SAMPLE_FMT_NONE) {
char buf[128];
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", avctx->sample_fmt);
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Specified sample format %s is invalid or not supported\n",
(char *)av_x_if_null(av_get_sample_fmt_name(avctx->sample_fmt), buf));
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
}
if (avctx->codec->pix_fmts) {
for (i = 0; avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] != AV_PIX_FMT_NONE; i++)
if (avctx->pix_fmt == avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i])
break;
if (avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] == AV_PIX_FMT_NONE
&& !((avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MJPEG || avctx->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_LJPEG)
&& avctx->strict_std_compliance <= FF_COMPLIANCE_UNOFFICIAL)) {
char buf[128];
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", avctx->pix_fmt);
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Specified pixel format %s is invalid or not supported\n",
(char *)av_x_if_null(av_get_pix_fmt_name(avctx->pix_fmt), buf));
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
if (avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] == AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ420P ||
avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] == AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ411P ||
avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] == AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ422P ||
avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] == AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ440P ||
avctx->codec->pix_fmts[i] == AV_PIX_FMT_YUVJ444P)
avctx->color_range = AVCOL_RANGE_JPEG;
}
if (avctx->codec->supported_samplerates) {
for (i = 0; avctx->codec->supported_samplerates[i] != 0; i++)
if (avctx->sample_rate == avctx->codec->supported_samplerates[i])
break;
if (avctx->codec->supported_samplerates[i] == 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Specified sample rate %d is not supported\n",
avctx->sample_rate);
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
}
if (avctx->sample_rate < 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Specified sample rate %d is not supported\n",
avctx->sample_rate);
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
if (avctx->codec->channel_layouts) {
if (!avctx->channel_layout) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Channel layout not specified\n");
} else {
for (i = 0; avctx->codec->channel_layouts[i] != 0; i++)
if (avctx->channel_layout == avctx->codec->channel_layouts[i])
break;
if (avctx->codec->channel_layouts[i] == 0) {
char buf[512];
av_get_channel_layout_string(buf, sizeof(buf), -1, avctx->channel_layout);
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Specified channel layout '%s' is not supported\n", buf);
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
}
}
if (avctx->channel_layout && avctx->channels) {
int channels = av_get_channel_layout_nb_channels(avctx->channel_layout);
if (channels != avctx->channels) {
char buf[512];
av_get_channel_layout_string(buf, sizeof(buf), -1, avctx->channel_layout);
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Channel layout '%s' with %d channels does not match number of specified channels %d\n",
buf, channels, avctx->channels);
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
} else if (avctx->channel_layout) {
avctx->channels = av_get_channel_layout_nb_channels(avctx->channel_layout);
}
if (avctx->channels < 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Specified number of channels %d is not supported\n",
avctx->channels);
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
if(avctx->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO) {
pixdesc = av_pix_fmt_desc_get(avctx->pix_fmt);
if ( avctx->bits_per_raw_sample < 0
|| (avctx->bits_per_raw_sample > 8 && pixdesc->comp[0].depth <= 8)) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Specified bit depth %d not possible with the specified pixel formats depth %d\n",
avctx->bits_per_raw_sample, pixdesc->comp[0].depth);
avctx->bits_per_raw_sample = pixdesc->comp[0].depth;
}
if (avctx->width <= 0 || avctx->height <= 0) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "dimensions not set\n");
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
}
if ( (avctx->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO || avctx->codec_type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_AUDIO)
&& avctx->bit_rate>0 && avctx->bit_rate<1000) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Bitrate %"PRId64" is extremely low, maybe you mean %"PRId64"k\n", avctx->bit_rate, avctx->bit_rate);
}
if (!avctx->rc_initial_buffer_occupancy)
avctx->rc_initial_buffer_occupancy = avctx->rc_buffer_size * 3LL / 4;
if (avctx->ticks_per_frame && avctx->time_base.num &&
avctx->ticks_per_frame > INT_MAX / avctx->time_base.num) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"ticks_per_frame %d too large for the timebase %d/%d.",
avctx->ticks_per_frame,
avctx->time_base.num,
avctx->time_base.den);
goto free_and_end;
}
if (avctx->hw_frames_ctx) {
AVHWFramesContext *frames_ctx = (AVHWFramesContext*)avctx->hw_frames_ctx->data;
if (frames_ctx->format != avctx->pix_fmt) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Mismatching AVCodecContext.pix_fmt and AVHWFramesContext.format\n");
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
if (avctx->sw_pix_fmt != AV_PIX_FMT_NONE &&
avctx->sw_pix_fmt != frames_ctx->sw_format) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR,
"Mismatching AVCodecContext.sw_pix_fmt (%s) "
"and AVHWFramesContext.sw_format (%s)\n",
av_get_pix_fmt_name(avctx->sw_pix_fmt),
av_get_pix_fmt_name(frames_ctx->sw_format));
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
avctx->sw_pix_fmt = frames_ctx->sw_format;
}
}
avctx->pts_correction_num_faulty_pts =
avctx->pts_correction_num_faulty_dts = 0;
avctx->pts_correction_last_pts =
avctx->pts_correction_last_dts = INT64_MIN;
if ( !CONFIG_GRAY && avctx->flags & AV_CODEC_FLAG_GRAY
&& avctx->codec_descriptor->type == AVMEDIA_TYPE_VIDEO)
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"gray decoding requested but not enabled at configuration time\n");
if ( avctx->codec->init && (!(avctx->active_thread_type&FF_THREAD_FRAME)
|| avctx->internal->frame_thread_encoder)) {
ret = avctx->codec->init(avctx);
if (ret < 0) {
goto free_and_end;
}
codec_init_ok = 1;
}
ret=0;
if (av_codec_is_decoder(avctx->codec)) {
if (!avctx->bit_rate)
avctx->bit_rate = get_bit_rate(avctx);
/* validate channel layout from the decoder */
if (avctx->channel_layout) {
int channels = av_get_channel_layout_nb_channels(avctx->channel_layout);
if (!avctx->channels)
avctx->channels = channels;
else if (channels != avctx->channels) {
char buf[512];
av_get_channel_layout_string(buf, sizeof(buf), -1, avctx->channel_layout);
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING,
"Channel layout '%s' with %d channels does not match specified number of channels %d: "
"ignoring specified channel layout\n",
buf, channels, avctx->channels);
avctx->channel_layout = 0;
}
}
if (avctx->channels && avctx->channels < 0 ||
avctx->channels > FF_SANE_NB_CHANNELS) {
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
if (avctx->bits_per_coded_sample < 0) {
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
}
if (avctx->sub_charenc) {
if (avctx->codec_type != AVMEDIA_TYPE_SUBTITLE) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Character encoding is only "
"supported with subtitles codecs\n");
ret = AVERROR(EINVAL);
goto free_and_end;
} else if (avctx->codec_descriptor->props & AV_CODEC_PROP_BITMAP_SUB) {
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "Codec '%s' is bitmap-based, "
"subtitles character encoding will be ignored\n",
avctx->codec_descriptor->name);
avctx->sub_charenc_mode = FF_SUB_CHARENC_MODE_DO_NOTHING;
} else {
/* input character encoding is set for a text based subtitle
* codec at this point */
if (avctx->sub_charenc_mode == FF_SUB_CHARENC_MODE_AUTOMATIC)
avctx->sub_charenc_mode = FF_SUB_CHARENC_MODE_PRE_DECODER;
if (avctx->sub_charenc_mode == FF_SUB_CHARENC_MODE_PRE_DECODER) {
#if CONFIG_ICONV
iconv_t cd = iconv_open("UTF-8", avctx->sub_charenc);
if (cd == (iconv_t)-1) {
ret = AVERROR(errno);
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Unable to open iconv context "
"with input character encoding \"%s\"\n", avctx->sub_charenc);
goto free_and_end;
}
iconv_close(cd);
#else
av_log(avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "Character encoding subtitles "
"conversion needs a libavcodec built with iconv support "
"for this codec\n");
ret = AVERROR(ENOSYS);
goto free_and_end;
#endif
}
}
}
#if FF_API_AVCTX_TIMEBASE
if (avctx->framerate.num > 0 && avctx->framerate.den > 0)
avctx->time_base = av_inv_q(av_mul_q(avctx->framerate, (AVRational){avctx->ticks_per_frame, 1}));
#endif
}
if (codec->priv_data_size > 0 && avctx->priv_data && codec->priv_class) {
av_assert0(*(const AVClass **)avctx->priv_data == codec->priv_class);
}
end:
ff_unlock_avcodec(codec);
if (options) {
av_dict_free(options);
*options = tmp;
}
return ret;
free_and_end:
if (avctx->codec &&
(codec_init_ok ||
(avctx->codec->caps_internal & FF_CODEC_CAP_INIT_CLEANUP)))
avctx->codec->close(avctx);
if (codec->priv_class && codec->priv_data_size)
av_opt_free(avctx->priv_data);
av_opt_free(avctx);
#if FF_API_CODED_FRAME
FF_DISABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS
av_frame_free(&avctx->coded_frame);
FF_ENABLE_DEPRECATION_WARNINGS
#endif
av_dict_free(&tmp);
av_freep(&avctx->priv_data);
if (avctx->internal) {
av_frame_free(&avctx->internal->to_free);
av_frame_free(&avctx->internal->compat_decode_frame);
av_frame_free(&avctx->internal->buffer_frame);
av_packet_free(&avctx->internal->buffer_pkt);
av_packet_free(&avctx->internal->last_pkt_props);
av_packet_free(&avctx->internal->ds.in_pkt);
ff_decode_bsfs_uninit(avctx);
av_freep(&avctx->internal->pool);
}
av_freep(&avctx->internal);
avctx->codec = NULL;
goto end;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID:
Summary: In FFmpeg before 4.2, avcodec_open2 in libavcodec/utils.c allows a NULL pointer dereference and possibly unspecified other impact when there is no valid close function pointer.
Commit Message: avcodec/utils: Check close before calling it
Fixes: NULL pointer dereference
Fixes: 15733/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_IDF_fuzzer-5658616977162240
Reviewed-by: Paul B Mahol <onemda@gmail.com>
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
|
???
| 169,489
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: virtual void FramePktHook(const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt) {
if (pkt->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY) {
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Exec Code Overflow Mem. Corr.
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: libvpx in mediaserver in Android 4.x before 4.4.4, 5.x before 5.1.1 LMY49H, and 6.0 before 2016-03-01 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory corruption) via a crafted media file, related to libwebm/mkvparser.cpp and other files, aka internal bug 23452792.
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
|
Low
| 174,502
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool SectionHasAutofilledField(const FormStructure& form_structure,
const FormData& form,
const std::string& section) {
DCHECK_EQ(form_structure.field_count(), form.fields.size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < form_structure.field_count(); ++i) {
if (form_structure.field(i)->section == section &&
form.fields[i].is_autofilled) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID:
Summary: Unsafe handling of credit card details in Autofill in Google Chrome prior to 69.0.3497.81 allowed a remote attacker to obtain potentially sensitive information from process memory via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: [AF] Don't simplify/dedupe suggestions for (partially) filled sections.
Since Autofill does not fill field by field anymore, this simplifying
and deduping of suggestions is not useful anymore.
Bug: 858820
Cq-Include-Trybots: luci.chromium.try:ios-simulator-full-configs;master.tryserver.chromium.mac:ios-simulator-cronet
Change-Id: I36f7cfe425a0bdbf5ba7503a3d96773b405cc19b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1128255
Reviewed-by: Roger McFarlane <rogerm@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Sebastien Seguin-Gagnon <sebsg@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573315}
|
???
| 173,201
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: int virtio_load(VirtIODevice *vdev, QEMUFile *f)
{
int i, ret;
uint32_t num;
uint32_t features;
uint32_t supported_features;
BusState *qbus = qdev_get_parent_bus(DEVICE(vdev));
VirtioBusClass *k = VIRTIO_BUS_GET_CLASS(qbus);
if (k->load_config) {
ret = k->load_config(qbus->parent, f);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
qemu_get_8s(f, &vdev->status);
qemu_get_8s(f, &vdev->isr);
qemu_get_be16s(f, &vdev->queue_sel);
qemu_get_be32s(f, &features);
if (virtio_set_features(vdev, features) < 0) {
return -1;
}
vdev->config_len = qemu_get_be32(f);
qemu_get_buffer(f, vdev->config, vdev->config_len);
num = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (num > VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX) {
error_report("Invalid number of PCI queues: 0x%x", num);
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
vdev->vq[i].vring.num = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (k->has_variable_vring_alignment) {
vdev->vq[i].vring.align = qemu_get_be32(f);
}
vdev->vq[i].pa = qemu_get_be64(f);
qemu_get_be16s(f, &vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx);
vdev->vq[i].signalled_used_valid = false;
vdev->vq[i].notification = true;
if (vdev->vq[i].pa) {
uint16_t nheads;
virtqueue_init(&vdev->vq[i]);
nheads = vring_avail_idx(&vdev->vq[i]) - vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx;
/* Check it isn't doing very strange things with descriptor numbers. */
if (nheads > vdev->vq[i].vring.num) {
error_report("VQ %d size 0x%x Guest index 0x%x "
"inconsistent with Host index 0x%x: delta 0x%x",
i, vdev->vq[i].vring.num,
vring_avail_idx(&vdev->vq[i]),
vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx, nheads);
return -1;
}
} else if (vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx) {
error_report("VQ %d address 0x0 "
"inconsistent with Host index 0x%x",
i, vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx);
return -1;
}
if (k->load_queue) {
ret = k->load_queue(qbus->parent, i, f);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
}
virtio_notify_vector(vdev, VIRTIO_NO_VECTOR);
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-94
Summary: Array index error in the virtio_load function in hw/virtio/virtio.c in QEMU before 1.7.2 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted savevm image.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,336
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool::PixelBufferRasterWorkerPool(
ResourceProvider* resource_provider,
ContextProvider* context_provider,
size_t num_threads,
size_t max_transfer_buffer_usage_bytes)
: RasterWorkerPool(resource_provider, context_provider, num_threads),
shutdown_(false),
scheduled_raster_task_count_(0),
bytes_pending_upload_(0),
max_bytes_pending_upload_(max_transfer_buffer_usage_bytes),
has_performed_uploads_since_last_flush_(false),
check_for_completed_raster_tasks_pending_(false),
should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_are_pending_(false),
should_notify_client_if_no_tasks_required_for_activation_are_pending_(
false) {
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in Google Chrome before 28.0.1500.71 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via vectors related to the handling of input.
Commit Message: cc: Simplify raster task completion notification logic
(Relanding after missing activation bug fixed in https://codereview.chromium.org/131763003/)
Previously the pixel buffer raster worker pool used a combination of
polling and explicit notifications from the raster worker pool to decide
when to tell the client about the completion of 1) all tasks or 2) the
subset of tasks required for activation. This patch simplifies the logic
by only triggering the notification based on the OnRasterTasksFinished
and OnRasterTasksRequiredForActivationFinished calls from the worker
pool.
BUG=307841,331534
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/99873007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@243991 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 171,262
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static u64 __skb_get_nlattr_nest(u64 ctx, u64 A, u64 X, u64 r4, u64 r5)
{
struct sk_buff *skb = (struct sk_buff *)(long) ctx;
struct nlattr *nla;
if (skb_is_nonlinear(skb))
return 0;
if (A > skb->len - sizeof(struct nlattr))
return 0;
nla = (struct nlattr *) &skb->data[A];
if (nla->nla_len > A - skb->len)
return 0;
nla = nla_find_nested(nla, X);
if (nla)
return (void *) nla - (void *) skb->data;
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST extension implementation in the sk_run_filter function in net/core/filter.c in the Linux kernel through 3.14.3 uses the reverse order in a certain subtraction, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (over-read and system crash) via crafted BPF instructions. NOTE: the affected code was moved to the __skb_get_nlattr_nest function before the vulnerability was announced.
Commit Message: filter: prevent nla extensions to peek beyond the end of the message
The BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR and BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST extensions fail to check
for a minimal message length before testing the supplied offset to be
within the bounds of the message. This allows the subtraction of the nla
header to underflow and therefore -- as the data type is unsigned --
allowing far to big offset and length values for the search of the
netlink attribute.
The remainder calculation for the BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST extension is
also wrong. It has the minuend and subtrahend mixed up, therefore
calculates a huge length value, allowing to overrun the end of the
message while looking for the netlink attribute.
The following three BPF snippets will trigger the bugs when attached to
a UNIX datagram socket and parsing a message with length 1, 2 or 3.
,-[ PoC for missing size check in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR ]--
| ld #0x87654321
| ldx #42
| ld #nla
| ret a
`---
,-[ PoC for the same bug in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST ]--
| ld #0x87654321
| ldx #42
| ld #nlan
| ret a
`---
,-[ PoC for wrong remainder calculation in BPF_S_ANC_NLATTR_NEST ]--
| ; (needs a fake netlink header at offset 0)
| ld #0
| ldx #42
| ld #nlan
| ret a
`---
Fix the first issue by ensuring the message length fulfills the minimal
size constrains of a nla header. Fix the second bug by getting the math
for the remainder calculation right.
Fixes: 4738c1db15 ("[SKFILTER]: Add SKF_ADF_NLATTR instruction")
Fixes: d214c7537b ("filter: add SKF_AD_NLATTR_NEST to look for nested..")
Cc: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Cc: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 166,384
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: init_global_keywords(bool global_active)
{
/* global definitions mapping */
install_keyword_root("linkbeat_use_polling", use_polling_handler, global_active);
#if HAVE_DECL_CLONE_NEWNET
install_keyword_root("net_namespace", &net_namespace_handler, global_active);
install_keyword_root("namespace_with_ipsets", &namespace_ipsets_handler, global_active);
#endif
install_keyword_root("use_pid_dir", &use_pid_dir_handler, global_active);
install_keyword_root("instance", &instance_handler, global_active);
install_keyword_root("child_wait_time", &child_wait_handler, global_active);
install_keyword_root("global_defs", NULL, global_active);
install_keyword("router_id", &routerid_handler);
install_keyword("notification_email_from", &emailfrom_handler);
install_keyword("smtp_server", &smtpserver_handler);
install_keyword("smtp_helo_name", &smtphelo_handler);
install_keyword("smtp_connect_timeout", &smtpto_handler);
install_keyword("notification_email", &email_handler);
install_keyword("smtp_alert", &smtp_alert_handler);
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
install_keyword("smtp_alert_vrrp", &smtp_alert_vrrp_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
install_keyword("smtp_alert_checker", &smtp_alert_checker_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
install_keyword("dynamic_interfaces", &dynamic_interfaces_handler);
install_keyword("no_email_faults", &no_email_faults_handler);
install_keyword("default_interface", &default_interface_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
install_keyword("lvs_timeouts", &lvs_timeouts);
install_keyword("lvs_flush", &lvs_flush_handler);
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
install_keyword("lvs_sync_daemon", &lvs_syncd_handler);
#endif
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
install_keyword("vrrp_mcast_group4", &vrrp_mcast_group4_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_mcast_group6", &vrrp_mcast_group6_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_garp_master_delay", &vrrp_garp_delay_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_garp_master_repeat", &vrrp_garp_rep_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_garp_master_refresh", &vrrp_garp_refresh_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_garp_master_refresh_repeat", &vrrp_garp_refresh_rep_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_garp_lower_prio_delay", &vrrp_garp_lower_prio_delay_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_garp_lower_prio_repeat", &vrrp_garp_lower_prio_rep_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_garp_interval", &vrrp_garp_interval_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_gna_interval", &vrrp_gna_interval_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_lower_prio_no_advert", &vrrp_lower_prio_no_advert_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_higher_prio_send_advert", &vrrp_higher_prio_send_advert_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_version", &vrrp_version_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_iptables", &vrrp_iptables_handler);
#ifdef _HAVE_LIBIPSET_
install_keyword("vrrp_ipsets", &vrrp_ipsets_handler);
#endif
install_keyword("vrrp_check_unicast_src", &vrrp_check_unicast_src_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_skip_check_adv_addr", &vrrp_check_adv_addr_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_strict", &vrrp_strict_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_priority", &vrrp_prio_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_no_swap", &vrrp_no_swap_handler);
#ifdef _HAVE_SCHED_RT_
install_keyword("vrrp_rt_priority", &vrrp_rt_priority_handler);
#if HAVE_DECL_RLIMIT_RTTIME == 1
install_keyword("vrrp_rlimit_rtime", &vrrp_rt_rlimit_handler);
#endif
#endif
#endif
install_keyword("notify_fifo", &global_notify_fifo);
install_keyword("notify_fifo_script", &global_notify_fifo_script);
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
install_keyword("vrrp_notify_fifo", &vrrp_notify_fifo);
install_keyword("vrrp_notify_fifo_script", &vrrp_notify_fifo_script);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
install_keyword("lvs_notify_fifo", &lvs_notify_fifo);
install_keyword("lvs_notify_fifo_script", &lvs_notify_fifo_script);
install_keyword("checker_priority", &checker_prio_handler);
install_keyword("checker_no_swap", &checker_no_swap_handler);
#ifdef _HAVE_SCHED_RT_
install_keyword("checker_rt_priority", &checker_rt_priority_handler);
#if HAVE_DECL_RLIMIT_RTTIME == 1
install_keyword("checker_rlimit_rtime", &checker_rt_rlimit_handler);
#endif
#endif
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_BFD_
install_keyword("bfd_priority", &bfd_prio_handler);
install_keyword("bfd_no_swap", &bfd_no_swap_handler);
#ifdef _HAVE_SCHED_RT_
install_keyword("bfd_rt_priority", &bfd_rt_priority_handler);
#if HAVE_DECL_RLIMIT_RTTIME == 1
install_keyword("bfd_rlimit_rtime", &bfd_rt_rlimit_handler);
#endif
#endif
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_
install_keyword("snmp_socket", &snmp_socket_handler);
install_keyword("enable_traps", &trap_handler);
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_VRRP_
install_keyword("enable_snmp_vrrp", &snmp_vrrp_handler);
install_keyword("enable_snmp_keepalived", &snmp_vrrp_handler); /* Deprecated v2.0.0 */
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_RFC_
install_keyword("enable_snmp_rfc", &snmp_rfc_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_RFCV2_
install_keyword("enable_snmp_rfcv2", &snmp_rfcv2_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_RFCV3_
install_keyword("enable_snmp_rfcv3", &snmp_rfcv3_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_SNMP_CHECKER_
install_keyword("enable_snmp_checker", &snmp_checker_handler);
#endif
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_DBUS_
install_keyword("enable_dbus", &enable_dbus_handler);
install_keyword("dbus_service_name", &dbus_service_name_handler);
#endif
install_keyword("script_user", &script_user_handler);
install_keyword("enable_script_security", &script_security_handler);
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
install_keyword("vrrp_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs", &vrrp_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs_force", &vrrp_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs_force_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs", &vrrp_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs_force", &vrrp_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs_force_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
install_keyword("lvs_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs", &lvs_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs_handler);
install_keyword("lvs_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs_force", &lvs_netlink_cmd_rcv_bufs_force_handler);
install_keyword("lvs_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs", &lvs_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs_handler);
install_keyword("lvs_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs_force", &lvs_netlink_monitor_rcv_bufs_force_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_LVS_
install_keyword("rs_init_notifies", &rs_init_notifies_handler);
install_keyword("no_checker_emails", &no_checker_emails_handler);
#endif
#ifdef _WITH_VRRP_
install_keyword("vrrp_rx_bufs_policy", &vrrp_rx_bufs_policy_handler);
install_keyword("vrrp_rx_bufs_multiplier", &vrrp_rx_bufs_multiplier_handler);
#endif
}
Vulnerability Type: +Info
CWE ID: CWE-200
Summary: keepalived 2.0.8 used mode 0666 when creating new temporary files upon a call to PrintData or PrintStats, potentially leaking sensitive information.
Commit Message: Add command line and configuration option to set umask
Issue #1048 identified that files created by keepalived are created
with mode 0666. This commit changes the default to 0644, and also
allows the umask to be specified in the configuration or as a command
line option.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
|
Low
| 168,981
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void SerializedScriptValue::transferArrayBuffers(v8::Isolate* isolate, const ArrayBufferArray& arrayBuffers, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
if (!arrayBuffers.size())
return;
for (size_t i = 0; i < arrayBuffers.size(); ++i) {
if (arrayBuffers[i]->isNeutered()) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(DataCloneError, "ArrayBuffer at index " + String::number(i) + " is already neutered.");
return;
}
}
OwnPtr<ArrayBufferContentsArray> contents = adoptPtr(new ArrayBufferContentsArray(arrayBuffers.size()));
HeapHashSet<Member<DOMArrayBufferBase>> visited;
for (size_t i = 0; i < arrayBuffers.size(); ++i) {
if (visited.contains(arrayBuffers[i]))
continue;
visited.add(arrayBuffers[i]);
if (arrayBuffers[i]->isShared()) {
bool result = arrayBuffers[i]->shareContentsWith(contents->at(i));
if (!result) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(DataCloneError, "SharedArrayBuffer at index " + String::number(i) + " could not be transferred.");
return;
}
} else {
Vector<v8::Local<v8::ArrayBuffer>, 4> bufferHandles;
v8::HandleScope handleScope(isolate);
acculumateArrayBuffersForAllWorlds(isolate, static_cast<DOMArrayBuffer*>(arrayBuffers[i].get()), bufferHandles);
bool isNeuterable = true;
for (size_t j = 0; j < bufferHandles.size(); ++j)
isNeuterable &= bufferHandles[j]->IsNeuterable();
DOMArrayBufferBase* toTransfer = arrayBuffers[i];
if (!isNeuterable)
toTransfer = DOMArrayBuffer::create(arrayBuffers[i]->buffer());
bool result = toTransfer->transfer(contents->at(i));
if (!result) {
exceptionState.throwDOMException(DataCloneError, "ArrayBuffer at index " + String::number(i) + " could not be transferred.");
return;
}
if (isNeuterable)
for (size_t j = 0; j < bufferHandles.size(); ++j)
bufferHandles[j]->Neuter();
}
}
m_arrayBufferContentsArray = contents.release();
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The SerializedScriptValue::transferArrayBuffers function in WebKit/Source/bindings/core/v8/SerializedScriptValue.cpp in the V8 bindings in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 50.0.2661.94, mishandles certain array-buffer data structures, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (use-after-free) or possibly have unspecified other impact via a crafted web site.
Commit Message: When we can't neuter ArrayBuffers, we can't transfer them
Instead, we need to copy
BUG=603987
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1904913002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#388719}
|
Medium
| 172,564
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void WriteDDSInfo(Image *image, const size_t pixelFormat,
const size_t compression, const size_t mipmaps)
{
char
software[MaxTextExtent];
register ssize_t
i;
unsigned int
format,
caps,
flags;
flags=(unsigned int) (DDSD_CAPS | DDSD_WIDTH | DDSD_HEIGHT |
DDSD_PIXELFORMAT | DDSD_LINEARSIZE);
caps=(unsigned int) DDSCAPS_TEXTURE;
format=(unsigned int) pixelFormat;
if (mipmaps > 0)
{
flags=flags | (unsigned int) DDSD_MIPMAPCOUNT;
caps=caps | (unsigned int) (DDSCAPS_MIPMAP | DDSCAPS_COMPLEX);
}
if (format != DDPF_FOURCC && image->matte)
format=format | DDPF_ALPHAPIXELS;
(void) WriteBlob(image,4,(unsigned char *) "DDS ");
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,124);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,flags);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int) image->rows);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int) image->columns);
if (compression == FOURCC_DXT1)
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,
(unsigned int) (Max(1,(image->columns+3)/4) * 8));
else
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,
(unsigned int) (Max(1,(image->columns+3)/4) * 16));
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x00);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int) mipmaps+1);
(void) ResetMagickMemory(software,0,sizeof(software));
(void) strcpy(software,"IMAGEMAGICK");
(void) WriteBlob(image,44,(unsigned char *) software);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,32);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,format);
if (pixelFormat == DDPF_FOURCC)
{
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,(unsigned int) compression);
for(i=0;i < 5;i++) // bitcount / masks
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x00);
}
else
{
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x00);
if (image->matte)
{
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,32);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0xff0000);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0xff00);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0xff);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0xff000000);
}
else
{
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,24);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0xff);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x00);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x00);
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x00);
}
}
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,caps);
for(i=0;i < 4;i++) // ddscaps2 + reserved region
(void) WriteBlobLSBLong(image,0x00);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: coders/dds.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted DDS file.
Commit Message: Added extra EOF check and some minor refactoring.
|
Medium
| 168,908
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: mem_log_init(const char* prog_name, const char *banner)
{
size_t log_name_len;
char *log_name;
if (__test_bit(LOG_CONSOLE_BIT, &debug)) {
log_op = stderr;
return;
}
if (log_op)
fclose(log_op);
log_name_len = 5 + strlen(prog_name) + 5 + 7 + 4 + 1; /* "/tmp/" + prog_name + "_mem." + PID + ".log" + '\0" */
log_name = malloc(log_name_len);
if (!log_name) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to malloc log file name");
log_op = stderr;
return;
}
snprintf(log_name, log_name_len, "/tmp/%s_mem.%d.log", prog_name, getpid());
log_op = fopen(log_name, "a");
if (log_op == NULL) {
log_message(LOG_INFO, "Unable to open %s for appending", log_name);
log_op = stderr;
}
else {
int fd = fileno(log_op);
/* We don't want any children to inherit the log file */
fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, fcntl(fd, F_GETFD) | FD_CLOEXEC);
/* Make the log output line buffered. This was to ensure that
* children didn't inherit the buffer, but the CLOEXEC above
* should resolve that. */
setlinebuf(log_op);
fprintf(log_op, "\n");
}
free(log_name);
terminate_banner = banner;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-59
Summary: keepalived 2.0.8 didn't check for pathnames with symlinks when writing data to a temporary file upon a call to PrintData or PrintStats. This allowed local users to overwrite arbitrary files if fs.protected_symlinks is set to 0, as demonstrated by a symlink from /tmp/keepalived.data or /tmp/keepalived.stats to /etc/passwd.
Commit Message: When opening files for write, ensure they aren't symbolic links
Issue #1048 identified that if, for example, a non privileged user
created a symbolic link from /etc/keepalvied.data to /etc/passwd,
writing to /etc/keepalived.data (which could be invoked via DBus)
would cause /etc/passwd to be overwritten.
This commit stops keepalived writing to pathnames where the ultimate
component is a symbolic link, by setting O_NOFOLLOW whenever opening
a file for writing.
This might break some setups, where, for example, /etc/keepalived.data
was a symbolic link to /home/fred/keepalived.data. If this was the case,
instead create a symbolic link from /home/fred/keepalived.data to
/tmp/keepalived.data, so that the file is still accessible via
/home/fred/keepalived.data.
There doesn't appear to be a way around this backward incompatibility,
since even checking if the pathname is a symbolic link prior to opening
for writing would create a race condition.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
|
Medium
| 168,995
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: ServiceWorkerHandler::ServiceWorkerHandler()
: DevToolsDomainHandler(ServiceWorker::Metainfo::domainName),
enabled_(false),
process_(nullptr),
weak_factory_(this) {}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: An object lifetime issue in the developer tools network handler in Google Chrome prior to 66.0.3359.117 allowed a local attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
|
Medium
| 172,768
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int mpage_da_map_blocks(struct mpage_da_data *mpd)
{
int err, blks, get_blocks_flags;
struct buffer_head new;
sector_t next = mpd->b_blocknr;
unsigned max_blocks = mpd->b_size >> mpd->inode->i_blkbits;
loff_t disksize = EXT4_I(mpd->inode)->i_disksize;
handle_t *handle = NULL;
/*
* We consider only non-mapped and non-allocated blocks
*/
if ((mpd->b_state & (1 << BH_Mapped)) &&
!(mpd->b_state & (1 << BH_Delay)) &&
!(mpd->b_state & (1 << BH_Unwritten)))
return 0;
/*
* If we didn't accumulate anything to write simply return
*/
if (!mpd->b_size)
return 0;
handle = ext4_journal_current_handle();
BUG_ON(!handle);
/*
* Call ext4_get_blocks() to allocate any delayed allocation
* blocks, or to convert an uninitialized extent to be
* initialized (in the case where we have written into
* one or more preallocated blocks).
*
* We pass in the magic EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE to
* indicate that we are on the delayed allocation path. This
* affects functions in many different parts of the allocation
* call path. This flag exists primarily because we don't
* want to change *many* call functions, so ext4_get_blocks()
* will set the magic i_delalloc_reserved_flag once the
* inode's allocation semaphore is taken.
*
* If the blocks in questions were delalloc blocks, set
* EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE so the delalloc accounting
* variables are updated after the blocks have been allocated.
*/
new.b_state = 0;
get_blocks_flags = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_CREATE;
if (mpd->b_state & (1 << BH_Delay))
get_blocks_flags |= EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_DELALLOC_RESERVE;
blks = ext4_get_blocks(handle, mpd->inode, next, max_blocks,
&new, get_blocks_flags);
if (blks < 0) {
err = blks;
/*
* If get block returns with error we simply
* return. Later writepage will redirty the page and
* writepages will find the dirty page again
*/
if (err == -EAGAIN)
return 0;
if (err == -ENOSPC &&
ext4_count_free_blocks(mpd->inode->i_sb)) {
mpd->retval = err;
return 0;
}
/*
* get block failure will cause us to loop in
* writepages, because a_ops->writepage won't be able
* to make progress. The page will be redirtied by
* writepage and writepages will again try to write
* the same.
*/
ext4_msg(mpd->inode->i_sb, KERN_CRIT,
"delayed block allocation failed for inode %lu at "
"logical offset %llu with max blocks %zd with "
"error %d\n", mpd->inode->i_ino,
(unsigned long long) next,
mpd->b_size >> mpd->inode->i_blkbits, err);
printk(KERN_CRIT "This should not happen!! "
"Data will be lost\n");
if (err == -ENOSPC) {
ext4_print_free_blocks(mpd->inode);
}
/* invalidate all the pages */
ext4_da_block_invalidatepages(mpd, next,
mpd->b_size >> mpd->inode->i_blkbits);
return err;
}
BUG_ON(blks == 0);
new.b_size = (blks << mpd->inode->i_blkbits);
if (buffer_new(&new))
__unmap_underlying_blocks(mpd->inode, &new);
/*
* If blocks are delayed marked, we need to
* put actual blocknr and drop delayed bit
*/
if ((mpd->b_state & (1 << BH_Delay)) ||
(mpd->b_state & (1 << BH_Unwritten)))
mpage_put_bnr_to_bhs(mpd, next, &new);
if (ext4_should_order_data(mpd->inode)) {
err = ext4_jbd2_file_inode(handle, mpd->inode);
if (err)
return err;
}
/*
* Update on-disk size along with block allocation.
*/
disksize = ((loff_t) next + blks) << mpd->inode->i_blkbits;
if (disksize > i_size_read(mpd->inode))
disksize = i_size_read(mpd->inode);
if (disksize > EXT4_I(mpd->inode)->i_disksize) {
ext4_update_i_disksize(mpd->inode, disksize);
return ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, mpd->inode);
}
return 0;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The ext4 implementation in the Linux kernel before 2.6.34 does not properly track the initialization of certain data structures, which allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and panic) via a crafted USB device, related to the ext4_fill_super function.
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
|
Low
| 167,551
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int gtco_probe(struct usb_interface *usbinterface,
const struct usb_device_id *id)
{
struct gtco *gtco;
struct input_dev *input_dev;
struct hid_descriptor *hid_desc;
char *report;
int result = 0, retry;
int error;
struct usb_endpoint_descriptor *endpoint;
/* Allocate memory for device structure */
gtco = kzalloc(sizeof(struct gtco), GFP_KERNEL);
input_dev = input_allocate_device();
if (!gtco || !input_dev) {
dev_err(&usbinterface->dev, "No more memory\n");
error = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_devs;
}
/* Set pointer to the input device */
gtco->inputdevice = input_dev;
/* Save interface information */
gtco->usbdev = interface_to_usbdev(usbinterface);
gtco->intf = usbinterface;
/* Allocate some data for incoming reports */
gtco->buffer = usb_alloc_coherent(gtco->usbdev, REPORT_MAX_SIZE,
GFP_KERNEL, >co->buf_dma);
if (!gtco->buffer) {
dev_err(&usbinterface->dev, "No more memory for us buffers\n");
error = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_devs;
}
/* Allocate URB for reports */
gtco->urbinfo = usb_alloc_urb(0, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!gtco->urbinfo) {
dev_err(&usbinterface->dev, "Failed to allocate URB\n");
error = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_buf;
}
/*
* The endpoint is always altsetting 0, we know this since we know
* this device only has one interrupt endpoint
*/
endpoint = &usbinterface->altsetting[0].endpoint[0].desc;
/* Some debug */
dev_dbg(&usbinterface->dev, "gtco # interfaces: %d\n", usbinterface->num_altsetting);
dev_dbg(&usbinterface->dev, "num endpoints: %d\n", usbinterface->cur_altsetting->desc.bNumEndpoints);
dev_dbg(&usbinterface->dev, "interface class: %d\n", usbinterface->cur_altsetting->desc.bInterfaceClass);
dev_dbg(&usbinterface->dev, "endpoint: attribute:0x%x type:0x%x\n", endpoint->bmAttributes, endpoint->bDescriptorType);
if (usb_endpoint_xfer_int(endpoint))
dev_dbg(&usbinterface->dev, "endpoint: we have interrupt endpoint\n");
dev_dbg(&usbinterface->dev, "endpoint extra len:%d\n", usbinterface->altsetting[0].extralen);
/*
* Find the HID descriptor so we can find out the size of the
* HID report descriptor
*/
if (usb_get_extra_descriptor(usbinterface->cur_altsetting,
HID_DEVICE_TYPE, &hid_desc) != 0){
dev_err(&usbinterface->dev,
"Can't retrieve exta USB descriptor to get hid report descriptor length\n");
error = -EIO;
goto err_free_urb;
}
dev_dbg(&usbinterface->dev,
"Extra descriptor success: type:%d len:%d\n",
hid_desc->bDescriptorType, hid_desc->wDescriptorLength);
report = kzalloc(le16_to_cpu(hid_desc->wDescriptorLength), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!report) {
dev_err(&usbinterface->dev, "No more memory for report\n");
error = -ENOMEM;
goto err_free_urb;
}
/* Couple of tries to get reply */
for (retry = 0; retry < 3; retry++) {
result = usb_control_msg(gtco->usbdev,
usb_rcvctrlpipe(gtco->usbdev, 0),
USB_REQ_GET_DESCRIPTOR,
USB_RECIP_INTERFACE | USB_DIR_IN,
REPORT_DEVICE_TYPE << 8,
0, /* interface */
report,
le16_to_cpu(hid_desc->wDescriptorLength),
5000); /* 5 secs */
dev_dbg(&usbinterface->dev, "usb_control_msg result: %d\n", result);
if (result == le16_to_cpu(hid_desc->wDescriptorLength)) {
parse_hid_report_descriptor(gtco, report, result);
break;
}
}
kfree(report);
/* If we didn't get the report, fail */
if (result != le16_to_cpu(hid_desc->wDescriptorLength)) {
dev_err(&usbinterface->dev,
"Failed to get HID Report Descriptor of size: %d\n",
hid_desc->wDescriptorLength);
error = -EIO;
goto err_free_urb;
}
/* Create a device file node */
usb_make_path(gtco->usbdev, gtco->usbpath, sizeof(gtco->usbpath));
strlcat(gtco->usbpath, "/input0", sizeof(gtco->usbpath));
/* Set Input device functions */
input_dev->open = gtco_input_open;
input_dev->close = gtco_input_close;
/* Set input device information */
input_dev->name = "GTCO_CalComp";
input_dev->phys = gtco->usbpath;
input_set_drvdata(input_dev, gtco);
/* Now set up all the input device capabilities */
gtco_setup_caps(input_dev);
/* Set input device required ID information */
usb_to_input_id(gtco->usbdev, &input_dev->id);
input_dev->dev.parent = &usbinterface->dev;
/* Setup the URB, it will be posted later on open of input device */
endpoint = &usbinterface->altsetting[0].endpoint[0].desc;
usb_fill_int_urb(gtco->urbinfo,
gtco->usbdev,
usb_rcvintpipe(gtco->usbdev,
endpoint->bEndpointAddress),
gtco->buffer,
REPORT_MAX_SIZE,
gtco_urb_callback,
gtco,
endpoint->bInterval);
gtco->urbinfo->transfer_dma = gtco->buf_dma;
gtco->urbinfo->transfer_flags |= URB_NO_TRANSFER_DMA_MAP;
/* Save gtco pointer in USB interface gtco */
usb_set_intfdata(usbinterface, gtco);
/* All done, now register the input device */
error = input_register_device(input_dev);
if (error)
goto err_free_urb;
return 0;
err_free_urb:
usb_free_urb(gtco->urbinfo);
err_free_buf:
usb_free_coherent(gtco->usbdev, REPORT_MAX_SIZE,
gtco->buffer, gtco->buf_dma);
err_free_devs:
input_free_device(input_dev);
kfree(gtco);
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID:
Summary: The gtco_probe function in drivers/input/tablet/gtco.c in the Linux kernel through 4.5.2 allows physically proximate attackers to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via a crafted endpoints value in a USB device descriptor.
Commit Message: Input: gtco - fix crash on detecting device without endpoints
The gtco driver expects at least one valid endpoint. If given malicious
descriptors that specify 0 for the number of endpoints, it will crash in
the probe function. Ensure there is at least one endpoint on the interface
before using it.
Also let's fix a minor coding style issue.
The full correct report of this issue can be found in the public
Red Hat Bugzilla:
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1283385
Reported-by: Ralf Spenneberg <ralf@spenneberg.net>
Signed-off-by: Vladis Dronov <vdronov@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
|
Low
| 167,431
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static struct sem_undo *find_alloc_undo(struct ipc_namespace *ns, int semid)
{
struct sem_array *sma;
struct sem_undo_list *ulp;
struct sem_undo *un, *new;
int nsems;
int error;
error = get_undo_list(&ulp);
if (error)
return ERR_PTR(error);
rcu_read_lock();
spin_lock(&ulp->lock);
un = lookup_undo(ulp, semid);
spin_unlock(&ulp->lock);
if (likely(un!=NULL))
goto out;
/* no undo structure around - allocate one. */
/* step 1: figure out the size of the semaphore array */
sma = sem_obtain_object_check(ns, semid);
if (IS_ERR(sma)) {
rcu_read_unlock();
return ERR_CAST(sma);
}
nsems = sma->sem_nsems;
ipc_rcu_getref(sma);
rcu_read_unlock();
/* step 2: allocate new undo structure */
new = kzalloc(sizeof(struct sem_undo) + sizeof(short)*nsems, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!new) {
sem_putref(sma);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
}
/* step 3: Acquire the lock on semaphore array */
sem_lock_and_putref(sma);
if (sma->sem_perm.deleted) {
sem_unlock(sma);
kfree(new);
un = ERR_PTR(-EIDRM);
goto out;
}
spin_lock(&ulp->lock);
/*
* step 4: check for races: did someone else allocate the undo struct?
*/
un = lookup_undo(ulp, semid);
if (un) {
kfree(new);
goto success;
}
/* step 5: initialize & link new undo structure */
new->semadj = (short *) &new[1];
new->ulp = ulp;
new->semid = semid;
assert_spin_locked(&ulp->lock);
list_add_rcu(&new->list_proc, &ulp->list_proc);
assert_spin_locked(&sma->sem_perm.lock);
list_add(&new->list_id, &sma->list_id);
un = new;
success:
spin_unlock(&ulp->lock);
rcu_read_lock();
sem_unlock(sma);
out:
return un;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The ipc_rcu_putref function in ipc/util.c in the Linux kernel before 3.10 does not properly manage a reference count, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (memory consumption or system crash) via a crafted application.
Commit Message: ipc,sem: fine grained locking for semtimedop
Introduce finer grained locking for semtimedop, to handle the common case
of a program wanting to manipulate one semaphore from an array with
multiple semaphores.
If the call is a semop manipulating just one semaphore in an array with
multiple semaphores, only take the lock for that semaphore itself.
If the call needs to manipulate multiple semaphores, or another caller is
in a transaction that manipulates multiple semaphores, the sem_array lock
is taken, as well as all the locks for the individual semaphores.
On a 24 CPU system, performance numbers with the semop-multi
test with N threads and N semaphores, look like this:
vanilla Davidlohr's Davidlohr's + Davidlohr's +
threads patches rwlock patches v3 patches
10 610652 726325 1783589 2142206
20 341570 365699 1520453 1977878
30 288102 307037 1498167 2037995
40 290714 305955 1612665 2256484
50 288620 312890 1733453 2650292
60 289987 306043 1649360 2388008
70 291298 306347 1723167 2717486
80 290948 305662 1729545 2763582
90 290996 306680 1736021 2757524
100 292243 306700 1773700 3059159
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: do not call sem_lock when bogus sma]
[davidlohr.bueso@hp.com: make refcounter atomic]
Signed-off-by: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Davidlohr Bueso <davidlohr.bueso@hp.com>
Cc: Chegu Vinod <chegu_vinod@hp.com>
Cc: Jason Low <jason.low2@hp.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Lespinasse <walken@google.com>
Cc: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Stanislav Kinsbursky <skinsbursky@parallels.com>
Tested-by: Emmanuel Benisty <benisty.e@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Sedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,970
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: hash_foreach (gpointer key, gpointer val, gpointer user_data)
{
const char *keystr = key;
const char *valstr = val;
guint *count = user_data;
*count += (strlen (keystr) + strlen (valstr));
g_print ("%s -> %s\n", keystr, valstr);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-264
Summary: DBus-GLib 0.73 disregards the access flag of exported GObject properties, which allows local users to bypass intended access restrictions and possibly cause a denial of service by modifying properties, as demonstrated by properties of the (1) DeviceKit-Power, (2) NetworkManager, and (3) ModemManager services.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,084
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,
int tlen, int offset)
{
__wsum csum = skb->csum;
if (skb->ip_summed != CHECKSUM_COMPLETE)
return;
if (offset != 0)
csum = csum_sub(csum,
csum_partial(skb_transport_header(skb) + tlen,
offset, 0));
put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IP, IP_CHECKSUM, sizeof(__wsum), &csum);
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-125
Summary: The ip_cmsg_recv_checksum function in net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c in the Linux kernel before 4.10.1 has incorrect expectations about skb data layout, which allows local users to cause a denial of service (buffer over-read) or possibly have unspecified other impact via crafted system calls, as demonstrated by use of the MSG_MORE flag in conjunction with loopback UDP transmission.
Commit Message: ip: fix IP_CHECKSUM handling
The skbs processed by ip_cmsg_recv() are not guaranteed to
be linear e.g. when sending UDP packets over loopback with
MSGMORE.
Using csum_partial() on [potentially] the whole skb len
is dangerous; instead be on the safe side and use skb_checksum().
Thanks to syzkaller team to detect the issue and provide the
reproducer.
v1 -> v2:
- move the variable declaration in a tighter scope
Fixes: ad6f939ab193 ("ip: Add offset parameter to ip_cmsg_recv")
Reported-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
|
Low
| 168,345
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static void InsertRow(unsigned char *p,ssize_t y,Image *image, int bpp)
{
ExceptionInfo
*exception;
int
bit;
ssize_t
x;
register PixelPacket
*q;
IndexPacket
index;
register IndexPacket
*indexes;
exception=(&image->exception);
switch (bpp)
{
case 1: /* Convert bitmap scanline. */
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-7); x+=8)
{
for (bit=0; bit < 8; bit++)
{
index=((*p) & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
}
p++;
}
if ((image->columns % 8) != 0)
{
for (bit=0; bit < (ssize_t) (image->columns % 8); bit++)
{
index=((*p) & (0x80 >> bit) ? 0x01 : 0x00);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+bit,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
}
p++;
}
if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception))
break;
break;
}
case 2: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 6) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 2) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
p++;
q++;
}
if ((image->columns % 4) != 0)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 6) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
if ((image->columns % 4) >= 1)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
if ((image->columns % 4) >= 2)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 2) & 0x3);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
}
}
p++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
break;
}
case 4: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < ((ssize_t) image->columns-1); x+=2)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x0f);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
q++;
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p) & 0x0f);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x+1,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
p++;
q++;
}
if ((image->columns % 2) != 0)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,(*p >> 4) & 0x0f);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
break;
}
case 8: /* Convert PseudoColor scanline. */
{
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL) break;
indexes=GetAuthenticIndexQueue(image);
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
index=ConstrainColormapIndex(image,*p);
SetPixelIndex(indexes+x,index);
SetPixelRGBO(q,image->colormap+(ssize_t) index);
p++;
q++;
}
if (SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception) == MagickFalse)
break;
}
break;
case 24: /* Convert DirectColor scanline. */
q=QueueAuthenticPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (q == (PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
SetPixelRed(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelGreen(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
SetPixelBlue(q,ScaleCharToQuantum(*p++));
q++;
}
if (!SyncAuthenticPixels(image,exception))
break;
break;
}
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-787
Summary: coders/wpg.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds write) via a crafted file.
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/102
|
Medium
| 168,803
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: SPL_METHOD(SplObjectStorage, unserialize)
{
spl_SplObjectStorage *intern = (spl_SplObjectStorage*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
char *buf;
int buf_len;
const unsigned char *p, *s;
php_unserialize_data_t var_hash;
zval *pentry, *pmembers, *pcount = NULL, *pinf;
long count;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &buf, &buf_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (buf_len == 0) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Empty serialized string cannot be empty");
return;
}
/* storage */
s = p = (const unsigned char*)buf;
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_INIT(var_hash);
if (*p!= 'x' || *++p != ':') {
goto outexcept;
}
++p;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(pcount);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&pcount, &p, s + buf_len, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC) || Z_TYPE_P(pcount) != IS_LONG) {
goto outexcept;
}
--p; /* for ';' */
count = Z_LVAL_P(pcount);
while(count-- > 0) {
spl_SplObjectStorageElement *pelement;
char *hash;
int hash_len;
if (*p != ';') {
goto outexcept;
}
++p;
if(*p != 'O' && *p != 'C' && *p != 'r') {
goto outexcept;
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(pentry);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&pentry, &p, s + buf_len, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&pentry);
goto outexcept;
}
if(Z_TYPE_P(pentry) != IS_OBJECT) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&pentry);
goto outexcept;
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(pinf);
if (*p == ',') { /* new version has inf */
++p;
if (!php_var_unserialize(&pinf, &p, s + buf_len, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&pinf);
goto outexcept;
}
}
hash = spl_object_storage_get_hash(intern, getThis(), pentry, &hash_len TSRMLS_CC);
if (!hash) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&pentry);
zval_ptr_dtor(&pinf);
goto outexcept;
}
pelement = spl_object_storage_get(intern, hash, hash_len TSRMLS_CC);
spl_object_storage_free_hash(intern, hash);
if(pelement) {
if(pelement->inf) {
var_push_dtor(&var_hash, &pelement->inf);
}
if(pelement->obj) {
var_push_dtor(&var_hash, &pelement->obj);
}
}
spl_object_storage_attach(intern, getThis(), pentry, pinf TSRMLS_CC);
zval_ptr_dtor(&pentry);
zval_ptr_dtor(&pinf);
}
if (*p != ';') {
goto outexcept;
}
++p;
/* members */
if (*p!= 'm' || *++p != ':') {
goto outexcept;
}
++p;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(pmembers);
if (!php_var_unserialize(&pmembers, &p, s + buf_len, &var_hash TSRMLS_CC)) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&pmembers);
goto outexcept;
}
/* copy members */
if (!intern->std.properties) {
rebuild_object_properties(&intern->std);
}
zend_hash_copy(intern->std.properties, Z_ARRVAL_P(pmembers), (copy_ctor_func_t) zval_add_ref, (void *) NULL, sizeof(zval *));
zval_ptr_dtor(&pmembers);
/* done reading $serialized */
if (pcount) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&pcount);
}
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
return;
outexcept:
if (pcount) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&pcount);
}
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Error at offset %ld of %d bytes", (long)((char*)p - buf), buf_len);
return;
} /* }}} */
ZEND_BEGIN_ARG_INFO(arginfo_Object, 0)
ZEND_ARG_INFO(0, object)
ZEND_END_ARG_INFO();
ZEND_BEGIN_ARG_INFO_EX(arginfo_attach, 0, 0, 1)
ZEND_ARG_INFO(0, object)
ZEND_ARG_INFO(0, inf)
ZEND_END_ARG_INFO();
ZEND_BEGIN_ARG_INFO(arginfo_Serialized, 0)
ZEND_ARG_INFO(0, serialized)
ZEND_END_ARG_INFO();
ZEND_BEGIN_ARG_INFO(arginfo_setInfo, 0)
ZEND_ARG_INFO(0, info)
ZEND_END_ARG_INFO();
ZEND_BEGIN_ARG_INFO(arginfo_getHash, 0)
ZEND_ARG_INFO(0, object)
ZEND_END_ARG_INFO();
ZEND_BEGIN_ARG_INFO_EX(arginfo_offsetGet, 0, 0, 1)
ZEND_ARG_INFO(0, object)
ZEND_END_ARG_INFO()
ZEND_BEGIN_ARG_INFO(arginfo_splobject_void, 0)
ZEND_END_ARG_INFO()
static const zend_function_entry spl_funcs_SplObjectStorage[] = {
SPL_ME(SplObjectStorage, attach, arginfo_attach, 0)
SPL_ME(SplObjectStorage, detach, arginfo_Object, 0)
SPL_ME(SplObjectStorage, contains, arginfo_Object, 0)
SPL_ME(SplObjectStorage, addAll, arginfo_Object, 0)
SPL_ME(SplObjectStorage, removeAll, arginfo_Object, 0)
SPL_ME(SplObjectStorage, removeAllExcept, arginfo_Object, 0)
SPL_ME(SplObjectStorage, getInfo, arginfo_splobject_void,0)
SPL_ME(SplObjectStorage, setInfo, arginfo_setInfo, 0)
SPL_ME(SplObjectStorage, getHash, arginfo_getHash, 0)
/* Countable */
SPL_ME(SplObjectStorage, count, arginfo_splobject_void,0)
/* Iterator */
SPL_ME(SplObjectStorage, rewind, arginfo_splobject_void,0)
SPL_ME(SplObjectStorage, valid, arginfo_splobject_void,0)
SPL_ME(SplObjectStorage, key, arginfo_splobject_void,0)
SPL_ME(SplObjectStorage, current, arginfo_splobject_void,0)
SPL_ME(SplObjectStorage, next, arginfo_splobject_void,0)
/* Serializable */
SPL_ME(SplObjectStorage, unserialize, arginfo_Serialized, 0)
SPL_ME(SplObjectStorage, serialize, arginfo_splobject_void,0)
/* ArrayAccess */
SPL_MA(SplObjectStorage, offsetExists, SplObjectStorage, contains, arginfo_offsetGet, 0)
SPL_MA(SplObjectStorage, offsetSet, SplObjectStorage, attach, arginfo_attach, 0)
SPL_MA(SplObjectStorage, offsetUnset, SplObjectStorage, detach, arginfo_offsetGet, 0)
SPL_ME(SplObjectStorage, offsetGet, arginfo_offsetGet, 0)
{NULL, NULL, NULL}
};
typedef enum {
MIT_NEED_ANY = 0,
MIT_NEED_ALL = 1,
MIT_KEYS_NUMERIC = 0,
MIT_KEYS_ASSOC = 2
} MultipleIteratorFlags;
#define SPL_MULTIPLE_ITERATOR_GET_ALL_CURRENT 1
#define SPL_MULTIPLE_ITERATOR_GET_ALL_KEY 2
/* {{{ proto void MultipleIterator::__construct([int flags = MIT_NEED_ALL|MIT_KEYS_NUMERIC])
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID:
Summary: The SPL component in PHP before 5.4.30 and 5.5.x before 5.5.14 incorrectly anticipates that certain data structures will have the array data type after unserialization, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted string that triggers use of a Hashtable destructor, related to "type confusion" issues in (1) ArrayObject and (2) SPLObjectStorage.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 165,167
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: FT_Bitmap_Convert( FT_Library library,
const FT_Bitmap *source,
FT_Bitmap *target,
FT_Int alignment )
{
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
FT_Memory memory;
FT_Int source_pitch, target_pitch;
if ( !library )
return FT_THROW( Invalid_Library_Handle );
memory = library->memory;
switch ( source->pixel_mode )
{
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_MONO:
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_GRAY:
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_GRAY2:
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_GRAY4:
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_LCD:
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_LCD_V:
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_LCD_V:
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_BGRA:
{
FT_Int pad, old_target_pitch;
FT_Long old_size;
old_target_pitch = target->pitch;
old_target_pitch = -old_target_pitch;
old_size = target->rows * old_target_pitch;
target->pixel_mode = FT_PIXEL_MODE_GRAY;
target->rows = source->rows;
target->width = source->width;
pad = 0;
if ( alignment > 0 )
{
pad = source->width % alignment;
if ( pad != 0 )
pad = alignment - pad;
}
target_pitch = source->width + pad;
if ( target_pitch > 0 &&
(FT_ULong)target->rows > FT_ULONG_MAX / target_pitch )
return FT_THROW( Invalid_Argument );
if ( target->rows * target_pitch > old_size &&
FT_QREALLOC( target->buffer,
old_size, target->rows * target_pitch ) )
return error;
target->pitch = target->pitch < 0 ? -target_pitch : target_pitch;
}
break;
default:
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_Argument );
}
source_pitch = source->pitch;
if ( source_pitch < 0 )
source_pitch = -source_pitch;
switch ( source->pixel_mode )
{
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_MONO:
{
FT_Byte* s = source->buffer;
FT_Byte* t = target->buffer;
FT_Int i;
target->num_grays = 2;
for ( i = source->rows; i > 0; i-- )
{
FT_Byte* ss = s;
FT_Byte* tt = t;
FT_Int j;
/* get the full bytes */
for ( j = source->width >> 3; j > 0; j-- )
{
FT_Int val = ss[0]; /* avoid a byte->int cast on each line */
tt[0] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0x80 ) >> 7 );
tt[1] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0x40 ) >> 6 );
tt[2] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0x20 ) >> 5 );
tt[3] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0x10 ) >> 4 );
tt[4] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0x08 ) >> 3 );
tt[5] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0x04 ) >> 2 );
tt[6] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0x02 ) >> 1 );
tt[7] = (FT_Byte)( val & 0x01 );
tt += 8;
ss += 1;
}
/* get remaining pixels (if any) */
j = source->width & 7;
if ( j > 0 )
{
FT_Int val = *ss;
for ( ; j > 0; j-- )
{
tt[0] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0x80 ) >> 7);
val <<= 1;
tt += 1;
}
}
s += source_pitch;
t += target_pitch;
}
}
break;
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_GRAY:
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_LCD:
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_LCD_V:
{
FT_Int width = source->width;
FT_Byte* s = source->buffer;
FT_Byte* t = target->buffer;
FT_Int i;
target->num_grays = 256;
for ( i = source->rows; i > 0; i-- )
{
FT_ARRAY_COPY( t, s, width );
s += source_pitch;
t += target_pitch;
}
}
break;
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_GRAY2:
{
FT_Byte* s = source->buffer;
FT_Byte* t = target->buffer;
FT_Int i;
target->num_grays = 4;
for ( i = source->rows; i > 0; i-- )
{
FT_Byte* ss = s;
FT_Byte* tt = t;
FT_Int j;
/* get the full bytes */
for ( j = source->width >> 2; j > 0; j-- )
{
FT_Int val = ss[0];
tt[0] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0xC0 ) >> 6 );
tt[1] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0x30 ) >> 4 );
tt[2] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0x0C ) >> 2 );
tt[3] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0x03 ) );
ss += 1;
tt += 4;
}
j = source->width & 3;
if ( j > 0 )
{
FT_Int val = ss[0];
for ( ; j > 0; j-- )
{
tt[0] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0xC0 ) >> 6 );
val <<= 2;
tt += 1;
}
}
s += source_pitch;
t += target_pitch;
}
}
break;
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_GRAY4:
{
FT_Byte* s = source->buffer;
FT_Byte* t = target->buffer;
FT_Int i;
target->num_grays = 16;
for ( i = source->rows; i > 0; i-- )
{
FT_Byte* ss = s;
FT_Byte* tt = t;
FT_Int j;
/* get the full bytes */
for ( j = source->width >> 1; j > 0; j-- )
{
FT_Int val = ss[0];
tt[0] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0xF0 ) >> 4 );
tt[1] = (FT_Byte)( ( val & 0x0F ) );
ss += 1;
tt += 2;
}
if ( source->width & 1 )
tt[0] = (FT_Byte)( ( ss[0] & 0xF0 ) >> 4 );
s += source_pitch;
t += target_pitch;
}
}
break;
case FT_PIXEL_MODE_BGRA:
{
FT_Byte* s = source->buffer;
FT_Byte* t = target->buffer;
FT_Int i;
target->num_grays = 256;
for ( i = source->rows; i > 0; i-- )
{
FT_Byte* ss = s;
FT_Byte* tt = t;
FT_Int j;
for ( j = source->width; j > 0; j-- )
{
tt[0] = ft_gray_for_premultiplied_srgb_bgra( ss );
ss += 4;
tt += 1;
}
s += source_pitch;
t += target_pitch;
}
}
break;
default:
;
}
return error;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119
Summary: The Load_SBit_Png function in sfnt/pngshim.c in FreeType before 2.5.4 does not restrict the rows and pitch values of PNG data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (integer overflow and heap-based buffer overflow) or possibly have unspecified other impact by embedding a PNG file in a .ttf font file.
Commit Message:
|
Low
| 164,847
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: iakerb_gss_init_sec_context(OM_uint32 *minor_status,
gss_cred_id_t claimant_cred_handle,
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle,
gss_name_t target_name,
gss_OID mech_type,
OM_uint32 req_flags,
OM_uint32 time_req,
gss_channel_bindings_t input_chan_bindings,
gss_buffer_t input_token,
gss_OID *actual_mech_type,
gss_buffer_t output_token,
OM_uint32 *ret_flags,
OM_uint32 *time_rec)
{
OM_uint32 major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
krb5_error_code code;
iakerb_ctx_id_t ctx;
krb5_gss_cred_id_t kcred;
krb5_gss_name_t kname;
krb5_boolean cred_locked = FALSE;
int initialContextToken = (*context_handle == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT);
if (initialContextToken) {
code = iakerb_alloc_context(&ctx);
if (code != 0) {
*minor_status = code;
goto cleanup;
}
if (claimant_cred_handle == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) {
major_status = iakerb_gss_acquire_cred(minor_status, NULL,
GSS_C_INDEFINITE,
GSS_C_NULL_OID_SET,
GSS_C_INITIATE,
&ctx->defcred, NULL, NULL);
if (GSS_ERROR(major_status))
goto cleanup;
claimant_cred_handle = ctx->defcred;
}
} else {
ctx = (iakerb_ctx_id_t)*context_handle;
if (claimant_cred_handle == GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
claimant_cred_handle = ctx->defcred;
}
kname = (krb5_gss_name_t)target_name;
major_status = kg_cred_resolve(minor_status, ctx->k5c,
claimant_cred_handle, target_name);
if (GSS_ERROR(major_status))
goto cleanup;
cred_locked = TRUE;
kcred = (krb5_gss_cred_id_t)claimant_cred_handle;
major_status = GSS_S_FAILURE;
if (initialContextToken) {
code = iakerb_get_initial_state(ctx, kcred, kname, time_req,
&ctx->state);
if (code != 0) {
*minor_status = code;
goto cleanup;
}
*context_handle = (gss_ctx_id_t)ctx;
}
if (ctx->state != IAKERB_AP_REQ) {
/* We need to do IAKERB. */
code = iakerb_initiator_step(ctx,
kcred,
kname,
time_req,
input_token,
output_token);
if (code == KRB5_BAD_MSIZE)
major_status = GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN;
if (code != 0) {
*minor_status = code;
goto cleanup;
}
}
if (ctx->state == IAKERB_AP_REQ) {
krb5_gss_ctx_ext_rec exts;
if (cred_locked) {
k5_mutex_unlock(&kcred->lock);
cred_locked = FALSE;
}
iakerb_make_exts(ctx, &exts);
if (ctx->gssc == GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
input_token = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
/* IAKERB is finished, or we skipped to Kerberos directly. */
major_status = krb5_gss_init_sec_context_ext(minor_status,
(gss_cred_id_t) kcred,
&ctx->gssc,
target_name,
(gss_OID)gss_mech_iakerb,
req_flags,
time_req,
input_chan_bindings,
input_token,
NULL,
output_token,
ret_flags,
time_rec,
&exts);
if (major_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
*context_handle = ctx->gssc;
ctx->gssc = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
iakerb_release_context(ctx);
}
if (actual_mech_type != NULL)
*actual_mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_krb5;
} else {
if (actual_mech_type != NULL)
*actual_mech_type = (gss_OID)gss_mech_iakerb;
if (ret_flags != NULL)
*ret_flags = 0;
if (time_rec != NULL)
*time_rec = 0;
major_status = GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED;
}
cleanup:
if (cred_locked)
k5_mutex_unlock(&kcred->lock);
if (initialContextToken && GSS_ERROR(major_status)) {
iakerb_release_context(ctx);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
}
return major_status;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-18
Summary: lib/gssapi/krb5/iakerb.c in MIT Kerberos 5 (aka krb5) before 1.14 relies on an inappropriate context handle, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (incorrect pointer read and process crash) via a crafted IAKERB packet that is mishandled during a gss_inquire_context call.
Commit Message: Fix IAKERB context aliasing bugs [CVE-2015-2696]
The IAKERB mechanism currently replaces its context handle with the
krb5 mechanism handle upon establishment, under the assumption that
most GSS functions are only called after context establishment. This
assumption is incorrect, and can lead to aliasing violations for some
programs. Maintain the IAKERB context structure after context
establishment and add new IAKERB entry points to refer to it with that
type. Add initiate and established flags to the IAKERB context
structure for use in gss_inquire_context() prior to context
establishment.
CVE-2015-2696:
In MIT krb5 1.9 and later, applications which call
gss_inquire_context() on a partially-established IAKERB context can
cause the GSS-API library to read from a pointer using the wrong type,
generally causing a process crash. Java server applications using the
native JGSS provider are vulnerable to this bug. A carefully crafted
IAKERB packet might allow the gss_inquire_context() call to succeed
with attacker-determined results, but applications should not make
access control decisions based on gss_inquire_context() results prior
to context establishment.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
[ghudson@mit.edu: several bugfixes, style changes, and edge-case
behavior changes; commit message and CVE description]
ticket: 8244
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
|
Medium
| 166,646
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: bool IsTraceEventArgsWhitelisted(const char* category_group_name,
const char* event_name) {
base::CStringTokenizer category_group_tokens(
category_group_name, category_group_name + strlen(category_group_name),
",");
while (category_group_tokens.GetNext()) {
const std::string& category_group_token = category_group_tokens.token();
for (int i = 0; kEventArgsWhitelist[i][0] != NULL; ++i) {
DCHECK(kEventArgsWhitelist[i][1]);
if (base::MatchPattern(category_group_token.c_str(),
kEventArgsWhitelist[i][0]) &&
base::MatchPattern(event_name, kEventArgsWhitelist[i][1])) {
return true;
}
}
}
return false;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS
CWE ID: CWE-399
Summary: Use-after-free vulnerability in the FrameSelection::updateAppearance function in core/editing/FrameSelection.cpp in Blink, as used in Google Chrome before 34.0.1847.137, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact by leveraging improper RenderObject handling.
Commit Message: Tracing: Add support for PII whitelisting of individual trace event arguments
R=dsinclair,shatch
BUG=546093
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1415013003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356690}
|
Low
| 171,680
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: EnumTraits<media::mojom::VideoCaptureError, media::VideoCaptureError>::ToMojom(
media::VideoCaptureError input) {
switch (input) {
case media::VideoCaptureError::kNone:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kNone;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kVideoCaptureControllerInvalidOrUnsupportedVideoCaptureParametersRequested:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kVideoCaptureControllerInvalidOrUnsupportedVideoCaptureParametersRequested;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kVideoCaptureControllerIsAlreadyInErrorState:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kVideoCaptureControllerIsAlreadyInErrorState;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kVideoCaptureManagerDeviceConnectionLost:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kVideoCaptureManagerDeviceConnectionLost;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kFrameSinkVideoCaptureDeviceAleradyEndedOnFatalError:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kFrameSinkVideoCaptureDeviceAleradyEndedOnFatalError;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kFrameSinkVideoCaptureDeviceEncounteredFatalError:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kFrameSinkVideoCaptureDeviceEncounteredFatalError;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToOpenV4L2DeviceDriverFile:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kV4L2FailedToOpenV4L2DeviceDriverFile;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2ThisIsNotAV4L2VideoCaptureDevice:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kV4L2ThisIsNotAV4L2VideoCaptureDevice;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToFindASupportedCameraFormat:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kV4L2FailedToFindASupportedCameraFormat;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToSetVideoCaptureFormat:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kV4L2FailedToSetVideoCaptureFormat;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2UnsupportedPixelFormat:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2UnsupportedPixelFormat;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToSetCameraFramerate:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToSetCameraFramerate;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2ErrorRequestingMmapBuffers:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2ErrorRequestingMmapBuffers;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2AllocateBufferFailed:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2AllocateBufferFailed;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2VidiocStreamonFailed:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2VidiocStreamonFailed;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2VidiocStreamoffFailed:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2VidiocStreamoffFailed;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToVidiocReqbufsWithCount0:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kV4L2FailedToVidiocReqbufsWithCount0;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2PollFailed:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2PollFailed;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kV4L2MultipleContinuousTimeoutsWhileReadPolling:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kV4L2MultipleContinuousTimeoutsWhileReadPolling;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToDequeueCaptureBuffer:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToDequeueCaptureBuffer;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToEnqueueCaptureBuffer:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kV4L2FailedToEnqueueCaptureBuffer;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kSingleClientVideoCaptureHostLostConnectionToDevice:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kSingleClientVideoCaptureHostLostConnectionToDevice;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kSingleClientVideoCaptureDeviceLaunchAborted:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kSingleClientVideoCaptureDeviceLaunchAborted;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kDesktopCaptureDeviceWebrtcDesktopCapturerHasFailed:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kDesktopCaptureDeviceWebrtcDesktopCapturerHasFailed;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kFileVideoCaptureDeviceCouldNotOpenVideoFile:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kFileVideoCaptureDeviceCouldNotOpenVideoFile;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kDeviceCaptureLinuxFailedToCreateVideoCaptureDelegate:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kDeviceCaptureLinuxFailedToCreateVideoCaptureDelegate;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kErrorFakeDeviceIntentionallyEmittingErrorEvent:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kErrorFakeDeviceIntentionallyEmittingErrorEvent;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kDeviceClientTooManyFramesDroppedY16:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kDeviceClientTooManyFramesDroppedY16;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kDeviceMediaToMojoAdapterEncounteredUnsupportedBufferType:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kDeviceMediaToMojoAdapterEncounteredUnsupportedBufferType;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kVideoCaptureManagerProcessDeviceStartQueueDeviceInfoNotFound:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kVideoCaptureManagerProcessDeviceStartQueueDeviceInfoNotFound;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kInProcessDeviceLauncherFailedToCreateDeviceInstance:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kInProcessDeviceLauncherFailedToCreateDeviceInstance;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kServiceDeviceLauncherLostConnectionToDeviceFactoryDuringDeviceStart:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kServiceDeviceLauncherLostConnectionToDeviceFactoryDuringDeviceStart;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kServiceDeviceLauncherServiceRespondedWithDeviceNotFound:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kServiceDeviceLauncherServiceRespondedWithDeviceNotFound;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kServiceDeviceLauncherConnectionLostWhileWaitingForCallback:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kServiceDeviceLauncherConnectionLostWhileWaitingForCallback;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kIntentionalErrorRaisedByUnitTest:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kIntentionalErrorRaisedByUnitTest;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kCrosHalV3FailedToStartDeviceThread:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3FailedToStartDeviceThread;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateMojoConnectionError:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateMojoConnectionError;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToGetCameraInfo:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToGetCameraInfo;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateMissingSensorOrientationInfo:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateMissingSensorOrientationInfo;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToOpenCameraDevice:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToOpenCameraDevice;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToInitializeCameraDevice:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToInitializeCameraDevice;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToConfigureStreams:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToConfigureStreams;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateWrongNumberOfStreamsConfigured:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateWrongNumberOfStreamsConfigured;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToGetDefaultRequestSettings:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToGetDefaultRequestSettings;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerHalRequestedTooManyBuffers:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerHalRequestedTooManyBuffers;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToCreateGpuMemoryBuffer:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToCreateGpuMemoryBuffer;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToMapGpuMemoryBuffer:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToMapGpuMemoryBuffer;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerUnsupportedVideoPixelFormat:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerUnsupportedVideoPixelFormat;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToDupFd:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToDupFd;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToWrapGpuMemoryHandle:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToWrapGpuMemoryHandle;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToRegisterBuffer:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToRegisterBuffer;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerProcessCaptureRequestFailed:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerProcessCaptureRequestFailed;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerInvalidPendingResultId:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerInvalidPendingResultId;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerReceivedDuplicatedPartialMetadata:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerReceivedDuplicatedPartialMetadata;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerIncorrectNumberOfOutputBuffersReceived:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerIncorrectNumberOfOutputBuffersReceived;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerInvalidTypeOfOutputBuffersReceived:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerInvalidTypeOfOutputBuffersReceived;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerReceivedMultipleResultBuffersForFrame:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerReceivedMultipleResultBuffersForFrame;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerUnknownStreamInCamera3NotifyMsg:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerUnknownStreamInCamera3NotifyMsg;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerReceivedInvalidShutterTime:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerReceivedInvalidShutterTime;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFatalDeviceError:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFatalDeviceError;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerReceivedFrameIsOutOfOrder:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerReceivedFrameIsOutOfOrder;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToUnwrapReleaseFenceFd:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerFailedToUnwrapReleaseFenceFd;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerSyncWaitOnReleaseFenceTimedOut:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerSyncWaitOnReleaseFenceTimedOut;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kCrosHalV3BufferManagerInvalidJpegBlob:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3BufferManagerInvalidJpegBlob;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidFailedToAllocate:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidFailedToAllocate;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidFailedToStartCapture:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidFailedToStartCapture;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidFailedToStopCapture:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidFailedToStopCapture;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidApi1CameraErrorCallbackReceived:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidApi1CameraErrorCallbackReceived;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidApi2CameraDeviceErrorReceived:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidApi2CameraDeviceErrorReceived;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidApi2CaptureSessionConfigureFailed:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidApi2CaptureSessionConfigureFailed;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidApi2ImageReaderUnexpectedImageFormat:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidApi2ImageReaderUnexpectedImageFormat;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidApi2ImageReaderSizeDidNotMatchImageSize:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidApi2ImageReaderSizeDidNotMatchImageSize;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidApi2ErrorRestartingPreview:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidApi2ErrorRestartingPreview;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidScreenCaptureUnsupportedFormat:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidScreenCaptureUnsupportedFormat;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidScreenCaptureFailedToStartCaptureMachine:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidScreenCaptureFailedToStartCaptureMachine;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidScreenCaptureTheUserDeniedScreenCapture:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidScreenCaptureTheUserDeniedScreenCapture;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidScreenCaptureFailedToStartScreenCapture:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidScreenCaptureFailedToStartScreenCapture;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kWinDirectShowCantGetCaptureFormatSettings:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowCantGetCaptureFormatSettings;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToGetNumberOfCapabilities:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToGetNumberOfCapabilities;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToGetCaptureDeviceCapabilities:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToGetCaptureDeviceCapabilities;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToSetCaptureDeviceOutputFormat:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToSetCaptureDeviceOutputFormat;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kWinDirectShowFailedToConnectTheCaptureGraph:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToConnectTheCaptureGraph;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kWinDirectShowFailedToPauseTheCaptureDevice:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToPauseTheCaptureDevice;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kWinDirectShowFailedToStartTheCaptureDevice:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToStartTheCaptureDevice;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kWinDirectShowFailedToStopTheCaptureGraph:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinDirectShowFailedToStopTheCaptureGraph;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kWinMediaFoundationEngineIsNull:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kWinMediaFoundationEngineIsNull;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kWinMediaFoundationEngineGetSourceFailed:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationEngineGetSourceFailed;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationFillPhotoCapabilitiesFailed:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationFillPhotoCapabilitiesFailed;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationFillVideoCapabilitiesFailed:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationFillVideoCapabilitiesFailed;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kWinMediaFoundationNoVideoCapabilityFound:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationNoVideoCapabilityFound;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationGetAvailableDeviceMediaTypeFailed:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationGetAvailableDeviceMediaTypeFailed;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSetCurrentDeviceMediaTypeFailed:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSetCurrentDeviceMediaTypeFailed;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kWinMediaFoundationEngineGetSinkFailed:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationEngineGetSinkFailed;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSinkQueryCapturePreviewInterfaceFailed:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSinkQueryCapturePreviewInterfaceFailed;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSinkRemoveAllStreamsFailed:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSinkRemoveAllStreamsFailed;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationCreateSinkVideoMediaTypeFailed:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationCreateSinkVideoMediaTypeFailed;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationConvertToVideoSinkMediaTypeFailed:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationConvertToVideoSinkMediaTypeFailed;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kWinMediaFoundationSinkAddStreamFailed:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSinkAddStreamFailed;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSinkSetSampleCallbackFailed:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationSinkSetSampleCallbackFailed;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kWinMediaFoundationEngineStartPreviewFailed:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationEngineStartPreviewFailed;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kWinMediaFoundationGetMediaEventStatusFailed:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kWinMediaFoundationGetMediaEventStatusFailed;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kMacSetCaptureDeviceFailed:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kMacSetCaptureDeviceFailed;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kMacCouldNotStartCaptureDevice:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kMacCouldNotStartCaptureDevice;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kMacReceivedFrameWithUnexpectedResolution:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kMacReceivedFrameWithUnexpectedResolution;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kMacUpdateCaptureResolutionFailed:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kMacUpdateCaptureResolutionFailed;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kMacDeckLinkDeviceIdNotFoundInTheSystem:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kMacDeckLinkDeviceIdNotFoundInTheSystem;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kMacDeckLinkErrorQueryingInputInterface:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kMacDeckLinkErrorQueryingInputInterface;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kMacDeckLinkErrorCreatingDisplayModeIterator:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kMacDeckLinkErrorCreatingDisplayModeIterator;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kMacDeckLinkCouldNotFindADisplayMode:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kMacDeckLinkCouldNotFindADisplayMode;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kMacDeckLinkCouldNotSelectTheVideoFormatWeLike:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kMacDeckLinkCouldNotSelectTheVideoFormatWeLike;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kMacDeckLinkCouldNotStartCapturing:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kMacDeckLinkCouldNotStartCapturing;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kMacDeckLinkUnsupportedPixelFormat:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kMacDeckLinkUnsupportedPixelFormat;
case media::VideoCaptureError::
kMacAvFoundationReceivedAVCaptureSessionRuntimeErrorNotification:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kMacAvFoundationReceivedAVCaptureSessionRuntimeErrorNotification;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kAndroidApi2ErrorConfiguringCamera:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kAndroidApi2ErrorConfiguringCamera;
case media::VideoCaptureError::kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToFlush:
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::
kCrosHalV3DeviceDelegateFailedToFlush;
}
NOTREACHED();
return media::mojom::VideoCaptureError::kNone;
}
Vulnerability Type:
CWE ID: CWE-19
Summary: Google Chrome prior to 55.0.2883.75 for Windows mishandled downloaded files, which allowed a remote attacker to prevent the downloaded file from receiving the Mark of the Web via a crafted HTML page.
Commit Message: Revert "Enable camera blob stream when needed"
This reverts commit 10f4b93635e12f9fa0cba1641a10938ca38ed448.
Reason for revert:
Findit (https://goo.gl/kROfz5) identified CL at revision 601492 as the
culprit for failures in the build cycles as shown on:
https://findit-for-me.appspot.com/waterfall/culprit?key=ag9zfmZpbmRpdC1mb3ItbWVyRAsSDVdmU3VzcGVjdGVkQ0wiMWNocm9taXVtLzEwZjRiOTM2MzVlMTJmOWZhMGNiYTE2NDFhMTA5MzhjYTM4ZWQ0NDgM
Sample Failed Build: https://ci.chromium.org/buildbot/chromium.memory/Linux%20ChromiumOS%20MSan%20Tests/9190
Sample Failed Step: capture_unittests
Original change's description:
> Enable camera blob stream when needed
>
> Since blob stream needs higher resolution, it causes higher cpu loading
> to require higher resolution and resize to smaller resolution.
> In hangout app, we don't need blob stream. Enabling blob stream when
> needed can save a lot of cpu usage.
>
> BUG=b:114676133
> TEST=manually test in apprtc and CCA. make sure picture taking still
> works in CCA.
>
> Change-Id: I9144461bc76627903d0b3b359ce9cf962ff3628c
> Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1261242
> Commit-Queue: Heng-ruey Hsu <henryhsu@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Ricky Liang <jcliang@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Xiaohan Wang <xhwang@chromium.org>
> Reviewed-by: Robert Sesek <rsesek@chromium.org>
> Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601492}
No-Presubmit: true
No-Tree-Checks: true
No-Try: true
BUG=b:114676133
Change-Id: If173ffe9259f7eca849b184806bd56e2a9fbaac4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1292256
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#601538}
|
Medium
| 172,513
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: zend_object_iterator *spl_filesystem_tree_get_iterator(zend_class_entry *ce, zval *object, int by_ref TSRMLS_DC)
{
spl_filesystem_iterator *iterator;
spl_filesystem_object *dir_object;
if (by_ref) {
zend_error(E_ERROR, "An iterator cannot be used with foreach by reference");
}
dir_object = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
iterator = spl_filesystem_object_to_iterator(dir_object);
/* initialize iterator if wasn't gotten before */
if (iterator->intern.data == NULL) {
iterator->intern.data = object;
iterator->intern.funcs = &spl_filesystem_tree_it_funcs;
}
zval_add_ref(&object);
return (zend_object_iterator*)iterator;
}
Vulnerability Type: DoS Overflow
CWE ID: CWE-190
Summary: Integer overflow in the SplFileObject::fread function in spl_directory.c in the SPL extension in PHP before 5.5.37 and 5.6.x before 5.6.23 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via a large integer argument, a related issue to CVE-2016-5096.
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
|
Low
| 167,086
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetKeyboardLibrary(
KeyboardLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->keyboard_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Vulnerability Type: Exec Code
CWE ID: CWE-189
Summary: The Program::getActiveUniformMaxLength function in libGLESv2/Program.cpp in libGLESv2.dll in the WebGLES library in Almost Native Graphics Layer Engine (ANGLE), as used in Mozilla Firefox 4.x before 4.0.1 on Windows and in the GPU process in Google Chrome before 10.0.648.205 on Windows, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via unspecified vectors, related to an *off-by-three* error.
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
|
Low
| 170,639
|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, vulnerability type with description, the commit message and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Output 'High' or 'Medium' or 'Low' only.
|
Code: static int net_ctl_permissions(struct ctl_table_header *head,
struct ctl_table *table)
{
struct net *net = container_of(head->set, struct net, sysctls);
kuid_t root_uid = make_kuid(net->user_ns, 0);
kgid_t root_gid = make_kgid(net->user_ns, 0);
/* Allow network administrator to have same access as root. */
if (ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN) ||
uid_eq(root_uid, current_uid())) {
int mode = (table->mode >> 6) & 7;
return (mode << 6) | (mode << 3) | mode;
}
/* Allow netns root group to have the same access as the root group */
if (gid_eq(root_gid, current_gid())) {
int mode = (table->mode >> 3) & 7;
return (mode << 3) | mode;
}
return table->mode;
}
Vulnerability Type: Bypass
CWE ID: CWE-20
Summary: The net_ctl_permissions function in net/sysctl_net.c in the Linux kernel before 3.11.5 does not properly determine uid and gid values, which allows local users to bypass intended /proc/sys/net restrictions via a crafted application.
Commit Message: net: Update the sysctl permissions handler to test effective uid/gid
Modify the code to use current_euid(), and in_egroup_p, as in done
in fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c:test_perm()
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Eric Sandeen <sandeen@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
|
Low
| 165,994
|
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