instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void buffer_pipe_buf_get(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
struct pipe_buffer *buf)
{
struct buffer_ref *ref = (struct buffer_ref *)buf->private;
ref->ref++;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'page-refs' (page ref overflow)
Merge page ref overflow branch.
Jann Horn reported that he can overflow the page ref count with
sufficient memory (and a filesystem that is intentionally extremely
slow).
Admittedly it's not exactly easy. To have more than four billion
references to a page requires a minimum of 32GB of kernel memory just
for the pointers to the pages, much less any metadata to keep track of
those pointers. Jann needed a total of 140GB of memory and a specially
crafted filesystem that leaves all reads pending (in order to not ever
free the page references and just keep adding more).
Still, we have a fairly straightforward way to limit the two obvious
user-controllable sources of page references: direct-IO like page
references gotten through get_user_pages(), and the splice pipe page
duplication. So let's just do that.
* branch page-refs:
fs: prevent page refcount overflow in pipe_buf_get
mm: prevent get_user_pages() from overflowing page refcount
mm: add 'try_get_page()' helper function
mm: make page ref count overflow check tighter and more explicit
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static void buffer_pipe_buf_get(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
static bool buffer_pipe_buf_get(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
struct pipe_buffer *buf)
{
struct buffer_ref *ref = (struct buffer_ref *)buf->private;
if (ref->ref > INT_MAX/2)
return false;
ref->ref++;
return true;
}
| 170,221 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PowerPopupView() {
SetHorizontalAlignment(ALIGN_RIGHT);
UpdateText();
}
Commit Message: ash: Fix right-alignment of power-status text.
It turns out setting ALING_RIGHT on a Label isn't enough to get proper
right-aligned text. Label has to be explicitly told that it is multi-lined.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9918026
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@129898 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | PowerPopupView() {
SetHorizontalAlignment(ALIGN_RIGHT);
SetMultiLine(true);
UpdateText();
}
| 170,908 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void unset_active_map(const vpx_codec_enc_cfg_t *cfg,
vpx_codec_ctx_t *codec) {
vpx_active_map_t map = {0};
map.rows = (cfg->g_h + 15) / 16;
map.cols = (cfg->g_w + 15) / 16;
map.active_map = NULL;
if (vpx_codec_control(codec, VP8E_SET_ACTIVEMAP, &map))
die_codec(codec, "Failed to set active map");
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void unset_active_map(const vpx_codec_enc_cfg_t *cfg,
vpx_codec_ctx_t *codec) {
vpx_active_map_t map = {0, 0, 0};
map.rows = (cfg->g_h + 15) / 16;
map.cols = (cfg->g_w + 15) / 16;
map.active_map = NULL;
if (vpx_codec_control(codec, VP8E_SET_ACTIVEMAP, &map))
die_codec(codec, "Failed to set active map");
}
| 174,485 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void OMXNodeInstance::invalidateBufferID(OMX::buffer_id buffer __unused) {
}
Commit Message: IOMX: Enable buffer ptr to buffer id translation for arm32
Bug: 20634516
Change-Id: Iac9eac3cb251eccd9bbad5df7421a07edc21da0c
(cherry picked from commit 2d6b6601743c3c6960c6511a2cb774ef902759f4)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void OMXNodeInstance::invalidateBufferID(OMX::buffer_id buffer __unused) {
| 173,359 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RunCoeffCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 5000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, input_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, output_ref_block, kNumCoeffs);
DECLARE_ALIGNED_ARRAY(16, int16_t, output_block, kNumCoeffs);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
input_block[j] = rnd.Rand8() - rnd.Rand8();
fwd_txfm_ref(input_block, output_ref_block, pitch_, tx_type_);
REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunFwdTxfm(input_block, output_block, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
EXPECT_EQ(output_block[j], output_ref_block[j]);
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void RunCoeffCheck() {
ACMRandom rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
const int count_test_block = 5000;
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, int16_t, input_block[kNumCoeffs]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, tran_low_t, output_ref_block[kNumCoeffs]);
DECLARE_ALIGNED(16, tran_low_t, output_block[kNumCoeffs]);
for (int i = 0; i < count_test_block; ++i) {
// Initialize a test block with input range [-mask_, mask_].
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
input_block[j] = (rnd.Rand16() & mask_) - (rnd.Rand16() & mask_);
fwd_txfm_ref(input_block, output_ref_block, pitch_, tx_type_);
ASM_REGISTER_STATE_CHECK(RunFwdTxfm(input_block, output_block, pitch_));
for (int j = 0; j < kNumCoeffs; ++j)
EXPECT_EQ(output_block[j], output_ref_block[j]);
}
}
| 174,548 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t SampleIterator::seekTo(uint32_t sampleIndex) {
ALOGV("seekTo(%d)", sampleIndex);
if (sampleIndex >= mTable->mNumSampleSizes) {
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
if (mTable->mSampleToChunkOffset < 0
|| mTable->mChunkOffsetOffset < 0
|| mTable->mSampleSizeOffset < 0
|| mTable->mTimeToSampleCount == 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mInitialized && mCurrentSampleIndex == sampleIndex) {
return OK;
}
if (!mInitialized || sampleIndex < mFirstChunkSampleIndex) {
reset();
}
if (sampleIndex >= mStopChunkSampleIndex) {
status_t err;
if ((err = findChunkRange(sampleIndex)) != OK) {
ALOGE("findChunkRange failed");
return err;
}
}
CHECK(sampleIndex < mStopChunkSampleIndex);
uint32_t chunk =
(sampleIndex - mFirstChunkSampleIndex) / mSamplesPerChunk
+ mFirstChunk;
if (!mInitialized || chunk != mCurrentChunkIndex) {
mCurrentChunkIndex = chunk;
status_t err;
if ((err = getChunkOffset(chunk, &mCurrentChunkOffset)) != OK) {
ALOGE("getChunkOffset return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.clear();
uint32_t firstChunkSampleIndex =
mFirstChunkSampleIndex
+ mSamplesPerChunk * (mCurrentChunkIndex - mFirstChunk);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSamplesPerChunk; ++i) {
size_t sampleSize;
if ((err = getSampleSizeDirect(
firstChunkSampleIndex + i, &sampleSize)) != OK) {
ALOGE("getSampleSizeDirect return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.push(sampleSize);
}
}
uint32_t chunkRelativeSampleIndex =
(sampleIndex - mFirstChunkSampleIndex) % mSamplesPerChunk;
mCurrentSampleOffset = mCurrentChunkOffset;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < chunkRelativeSampleIndex; ++i) {
mCurrentSampleOffset += mCurrentChunkSampleSizes[i];
}
mCurrentSampleSize = mCurrentChunkSampleSizes[chunkRelativeSampleIndex];
if (sampleIndex < mTTSSampleIndex) {
mTimeToSampleIndex = 0;
mTTSSampleIndex = 0;
mTTSSampleTime = 0;
mTTSCount = 0;
mTTSDuration = 0;
}
status_t err;
if ((err = findSampleTimeAndDuration(
sampleIndex, &mCurrentSampleTime, &mCurrentSampleDuration)) != OK) {
ALOGE("findSampleTime return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentSampleIndex = sampleIndex;
mInitialized = true;
return OK;
}
Commit Message: MPEG4Extractor: ensure kKeyTrackID exists before creating an MPEG4Source as track.
GenericSource: return error when no track exists.
SampleIterator: make sure mSamplesPerChunk is not zero before using it as divisor.
Bug: 21657957
Bug: 23705695
Bug: 22802344
Bug: 28799341
Change-Id: I7664992ade90b935d3f255dcd43ecc2898f30b04
(cherry picked from commit 0386c91b8a910a134e5898ffa924c1b6c7560b13)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | status_t SampleIterator::seekTo(uint32_t sampleIndex) {
ALOGV("seekTo(%d)", sampleIndex);
if (sampleIndex >= mTable->mNumSampleSizes) {
return ERROR_END_OF_STREAM;
}
if (mTable->mSampleToChunkOffset < 0
|| mTable->mChunkOffsetOffset < 0
|| mTable->mSampleSizeOffset < 0
|| mTable->mTimeToSampleCount == 0) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
if (mInitialized && mCurrentSampleIndex == sampleIndex) {
return OK;
}
if (!mInitialized || sampleIndex < mFirstChunkSampleIndex) {
reset();
}
if (sampleIndex >= mStopChunkSampleIndex) {
status_t err;
if ((err = findChunkRange(sampleIndex)) != OK) {
ALOGE("findChunkRange failed");
return err;
}
}
CHECK(sampleIndex < mStopChunkSampleIndex);
if (mSamplesPerChunk == 0) {
ALOGE("b/22802344");
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
uint32_t chunk =
(sampleIndex - mFirstChunkSampleIndex) / mSamplesPerChunk
+ mFirstChunk;
if (!mInitialized || chunk != mCurrentChunkIndex) {
mCurrentChunkIndex = chunk;
status_t err;
if ((err = getChunkOffset(chunk, &mCurrentChunkOffset)) != OK) {
ALOGE("getChunkOffset return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.clear();
uint32_t firstChunkSampleIndex =
mFirstChunkSampleIndex
+ mSamplesPerChunk * (mCurrentChunkIndex - mFirstChunk);
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mSamplesPerChunk; ++i) {
size_t sampleSize;
if ((err = getSampleSizeDirect(
firstChunkSampleIndex + i, &sampleSize)) != OK) {
ALOGE("getSampleSizeDirect return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentChunkSampleSizes.push(sampleSize);
}
}
uint32_t chunkRelativeSampleIndex =
(sampleIndex - mFirstChunkSampleIndex) % mSamplesPerChunk;
mCurrentSampleOffset = mCurrentChunkOffset;
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < chunkRelativeSampleIndex; ++i) {
mCurrentSampleOffset += mCurrentChunkSampleSizes[i];
}
mCurrentSampleSize = mCurrentChunkSampleSizes[chunkRelativeSampleIndex];
if (sampleIndex < mTTSSampleIndex) {
mTimeToSampleIndex = 0;
mTTSSampleIndex = 0;
mTTSSampleTime = 0;
mTTSCount = 0;
mTTSDuration = 0;
}
status_t err;
if ((err = findSampleTimeAndDuration(
sampleIndex, &mCurrentSampleTime, &mCurrentSampleDuration)) != OK) {
ALOGE("findSampleTime return error");
return err;
}
mCurrentSampleIndex = sampleIndex;
mInitialized = true;
return OK;
}
| 173,766 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_char *p;
size_t slen, rlen;
int r, ssh1cipher;
if (!compat20) {
ssh1cipher = cipher_ctx_get_number(state->receive_context);
slen = cipher_get_keyiv_len(state->send_context);
rlen = cipher_get_keyiv_len(state->receive_context);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->remote_protocol_flags)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ssh1cipher)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, state->ssh1_key, state->ssh1_keylen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_reserve(m, slen, &p)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_get_keyiv(state->send_context, p, slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, rlen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_reserve(m, rlen, &p)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_get_keyiv(state->receive_context, p, rlen)) != 0)
return r;
} else {
if ((r = kex_to_blob(m, ssh->kex)) != 0 ||
(r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 ||
(r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->rekey_limit)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->rekey_interval)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.packets)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.packets)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.bytes)) != 0)
return r;
}
slen = cipher_get_keycontext(state->send_context, NULL);
rlen = cipher_get_keycontext(state->receive_context, NULL);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_reserve(m, slen, &p)) != 0)
return r;
if (cipher_get_keycontext(state->send_context, p) != (int)slen)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, rlen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_reserve(m, rlen, &p)) != 0)
return r;
if (cipher_get_keycontext(state->receive_context, p) != (int)rlen)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((r = ssh_packet_get_compress_state(m, ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->input)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->output)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_char *p;
size_t slen, rlen;
int r, ssh1cipher;
if (!compat20) {
ssh1cipher = cipher_ctx_get_number(state->receive_context);
slen = cipher_get_keyiv_len(state->send_context);
rlen = cipher_get_keyiv_len(state->receive_context);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->remote_protocol_flags)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ssh1cipher)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, state->ssh1_key, state->ssh1_keylen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_reserve(m, slen, &p)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_get_keyiv(state->send_context, p, slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, rlen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_reserve(m, rlen, &p)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_get_keyiv(state->receive_context, p, rlen)) != 0)
return r;
} else {
if ((r = kex_to_blob(m, ssh->kex)) != 0 ||
(r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 ||
(r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->rekey_limit)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->rekey_interval)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.packets)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.packets)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.bytes)) != 0)
return r;
}
slen = cipher_get_keycontext(state->send_context, NULL);
rlen = cipher_get_keycontext(state->receive_context, NULL);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_reserve(m, slen, &p)) != 0)
return r;
if (cipher_get_keycontext(state->send_context, p) != (int)slen)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, rlen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_reserve(m, rlen, &p)) != 0)
return r;
if (cipher_get_keycontext(state->receive_context, p) != (int)rlen)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->input)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->output)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
| 168,653 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: get_principal_2_svc(gprinc_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gprinc_ret ret;
char *prime_arg, *funcname;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gprinc_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
funcname = "kadm5_get_principal";
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (! cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ) &&
(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_INQUIRE,
arg->princ,
NULL))) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_GET;
log_unauth(funcname, prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_principal(handle, arg->princ, &ret.rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done(funcname, prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | get_principal_2_svc(gprinc_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static gprinc_ret ret;
char *prime_arg, *funcname;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_gprinc_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
funcname = "kadm5_get_principal";
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (! cmp_gss_krb5_name(handle, rqst2name(rqstp), arg->princ) &&
(CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp) || !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context,
rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_INQUIRE,
arg->princ,
NULL))) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_GET;
log_unauth(funcname, prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_get_principal(handle, arg->princ, &ret.rec,
arg->mask);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done(funcname, prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
| 167,515 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *in)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
LutContext *s = ctx->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = ctx->outputs[0];
AVFrame *out;
uint8_t *inrow, *outrow, *inrow0, *outrow0;
int i, j, plane, direct = 0;
if (av_frame_is_writable(in)) {
direct = 1;
out = in;
} else {
out = ff_get_video_buffer(outlink, outlink->w, outlink->h);
if (!out) {
av_frame_free(&in);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
av_frame_copy_props(out, in);
}
if (s->is_rgb) {
/* packed */
inrow0 = in ->data[0];
outrow0 = out->data[0];
for (i = 0; i < in->height; i ++) {
int w = inlink->w;
const uint8_t (*tab)[256] = (const uint8_t (*)[256])s->lut;
inrow = inrow0;
outrow = outrow0;
for (j = 0; j < w; j++) {
switch (s->step) {
case 4: outrow[3] = tab[3][inrow[3]]; // Fall-through
case 3: outrow[2] = tab[2][inrow[2]]; // Fall-through
case 2: outrow[1] = tab[1][inrow[1]]; // Fall-through
default: outrow[0] = tab[0][inrow[0]];
}
outrow += s->step;
inrow += s->step;
}
inrow0 += in ->linesize[0];
outrow0 += out->linesize[0];
}
} else {
/* planar */
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && in->data[plane]; plane++) {
int vsub = plane == 1 || plane == 2 ? s->vsub : 0;
int hsub = plane == 1 || plane == 2 ? s->hsub : 0;
int h = FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->h, vsub);
int w = FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->w, hsub);
inrow = in ->data[plane];
outrow = out->data[plane];
for (i = 0; i < h; i++) {
const uint8_t *tab = s->lut[plane];
for (j = 0; j < w; j++)
outrow[j] = tab[inrow[j]];
inrow += in ->linesize[plane];
outrow += out->linesize[plane];
}
}
}
if (!direct)
av_frame_free(&in);
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, out);
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *in)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
LutContext *s = ctx->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = ctx->outputs[0];
AVFrame *out;
uint8_t *inrow, *outrow, *inrow0, *outrow0;
int i, j, plane, direct = 0;
if (av_frame_is_writable(in)) {
direct = 1;
out = in;
} else {
out = ff_get_video_buffer(outlink, outlink->w, outlink->h);
if (!out) {
av_frame_free(&in);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
av_frame_copy_props(out, in);
}
if (s->is_rgb) {
/* packed */
inrow0 = in ->data[0];
outrow0 = out->data[0];
for (i = 0; i < in->height; i ++) {
int w = inlink->w;
const uint8_t (*tab)[256] = (const uint8_t (*)[256])s->lut;
inrow = inrow0;
outrow = outrow0;
for (j = 0; j < w; j++) {
switch (s->step) {
case 4: outrow[3] = tab[3][inrow[3]]; // Fall-through
case 3: outrow[2] = tab[2][inrow[2]]; // Fall-through
case 2: outrow[1] = tab[1][inrow[1]]; // Fall-through
default: outrow[0] = tab[0][inrow[0]];
}
outrow += s->step;
inrow += s->step;
}
inrow0 += in ->linesize[0];
outrow0 += out->linesize[0];
}
} else {
/* planar */
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && in->data[plane] && in->linesize[plane]; plane++) {
int vsub = plane == 1 || plane == 2 ? s->vsub : 0;
int hsub = plane == 1 || plane == 2 ? s->hsub : 0;
int h = FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->h, vsub);
int w = FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->w, hsub);
inrow = in ->data[plane];
outrow = out->data[plane];
for (i = 0; i < h; i++) {
const uint8_t *tab = s->lut[plane];
for (j = 0; j < w; j++)
outrow[j] = tab[inrow[j]];
inrow += in ->linesize[plane];
outrow += out->linesize[plane];
}
}
}
if (!direct)
av_frame_free(&in);
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, out);
}
| 166,004 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void fdct16x16_ref(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
vp9_fdct16x16_c(in, out, stride);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void fdct16x16_ref(const int16_t *in, int16_t *out, int stride, int tx_type) {
void fdct16x16_ref(const int16_t *in, tran_low_t *out, int stride,
int /*tx_type*/) {
vpx_fdct16x16_c(in, out, stride);
}
| 174,529 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: chunk_new_with_alloc_size(size_t alloc)
{
chunk_t *ch;
ch = tor_malloc(alloc);
ch->next = NULL;
ch->datalen = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_CHUNK_ALLOC
ch->DBG_alloc = alloc;
#endif
ch->memlen = CHUNK_SIZE_WITH_ALLOC(alloc);
total_bytes_allocated_in_chunks += alloc;
ch->data = &ch->mem[0];
return ch;
}
Commit Message: Add a one-word sentinel value of 0x0 at the end of each buf_t chunk
This helps protect against bugs where any part of a buf_t's memory
is passed to a function that expects a NUL-terminated input.
It also closes TROVE-2016-10-001 (aka bug 20384).
CWE ID: CWE-119 | chunk_new_with_alloc_size(size_t alloc)
{
chunk_t *ch;
ch = tor_malloc(alloc);
ch->next = NULL;
ch->datalen = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_CHUNK_ALLOC
ch->DBG_alloc = alloc;
#endif
ch->memlen = CHUNK_SIZE_WITH_ALLOC(alloc);
total_bytes_allocated_in_chunks += alloc;
ch->data = &ch->mem[0];
CHUNK_SET_SENTINEL(ch, alloc);
return ch;
}
| 168,758 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool Track::GetLacing() const
{
return m_info.lacing;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool Track::GetLacing() const
| 174,334 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: horDiff16(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
TIFFPredictorState* sp = PredictorState(tif);
tmsize_t stride = sp->stride;
uint16 *wp = (uint16*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc/2;
assert((cc%(2*stride))==0);
if (wc > stride) {
wc -= stride;
wp += wc - 1;
do {
REPEAT4(stride, wp[stride] = (uint16)(((unsigned int)wp[stride] - (unsigned int)wp[0]) & 0xffff); wp--)
wc -= stride;
} while (wc > 0);
}
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | horDiff16(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
TIFFPredictorState* sp = PredictorState(tif);
tmsize_t stride = sp->stride;
uint16 *wp = (uint16*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc/2;
if((cc%(2*stride))!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "horDiff8",
"%s", "(cc%(2*stride))!=0");
return 0;
}
if (wc > stride) {
wc -= stride;
wp += wc - 1;
do {
REPEAT4(stride, wp[stride] = (uint16)(((unsigned int)wp[stride] - (unsigned int)wp[0]) & 0xffff); wp--)
wc -= stride;
} while (wc > 0);
}
return 1;
}
| 166,885 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: LauncherView::LauncherView(LauncherModel* model,
LauncherDelegate* delegate,
ShelfLayoutManager* shelf_layout_manager)
: model_(model),
delegate_(delegate),
view_model_(new views::ViewModel),
last_visible_index_(-1),
overflow_button_(NULL),
dragging_(false),
drag_view_(NULL),
drag_offset_(0),
start_drag_index_(-1),
context_menu_id_(0),
alignment_(SHELF_ALIGNMENT_BOTTOM) {
DCHECK(model_);
bounds_animator_.reset(new views::BoundsAnimator(this));
bounds_animator_->AddObserver(this);
set_context_menu_controller(this);
focus_search_.reset(new LauncherFocusSearch(view_model_.get()));
tooltip_.reset(new LauncherTooltipManager(alignment_, shelf_layout_manager));
}
Commit Message: ash: Add launcher overflow bubble.
- Host a LauncherView in bubble to display overflown items;
- Mouse wheel and two-finger scroll to scroll the LauncherView in bubble in case overflow bubble is overflown;
- Fit bubble when items are added/removed;
- Keep launcher bar on screen when the bubble is shown;
BUG=128054
TEST=Verify launcher overflown items are in a bubble instead of menu.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10659003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146460 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | LauncherView::LauncherView(LauncherModel* model,
LauncherDelegate* delegate,
ShelfLayoutManager* shelf_layout_manager)
: model_(model),
delegate_(delegate),
view_model_(new views::ViewModel),
first_visible_index_(0),
last_visible_index_(-1),
overflow_button_(NULL),
dragging_(false),
drag_view_(NULL),
drag_offset_(0),
start_drag_index_(-1),
context_menu_id_(0),
alignment_(SHELF_ALIGNMENT_BOTTOM),
leading_inset_(kDefaultLeadingInset) {
DCHECK(model_);
bounds_animator_.reset(new views::BoundsAnimator(this));
bounds_animator_->AddObserver(this);
set_context_menu_controller(this);
focus_search_.reset(new LauncherFocusSearch(view_model_.get()));
tooltip_.reset(new LauncherTooltipManager(alignment_, shelf_layout_manager));
}
| 170,892 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: standard_display_init(standard_display *dp, png_store* ps, png_uint_32 id,
int do_interlace, int use_update_info)
{
memset(dp, 0, sizeof *dp);
dp->ps = ps;
dp->colour_type = COL_FROM_ID(id);
dp->bit_depth = DEPTH_FROM_ID(id);
if (dp->bit_depth < 1 || dp->bit_depth > 16)
internal_error(ps, "internal: bad bit depth");
if (dp->colour_type == 3)
dp->red_sBIT = dp->blue_sBIT = dp->green_sBIT = dp->alpha_sBIT = 8;
else
dp->red_sBIT = dp->blue_sBIT = dp->green_sBIT = dp->alpha_sBIT =
dp->bit_depth;
dp->interlace_type = INTERLACE_FROM_ID(id);
check_interlace_type(dp->interlace_type);
dp->id = id;
/* All the rest are filled in after the read_info: */
dp->w = 0;
dp->h = 0;
dp->npasses = 0;
dp->pixel_size = 0;
dp->bit_width = 0;
dp->cbRow = 0;
dp->do_interlace = do_interlace;
dp->is_transparent = 0;
dp->speed = ps->speed;
dp->use_update_info = use_update_info;
dp->npalette = 0;
/* Preset the transparent color to black: */
memset(&dp->transparent, 0, sizeof dp->transparent);
/* Preset the palette to full intensity/opaque througout: */
memset(dp->palette, 0xff, sizeof dp->palette);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | standard_display_init(standard_display *dp, png_store* ps, png_uint_32 id,
int do_interlace, int use_update_info)
{
memset(dp, 0, sizeof *dp);
dp->ps = ps;
dp->colour_type = COL_FROM_ID(id);
dp->bit_depth = DEPTH_FROM_ID(id);
if (dp->bit_depth < 1 || dp->bit_depth > 16)
internal_error(ps, "internal: bad bit depth");
if (dp->colour_type == 3)
dp->red_sBIT = dp->blue_sBIT = dp->green_sBIT = dp->alpha_sBIT = 8;
else
dp->red_sBIT = dp->blue_sBIT = dp->green_sBIT = dp->alpha_sBIT =
dp->bit_depth;
dp->interlace_type = INTERLACE_FROM_ID(id);
check_interlace_type(dp->interlace_type);
dp->id = id;
/* All the rest are filled in after the read_info: */
dp->w = 0;
dp->h = 0;
dp->npasses = 0;
dp->pixel_size = 0;
dp->bit_width = 0;
dp->cbRow = 0;
dp->do_interlace = do_interlace;
dp->littleendian = 0;
dp->is_transparent = 0;
dp->speed = ps->speed;
dp->use_update_info = use_update_info;
dp->npalette = 0;
/* Preset the transparent color to black: */
memset(&dp->transparent, 0, sizeof dp->transparent);
/* Preset the palette to full intensity/opaque througout: */
memset(dp->palette, 0xff, sizeof dp->palette);
}
| 173,697 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: read_bytes(FILE *fp, void *buf, size_t bytes_to_read, int fail_on_eof,
char *errbuf)
{
size_t amt_read;
amt_read = fread(buf, 1, bytes_to_read, fp);
if (amt_read != bytes_to_read) {
if (ferror(fp)) {
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
errno, "error reading dump file");
} else {
if (amt_read == 0 && !fail_on_eof)
return (0); /* EOF */
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
"truncated dump file; tried to read %" PRIsize " bytes, only got %" PRIsize,
bytes_to_read, amt_read);
}
return (-1);
}
return (1);
}
Commit Message: do sanity checks on PHB header length before allocating memory. There was no fault; but doing the check results in a more consistent error
CWE ID: CWE-20 | read_bytes(FILE *fp, void *buf, size_t bytes_to_read, int fail_on_eof,
char *errbuf)
{
size_t amt_read;
amt_read = fread(buf, 1, bytes_to_read, fp);
if (amt_read != bytes_to_read) {
if (ferror(fp)) {
pcap_fmt_errmsg_for_errno(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
errno, "error reading dump file");
} else {
if (amt_read == 0 && !fail_on_eof)
return (0); /* EOF */
pcap_snprintf(errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE,
"truncated pcapng dump file; tried to read %" PRIsize " bytes, only got %" PRIsize,
bytes_to_read, amt_read);
}
return (-1);
}
return (1);
}
| 170,188 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BrowserContextDestroyer::RenderProcessHostDestroyed(
content::RenderProcessHost* host) {
DCHECK_GT(pending_hosts_, 0U);
if (--pending_hosts_ != 0) {
return;
}
//// static
if (content::RenderProcessHost::run_renderer_in_process()) {
FinishDestroyContext();
} else {
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&BrowserContextDestroyer::FinishDestroyContext,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void BrowserContextDestroyer::RenderProcessHostDestroyed(
content::RenderProcessHost* host) {
DCHECK_GT(pending_host_ids_.size(), 0U);
size_t erased = pending_host_ids_.erase(host->GetID());
DCHECK_GT(erased, 0U);
MaybeScheduleFinishDestroyContext(host);
}
//// static
void BrowserContextDestroyer::DestroyContext(
std::unique_ptr<BrowserContext> context) {
bool has_live_otr_context = false;
uint32_t otr_contexts_pending_deletion = 0;
if (!context->IsOffTheRecord()) {
// If |context| is not an OTR BrowserContext, we need to keep track of how
// many OTR BrowserContexts that were owned by it are scheduled for deletion
// but still exist, as |context| must outlive these
for (auto* destroyer : g_contexts_pending_deletion.Get()) {
if (destroyer->context_->IsOffTheRecord() &&
destroyer->context_->GetOriginalContext() == context.get()) {
++otr_contexts_pending_deletion;
}
}
// If |context| is not an OTR BrowserContext but currently owns a live OTR
// BrowserContext, then we have to outlive that
has_live_otr_context = context->HasOffTheRecordContext();
} else {
// If |context| is an OTR BrowserContext and its owner has already been
// scheduled for deletion, then we need to prevent the owner from being
// deleted until after |context|
BrowserContextDestroyer* orig_destroyer =
GetForContext(context->GetOriginalContext());
if (orig_destroyer) {
CHECK(!orig_destroyer->finish_destroy_scheduled_);
++orig_destroyer->otr_contexts_pending_deletion_;
}
}
// Get all of the live RenderProcessHosts that are using |context|
std::set<content::RenderProcessHost*> hosts =
GetHostsForContext(context.get());
content::BrowserContext::NotifyWillBeDestroyed(context.get());
// |hosts| might not be empty if the application released its BrowserContext
// too early, or if |context| is an OTR context or this application is single
// process
if (!hosts.empty() ||
otr_contexts_pending_deletion > 0 ||
has_live_otr_context) {
// |context| is not safe to delete yet
new BrowserContextDestroyer(std::move(context),
hosts,
otr_contexts_pending_deletion);
}
}
| 165,421 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int qcow2_snapshot_load_tmp(BlockDriverState *bs,
const char *snapshot_id,
const char *name,
Error **errp)
{
int i, snapshot_index;
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
QCowSnapshot *sn;
uint64_t *new_l1_table;
int new_l1_bytes;
int ret;
assert(bs->read_only);
/* Search the snapshot */
snapshot_index = find_snapshot_by_id_and_name(bs, snapshot_id, name);
if (snapshot_index < 0) {
error_setg(errp,
"Can't find snapshot");
return -ENOENT;
}
sn = &s->snapshots[snapshot_index];
/* Allocate and read in the snapshot's L1 table */
new_l1_bytes = s->l1_size * sizeof(uint64_t);
new_l1_table = g_malloc0(align_offset(new_l1_bytes, 512));
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, sn->l1_table_offset, new_l1_table, new_l1_bytes);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg(errp, "Failed to read l1 table for snapshot");
g_free(new_l1_table);
return ret;
}
/* Switch the L1 table */
g_free(s->l1_table);
s->l1_size = sn->l1_size;
s->l1_table_offset = sn->l1_table_offset;
s->l1_table = new_l1_table;
for(i = 0;i < s->l1_size; i++) {
be64_to_cpus(&s->l1_table[i]);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int qcow2_snapshot_load_tmp(BlockDriverState *bs,
const char *snapshot_id,
const char *name,
Error **errp)
{
int i, snapshot_index;
BDRVQcowState *s = bs->opaque;
QCowSnapshot *sn;
uint64_t *new_l1_table;
int new_l1_bytes;
int ret;
assert(bs->read_only);
/* Search the snapshot */
snapshot_index = find_snapshot_by_id_and_name(bs, snapshot_id, name);
if (snapshot_index < 0) {
error_setg(errp,
"Can't find snapshot");
return -ENOENT;
}
sn = &s->snapshots[snapshot_index];
/* Allocate and read in the snapshot's L1 table */
new_l1_bytes = sn->l1_size * sizeof(uint64_t);
new_l1_table = g_malloc0(align_offset(new_l1_bytes, 512));
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, sn->l1_table_offset, new_l1_table, new_l1_bytes);
if (ret < 0) {
error_setg(errp, "Failed to read l1 table for snapshot");
g_free(new_l1_table);
return ret;
}
/* Switch the L1 table */
g_free(s->l1_table);
s->l1_size = sn->l1_size;
s->l1_table_offset = sn->l1_table_offset;
s->l1_table = new_l1_table;
for(i = 0;i < s->l1_size; i++) {
be64_to_cpus(&s->l1_table[i]);
}
return 0;
}
| 165,402 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t exitcode_proc_write(struct file *file,
const char __user *buffer, size_t count, loff_t *pos)
{
char *end, buf[sizeof("nnnnn\0")];
int tmp;
if (copy_from_user(buf, buffer, count))
return -EFAULT;
tmp = simple_strtol(buf, &end, 0);
if ((*end != '\0') && !isspace(*end))
return -EINVAL;
uml_exitcode = tmp;
return count;
}
Commit Message: uml: check length in exitcode_proc_write()
We don't cap the size of buffer from the user so we could write past the
end of the array here. Only root can write to this file.
Reported-by: Nico Golde <nico@ngolde.de>
Reported-by: Fabian Yamaguchi <fabs@goesec.de>
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static ssize_t exitcode_proc_write(struct file *file,
const char __user *buffer, size_t count, loff_t *pos)
{
char *end, buf[sizeof("nnnnn\0")];
size_t size;
int tmp;
size = min(count, sizeof(buf));
if (copy_from_user(buf, buffer, size))
return -EFAULT;
tmp = simple_strtol(buf, &end, 0);
if ((*end != '\0') && !isspace(*end))
return -EINVAL;
uml_exitcode = tmp;
return count;
}
| 165,966 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long VideoTrack::Parse(
Segment* pSegment,
const Info& info,
long long element_start,
long long element_size,
VideoTrack*& pResult)
{
if (pResult)
return -1;
if (info.type != Track::kVideo)
return -1;
long long width = 0;
long long height = 0;
double rate = 0.0;
IMkvReader* const pReader = pSegment->m_pReader;
const Settings& s = info.settings;
assert(s.start >= 0);
assert(s.size >= 0);
long long pos = s.start;
assert(pos >= 0);
const long long stop = pos + s.size;
while (pos < stop)
{
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(
pReader,
pos,
stop,
id,
size);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (id == 0x30) //pixel width
{
width = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (width <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
else if (id == 0x3A) //pixel height
{
height = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (height <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
else if (id == 0x0383E3) //frame rate
{
const long status = UnserializeFloat(
pReader,
pos,
size,
rate);
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (rate <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
pos += size; //consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
VideoTrack* const pTrack = new (std::nothrow) VideoTrack(pSegment,
element_start,
element_size);
if (pTrack == NULL)
return -1; //generic error
const int status = info.Copy(pTrack->m_info);
if (status) // error
{
delete pTrack;
return status;
}
pTrack->m_width = width;
pTrack->m_height = height;
pTrack->m_rate = rate;
pResult = pTrack;
return 0; //success
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long VideoTrack::Parse(
IMkvReader* const pReader = pSegment->m_pReader;
const Settings& s = info.settings;
assert(s.start >= 0);
assert(s.size >= 0);
long long pos = s.start;
assert(pos >= 0);
const long long stop = pos + s.size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x30) { // pixel width
width = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (width <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x3A) { // pixel height
height = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (height <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x0383E3) { // frame rate
const long status = UnserializeFloat(pReader, pos, size, rate);
| 174,406 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void lo_release(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode)
{
struct loop_device *lo = disk->private_data;
int err;
if (atomic_dec_return(&lo->lo_refcnt))
return;
mutex_lock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
if (lo->lo_flags & LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR) {
/*
* In autoclear mode, stop the loop thread
* and remove configuration after last close.
*/
err = loop_clr_fd(lo);
if (!err)
return;
} else if (lo->lo_state == Lo_bound) {
/*
* Otherwise keep thread (if running) and config,
* but flush possible ongoing bios in thread.
*/
blk_mq_freeze_queue(lo->lo_queue);
blk_mq_unfreeze_queue(lo->lo_queue);
}
mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
}
Commit Message: loop: fix concurrent lo_open/lo_release
范龙飞 reports that KASAN can report a use-after-free in __lock_acquire.
The reason is due to insufficient serialization in lo_release(), which
will continue to use the loop device even after it has decremented the
lo_refcnt to zero.
In the meantime, another process can come in, open the loop device
again as it is being shut down. Confusion ensues.
Reported-by: 范龙飞 <long7573@126.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static void lo_release(struct gendisk *disk, fmode_t mode)
static void __lo_release(struct loop_device *lo)
{
int err;
if (atomic_dec_return(&lo->lo_refcnt))
return;
mutex_lock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
if (lo->lo_flags & LO_FLAGS_AUTOCLEAR) {
/*
* In autoclear mode, stop the loop thread
* and remove configuration after last close.
*/
err = loop_clr_fd(lo);
if (!err)
return;
} else if (lo->lo_state == Lo_bound) {
/*
* Otherwise keep thread (if running) and config,
* but flush possible ongoing bios in thread.
*/
blk_mq_freeze_queue(lo->lo_queue);
blk_mq_unfreeze_queue(lo->lo_queue);
}
mutex_unlock(&lo->lo_ctl_mutex);
}
| 169,352 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long mkvparser::ParseElementHeader(
IMkvReader* pReader,
long long& pos,
long long stop,
long long& id,
long long& size)
{
if ((stop >= 0) && (pos >= stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
long len;
id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; //consume id
if ((stop >= 0) && (pos >= stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; //consume length of size
if ((stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0; //success
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long mkvparser::ParseElementHeader(
long len;
id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume id
if ((stop >= 0) && (pos >= stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
pos += len; // consume length of size
// pos now designates payload
if ((stop >= 0) && ((pos + size) > stop))
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0; // success
}
| 174,424 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: getprivs_ret * get_privs_2_svc(krb5_ui_4 *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static getprivs_ret ret;
gss_buffer_desc client_name, service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_getprivs_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(*arg, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
ret.code = kadm5_get_privs((void *)handle, &ret.privs);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_get_privs", client_name.value, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | getprivs_ret * get_privs_2_svc(krb5_ui_4 *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static getprivs_ret ret;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_getprivs_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(*arg, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
ret.code = kadm5_get_privs((void *)handle, &ret.privs);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_get_privs", client_name.value, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
| 167,517 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DevToolsSession::DevToolsSession(DevToolsAgentHostImpl* agent_host,
DevToolsAgentHostClient* client)
: binding_(this),
agent_host_(agent_host),
client_(client),
process_(nullptr),
host_(nullptr),
dispatcher_(new protocol::UberDispatcher(this)),
weak_factory_(this) {
dispatcher_->setFallThroughForNotFound(true);
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | DevToolsSession::DevToolsSession(DevToolsAgentHostImpl* agent_host,
DevToolsAgentHostClient* client)
: binding_(this),
agent_host_(agent_host),
client_(client),
process_host_id_(ChildProcessHost::kInvalidUniqueID),
host_(nullptr),
dispatcher_(new protocol::UberDispatcher(this)),
weak_factory_(this) {
dispatcher_->setFallThroughForNotFound(true);
}
| 172,741 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_many_uppercase (MyObject *obj, const char * const *in, char ***out, GError **error)
{
int len;
int i;
len = g_strv_length ((char**) in);
*out = g_new0 (char *, len + 1);
for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
{
(*out)[i] = g_ascii_strup (in[i], -1);
}
(*out)[i] = NULL;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_many_uppercase (MyObject *obj, const char * const *in, char ***out, GError **error)
| 165,113 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: stringprep_strerror (Stringprep_rc rc)
{
const char *p;
bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
switch (rc)
{
case STRINGPREP_OK:
p = _("Success");
break;
case STRINGPREP_CONTAINS_UNASSIGNED:
p = _("Forbidden unassigned code points in input");
break;
case STRINGPREP_CONTAINS_PROHIBITED:
p = _("Prohibited code points in input");
break;
case STRINGPREP_BIDI_BOTH_L_AND_RAL:
p = _("Conflicting bidirectional properties in input");
break;
case STRINGPREP_BIDI_LEADTRAIL_NOT_RAL:
p = _("Malformed bidirectional string");
break;
case STRINGPREP_BIDI_CONTAINS_PROHIBITED:
p = _("Prohibited bidirectional code points in input");
break;
case STRINGPREP_TOO_SMALL_BUFFER:
p = _("Output would exceed the buffer space provided");
break;
case STRINGPREP_PROFILE_ERROR:
p = _("Error in stringprep profile definition");
break;
case STRINGPREP_FLAG_ERROR:
p = _("Flag conflict with profile");
break;
case STRINGPREP_UNKNOWN_PROFILE:
case STRINGPREP_UNKNOWN_PROFILE:
p = _("Unknown profile");
break;
case STRINGPREP_NFKC_FAILED:
p = _("Unicode normalization failed (internal error)");
break;
default:
p = _("Unknown error");
break;
}
return p;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | stringprep_strerror (Stringprep_rc rc)
{
const char *p;
bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
switch (rc)
{
case STRINGPREP_OK:
p = _("Success");
break;
case STRINGPREP_CONTAINS_UNASSIGNED:
p = _("Forbidden unassigned code points in input");
break;
case STRINGPREP_CONTAINS_PROHIBITED:
p = _("Prohibited code points in input");
break;
case STRINGPREP_BIDI_BOTH_L_AND_RAL:
p = _("Conflicting bidirectional properties in input");
break;
case STRINGPREP_BIDI_LEADTRAIL_NOT_RAL:
p = _("Malformed bidirectional string");
break;
case STRINGPREP_BIDI_CONTAINS_PROHIBITED:
p = _("Prohibited bidirectional code points in input");
break;
case STRINGPREP_TOO_SMALL_BUFFER:
p = _("Output would exceed the buffer space provided");
break;
case STRINGPREP_PROFILE_ERROR:
p = _("Error in stringprep profile definition");
break;
case STRINGPREP_FLAG_ERROR:
p = _("Flag conflict with profile");
break;
case STRINGPREP_UNKNOWN_PROFILE:
case STRINGPREP_UNKNOWN_PROFILE:
p = _("Unknown profile");
break;
case STRINGPREP_ICONV_ERROR:
p = _("Could not convert string in locale encoding.");
break;
case STRINGPREP_NFKC_FAILED:
p = _("Unicode normalization failed (internal error)");
break;
default:
p = _("Unknown error");
break;
}
return p;
}
| 164,761 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void __detach_mounts(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct mountpoint *mp;
struct mount *mnt;
namespace_lock();
mp = lookup_mountpoint(dentry);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mp))
goto out_unlock;
lock_mount_hash();
while (!hlist_empty(&mp->m_list)) {
mnt = hlist_entry(mp->m_list.first, struct mount, mnt_mp_list);
if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_UMOUNT) {
struct mount *p, *tmp;
list_for_each_entry_safe(p, tmp, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) {
hlist_add_head(&p->mnt_umount.s_list, &unmounted);
umount_mnt(p);
}
}
else umount_tree(mnt, 0);
}
unlock_mount_hash();
put_mountpoint(mp);
out_unlock:
namespace_unlock();
}
Commit Message: mnt: Update detach_mounts to leave mounts connected
Now that it is possible to lazily unmount an entire mount tree and
leave the individual mounts connected to each other add a new flag
UMOUNT_CONNECTED to umount_tree to force this behavior and use
this flag in detach_mounts.
This closes a bug where the deletion of a file or directory could
trigger an unmount and reveal data under a mount point.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void __detach_mounts(struct dentry *dentry)
{
struct mountpoint *mp;
struct mount *mnt;
namespace_lock();
mp = lookup_mountpoint(dentry);
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mp))
goto out_unlock;
lock_mount_hash();
while (!hlist_empty(&mp->m_list)) {
mnt = hlist_entry(mp->m_list.first, struct mount, mnt_mp_list);
if (mnt->mnt.mnt_flags & MNT_UMOUNT) {
struct mount *p, *tmp;
list_for_each_entry_safe(p, tmp, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) {
hlist_add_head(&p->mnt_umount.s_list, &unmounted);
umount_mnt(p);
}
}
else umount_tree(mnt, UMOUNT_CONNECTED);
}
unlock_mount_hash();
put_mountpoint(mp);
out_unlock:
namespace_unlock();
}
| 167,564 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ScriptPromise BluetoothRemoteGATTService::getCharacteristicsImpl(
ScriptState* scriptState,
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity quantity,
const String& characteristicsUUID) {
if (!device()->gatt()->connected()) {
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState,
DOMException::create(NetworkError, kGATTServerNotConnected));
}
if (!device()->isValidService(m_service->instance_id)) {
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState, DOMException::create(InvalidStateError, kInvalidService));
}
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::create(scriptState);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->promise();
device()->gatt()->AddToActiveAlgorithms(resolver);
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothService* service = m_device->bluetooth()->service();
WTF::Optional<String> uuid = WTF::nullopt;
if (!characteristicsUUID.isEmpty())
uuid = characteristicsUUID;
service->RemoteServiceGetCharacteristics(
m_service->instance_id, quantity, uuid,
convertToBaseCallback(
WTF::bind(&BluetoothRemoteGATTService::GetCharacteristicsCallback,
wrapPersistent(this), m_service->instance_id, quantity,
wrapPersistent(resolver))));
return promise;
}
Commit Message: Allow serialization of empty bluetooth uuids.
This change allows the passing WTF::Optional<String> types as
bluetooth.mojom.UUID optional parameter without needing to ensure the passed
object isn't empty.
BUG=None
R=juncai, dcheng
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2646613003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445809}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ScriptPromise BluetoothRemoteGATTService::getCharacteristicsImpl(
ScriptState* scriptState,
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothGATTQueryQuantity quantity,
const String& characteristicsUUID) {
if (!device()->gatt()->connected()) {
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState,
DOMException::create(NetworkError, kGATTServerNotConnected));
}
if (!device()->isValidService(m_service->instance_id)) {
return ScriptPromise::rejectWithDOMException(
scriptState, DOMException::create(InvalidStateError, kInvalidService));
}
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver = ScriptPromiseResolver::create(scriptState);
ScriptPromise promise = resolver->promise();
device()->gatt()->AddToActiveAlgorithms(resolver);
mojom::blink::WebBluetoothService* service = m_device->bluetooth()->service();
service->RemoteServiceGetCharacteristics(
m_service->instance_id, quantity, characteristicsUUID,
convertToBaseCallback(
WTF::bind(&BluetoothRemoteGATTService::GetCharacteristicsCallback,
wrapPersistent(this), m_service->instance_id, quantity,
wrapPersistent(resolver))));
return promise;
}
| 172,023 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void _modinit(module_t *m)
{
service_named_bind_command("chanserv", &cs_flags);
}
Commit Message: chanserv/flags: make Anope FLAGS compatibility an option
Previously, ChanServ FLAGS behavior could be modified by registering or
dropping the keyword nicks "LIST", "CLEAR", and "MODIFY".
Now, a configuration option is available that when turned on (default),
disables registration of these keyword nicks and enables this
compatibility feature. When turned off, registration of these keyword
nicks is possible, and compatibility to Anope's FLAGS command is
disabled.
Fixes atheme/atheme#397
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void _modinit(module_t *m)
{
service_named_bind_command("chanserv", &cs_flags);
add_bool_conf_item("ANOPE_FLAGS_COMPAT", &chansvs.me->conf_table, 0, &anope_flags_compat, true);
hook_add_event("nick_can_register");
hook_add_nick_can_register(check_registration_keywords);
hook_add_event("user_can_register");
hook_add_user_can_register(check_registration_keywords);
}
| 167,586 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool PermissionUtil::GetPermissionType(ContentSettingsType type,
PermissionType* out) {
if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_GEOLOCATION) {
*out = PermissionType::GEOLOCATION;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_NOTIFICATIONS) {
*out = PermissionType::NOTIFICATIONS;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PUSH_MESSAGING) {
*out = PermissionType::PUSH_MESSAGING;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MIDI_SYSEX) {
*out = PermissionType::MIDI_SYSEX;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_DURABLE_STORAGE) {
*out = PermissionType::DURABLE_STORAGE;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_CAMERA) {
*out = PermissionType::VIDEO_CAPTURE;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_MIC) {
*out = PermissionType::AUDIO_CAPTURE;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_BACKGROUND_SYNC) {
*out = PermissionType::BACKGROUND_SYNC;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PLUGINS) {
*out = PermissionType::FLASH;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PROTECTED_MEDIA_IDENTIFIER) {
*out = PermissionType::PROTECTED_MEDIA_IDENTIFIER;
#endif
} else {
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: PermissionUtil::GetPermissionType needs to handle MIDI
After the recent PermissionManager's change, it calls
GetPermissionType even for CONTENT_SETTING_TYPE_MIDI.
BUG=697771
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#454231}
CWE ID: | bool PermissionUtil::GetPermissionType(ContentSettingsType type,
PermissionType* out) {
if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_GEOLOCATION) {
*out = PermissionType::GEOLOCATION;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_NOTIFICATIONS) {
*out = PermissionType::NOTIFICATIONS;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PUSH_MESSAGING) {
*out = PermissionType::PUSH_MESSAGING;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MIDI) {
*out = PermissionType::MIDI;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MIDI_SYSEX) {
*out = PermissionType::MIDI_SYSEX;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_DURABLE_STORAGE) {
*out = PermissionType::DURABLE_STORAGE;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_CAMERA) {
*out = PermissionType::VIDEO_CAPTURE;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_MIC) {
*out = PermissionType::AUDIO_CAPTURE;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_BACKGROUND_SYNC) {
*out = PermissionType::BACKGROUND_SYNC;
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PLUGINS) {
*out = PermissionType::FLASH;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
} else if (type == CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_PROTECTED_MEDIA_IDENTIFIER) {
*out = PermissionType::PROTECTED_MEDIA_IDENTIFIER;
#endif
} else {
return false;
}
return true;
}
| 172,033 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ServiceWorkerContainer* NavigatorServiceWorker::serviceWorker(Navigator& navigator, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
return NavigatorServiceWorker::from(navigator).serviceWorker(exceptionState);
}
Commit Message: Add ASSERT() to avoid accidental leaking ServiceWorkerContainer to cross origin context.
BUG=522791
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1305903007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@201889 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-264 | ServiceWorkerContainer* NavigatorServiceWorker::serviceWorker(Navigator& navigator, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
ServiceWorkerContainer* NavigatorServiceWorker::serviceWorker(ExecutionContext* executionContext, Navigator& navigator, ExceptionState& exceptionState)
{
ASSERT(!navigator.frame() || executionContext->securityOrigin()->canAccessCheckSuborigins(navigator.frame()->securityContext()->securityOrigin()));
return NavigatorServiceWorker::from(navigator).serviceWorker(exceptionState);
}
| 171,862 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xsltNumber(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
xmlNodePtr inst, xsltStylePreCompPtr castedComp)
{
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemNumberPtr comp = (xsltStyleItemNumberPtr) castedComp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp = castedComp;
#endif
if (comp == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"xsl:number : compilation failed\n");
return;
}
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (node == NULL) || (inst == NULL) || (comp == NULL))
return;
comp->numdata.doc = inst->doc;
comp->numdata.node = inst;
xsltNumberFormat(ctxt, &comp->numdata, node);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xsltNumber(xsltTransformContextPtr ctxt, xmlNodePtr node,
xmlNodePtr inst, xsltStylePreCompPtr castedComp)
{
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
xsltStyleItemNumberPtr comp = (xsltStyleItemNumberPtr) castedComp;
#else
xsltStylePreCompPtr comp = castedComp;
#endif
xmlXPathContextPtr xpctxt;
xmlNsPtr *oldXPNamespaces;
int oldXPNsNr;
if (comp == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(ctxt, NULL, inst,
"xsl:number : compilation failed\n");
return;
}
if ((ctxt == NULL) || (node == NULL) || (inst == NULL) || (comp == NULL))
return;
comp->numdata.doc = inst->doc;
comp->numdata.node = inst;
xpctxt = ctxt->xpathCtxt;
oldXPNsNr = xpctxt->nsNr;
oldXPNamespaces = xpctxt->namespaces;
#ifdef XSLT_REFACTORED
if (comp->inScopeNs != NULL) {
xpctxt->namespaces = comp->inScopeNs->list;
xpctxt->nsNr = comp->inScopeNs->xpathNumber;
} else {
xpctxt->namespaces = NULL;
xpctxt->nsNr = 0;
}
#else
xpctxt->namespaces = comp->nsList;
xpctxt->nsNr = comp->nsNr;
#endif
xsltNumberFormat(ctxt, &comp->numdata, node);
xpctxt->nsNr = oldXPNsNr;
xpctxt->namespaces = oldXPNamespaces;
}
| 173,329 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cc::FrameSinkId RenderWidgetHostViewAura::GetFrameSinkId() {
return delegated_frame_host_ ? delegated_frame_host_->GetFrameSinkId()
: cc::FrameSinkId();
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | cc::FrameSinkId RenderWidgetHostViewAura::GetFrameSinkId() {
return frame_sink_id_;
}
| 172,234 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int br_mdb_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb,
struct net_device *dev)
{
struct net_bridge *br = netdev_priv(dev);
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb;
struct nlattr *nest, *nest2;
int i, err = 0;
int idx = 0, s_idx = cb->args[1];
if (br->multicast_disabled)
return 0;
mdb = rcu_dereference(br->mdb);
if (!mdb)
return 0;
nest = nla_nest_start(skb, MDBA_MDB);
if (nest == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
for (i = 0; i < mdb->max; i++) {
struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp;
struct net_bridge_port_group *p, **pp;
struct net_bridge_port *port;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(mp, &mdb->mhash[i], hlist[mdb->ver]) {
if (idx < s_idx)
goto skip;
nest2 = nla_nest_start(skb, MDBA_MDB_ENTRY);
if (nest2 == NULL) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
goto out;
}
for (pp = &mp->ports;
(p = rcu_dereference(*pp)) != NULL;
pp = &p->next) {
port = p->port;
if (port) {
struct br_mdb_entry e;
e.ifindex = port->dev->ifindex;
e.state = p->state;
if (p->addr.proto == htons(ETH_P_IP))
e.addr.u.ip4 = p->addr.u.ip4;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
if (p->addr.proto == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
e.addr.u.ip6 = p->addr.u.ip6;
#endif
e.addr.proto = p->addr.proto;
if (nla_put(skb, MDBA_MDB_ENTRY_INFO, sizeof(e), &e)) {
nla_nest_cancel(skb, nest2);
err = -EMSGSIZE;
goto out;
}
}
}
nla_nest_end(skb, nest2);
skip:
idx++;
}
}
out:
cb->args[1] = idx;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest);
return err;
}
Commit Message: bridge: fix mdb info leaks
The bridging code discloses heap and stack bytes via the RTM_GETMDB
netlink interface and via the notify messages send to group RTNLGRP_MDB
afer a successful add/del.
Fix both cases by initializing all unset members/padding bytes with
memset(0).
Cc: Stephen Hemminger <stephen@networkplumber.org>
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static int br_mdb_fill_info(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb,
struct net_device *dev)
{
struct net_bridge *br = netdev_priv(dev);
struct net_bridge_mdb_htable *mdb;
struct nlattr *nest, *nest2;
int i, err = 0;
int idx = 0, s_idx = cb->args[1];
if (br->multicast_disabled)
return 0;
mdb = rcu_dereference(br->mdb);
if (!mdb)
return 0;
nest = nla_nest_start(skb, MDBA_MDB);
if (nest == NULL)
return -EMSGSIZE;
for (i = 0; i < mdb->max; i++) {
struct net_bridge_mdb_entry *mp;
struct net_bridge_port_group *p, **pp;
struct net_bridge_port *port;
hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(mp, &mdb->mhash[i], hlist[mdb->ver]) {
if (idx < s_idx)
goto skip;
nest2 = nla_nest_start(skb, MDBA_MDB_ENTRY);
if (nest2 == NULL) {
err = -EMSGSIZE;
goto out;
}
for (pp = &mp->ports;
(p = rcu_dereference(*pp)) != NULL;
pp = &p->next) {
port = p->port;
if (port) {
struct br_mdb_entry e;
memset(&e, 0, sizeof(e));
e.ifindex = port->dev->ifindex;
e.state = p->state;
if (p->addr.proto == htons(ETH_P_IP))
e.addr.u.ip4 = p->addr.u.ip4;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
if (p->addr.proto == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
e.addr.u.ip6 = p->addr.u.ip6;
#endif
e.addr.proto = p->addr.proto;
if (nla_put(skb, MDBA_MDB_ENTRY_INFO, sizeof(e), &e)) {
nla_nest_cancel(skb, nest2);
err = -EMSGSIZE;
goto out;
}
}
}
nla_nest_end(skb, nest2);
skip:
idx++;
}
}
out:
cb->args[1] = idx;
nla_nest_end(skb, nest);
return err;
}
| 166,053 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void virtio_gpu_set_scanout(VirtIOGPU *g,
struct virtio_gpu_ctrl_command *cmd)
{
struct virtio_gpu_simple_resource *res;
struct virtio_gpu_scanout *scanout;
pixman_format_code_t format;
uint32_t offset;
int bpp;
struct virtio_gpu_set_scanout ss;
VIRTIO_GPU_FILL_CMD(ss);
trace_virtio_gpu_cmd_set_scanout(ss.scanout_id, ss.resource_id,
ss.r.width, ss.r.height, ss.r.x, ss.r.y);
if (ss.scanout_id >= g->conf.max_outputs) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "%s: illegal scanout id specified %d",
__func__, ss.scanout_id);
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_SCANOUT_ID;
return;
}
g->enable = 1;
if (ss.resource_id == 0) {
scanout = &g->scanout[ss.scanout_id];
if (scanout->resource_id) {
res = virtio_gpu_find_resource(g, scanout->resource_id);
if (res) {
res->scanout_bitmask &= ~(1 << ss.scanout_id);
}
}
if (ss.scanout_id == 0) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
"%s: illegal scanout id specified %d",
__func__, ss.scanout_id);
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_SCANOUT_ID;
return;
}
dpy_gfx_replace_surface(g->scanout[ss.scanout_id].con, NULL);
scanout->ds = NULL;
scanout->width = 0;
scanout->height = 0;
return;
}
/* create a surface for this scanout */
res = virtio_gpu_find_resource(g, ss.resource_id);
if (!res) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "%s: illegal resource specified %d\n",
__func__, ss.resource_id);
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_RESOURCE_ID;
return;
}
if (ss.r.x > res->width ||
ss.r.y > res->height ||
ss.r.width > res->width ||
ss.r.height > res->height ||
ss.r.x + ss.r.width > res->width ||
ss.r.y + ss.r.height > res->height) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "%s: illegal scanout %d bounds for"
" resource %d, (%d,%d)+%d,%d vs %d %d\n",
__func__, ss.scanout_id, ss.resource_id, ss.r.x, ss.r.y,
ss.r.width, ss.r.height, res->width, res->height);
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
return;
}
scanout = &g->scanout[ss.scanout_id];
format = pixman_image_get_format(res->image);
bpp = (PIXMAN_FORMAT_BPP(format) + 7) / 8;
offset = (ss.r.x * bpp) + ss.r.y * pixman_image_get_stride(res->image);
if (!scanout->ds || surface_data(scanout->ds)
!= ((uint8_t *)pixman_image_get_data(res->image) + offset) ||
scanout->width != ss.r.width ||
scanout->height != ss.r.height) {
pixman_image_t *rect;
void *ptr = (uint8_t *)pixman_image_get_data(res->image) + offset;
rect = pixman_image_create_bits(format, ss.r.width, ss.r.height, ptr,
pixman_image_get_stride(res->image));
pixman_image_ref(res->image);
pixman_image_set_destroy_function(rect, virtio_unref_resource,
res->image);
/* realloc the surface ptr */
scanout->ds = qemu_create_displaysurface_pixman(rect);
if (!scanout->ds) {
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_UNSPEC;
return;
}
dpy_gfx_replace_surface(g->scanout[ss.scanout_id].con, scanout->ds);
}
scanout->resource_id = ss.resource_id;
scanout->x = ss.r.x;
scanout->y = ss.r.y;
scanout->width = ss.r.width;
scanout->height = ss.r.height;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-772 | static void virtio_gpu_set_scanout(VirtIOGPU *g,
struct virtio_gpu_ctrl_command *cmd)
{
struct virtio_gpu_simple_resource *res;
struct virtio_gpu_scanout *scanout;
pixman_format_code_t format;
uint32_t offset;
int bpp;
struct virtio_gpu_set_scanout ss;
VIRTIO_GPU_FILL_CMD(ss);
trace_virtio_gpu_cmd_set_scanout(ss.scanout_id, ss.resource_id,
ss.r.width, ss.r.height, ss.r.x, ss.r.y);
if (ss.scanout_id >= g->conf.max_outputs) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "%s: illegal scanout id specified %d",
__func__, ss.scanout_id);
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_SCANOUT_ID;
return;
}
g->enable = 1;
if (ss.resource_id == 0) {
scanout = &g->scanout[ss.scanout_id];
if (scanout->resource_id) {
res = virtio_gpu_find_resource(g, scanout->resource_id);
if (res) {
res->scanout_bitmask &= ~(1 << ss.scanout_id);
}
}
if (ss.scanout_id == 0) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
"%s: illegal scanout id specified %d",
__func__, ss.scanout_id);
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_SCANOUT_ID;
return;
}
dpy_gfx_replace_surface(g->scanout[ss.scanout_id].con, NULL);
scanout->ds = NULL;
scanout->width = 0;
scanout->height = 0;
return;
}
/* create a surface for this scanout */
res = virtio_gpu_find_resource(g, ss.resource_id);
if (!res) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "%s: illegal resource specified %d\n",
__func__, ss.resource_id);
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_RESOURCE_ID;
return;
}
if (ss.r.x > res->width ||
ss.r.y > res->height ||
ss.r.width > res->width ||
ss.r.height > res->height ||
ss.r.x + ss.r.width > res->width ||
ss.r.y + ss.r.height > res->height) {
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "%s: illegal scanout %d bounds for"
" resource %d, (%d,%d)+%d,%d vs %d %d\n",
__func__, ss.scanout_id, ss.resource_id, ss.r.x, ss.r.y,
ss.r.width, ss.r.height, res->width, res->height);
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
return;
}
scanout = &g->scanout[ss.scanout_id];
format = pixman_image_get_format(res->image);
bpp = (PIXMAN_FORMAT_BPP(format) + 7) / 8;
offset = (ss.r.x * bpp) + ss.r.y * pixman_image_get_stride(res->image);
if (!scanout->ds || surface_data(scanout->ds)
!= ((uint8_t *)pixman_image_get_data(res->image) + offset) ||
scanout->width != ss.r.width ||
scanout->height != ss.r.height) {
pixman_image_t *rect;
void *ptr = (uint8_t *)pixman_image_get_data(res->image) + offset;
rect = pixman_image_create_bits(format, ss.r.width, ss.r.height, ptr,
pixman_image_get_stride(res->image));
pixman_image_ref(res->image);
pixman_image_set_destroy_function(rect, virtio_unref_resource,
res->image);
/* realloc the surface ptr */
scanout->ds = qemu_create_displaysurface_pixman(rect);
if (!scanout->ds) {
cmd->error = VIRTIO_GPU_RESP_ERR_UNSPEC;
return;
}
pixman_image_unref(rect);
dpy_gfx_replace_surface(g->scanout[ss.scanout_id].con, scanout->ds);
}
scanout->resource_id = ss.resource_id;
scanout->x = ss.r.x;
scanout->y = ss.r.y;
scanout->width = ss.r.width;
scanout->height = ss.r.height;
}
| 164,813 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: rdp_in_unistr(STREAM s, int in_len, char **string, uint32 * str_size)
{
static iconv_t icv_utf16_to_local;
size_t ibl, obl;
char *pin, *pout;
if (!icv_utf16_to_local)
{
icv_utf16_to_local = iconv_open(g_codepage, WINDOWS_CODEPAGE);
if (icv_utf16_to_local == (iconv_t) - 1)
{
logger(Protocol, Error, "rdp_in_unistr(), iconv_open[%s -> %s] fail %p",
WINDOWS_CODEPAGE, g_codepage, icv_utf16_to_local);
abort();
}
}
/* Dynamic allocate of destination string if not provided */
if (*string == NULL)
{
*string = xmalloc(in_len * 2);
*str_size = in_len * 2;
}
ibl = in_len;
obl = *str_size - 1;
pin = (char *) s->p;
pout = *string;
if (iconv(icv_utf16_to_local, (char **) &pin, &ibl, &pout, &obl) == (size_t) - 1)
{
if (errno == E2BIG)
{
logger(Protocol, Warning,
"rdp_in_unistr(), server sent an unexpectedly long string, truncating");
}
else
{
logger(Protocol, Warning, "rdp_in_unistr(), iconv fail, errno %d", errno);
free(*string);
*string = NULL;
*str_size = 0;
}
abort();
}
/* we must update the location of the current STREAM for future reads of s->p */
s->p += in_len;
*pout = 0;
if (*string)
*str_size = pout - *string;
}
Commit Message: Malicious RDP server security fixes
This commit includes fixes for a set of 21 vulnerabilities in
rdesktop when a malicious RDP server is used.
All vulnerabilities was identified and reported by Eyal Itkin.
* Add rdp_protocol_error function that is used in several fixes
* Refactor of process_bitmap_updates
* Fix possible integer overflow in s_check_rem() on 32bit arch
* Fix memory corruption in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8794
* Fix remote code execution in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8795
* Fix remote code execution in process_plane - CVE-2018-8797
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_recv_connect_response - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in mcs_parse_domain_params - CVE-2018-20175
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_parse_crypt_info - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix Denial of Service in sec_recv - CVE-2018-20176
* Fix minor information leak in rdpdr_process - CVE-2018-8791
* Fix Denial of Service in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8792
* Fix remote code execution in cssp_read_tsrequest - CVE-2018-8793
* Fix Denial of Service in process_bitmap_data - CVE-2018-8796
* Fix minor information leak in rdpsnd_process_ping - CVE-2018-8798
* Fix Denial of Service in process_secondary_order - CVE-2018-8799
* Fix remote code execution in in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-8800
* Fix major information leak in ui_clip_handle_data - CVE-2018-20174
* Fix memory corruption in rdp_in_unistr - CVE-2018-20177
* Fix Denial of Service in process_demand_active - CVE-2018-20178
* Fix remote code execution in lspci_process - CVE-2018-20179
* Fix remote code execution in rdpsnddbg_process - CVE-2018-20180
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process - CVE-2018-20181
* Fix remote code execution in seamless_process_line - CVE-2018-20182
CWE ID: CWE-119 | rdp_in_unistr(STREAM s, int in_len, char **string, uint32 * str_size)
{
static iconv_t icv_utf16_to_local;
size_t ibl, obl;
char *pin, *pout;
struct stream packet = *s;
if ((in_len < 0) || ((uint32)in_len >= (RD_UINT32_MAX / 2)))
{
logger(Protocol, Error, "rdp_in_unistr(), length of unicode data is out of bounds.");
abort();
}
if (!s_check_rem(s, in_len))
{
rdp_protocol_error("rdp_in_unistr(), consume of unicode data from stream would overrun", &packet);
}
if (!icv_utf16_to_local)
{
icv_utf16_to_local = iconv_open(g_codepage, WINDOWS_CODEPAGE);
if (icv_utf16_to_local == (iconv_t) - 1)
{
logger(Protocol, Error, "rdp_in_unistr(), iconv_open[%s -> %s] fail %p",
WINDOWS_CODEPAGE, g_codepage, icv_utf16_to_local);
abort();
}
}
/* Dynamic allocate of destination string if not provided */
if (*string == NULL)
{
*string = xmalloc(in_len * 2);
*str_size = in_len * 2;
}
ibl = in_len;
obl = *str_size - 1;
pin = (char *) s->p;
pout = *string;
if (iconv(icv_utf16_to_local, (char **) &pin, &ibl, &pout, &obl) == (size_t) - 1)
{
if (errno == E2BIG)
{
logger(Protocol, Warning,
"rdp_in_unistr(), server sent an unexpectedly long string, truncating");
}
else
{
logger(Protocol, Warning, "rdp_in_unistr(), iconv fail, errno %d", errno);
free(*string);
*string = NULL;
*str_size = 0;
}
abort();
}
/* we must update the location of the current STREAM for future reads of s->p */
s->p += in_len;
*pout = 0;
if (*string)
*str_size = pout - *string;
}
| 169,804 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cib_recv_plaintext(int sock)
{
char *buf = NULL;
ssize_t rc = 0;
ssize_t len = 0;
ssize_t chunk_size = 512;
buf = calloc(1, chunk_size);
while (1) {
errno = 0;
rc = read(sock, buf + len, chunk_size);
crm_trace("Got %d more bytes. errno=%d", (int)rc, errno);
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN) {
crm_trace("Retry: %d", (int)rc);
if (rc > 0) {
len += rc;
buf = realloc(buf, len + chunk_size);
CRM_ASSERT(buf != NULL);
}
} else if (rc < 0) {
crm_perror(LOG_ERR, "Error receiving message: %d", (int)rc);
goto bail;
} else if (rc == chunk_size) {
len += rc;
chunk_size *= 2;
buf = realloc(buf, len + chunk_size);
crm_trace("Retry with %d more bytes", (int)chunk_size);
CRM_ASSERT(buf != NULL);
} else if (buf[len + rc - 1] != 0) {
crm_trace("Last char is %d '%c'", buf[len + rc - 1], buf[len + rc - 1]);
crm_trace("Retry with %d more bytes", (int)chunk_size);
len += rc;
buf = realloc(buf, len + chunk_size);
CRM_ASSERT(buf != NULL);
} else {
return buf;
}
}
bail:
free(buf);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | cib_recv_plaintext(int sock)
/*!
* \internal
* \brief Read bytes off non blocking socket.
*
* \param session - tls session to read
* \param max_size - max bytes allowed to read for buffer. 0 assumes no limit
*
* \note only use with NON-Blocking sockets. Should only be used after polling socket.
* This function will return once max_size is met, the socket read buffer
* is empty, or an error is encountered.
*
* \retval '\0' terminated buffer on success
*/
static char *
crm_recv_plaintext(int sock, size_t max_size, size_t *recv_len, int *disconnected)
{
char *buf = NULL;
ssize_t rc = 0;
ssize_t len = 0;
ssize_t chunk_size = max_size ? max_size : 1024;
size_t buf_size = 0;
size_t read_size = 0;
if (sock <= 0) {
if (disconnected) {
*disconnected = 1;
}
goto done;
}
buf = calloc(1, chunk_size + 1);
buf_size = chunk_size;
while (TRUE) {
errno = 0;
read_size = buf_size - len;
/* automatically grow the buffer when needed if max_size is not set.*/
if (!max_size && (read_size < (chunk_size / 2))) {
buf_size += chunk_size;
crm_trace("Grow buffer by %d more bytes. buf is now %d bytes", (int)chunk_size, buf_size);
buf = realloc(buf, buf_size + 1);
CRM_ASSERT(buf != NULL);
read_size = buf_size - len;
}
rc = read(sock, buf + len, chunk_size);
if (rc > 0) {
crm_trace("Got %d more bytes. errno=%d", (int)rc, errno);
len += rc;
/* always null terminate buffer, the +1 to alloc always allows for this.*/
buf[len] = '\0';
}
if (max_size && (max_size == read_size)) {
crm_trace("Buffer max read size %d met" , max_size);
goto done;
}
if (rc > 0) {
continue;
} else if (rc == 0) {
if (disconnected) {
*disconnected = 1;
}
crm_trace("EOF encoutered during read");
goto done;
}
/* process errors */
if (errno == EINTR) {
crm_trace("EINTER encoutered, retry socket read.");
} else if (errno == EAGAIN) {
crm_trace("non-blocking, exiting read on rc = %d", rc);
goto done;
} else if (errno <= 0) {
if (disconnected) {
*disconnected = 1;
}
crm_debug("Error receiving message: %d", (int)rc);
goto done;
}
}
done:
if (recv_len) {
*recv_len = len;
}
if (!len) {
free(buf);
buf = NULL;
}
return buf;
}
| 166,158 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> ModuleSystem::LoadModule(const std::string& module_name) {
v8::EscapableHandleScope handle_scope(GetIsolate());
v8::Local<v8::Context> v8_context = context()->v8_context();
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(v8_context);
v8::Local<v8::Value> source(GetSource(module_name));
if (source.IsEmpty() || source->IsUndefined()) {
Fatal(context_, "No source for require(" + module_name + ")");
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
v8::Local<v8::String> wrapped_source(
WrapSource(v8::Local<v8::String>::Cast(source)));
v8::Local<v8::String> v8_module_name;
if (!ToV8String(GetIsolate(), module_name.c_str(), &v8_module_name)) {
NOTREACHED() << "module_name is too long";
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> func_as_value =
RunString(wrapped_source, v8_module_name);
if (func_as_value.IsEmpty() || func_as_value->IsUndefined()) {
Fatal(context_, "Bad source for require(" + module_name + ")");
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
v8::Local<v8::Function> func = v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(func_as_value);
v8::Local<v8::Object> define_object = v8::Object::New(GetIsolate());
gin::ModuleRegistry::InstallGlobals(GetIsolate(), define_object);
v8::Local<v8::Value> exports = v8::Object::New(GetIsolate());
v8::Local<v8::Object> natives(NewInstance());
CHECK(!natives.IsEmpty()); // this can fail if v8 has issues
v8::Local<v8::Value> args[] = {
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, define_object, "define"),
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, natives, "require",
v8::NewStringType::kInternalized),
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, natives, "requireNative",
v8::NewStringType::kInternalized),
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, natives, "requireAsync",
v8::NewStringType::kInternalized),
exports,
console::AsV8Object(GetIsolate()),
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, natives, "privates",
v8::NewStringType::kInternalized),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetArray(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetFunction(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetJSON(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetObjekt(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetRegExp(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetString(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetError(),
};
{
v8::TryCatch try_catch(GetIsolate());
try_catch.SetCaptureMessage(true);
context_->CallFunction(func, arraysize(args), args);
if (try_catch.HasCaught()) {
HandleException(try_catch);
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
}
return handle_scope.Escape(exports);
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Don't allow built-in extensions code to be overridden
BUG=546677
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1417513003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#356654}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | v8::Local<v8::Value> ModuleSystem::LoadModule(const std::string& module_name) {
v8::EscapableHandleScope handle_scope(GetIsolate());
v8::Local<v8::Context> v8_context = context()->v8_context();
v8::Context::Scope context_scope(v8_context);
v8::Local<v8::Value> source(GetSource(module_name));
if (source.IsEmpty() || source->IsUndefined()) {
Fatal(context_, "No source for require(" + module_name + ")");
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
v8::Local<v8::String> wrapped_source(
WrapSource(v8::Local<v8::String>::Cast(source)));
v8::Local<v8::String> v8_module_name;
if (!ToV8String(GetIsolate(), module_name.c_str(), &v8_module_name)) {
NOTREACHED() << "module_name is too long";
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
v8::Local<v8::Value> func_as_value =
RunString(wrapped_source, v8_module_name);
if (func_as_value.IsEmpty() || func_as_value->IsUndefined()) {
Fatal(context_, "Bad source for require(" + module_name + ")");
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
v8::Local<v8::Function> func = v8::Local<v8::Function>::Cast(func_as_value);
v8::Local<v8::Object> define_object = v8::Object::New(GetIsolate());
gin::ModuleRegistry::InstallGlobals(GetIsolate(), define_object);
v8::Local<v8::Object> exports = v8::Object::New(GetIsolate());
v8::Local<v8::FunctionTemplate> tmpl = v8::FunctionTemplate::New(
GetIsolate(),
&SetExportsProperty);
v8::Local<v8::String> v8_key;
if (!v8_helpers::ToV8String(GetIsolate(), "$set", &v8_key)) {
NOTREACHED();
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
v8::Local<v8::Function> function;
if (!tmpl->GetFunction(v8_context).ToLocal(&function)) {
NOTREACHED();
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
exports->ForceSet(v8_key, function, v8::ReadOnly);
v8::Local<v8::Object> natives(NewInstance());
CHECK(!natives.IsEmpty()); // this can fail if v8 has issues
v8::Local<v8::Value> args[] = {
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, define_object, "define"),
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, natives, "require",
v8::NewStringType::kInternalized),
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, natives, "requireNative",
v8::NewStringType::kInternalized),
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, natives, "requireAsync",
v8::NewStringType::kInternalized),
exports,
console::AsV8Object(GetIsolate()),
GetPropertyUnsafe(v8_context, natives, "privates",
v8::NewStringType::kInternalized),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetArray(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetFunction(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetJSON(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetObjekt(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetRegExp(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetString(),
context_->safe_builtins()->GetError(),
};
{
v8::TryCatch try_catch(GetIsolate());
try_catch.SetCaptureMessage(true);
context_->CallFunction(func, arraysize(args), args);
if (try_catch.HasCaught()) {
HandleException(try_catch);
return v8::Undefined(GetIsolate());
}
}
return handle_scope.Escape(exports);
}
| 172,287 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: GF_Err dinf_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e = gf_isom_box_array_read(s, bs, dinf_AddBox);
if (e) {
return e;
}
if (!((GF_DataInformationBox *)s)->dref) {
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] Missing dref box in dinf\n"));
((GF_DataInformationBox *)s)->dref = (GF_DataReferenceBox *)gf_isom_box_new(GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_DREF);
}
return GF_OK;
}
Commit Message: prevent dref memleak on invalid input (#1183)
CWE ID: CWE-400 | GF_Err dinf_Read(GF_Box *s, GF_BitStream *bs)
{
GF_Err e = gf_isom_box_array_read(s, bs, dinf_AddBox);
if (e) {
return e;
}
if (!((GF_DataInformationBox *)s)->dref) {
GF_Box* dref;
GF_LOG(GF_LOG_ERROR, GF_LOG_CONTAINER, ("[iso file] Missing dref box in dinf\n"));
dref = gf_isom_box_new(GF_ISOM_BOX_TYPE_DREF);
((GF_DataInformationBox *)s)->dref = (GF_DataReferenceBox *)dref;
gf_isom_box_add_for_dump_mode(s, dref);
}
return GF_OK;
}
| 169,759 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: GpuChannel::GpuChannel(GpuChannelManager* gpu_channel_manager,
GpuWatchdog* watchdog,
gfx::GLShareGroup* share_group,
int client_id,
bool software)
: gpu_channel_manager_(gpu_channel_manager),
client_id_(client_id),
renderer_process_(base::kNullProcessHandle),
renderer_pid_(base::kNullProcessId),
share_group_(share_group ? share_group : new gfx::GLShareGroup),
watchdog_(watchdog),
software_(software),
handle_messages_scheduled_(false),
processed_get_state_fast_(false),
num_contexts_preferring_discrete_gpu_(0),
weak_factory_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)) {
DCHECK(gpu_channel_manager);
DCHECK(client_id);
channel_id_ = IPC::Channel::GenerateVerifiedChannelID("gpu");
const CommandLine* command_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
log_messages_ = command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kLogPluginMessages);
disallowed_features_.multisampling =
command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGLMultisampling);
disallowed_features_.driver_bug_workarounds =
command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuDriverBugWorkarounds);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | GpuChannel::GpuChannel(GpuChannelManager* gpu_channel_manager,
GpuWatchdog* watchdog,
gfx::GLShareGroup* share_group,
int client_id,
bool software)
: gpu_channel_manager_(gpu_channel_manager),
client_id_(client_id),
share_group_(share_group ? share_group : new gfx::GLShareGroup),
watchdog_(watchdog),
software_(software),
handle_messages_scheduled_(false),
processed_get_state_fast_(false),
num_contexts_preferring_discrete_gpu_(0),
weak_factory_(ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(this)) {
DCHECK(gpu_channel_manager);
DCHECK(client_id);
channel_id_ = IPC::Channel::GenerateVerifiedChannelID("gpu");
const CommandLine* command_line = CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
log_messages_ = command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kLogPluginMessages);
disallowed_features_.multisampling =
command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGLMultisampling);
disallowed_features_.driver_bug_workarounds =
command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDisableGpuDriverBugWorkarounds);
}
| 170,931 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
{
xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *any;
size_t len; /* length of data remaining in request */
int rc = Success;
int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 };
REQUEST(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
if (!stuff->num_changes)
return rc;
len = ((size_t)stuff->length << 2) - sizeof(xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo);
any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) &stuff[1];
while (stuff->num_changes--) {
if (len < sizeof(xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo)) {
rc = BadLength;
goto unwind;
}
SWAPIF(swaps(&any->type));
SWAPIF(swaps(&any->length));
if (len < ((size_t)any->length << 2))
return BadLength;
#define CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(type) \
do { \
if ((len < sizeof(type)) || (any->length != (sizeof(type) >> 2))) { \
rc = BadLength; \
goto unwind; \
} \
} while(0)
switch (any->type) {
case XIAddMaster:
{
xXIAddMasterInfo *c = (xXIAddMasterInfo *) any;
/* Variable length, due to appended name string */
if (len < sizeof(xXIAddMasterInfo)) {
rc = BadLength;
goto unwind;
}
SWAPIF(swaps(&c->name_len));
if (c->name_len > (len - sizeof(xXIAddMasterInfo))) {
rc = BadLength;
goto unwind;
}
rc = add_master(client, c, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
}
break;
case XIRemoveMaster:
{
xXIRemoveMasterInfo *r = (xXIRemoveMasterInfo *) any;
CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(xXIRemoveMasterInfo);
rc = remove_master(client, r, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
}
break;
case XIDetachSlave:
{
xXIDetachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIDetachSlaveInfo *) any;
CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(xXIDetachSlaveInfo);
rc = detach_slave(client, c, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
}
break;
case XIAttachSlave:
{
xXIAttachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIAttachSlaveInfo *) any;
CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(xXIAttachSlaveInfo);
rc = attach_slave(client, c, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
}
break;
}
len -= any->length * 4;
any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) ((char *) any + any->length * 4);
}
unwind:
XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
return rc;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | ProcXIChangeHierarchy(ClientPtr client)
{
xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *any;
size_t len; /* length of data remaining in request */
int rc = Success;
int flags[MAXDEVICES] = { 0 };
REQUEST(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
REQUEST_AT_LEAST_SIZE(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
if (!stuff->num_changes)
return rc;
len = ((size_t)stuff->length << 2) - sizeof(xXIChangeHierarchyReq);
any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) &stuff[1];
while (stuff->num_changes--) {
if (len < sizeof(xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo)) {
rc = BadLength;
goto unwind;
}
SWAPIF(swaps(&any->type));
SWAPIF(swaps(&any->length));
if (len < ((size_t)any->length << 2))
return BadLength;
#define CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(type) \
do { \
if ((len < sizeof(type)) || (any->length != (sizeof(type) >> 2))) { \
rc = BadLength; \
goto unwind; \
} \
} while(0)
switch (any->type) {
case XIAddMaster:
{
xXIAddMasterInfo *c = (xXIAddMasterInfo *) any;
/* Variable length, due to appended name string */
if (len < sizeof(xXIAddMasterInfo)) {
rc = BadLength;
goto unwind;
}
SWAPIF(swaps(&c->name_len));
if (c->name_len > (len - sizeof(xXIAddMasterInfo))) {
rc = BadLength;
goto unwind;
}
rc = add_master(client, c, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
}
break;
case XIRemoveMaster:
{
xXIRemoveMasterInfo *r = (xXIRemoveMasterInfo *) any;
CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(xXIRemoveMasterInfo);
rc = remove_master(client, r, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
}
break;
case XIDetachSlave:
{
xXIDetachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIDetachSlaveInfo *) any;
CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(xXIDetachSlaveInfo);
rc = detach_slave(client, c, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
}
break;
case XIAttachSlave:
{
xXIAttachSlaveInfo *c = (xXIAttachSlaveInfo *) any;
CHANGE_SIZE_MATCH(xXIAttachSlaveInfo);
rc = attach_slave(client, c, flags);
if (rc != Success)
goto unwind;
}
break;
}
len -= any->length * 4;
any = (xXIAnyHierarchyChangeInfo *) ((char *) any + any->length * 4);
}
unwind:
XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent(flags);
return rc;
}
| 165,446 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: gfx::Rect ShellWindowFrameView::GetBoundsForClientView() const {
if (frame_->IsFullscreen())
return bounds();
return gfx::Rect(0, kCaptionHeight, width(),
std::max(0, height() - kCaptionHeight));
}
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79 | gfx::Rect ShellWindowFrameView::GetBoundsForClientView() const {
if (is_frameless_ || frame_->IsFullscreen())
return bounds();
return gfx::Rect(0, kCaptionHeight, width(),
std::max(0, height() - kCaptionHeight));
}
| 170,711 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int main(int argc, char **argv) {
int frame_cnt = 0;
FILE *outfile = NULL;
vpx_codec_ctx_t codec;
VpxVideoReader *reader = NULL;
const VpxInterface *decoder = NULL;
const VpxVideoInfo *info = NULL;
exec_name = argv[0];
if (argc != 3)
die("Invalid number of arguments.");
reader = vpx_video_reader_open(argv[1]);
if (!reader)
die("Failed to open %s for reading.", argv[1]);
if (!(outfile = fopen(argv[2], "wb")))
die("Failed to open %s for writing.", argv[2]);
info = vpx_video_reader_get_info(reader);
decoder = get_vpx_decoder_by_fourcc(info->codec_fourcc);
if (!decoder)
die("Unknown input codec.");
printf("Using %s\n", vpx_codec_iface_name(decoder->interface()));
if (vpx_codec_dec_init(&codec, decoder->interface(), NULL, 0))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to initialize decoder.");
while (vpx_video_reader_read_frame(reader)) {
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
vpx_image_t *img = NULL;
size_t frame_size = 0;
const unsigned char *frame = vpx_video_reader_get_frame(reader,
&frame_size);
if (vpx_codec_decode(&codec, frame, (unsigned int)frame_size, NULL, 0))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to decode frame.");
while ((img = vpx_codec_get_frame(&codec, &iter)) != NULL) {
vpx_img_write(img, outfile);
++frame_cnt;
}
}
printf("Processed %d frames.\n", frame_cnt);
if (vpx_codec_destroy(&codec))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to destroy codec");
printf("Play: ffplay -f rawvideo -pix_fmt yuv420p -s %dx%d %s\n",
info->frame_width, info->frame_height, argv[2]);
vpx_video_reader_close(reader);
fclose(outfile);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int main(int argc, char **argv) {
int frame_cnt = 0;
FILE *outfile = NULL;
vpx_codec_ctx_t codec;
VpxVideoReader *reader = NULL;
const VpxInterface *decoder = NULL;
const VpxVideoInfo *info = NULL;
exec_name = argv[0];
if (argc != 3)
die("Invalid number of arguments.");
reader = vpx_video_reader_open(argv[1]);
if (!reader)
die("Failed to open %s for reading.", argv[1]);
if (!(outfile = fopen(argv[2], "wb")))
die("Failed to open %s for writing.", argv[2]);
info = vpx_video_reader_get_info(reader);
decoder = get_vpx_decoder_by_fourcc(info->codec_fourcc);
if (!decoder)
die("Unknown input codec.");
printf("Using %s\n", vpx_codec_iface_name(decoder->codec_interface()));
if (vpx_codec_dec_init(&codec, decoder->codec_interface(), NULL, 0))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to initialize decoder.");
while (vpx_video_reader_read_frame(reader)) {
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
vpx_image_t *img = NULL;
size_t frame_size = 0;
const unsigned char *frame = vpx_video_reader_get_frame(reader,
&frame_size);
if (vpx_codec_decode(&codec, frame, (unsigned int)frame_size, NULL, 0))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to decode frame.");
while ((img = vpx_codec_get_frame(&codec, &iter)) != NULL) {
vpx_img_write(img, outfile);
++frame_cnt;
}
}
printf("Processed %d frames.\n", frame_cnt);
if (vpx_codec_destroy(&codec))
die_codec(&codec, "Failed to destroy codec");
printf("Play: ffplay -f rawvideo -pix_fmt yuv420p -s %dx%d %s\n",
info->frame_width, info->frame_height, argv[2]);
vpx_video_reader_close(reader);
fclose(outfile);
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
| 174,487 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool HTMLFormControlElement::isAutofocusable() const
{
if (!fastHasAttribute(autofocusAttr))
return false;
if (hasTagName(inputTag))
return !toHTMLInputElement(this)->isInputTypeHidden();
if (hasTagName(selectTag))
return true;
if (hasTagName(keygenTag))
return true;
if (hasTagName(buttonTag))
return true;
if (hasTagName(textareaTag))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Add HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus to fix a FIXME comment.
This virtual function should return true if the form control can hanlde
'autofocucs' attribute if it is specified.
Note: HTMLInputElement::supportsAutofocus reuses InputType::isInteractiveContent
because interactiveness is required for autofocus capability.
BUG=none
TEST=none; no behavior changes.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/143343003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@165432 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool HTMLFormControlElement::isAutofocusable() const
bool HTMLFormControlElement::supportsAutofocus() const
{
return false;
}
| 171,343 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ScriptValue ScriptController::executeScriptInMainWorld(const ScriptSourceCode& sourceCode, AccessControlStatus corsStatus)
{
String sourceURL = sourceCode.url();
const String* savedSourceURL = m_sourceURL;
m_sourceURL = &sourceURL;
v8::HandleScope handleScope;
v8::Handle<v8::Context> v8Context = ScriptController::mainWorldContext(m_frame);
if (v8Context.IsEmpty())
return ScriptValue();
v8::Context::Scope scope(v8Context);
RefPtr<Frame> protect(m_frame);
v8::Local<v8::Value> object = compileAndRunScript(sourceCode, corsStatus);
m_sourceURL = savedSourceURL;
if (object.IsEmpty())
return ScriptValue();
return ScriptValue(object);
}
Commit Message: Call didAccessInitialDocument when javascript: URLs are used.
BUG=265221
TEST=See bug for repro.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/22572004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@155790 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | ScriptValue ScriptController::executeScriptInMainWorld(const ScriptSourceCode& sourceCode, AccessControlStatus corsStatus)
{
String sourceURL = sourceCode.url();
const String* savedSourceURL = m_sourceURL;
m_sourceURL = &sourceURL;
v8::HandleScope handleScope;
v8::Handle<v8::Context> v8Context = ScriptController::mainWorldContext(m_frame);
if (v8Context.IsEmpty())
return ScriptValue();
RefPtr<Frame> protect(m_frame);
if (m_frame->loader()->stateMachine()->isDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument())
m_frame->loader()->didAccessInitialDocument();
v8::Context::Scope scope(v8Context);
v8::Local<v8::Value> object = compileAndRunScript(sourceCode, corsStatus);
m_sourceURL = savedSourceURL;
if (object.IsEmpty())
return ScriptValue();
return ScriptValue(object);
}
| 171,179 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static HashTable* spl_filesystem_object_get_debug_info(zval *obj, int *is_temp TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(obj TSRMLS_CC);
HashTable *rv;
zval *tmp, zrv;
char *pnstr, *path;
int pnlen, path_len;
char stmp[2];
*is_temp = 1;
if (!intern->std.properties) {
rebuild_object_properties(&intern->std);
}
ALLOC_HASHTABLE(rv);
ZEND_INIT_SYMTABLE_EX(rv, zend_hash_num_elements(intern->std.properties) + 3, 0);
INIT_PZVAL(&zrv);
Z_ARRVAL(zrv) = rv;
zend_hash_copy(rv, intern->std.properties, (copy_ctor_func_t) zval_add_ref, (void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *));
pnstr = spl_gen_private_prop_name(spl_ce_SplFileInfo, "pathName", sizeof("pathName")-1, &pnlen TSRMLS_CC);
path = spl_filesystem_object_get_pathname(intern, &path_len TSRMLS_CC);
add_assoc_stringl_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, path, path_len, 1);
efree(pnstr);
if (intern->file_name) {
pnstr = spl_gen_private_prop_name(spl_ce_SplFileInfo, "fileName", sizeof("fileName")-1, &pnlen TSRMLS_CC);
spl_filesystem_object_get_path(intern, &path_len TSRMLS_CC);
if (path_len && path_len < intern->file_name_len) {
add_assoc_stringl_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, intern->file_name + path_len + 1, intern->file_name_len - (path_len + 1), 1);
} else {
add_assoc_stringl_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
}
efree(pnstr);
}
if (intern->type == SPL_FS_DIR) {
#ifdef HAVE_GLOB
pnstr = spl_gen_private_prop_name(spl_ce_DirectoryIterator, "glob", sizeof("glob")-1, &pnlen TSRMLS_CC);
if (php_stream_is(intern->u.dir.dirp ,&php_glob_stream_ops)) {
add_assoc_stringl_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, intern->_path, intern->_path_len, 1);
} else {
add_assoc_bool_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, 0);
}
efree(pnstr);
#endif
pnstr = spl_gen_private_prop_name(spl_ce_RecursiveDirectoryIterator, "subPathName", sizeof("subPathName")-1, &pnlen TSRMLS_CC);
if (intern->u.dir.sub_path) {
add_assoc_stringl_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, intern->u.dir.sub_path, intern->u.dir.sub_path_len, 1);
} else {
add_assoc_stringl_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, "", 0, 1);
}
efree(pnstr);
}
if (intern->type == SPL_FS_FILE) {
pnstr = spl_gen_private_prop_name(spl_ce_SplFileObject, "openMode", sizeof("openMode")-1, &pnlen TSRMLS_CC);
add_assoc_stringl_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, intern->u.file.open_mode, intern->u.file.open_mode_len, 1);
efree(pnstr);
stmp[1] = '\0';
stmp[0] = intern->u.file.delimiter;
pnstr = spl_gen_private_prop_name(spl_ce_SplFileObject, "delimiter", sizeof("delimiter")-1, &pnlen TSRMLS_CC);
add_assoc_stringl_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, stmp, 1, 1);
efree(pnstr);
stmp[0] = intern->u.file.enclosure;
pnstr = spl_gen_private_prop_name(spl_ce_SplFileObject, "enclosure", sizeof("enclosure")-1, &pnlen TSRMLS_CC);
add_assoc_stringl_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, stmp, 1, 1);
efree(pnstr);
}
return rv;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static HashTable* spl_filesystem_object_get_debug_info(zval *obj, int *is_temp TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(obj TSRMLS_CC);
HashTable *rv;
zval *tmp, zrv;
char *pnstr, *path;
int pnlen, path_len;
char stmp[2];
*is_temp = 1;
if (!intern->std.properties) {
rebuild_object_properties(&intern->std);
}
ALLOC_HASHTABLE(rv);
ZEND_INIT_SYMTABLE_EX(rv, zend_hash_num_elements(intern->std.properties) + 3, 0);
INIT_PZVAL(&zrv);
Z_ARRVAL(zrv) = rv;
zend_hash_copy(rv, intern->std.properties, (copy_ctor_func_t) zval_add_ref, (void *) &tmp, sizeof(zval *));
pnstr = spl_gen_private_prop_name(spl_ce_SplFileInfo, "pathName", sizeof("pathName")-1, &pnlen TSRMLS_CC);
path = spl_filesystem_object_get_pathname(intern, &path_len TSRMLS_CC);
add_assoc_stringl_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, path, path_len, 1);
efree(pnstr);
if (intern->file_name) {
pnstr = spl_gen_private_prop_name(spl_ce_SplFileInfo, "fileName", sizeof("fileName")-1, &pnlen TSRMLS_CC);
spl_filesystem_object_get_path(intern, &path_len TSRMLS_CC);
if (path_len && path_len < intern->file_name_len) {
add_assoc_stringl_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, intern->file_name + path_len + 1, intern->file_name_len - (path_len + 1), 1);
} else {
add_assoc_stringl_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, intern->file_name, intern->file_name_len, 1);
}
efree(pnstr);
}
if (intern->type == SPL_FS_DIR) {
#ifdef HAVE_GLOB
pnstr = spl_gen_private_prop_name(spl_ce_DirectoryIterator, "glob", sizeof("glob")-1, &pnlen TSRMLS_CC);
if (php_stream_is(intern->u.dir.dirp ,&php_glob_stream_ops)) {
add_assoc_stringl_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, intern->_path, intern->_path_len, 1);
} else {
add_assoc_bool_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, 0);
}
efree(pnstr);
#endif
pnstr = spl_gen_private_prop_name(spl_ce_RecursiveDirectoryIterator, "subPathName", sizeof("subPathName")-1, &pnlen TSRMLS_CC);
if (intern->u.dir.sub_path) {
add_assoc_stringl_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, intern->u.dir.sub_path, intern->u.dir.sub_path_len, 1);
} else {
add_assoc_stringl_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, "", 0, 1);
}
efree(pnstr);
}
if (intern->type == SPL_FS_FILE) {
pnstr = spl_gen_private_prop_name(spl_ce_SplFileObject, "openMode", sizeof("openMode")-1, &pnlen TSRMLS_CC);
add_assoc_stringl_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, intern->u.file.open_mode, intern->u.file.open_mode_len, 1);
efree(pnstr);
stmp[1] = '\0';
stmp[0] = intern->u.file.delimiter;
pnstr = spl_gen_private_prop_name(spl_ce_SplFileObject, "delimiter", sizeof("delimiter")-1, &pnlen TSRMLS_CC);
add_assoc_stringl_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, stmp, 1, 1);
efree(pnstr);
stmp[0] = intern->u.file.enclosure;
pnstr = spl_gen_private_prop_name(spl_ce_SplFileObject, "enclosure", sizeof("enclosure")-1, &pnlen TSRMLS_CC);
add_assoc_stringl_ex(&zrv, pnstr, pnlen+1, stmp, 1, 1);
efree(pnstr);
}
return rv;
}
/* }}} */
| 167,084 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual InputMethodDescriptors* GetActiveInputMethods() {
chromeos::InputMethodDescriptors* result =
new chromeos::InputMethodDescriptors;
for (size_t i = 0; i < active_input_method_ids_.size(); ++i) {
const std::string& input_method_id = active_input_method_ids_[i];
const InputMethodDescriptor* descriptor =
chromeos::input_method::GetInputMethodDescriptorFromId(
input_method_id);
if (descriptor) {
result->push_back(*descriptor);
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Descriptor is not found for: " << input_method_id;
}
}
if (result->empty()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "No active input methods found.";
result->push_back(input_method::GetFallbackInputMethodDescriptor());
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | virtual InputMethodDescriptors* GetActiveInputMethods() {
virtual input_method::InputMethodDescriptors* GetActiveInputMethods() {
input_method::InputMethodDescriptors* result =
new input_method::InputMethodDescriptors;
for (size_t i = 0; i < active_input_method_ids_.size(); ++i) {
const std::string& input_method_id = active_input_method_ids_[i];
const input_method::InputMethodDescriptor* descriptor =
input_method::GetInputMethodDescriptorFromId(
input_method_id);
if (descriptor) {
result->push_back(*descriptor);
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "Descriptor is not found for: " << input_method_id;
}
}
if (result->empty()) {
LOG(WARNING) << "No active input methods found.";
result->push_back(input_method::GetFallbackInputMethodDescriptor());
}
return result;
}
| 170,486 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleDrawElements(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::DrawElements& c) {
if (!bound_element_array_buffer_ ||
bound_element_array_buffer_->IsDeleted()) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glDrawElements: No element array buffer bound");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLenum mode = c.mode;
GLsizei count = c.count;
GLenum type = c.type;
int32 offset = c.index_offset;
if (count < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDrawElements: count < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (offset < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDrawElements: offset < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!validators_->draw_mode.IsValid(mode)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glDrawElements: mode GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!validators_->index_type.IsValid(type)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glDrawElements: type GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!CheckFramebufferComplete("glDrawElements")) {
return error::kNoError;
}
if (count == 0) {
return error::kNoError;
}
GLuint max_vertex_accessed;
if (!bound_element_array_buffer_->GetMaxValueForRange(
offset, count, type, &max_vertex_accessed)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glDrawElements: range out of bounds for buffer");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (IsDrawValid(max_vertex_accessed)) {
bool simulated_attrib_0 = SimulateAttrib0(max_vertex_accessed);
bool simulated_fixed_attribs = false;
if (SimulateFixedAttribs(max_vertex_accessed, &simulated_fixed_attribs)) {
bool textures_set = SetBlackTextureForNonRenderableTextures();
ApplyDirtyState();
const GLvoid* indices = reinterpret_cast<const GLvoid*>(offset);
glDrawElements(mode, count, type, indices);
if (textures_set) {
RestoreStateForNonRenderableTextures();
}
if (simulated_fixed_attribs) {
RestoreStateForSimulatedFixedAttribs();
}
}
if (simulated_attrib_0) {
RestoreStateForSimulatedAttrib0();
}
if (WasContextLost()) {
LOG(ERROR) << " GLES2DecoderImpl: Context lost during DrawElements.";
return error::kLostContext;
}
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleDrawElements(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::DrawElements& c) {
if (!bound_element_array_buffer_ ||
bound_element_array_buffer_->IsDeleted()) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glDrawElements: No element array buffer bound");
return error::kNoError;
}
GLenum mode = c.mode;
GLsizei count = c.count;
GLenum type = c.type;
int32 offset = c.index_offset;
if (count < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDrawElements: count < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (offset < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDrawElements: offset < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!validators_->draw_mode.IsValid(mode)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glDrawElements: mode GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!validators_->index_type.IsValid(type)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glDrawElements: type GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!CheckFramebufferComplete("glDrawElements")) {
return error::kNoError;
}
if (count == 0) {
return error::kNoError;
}
GLuint max_vertex_accessed;
if (!bound_element_array_buffer_->GetMaxValueForRange(
offset, count, type, &max_vertex_accessed)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_OPERATION,
"glDrawElements: range out of bounds for buffer");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (IsDrawValid(max_vertex_accessed)) {
bool simulated_attrib_0 = false;
if (!SimulateAttrib0(max_vertex_accessed, &simulated_attrib_0)) {
return error::kNoError;
}
bool simulated_fixed_attribs = false;
if (SimulateFixedAttribs(max_vertex_accessed, &simulated_fixed_attribs)) {
bool textures_set = SetBlackTextureForNonRenderableTextures();
ApplyDirtyState();
const GLvoid* indices = reinterpret_cast<const GLvoid*>(offset);
glDrawElements(mode, count, type, indices);
if (textures_set) {
RestoreStateForNonRenderableTextures();
}
if (simulated_fixed_attribs) {
RestoreStateForSimulatedFixedAttribs();
}
}
if (simulated_attrib_0) {
RestoreStateForSimulatedAttrib0();
}
if (WasContextLost()) {
LOG(ERROR) << " GLES2DecoderImpl: Context lost during DrawElements.";
return error::kLostContext;
}
}
return error::kNoError;
}
| 170,331 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: AppControllerImpl::~AppControllerImpl() {
if (apps::AppServiceProxy::Get(profile_))
app_service_proxy_->AppRegistryCache().RemoveObserver(this);
}
Commit Message: Refactor the AppController implementation into a KeyedService.
This is necessary to guarantee that the AppController will not outlive
the AppServiceProxy, which could happen before during Profile destruction.
Bug: 945427
Change-Id: I9e2089799e38d5a70a4a9aa66df5319113e7809e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1542336
Reviewed-by: Michael Giuffrida <michaelpg@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Lucas Tenório <ltenorio@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#645122}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | AppControllerImpl::~AppControllerImpl() {
AppControllerService::~AppControllerService() {
app_service_proxy_->AppRegistryCache().RemoveObserver(this);
}
| 172,089 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BOOL nsc_process_message(NSC_CONTEXT* context, UINT16 bpp,
UINT32 width, UINT32 height,
const BYTE* data, UINT32 length,
BYTE* pDstData, UINT32 DstFormat,
UINT32 nDstStride,
UINT32 nXDst, UINT32 nYDst, UINT32 nWidth,
UINT32 nHeight, UINT32 flip)
{
wStream* s;
BOOL ret;
s = Stream_New((BYTE*)data, length);
if (!s)
return FALSE;
if (nDstStride == 0)
nDstStride = nWidth * GetBytesPerPixel(DstFormat);
switch (bpp)
{
case 32:
context->format = PIXEL_FORMAT_BGRA32;
break;
case 24:
context->format = PIXEL_FORMAT_BGR24;
break;
case 16:
context->format = PIXEL_FORMAT_BGR16;
break;
case 8:
context->format = PIXEL_FORMAT_RGB8;
break;
case 4:
context->format = PIXEL_FORMAT_A4;
break;
default:
Stream_Free(s, TRUE);
return FALSE;
}
context->width = width;
context->height = height;
ret = nsc_context_initialize(context, s);
Stream_Free(s, FALSE);
if (!ret)
return FALSE;
/* RLE decode */
PROFILER_ENTER(context->priv->prof_nsc_rle_decompress_data)
nsc_rle_decompress_data(context);
PROFILER_EXIT(context->priv->prof_nsc_rle_decompress_data)
/* Colorloss recover, Chroma supersample and AYCoCg to ARGB Conversion in one step */
PROFILER_ENTER(context->priv->prof_nsc_decode)
context->decode(context);
PROFILER_EXIT(context->priv->prof_nsc_decode)
if (!freerdp_image_copy(pDstData, DstFormat, nDstStride, nXDst, nYDst,
width, height, context->BitmapData,
PIXEL_FORMAT_BGRA32, 0, 0, 0, NULL, flip))
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | BOOL nsc_process_message(NSC_CONTEXT* context, UINT16 bpp,
UINT32 width, UINT32 height,
const BYTE* data, UINT32 length,
BYTE* pDstData, UINT32 DstFormat,
UINT32 nDstStride,
UINT32 nXDst, UINT32 nYDst, UINT32 nWidth,
UINT32 nHeight, UINT32 flip)
{
wStream* s;
BOOL ret;
s = Stream_New((BYTE*)data, length);
if (!s)
return FALSE;
if (nDstStride == 0)
nDstStride = nWidth * GetBytesPerPixel(DstFormat);
switch (bpp)
{
case 32:
context->format = PIXEL_FORMAT_BGRA32;
break;
case 24:
context->format = PIXEL_FORMAT_BGR24;
break;
case 16:
context->format = PIXEL_FORMAT_BGR16;
break;
case 8:
context->format = PIXEL_FORMAT_RGB8;
break;
case 4:
context->format = PIXEL_FORMAT_A4;
break;
default:
Stream_Free(s, TRUE);
return FALSE;
}
context->width = width;
context->height = height;
ret = nsc_context_initialize(context, s);
Stream_Free(s, FALSE);
if (!ret)
return FALSE;
/* RLE decode */
{
BOOL rc;
PROFILER_ENTER(context->priv->prof_nsc_rle_decompress_data)
rc = nsc_rle_decompress_data(context);
PROFILER_EXIT(context->priv->prof_nsc_rle_decompress_data)
if (!rc)
return FALSE;
}
/* Colorloss recover, Chroma supersample and AYCoCg to ARGB Conversion in one step */
{
BOOL rc;
PROFILER_ENTER(context->priv->prof_nsc_decode)
rc = context->decode(context);
PROFILER_EXIT(context->priv->prof_nsc_decode)
if (!rc)
return FALSE;
}
if (!freerdp_image_copy(pDstData, DstFormat, nDstStride, nXDst, nYDst,
width, height, context->BitmapData,
PIXEL_FORMAT_BGRA32, 0, 0, 0, NULL, flip))
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
}
| 169,283 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WebContext* WebContext::FromBrowserContext(oxide::BrowserContext* context) {
BrowserContextDelegate* delegate =
static_cast<BrowserContextDelegate*>(context->GetDelegate());
if (!delegate) {
return nullptr;
}
return delegate->context();
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | WebContext* WebContext::FromBrowserContext(oxide::BrowserContext* context) {
WebContext* WebContext::FromBrowserContext(BrowserContext* context) {
BrowserContextDelegate* delegate =
static_cast<BrowserContextDelegate*>(context->GetDelegate());
if (!delegate) {
return nullptr;
}
return delegate->context();
}
| 165,411 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_is_block_algorithm)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(algorithms_dir)
if (mcrypt_module_is_block_algorithm(module, dir) == 1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_module_is_block_algorithm)
{
MCRYPT_GET_MODE_DIR_ARGS(algorithms_dir)
if (mcrypt_module_is_block_algorithm(module, dir) == 1) {
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
| 167,097 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PluginInfoMessageFilter::Context::GrantAccess(
const ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status& status,
const FilePath& path) const {
if (status.value == ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kAllowed ||
status.value == ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kClickToPlay) {
ChromePluginServiceFilter::GetInstance()->AuthorizePlugin(
render_process_id_, path);
}
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | void PluginInfoMessageFilter::Context::GrantAccess(
void PluginInfoMessageFilter::Context::MaybeGrantAccess(
const ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status& status,
const FilePath& path) const {
if (status.value == ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kAllowed ||
status.value == ChromeViewHostMsg_GetPluginInfo_Status::kClickToPlay) {
ChromePluginServiceFilter::GetInstance()->AuthorizePlugin(
render_process_id_, path);
}
}
| 171,472 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info_t *decoder_info,int size,int yposY,int xposY,int sub)
{
int width = decoder_info->width;
int height = decoder_info->height;
stream_t *stream = decoder_info->stream;
frame_type_t frame_type = decoder_info->frame_info.frame_type;
int split_flag = 0;
if (yposY >= height || xposY >= width)
return;
int decode_this_size = (yposY + size <= height) && (xposY + size <= width);
int decode_rectangular_size = !decode_this_size && frame_type != I_FRAME;
int bit_start = stream->bitcnt;
int mode = MODE_SKIP;
block_context_t block_context;
TEMPLATE(find_block_contexts)(yposY, xposY, height, width, size, decoder_info->deblock_data, &block_context, decoder_info->use_block_contexts);
decoder_info->block_context = &block_context;
split_flag = decode_super_mode(decoder_info,size,decode_this_size);
mode = decoder_info->mode;
/* Read delta_qp and set block-level qp */
if (size == (1<<decoder_info->log2_sb_size) && (split_flag || mode != MODE_SKIP) && decoder_info->max_delta_qp > 0) {
/* Read delta_qp */
int delta_qp = read_delta_qp(stream);
int prev_qp;
if (yposY == 0 && xposY == 0)
prev_qp = decoder_info->frame_info.qp;
else
prev_qp = decoder_info->frame_info.qpb;
decoder_info->frame_info.qpb = prev_qp + delta_qp;
}
decoder_info->bit_count.super_mode[decoder_info->bit_count.stat_frame_type] += (stream->bitcnt - bit_start);
if (split_flag){
int new_size = size/2;
TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info,new_size,yposY+0*new_size,xposY+0*new_size,sub);
TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info,new_size,yposY+1*new_size,xposY+0*new_size,sub);
TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info,new_size,yposY+0*new_size,xposY+1*new_size,sub);
TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info,new_size,yposY+1*new_size,xposY+1*new_size,sub);
}
else if (decode_this_size || decode_rectangular_size){
decode_block(decoder_info,size,yposY,xposY,sub);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix possible stack overflows in decoder for illegal bit streams
Fixes CVE-2018-0429
A vulnerability in the Thor decoder (available at:
https://github.com/cisco/thor) could allow an authenticated, local
attacker to cause segmentation faults and stack overflows when using a
non-conformant Thor bitstream as input.
The vulnerability is due to lack of input validation when parsing the
bitstream. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause a
stack overflow and potentially inject and execute arbitrary code.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info_t *decoder_info,int size,int yposY,int xposY,int sub)
{
int width = decoder_info->width;
int height = decoder_info->height;
stream_t *stream = decoder_info->stream;
frame_type_t frame_type = decoder_info->frame_info.frame_type;
int split_flag = 0;
if (yposY >= height || xposY >= width)
return;
int decode_this_size = (yposY + size <= height) && (xposY + size <= width);
int decode_rectangular_size = !decode_this_size && frame_type != I_FRAME;
int bit_start = stream->bitcnt;
int mode = MODE_SKIP;
block_context_t block_context;
TEMPLATE(find_block_contexts)(yposY, xposY, height, width, size, decoder_info->deblock_data, &block_context, decoder_info->use_block_contexts);
decoder_info->block_context = &block_context;
split_flag = decode_super_mode(decoder_info,size,decode_this_size);
mode = decoder_info->mode;
/* Read delta_qp and set block-level qp */
if (size == (1<<decoder_info->log2_sb_size) && (split_flag || mode != MODE_SKIP) && decoder_info->max_delta_qp > 0) {
/* Read delta_qp */
int delta_qp = read_delta_qp(stream);
int prev_qp;
if (yposY == 0 && xposY == 0)
prev_qp = decoder_info->frame_info.qp;
else
prev_qp = decoder_info->frame_info.qpb;
decoder_info->frame_info.qpb = prev_qp + delta_qp;
}
decoder_info->bit_count.super_mode[decoder_info->bit_count.stat_frame_type] += (stream->bitcnt - bit_start);
if (split_flag && size >= MIN_BLOCK_SIZE){
int new_size = size/2;
TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info,new_size,yposY+0*new_size,xposY+0*new_size,sub);
TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info,new_size,yposY+1*new_size,xposY+0*new_size,sub);
TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info,new_size,yposY+0*new_size,xposY+1*new_size,sub);
TEMPLATE(process_block_dec)(decoder_info,new_size,yposY+1*new_size,xposY+1*new_size,sub);
}
else if (decode_this_size || decode_rectangular_size){
decode_block(decoder_info,size,yposY,xposY,sub);
}
}
| 169,366 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual bool SetImeConfig(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
return false;
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | virtual bool SetImeConfig(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const input_method::ImeConfigValue& value) {
return false;
}
| 170,506 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CuePoint::TrackPosition::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long start_,
long long size_) {
const long long stop = start_ + size_;
long long pos = start_;
m_track = -1;
m_pos = -1;
m_block = 1; // default
while (pos < stop) {
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume Size field
assert((pos + size) <= stop);
if (id == 0x77) // CueTrack ID
m_track = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
else if (id == 0x71) // CueClusterPos ID
m_pos = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
else if (id == 0x1378) // CueBlockNumber
m_block = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(m_pos >= 0);
assert(m_track > 0);
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void CuePoint::TrackPosition::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long start_,
bool CuePoint::TrackPosition::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long start_,
long long size_) {
const long long stop = start_ + size_;
long long pos = start_;
m_track = -1;
m_pos = -1;
m_block = 1; // default
while (pos < stop) {
long len;
const long long id = ReadID(pReader, pos, len);
if ((id < 0) || ((pos + len) > stop)) {
return false;
}
pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if ((size < 0) || ((pos + len) > stop)) {
return false;
}
pos += len; // consume Size field
if ((pos + size) > stop) {
return false;
}
if (id == 0x77) // CueTrack ID
m_track = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
else if (id == 0x71) // CueClusterPos ID
m_pos = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
else if (id == 0x1378) // CueBlockNumber
m_block = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
pos += size; // consume payload
}
if ((m_pos < 0) || (m_track <= 0)) {
return false;
}
return true;
}
| 173,837 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int do_devinfo_ioctl(struct comedi_device *dev,
struct comedi_devinfo __user *arg,
struct file *file)
{
struct comedi_devinfo devinfo;
const unsigned minor = iminor(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
struct comedi_device_file_info *dev_file_info =
comedi_get_device_file_info(minor);
struct comedi_subdevice *read_subdev =
comedi_get_read_subdevice(dev_file_info);
struct comedi_subdevice *write_subdev =
comedi_get_write_subdevice(dev_file_info);
memset(&devinfo, 0, sizeof(devinfo));
/* fill devinfo structure */
devinfo.version_code = COMEDI_VERSION_CODE;
devinfo.n_subdevs = dev->n_subdevices;
memcpy(devinfo.driver_name, dev->driver->driver_name, COMEDI_NAMELEN);
memcpy(devinfo.board_name, dev->board_name, COMEDI_NAMELEN);
if (read_subdev)
devinfo.read_subdevice = read_subdev - dev->subdevices;
else
devinfo.read_subdevice = -1;
if (write_subdev)
devinfo.write_subdevice = write_subdev - dev->subdevices;
else
devinfo.write_subdevice = -1;
if (copy_to_user(arg, &devinfo, sizeof(struct comedi_devinfo)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: staging: comedi: fix infoleak to userspace
driver_name and board_name are pointers to strings, not buffers of size
COMEDI_NAMELEN. Copying COMEDI_NAMELEN bytes of a string containing
less than COMEDI_NAMELEN-1 bytes would leak some unrelated bytes.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int do_devinfo_ioctl(struct comedi_device *dev,
struct comedi_devinfo __user *arg,
struct file *file)
{
struct comedi_devinfo devinfo;
const unsigned minor = iminor(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
struct comedi_device_file_info *dev_file_info =
comedi_get_device_file_info(minor);
struct comedi_subdevice *read_subdev =
comedi_get_read_subdevice(dev_file_info);
struct comedi_subdevice *write_subdev =
comedi_get_write_subdevice(dev_file_info);
memset(&devinfo, 0, sizeof(devinfo));
/* fill devinfo structure */
devinfo.version_code = COMEDI_VERSION_CODE;
devinfo.n_subdevs = dev->n_subdevices;
strlcpy(devinfo.driver_name, dev->driver->driver_name, COMEDI_NAMELEN);
strlcpy(devinfo.board_name, dev->board_name, COMEDI_NAMELEN);
if (read_subdev)
devinfo.read_subdevice = read_subdev - dev->subdevices;
else
devinfo.read_subdevice = -1;
if (write_subdev)
devinfo.write_subdevice = write_subdev - dev->subdevices;
else
devinfo.write_subdevice = -1;
if (copy_to_user(arg, &devinfo, sizeof(struct comedi_devinfo)))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
}
| 166,557 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DocumentLoader::InstallNewDocument(
const KURL& url,
Document* owner_document,
bool should_reuse_default_view,
const AtomicString& mime_type,
const AtomicString& encoding,
InstallNewDocumentReason reason,
ParserSynchronizationPolicy parsing_policy,
const KURL& overriding_url) {
DCHECK(!frame_->GetDocument() || !frame_->GetDocument()->IsActive());
DCHECK_EQ(frame_->Tree().ChildCount(), 0u);
if (GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->IsDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument()) {
GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->AdvanceTo(
FrameLoaderStateMachine::kCommittedFirstRealLoad);
}
SecurityOrigin* previous_security_origin = nullptr;
if (frame_->GetDocument())
previous_security_origin = frame_->GetDocument()->GetSecurityOrigin();
if (!should_reuse_default_view)
frame_->SetDOMWindow(LocalDOMWindow::Create(*frame_));
bool user_gesture_bit_set = frame_->HasReceivedUserGesture() ||
frame_->HasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation();
if (reason == InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation)
WillCommitNavigation();
Document* document = frame_->DomWindow()->InstallNewDocument(
mime_type,
DocumentInit::Create()
.WithFrame(frame_)
.WithURL(url)
.WithOwnerDocument(owner_document)
.WithNewRegistrationContext(),
false);
if (user_gesture_bit_set) {
frame_->SetDocumentHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation(
ShouldPersistUserGestureValue(previous_security_origin,
document->GetSecurityOrigin()));
if (frame_->IsMainFrame())
frame_->ClearDocumentHasReceivedUserGesture();
}
if (ShouldClearWindowName(*frame_, previous_security_origin, *document)) {
frame_->Tree().ExperimentalSetNulledName();
}
frame_->GetPage()->GetChromeClient().InstallSupplements(*frame_);
if (!overriding_url.IsEmpty())
document->SetBaseURLOverride(overriding_url);
DidInstallNewDocument(document);
if (reason == InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation)
DidCommitNavigation();
writer_ =
DocumentWriter::Create(document, parsing_policy, mime_type, encoding);
document->SetFeaturePolicy(
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::FeaturePolicyExperimentalFeaturesEnabled()
? response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Feature_Policy)
: g_empty_string);
GetFrameLoader().DispatchDidClearDocumentOfWindowObject();
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | void DocumentLoader::InstallNewDocument(
const KURL& url,
Document* owner_document,
bool should_reuse_default_view,
const AtomicString& mime_type,
const AtomicString& encoding,
InstallNewDocumentReason reason,
ParserSynchronizationPolicy parsing_policy,
const KURL& overriding_url) {
DCHECK(!frame_->GetDocument() || !frame_->GetDocument()->IsActive());
DCHECK_EQ(frame_->Tree().ChildCount(), 0u);
if (GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->IsDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument()) {
GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->AdvanceTo(
FrameLoaderStateMachine::kCommittedFirstRealLoad);
}
SecurityOrigin* previous_security_origin = nullptr;
if (frame_->GetDocument())
previous_security_origin = frame_->GetDocument()->GetSecurityOrigin();
if (!should_reuse_default_view)
frame_->SetDOMWindow(LocalDOMWindow::Create(*frame_));
bool user_gesture_bit_set = frame_->HasReceivedUserGesture() ||
frame_->HasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation();
if (reason == InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation)
WillCommitNavigation();
Document* document = frame_->DomWindow()->InstallNewDocument(
mime_type,
DocumentInit::Create()
.WithFrame(frame_)
.WithURL(url)
.WithOwnerDocument(owner_document)
.WithNewRegistrationContext(),
false);
if (user_gesture_bit_set) {
frame_->SetDocumentHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation(
ShouldPersistUserGestureValue(previous_security_origin,
document->GetSecurityOrigin()));
if (frame_->IsMainFrame())
frame_->ClearDocumentHasReceivedUserGesture();
}
if (ShouldClearWindowName(*frame_, previous_security_origin, *document)) {
frame_->Tree().ExperimentalSetNulledName();
}
frame_->GetPage()->GetChromeClient().InstallSupplements(*frame_);
if (!overriding_url.IsEmpty())
document->SetBaseURLOverride(overriding_url);
DidInstallNewDocument(document, reason);
if (reason == InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation)
DidCommitNavigation();
writer_ =
DocumentWriter::Create(document, parsing_policy, mime_type, encoding);
document->SetFeaturePolicy(
RuntimeEnabledFeatures::FeaturePolicyExperimentalFeaturesEnabled()
? response_.HttpHeaderField(HTTPNames::Feature_Policy)
: g_empty_string);
GetFrameLoader().DispatchDidClearDocumentOfWindowObject();
}
| 172,303 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(xml)
{
le_xml_parser = zend_register_list_destructors_ex(xml_parser_dtor, NULL, "xml", module_number);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_NONE", XML_ERROR_NONE, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY", XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_SYNTAX", XML_ERROR_SYNTAX, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_NO_ELEMENTS", XML_ERROR_NO_ELEMENTS, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN", XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN", XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR", XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_TAG_MISMATCH", XML_ERROR_TAG_MISMATCH, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ATTRIBUTE", XML_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ATTRIBUTE, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_JUNK_AFTER_DOC_ELEMENT", XML_ERROR_JUNK_AFTER_DOC_ELEMENT, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_PARAM_ENTITY_REF", XML_ERROR_PARAM_ENTITY_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_UNDEFINED_ENTITY", XML_ERROR_UNDEFINED_ENTITY, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_RECURSIVE_ENTITY_REF", XML_ERROR_RECURSIVE_ENTITY_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_ASYNC_ENTITY", XML_ERROR_ASYNC_ENTITY, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_BAD_CHAR_REF", XML_ERROR_BAD_CHAR_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_BINARY_ENTITY_REF", XML_ERROR_BINARY_ENTITY_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_ATTRIBUTE_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_REF", XML_ERROR_ATTRIBUTE_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_MISPLACED_XML_PI", XML_ERROR_MISPLACED_XML_PI, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ENCODING", XML_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ENCODING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_INCORRECT_ENCODING", XML_ERROR_INCORRECT_ENCODING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_CDATA_SECTION", XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_CDATA_SECTION, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING", XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_OPTION_CASE_FOLDING", PHP_XML_OPTION_CASE_FOLDING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_OPTION_TARGET_ENCODING", PHP_XML_OPTION_TARGET_ENCODING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_OPTION_SKIP_TAGSTART", PHP_XML_OPTION_SKIP_TAGSTART, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_OPTION_SKIP_WHITE", PHP_XML_OPTION_SKIP_WHITE, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
/* this object should not be pre-initialised at compile time,
as the order of members may vary */
php_xml_mem_hdlrs.malloc_fcn = php_xml_malloc_wrapper;
php_xml_mem_hdlrs.realloc_fcn = php_xml_realloc_wrapper;
php_xml_mem_hdlrs.free_fcn = php_xml_free_wrapper;
#ifdef LIBXML_EXPAT_COMPAT
REGISTER_STRING_CONSTANT("XML_SAX_IMPL", "libxml", CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
#else
REGISTER_STRING_CONSTANT("XML_SAX_IMPL", "expat", CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
return SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | PHP_MINIT_FUNCTION(xml)
{
le_xml_parser = zend_register_list_destructors_ex(xml_parser_dtor, NULL, "xml", module_number);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_NONE", XML_ERROR_NONE, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY", XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_SYNTAX", XML_ERROR_SYNTAX, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_NO_ELEMENTS", XML_ERROR_NO_ELEMENTS, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN", XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN", XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_TOKEN, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR", XML_ERROR_PARTIAL_CHAR, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_TAG_MISMATCH", XML_ERROR_TAG_MISMATCH, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ATTRIBUTE", XML_ERROR_DUPLICATE_ATTRIBUTE, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_JUNK_AFTER_DOC_ELEMENT", XML_ERROR_JUNK_AFTER_DOC_ELEMENT, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_PARAM_ENTITY_REF", XML_ERROR_PARAM_ENTITY_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_UNDEFINED_ENTITY", XML_ERROR_UNDEFINED_ENTITY, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_RECURSIVE_ENTITY_REF", XML_ERROR_RECURSIVE_ENTITY_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_ASYNC_ENTITY", XML_ERROR_ASYNC_ENTITY, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_BAD_CHAR_REF", XML_ERROR_BAD_CHAR_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_BINARY_ENTITY_REF", XML_ERROR_BINARY_ENTITY_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_ATTRIBUTE_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_REF", XML_ERROR_ATTRIBUTE_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_REF, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_MISPLACED_XML_PI", XML_ERROR_MISPLACED_XML_PI, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ENCODING", XML_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ENCODING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_INCORRECT_ENCODING", XML_ERROR_INCORRECT_ENCODING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_CDATA_SECTION", XML_ERROR_UNCLOSED_CDATA_SECTION, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING", XML_ERROR_EXTERNAL_ENTITY_HANDLING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_OPTION_CASE_FOLDING", PHP_XML_OPTION_CASE_FOLDING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_OPTION_TARGET_ENCODING", PHP_XML_OPTION_TARGET_ENCODING, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_OPTION_SKIP_TAGSTART", PHP_XML_OPTION_SKIP_TAGSTART, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
REGISTER_LONG_CONSTANT("XML_OPTION_SKIP_WHITE", PHP_XML_OPTION_SKIP_WHITE, CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
/* this object should not be pre-initialised at compile time,
as the order of members may vary */
php_xml_mem_hdlrs.malloc_fcn = php_xml_malloc_wrapper;
php_xml_mem_hdlrs.realloc_fcn = php_xml_realloc_wrapper;
php_xml_mem_hdlrs.free_fcn = php_xml_free_wrapper;
#ifdef LIBXML_EXPAT_COMPAT
REGISTER_STRING_CONSTANT("XML_SAX_IMPL", "libxml", CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
#else
REGISTER_STRING_CONSTANT("XML_SAX_IMPL", "expat", CONST_CS|CONST_PERSISTENT);
#endif
return SUCCESS;
}
| 165,038 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int vfs_open(const struct path *path, struct file *file,
const struct cred *cred)
{
struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
file->f_path = *path;
if (dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_OP_SELECT_INODE) {
inode = dentry->d_op->d_select_inode(dentry, file->f_flags);
if (IS_ERR(inode))
return PTR_ERR(inode);
}
return do_dentry_open(file, inode, NULL, cred);
}
Commit Message: vfs: add vfs_select_inode() helper
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.2+
CWE ID: CWE-284 | int vfs_open(const struct path *path, struct file *file,
const struct cred *cred)
{
struct inode *inode = vfs_select_inode(path->dentry, file->f_flags);
if (IS_ERR(inode))
return PTR_ERR(inode);
file->f_path = *path;
return do_dentry_open(file, inode, NULL, cred);
}
| 169,943 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get(u32 ufd)
{
struct fd f = fdget(ufd);
struct bpf_prog *prog;
prog = __bpf_prog_get(f);
if (IS_ERR(prog))
return prog;
atomic_inc(&prog->aux->refcnt);
fdput(f);
return prog;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog_get(u32 ufd)
{
struct fd f = fdget(ufd);
struct bpf_prog *prog;
prog = __bpf_prog_get(f);
if (IS_ERR(prog))
return prog;
prog = bpf_prog_inc(prog);
fdput(f);
return prog;
}
| 167,254 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ShouldUseNativeViews() {
#if defined(OS_WIN) || defined(OS_MACOSX) || defined(OS_LINUX)
return base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kAutofillExpandedPopupViews) ||
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(::features::kExperimentalUi);
#else
return false;
#endif
}
Commit Message: [Autofill] Remove AutofillPopupViewViews and associated feature.
Bug: 906135,831603
Change-Id: I3c982f8b3ffb4928c7c878e74e10113999106499
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1387124
Reviewed-by: Robert Kaplow <rkaplow@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Vasilii Sukhanov <vasilii@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Fabio Tirelo <ftirelo@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tommy Martino <tmartino@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Mathieu Perreault <mathp@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#621360}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | bool ShouldUseNativeViews() {
| 172,098 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: krb5_gss_export_sec_context(minor_status, context_handle, interprocess_token)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle;
gss_buffer_t interprocess_token;
{
krb5_context context = NULL;
krb5_error_code kret;
OM_uint32 retval;
size_t bufsize, blen;
krb5_gss_ctx_id_t ctx;
krb5_octet *obuffer, *obp;
/* Assume a tragic failure */
obuffer = (krb5_octet *) NULL;
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*minor_status = 0;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_t) *context_handle;
context = ctx->k5_context;
kret = krb5_gss_ser_init(context);
if (kret)
goto error_out;
/* Determine size needed for externalization of context */
bufsize = 0;
if ((kret = kg_ctx_size(context, (krb5_pointer) ctx,
&bufsize)))
goto error_out;
/* Allocate the buffer */
if ((obuffer = gssalloc_malloc(bufsize)) == NULL) {
kret = ENOMEM;
goto error_out;
}
obp = obuffer;
blen = bufsize;
/* Externalize the context */
if ((kret = kg_ctx_externalize(context,
(krb5_pointer) ctx, &obp, &blen)))
goto error_out;
/* Success! Return the buffer */
interprocess_token->length = bufsize - blen;
interprocess_token->value = obuffer;
*minor_status = 0;
retval = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
/* Now, clean up the context state */
(void)krb5_gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status, context_handle, NULL);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
return (GSS_S_COMPLETE);
error_out:
if (retval != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
if (kret != 0 && context != 0)
save_error_info((OM_uint32)kret, context);
if (obuffer && bufsize) {
memset(obuffer, 0, bufsize);
xfree(obuffer);
}
if (*minor_status == 0)
*minor_status = (OM_uint32) kret;
return(retval);
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | krb5_gss_export_sec_context(minor_status, context_handle, interprocess_token)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t *context_handle;
gss_buffer_t interprocess_token;
{
krb5_context context = NULL;
krb5_error_code kret;
OM_uint32 retval;
size_t bufsize, blen;
krb5_gss_ctx_id_t ctx;
krb5_octet *obuffer, *obp;
/* Assume a tragic failure */
obuffer = (krb5_octet *) NULL;
retval = GSS_S_FAILURE;
*minor_status = 0;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_t) *context_handle;
if (ctx->terminated) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return (GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
context = ctx->k5_context;
kret = krb5_gss_ser_init(context);
if (kret)
goto error_out;
/* Determine size needed for externalization of context */
bufsize = 0;
if ((kret = kg_ctx_size(context, (krb5_pointer) ctx,
&bufsize)))
goto error_out;
/* Allocate the buffer */
if ((obuffer = gssalloc_malloc(bufsize)) == NULL) {
kret = ENOMEM;
goto error_out;
}
obp = obuffer;
blen = bufsize;
/* Externalize the context */
if ((kret = kg_ctx_externalize(context,
(krb5_pointer) ctx, &obp, &blen)))
goto error_out;
/* Success! Return the buffer */
interprocess_token->length = bufsize - blen;
interprocess_token->value = obuffer;
*minor_status = 0;
retval = GSS_S_COMPLETE;
/* Now, clean up the context state */
(void)krb5_gss_delete_sec_context(minor_status, context_handle, NULL);
*context_handle = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
return (GSS_S_COMPLETE);
error_out:
if (retval != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
if (kret != 0 && context != 0)
save_error_info((OM_uint32)kret, context);
if (obuffer && bufsize) {
memset(obuffer, 0, bufsize);
xfree(obuffer);
}
if (*minor_status == 0)
*minor_status = (OM_uint32) kret;
return(retval);
}
| 166,814 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xmlParseNmtoken(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar buf[XML_MAX_NAMELEN + 5];
int len = 0, l;
int c;
int count = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG
nbParseNmToken++;
#endif
GROW;
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
while (xmlIsNameChar(ctxt, c)) {
if (count++ > 100) {
count = 0;
GROW;
}
COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,c);
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
if (len >= XML_MAX_NAMELEN) {
/*
* Okay someone managed to make a huge token, so he's ready to pay
* for the processing speed.
*/
xmlChar *buffer;
int max = len * 2;
buffer = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(max * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buffer == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
memcpy(buffer, buf, len);
while (xmlIsNameChar(ctxt, c)) {
if (count++ > 100) {
count = 0;
GROW;
}
if (len + 10 > max) {
xmlChar *tmp;
max *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buffer,
max * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFree(buffer);
return(NULL);
}
buffer = tmp;
}
COPY_BUF(l,buffer,len,c);
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
buffer[len] = 0;
return(buffer);
}
}
if (len == 0)
return(NULL);
return(xmlStrndup(buf, len));
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xmlParseNmtoken(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
xmlChar buf[XML_MAX_NAMELEN + 5];
int len = 0, l;
int c;
int count = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG
nbParseNmToken++;
#endif
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF)
return(NULL);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
while (xmlIsNameChar(ctxt, c)) {
if (count++ > 100) {
count = 0;
GROW;
}
COPY_BUF(l,buf,len,c);
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
if (len >= XML_MAX_NAMELEN) {
/*
* Okay someone managed to make a huge token, so he's ready to pay
* for the processing speed.
*/
xmlChar *buffer;
int max = len * 2;
buffer = (xmlChar *) xmlMallocAtomic(max * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (buffer == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
return(NULL);
}
memcpy(buffer, buf, len);
while (xmlIsNameChar(ctxt, c)) {
if (count++ > 100) {
count = 0;
GROW;
if (ctxt->instate == XML_PARSER_EOF) {
xmlFree(buffer);
return(NULL);
}
}
if (len + 10 > max) {
xmlChar *tmp;
max *= 2;
tmp = (xmlChar *) xmlRealloc(buffer,
max * sizeof(xmlChar));
if (tmp == NULL) {
xmlErrMemory(ctxt, NULL);
xmlFree(buffer);
return(NULL);
}
buffer = tmp;
}
COPY_BUF(l,buffer,len,c);
NEXTL(l);
c = CUR_CHAR(l);
}
buffer[len] = 0;
return(buffer);
}
}
if (len == 0)
return(NULL);
return(xmlStrndup(buf, len));
}
| 171,298 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int get_cox(Jpeg2000DecoderContext *s, Jpeg2000CodingStyle *c)
{
uint8_t byte;
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g) < 5)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
/* nreslevels = number of resolution levels
= number of decomposition level +1 */
c->nreslevels = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g) + 1;
if (c->nreslevels >= JPEG2000_MAX_RESLEVELS) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "nreslevels %d is invalid\n", c->nreslevels);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
/* compute number of resolution levels to decode */
if (c->nreslevels < s->reduction_factor)
c->nreslevels2decode = 1;
else
c->nreslevels2decode = c->nreslevels - s->reduction_factor;
c->log2_cblk_width = (bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g) & 15) + 2; // cblk width
c->log2_cblk_height = (bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g) & 15) + 2; // cblk height
if (c->log2_cblk_width > 10 || c->log2_cblk_height > 10 ||
c->log2_cblk_width + c->log2_cblk_height > 12) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "cblk size invalid\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (c->log2_cblk_width > 6 || c->log2_cblk_height > 6) {
avpriv_request_sample(s->avctx, "cblk size > 64");
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
c->cblk_style = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g);
if (c->cblk_style != 0) { // cblk style
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "extra cblk styles %X\n", c->cblk_style);
}
c->transform = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g); // DWT transformation type
/* set integer 9/7 DWT in case of BITEXACT flag */
if ((s->avctx->flags & CODEC_FLAG_BITEXACT) && (c->transform == FF_DWT97))
c->transform = FF_DWT97_INT;
if (c->csty & JPEG2000_CSTY_PREC) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < c->nreslevels; i++) {
byte = bytestream2_get_byte(&s->g);
c->log2_prec_widths[i] = byte & 0x0F; // precinct PPx
c->log2_prec_heights[i] = (byte >> 4) & 0x0F; // precinct PPy
}
} else {
memset(c->log2_prec_widths , 15, sizeof(c->log2_prec_widths ));
memset(c->log2_prec_heights, 15, sizeof(c->log2_prec_heights));
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/jpeg2000dec: fix context consistency with too large lowres
Fixes out of array accesses
Fixes Ticket2898
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int get_cox(Jpeg2000DecoderContext *s, Jpeg2000CodingStyle *c)
{
uint8_t byte;
if (bytestream2_get_bytes_left(&s->g) < 5)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
/* nreslevels = number of resolution levels
= number of decomposition level +1 */
c->nreslevels = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g) + 1;
if (c->nreslevels >= JPEG2000_MAX_RESLEVELS) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "nreslevels %d is invalid\n", c->nreslevels);
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (c->nreslevels <= s->reduction_factor) {
/* we are forced to update reduction_factor as its requested value is
not compatible with this bitstream, and as we might have used it
already in setup earlier we have to fail this frame until
reinitialization is implemented */
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "reduction_factor too large for this bitstream, max is %d\n", c->nreslevels - 1);
s->reduction_factor = c->nreslevels - 1;
return AVERROR(EINVAL);
}
/* compute number of resolution levels to decode */
c->nreslevels2decode = c->nreslevels - s->reduction_factor;
c->log2_cblk_width = (bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g) & 15) + 2; // cblk width
c->log2_cblk_height = (bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g) & 15) + 2; // cblk height
if (c->log2_cblk_width > 10 || c->log2_cblk_height > 10 ||
c->log2_cblk_width + c->log2_cblk_height > 12) {
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_ERROR, "cblk size invalid\n");
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
}
if (c->log2_cblk_width > 6 || c->log2_cblk_height > 6) {
avpriv_request_sample(s->avctx, "cblk size > 64");
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
c->cblk_style = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g);
if (c->cblk_style != 0) { // cblk style
av_log(s->avctx, AV_LOG_WARNING, "extra cblk styles %X\n", c->cblk_style);
}
c->transform = bytestream2_get_byteu(&s->g); // DWT transformation type
/* set integer 9/7 DWT in case of BITEXACT flag */
if ((s->avctx->flags & CODEC_FLAG_BITEXACT) && (c->transform == FF_DWT97))
c->transform = FF_DWT97_INT;
if (c->csty & JPEG2000_CSTY_PREC) {
int i;
for (i = 0; i < c->nreslevels; i++) {
byte = bytestream2_get_byte(&s->g);
c->log2_prec_widths[i] = byte & 0x0F; // precinct PPx
c->log2_prec_heights[i] = (byte >> 4) & 0x0F; // precinct PPy
}
} else {
memset(c->log2_prec_widths , 15, sizeof(c->log2_prec_widths ));
memset(c->log2_prec_heights, 15, sizeof(c->log2_prec_heights));
}
return 0;
}
| 165,918 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void nfs4_close_state(struct path *path, struct nfs4_state *state, mode_t mode)
{
__nfs4_close(path, state, mode, 0);
}
Commit Message: NFSv4: Convert the open and close ops to use fmode
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
CWE ID: | void nfs4_close_state(struct path *path, struct nfs4_state *state, mode_t mode)
void nfs4_close_state(struct path *path, struct nfs4_state *state, fmode_t fmode)
{
__nfs4_close(path, state, fmode, 0);
}
| 165,710 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MessageService::OpenChannelToNativeApp(
int source_process_id,
int source_routing_id,
int receiver_port_id,
const std::string& source_extension_id,
const std::string& native_app_name,
const std::string& channel_name,
const std::string& connect_message) {
content::RenderProcessHost* source =
content::RenderProcessHost::FromID(source_process_id);
if (!source)
return;
WebContents* source_contents = tab_util::GetWebContentsByID(
source_process_id, source_routing_id);
std::string tab_json = "null";
if (source_contents) {
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> tab_value(ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
source_contents, ExtensionTabUtil::INCLUDE_PRIVACY_SENSITIVE_FIELDS));
base::JSONWriter::Write(tab_value.get(), &tab_json);
}
scoped_ptr<MessageChannel> channel(new MessageChannel());
channel->opener.reset(new ExtensionMessagePort(source, MSG_ROUTING_CONTROL,
source_extension_id));
NativeMessageProcessHost::MessageType type =
channel_name == "chrome.runtime.sendNativeMessage" ?
NativeMessageProcessHost::TYPE_SEND_MESSAGE_REQUEST :
NativeMessageProcessHost::TYPE_CONNECT;
content::BrowserThread::PostTask(
content::BrowserThread::FILE,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&NativeMessageProcessHost::Create,
base::WeakPtr<NativeMessageProcessHost::Client>(
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
native_app_name, connect_message, receiver_port_id,
type,
base::Bind(&MessageService::FinalizeOpenChannelToNativeApp,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
receiver_port_id,
channel_name,
base::Passed(&channel),
tab_json)));
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void MessageService::OpenChannelToNativeApp(
int source_process_id,
int source_routing_id,
int receiver_port_id,
const std::string& source_extension_id,
const std::string& native_app_name,
const std::string& channel_name,
const std::string& connect_message) {
content::RenderProcessHost* source =
content::RenderProcessHost::FromID(source_process_id);
if (!source)
return;
WebContents* source_contents = tab_util::GetWebContentsByID(
source_process_id, source_routing_id);
std::string tab_json = "null";
if (source_contents) {
scoped_ptr<DictionaryValue> tab_value(ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
source_contents));
base::JSONWriter::Write(tab_value.get(), &tab_json);
}
scoped_ptr<MessageChannel> channel(new MessageChannel());
channel->opener.reset(new ExtensionMessagePort(source, MSG_ROUTING_CONTROL,
source_extension_id));
NativeMessageProcessHost::MessageType type =
channel_name == "chrome.runtime.sendNativeMessage" ?
NativeMessageProcessHost::TYPE_SEND_MESSAGE_REQUEST :
NativeMessageProcessHost::TYPE_CONNECT;
content::BrowserThread::PostTask(
content::BrowserThread::FILE,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&NativeMessageProcessHost::Create,
base::WeakPtr<NativeMessageProcessHost::Client>(
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
native_app_name, connect_message, receiver_port_id,
type,
base::Bind(&MessageService::FinalizeOpenChannelToNativeApp,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
receiver_port_id,
channel_name,
base::Passed(&channel),
tab_json)));
}
| 171,447 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DocumentLoader::InstallNewDocument(
const KURL& url,
Document* owner_document,
WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy global_object_reuse_policy,
const AtomicString& mime_type,
const AtomicString& encoding,
InstallNewDocumentReason reason,
ParserSynchronizationPolicy parsing_policy,
const KURL& overriding_url) {
DCHECK(!frame_->GetDocument() || !frame_->GetDocument()->IsActive());
DCHECK_EQ(frame_->Tree().ChildCount(), 0u);
if (GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->IsDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument()) {
GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->AdvanceTo(
FrameLoaderStateMachine::kCommittedFirstRealLoad);
}
const SecurityOrigin* previous_security_origin = nullptr;
const ContentSecurityPolicy* previous_csp = nullptr;
if (frame_->GetDocument()) {
previous_security_origin = frame_->GetDocument()->GetSecurityOrigin();
previous_csp = frame_->GetDocument()->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
}
if (global_object_reuse_policy != WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kUseExisting)
frame_->SetDOMWindow(LocalDOMWindow::Create(*frame_));
if (reason == InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation)
WillCommitNavigation();
Document* document = frame_->DomWindow()->InstallNewDocument(
mime_type,
DocumentInit::Create()
.WithDocumentLoader(this)
.WithURL(url)
.WithOwnerDocument(owner_document)
.WithNewRegistrationContext()
.WithPreviousDocumentCSP(previous_csp),
false);
if (frame_->IsMainFrame())
frame_->ClearActivation();
if (frame_->HasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation() !=
had_sticky_activation_) {
frame_->SetDocumentHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation(
had_sticky_activation_);
GetLocalFrameClient().SetHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation(
had_sticky_activation_);
}
if (ShouldClearWindowName(*frame_, previous_security_origin, *document)) {
frame_->Tree().ExperimentalSetNulledName();
}
if (!overriding_url.IsEmpty())
document->SetBaseURLOverride(overriding_url);
DidInstallNewDocument(document, previous_csp);
if (reason == InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation)
DidCommitNavigation(global_object_reuse_policy);
if (GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->CommittedFirstRealDocumentLoad()) {
if (document->GetSettings()
->GetForceTouchEventFeatureDetectionForInspector()) {
OriginTrialContext::FromOrCreate(document)->AddFeature(
"ForceTouchEventFeatureDetectionForInspector");
}
OriginTrialContext::AddTokensFromHeader(
document, response_.HttpHeaderField(http_names::kOriginTrial));
}
bool stale_while_revalidate_enabled =
origin_trials::StaleWhileRevalidateEnabled(document);
fetcher_->SetStaleWhileRevalidateEnabled(stale_while_revalidate_enabled);
if (stale_while_revalidate_enabled &&
!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::StaleWhileRevalidateEnabledByRuntimeFlag())
UseCounter::Count(frame_, WebFeature::kStaleWhileRevalidateEnabled);
parser_ = document->OpenForNavigation(parsing_policy, mime_type, encoding);
ScriptableDocumentParser* scriptable_parser =
parser_->AsScriptableDocumentParser();
if (scriptable_parser && GetResource()) {
scriptable_parser->SetInlineScriptCacheHandler(
ToRawResource(GetResource())->InlineScriptCacheHandler());
}
WTF::String feature_policy(
response_.HttpHeaderField(http_names::kFeaturePolicy));
MergeFeaturesFromOriginPolicy(feature_policy, request_.GetOriginPolicy());
document->ApplyFeaturePolicyFromHeader(feature_policy);
GetFrameLoader().DispatchDidClearDocumentOfWindowObject();
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void DocumentLoader::InstallNewDocument(
const KURL& url,
Document* owner_document,
WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy global_object_reuse_policy,
const AtomicString& mime_type,
const AtomicString& encoding,
InstallNewDocumentReason reason,
ParserSynchronizationPolicy parsing_policy,
const KURL& overriding_url) {
DCHECK(!frame_->GetDocument() || !frame_->GetDocument()->IsActive());
DCHECK_EQ(frame_->Tree().ChildCount(), 0u);
if (GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->IsDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument()) {
GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->AdvanceTo(
FrameLoaderStateMachine::kCommittedFirstRealLoad);
}
const SecurityOrigin* previous_security_origin = nullptr;
if (frame_->GetDocument()) {
previous_security_origin = frame_->GetDocument()->GetSecurityOrigin();
}
if (global_object_reuse_policy != WebGlobalObjectReusePolicy::kUseExisting)
frame_->SetDOMWindow(LocalDOMWindow::Create(*frame_));
if (reason == InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation)
WillCommitNavigation();
Document* document = frame_->DomWindow()->InstallNewDocument(
mime_type,
DocumentInit::Create()
.WithDocumentLoader(this)
.WithURL(url)
.WithOwnerDocument(owner_document)
.WithNewRegistrationContext(),
false);
if (frame_->IsMainFrame())
frame_->ClearActivation();
if (frame_->HasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation() !=
had_sticky_activation_) {
frame_->SetDocumentHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation(
had_sticky_activation_);
GetLocalFrameClient().SetHasReceivedUserGestureBeforeNavigation(
had_sticky_activation_);
}
if (ShouldClearWindowName(*frame_, previous_security_origin, *document)) {
frame_->Tree().ExperimentalSetNulledName();
}
if (!overriding_url.IsEmpty())
document->SetBaseURLOverride(overriding_url);
DidInstallNewDocument(document);
if (reason == InstallNewDocumentReason::kNavigation)
DidCommitNavigation(global_object_reuse_policy);
if (GetFrameLoader().StateMachine()->CommittedFirstRealDocumentLoad()) {
if (document->GetSettings()
->GetForceTouchEventFeatureDetectionForInspector()) {
OriginTrialContext::FromOrCreate(document)->AddFeature(
"ForceTouchEventFeatureDetectionForInspector");
}
OriginTrialContext::AddTokensFromHeader(
document, response_.HttpHeaderField(http_names::kOriginTrial));
}
bool stale_while_revalidate_enabled =
origin_trials::StaleWhileRevalidateEnabled(document);
fetcher_->SetStaleWhileRevalidateEnabled(stale_while_revalidate_enabled);
if (stale_while_revalidate_enabled &&
!RuntimeEnabledFeatures::StaleWhileRevalidateEnabledByRuntimeFlag())
UseCounter::Count(frame_, WebFeature::kStaleWhileRevalidateEnabled);
parser_ = document->OpenForNavigation(parsing_policy, mime_type, encoding);
ScriptableDocumentParser* scriptable_parser =
parser_->AsScriptableDocumentParser();
if (scriptable_parser && GetResource()) {
scriptable_parser->SetInlineScriptCacheHandler(
ToRawResource(GetResource())->InlineScriptCacheHandler());
}
WTF::String feature_policy(
response_.HttpHeaderField(http_names::kFeaturePolicy));
MergeFeaturesFromOriginPolicy(feature_policy, request_.GetOriginPolicy());
document->ApplyFeaturePolicyFromHeader(feature_policy);
GetFrameLoader().DispatchDidClearDocumentOfWindowObject();
}
| 173,057 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CLASS foveon_dp_load_raw()
{
unsigned c, roff[4], row, col, diff;
ushort huff[512], vpred[2][2], hpred[2];
fseek (ifp, 8, SEEK_CUR);
foveon_huff (huff);
roff[0] = 48;
FORC3 roff[c+1] = -(-(roff[c] + get4()) & -16);
FORC3 {
fseek (ifp, data_offset+roff[c], SEEK_SET);
getbits(-1);
vpred[0][0] = vpred[0][1] = vpred[1][0] = vpred[1][1] = 512;
for (row=0; row < height; row++) {
#ifdef LIBRAW_LIBRARY_BUILD
checkCancel();
#endif
for (col=0; col < width; col++) {
diff = ljpeg_diff(huff);
if (col < 2) hpred[col] = vpred[row & 1][col] += diff;
else hpred[col & 1] += diff;
image[row*width+col][c] = hpred[col & 1];
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Fixed possible foveon buffer overrun (Secunia SA750000)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void CLASS foveon_dp_load_raw()
{
unsigned c, roff[4], row, col, diff;
ushort huff[1024], vpred[2][2], hpred[2];
fseek (ifp, 8, SEEK_CUR);
foveon_huff (huff);
roff[0] = 48;
FORC3 roff[c+1] = -(-(roff[c] + get4()) & -16);
FORC3 {
fseek (ifp, data_offset+roff[c], SEEK_SET);
getbits(-1);
vpred[0][0] = vpred[0][1] = vpred[1][0] = vpred[1][1] = 512;
for (row=0; row < height; row++) {
#ifdef LIBRAW_LIBRARY_BUILD
checkCancel();
#endif
for (col=0; col < width; col++) {
diff = ljpeg_diff(huff);
if (col < 2) hpred[col] = vpred[row & 1][col] += diff;
else hpred[col & 1] += diff;
image[row*width+col][c] = hpred[col & 1];
}
}
}
}
| 168,313 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ps_files_valid_key(const char *key)
{
size_t len;
const char *p;
char c;
int ret = 1;
for (p = key; (c = *p); p++) {
/* valid characters are a..z,A..Z,0..9 */
if (!((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z')
|| (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
|| (c >= '0' && c <= '9')
|| c == ','
|| c == '-')) {
ret = 0;
break;
}
}
len = p - key;
/* Somewhat arbitrary length limit here, but should be way more than
anyone needs and avoids file-level warnings later on if we exceed MAX_PATH */
if (len == 0 || len > 128) {
ret = 0;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static int ps_files_valid_key(const char *key)
| 164,871 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: flac_read_loop (SF_PRIVATE *psf, unsigned len)
{ FLAC_PRIVATE* pflac = (FLAC_PRIVATE*) psf->codec_data ;
pflac->pos = 0 ;
pflac->len = len ;
pflac->remain = len ;
/* First copy data that has already been decoded and buffered. */
if (pflac->frame != NULL && pflac->bufferpos < pflac->frame->header.blocksize)
flac_buffer_copy (psf) ;
/* Decode some more. */
while (pflac->pos < pflac->len)
{ if (FLAC__stream_decoder_process_single (pflac->fsd) == 0)
break ;
if (FLAC__stream_decoder_get_state (pflac->fsd) >= FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_END_OF_STREAM)
break ;
} ;
pflac->ptr = NULL ;
return pflac->pos ;
} /* flac_read_loop */
Commit Message: src/flac.c: Improve error handling
Especially when dealing with corrupt or malicious files.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | flac_read_loop (SF_PRIVATE *psf, unsigned len)
{ FLAC_PRIVATE* pflac = (FLAC_PRIVATE*) psf->codec_data ;
FLAC__StreamDecoderState state ;
pflac->pos = 0 ;
pflac->len = len ;
pflac->remain = len ;
state = FLAC__stream_decoder_get_state (pflac->fsd) ;
if (state > FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_END_OF_STREAM)
{ psf_log_printf (psf, "FLAC__stream_decoder_get_state returned %s\n", FLAC__StreamDecoderStateString [state]) ;
/* Current frame is busted, so NULL the pointer. */
pflac->frame = NULL ;
} ;
/* First copy data that has already been decoded and buffered. */
if (pflac->frame != NULL && pflac->bufferpos < pflac->frame->header.blocksize)
flac_buffer_copy (psf) ;
/* Decode some more. */
while (pflac->pos < pflac->len)
{ if (FLAC__stream_decoder_process_single (pflac->fsd) == 0)
break ;
state = FLAC__stream_decoder_get_state (pflac->fsd) ;
if (state >= FLAC__STREAM_DECODER_END_OF_STREAM)
{ psf_log_printf (psf, "FLAC__stream_decoder_get_state returned %s\n", FLAC__StreamDecoderStateString [state]) ;
/* Current frame is busted, so NULL the pointer. */
pflac->frame = NULL ;
break ;
} ;
} ;
pflac->ptr = NULL ;
return pflac->pos ;
} /* flac_read_loop */
| 168,255 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AppCacheHost::SelectCacheForWorker(int parent_process_id,
int parent_host_id) {
DCHECK(pending_start_update_callback_.is_null() &&
pending_swap_cache_callback_.is_null() &&
pending_get_status_callback_.is_null() &&
!is_selection_pending() && !was_select_cache_called_);
was_select_cache_called_ = true;
parent_process_id_ = parent_process_id;
parent_host_id_ = parent_host_id;
FinishCacheSelection(NULL, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Fix possible map::end() dereference in AppCacheUpdateJob triggered by a compromised renderer.
BUG=551044
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1418783005
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#358815}
CWE ID: | void AppCacheHost::SelectCacheForWorker(int parent_process_id,
bool AppCacheHost::SelectCacheForWorker(int parent_process_id,
int parent_host_id) {
if (was_select_cache_called_)
return false;
DCHECK(pending_start_update_callback_.is_null() &&
pending_swap_cache_callback_.is_null() &&
pending_get_status_callback_.is_null() &&
!is_selection_pending());
was_select_cache_called_ = true;
parent_process_id_ = parent_process_id;
parent_host_id_ = parent_host_id;
FinishCacheSelection(NULL, NULL);
return true;
}
| 171,742 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static unsigned char *AcquireCompactPixels(const Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
size_t
packet_size;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels;
packet_size=image->depth > 8UL ? 2UL : 1UL;
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((9*
image->columns)+1,packet_size*sizeof(*compact_pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",
image->filename);
}
return(compact_pixels);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/350
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static unsigned char *AcquireCompactPixels(const Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
size_t
packet_size;
unsigned char
*compact_pixels;
packet_size=image->depth > 8UL ? 2UL : 1UL;
compact_pixels=(unsigned char *) AcquireQuantumMemory((9*
image->columns)+1,packet_size*sizeof(*compact_pixels));
if (compact_pixels == (unsigned char *) NULL)
{
(void) ThrowMagickException(exception,GetMagickModule(),
ResourceLimitError,"MemoryAllocationFailed","`%s'",image->filename);
}
return(compact_pixels);
}
| 168,403 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋп] > n; [ŧтҭ] > t;"
"[ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщฟ] > w; [мӎ] > m;"
"[єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; ғ > f; [ҫင] > c;"
"ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
#if defined(OS_WIN)
"ӏ > i;"
#else
"ӏ > l;"
#endif
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടร] > s; ၂ > j"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
Commit Message: Add more to confusables list
U+04FB (ӻ) to f
U+050F (ԏ) to t
U+050B (ԋ) and U+0527 (ԧ) to h
U+0437(з) and U+04E1(ӡ) to 3
Add tests for the above entries and tests for ASCII-digit spoofing.
Bug: 816769,820068
Test: components_unittests --gtest_filter=*IDN*
Change-Id: I6cd0a7e97cd0ec2df522ce30f632acfd7b78eee2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/962875
Reviewed-by: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Peter Kasting <pkasting@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#543600}
CWE ID: | IDNSpoofChecker::IDNSpoofChecker() {
UErrorCode status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
checker_ = uspoof_open(&status);
if (U_FAILURE(status)) {
checker_ = nullptr;
return;
}
uspoof_setRestrictionLevel(checker_, USPOOF_HIGHLY_RESTRICTIVE);
SetAllowedUnicodeSet(&status);
int32_t checks = uspoof_getChecks(checker_, &status) | USPOOF_AUX_INFO;
uspoof_setChecks(checker_, checks, &status);
deviation_characters_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u00df\\u03c2\\u200c\\u200d]"), status);
deviation_characters_.freeze();
non_ascii_latin_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:] - [a-zA-Z]]"), status);
non_ascii_latin_letters_.freeze();
kana_letters_exceptions_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u3078-\\u307a\\u30d8-\\u30da\\u30fb-\\u30fe]"),
status);
kana_letters_exceptions_.freeze();
combining_diacritics_exceptions_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[\\u0300-\\u0339]"), status);
combining_diacritics_exceptions_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[асԁеһіјӏорԛѕԝхуъЬҽпгѵѡ]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_latin_alike_.freeze();
cyrillic_letters_ =
icu::UnicodeSet(UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Cyrl:]]"), status);
cyrillic_letters_.freeze();
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status));
lgc_letters_n_ascii_ = icu::UnicodeSet(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("[[:Latin:][:Greek:][:Cyrillic:][0-9\\u002e_"
"\\u002d][\\u0300-\\u0339]]"),
status);
lgc_letters_n_ascii_.freeze();
UParseError parse_error;
diacritic_remover_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("DropAcc"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("::NFD; ::[:Nonspacing Mark:] Remove; ::NFC;"
" ł > l; ø > o; đ > d;"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
// U+04C8 (ӈ), U+04CA (ӊ), U+050B (ԋ), U+0527 (ԧ), U+0529 (ԩ)} => h
// - {U+0167 (ŧ), U+0442 (т), U+04AD (ҭ), U+050F (ԏ)} => t
// - {U+0493 (ғ), U+04FB (ӻ)} => f
// - {U+0437 (з), U+04E1 (ӡ)} => 3
extra_confusable_mapper_.reset(icu::Transliterator::createFromRules(
UNICODE_STRING_SIMPLE("ExtraConf"),
icu::UnicodeString::fromUTF8("[þϼҏ] > p; [ħнћңҥӈӊԋԧԩ] > h;"
"[ĸκкқҝҟҡӄԟ] > k; [ŋп] > n; [ŧтҭԏ] > t;"
"[ƅьҍв] > b; [ωшщฟ] > w; [мӎ] > m;"
"[єҽҿၔ] > e; ґ > r; [ғӻ] > f; [ҫင] > c;"
"ұ > y; [χҳӽӿ] > x;"
#if defined(OS_WIN)
"ӏ > i;"
#else
"ӏ > l;"
#endif
"ԃ > d; [ԍဌ] > g; [ടร] > s; ၂ > j;"
"[зӡ] > 3"),
UTRANS_FORWARD, parse_error, status));
DCHECK(U_SUCCESS(status))
<< "Spoofchecker initalization failed due to an error: "
<< u_errorName(status);
}
| 172,736 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void TestFlashMessageLoop::RunTests(const std::string& filter) {
RUN_TEST(Basics, filter);
RUN_TEST(RunWithoutQuit, filter);
}
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void TestFlashMessageLoop::RunTests(const std::string& filter) {
RUN_TEST(Basics, filter);
RUN_TEST(RunWithoutQuit, filter);
RUN_TEST(SuspendScriptCallbackWhileRunning, filter);
}
void TestFlashMessageLoop::DidRunScriptCallback() {
// Script callbacks are not supposed to run while the Flash message loop is
// running.
if (message_loop_)
suspend_script_callback_result_ = false;
}
pp::deprecated::ScriptableObject* TestFlashMessageLoop::CreateTestObject() {
if (!instance_so_)
instance_so_ = new InstanceSO(this);
return instance_so_;
}
| 172,125 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool vmxnet_tx_pkt_parse_headers(struct VmxnetTxPkt *pkt)
{
struct iovec *l2_hdr, *l3_hdr;
size_t bytes_read;
size_t full_ip6hdr_len;
uint16_t l3_proto;
assert(pkt);
l2_hdr = &pkt->vec[VMXNET_TX_PKT_L2HDR_FRAG];
l3_hdr = &pkt->vec[VMXNET_TX_PKT_L3HDR_FRAG];
bytes_read = iov_to_buf(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags, 0, l2_hdr->iov_base,
ETH_MAX_L2_HDR_LEN);
if (bytes_read < ETH_MAX_L2_HDR_LEN) {
l2_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
} else {
l2_hdr->iov_len = eth_get_l2_hdr_length(l2_hdr->iov_base);
}
l3_proto = eth_get_l3_proto(l2_hdr->iov_base, l2_hdr->iov_len);
l3_hdr->iov_len = IP_HDR_GET_LEN(l3_hdr->iov_base);
pkt->l4proto = ((struct ip_header *) l3_hdr->iov_base)->ip_p;
/* copy optional IPv4 header data */
bytes_read = iov_to_buf(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags,
l2_hdr->iov_len + sizeof(struct ip_header),
l3_hdr->iov_base + sizeof(struct ip_header),
l3_hdr->iov_len - sizeof(struct ip_header));
if (bytes_read < l3_hdr->iov_len - sizeof(struct ip_header)) {
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
}
break;
case ETH_P_IPV6:
if (!eth_parse_ipv6_hdr(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags, l2_hdr->iov_len,
&pkt->l4proto, &full_ip6hdr_len)) {
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
}
l3_hdr->iov_base = g_malloc(full_ip6hdr_len);
bytes_read = iov_to_buf(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags, l2_hdr->iov_len,
l3_hdr->iov_base, full_ip6hdr_len);
if (bytes_read < full_ip6hdr_len) {
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
} else {
l3_hdr->iov_len = full_ip6hdr_len;
}
break;
default:
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
break;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static bool vmxnet_tx_pkt_parse_headers(struct VmxnetTxPkt *pkt)
{
struct iovec *l2_hdr, *l3_hdr;
size_t bytes_read;
size_t full_ip6hdr_len;
uint16_t l3_proto;
assert(pkt);
l2_hdr = &pkt->vec[VMXNET_TX_PKT_L2HDR_FRAG];
l3_hdr = &pkt->vec[VMXNET_TX_PKT_L3HDR_FRAG];
bytes_read = iov_to_buf(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags, 0, l2_hdr->iov_base,
ETH_MAX_L2_HDR_LEN);
if (bytes_read < sizeof(struct eth_header)) {
l2_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
}
l2_hdr->iov_len = sizeof(struct eth_header);
switch (be16_to_cpu(PKT_GET_ETH_HDR(l2_hdr->iov_base)->h_proto)) {
case ETH_P_VLAN:
l2_hdr->iov_len += sizeof(struct vlan_header);
break;
case ETH_P_DVLAN:
l2_hdr->iov_len += 2 * sizeof(struct vlan_header);
break;
}
if (bytes_read < l2_hdr->iov_len) {
l2_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
}
l3_proto = eth_get_l3_proto(l2_hdr->iov_base, l2_hdr->iov_len);
l3_hdr->iov_len = IP_HDR_GET_LEN(l3_hdr->iov_base);
pkt->l4proto = ((struct ip_header *) l3_hdr->iov_base)->ip_p;
/* copy optional IPv4 header data */
bytes_read = iov_to_buf(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags,
l2_hdr->iov_len + sizeof(struct ip_header),
l3_hdr->iov_base + sizeof(struct ip_header),
l3_hdr->iov_len - sizeof(struct ip_header));
if (bytes_read < l3_hdr->iov_len - sizeof(struct ip_header)) {
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
}
break;
case ETH_P_IPV6:
if (!eth_parse_ipv6_hdr(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags, l2_hdr->iov_len,
&pkt->l4proto, &full_ip6hdr_len)) {
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
}
l3_hdr->iov_base = g_malloc(full_ip6hdr_len);
bytes_read = iov_to_buf(pkt->raw, pkt->raw_frags, l2_hdr->iov_len,
l3_hdr->iov_base, full_ip6hdr_len);
if (bytes_read < full_ip6hdr_len) {
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
return false;
} else {
l3_hdr->iov_len = full_ip6hdr_len;
}
break;
default:
l3_hdr->iov_len = 0;
break;
}
| 165,277 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType SetQuantumDepth(const Image *image,
QuantumInfo *quantum_info,const size_t depth)
{
size_t
extent,
quantum;
/*
Allocate the quantum pixel buffer.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
quantum_info->depth=depth;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
if (quantum_info->depth > 32)
quantum_info->depth=64;
else
if (quantum_info->depth > 16)
quantum_info->depth=32;
else
quantum_info->depth=16;
}
if (quantum_info->pixels != (unsigned char **) NULL)
DestroyQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
quantum=(quantum_info->pad+6)*(quantum_info->depth+7)/8;
extent=image->columns*quantum;
if ((image->columns != 0) && (quantum != (extent/image->columns)))
return(MagickFalse);
return(AcquireQuantumPixels(quantum_info,extent));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/105
CWE ID: CWE-369 | MagickExport MagickBooleanType SetQuantumDepth(const Image *image,
QuantumInfo *quantum_info,const size_t depth)
{
size_t
extent,
quantum;
/*
Allocate the quantum pixel buffer.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickCoreSignature);
quantum_info->depth=depth;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
if (quantum_info->depth > 32)
quantum_info->depth=64;
else
if (quantum_info->depth > 16)
quantum_info->depth=32;
else
quantum_info->depth=16;
}
if (quantum_info->pixels != (unsigned char **) NULL)
DestroyQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
quantum=(quantum_info->pad+6)*(quantum_info->depth+7)/8;
extent=MagickMax(image->columns,image->rows)*quantum;
if ((MagickMax(image->columns,image->rows) != 0) &&
(quantum != (extent/MagickMax(image->columns,image->rows))))
return(MagickFalse);
return(AcquireQuantumPixels(quantum_info,extent));
}
| 168,799 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnCreateTransferBuffer(int32 size,
int32 id_request,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuCommandBufferStub::OnCreateTransferBuffer");
if (command_buffer_.get()) {
int32 id = command_buffer_->CreateTransferBuffer(size, id_request);
GpuCommandBufferMsg_CreateTransferBuffer::WriteReplyParams(
reply_message, id);
} else {
reply_message->set_reply_error();
}
Send(reply_message);
}
Commit Message: Sizes going across an IPC should be uint32.
BUG=164946
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11472038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171944 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnCreateTransferBuffer(int32 size,
void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnCreateTransferBuffer(uint32 size,
int32 id_request,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuCommandBufferStub::OnCreateTransferBuffer");
if (command_buffer_.get()) {
int32 id = command_buffer_->CreateTransferBuffer(size, id_request);
GpuCommandBufferMsg_CreateTransferBuffer::WriteReplyParams(
reply_message, id);
} else {
reply_message->set_reply_error();
}
Send(reply_message);
}
| 171,405 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: log2vis_unicode (PyObject * unicode, FriBidiParType base_direction, int clean, int reordernsm)
{
PyObject *logical = NULL; /* input string encoded in utf-8 */
PyObject *visual = NULL; /* output string encoded in utf-8 */
PyObject *result = NULL; /* unicode output string */
int length = PyUnicode_GET_SIZE (unicode);
logical = PyUnicode_AsUTF8String (unicode);
if (logical == NULL)
goto cleanup;
visual = log2vis_utf8 (logical, length, base_direction, clean, reordernsm);
if (visual == NULL)
goto cleanup;
result = PyUnicode_DecodeUTF8 (PyString_AS_STRING (visual),
PyString_GET_SIZE (visual), "strict");
cleanup:
Py_XDECREF (logical);
Py_XDECREF (visual);
return result;
}
Commit Message: refactor pyfribidi.c module
pyfribidi.c is now compiled as _pyfribidi. This module only handles
unicode internally and doesn't use the fribidi_utf8_to_unicode
function (which can't handle 4 byte utf-8 sequences). This fixes the
buffer overflow in issue #2.
The code is now also much simpler: pyfribidi.c is down from 280 to 130
lines of code.
We now ship a pure python pyfribidi that handles the case when
non-unicode strings are passed in.
We now also adapt the size of the output string if clean=True is
passed.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | log2vis_unicode (PyObject * unicode, FriBidiParType base_direction, int clean, int reordernsm)
_pyfribidi_log2vis (PyObject * self, PyObject * args, PyObject * kw)
{
PyUnicodeObject *logical = NULL; /* input unicode or string object */
FriBidiParType base = FRIBIDI_TYPE_RTL; /* optional direction */
int clean = 0; /* optional flag to clean the string */
int reordernsm = 1; /* optional flag to allow reordering of non spacing marks*/
static char *kwargs[] =
{ "logical", "base_direction", "clean", "reordernsm", NULL };
if (!PyArg_ParseTupleAndKeywords (args, kw, "U|iii", kwargs,
&logical, &base, &clean, &reordernsm)) {
return NULL;
}
/* Validate base */
if (!(base == FRIBIDI_TYPE_RTL
|| base == FRIBIDI_TYPE_LTR
|| base == FRIBIDI_TYPE_ON)) {
return PyErr_Format (PyExc_ValueError,
"invalid value %d: use either RTL, LTR or ON",
base);
}
return unicode_log2vis (logical, base, clean, reordernsm);
}
| 165,641 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetCryptohomeLibrary(
CryptohomeLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->crypto_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetCryptohomeLibrary(
| 170,637 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PluginChannel::OnChannelConnected(int32 peer_pid) {
base::ProcessHandle handle;
if (!base::OpenProcessHandle(peer_pid, &handle)) {
NOTREACHED();
}
renderer_handle_ = handle;
NPChannelBase::OnChannelConnected(peer_pid);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void PluginChannel::OnChannelConnected(int32 peer_pid) {
| 170,948 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WORD32 ihevcd_create(iv_obj_t *ps_codec_obj,
void *pv_api_ip,
void *pv_api_op)
{
ihevcd_cxa_create_op_t *ps_create_op;
WORD32 ret;
codec_t *ps_codec;
ps_create_op = (ihevcd_cxa_create_op_t *)pv_api_op;
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = 0;
ret = ihevcd_allocate_static_bufs(&ps_codec_obj, pv_api_ip, pv_api_op);
/* If allocation of some buffer fails, then free buffers allocated till then */
if((IV_FAIL == ret) && (NULL != ps_codec_obj))
{
ihevcd_free_static_bufs(ps_codec_obj);
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED;
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
return IV_FAIL;
}
ps_codec = (codec_t *)ps_codec_obj->pv_codec_handle;
ret = ihevcd_init(ps_codec);
TRACE_INIT(NULL);
STATS_INIT();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Decoder: Handle ps_codec_obj memory allocation failure gracefully
If memory allocation for ps_codec_obj fails, return gracefully
with an error code. All other allocation failures are
handled correctly.
Bug: 68299873
Test: before/after with always-failing malloc
Change-Id: I5e6c07b147b13df81e65476851662d4b55d33b83
(cherry picked from commit a966e2a65dd901151ce7f4481d0084840c9a0f7e)
CWE ID: CWE-770 | WORD32 ihevcd_create(iv_obj_t *ps_codec_obj,
void *pv_api_ip,
void *pv_api_op)
{
ihevcd_cxa_create_ip_t *ps_create_ip;
ihevcd_cxa_create_op_t *ps_create_op;
WORD32 ret;
codec_t *ps_codec;
ps_create_ip = (ihevcd_cxa_create_ip_t *)pv_api_ip;
ps_create_op = (ihevcd_cxa_create_op_t *)pv_api_op;
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = 0;
ps_codec_obj = NULL;
ret = ihevcd_allocate_static_bufs(&ps_codec_obj, pv_api_ip, pv_api_op);
/* If allocation of some buffer fails, then free buffers allocated till then */
if(IV_FAIL == ret)
{
if(NULL != ps_codec_obj)
{
if(ps_codec_obj->pv_codec_handle)
{
ihevcd_free_static_bufs(ps_codec_obj);
}
else
{
void (*pf_aligned_free)(void *pv_mem_ctxt, void *pv_buf);
void *pv_mem_ctxt;
pf_aligned_free = ps_create_ip->s_ivd_create_ip_t.pf_aligned_free;
pv_mem_ctxt = ps_create_ip->s_ivd_create_ip_t.pv_mem_ctxt;
pf_aligned_free(pv_mem_ctxt, ps_codec_obj);
}
}
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = IVD_MEM_ALLOC_FAILED;
ps_create_op->s_ivd_create_op_t.u4_error_code = 1 << IVD_FATALERROR;
return IV_FAIL;
}
ps_codec = (codec_t *)ps_codec_obj->pv_codec_handle;
ret = ihevcd_init(ps_codec);
TRACE_INIT(NULL);
STATS_INIT();
return ret;
}
| 174,111 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int cdxl_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data,
int *got_frame, AVPacket *pkt)
{
CDXLVideoContext *c = avctx->priv_data;
AVFrame * const p = data;
int ret, w, h, encoding, aligned_width, buf_size = pkt->size;
const uint8_t *buf = pkt->data;
if (buf_size < 32)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
encoding = buf[1] & 7;
c->format = buf[1] & 0xE0;
w = AV_RB16(&buf[14]);
h = AV_RB16(&buf[16]);
c->bpp = buf[19];
c->palette_size = AV_RB16(&buf[20]);
c->palette = buf + 32;
c->video = c->palette + c->palette_size;
c->video_size = buf_size - c->palette_size - 32;
if (c->palette_size > 512)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (buf_size < c->palette_size + 32)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (c->bpp < 1)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (c->format != BIT_PLANAR && c->format != BIT_LINE && c->format != CHUNKY) {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "Pixel format 0x%0x", c->format);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if ((ret = ff_set_dimensions(avctx, w, h)) < 0)
return ret;
if (c->format == CHUNKY)
aligned_width = avctx->width;
else
aligned_width = FFALIGN(c->avctx->width, 16);
c->padded_bits = aligned_width - c->avctx->width;
if (c->video_size < aligned_width * avctx->height * (int64_t)c->bpp / 8)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (!encoding && c->palette_size && c->bpp <= 8) {
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8;
} else if (encoding == 1 && (c->bpp == 6 || c->bpp == 8)) {
if (c->palette_size != (1 << (c->bpp - 1)))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_BGR24;
} else if (!encoding && c->bpp == 24 && c->format == CHUNKY &&
!c->palette_size) {
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_RGB24;
} else {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "Encoding %d, bpp %d and format 0x%x",
encoding, c->bpp, c->format);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if ((ret = ff_get_buffer(avctx, p, 0)) < 0)
return ret;
p->pict_type = AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I;
if (encoding) {
av_fast_padded_malloc(&c->new_video, &c->new_video_size,
h * w + AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
if (!c->new_video)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
if (c->bpp == 8)
cdxl_decode_ham8(c, p);
else
cdxl_decode_ham6(c, p);
} else if (avctx->pix_fmt == AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8) {
cdxl_decode_rgb(c, p);
} else {
cdxl_decode_raw(c, p);
}
*got_frame = 1;
return buf_size;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/cdxl: Check format parameter
Fixes out of array access
Fixes: 1378/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-5715088008806400
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/targets/ffmpeg
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int cdxl_decode_frame(AVCodecContext *avctx, void *data,
int *got_frame, AVPacket *pkt)
{
CDXLVideoContext *c = avctx->priv_data;
AVFrame * const p = data;
int ret, w, h, encoding, aligned_width, buf_size = pkt->size;
const uint8_t *buf = pkt->data;
if (buf_size < 32)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
encoding = buf[1] & 7;
c->format = buf[1] & 0xE0;
w = AV_RB16(&buf[14]);
h = AV_RB16(&buf[16]);
c->bpp = buf[19];
c->palette_size = AV_RB16(&buf[20]);
c->palette = buf + 32;
c->video = c->palette + c->palette_size;
c->video_size = buf_size - c->palette_size - 32;
if (c->palette_size > 512)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (buf_size < c->palette_size + 32)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (c->bpp < 1)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (c->format != BIT_PLANAR && c->format != BIT_LINE && c->format != CHUNKY) {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "Pixel format 0x%0x", c->format);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if ((ret = ff_set_dimensions(avctx, w, h)) < 0)
return ret;
if (c->format == CHUNKY)
aligned_width = avctx->width;
else
aligned_width = FFALIGN(c->avctx->width, 16);
c->padded_bits = aligned_width - c->avctx->width;
if (c->video_size < aligned_width * avctx->height * (int64_t)c->bpp / 8)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
if (!encoding && c->palette_size && c->bpp <= 8 && c->format != CHUNKY) {
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8;
} else if (encoding == 1 && (c->bpp == 6 || c->bpp == 8)) {
if (c->palette_size != (1 << (c->bpp - 1)))
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_BGR24;
} else if (!encoding && c->bpp == 24 && c->format == CHUNKY &&
!c->palette_size) {
avctx->pix_fmt = AV_PIX_FMT_RGB24;
} else {
avpriv_request_sample(avctx, "Encoding %d, bpp %d and format 0x%x",
encoding, c->bpp, c->format);
return AVERROR_PATCHWELCOME;
}
if ((ret = ff_get_buffer(avctx, p, 0)) < 0)
return ret;
p->pict_type = AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I;
if (encoding) {
av_fast_padded_malloc(&c->new_video, &c->new_video_size,
h * w + AV_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
if (!c->new_video)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
if (c->bpp == 8)
cdxl_decode_ham8(c, p);
else
cdxl_decode_ham6(c, p);
} else if (avctx->pix_fmt == AV_PIX_FMT_PAL8) {
cdxl_decode_rgb(c, p);
} else {
cdxl_decode_raw(c, p);
}
*got_frame = 1;
return buf_size;
}
| 170,042 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int skt_write(int fd, const void *p, size_t len)
{
int sent;
struct pollfd pfd;
FNLOG();
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLOUT;
/* poll for 500 ms */
/* send time out */
if (poll(&pfd, 1, 500) == 0)
return 0;
ts_log("skt_write", len, NULL);
if ((sent = send(fd, p, len, MSG_NOSIGNAL)) == -1)
{
ERROR("write failed with errno=%d\n", errno);
return -1;
}
return sent;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static int skt_write(int fd, const void *p, size_t len)
{
int sent;
struct pollfd pfd;
FNLOG();
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLOUT;
/* poll for 500 ms */
/* send time out */
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(poll(&pfd, 1, 500)) == 0)
return 0;
ts_log("skt_write", len, NULL);
if ((sent = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(fd, p, len, MSG_NOSIGNAL))) == -1)
{
ERROR("write failed with errno=%d\n", errno);
return -1;
}
return sent;
}
| 173,429 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MockRenderThread::MockRenderThread()
: routing_id_(0), surface_id_(0), opener_id_(0) {
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | MockRenderThread::MockRenderThread()
: routing_id_(0), surface_id_(0), opener_id_(0), new_window_routing_id_(0) {
}
| 171,022 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: NetworkHandler::NetworkHandler(const std::string& host_id)
: DevToolsDomainHandler(Network::Metainfo::domainName),
process_(nullptr),
host_(nullptr),
enabled_(false),
host_id_(host_id),
bypass_service_worker_(false),
cache_disabled_(false),
weak_factory_(this) {
static bool have_configured_service_worker_context = false;
if (have_configured_service_worker_context)
return;
have_configured_service_worker_context = true;
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&ConfigureServiceWorkerContextOnIO));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | NetworkHandler::NetworkHandler(const std::string& host_id)
: DevToolsDomainHandler(Network::Metainfo::domainName),
browser_context_(nullptr),
storage_partition_(nullptr),
host_(nullptr),
enabled_(false),
host_id_(host_id),
bypass_service_worker_(false),
cache_disabled_(false),
weak_factory_(this) {
static bool have_configured_service_worker_context = false;
if (have_configured_service_worker_context)
return;
have_configured_service_worker_context = true;
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&ConfigureServiceWorkerContextOnIO));
}
| 172,759 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int picolcd_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,
struct hid_report *report, u8 *raw_data, int size)
{
struct picolcd_data *data = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
unsigned long flags;
int ret = 0;
if (!data)
return 1;
if (report->id == REPORT_KEY_STATE) {
if (data->input_keys)
ret = picolcd_raw_keypad(data, report, raw_data+1, size-1);
} else if (report->id == REPORT_IR_DATA) {
ret = picolcd_raw_cir(data, report, raw_data+1, size-1);
} else {
spin_lock_irqsave(&data->lock, flags);
/*
* We let the caller of picolcd_send_and_wait() check if the
* report we got is one of the expected ones or not.
*/
if (data->pending) {
memcpy(data->pending->raw_data, raw_data+1, size-1);
data->pending->raw_size = size-1;
data->pending->in_report = report;
complete(&data->pending->ready);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&data->lock, flags);
}
picolcd_debug_raw_event(data, hdev, report, raw_data, size);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: HID: picolcd: sanity check report size in raw_event() callback
The report passed to us from transport driver could potentially be
arbitrarily large, therefore we better sanity-check it so that raw_data
that we hold in picolcd_pending structure are always kept within proper
bounds.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Steven Vittitoe <scvitti@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int picolcd_raw_event(struct hid_device *hdev,
struct hid_report *report, u8 *raw_data, int size)
{
struct picolcd_data *data = hid_get_drvdata(hdev);
unsigned long flags;
int ret = 0;
if (!data)
return 1;
if (size > 64) {
hid_warn(hdev, "invalid size value (%d) for picolcd raw event\n",
size);
return 0;
}
if (report->id == REPORT_KEY_STATE) {
if (data->input_keys)
ret = picolcd_raw_keypad(data, report, raw_data+1, size-1);
} else if (report->id == REPORT_IR_DATA) {
ret = picolcd_raw_cir(data, report, raw_data+1, size-1);
} else {
spin_lock_irqsave(&data->lock, flags);
/*
* We let the caller of picolcd_send_and_wait() check if the
* report we got is one of the expected ones or not.
*/
if (data->pending) {
memcpy(data->pending->raw_data, raw_data+1, size-1);
data->pending->raw_size = size-1;
data->pending->in_report = report;
complete(&data->pending->ready);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&data->lock, flags);
}
picolcd_debug_raw_event(data, hdev, report, raw_data, size);
return 1;
}
| 166,368 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int prctl_set_vma_anon_name(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
unsigned long arg)
{
unsigned long tmp;
struct vm_area_struct * vma, *prev;
int unmapped_error = 0;
int error = -EINVAL;
/*
* If the interval [start,end) covers some unmapped address
* ranges, just ignore them, but return -ENOMEM at the end.
* - this matches the handling in madvise.
*/
vma = find_vma_prev(current->mm, start, &prev);
if (vma && start > vma->vm_start)
prev = vma;
for (;;) {
/* Still start < end. */
error = -ENOMEM;
if (!vma)
return error;
/* Here start < (end|vma->vm_end). */
if (start < vma->vm_start) {
unmapped_error = -ENOMEM;
start = vma->vm_start;
if (start >= end)
return error;
}
/* Here vma->vm_start <= start < (end|vma->vm_end) */
tmp = vma->vm_end;
if (end < tmp)
tmp = end;
/* Here vma->vm_start <= start < tmp <= (end|vma->vm_end). */
error = prctl_update_vma_anon_name(vma, &prev, start, end,
(const char __user *)arg);
if (error)
return error;
start = tmp;
if (prev && start < prev->vm_end)
start = prev->vm_end;
error = unmapped_error;
if (start >= end)
return error;
if (prev)
vma = prev->vm_next;
else /* madvise_remove dropped mmap_sem */
vma = find_vma(current->mm, start);
}
}
Commit Message: mm: fix prctl_set_vma_anon_name
prctl_set_vma_anon_name could attempt to set the name across
two vmas at the same time due to a typo, which might corrupt
the vma list. Fix it to use tmp instead of end to limit
the name setting to a single vma at a time.
Change-Id: Ie32d8ddb0fd547efbeedd6528acdab5ca5b308b4
Reported-by: Jed Davis <jld@mozilla.com>
Signed-off-by: Colin Cross <ccross@android.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static int prctl_set_vma_anon_name(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
unsigned long arg)
{
unsigned long tmp;
struct vm_area_struct * vma, *prev;
int unmapped_error = 0;
int error = -EINVAL;
/*
* If the interval [start,end) covers some unmapped address
* ranges, just ignore them, but return -ENOMEM at the end.
* - this matches the handling in madvise.
*/
vma = find_vma_prev(current->mm, start, &prev);
if (vma && start > vma->vm_start)
prev = vma;
for (;;) {
/* Still start < end. */
error = -ENOMEM;
if (!vma)
return error;
/* Here start < (end|vma->vm_end). */
if (start < vma->vm_start) {
unmapped_error = -ENOMEM;
start = vma->vm_start;
if (start >= end)
return error;
}
/* Here vma->vm_start <= start < (end|vma->vm_end) */
tmp = vma->vm_end;
if (end < tmp)
tmp = end;
/* Here vma->vm_start <= start < tmp <= (end|vma->vm_end). */
error = prctl_update_vma_anon_name(vma, &prev, start, tmp,
(const char __user *)arg);
if (error)
return error;
start = tmp;
if (prev && start < prev->vm_end)
start = prev->vm_end;
error = unmapped_error;
if (start >= end)
return error;
if (prev)
vma = prev->vm_next;
else /* madvise_remove dropped mmap_sem */
vma = find_vma(current->mm, start);
}
}
| 173,972 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int open_debug_log(void) {
/* don't do anything if we're not actually running... */
if(verify_config || test_scheduling == TRUE)
return OK;
/* don't do anything if we're not debugging */
if(debug_level == DEBUGL_NONE)
return OK;
if((debug_file_fp = fopen(debug_file, "a+")) == NULL)
return ERROR;
(void)fcntl(fileno(debug_file_fp), F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
return OK;
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'maint'
CWE ID: CWE-264 | int open_debug_log(void) {
int open_debug_log(void)
{
int fh;
struct stat st;
/* don't do anything if we're not actually running... */
if(verify_config || test_scheduling == TRUE)
return OK;
/* don't do anything if we're not debugging */
if(debug_level == DEBUGL_NONE)
return OK;
if ((fh = open(debug_file, O_RDWR|O_APPEND|O_CREAT|O_NOFOLLOW, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR)) == -1)
return ERROR;
if((debug_file_fp = fdopen(fh, "a+")) == NULL)
return ERROR;
if ((fstat(fh, &st)) == -1) {
debug_file_fp = NULL;
close(fh);
return ERROR;
}
if (st.st_nlink != 1 || (st.st_mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFREG) {
debug_file_fp = NULL;
close(fh);
return ERROR;
}
(void)fcntl(fh, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
return OK;
}
| 166,859 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const user_manager::UserList UserSelectionScreen::PrepareUserListForSending(
const user_manager::UserList& users,
const AccountId& owner,
bool is_signin_to_add) {
user_manager::UserList users_to_send;
bool has_owner = owner.is_valid();
size_t max_non_owner_users = has_owner ? kMaxUsers - 1 : kMaxUsers;
size_t non_owner_count = 0;
for (user_manager::UserList::const_iterator it = users.begin();
it != users.end(); ++it) {
bool is_owner = ((*it)->GetAccountId() == owner);
bool is_public_account =
((*it)->GetType() == user_manager::USER_TYPE_PUBLIC_ACCOUNT);
if ((is_public_account && !is_signin_to_add) || is_owner ||
(!is_public_account && non_owner_count < max_non_owner_users)) {
if (!is_owner)
++non_owner_count;
if (is_owner && users_to_send.size() > kMaxUsers) {
users_to_send.insert(users_to_send.begin() + (kMaxUsers - 1), *it);
while (users_to_send.size() > kMaxUsers)
users_to_send.erase(users_to_send.begin() + kMaxUsers);
} else if (users_to_send.size() < kMaxUsers) {
users_to_send.push_back(*it);
}
}
}
return users_to_send;
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID: | const user_manager::UserList UserSelectionScreen::PrepareUserListForSending(
const user_manager::UserList& users,
const AccountId& owner,
bool is_signin_to_add) {
user_manager::UserList users_to_send;
bool has_owner = owner.is_valid();
size_t max_non_owner_users = has_owner ? kMaxUsers - 1 : kMaxUsers;
size_t non_owner_count = 0;
for (user_manager::User* user : users) {
bool is_owner = user->GetAccountId() == owner;
bool is_public_account =
user->GetType() == user_manager::USER_TYPE_PUBLIC_ACCOUNT;
if ((is_public_account && !is_signin_to_add) || is_owner ||
(!is_public_account && non_owner_count < max_non_owner_users)) {
if (!is_owner)
++non_owner_count;
if (is_owner && users_to_send.size() > kMaxUsers) {
users_to_send.insert(users_to_send.begin() + (kMaxUsers - 1), user);
while (users_to_send.size() > kMaxUsers)
users_to_send.erase(users_to_send.begin() + kMaxUsers);
} else if (users_to_send.size() < kMaxUsers) {
users_to_send.push_back(user);
}
}
}
return users_to_send;
}
| 172,203 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: exsltCryptoRc4DecryptFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) {
int key_len = 0, key_size = 0;
int str_len = 0, bin_len = 0, ret_len = 0;
xmlChar *key = NULL, *str = NULL, *padkey = NULL, *bin =
NULL, *ret = NULL;
xsltTransformContextPtr tctxt = NULL;
if (nargs != 2) {
xmlXPathSetArityError (ctxt);
return;
}
tctxt = xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt);
str = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
str_len = xmlUTF8Strlen (str);
if (str_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (str);
return;
}
key = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
key_len = xmlUTF8Strlen (key);
if (key_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (key);
xmlFree (str);
return;
}
padkey = xmlMallocAtomic (RC4_KEY_LENGTH + 1);
if (padkey == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate padkey\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
memset(padkey, 0, RC4_KEY_LENGTH + 1);
key_size = xmlUTF8Strsize (key, key_len);
if ((key_size > RC4_KEY_LENGTH) || (key_size < 0)) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: key size too long or key broken\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
memcpy (padkey, key, key_size);
/* decode hex to binary */
bin_len = str_len;
bin = xmlMallocAtomic (bin_len);
if (bin == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate string\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
ret_len = exsltCryptoHex2Bin (str, str_len, bin, bin_len);
/* decrypt the binary blob */
ret = xmlMallocAtomic (ret_len + 1);
if (ret == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate result\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
PLATFORM_RC4_DECRYPT (ctxt, padkey, bin, ret_len, ret, ret_len);
ret[ret_len] = 0;
xmlXPathReturnString (ctxt, ret);
done:
if (key != NULL)
xmlFree (key);
if (str != NULL)
xmlFree (str);
if (padkey != NULL)
xmlFree (padkey);
if (bin != NULL)
xmlFree (bin);
}
Commit Message: Roll libxslt to 891681e3e948f31732229f53cb6db7215f740fc7
BUG=583156,583171
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1853083002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385338}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | exsltCryptoRc4DecryptFunction (xmlXPathParserContextPtr ctxt, int nargs) {
int key_len = 0;
int str_len = 0, bin_len = 0, ret_len = 0;
xmlChar *key = NULL, *str = NULL, *padkey = NULL, *bin =
NULL, *ret = NULL;
xsltTransformContextPtr tctxt = NULL;
if (nargs != 2) {
xmlXPathSetArityError (ctxt);
return;
}
tctxt = xsltXPathGetTransformContext(ctxt);
str = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
str_len = xmlStrlen (str);
if (str_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (str);
return;
}
key = xmlXPathPopString (ctxt);
key_len = xmlStrlen (key);
if (key_len == 0) {
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
xmlFree (key);
xmlFree (str);
return;
}
padkey = xmlMallocAtomic (RC4_KEY_LENGTH + 1);
if (padkey == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate padkey\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
memset(padkey, 0, RC4_KEY_LENGTH + 1);
if ((key_len > RC4_KEY_LENGTH) || (key_len < 0)) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: key size too long or key broken\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
memcpy (padkey, key, key_len);
/* decode hex to binary */
bin_len = str_len;
bin = xmlMallocAtomic (bin_len);
if (bin == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate string\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
ret_len = exsltCryptoHex2Bin (str, str_len, bin, bin_len);
/* decrypt the binary blob */
ret = xmlMallocAtomic (ret_len + 1);
if (ret == NULL) {
xsltTransformError(tctxt, NULL, tctxt->inst,
"exsltCryptoRc4EncryptFunction: Failed to allocate result\n");
tctxt->state = XSLT_STATE_STOPPED;
xmlXPathReturnEmptyString (ctxt);
goto done;
}
PLATFORM_RC4_DECRYPT (ctxt, padkey, bin, ret_len, ret, ret_len);
ret[ret_len] = 0;
xmlXPathReturnString (ctxt, ret);
done:
if (key != NULL)
xmlFree (key);
if (str != NULL)
xmlFree (str);
if (padkey != NULL)
xmlFree (padkey);
if (bin != NULL)
xmlFree (bin);
}
| 173,287 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int CLASS ljpeg_start (struct jhead *jh, int info_only)
{
int c, tag, len;
uchar data[0x10000];
const uchar *dp;
memset (jh, 0, sizeof *jh);
jh->restart = INT_MAX;
fread (data, 2, 1, ifp);
if (data[1] != 0xd8) return 0;
do {
fread (data, 2, 2, ifp);
tag = data[0] << 8 | data[1];
len = (data[2] << 8 | data[3]) - 2;
if (tag <= 0xff00) return 0;
fread (data, 1, len, ifp);
switch (tag) {
case 0xffc3:
jh->sraw = ((data[7] >> 4) * (data[7] & 15) - 1) & 3;
case 0xffc0:
jh->bits = data[0];
jh->high = data[1] << 8 | data[2];
jh->wide = data[3] << 8 | data[4];
jh->clrs = data[5] + jh->sraw;
if (len == 9 && !dng_version) getc(ifp);
break;
case 0xffc4:
if (info_only) break;
for (dp = data; dp < data+len && (c = *dp++) < 4; )
jh->free[c] = jh->huff[c] = make_decoder_ref (&dp);
break;
case 0xffda:
jh->psv = data[1+data[0]*2];
jh->bits -= data[3+data[0]*2] & 15;
break;
case 0xffdd:
jh->restart = data[0] << 8 | data[1];
}
} while (tag != 0xffda);
if (info_only) return 1;
FORC(5) if (!jh->huff[c+1]) jh->huff[c+1] = jh->huff[c];
if (jh->sraw) {
FORC(4) jh->huff[2+c] = jh->huff[1];
FORC(jh->sraw) jh->huff[1+c] = jh->huff[0];
}
jh->row = (ushort *) calloc (jh->wide*jh->clrs, 4);
merror (jh->row, "ljpeg_start()");
return zero_after_ff = 1;
}
Commit Message: Avoid overflow in ljpeg_start().
CWE ID: CWE-189 | int CLASS ljpeg_start (struct jhead *jh, int info_only)
{
int c, tag;
ushort len;
uchar data[0x10000];
const uchar *dp;
memset (jh, 0, sizeof *jh);
jh->restart = INT_MAX;
fread (data, 2, 1, ifp);
if (data[1] != 0xd8) return 0;
do {
fread (data, 2, 2, ifp);
tag = data[0] << 8 | data[1];
len = (data[2] << 8 | data[3]) - 2;
if (tag <= 0xff00) return 0;
fread (data, 1, len, ifp);
switch (tag) {
case 0xffc3:
jh->sraw = ((data[7] >> 4) * (data[7] & 15) - 1) & 3;
case 0xffc0:
jh->bits = data[0];
jh->high = data[1] << 8 | data[2];
jh->wide = data[3] << 8 | data[4];
jh->clrs = data[5] + jh->sraw;
if (len == 9 && !dng_version) getc(ifp);
break;
case 0xffc4:
if (info_only) break;
for (dp = data; dp < data+len && (c = *dp++) < 4; )
jh->free[c] = jh->huff[c] = make_decoder_ref (&dp);
break;
case 0xffda:
jh->psv = data[1+data[0]*2];
jh->bits -= data[3+data[0]*2] & 15;
break;
case 0xffdd:
jh->restart = data[0] << 8 | data[1];
}
} while (tag != 0xffda);
if (info_only) return 1;
FORC(5) if (!jh->huff[c+1]) jh->huff[c+1] = jh->huff[c];
if (jh->sraw) {
FORC(4) jh->huff[2+c] = jh->huff[1];
FORC(jh->sraw) jh->huff[1+c] = jh->huff[0];
}
jh->row = (ushort *) calloc (jh->wide*jh->clrs, 4);
merror (jh->row, "ljpeg_start()");
return zero_after_ff = 1;
}
| 166,622 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool WebviewInfo::IsResourceWebviewAccessible(
const Extension* extension,
const std::string& partition_id,
const std::string& relative_path) {
if (!extension)
return false;
const WebviewInfo* info = GetResourcesInfo(*extension);
if (!info)
return false;
bool partition_is_privileged = false;
for (size_t i = 0;
i < info->webview_privileged_partitions_.size();
++i) {
if (MatchPattern(partition_id, info->webview_privileged_partitions_[i])) {
partition_is_privileged = true;
break;
}
}
return partition_is_privileged && extension->ResourceMatches(
info->webview_accessible_resources_, relative_path);
}
Commit Message: <webview>: Update format for local file access in manifest.json
The new format is:
"webview" : {
"partitions" : [
{
"name" : "foo*",
"accessible_resources" : ["a.html", "b.html"]
},
{
"name" : "bar",
"accessible_resources" : ["a.html", "c.html"]
}
]
}
BUG=340291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/151923005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@249640 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool WebviewInfo::IsResourceWebviewAccessible(
const Extension* extension,
const std::string& partition_id,
const std::string& relative_path) {
if (!extension)
return false;
const WebviewInfo* info = GetResourcesInfo(*extension);
if (!info)
return false;
for (size_t i = 0; i < info->partition_items_.size(); ++i) {
const PartitionItem* const item = info->partition_items_[i];
if (item->Matches(partition_id) &&
extension->ResourceMatches(item->accessible_resources(),
relative_path)) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
void WebviewInfo::AddPartitionItem(scoped_ptr<PartitionItem> item) {
partition_items_.push_back(item.release());
}
| 171,208 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: AppResult::AppResult(Profile* profile,
const std::string& app_id,
AppListControllerDelegate* controller,
bool is_recommendation)
: profile_(profile),
app_id_(app_id),
controller_(controller),
extension_registry_(NULL) {
set_id(extensions::Extension::GetBaseURLFromExtensionId(app_id_).spec());
if (app_list::switches::IsExperimentalAppListEnabled())
set_display_type(is_recommendation ? DISPLAY_RECOMMENDATION : DISPLAY_TILE);
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)->extension_service()
->GetInstalledExtension(app_id_);
DCHECK(extension);
is_platform_app_ = extension->is_platform_app();
icon_.reset(
new extensions::IconImage(profile_,
extension,
extensions::IconsInfo::GetIcons(extension),
GetPreferredIconDimension(),
extensions::util::GetDefaultAppIcon(),
this));
UpdateIcon();
StartObservingExtensionRegistry();
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | AppResult::AppResult(Profile* profile,
const std::string& app_id,
AppListControllerDelegate* controller,
bool is_recommendation)
: profile_(profile),
app_id_(app_id),
controller_(controller),
extension_registry_(NULL) {
set_id(extensions::Extension::GetBaseURLFromExtensionId(app_id_).spec());
if (app_list::switches::IsExperimentalAppListEnabled())
set_display_type(is_recommendation ? DISPLAY_RECOMMENDATION : DISPLAY_TILE);
const extensions::Extension* extension =
extensions::ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile_)->GetInstalledExtension(
app_id_);
DCHECK(extension);
is_platform_app_ = extension->is_platform_app();
icon_.reset(
new extensions::IconImage(profile_,
extension,
extensions::IconsInfo::GetIcons(extension),
GetPreferredIconDimension(),
extensions::util::GetDefaultAppIcon(),
this));
UpdateIcon();
StartObservingExtensionRegistry();
}
| 171,725 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_generic_init)
{
char *key, *iv;
int key_len, iv_len;
zval *mcryptind;
unsigned char *key_s, *iv_s;
int max_key_size, key_size, iv_size;
php_mcrypt *pm;
int result = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rss", &mcryptind, &key, &key_len, &iv, &iv_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(pm, php_mcrypt *, &mcryptind, -1, "MCrypt", le_mcrypt);
max_key_size = mcrypt_enc_get_key_size(pm->td);
iv_size = mcrypt_enc_get_iv_size(pm->td);
if (key_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Key size is 0");
}
key_s = emalloc(key_len);
memset(key_s, 0, key_len);
iv_s = emalloc(iv_size + 1);
memset(iv_s, 0, iv_size + 1);
if (key_len > max_key_size) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Key size too large; supplied length: %d, max: %d", key_len, max_key_size);
key_size = max_key_size;
} else {
key_size = key_len;
}
memcpy(key_s, key, key_len);
if (iv_len != iv_size) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Iv size incorrect; supplied length: %d, needed: %d", iv_len, iv_size);
if (iv_len > iv_size) {
iv_len = iv_size;
}
}
memcpy(iv_s, iv, iv_len);
mcrypt_generic_deinit(pm->td);
result = mcrypt_generic_init(pm->td, key_s, key_size, iv_s);
/* If this function fails, close the mcrypt module to prevent crashes
* when further functions want to access this resource */
if (result < 0) {
zend_list_delete(Z_LVAL_P(mcryptind));
switch (result) {
case -3:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Key length incorrect");
break;
case -4:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Memory allocation error");
break;
case -1:
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown error");
break;
}
} else {
pm->init = 1;
}
RETVAL_LONG(result);
efree(iv_s);
efree(key_s);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_generic_init)
{
char *key, *iv;
int key_len, iv_len;
zval *mcryptind;
unsigned char *key_s, *iv_s;
int max_key_size, key_size, iv_size;
php_mcrypt *pm;
int result = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rss", &mcryptind, &key, &key_len, &iv, &iv_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(pm, php_mcrypt *, &mcryptind, -1, "MCrypt", le_mcrypt);
max_key_size = mcrypt_enc_get_key_size(pm->td);
iv_size = mcrypt_enc_get_iv_size(pm->td);
if (key_len == 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Key size is 0");
}
key_s = emalloc(key_len);
memset(key_s, 0, key_len);
iv_s = emalloc(iv_size + 1);
memset(iv_s, 0, iv_size + 1);
if (key_len > max_key_size) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Key size too large; supplied length: %d, max: %d", key_len, max_key_size);
key_size = max_key_size;
} else {
key_size = key_len;
}
memcpy(key_s, key, key_len);
if (iv_len != iv_size) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Iv size incorrect; supplied length: %d, needed: %d", iv_len, iv_size);
if (iv_len > iv_size) {
iv_len = iv_size;
}
}
memcpy(iv_s, iv, iv_len);
mcrypt_generic_deinit(pm->td);
result = mcrypt_generic_init(pm->td, key_s, key_size, iv_s);
/* If this function fails, close the mcrypt module to prevent crashes
* when further functions want to access this resource */
if (result < 0) {
zend_list_delete(Z_LVAL_P(mcryptind));
switch (result) {
case -3:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Key length incorrect");
break;
case -4:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Memory allocation error");
break;
case -1:
default:
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unknown error");
break;
}
} else {
pm->init = 1;
}
RETVAL_LONG(result);
efree(iv_s);
efree(key_s);
}
| 167,090 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int do_dentry_open(struct file *f,
int (*open)(struct inode *, struct file *),
const struct cred *cred)
{
static const struct file_operations empty_fops = {};
struct inode *inode;
int error;
f->f_mode = OPEN_FMODE(f->f_flags) | FMODE_LSEEK |
FMODE_PREAD | FMODE_PWRITE;
if (unlikely(f->f_flags & O_PATH))
f->f_mode = FMODE_PATH;
path_get(&f->f_path);
inode = f->f_inode = f->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
error = __get_file_write_access(inode, f->f_path.mnt);
if (error)
goto cleanup_file;
if (!special_file(inode->i_mode))
file_take_write(f);
}
f->f_mapping = inode->i_mapping;
file_sb_list_add(f, inode->i_sb);
if (unlikely(f->f_mode & FMODE_PATH)) {
f->f_op = &empty_fops;
return 0;
}
f->f_op = fops_get(inode->i_fop);
if (unlikely(WARN_ON(!f->f_op))) {
error = -ENODEV;
goto cleanup_all;
}
error = security_file_open(f, cred);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
error = break_lease(inode, f->f_flags);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
if (!open)
open = f->f_op->open;
if (open) {
error = open(inode, f);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
}
if ((f->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
i_readcount_inc(inode);
f->f_flags &= ~(O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_NOCTTY | O_TRUNC);
file_ra_state_init(&f->f_ra, f->f_mapping->host->i_mapping);
return 0;
cleanup_all:
fops_put(f->f_op);
file_sb_list_del(f);
if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
put_write_access(inode);
if (!special_file(inode->i_mode)) {
/*
* We don't consider this a real
* mnt_want/drop_write() pair
* because it all happenend right
* here, so just reset the state.
*/
file_reset_write(f);
__mnt_drop_write(f->f_path.mnt);
}
}
cleanup_file:
path_put(&f->f_path);
f->f_path.mnt = NULL;
f->f_path.dentry = NULL;
f->f_inode = NULL;
return error;
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | static int do_dentry_open(struct file *f,
int (*open)(struct inode *, struct file *),
const struct cred *cred)
{
static const struct file_operations empty_fops = {};
struct inode *inode;
int error;
f->f_mode = OPEN_FMODE(f->f_flags) | FMODE_LSEEK |
FMODE_PREAD | FMODE_PWRITE;
if (unlikely(f->f_flags & O_PATH))
f->f_mode = FMODE_PATH;
path_get(&f->f_path);
inode = f->f_inode = f->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
error = __get_file_write_access(inode, f->f_path.mnt);
if (error)
goto cleanup_file;
if (!special_file(inode->i_mode))
file_take_write(f);
}
f->f_mapping = inode->i_mapping;
if (unlikely(f->f_mode & FMODE_PATH)) {
f->f_op = &empty_fops;
return 0;
}
f->f_op = fops_get(inode->i_fop);
if (unlikely(WARN_ON(!f->f_op))) {
error = -ENODEV;
goto cleanup_all;
}
error = security_file_open(f, cred);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
error = break_lease(inode, f->f_flags);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
if (!open)
open = f->f_op->open;
if (open) {
error = open(inode, f);
if (error)
goto cleanup_all;
}
if ((f->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
i_readcount_inc(inode);
f->f_flags &= ~(O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_NOCTTY | O_TRUNC);
file_ra_state_init(&f->f_ra, f->f_mapping->host->i_mapping);
return 0;
cleanup_all:
fops_put(f->f_op);
if (f->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
put_write_access(inode);
if (!special_file(inode->i_mode)) {
/*
* We don't consider this a real
* mnt_want/drop_write() pair
* because it all happenend right
* here, so just reset the state.
*/
file_reset_write(f);
__mnt_drop_write(f->f_path.mnt);
}
}
cleanup_file:
path_put(&f->f_path);
f->f_path.mnt = NULL;
f->f_path.dentry = NULL;
f->f_inode = NULL;
return error;
}
| 166,805 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(radius_get_vendor_attr)
{
int res;
const void *data;
int len;
u_int32_t vendor;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &data, &len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
res = rad_get_vendor_attr(&vendor, &data, (size_t *) &len);
if (res == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
array_init(return_value);
add_assoc_long(return_value, "attr", res);
add_assoc_long(return_value, "vendor", vendor);
add_assoc_stringl(return_value, "data", (char *) data, len, 1);
return;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix a security issue in radius_get_vendor_attr().
The underlying rad_get_vendor_attr() function assumed that it would always be
given valid VSA data. Indeed, the buffer length wasn't even passed in; the
assumption was that the length field within the VSA structure would be valid.
This could result in denial of service by providing a length that would be
beyond the memory limit, or potential arbitrary memory access by providing a
length greater than the actual data given.
rad_get_vendor_attr() has been changed to require the raw data length be
provided, and this is then used to check that the VSA is valid.
Conflicts:
radlib_vs.h
CWE ID: CWE-119 | PHP_FUNCTION(radius_get_vendor_attr)
{
const void *data, *raw;
int len;
u_int32_t vendor;
unsigned char type;
size_t data_len;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &raw, &len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (rad_get_vendor_attr(&vendor, &type, &data, &data_len, raw, len) == -1) {
RETURN_FALSE;
} else {
array_init(return_value);
add_assoc_long(return_value, "attr", type);
add_assoc_long(return_value, "vendor", vendor);
add_assoc_stringl(return_value, "data", (char *) data, data_len, 1);
return;
}
}
| 166,077 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static unsigned int variance_ref(const uint8_t *ref, const uint8_t *src,
int l2w, int l2h, unsigned int *sse_ptr) {
int se = 0;
unsigned int sse = 0;
const int w = 1 << l2w, h = 1 << l2h;
for (int y = 0; y < h; y++) {
for (int x = 0; x < w; x++) {
int diff = ref[w * y + x] - src[w * y + x];
se += diff;
sse += diff * diff;
}
//// Truncate high bit depth results by downshifting (with rounding) by:
//// 2 * (bit_depth - 8) for sse
//// (bit_depth - 8) for se
}
*sse_ptr = sse;
return sse - (((int64_t) se * se) >> (l2w + l2h));
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static unsigned int variance_ref(const uint8_t *ref, const uint8_t *src,
//// Truncate high bit depth results by downshifting (with rounding) by:
//// 2 * (bit_depth - 8) for sse
//// (bit_depth - 8) for se
static void RoundHighBitDepth(int bit_depth, int64_t *se, uint64_t *sse) {
switch (bit_depth) {
case VPX_BITS_12:
*sse = (*sse + 128) >> 8;
*se = (*se + 8) >> 4;
break;
case VPX_BITS_10:
*sse = (*sse + 8) >> 4;
*se = (*se + 2) >> 2;
break;
case VPX_BITS_8:
default:
break;
}
}
| 174,596 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static M_fs_error_t M_fs_copy_file(const char *path_old, const char *path_new, M_fs_file_mode_t mode, M_fs_progress_cb_t cb, M_fs_progress_flags_t progress_flags, M_fs_progress_t *progress, const M_fs_perms_t *perms)
{
M_fs_file_t *fd_old;
M_fs_file_t *fd_new;
M_fs_info_t *info = NULL;
unsigned char temp[M_FS_BUF_SIZE];
size_t read_len;
size_t wrote_len;
size_t wrote_total = 0;
size_t offset;
M_fs_error_t res;
/* We're going to create/open/truncate the new file, then as we read the contents from the old file we'll write it
* to new file. */
if (M_fs_perms_can_access(path_new, M_FS_PERMS_MODE_NONE) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
/* Try to delete the file since we'll be overwrite it. This is so when we create the file we create it without
* any permissions and to ensure that anything that has the file already open won't be able to read the new
* contents we're writing to the file or be able to change the perms. There is an unavoidable race condition
* between deleting and creating the file where someone could create the file and have access. However,
* depending on the OS they may have access even if the file is created with no perms... */
res = M_fs_delete(path_new, M_FALSE, NULL, M_FS_PROGRESS_NOEXTRA);
if (res != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
return res;
}
}
/* Open the old file */
res = M_fs_file_open(&fd_old, path_old, M_FS_BUF_SIZE, M_FS_FILE_MODE_READ|M_FS_FILE_MODE_NOCREATE, NULL);
if (res != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
return res;
}
if (perms == NULL && mode & M_FS_FILE_MODE_PRESERVE_PERMS) {
res = M_fs_info_file(&info, fd_old, M_FS_PATH_INFO_FLAGS_NONE);
if (res != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
M_fs_file_close(fd_old);
return res;
}
perms = M_fs_info_get_perms(info);
}
res = M_fs_file_open(&fd_new, path_new, M_FS_BUF_SIZE, M_FS_FILE_MODE_WRITE|M_FS_FILE_MODE_OVERWRITE, perms);
M_fs_info_destroy(info);
if (res != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
M_fs_file_close(fd_old);
return res;
}
/* Copy the contents of old into new. */
while ((res = M_fs_file_read(fd_old, temp, sizeof(temp), &read_len, M_FS_FILE_RW_NORMAL)) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS && read_len != 0) {
offset = 0;
while (offset < read_len) {
res = M_fs_file_write(fd_new, temp+offset, read_len-offset, &wrote_len, M_FS_FILE_RW_NORMAL);
offset += wrote_len;
wrote_total += wrote_len;
if (cb) {
M_fs_progress_set_result(progress, res);
if (progress_flags & M_FS_PROGRESS_SIZE_TOTAL) {
M_fs_progress_set_size_total_progess(progress, M_fs_progress_get_size_total_progess(progress)+wrote_len);
}
if (progress_flags & M_FS_PROGRESS_SIZE_CUR) {
M_fs_progress_set_size_current_progress(progress, wrote_total);
}
if (progress_flags & M_FS_PROGRESS_COUNT) {
M_fs_progress_set_count(progress, M_fs_progress_get_count(progress)+1);
}
if (!cb(progress)) {
res = M_FS_ERROR_CANCELED;
}
}
if (res != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
break;
}
}
if (res != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
break;
}
}
M_fs_file_close(fd_old);
M_fs_file_close(fd_new);
if (res != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
return res;
}
return M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fs: Don't try to delete the file when copying. It could cause a security issue if the file exists and doesn't allow other's to read/write. delete could allow someone to create the file and have access to the data.
CWE ID: CWE-732 | static M_fs_error_t M_fs_copy_file(const char *path_old, const char *path_new, M_fs_file_mode_t mode, M_fs_progress_cb_t cb, M_fs_progress_flags_t progress_flags, M_fs_progress_t *progress, const M_fs_perms_t *perms)
{
M_fs_file_t *fd_old;
M_fs_file_t *fd_new;
M_fs_info_t *info = NULL;
unsigned char temp[M_FS_BUF_SIZE];
size_t read_len;
size_t wrote_len;
size_t wrote_total = 0;
size_t offset;
M_fs_error_t res;
/* Open the old file */
res = M_fs_file_open(&fd_old, path_old, M_FS_BUF_SIZE, M_FS_FILE_MODE_READ|M_FS_FILE_MODE_NOCREATE, NULL);
if (res != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
return res;
}
if (perms == NULL && mode & M_FS_FILE_MODE_PRESERVE_PERMS) {
res = M_fs_info_file(&info, fd_old, M_FS_PATH_INFO_FLAGS_NONE);
if (res != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
M_fs_file_close(fd_old);
return res;
}
perms = M_fs_info_get_perms(info);
}
/* We're going to create/open/truncate the new file, then as we read the contents from the old file we'll write it
* to new file. */
res = M_fs_file_open(&fd_new, path_new, M_FS_BUF_SIZE, M_FS_FILE_MODE_WRITE|M_FS_FILE_MODE_OVERWRITE, perms);
M_fs_info_destroy(info);
if (res != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
M_fs_file_close(fd_old);
return res;
}
/* Copy the contents of old into new. */
while ((res = M_fs_file_read(fd_old, temp, sizeof(temp), &read_len, M_FS_FILE_RW_NORMAL)) == M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS && read_len != 0) {
offset = 0;
while (offset < read_len) {
res = M_fs_file_write(fd_new, temp+offset, read_len-offset, &wrote_len, M_FS_FILE_RW_NORMAL);
offset += wrote_len;
wrote_total += wrote_len;
if (cb) {
M_fs_progress_set_result(progress, res);
if (progress_flags & M_FS_PROGRESS_SIZE_TOTAL) {
M_fs_progress_set_size_total_progess(progress, M_fs_progress_get_size_total_progess(progress)+wrote_len);
}
if (progress_flags & M_FS_PROGRESS_SIZE_CUR) {
M_fs_progress_set_size_current_progress(progress, wrote_total);
}
if (progress_flags & M_FS_PROGRESS_COUNT) {
M_fs_progress_set_count(progress, M_fs_progress_get_count(progress)+1);
}
if (!cb(progress)) {
res = M_FS_ERROR_CANCELED;
}
}
if (res != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
break;
}
}
if (res != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
break;
}
}
M_fs_file_close(fd_old);
M_fs_file_close(fd_new);
if (res != M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS) {
return res;
}
return M_FS_ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
| 169,142 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: XcursorImageCreate (int width, int height)
{
XcursorImage *image;
image = malloc (sizeof (XcursorImage) +
width * height * sizeof (XcursorPixel));
if (!image)
image->height = height;
image->delay = 0;
return image;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | XcursorImageCreate (int width, int height)
{
XcursorImage *image;
if (width < 0 || height < 0)
return NULL;
if (width > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE || height > XCURSOR_IMAGE_MAX_SIZE)
return NULL;
image = malloc (sizeof (XcursorImage) +
width * height * sizeof (XcursorPixel));
if (!image)
image->height = height;
image->delay = 0;
return image;
}
| 164,626 |
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