instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PepperMediaDeviceManager* PepperMediaDeviceManager::GetForRenderFrame(
RenderFrame* render_frame) {
PepperMediaDeviceManager* handler =
PepperMediaDeviceManager::Get(render_frame);
if (!handler)
handler = new PepperMediaDeviceManager(render_frame);
return handler;
}
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | PepperMediaDeviceManager* PepperMediaDeviceManager::GetForRenderFrame(
base::WeakPtr<PepperMediaDeviceManager>
PepperMediaDeviceManager::GetForRenderFrame(
RenderFrame* render_frame) {
PepperMediaDeviceManager* handler =
PepperMediaDeviceManager::Get(render_frame);
if (!handler)
handler = new PepperMediaDeviceManager(render_frame);
return handler->AsWeakPtr();
}
| 171,608 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int nntp_hcache_namer(const char *path, char *dest, size_t destlen)
{
return snprintf(dest, destlen, "%s.hcache", path);
}
Commit Message: sanitise cache paths
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-22 | static int nntp_hcache_namer(const char *path, char *dest, size_t destlen)
{
int count = snprintf(dest, destlen, "%s.hcache", path);
/* Strip out any directories in the path */
char *first = strchr(dest, '/');
char *last = strrchr(dest, '/');
if (first && last && (last > first))
{
memmove(first, last, strlen(last) + 1);
count -= (last - first);
}
return count;
}
| 169,119 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RecordDailyContentLengthHistograms(
int64 original_length,
int64 received_length,
int64 original_length_with_data_reduction_enabled,
int64 received_length_with_data_reduction_enabled,
int64 original_length_via_data_reduction_proxy,
int64 received_length_via_data_reduction_proxy) {
if (original_length <= 0 || received_length <= 0)
return;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(
"Net.DailyOriginalContentLength", original_length >> 10);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(
"Net.DailyContentLength", received_length >> 10);
int percent = 0;
if (original_length > received_length) {
percent = (100 * (original_length - received_length)) / original_length;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE("Net.DailyContentSavingPercent", percent);
if (original_length_with_data_reduction_enabled <= 0 ||
received_length_with_data_reduction_enabled <= 0) {
return;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(
"Net.DailyOriginalContentLength_DataReductionProxyEnabled",
original_length_with_data_reduction_enabled >> 10);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(
"Net.DailyContentLength_DataReductionProxyEnabled",
received_length_with_data_reduction_enabled >> 10);
int percent_data_reduction_proxy_enabled = 0;
if (original_length_with_data_reduction_enabled >
received_length_with_data_reduction_enabled) {
percent_data_reduction_proxy_enabled =
100 * (original_length_with_data_reduction_enabled -
received_length_with_data_reduction_enabled) /
original_length_with_data_reduction_enabled;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(
"Net.DailyContentSavingPercent_DataReductionProxyEnabled",
percent_data_reduction_proxy_enabled);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(
"Net.DailyContentPercent_DataReductionProxyEnabled",
(100 * received_length_with_data_reduction_enabled) / received_length);
if (original_length_via_data_reduction_proxy <= 0 ||
received_length_via_data_reduction_proxy <= 0) {
return;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(
"Net.DailyOriginalContentLength_ViaDataReductionProxy",
original_length_via_data_reduction_proxy >> 10);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(
"Net.DailyContentLength_ViaDataReductionProxy",
received_length_via_data_reduction_proxy >> 10);
int percent_via_data_reduction_proxy = 0;
if (original_length_via_data_reduction_proxy >
received_length_via_data_reduction_proxy) {
percent_via_data_reduction_proxy =
100 * (original_length_via_data_reduction_proxy -
received_length_via_data_reduction_proxy) /
original_length_via_data_reduction_proxy;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(
"Net.DailyContentSavingPercent_ViaDataReductionProxy",
percent_via_data_reduction_proxy);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(
"Net.DailyContentPercent_ViaDataReductionProxy",
(100 * received_length_via_data_reduction_proxy) / received_length);
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void RecordDailyContentLengthHistograms(
int64 original_length,
int64 received_length,
int64 original_length_with_data_reduction_enabled,
int64 received_length_with_data_reduction_enabled,
int64 original_length_via_data_reduction_proxy,
int64 received_length_via_data_reduction_proxy,
int64 https_length_with_data_reduction_enabled,
int64 short_bypass_length_with_data_reduction_enabled,
int64 long_bypass_length_with_data_reduction_enabled,
int64 unknown_length_with_data_reduction_enabled) {
if (original_length <= 0 || received_length <= 0)
return;
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(
"Net.DailyOriginalContentLength", original_length >> 10);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(
"Net.DailyContentLength", received_length >> 10);
int percent = 0;
if (original_length > received_length) {
percent = (100 * (original_length - received_length)) / original_length;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE("Net.DailyContentSavingPercent", percent);
if (original_length_with_data_reduction_enabled <= 0 ||
received_length_with_data_reduction_enabled <= 0) {
return;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(
"Net.DailyOriginalContentLength_DataReductionProxyEnabled",
original_length_with_data_reduction_enabled >> 10);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(
"Net.DailyContentLength_DataReductionProxyEnabled",
received_length_with_data_reduction_enabled >> 10);
int percent_data_reduction_proxy_enabled = 0;
if (original_length_with_data_reduction_enabled >
received_length_with_data_reduction_enabled) {
percent_data_reduction_proxy_enabled =
100 * (original_length_with_data_reduction_enabled -
received_length_with_data_reduction_enabled) /
original_length_with_data_reduction_enabled;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(
"Net.DailyContentSavingPercent_DataReductionProxyEnabled",
percent_data_reduction_proxy_enabled);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(
"Net.DailyContentPercent_DataReductionProxyEnabled",
(100 * received_length_with_data_reduction_enabled) / received_length);
if (https_length_with_data_reduction_enabled > 0) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(
"Net.DailyContentLength_DataReductionProxyEnabled_Https",
https_length_with_data_reduction_enabled >> 10);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(
"Net.DailyContentPercent_DataReductionProxyEnabled_Https",
(100 * https_length_with_data_reduction_enabled) / received_length);
}
if (short_bypass_length_with_data_reduction_enabled > 0) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(
"Net.DailyContentLength_DataReductionProxyEnabled_ShortBypass",
short_bypass_length_with_data_reduction_enabled >> 10);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(
"Net.DailyContentPercent_DataReductionProxyEnabled_ShortBypass",
((100 * short_bypass_length_with_data_reduction_enabled) /
received_length));
}
if (long_bypass_length_with_data_reduction_enabled > 0) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(
"Net.DailyContentLength_DataReductionProxyEnabled_LongBypass",
long_bypass_length_with_data_reduction_enabled >> 10);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(
"Net.DailyContentPercent_DataReductionProxyEnabled_LongBypass",
((100 * long_bypass_length_with_data_reduction_enabled) /
received_length));
}
if (unknown_length_with_data_reduction_enabled > 0) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(
"Net.DailyContentLength_DataReductionProxyEnabled_Unknown",
unknown_length_with_data_reduction_enabled >> 10);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(
"Net.DailyContentPercent_DataReductionProxyEnabled_Unknown",
((100 * unknown_length_with_data_reduction_enabled) /
received_length));
}
if (original_length_via_data_reduction_proxy <= 0 ||
received_length_via_data_reduction_proxy <= 0) {
return;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(
"Net.DailyOriginalContentLength_ViaDataReductionProxy",
original_length_via_data_reduction_proxy >> 10);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_COUNTS(
"Net.DailyContentLength_ViaDataReductionProxy",
received_length_via_data_reduction_proxy >> 10);
int percent_via_data_reduction_proxy = 0;
if (original_length_via_data_reduction_proxy >
received_length_via_data_reduction_proxy) {
percent_via_data_reduction_proxy =
100 * (original_length_via_data_reduction_proxy -
received_length_via_data_reduction_proxy) /
original_length_via_data_reduction_proxy;
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(
"Net.DailyContentSavingPercent_ViaDataReductionProxy",
percent_via_data_reduction_proxy);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_PERCENTAGE(
"Net.DailyContentPercent_ViaDataReductionProxy",
(100 * received_length_via_data_reduction_proxy) / received_length);
}
| 171,326 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n"
" [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n"
" ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n");
exit(1);
}
Commit Message: add a whitelist of paths from which ssh-agent will load (via
ssh-pkcs11-helper) a PKCS#11 module; ok markus@
CWE ID: CWE-426 | usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n"
" [-P pkcs11_whitelist] [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n"
" ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n");
exit(1);
}
| 168,665 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool AddPolicyForGPU(CommandLine* cmd_line, sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
#if !defined(NACL_WIN64) // We don't need this code on win nacl64.
if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_SERVER_2003) {
if (cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kUseGL) ==
gfx::kGLImplementationDesktopName) {
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0);
policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
} else {
if (cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kUseGL) ==
gfx::kGLImplementationSwiftShaderName ||
cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kReduceGpuSandbox)) {
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LIMITED_USER,
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_SYSTEMPARAMETERS |
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DESKTOP |
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_EXITWINDOWS |
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DISPLAYSETTINGS);
} else {
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED);
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN,
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_HANDLES);
}
policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
}
} else {
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0);
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED,
sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
}
sandbox::ResultCode result = policy->AddRule(
sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.gpu.*");
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return false;
AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
#endif
return true;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | bool AddPolicyForGPU(CommandLine* cmd_line, sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
#if !defined(NACL_WIN64) // We don't need this code on win nacl64.
if (base::win::GetVersion() > base::win::VERSION_SERVER_2003) {
if (cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kUseGL) ==
gfx::kGLImplementationDesktopName) {
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0);
policy->SetDelayedIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
} else {
if (cmd_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(switches::kUseGL) ==
gfx::kGLImplementationSwiftShaderName ||
cmd_line->HasSwitch(switches::kReduceGpuSandbox)) {
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LIMITED_USER,
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_SYSTEMPARAMETERS |
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DESKTOP |
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_EXITWINDOWS |
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_DISPLAYSETTINGS);
} else {
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED);
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_LOCKDOWN,
JOB_OBJECT_UILIMIT_HANDLES);
}
policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
}
} else {
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0);
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED,
sandbox::USER_LIMITED);
}
sandbox::ResultCode result = policy->AddRule(
sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.gpu.*");
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return false;
// GPU needs to copy sections to renderers.
result = policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
L"Section");
if (result != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK)
return false;
AddGenericDllEvictionPolicy(policy);
#endif
return true;
}
| 170,944 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: fpAcc(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
uint32 bps = tif->tif_dir.td_bitspersample / 8;
tmsize_t wc = cc / bps;
tmsize_t count = cc;
uint8 *cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
uint8 *tmp = (uint8 *)_TIFFmalloc(cc);
if(cc%(bps*stride)!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "fpAcc",
"%s", "cc%(bps*stride))!=0");
return 0;
}
if (!tmp)
return 0;
while (count > stride) {
REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] =
(unsigned char) ((cp[stride] + cp[0]) & 0xff); cp++)
count -= stride;
}
_TIFFmemcpy(tmp, cp0, cc);
cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
for (count = 0; count < wc; count++) {
uint32 byte;
for (byte = 0; byte < bps; byte++) {
#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
cp[bps * count + byte] = tmp[byte * wc + count];
#else
cp[bps * count + byte] =
tmp[(bps - byte - 1) * wc + count];
#endif
}
}
_TIFFfree(tmp);
return 1;
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predic.c: fix memory leaks in error code paths added in
previous commit (fix for MSVR 35105)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | fpAcc(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
uint32 bps = tif->tif_dir.td_bitspersample / 8;
tmsize_t wc = cc / bps;
tmsize_t count = cc;
uint8 *cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
uint8 *tmp;
if(cc%(bps*stride)!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "fpAcc",
"%s", "cc%(bps*stride))!=0");
return 0;
}
tmp = (uint8 *)_TIFFmalloc(cc);
if (!tmp)
return 0;
while (count > stride) {
REPEAT4(stride, cp[stride] =
(unsigned char) ((cp[stride] + cp[0]) & 0xff); cp++)
count -= stride;
}
_TIFFmemcpy(tmp, cp0, cc);
cp = (uint8 *) cp0;
for (count = 0; count < wc; count++) {
uint32 byte;
for (byte = 0; byte < bps; byte++) {
#if WORDS_BIGENDIAN
cp[bps * count + byte] = tmp[byte * wc + count];
#else
cp[bps * count + byte] =
tmp[(bps - byte - 1) * wc + count];
#endif
}
}
_TIFFfree(tmp);
return 1;
}
| 169,938 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::ResourceDispatcherHostImpl()
: download_file_manager_(new DownloadFileManager(NULL)),
save_file_manager_(new SaveFileManager()),
request_id_(-1),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(weak_factory_(this)),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(ssl_delegate_weak_factory_(this)),
is_shutdown_(false),
max_outstanding_requests_cost_per_process_(
kMaxOutstandingRequestsCostPerProcess),
filter_(NULL),
delegate_(NULL),
allow_cross_origin_auth_prompt_(false) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(!g_resource_dispatcher_host);
g_resource_dispatcher_host = this;
GetContentClient()->browser()->ResourceDispatcherHostCreated();
ANNOTATE_BENIGN_RACE(
&last_user_gesture_time_,
"We don't care about the precise value, see http://crbug.com/92889");
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&appcache::AppCacheInterceptor::EnsureRegistered));
update_load_states_timer_.reset(
new base::RepeatingTimer<ResourceDispatcherHostImpl>());
}
Commit Message: Inherits SupportsWeakPtr<T> instead of having WeakPtrFactory<T>
This change refines r137676.
BUG=122654
TEST=browser_test
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10332233
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139771 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ResourceDispatcherHostImpl::ResourceDispatcherHostImpl()
: download_file_manager_(new DownloadFileManager(NULL)),
save_file_manager_(new SaveFileManager()),
request_id_(-1),
is_shutdown_(false),
max_outstanding_requests_cost_per_process_(
kMaxOutstandingRequestsCostPerProcess),
filter_(NULL),
delegate_(NULL),
allow_cross_origin_auth_prompt_(false) {
DCHECK(BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI));
DCHECK(!g_resource_dispatcher_host);
g_resource_dispatcher_host = this;
GetContentClient()->browser()->ResourceDispatcherHostCreated();
ANNOTATE_BENIGN_RACE(
&last_user_gesture_time_,
"We don't care about the precise value, see http://crbug.com/92889");
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&appcache::AppCacheInterceptor::EnsureRegistered));
update_load_states_timer_.reset(
new base::RepeatingTimer<ResourceDispatcherHostImpl>());
}
| 170,991 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const Extension* ExtensionAppItem::GetExtension() const {
const ExtensionService* service =
extensions::ExtensionSystem::Get(profile_)->extension_service();
const Extension* extension = service->GetInstalledExtension(extension_id_);
return extension;
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | const Extension* ExtensionAppItem::GetExtension() const {
const extensions::ExtensionRegistry* registry =
extensions::ExtensionRegistry::Get(profile_);
const Extension* extension = registry->GetInstalledExtension(
extension_id_);
return extension;
}
| 171,723 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ChromeContentRendererClient::ShouldFork(WebFrame* frame,
const GURL& url,
bool is_initial_navigation,
bool* send_referrer) {
DCHECK(!frame->parent());
if (prerender_dispatcher_.get() && prerender_dispatcher_->IsPrerenderURL(url))
return true;
const ExtensionSet* extensions = extension_dispatcher_->extensions();
const Extension* new_url_extension = extensions::GetNonBookmarkAppExtension(
*extensions, ExtensionURLInfo(url));
bool is_extension_url = !!new_url_extension;
if (CrossesExtensionExtents(frame, url, *extensions, is_extension_url,
is_initial_navigation)) {
*send_referrer = true;
const Extension* extension =
extension_dispatcher_->extensions()->GetExtensionOrAppByURL(
ExtensionURLInfo(url));
if (extension && extension->is_app()) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(
extension_misc::kAppLaunchHistogram,
extension_misc::APP_LAUNCH_CONTENT_NAVIGATION,
extension_misc::APP_LAUNCH_BUCKET_BOUNDARY);
}
return true;
}
if (frame->top()->document().url() == url) {
if (is_extension_url != extension_dispatcher_->is_extension_process())
return true;
}
if (url.SchemeIs(kChromeUIScheme))
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Allow browser to handle all WebUI navigations.
BUG=113496
TEST="Google Dashboard" link in Sync settings loads in new process.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9663045
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@126949 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | bool ChromeContentRendererClient::ShouldFork(WebFrame* frame,
const GURL& url,
bool is_initial_navigation,
bool* send_referrer) {
DCHECK(!frame->parent());
if (prerender_dispatcher_.get() && prerender_dispatcher_->IsPrerenderURL(url))
return true;
const ExtensionSet* extensions = extension_dispatcher_->extensions();
const Extension* new_url_extension = extensions::GetNonBookmarkAppExtension(
*extensions, ExtensionURLInfo(url));
bool is_extension_url = !!new_url_extension;
if (CrossesExtensionExtents(frame, url, *extensions, is_extension_url,
is_initial_navigation)) {
*send_referrer = true;
const Extension* extension =
extension_dispatcher_->extensions()->GetExtensionOrAppByURL(
ExtensionURLInfo(url));
if (extension && extension->is_app()) {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(
extension_misc::kAppLaunchHistogram,
extension_misc::APP_LAUNCH_CONTENT_NAVIGATION,
extension_misc::APP_LAUNCH_BUCKET_BOUNDARY);
}
return true;
}
if (frame->top()->document().url() == url) {
if (is_extension_url != extension_dispatcher_->is_extension_process())
return true;
}
return false;
}
| 171,009 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void InspectorNetworkAgent::WillSendRequestInternal(
ExecutionContext* execution_context,
unsigned long identifier,
DocumentLoader* loader,
const ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info) {
String request_id = IdentifiersFactory::RequestId(identifier);
String loader_id = loader ? IdentifiersFactory::LoaderId(loader) : "";
resources_data_->ResourceCreated(request_id, loader_id, request.Url());
InspectorPageAgent::ResourceType type = InspectorPageAgent::kOtherResource;
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::xmlhttprequest) {
type = InspectorPageAgent::kXHRResource;
resources_data_->SetResourceType(request_id, type);
} else if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::document) {
type = InspectorPageAgent::kDocumentResource;
resources_data_->SetResourceType(request_id, type);
}
String frame_id = loader && loader->GetFrame()
? IdentifiersFactory::FrameId(loader->GetFrame())
: "";
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::Initiator> initiator_object =
BuildInitiatorObject(loader && loader->GetFrame()
? loader->GetFrame()->GetDocument()
: nullptr,
initiator_info);
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::document) {
FrameNavigationInitiatorMap::iterator it =
frame_navigation_initiator_map_.find(frame_id);
if (it != frame_navigation_initiator_map_.end())
initiator_object = it->value->clone();
}
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::Request> request_info(
BuildObjectForResourceRequest(request));
if (loader) {
request_info->setMixedContentType(MixedContentTypeForContextType(
MixedContentChecker::ContextTypeForInspector(loader->GetFrame(),
request)));
}
request_info->setReferrerPolicy(
GetReferrerPolicy(request.GetReferrerPolicy()));
if (initiator_info.is_link_preload)
request_info->setIsLinkPreload(true);
String resource_type = InspectorPageAgent::ResourceTypeJson(type);
String documentURL =
loader ? UrlWithoutFragment(loader->Url()).GetString()
: UrlWithoutFragment(execution_context->Url()).GetString();
Maybe<String> maybe_frame_id;
if (!frame_id.IsEmpty())
maybe_frame_id = frame_id;
GetFrontend()->requestWillBeSent(
request_id, loader_id, documentURL, std::move(request_info),
MonotonicallyIncreasingTime(), CurrentTime(), std::move(initiator_object),
BuildObjectForResourceResponse(redirect_response), resource_type,
std::move(maybe_frame_id));
if (pending_xhr_replay_data_ && !pending_xhr_replay_data_->Async())
GetFrontend()->flush();
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void InspectorNetworkAgent::WillSendRequestInternal(
ExecutionContext* execution_context,
unsigned long identifier,
DocumentLoader* loader,
const ResourceRequest& request,
const ResourceResponse& redirect_response,
const FetchInitiatorInfo& initiator_info,
InspectorPageAgent::ResourceType type) {
String request_id = IdentifiersFactory::RequestId(identifier);
String loader_id = loader ? IdentifiersFactory::LoaderId(loader) : "";
resources_data_->ResourceCreated(request_id, loader_id, request.Url());
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::xmlhttprequest)
type = InspectorPageAgent::kXHRResource;
resources_data_->SetResourceType(request_id, type);
String frame_id = loader && loader->GetFrame()
? IdentifiersFactory::FrameId(loader->GetFrame())
: "";
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::Initiator> initiator_object =
BuildInitiatorObject(loader && loader->GetFrame()
? loader->GetFrame()->GetDocument()
: nullptr,
initiator_info);
if (initiator_info.name == FetchInitiatorTypeNames::document) {
FrameNavigationInitiatorMap::iterator it =
frame_navigation_initiator_map_.find(frame_id);
if (it != frame_navigation_initiator_map_.end())
initiator_object = it->value->clone();
}
std::unique_ptr<protocol::Network::Request> request_info(
BuildObjectForResourceRequest(request));
if (loader) {
request_info->setMixedContentType(MixedContentTypeForContextType(
MixedContentChecker::ContextTypeForInspector(loader->GetFrame(),
request)));
}
request_info->setReferrerPolicy(
GetReferrerPolicy(request.GetReferrerPolicy()));
if (initiator_info.is_link_preload)
request_info->setIsLinkPreload(true);
String resource_type = InspectorPageAgent::ResourceTypeJson(type);
String documentURL =
loader ? UrlWithoutFragment(loader->Url()).GetString()
: UrlWithoutFragment(execution_context->Url()).GetString();
Maybe<String> maybe_frame_id;
if (!frame_id.IsEmpty())
maybe_frame_id = frame_id;
GetFrontend()->requestWillBeSent(
request_id, loader_id, documentURL, std::move(request_info),
MonotonicallyIncreasingTime(), CurrentTime(), std::move(initiator_object),
BuildObjectForResourceResponse(redirect_response), resource_type,
std::move(maybe_frame_id));
if (pending_xhr_replay_data_ && !pending_xhr_replay_data_->Async())
GetFrontend()->flush();
}
| 172,468 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool SyncManager::Init(
const FilePath& database_location,
const WeakHandle<JsEventHandler>& event_handler,
const std::string& sync_server_and_path,
int sync_server_port,
bool use_ssl,
const scoped_refptr<base::TaskRunner>& blocking_task_runner,
HttpPostProviderFactory* post_factory,
ModelSafeWorkerRegistrar* registrar,
browser_sync::ExtensionsActivityMonitor* extensions_activity_monitor,
ChangeDelegate* change_delegate,
const std::string& user_agent,
const SyncCredentials& credentials,
bool enable_sync_tabs_for_other_clients,
sync_notifier::SyncNotifier* sync_notifier,
const std::string& restored_key_for_bootstrapping,
TestingMode testing_mode,
Encryptor* encryptor,
UnrecoverableErrorHandler* unrecoverable_error_handler,
ReportUnrecoverableErrorFunction report_unrecoverable_error_function) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(post_factory);
DVLOG(1) << "SyncManager starting Init...";
std::string server_string(sync_server_and_path);
return data_->Init(database_location,
event_handler,
server_string,
sync_server_port,
use_ssl,
blocking_task_runner,
post_factory,
registrar,
extensions_activity_monitor,
change_delegate,
user_agent,
credentials,
enable_sync_tabs_for_other_clients,
sync_notifier,
restored_key_for_bootstrapping,
testing_mode,
encryptor,
unrecoverable_error_handler,
report_unrecoverable_error_function);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | bool SyncManager::Init(
const FilePath& database_location,
const WeakHandle<JsEventHandler>& event_handler,
const std::string& sync_server_and_path,
int sync_server_port,
bool use_ssl,
const scoped_refptr<base::TaskRunner>& blocking_task_runner,
HttpPostProviderFactory* post_factory,
ModelSafeWorkerRegistrar* registrar,
browser_sync::ExtensionsActivityMonitor* extensions_activity_monitor,
ChangeDelegate* change_delegate,
const std::string& user_agent,
const SyncCredentials& credentials,
sync_notifier::SyncNotifier* sync_notifier,
const std::string& restored_key_for_bootstrapping,
TestingMode testing_mode,
Encryptor* encryptor,
UnrecoverableErrorHandler* unrecoverable_error_handler,
ReportUnrecoverableErrorFunction report_unrecoverable_error_function) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(post_factory);
DVLOG(1) << "SyncManager starting Init...";
std::string server_string(sync_server_and_path);
return data_->Init(database_location,
event_handler,
server_string,
sync_server_port,
use_ssl,
blocking_task_runner,
post_factory,
registrar,
extensions_activity_monitor,
change_delegate,
user_agent,
credentials,
sync_notifier,
restored_key_for_bootstrapping,
testing_mode,
encryptor,
unrecoverable_error_handler,
report_unrecoverable_error_function);
}
| 170,792 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SelectionController::SetNonDirectionalSelectionIfNeeded(
const SelectionInFlatTree& passed_selection,
TextGranularity granularity,
EndPointsAdjustmentMode endpoints_adjustment_mode,
HandleVisibility handle_visibility) {
GetDocument().UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const VisibleSelectionInFlatTree& new_selection =
CreateVisibleSelection(passed_selection);
const PositionInFlatTree& base_position =
original_base_in_flat_tree_.GetPosition();
const VisiblePositionInFlatTree& original_base =
base_position.IsConnected() ? CreateVisiblePosition(base_position)
: VisiblePositionInFlatTree();
const VisiblePositionInFlatTree& base =
original_base.IsNotNull() ? original_base
: CreateVisiblePosition(new_selection.Base());
const VisiblePositionInFlatTree& extent =
CreateVisiblePosition(new_selection.Extent());
const SelectionInFlatTree& adjusted_selection =
endpoints_adjustment_mode == kAdjustEndpointsAtBidiBoundary
? AdjustEndpointsAtBidiBoundary(base, extent)
: SelectionInFlatTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(base.DeepEquivalent(),
extent.DeepEquivalent())
.Build();
SelectionInFlatTree::Builder builder(new_selection.AsSelection());
if (adjusted_selection.Base() != base.DeepEquivalent() ||
adjusted_selection.Extent() != extent.DeepEquivalent()) {
original_base_in_flat_tree_ = base.ToPositionWithAffinity();
SetContext(&GetDocument());
builder.SetBaseAndExtent(adjusted_selection.Base(),
adjusted_selection.Extent());
} else if (original_base.IsNotNull()) {
if (CreateVisiblePosition(
Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInFlatTree().Base())
.DeepEquivalent() ==
CreateVisiblePosition(new_selection.Base()).DeepEquivalent()) {
builder.SetBaseAndExtent(original_base.DeepEquivalent(),
new_selection.Extent());
}
original_base_in_flat_tree_ = PositionInFlatTreeWithAffinity();
}
builder.SetIsHandleVisible(handle_visibility == HandleVisibility::kVisible);
const SelectionInFlatTree& selection_in_flat_tree = builder.Build();
if (Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInFlatTree() ==
CreateVisibleSelection(selection_in_flat_tree) &&
Selection().IsHandleVisible() == selection_in_flat_tree.IsHandleVisible())
return;
Selection().SetSelection(
ConvertToSelectionInDOMTree(selection_in_flat_tree),
SetSelectionData::Builder()
.SetShouldCloseTyping(true)
.SetShouldClearTypingStyle(true)
.SetCursorAlignOnScroll(CursorAlignOnScroll::kIfNeeded)
.SetGranularity(granularity)
.Build());
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void SelectionController::SetNonDirectionalSelectionIfNeeded(
const SelectionInFlatTree& passed_selection,
TextGranularity granularity,
EndPointsAdjustmentMode endpoints_adjustment_mode,
HandleVisibility handle_visibility) {
GetDocument().UpdateStyleAndLayoutIgnorePendingStylesheets();
const VisibleSelectionInFlatTree& new_selection =
CreateVisibleSelection(passed_selection);
const PositionInFlatTree& base_position =
original_base_in_flat_tree_.GetPosition();
const VisiblePositionInFlatTree& original_base =
base_position.IsConnected() ? CreateVisiblePosition(base_position)
: VisiblePositionInFlatTree();
const VisiblePositionInFlatTree& base =
original_base.IsNotNull() ? original_base
: CreateVisiblePosition(new_selection.Base());
const VisiblePositionInFlatTree& extent =
CreateVisiblePosition(new_selection.Extent());
const SelectionInFlatTree& adjusted_selection =
endpoints_adjustment_mode == kAdjustEndpointsAtBidiBoundary
? AdjustEndpointsAtBidiBoundary(base, extent)
: SelectionInFlatTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(base.DeepEquivalent(),
extent.DeepEquivalent())
.Build();
SelectionInFlatTree::Builder builder(new_selection.AsSelection());
if (adjusted_selection.Base() != base.DeepEquivalent() ||
adjusted_selection.Extent() != extent.DeepEquivalent()) {
original_base_in_flat_tree_ = base.ToPositionWithAffinity();
SetContext(&GetDocument());
builder.SetBaseAndExtent(adjusted_selection.Base(),
adjusted_selection.Extent());
} else if (original_base.IsNotNull()) {
if (CreateVisiblePosition(
Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInFlatTree().Base())
.DeepEquivalent() ==
CreateVisiblePosition(new_selection.Base()).DeepEquivalent()) {
builder.SetBaseAndExtent(original_base.DeepEquivalent(),
new_selection.Extent());
}
original_base_in_flat_tree_ = PositionInFlatTreeWithAffinity();
}
const SelectionInFlatTree& selection_in_flat_tree = builder.Build();
const bool should_show_handle =
handle_visibility == HandleVisibility::kVisible;
if (Selection().ComputeVisibleSelectionInFlatTree() ==
CreateVisibleSelection(selection_in_flat_tree) &&
Selection().IsHandleVisible() == should_show_handle)
return;
Selection().SetSelection(
ConvertToSelectionInDOMTree(selection_in_flat_tree),
SetSelectionData::Builder()
.SetShouldCloseTyping(true)
.SetShouldClearTypingStyle(true)
.SetCursorAlignOnScroll(CursorAlignOnScroll::kIfNeeded)
.SetGranularity(granularity)
.SetShouldShowHandle(should_show_handle)
.Build());
}
| 171,763 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void mkvparser::GetVersion(int& major, int& minor, int& build, int& revision) {
major = 1;
minor = 0;
build = 0;
revision = 28;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void mkvparser::GetVersion(int& major, int& minor, int& build, int& revision) {
IMkvReader::~IMkvReader() {}
template<typename Type> Type* SafeArrayAlloc(unsigned long long num_elements,
unsigned long long element_size) {
if (num_elements == 0 || element_size == 0)
return NULL;
const size_t kMaxAllocSize = 0x80000000; // 2GiB
const unsigned long long num_bytes = num_elements * element_size;
if (element_size > (kMaxAllocSize / num_elements))
return NULL;
return new (std::nothrow) Type[num_bytes];
}
void GetVersion(int& major, int& minor, int& build, int& revision) {
major = 1;
minor = 0;
build = 0;
revision = 30;
}
| 173,825 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebContentsImpl::AttachInterstitialPage(
InterstitialPageImpl* interstitial_page) {
DCHECK(interstitial_page);
GetRenderManager()->set_interstitial_page(interstitial_page);
CancelActiveAndPendingDialogs();
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidAttachInterstitialPage();
if (frame_tree_.IsLoading())
LoadingStateChanged(true, true, nullptr);
if (node_.OuterContentsFrameTreeNode()) {
if (GetRenderManager()->GetProxyToOuterDelegate()) {
DCHECK(
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(interstitial_page->GetView())
->IsRenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame());
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame* view =
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame*>(
interstitial_page->GetView());
GetRenderManager()->SetRWHViewForInnerContents(view);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void WebContentsImpl::AttachInterstitialPage(
InterstitialPageImpl* interstitial_page) {
DCHECK(!interstitial_page_ && interstitial_page);
interstitial_page_ = interstitial_page;
CancelActiveAndPendingDialogs();
for (auto& observer : observers_)
observer.DidAttachInterstitialPage();
if (frame_tree_.IsLoading())
LoadingStateChanged(true, true, nullptr);
if (node_.OuterContentsFrameTreeNode()) {
if (GetRenderManager()->GetProxyToOuterDelegate()) {
DCHECK(
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewBase*>(interstitial_page->GetView())
->IsRenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame());
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame* view =
static_cast<RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame*>(
interstitial_page->GetView());
GetRenderManager()->SetRWHViewForInnerContents(view);
}
}
}
| 172,324 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: UWORD16 impeg2d_get_mb_addr_incr(stream_t *ps_stream)
{
UWORD16 u2_mb_addr_incr = 0;
while (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,MB_ESCAPE_CODE_LEN) == MB_ESCAPE_CODE)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,MB_ESCAPE_CODE_LEN);
u2_mb_addr_incr += 33;
}
u2_mb_addr_incr += impeg2d_dec_vld_symbol(ps_stream,gai2_impeg2d_mb_addr_incr,MB_ADDR_INCR_LEN) +
MB_ADDR_INCR_OFFSET;
return(u2_mb_addr_incr);
}
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
CWE ID: CWE-254 | UWORD16 impeg2d_get_mb_addr_incr(stream_t *ps_stream)
{
UWORD16 u2_mb_addr_incr = 0;
while (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,MB_ESCAPE_CODE_LEN) == MB_ESCAPE_CODE &&
ps_stream->u4_offset < ps_stream->u4_max_offset)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,MB_ESCAPE_CODE_LEN);
u2_mb_addr_incr += 33;
}
u2_mb_addr_incr += impeg2d_dec_vld_symbol(ps_stream,gai2_impeg2d_mb_addr_incr,MB_ADDR_INCR_LEN) +
MB_ADDR_INCR_OFFSET;
return(u2_mb_addr_incr);
}
| 173,952 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: unsigned long Tracks::GetTracksCount() const
{
const ptrdiff_t result = m_trackEntriesEnd - m_trackEntries;
assert(result >= 0);
return static_cast<unsigned long>(result);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | unsigned long Tracks::GetTracksCount() const
| 174,374 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_@_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
transform_display *that, png_structp pp, png_infop pi)
{
png_set_@(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_@_set(PNG_CONST image_transform *this,
| 173,602 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(move_uploaded_file)
{
char *path, *new_path;
int path_len, new_path_len;
zend_bool successful = 0;
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
int oldmask; int ret;
#endif
if (!SG(rfc1867_uploaded_files)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss", &path, &path_len, &new_path, &new_path_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!zend_hash_exists(SG(rfc1867_uploaded_files), path, path_len + 1)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (php_check_open_basedir(new_path TSRMLS_CC)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (VCWD_RENAME(path, new_path) == 0) {
successful = 1;
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
oldmask = umask(077);
umask(oldmask);
ret = VCWD_CHMOD(new_path, 0666 & ~oldmask);
if (ret == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "%s", strerror(errno));
}
#endif
} else if (php_copy_file_ex(path, new_path, STREAM_DISABLE_OPEN_BASEDIR TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
VCWD_UNLINK(path);
successful = 1;
}
if (successful) {
zend_hash_del(SG(rfc1867_uploaded_files), path, path_len + 1);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to move '%s' to '%s'", path, new_path);
}
RETURN_BOOL(successful);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | PHP_FUNCTION(move_uploaded_file)
{
char *path, *new_path;
int path_len, new_path_len;
zend_bool successful = 0;
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
int oldmask; int ret;
#endif
if (!SG(rfc1867_uploaded_files)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "sp", &path, &path_len, &new_path, &new_path_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (!zend_hash_exists(SG(rfc1867_uploaded_files), path, path_len + 1)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (php_check_open_basedir(new_path TSRMLS_CC)) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (VCWD_RENAME(path, new_path) == 0) {
successful = 1;
#ifndef PHP_WIN32
oldmask = umask(077);
umask(oldmask);
ret = VCWD_CHMOD(new_path, 0666 & ~oldmask);
if (ret == -1) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "%s", strerror(errno));
}
#endif
} else if (php_copy_file_ex(path, new_path, STREAM_DISABLE_OPEN_BASEDIR TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
VCWD_UNLINK(path);
successful = 1;
}
if (successful) {
zend_hash_del(SG(rfc1867_uploaded_files), path, path_len + 1);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Unable to move '%s' to '%s'", path, new_path);
}
RETURN_BOOL(successful);
}
| 164,751 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void read_quant_matrix_ext(MpegEncContext *s, GetBitContext *gb)
{
int i, j, v;
if (get_bits1(gb)) {
/* intra_quantiser_matrix */
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
v = get_bits(gb, 8);
j = s->idsp.idct_permutation[ff_zigzag_direct[i]];
s->intra_matrix[j] = v;
s->chroma_intra_matrix[j] = v;
}
}
if (get_bits1(gb)) {
/* non_intra_quantiser_matrix */
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
get_bits(gb, 8);
}
}
if (get_bits1(gb)) {
/* chroma_intra_quantiser_matrix */
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
v = get_bits(gb, 8);
j = s->idsp.idct_permutation[ff_zigzag_direct[i]];
s->chroma_intra_matrix[j] = v;
}
}
if (get_bits1(gb)) {
/* chroma_non_intra_quantiser_matrix */
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
get_bits(gb, 8);
}
}
next_start_code_studio(gb);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Check for bitstream end in read_quant_matrix_ext()
Fixes: out of array read
Fixes: asff-crash-0e53d0dc491dfdd507530b66562812fbd4c36678
Found-by: Paul Ch <paulcher@icloud.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static void read_quant_matrix_ext(MpegEncContext *s, GetBitContext *gb)
static int read_quant_matrix_ext(MpegEncContext *s, GetBitContext *gb)
{
int i, j, v;
if (get_bits1(gb)) {
if (get_bits_left(gb) < 64*8)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
/* intra_quantiser_matrix */
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
v = get_bits(gb, 8);
j = s->idsp.idct_permutation[ff_zigzag_direct[i]];
s->intra_matrix[j] = v;
s->chroma_intra_matrix[j] = v;
}
}
if (get_bits1(gb)) {
if (get_bits_left(gb) < 64*8)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
/* non_intra_quantiser_matrix */
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
get_bits(gb, 8);
}
}
if (get_bits1(gb)) {
if (get_bits_left(gb) < 64*8)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
/* chroma_intra_quantiser_matrix */
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
v = get_bits(gb, 8);
j = s->idsp.idct_permutation[ff_zigzag_direct[i]];
s->chroma_intra_matrix[j] = v;
}
}
if (get_bits1(gb)) {
if (get_bits_left(gb) < 64*8)
return AVERROR_INVALIDDATA;
/* chroma_non_intra_quantiser_matrix */
for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
get_bits(gb, 8);
}
}
next_start_code_studio(gb);
return 0;
}
| 168,922 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int pvc_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sockaddr,
int *sockaddr_len, int peer)
{
struct sockaddr_atmpvc *addr;
struct atm_vcc *vcc = ATM_SD(sock);
if (!vcc->dev || !test_bit(ATM_VF_ADDR, &vcc->flags))
return -ENOTCONN;
*sockaddr_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_atmpvc);
addr = (struct sockaddr_atmpvc *)sockaddr;
addr->sap_family = AF_ATMPVC;
addr->sap_addr.itf = vcc->dev->number;
addr->sap_addr.vpi = vcc->vpi;
addr->sap_addr.vci = vcc->vci;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: atm: fix info leak via getsockname()
The ATM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
sockaddr_atmpvc inserted for alignment. Add an explicit memset(0)
before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int pvc_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sockaddr,
int *sockaddr_len, int peer)
{
struct sockaddr_atmpvc *addr;
struct atm_vcc *vcc = ATM_SD(sock);
if (!vcc->dev || !test_bit(ATM_VF_ADDR, &vcc->flags))
return -ENOTCONN;
*sockaddr_len = sizeof(struct sockaddr_atmpvc);
addr = (struct sockaddr_atmpvc *)sockaddr;
memset(addr, 0, sizeof(*addr));
addr->sap_family = AF_ATMPVC;
addr->sap_addr.itf = vcc->dev->number;
addr->sap_addr.vpi = vcc->vpi;
addr->sap_addr.vci = vcc->vci;
return 0;
}
| 169,896 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void nsc_rle_decode(BYTE* in, BYTE* out, UINT32 originalSize)
{
UINT32 len;
UINT32 left;
BYTE value;
left = originalSize;
while (left > 4)
{
value = *in++;
if (left == 5)
{
*out++ = value;
left--;
}
else if (value == *in)
{
in++;
if (*in < 0xFF)
{
len = (UINT32) * in++;
len += 2;
}
else
{
in++;
len = *((UINT32*) in);
in += 4;
}
FillMemory(out, len, value);
out += len;
left -= len;
}
else
{
*out++ = value;
left--;
}
}
*((UINT32*)out) = *((UINT32*)in);
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8788
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static void nsc_rle_decode(BYTE* in, BYTE* out, UINT32 originalSize)
static BOOL nsc_rle_decode(BYTE* in, BYTE* out, UINT32 outSize, UINT32 originalSize)
{
UINT32 len;
UINT32 left;
BYTE value;
left = originalSize;
while (left > 4)
{
value = *in++;
if (left == 5)
{
if (outSize < 1)
return FALSE;
outSize--;
*out++ = value;
left--;
}
else if (value == *in)
{
in++;
if (*in < 0xFF)
{
len = (UINT32) * in++;
len += 2;
}
else
{
in++;
len = *((UINT32*) in);
in += 4;
}
if (outSize < len)
return FALSE;
outSize -= len;
FillMemory(out, len, value);
out += len;
left -= len;
}
else
{
if (outSize < 1)
return FALSE;
outSize--;
*out++ = value;
left--;
}
}
if ((outSize < 4) || (left < 4))
return FALSE;
memcpy(out, in, 4);
return TRUE;
}
| 169,284 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cib_tls_close(cib_t * cib)
{
cib_remote_opaque_t *private = cib->variant_opaque;
shutdown(private->command.socket, SHUT_RDWR); /* no more receptions */
shutdown(private->callback.socket, SHUT_RDWR); /* no more receptions */
close(private->command.socket);
close(private->callback.socket);
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
if (private->command.encrypted) {
gnutls_bye(*(private->command.session), GNUTLS_SHUT_RDWR);
gnutls_deinit(*(private->command.session));
gnutls_free(private->command.session);
gnutls_bye(*(private->callback.session), GNUTLS_SHUT_RDWR);
gnutls_deinit(*(private->callback.session));
gnutls_free(private->callback.session);
gnutls_anon_free_client_credentials(anon_cred_c);
gnutls_global_deinit();
}
#endif
return 0;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | cib_tls_close(cib_t * cib)
{
cib_remote_opaque_t *private = cib->variant_opaque;
#ifdef HAVE_GNUTLS_GNUTLS_H
if (private->command.encrypted) {
if (private->command.session) {
gnutls_bye(*(private->command.session), GNUTLS_SHUT_RDWR);
gnutls_deinit(*(private->command.session));
gnutls_free(private->command.session);
}
if (private->callback.session) {
gnutls_bye(*(private->callback.session), GNUTLS_SHUT_RDWR);
gnutls_deinit(*(private->callback.session));
gnutls_free(private->callback.session);
}
private->command.session = NULL;
private->callback.session = NULL;
if (remote_gnutls_credentials_init) {
gnutls_anon_free_client_credentials(anon_cred_c);
gnutls_global_deinit();
remote_gnutls_credentials_init = FALSE;
}
}
#endif
if (private->command.socket) {
shutdown(private->command.socket, SHUT_RDWR); /* no more receptions */
close(private->command.socket);
}
if (private->callback.socket) {
shutdown(private->callback.socket, SHUT_RDWR); /* no more receptions */
close(private->callback.socket);
}
private->command.socket = 0;
private->callback.socket = 0;
free(private->command.recv_buf);
free(private->callback.recv_buf);
private->command.recv_buf = NULL;
private->callback.recv_buf = NULL;
return 0;
}
| 166,155 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: HTMLTreeBuilderSimulator::SimulatedToken HTMLTreeBuilderSimulator::Simulate(
const CompactHTMLToken& token,
HTMLTokenizer* tokenizer) {
SimulatedToken simulated_token = kOtherToken;
if (token.GetType() == HTMLToken::kStartTag) {
const String& tag_name = token.Data();
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, SVGNames::svgTag))
namespace_stack_.push_back(SVG);
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, MathMLNames::mathTag))
namespace_stack_.push_back(kMathML);
if (InForeignContent() && TokenExitsForeignContent(token))
namespace_stack_.pop_back();
if ((namespace_stack_.back() == SVG && TokenExitsSVG(token)) ||
(namespace_stack_.back() == kMathML && TokenExitsMath(token)))
namespace_stack_.push_back(HTML);
if (!InForeignContent()) {
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, textareaTag) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, titleTag)) {
tokenizer->SetState(HTMLTokenizer::kRCDATAState);
} else if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, scriptTag)) {
tokenizer->SetState(HTMLTokenizer::kScriptDataState);
simulated_token = kScriptStart;
} else if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, linkTag)) {
simulated_token = kLink;
} else if (!in_select_insertion_mode_) {
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, plaintextTag) &&
!in_select_insertion_mode_) {
tokenizer->SetState(HTMLTokenizer::kPLAINTEXTState);
} else if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, styleTag) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, iframeTag) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, xmpTag) ||
(ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, noembedTag) &&
options_.plugins_enabled) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, noframesTag) ||
(ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, noscriptTag) &&
options_.script_enabled)) {
tokenizer->SetState(HTMLTokenizer::kRAWTEXTState);
}
}
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, selectTag)) {
in_select_insertion_mode_ = true;
} else if (in_select_insertion_mode_ && TokenExitsInSelect(token)) {
in_select_insertion_mode_ = false;
}
}
}
if (token.GetType() == HTMLToken::kEndTag ||
(token.GetType() == HTMLToken::kStartTag && token.SelfClosing() &&
InForeignContent())) {
const String& tag_name = token.Data();
if ((namespace_stack_.back() == SVG &&
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, SVGNames::svgTag)) ||
(namespace_stack_.back() == kMathML &&
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, MathMLNames::mathTag)) ||
(namespace_stack_.Contains(SVG) && namespace_stack_.back() == HTML &&
TokenExitsSVG(token)) ||
(namespace_stack_.Contains(kMathML) &&
namespace_stack_.back() == HTML && TokenExitsMath(token))) {
namespace_stack_.pop_back();
}
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, scriptTag)) {
if (!InForeignContent())
tokenizer->SetState(HTMLTokenizer::kDataState);
return kScriptEnd;
} else if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, selectTag)) {
in_select_insertion_mode_ = false;
}
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, styleTag))
simulated_token = kStyleEnd;
}
tokenizer->SetForceNullCharacterReplacement(InForeignContent());
tokenizer->SetShouldAllowCDATA(InForeignContent());
return simulated_token;
}
Commit Message: HTML parser: Fix "HTML integration point" implementation in HTMLTreeBuilderSimulator.
HTMLTreeBuilderSimulator assumed only <foreignObject> as an HTML
integration point. This CL adds <annotation-xml>, <desc>, and SVG
<title>.
Bug: 805924
Change-Id: I6793d9163d4c6bc8bf0790415baedddaac7a1fc2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/964038
Commit-Queue: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kouhei Ueno <kouhei@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#543634}
CWE ID: CWE-79 | HTMLTreeBuilderSimulator::SimulatedToken HTMLTreeBuilderSimulator::Simulate(
const CompactHTMLToken& token,
HTMLTokenizer* tokenizer) {
SimulatedToken simulated_token = kOtherToken;
if (token.GetType() == HTMLToken::kStartTag) {
const String& tag_name = token.Data();
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, SVGNames::svgTag))
namespace_stack_.push_back(SVG);
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, MathMLNames::mathTag))
namespace_stack_.push_back(kMathML);
if (InForeignContent() && TokenExitsForeignContent(token))
namespace_stack_.pop_back();
if (IsHTMLIntegrationPointForStartTag(token) ||
(namespace_stack_.back() == kMathML && TokenExitsMath(token))) {
namespace_stack_.push_back(HTML);
} else if (!InForeignContent()) {
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, textareaTag) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, titleTag)) {
tokenizer->SetState(HTMLTokenizer::kRCDATAState);
} else if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, scriptTag)) {
tokenizer->SetState(HTMLTokenizer::kScriptDataState);
simulated_token = kScriptStart;
} else if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, linkTag)) {
simulated_token = kLink;
} else if (!in_select_insertion_mode_) {
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, plaintextTag) &&
!in_select_insertion_mode_) {
tokenizer->SetState(HTMLTokenizer::kPLAINTEXTState);
} else if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, styleTag) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, iframeTag) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, xmpTag) ||
(ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, noembedTag) &&
options_.plugins_enabled) ||
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, noframesTag) ||
(ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, noscriptTag) &&
options_.script_enabled)) {
tokenizer->SetState(HTMLTokenizer::kRAWTEXTState);
}
}
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, selectTag)) {
in_select_insertion_mode_ = true;
} else if (in_select_insertion_mode_ && TokenExitsInSelect(token)) {
in_select_insertion_mode_ = false;
}
}
}
if (token.GetType() == HTMLToken::kEndTag ||
(token.GetType() == HTMLToken::kStartTag && token.SelfClosing() &&
InForeignContent())) {
const String& tag_name = token.Data();
if ((namespace_stack_.back() == SVG &&
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, SVGNames::svgTag)) ||
(namespace_stack_.back() == kMathML &&
ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, MathMLNames::mathTag)) ||
IsHTMLIntegrationPointForEndTag(token) ||
(namespace_stack_.Contains(kMathML) &&
namespace_stack_.back() == HTML && TokenExitsMath(token))) {
namespace_stack_.pop_back();
}
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, scriptTag)) {
if (!InForeignContent())
tokenizer->SetState(HTMLTokenizer::kDataState);
return kScriptEnd;
} else if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, selectTag)) {
in_select_insertion_mode_ = false;
}
if (ThreadSafeMatch(tag_name, styleTag))
simulated_token = kStyleEnd;
}
tokenizer->SetForceNullCharacterReplacement(InForeignContent());
tokenizer->SetShouldAllowCDATA(InForeignContent());
return simulated_token;
}
| 173,254 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, delete)
{
char *fname;
size_t fname_len;
char *error;
phar_entry_info *entry;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (PHAR_G(readonly) && !phar_obj->archive->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"Cannot write out phar archive, phar is read-only");
return;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s", &fname, &fname_len) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (phar_obj->archive->is_persistent && FAILURE == phar_copy_on_write(&(phar_obj->archive))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "phar \"%s\" is persistent, unable to copy on write", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (zend_hash_str_exists(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, fname, (uint) fname_len)) {
if (NULL != (entry = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, fname, (uint) fname_len))) {
if (entry->is_deleted) {
/* entry is deleted, but has not been flushed to disk yet */
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
entry->is_deleted = 1;
entry->is_modified = 1;
phar_obj->archive->is_modified = 1;
}
}
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Entry %s does not exist and cannot be deleted", fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
phar_flush(phar_obj->archive, NULL, 0, 0, &error);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | PHP_METHOD(Phar, delete)
{
char *fname;
size_t fname_len;
char *error;
phar_entry_info *entry;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (PHAR_G(readonly) && !phar_obj->archive->is_data) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0,
"Cannot write out phar archive, phar is read-only");
return;
}
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "p", &fname, &fname_len) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (phar_obj->archive->is_persistent && FAILURE == phar_copy_on_write(&(phar_obj->archive))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "phar \"%s\" is persistent, unable to copy on write", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (zend_hash_str_exists(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, fname, (uint) fname_len)) {
if (NULL != (entry = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, fname, (uint) fname_len))) {
if (entry->is_deleted) {
/* entry is deleted, but has not been flushed to disk yet */
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
entry->is_deleted = 1;
entry->is_modified = 1;
phar_obj->archive->is_modified = 1;
}
}
} else {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Entry %s does not exist and cannot be deleted", fname);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
phar_flush(phar_obj->archive, NULL, 0, 0, &error);
if (error) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(phar_ce_PharException, 0, "%s", error);
efree(error);
}
RETURN_TRUE;
}
| 165,063 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline int _setEdgePixel(const gdImagePtr src, unsigned int x, unsigned int y, gdFixed coverage, const int bgColor)
{
const gdFixed f_127 = gd_itofx(127);
register int c = src->tpixels[y][x];
c = c | (( (int) (gd_fxtof(gd_mulfx(coverage, f_127)) + 50.5f)) << 24);
return _color_blend(bgColor, c);
}
Commit Message: Fixed bug #72227: imagescale out-of-bounds read
Ported from https://github.com/libgd/libgd/commit/4f65a3e4eedaffa1efcf9ee1eb08f0b504fbc31a
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static inline int _setEdgePixel(const gdImagePtr src, unsigned int x, unsigned int y, gdFixed coverage, const int bgColor)
static inline int _setEdgePixel(const gdImagePtr src, unsigned int x, unsigned int y, gdFixed coverage, const int bgColor)
{
const gdFixed f_127 = gd_itofx(127);
register int c = src->tpixels[y][x];
c = c | (( (int) (gd_fxtof(gd_mulfx(coverage, f_127)) + 50.5f)) << 24);
return _color_blend(bgColor, c);
}
| 170,005 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool add_free_nid(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, nid_t nid, bool build)
{
struct f2fs_nm_info *nm_i = NM_I(sbi);
struct free_nid *i;
struct nat_entry *ne;
int err;
/* 0 nid should not be used */
if (unlikely(nid == 0))
return false;
if (build) {
/* do not add allocated nids */
ne = __lookup_nat_cache(nm_i, nid);
if (ne && (!get_nat_flag(ne, IS_CHECKPOINTED) ||
nat_get_blkaddr(ne) != NULL_ADDR))
return false;
}
i = f2fs_kmem_cache_alloc(free_nid_slab, GFP_NOFS);
i->nid = nid;
i->state = NID_NEW;
if (radix_tree_preload(GFP_NOFS)) {
kmem_cache_free(free_nid_slab, i);
return true;
}
spin_lock(&nm_i->nid_list_lock);
err = __insert_nid_to_list(sbi, i, FREE_NID_LIST, true);
spin_unlock(&nm_i->nid_list_lock);
radix_tree_preload_end();
if (err) {
kmem_cache_free(free_nid_slab, i);
return true;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: f2fs: fix race condition in between free nid allocator/initializer
In below concurrent case, allocated nid can be loaded into free nid cache
and be allocated again.
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_create
- f2fs_new_inode
- alloc_nid
- __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- f2fs_balance_fs_bg
- build_free_nids
- __build_free_nids
- scan_nat_page
- add_free_nid
- __lookup_nat_cache
- f2fs_add_link
- init_inode_metadata
- new_inode_page
- new_node_page
- set_node_addr
- alloc_nid_done
- __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
- __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
This patch makes nat cache lookup and free nid list operation being atomical
to avoid this race condition.
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Chao Yu <yuchao0@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | static bool add_free_nid(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, nid_t nid, bool build)
{
struct f2fs_nm_info *nm_i = NM_I(sbi);
struct free_nid *i, *e;
struct nat_entry *ne;
int err = -EINVAL;
bool ret = false;
/* 0 nid should not be used */
if (unlikely(nid == 0))
return false;
i = f2fs_kmem_cache_alloc(free_nid_slab, GFP_NOFS);
i->nid = nid;
i->state = NID_NEW;
if (radix_tree_preload(GFP_NOFS))
goto err;
spin_lock(&nm_i->nid_list_lock);
if (build) {
/*
* Thread A Thread B
* - f2fs_create
* - f2fs_new_inode
* - alloc_nid
* - __insert_nid_to_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
* - f2fs_balance_fs_bg
* - build_free_nids
* - __build_free_nids
* - scan_nat_page
* - add_free_nid
* - __lookup_nat_cache
* - f2fs_add_link
* - init_inode_metadata
* - new_inode_page
* - new_node_page
* - set_node_addr
* - alloc_nid_done
* - __remove_nid_from_list(ALLOC_NID_LIST)
* - __insert_nid_to_list(FREE_NID_LIST)
*/
ne = __lookup_nat_cache(nm_i, nid);
if (ne && (!get_nat_flag(ne, IS_CHECKPOINTED) ||
nat_get_blkaddr(ne) != NULL_ADDR))
goto err_out;
e = __lookup_free_nid_list(nm_i, nid);
if (e) {
if (e->state == NID_NEW)
ret = true;
goto err_out;
}
}
ret = true;
err = __insert_nid_to_list(sbi, i, FREE_NID_LIST, true);
err_out:
spin_unlock(&nm_i->nid_list_lock);
radix_tree_preload_end();
err:
if (err)
kmem_cache_free(free_nid_slab, i);
return ret;
}
| 169,379 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FrameLoader::StopAllLoaders() {
if (frame_->GetDocument()->PageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() !=
Document::kNoDismissal)
return;
if (in_stop_all_loaders_)
return;
in_stop_all_loaders_ = true;
for (Frame* child = frame_->Tree().FirstChild(); child;
child = child->Tree().NextSibling()) {
if (child->IsLocalFrame())
ToLocalFrame(child)->Loader().StopAllLoaders();
}
frame_->GetDocument()->CancelParsing();
if (document_loader_)
document_loader_->Fetcher()->StopFetching();
if (!protect_provisional_loader_)
DetachDocumentLoader(provisional_document_loader_);
frame_->GetNavigationScheduler().Cancel();
if (document_loader_ && !document_loader_->SentDidFinishLoad()) {
document_loader_->LoadFailed(
ResourceError::CancelledError(document_loader_->Url()));
}
in_stop_all_loaders_ = false;
TakeObjectSnapshot();
}
Commit Message: Fix detach with open()ed document leaving parent loading indefinitely
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Bug: 803416
Test: fast/loader/document-open-iframe-then-detach.html
Change-Id: I26c2a054b9f1e5eb076acd677e1223058825f6d6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/887298
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Nate Chapin <japhet@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#532967}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void FrameLoader::StopAllLoaders() {
if (frame_->GetDocument()->PageDismissalEventBeingDispatched() !=
Document::kNoDismissal)
return;
if (in_stop_all_loaders_)
return;
AutoReset<bool> in_stop_all_loaders(&in_stop_all_loaders_, true);
for (Frame* child = frame_->Tree().FirstChild(); child;
child = child->Tree().NextSibling()) {
if (child->IsLocalFrame())
ToLocalFrame(child)->Loader().StopAllLoaders();
}
frame_->GetDocument()->CancelParsing();
if (document_loader_)
document_loader_->StopLoading();
if (!protect_provisional_loader_)
DetachDocumentLoader(provisional_document_loader_);
frame_->GetNavigationScheduler().Cancel();
DidFinishNavigation();
TakeObjectSnapshot();
}
| 171,852 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::RejectPromise(
ImageBitmapRejectionReason reason) {
switch (reason) {
case kUndecodableImageBitmapRejectionReason:
resolver_->Reject(
DOMException::Create(DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"The source image could not be decoded."));
break;
case kAllocationFailureImageBitmapRejectionReason:
resolver_->Reject(
DOMException::Create(DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"The ImageBitmap could not be allocated."));
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
factory_->DidFinishLoading(this);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAP in ImageBitmapLoader/FileReaderLoader
FileReaderLoader stores its client as a raw pointer, so in cases like
ImageBitmapLoader where the FileReaderLoaderClient really is garbage
collected we have to make sure to destroy the FileReaderLoader when
the ExecutionContext that owns it is destroyed.
Bug: 913970
Change-Id: I40b02115367cf7bf5bbbbb8e9b57874d2510f861
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1374511
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Marijn Kruisselbrink <mek@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#616342}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void ImageBitmapFactories::ImageBitmapLoader::RejectPromise(
ImageBitmapRejectionReason reason) {
switch (reason) {
case kUndecodableImageBitmapRejectionReason:
resolver_->Reject(
DOMException::Create(DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"The source image could not be decoded."));
break;
case kAllocationFailureImageBitmapRejectionReason:
resolver_->Reject(
DOMException::Create(DOMExceptionCode::kInvalidStateError,
"The ImageBitmap could not be allocated."));
break;
default:
NOTREACHED();
}
loader_.reset();
factory_->DidFinishLoading(this);
}
| 173,069 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static NTSTATUS fd_open_atomic(struct connection_struct *conn,
files_struct *fsp,
int flags,
mode_t mode,
bool *file_created)
{
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
bool file_existed = VALID_STAT(fsp->fsp_name->st);
*file_created = false;
* We're not creating the file, just pass through.
*/
return fd_open(conn, fsp, flags, mode);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-835 | static NTSTATUS fd_open_atomic(struct connection_struct *conn,
files_struct *fsp,
int flags,
mode_t mode,
bool *file_created)
{
NTSTATUS status = NT_STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
NTSTATUS retry_status;
bool file_existed = VALID_STAT(fsp->fsp_name->st);
int curr_flags;
*file_created = false;
* We're not creating the file, just pass through.
*/
return fd_open(conn, fsp, flags, mode);
}
| 164,794 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> PersistentHistogramAllocator::GetHistogram(
Reference ref) {
PersistentHistogramData* data =
memory_allocator_->GetAsObject<PersistentHistogramData>(ref);
const size_t length = memory_allocator_->GetAllocSize(ref);
if (!data || data->name[0] == '\0' ||
reinterpret_cast<char*>(data)[length - 1] != '\0' ||
data->samples_metadata.id == 0 || data->logged_metadata.id == 0 ||
(data->logged_metadata.id != data->samples_metadata.id &&
data->logged_metadata.id != data->samples_metadata.id + 1) ||
HashMetricName(data->name) != data->samples_metadata.id) {
RecordCreateHistogramResult(CREATE_HISTOGRAM_INVALID_METADATA);
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
return CreateHistogram(data);
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> PersistentHistogramAllocator::GetHistogram(
Reference ref) {
PersistentHistogramData* data =
memory_allocator_->GetAsObject<PersistentHistogramData>(ref);
const size_t length = memory_allocator_->GetAllocSize(ref);
if (!data || data->name[0] == '\0' ||
reinterpret_cast<char*>(data)[length - 1] != '\0' ||
data->samples_metadata.id == 0 || data->logged_metadata.id == 0 ||
(data->logged_metadata.id != data->samples_metadata.id &&
data->logged_metadata.id != data->samples_metadata.id + 1) ||
HashMetricName(data->name) != data->samples_metadata.id) {
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
return CreateHistogram(data);
}
| 172,134 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: check_mountpoint(const char *progname, char *mountpoint)
{
int err;
struct stat statbuf;
/* does mountpoint exist and is it a directory? */
err = stat(mountpoint, &statbuf);
if (err) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: failed to stat %s: %s\n", progname,
mountpoint, strerror(errno));
return EX_USAGE;
}
if (!S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode)) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s is not a directory!", progname,
mountpoint);
return EX_USAGE;
}
#if CIFS_LEGACY_SETUID_CHECK
/* do extra checks on mountpoint for legacy setuid behavior */
if (!getuid() || geteuid())
return 0;
if (statbuf.st_uid != getuid()) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s is not owned by user\n", progname,
mountpoint);
return EX_USAGE;
}
if ((statbuf.st_mode & S_IRWXU) != S_IRWXU) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid permissions on %s\n", progname,
mountpoint);
return EX_USAGE;
}
#endif /* CIFS_LEGACY_SETUID_CHECK */
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-59 | check_mountpoint(const char *progname, char *mountpoint)
{
int err;
struct stat statbuf;
/* does mountpoint exist and is it a directory? */
err = stat(".", &statbuf);
if (err) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: failed to stat %s: %s\n", progname,
mountpoint, strerror(errno));
return EX_USAGE;
}
if (!S_ISDIR(statbuf.st_mode)) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s is not a directory!", progname,
mountpoint);
return EX_USAGE;
}
#if CIFS_LEGACY_SETUID_CHECK
/* do extra checks on mountpoint for legacy setuid behavior */
if (!getuid() || geteuid())
return 0;
if (statbuf.st_uid != getuid()) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: %s is not owned by user\n", progname,
mountpoint);
return EX_USAGE;
}
if ((statbuf.st_mode & S_IRWXU) != S_IRWXU) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid permissions on %s\n", progname,
mountpoint);
return EX_USAGE;
}
#endif /* CIFS_LEGACY_SETUID_CHECK */
return 0;
}
| 165,168 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int nntp_add_group(char *line, void *data)
{
struct NntpServer *nserv = data;
struct NntpData *nntp_data = NULL;
char group[LONG_STRING];
char desc[HUGE_STRING] = "";
char mod;
anum_t first, last;
if (!nserv || !line)
return 0;
if (sscanf(line, "%s " ANUM " " ANUM " %c %[^\n]", group, &last, &first, &mod, desc) < 4)
return 0;
nntp_data = nntp_data_find(nserv, group);
nntp_data->deleted = false;
nntp_data->first_message = first;
nntp_data->last_message = last;
nntp_data->allowed = (mod == 'y') || (mod == 'm');
mutt_str_replace(&nntp_data->desc, desc);
if (nntp_data->newsrc_ent || nntp_data->last_cached)
nntp_group_unread_stat(nntp_data);
else if (nntp_data->last_message && nntp_data->first_message <= nntp_data->last_message)
nntp_data->unread = nntp_data->last_message - nntp_data->first_message + 1;
else
nntp_data->unread = 0;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Set length modifiers for group and desc
nntp_add_group parses a line controlled by the connected nntp server.
Restrict the maximum lengths read into the stack buffers group, and
desc.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int nntp_add_group(char *line, void *data)
{
struct NntpServer *nserv = data;
struct NntpData *nntp_data = NULL;
char group[LONG_STRING] = "";
char desc[HUGE_STRING] = "";
char mod;
anum_t first, last;
if (!nserv || !line)
return 0;
/* These sscanf limits must match the sizes of the group and desc arrays */
if (sscanf(line, "%1023s " ANUM " " ANUM " %c %8191[^\n]", group, &last, &first, &mod, desc) < 4)
{
mutt_debug(4, "Cannot parse server line: %s\n", line);
return 0;
}
nntp_data = nntp_data_find(nserv, group);
nntp_data->deleted = false;
nntp_data->first_message = first;
nntp_data->last_message = last;
nntp_data->allowed = (mod == 'y') || (mod == 'm');
mutt_str_replace(&nntp_data->desc, desc);
if (nntp_data->newsrc_ent || nntp_data->last_cached)
nntp_group_unread_stat(nntp_data);
else if (nntp_data->last_message && nntp_data->first_message <= nntp_data->last_message)
nntp_data->unread = nntp_data->last_message - nntp_data->first_message + 1;
else
nntp_data->unread = 0;
return 0;
}
| 169,125 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: std::string TestFlashMessageLoop::TestBasics() {
message_loop_ = new pp::flash::MessageLoop(instance_);
pp::CompletionCallback callback = callback_factory_.NewCallback(
&TestFlashMessageLoop::QuitMessageLoopTask);
pp::Module::Get()->core()->CallOnMainThread(0, callback);
int32_t result = message_loop_->Run();
ASSERT_TRUE(message_loop_);
delete message_loop_;
message_loop_ = NULL;
ASSERT_EQ(PP_OK, result);
PASS();
}
Commit Message: Fix PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
This CL suspends script callbacks and resource loads while running nested message loop using PPB_Flash_MessageLoop.
BUG=569496
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1559113002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#374529}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | std::string TestFlashMessageLoop::TestBasics() {
message_loop_ = new pp::flash::MessageLoop(instance_);
pp::CompletionCallback callback = callback_factory_.NewCallback(
&TestFlashMessageLoop::QuitMessageLoopTask);
pp::Module::Get()->core()->CallOnMainThread(0, callback);
int32_t result = message_loop_->Run();
ASSERT_TRUE(message_loop_);
delete message_loop_;
message_loop_ = nullptr;
ASSERT_EQ(PP_OK, result);
PASS();
}
| 172,126 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DelegatedFrameHost::ClearDelegatedFrame() {
EvictDelegatedFrame();
}
Commit Message: mac: Make RWHVMac::ClearCompositorFrame clear locks
Ensure that the BrowserCompositorMac not hold on to a compositor lock
when requested to clear its compositor frame. This lock may be held
indefinitely (if the renderer hangs) and so the frame will never be
cleared.
Bug: 739621
Change-Id: I15d0e82bdf632f3379a48e959f198afb8a4ac218
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/608239
Commit-Queue: ccameron chromium <ccameron@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Ken Buchanan <kenrb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#493563}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void DelegatedFrameHost::ClearDelegatedFrame() {
// Ensure that we are able to swap in a new blank frame to replace any old
// content. This will result in a white flash if we switch back to this
// content.
// https://crbug.com/739621
released_front_lock_.reset();
EvictDelegatedFrame();
}
| 172,954 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: atmarp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length, u_int caplen)
{
const struct atmarp_pkthdr *ap;
u_short pro, hrd, op;
ap = (const struct atmarp_pkthdr *)bp;
ND_TCHECK(*ap);
hrd = ATMHRD(ap);
pro = ATMPRO(ap);
op = ATMOP(ap);
if (!ND_TTEST2(*aar_tpa(ap), ATMTPROTO_LEN(ap))) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)ap, length);
return;
}
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ARP, "));
}
if ((pro != ETHERTYPE_IP && pro != ETHERTYPE_TRAIL) ||
ATMSPROTO_LEN(ap) != 4 ||
ATMTPROTO_LEN(ap) != 4 ||
ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s, %s (len %u/%u)",
tok2str(arphrd_values, "Unknown Hardware (%u)", hrd),
tok2str(ethertype_values, "Unknown Protocol (0x%04x)", pro),
ATMSPROTO_LEN(ap),
ATMTPROTO_LEN(ap)));
/* don't know know about the address formats */
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag) {
goto out;
}
}
/* print operation */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s ",
ndo->ndo_vflag ? ", " : "",
tok2str(arpop_values, "Unknown (%u)", op)));
switch (op) {
case ARPOP_REQUEST:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "who-has %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, ATMTPA(ap))));
if (ATMTHRD_LEN(ap) != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ("));
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMTHA(ap), ATMTHRD_LEN(ap),
ATMTSA(ap), ATMTSLN(ap));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "tell %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, ATMSPA(ap))));
break;
case ARPOP_REPLY:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s is-at ", ipaddr_string(ndo, ATMSPA(ap))));
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMSHA(ap), ATMSHRD_LEN(ap), ATMSSA(ap),
ATMSSLN(ap));
break;
case ARPOP_INVREQUEST:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "who-is "));
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMTHA(ap), ATMTHRD_LEN(ap), ATMTSA(ap),
ATMTSLN(ap));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tell "));
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMSHA(ap), ATMSHRD_LEN(ap), ATMSSA(ap),
ATMSSLN(ap));
break;
case ARPOP_INVREPLY:
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMSHA(ap), ATMSHRD_LEN(ap), ATMSSA(ap),
ATMSSLN(ap));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "at %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, ATMSPA(ap))));
break;
case ARPOP_NAK:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "for %s", ipaddr_string(ndo, ATMSPA(ap))));
break;
default:
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)ap, caplen);
return;
}
out:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13013/ARP: Fix printing of ARP protocol addresses.
If the protocol type isn't ETHERTYPE_IP or ETHERTYPE_TRAIL, or if the
protocol address length isn't 4, don't print the address as an IPv4 address.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s), modified
so the capture file won't be rejected as an invalid capture.
Update another test file's tcpdump output to reflect this change.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | atmarp_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length, u_int caplen)
{
const struct atmarp_pkthdr *ap;
u_short pro, hrd, op;
ap = (const struct atmarp_pkthdr *)bp;
ND_TCHECK(*ap);
hrd = ATMHRD(ap);
pro = ATMPRO(ap);
op = ATMOP(ap);
if (!ND_TTEST2(*aar_tpa(ap), ATMTPROTO_LEN(ap))) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)ap, length);
return;
}
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "ARP, "));
}
if ((pro != ETHERTYPE_IP && pro != ETHERTYPE_TRAIL) ||
ATMSPROTO_LEN(ap) != 4 ||
ATMTPROTO_LEN(ap) != 4 ||
ndo->ndo_vflag) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s, %s (len %u/%u)",
tok2str(arphrd_values, "Unknown Hardware (%u)", hrd),
tok2str(ethertype_values, "Unknown Protocol (0x%04x)", pro),
ATMSPROTO_LEN(ap),
ATMTPROTO_LEN(ap)));
/* don't know know about the address formats */
if (!ndo->ndo_vflag) {
goto out;
}
}
/* print operation */
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s%s ",
ndo->ndo_vflag ? ", " : "",
tok2str(arpop_values, "Unknown (%u)", op)));
switch (op) {
case ARPOP_REQUEST:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "who-has "));
atmarp_tpaddr_print(ndo, ap, pro);
if (ATMTHRD_LEN(ap) != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " ("));
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMTHA(ap), ATMTHRD_LEN(ap),
ATMTSA(ap), ATMTSLN(ap));
ND_PRINT((ndo, ")"));
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tell "));
atmarp_spaddr_print(ndo, ap, pro);
break;
case ARPOP_REPLY:
atmarp_spaddr_print(ndo, ap, pro);
ND_PRINT((ndo, " is-at "));
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMSHA(ap), ATMSHRD_LEN(ap), ATMSSA(ap),
ATMSSLN(ap));
break;
case ARPOP_INVREQUEST:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "who-is "));
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMTHA(ap), ATMTHRD_LEN(ap), ATMTSA(ap),
ATMTSLN(ap));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " tell "));
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMSHA(ap), ATMSHRD_LEN(ap), ATMSSA(ap),
ATMSSLN(ap));
break;
case ARPOP_INVREPLY:
atmarp_addr_print(ndo, ATMSHA(ap), ATMSHRD_LEN(ap), ATMSSA(ap),
ATMSSLN(ap));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "at "));
atmarp_spaddr_print(ndo, ap, pro);
break;
case ARPOP_NAK:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "for "));
atmarp_spaddr_print(ndo, ap, pro);
break;
default:
ND_DEFAULTPRINT((const u_char *)ap, caplen);
return;
}
out:
ND_PRINT((ndo, ", length %u", length));
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", tstr));
}
| 167,881 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static size_t StringSize(const uint8_t *start, uint8_t encoding) {
//// return includes terminator; if unterminated, returns > limit
if (encoding == 0x00 || encoding == 0x03) {
return strlen((const char *)start) + 1;
}
size_t n = 0;
while (start[n] != '\0' || start[n + 1] != '\0') {
n += 2;
}
return n + 2;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: defensive parsing of mp3 album art information
several points in stagefrights mp3 album art code
used strlen() to parse user-supplied strings that may be
unterminated, resulting in reading beyond the end of a buffer.
This changes the code to use strnlen() for 8-bit encodings and
strengthens the parsing of 16-bit encodings similarly. It also
reworks how we watch for the end-of-buffer to avoid all over-reads.
Bug: 32377688
Test: crafted mp3's w/ good/bad cover art. See what showed in play music
Change-Id: Ia9f526d71b21ef6a61acacf616b573753cd21df6
(cherry picked from commit fa0806b594e98f1aed3ebcfc6a801b4c0056f9eb)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static size_t StringSize(const uint8_t *start, uint8_t encoding) {
//// return includes terminator; if unterminated, returns > limit
static size_t StringSize(const uint8_t *start, size_t limit, uint8_t encoding) {
if (encoding == 0x00 || encoding == 0x03) {
return strnlen((const char *)start, limit) + 1;
}
size_t n = 0;
while ((n+1 < limit) && (start[n] != '\0' || start[n + 1] != '\0')) {
n += 2;
}
n += 2;
return n;
}
| 174,061 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Maybe<bool> IncludesValueImpl(Isolate* isolate,
Handle<JSObject> object,
Handle<Object> value,
uint32_t start_from, uint32_t length) {
DCHECK(JSObject::PrototypeHasNoElements(isolate, *object));
Handle<Map> original_map = handle(object->map(), isolate);
Handle<FixedArray> parameter_map(FixedArray::cast(object->elements()),
isolate);
bool search_for_hole = value->IsUndefined(isolate);
for (uint32_t k = start_from; k < length; ++k) {
uint32_t entry = GetEntryForIndexImpl(isolate, *object, *parameter_map, k,
ALL_PROPERTIES);
if (entry == kMaxUInt32) {
if (search_for_hole) return Just(true);
continue;
}
Handle<Object> element_k =
Subclass::GetImpl(isolate, *parameter_map, entry);
if (element_k->IsAccessorPair()) {
LookupIterator it(isolate, object, k, LookupIterator::OWN);
DCHECK(it.IsFound());
DCHECK_EQ(it.state(), LookupIterator::ACCESSOR);
ASSIGN_RETURN_ON_EXCEPTION_VALUE(isolate, element_k,
Object::GetPropertyWithAccessor(&it),
Nothing<bool>());
if (value->SameValueZero(*element_k)) return Just(true);
if (object->map() != *original_map) {
return IncludesValueSlowPath(isolate, object, value, k + 1, length);
}
} else if (value->SameValueZero(*element_k)) {
return Just(true);
}
}
return Just(false);
}
Commit Message: Backport: Fix Object.entries/values with changing elements
Bug: 111274046
Test: m -j proxy_resolver_v8_unittest && adb sync && adb shell \
/data/nativetest64/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest/proxy_resolver_v8_unittest
Change-Id: I705fc512cc5837e9364ed187559cc75d079aa5cb
(cherry picked from commit d8be9a10287afed07705ac8af027d6a46d4def99)
CWE ID: CWE-704 | static Maybe<bool> IncludesValueImpl(Isolate* isolate,
Handle<JSObject> object,
Handle<Object> value,
uint32_t start_from, uint32_t length) {
DCHECK(JSObject::PrototypeHasNoElements(isolate, *object));
Handle<Map> original_map(object->map(), isolate);
Handle<FixedArray> parameter_map(FixedArray::cast(object->elements()),
isolate);
bool search_for_hole = value->IsUndefined(isolate);
for (uint32_t k = start_from; k < length; ++k) {
DCHECK_EQ(object->map(), *original_map);
uint32_t entry = GetEntryForIndexImpl(isolate, *object, *parameter_map, k,
ALL_PROPERTIES);
if (entry == kMaxUInt32) {
if (search_for_hole) return Just(true);
continue;
}
Handle<Object> element_k =
Subclass::GetImpl(isolate, *parameter_map, entry);
if (element_k->IsAccessorPair()) {
LookupIterator it(isolate, object, k, LookupIterator::OWN);
DCHECK(it.IsFound());
DCHECK_EQ(it.state(), LookupIterator::ACCESSOR);
ASSIGN_RETURN_ON_EXCEPTION_VALUE(isolate, element_k,
Object::GetPropertyWithAccessor(&it),
Nothing<bool>());
if (value->SameValueZero(*element_k)) return Just(true);
if (object->map() != *original_map) {
return IncludesValueSlowPath(isolate, object, value, k + 1, length);
}
} else if (value->SameValueZero(*element_k)) {
return Just(true);
}
}
return Just(false);
}
| 174,097 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: gs_main_init1(gs_main_instance * minst)
{
if (minst->init_done < 1) {
gs_dual_memory_t idmem;
int code =
ialloc_init(&idmem, minst->heap,
minst->memory_clump_size, gs_have_level2());
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = gs_lib_init1((gs_memory_t *)idmem.space_system);
if (code < 0)
return code;
alloc_save_init(&idmem);
{
gs_memory_t *mem = (gs_memory_t *)idmem.space_system;
name_table *nt = names_init(minst->name_table_size,
idmem.space_system);
if (nt == 0)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
mem->gs_lib_ctx->gs_name_table = nt;
code = gs_register_struct_root(mem, NULL,
(void **)&mem->gs_lib_ctx->gs_name_table,
"the_gs_name_table");
"the_gs_name_table");
if (code < 0)
return code;
}
code = obj_init(&minst->i_ctx_p, &idmem); /* requires name_init */
if (code < 0)
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = i_iodev_init(minst->i_ctx_p);
if (code < 0)
return code;
minst->init_done = 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | gs_main_init1(gs_main_instance * minst)
{
if (minst->init_done < 1) {
gs_dual_memory_t idmem;
int code =
ialloc_init(&idmem, minst->heap,
minst->memory_clump_size, gs_have_level2());
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = gs_lib_init1((gs_memory_t *)idmem.space_system);
if (code < 0)
return code;
alloc_save_init(&idmem);
{
gs_memory_t *mem = (gs_memory_t *)idmem.space_system;
name_table *nt = names_init(minst->name_table_size,
idmem.space_system);
if (nt == 0)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
mem->gs_lib_ctx->gs_name_table = nt;
code = gs_register_struct_root(mem, NULL,
(void **)&mem->gs_lib_ctx->gs_name_table,
"the_gs_name_table");
"the_gs_name_table");
if (code < 0)
return code;
mem->gs_lib_ctx->client_check_file_permission = z_check_file_permissions;
}
code = obj_init(&minst->i_ctx_p, &idmem); /* requires name_init */
if (code < 0)
if (code < 0)
return code;
code = i_iodev_init(minst->i_ctx_p);
if (code < 0)
return code;
minst->init_done = 1;
}
return 0;
}
| 165,267 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BrowserPpapiHostImpl::AddInstance(
PP_Instance instance,
const PepperRendererInstanceData& renderer_instance_data) {
DCHECK(instance_map_.find(instance) == instance_map_.end());
instance_map_[instance] =
base::MakeUnique<InstanceData>(renderer_instance_data);
}
Commit Message: Validate in-process plugin instance messages.
Bug: 733548, 733549
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Ie5572c7bcafa05399b09c44425ddd5ce9b9e4cba
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/538908
Commit-Queue: Bill Budge <bbudge@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Raymes Khoury <raymes@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480696}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void BrowserPpapiHostImpl::AddInstance(
PP_Instance instance,
const PepperRendererInstanceData& renderer_instance_data) {
// NOTE: 'instance' may be coming from a compromised renderer process. We
// take care here to make sure an attacker can't overwrite data for an
// existing plugin instance.
// See http://crbug.com/733548.
if (instance_map_.find(instance) == instance_map_.end()) {
instance_map_[instance] =
base::MakeUnique<InstanceData>(renderer_instance_data);
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
}
| 172,309 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void color_sycc_to_rgb(opj_image_t *img)
{
if(img->numcomps < 3)
{
img->color_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_GRAY;
return;
}
if((img->comps[0].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dx == 2)
&& (img->comps[2].dx == 2)
&& (img->comps[0].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dy == 2)
&& (img->comps[2].dy == 2))/* horizontal and vertical sub-sample */
{
sycc420_to_rgb(img);
}
else
if((img->comps[0].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dx == 2)
&& (img->comps[2].dx == 2)
&& (img->comps[0].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[2].dy == 1))/* horizontal sub-sample only */
{
sycc422_to_rgb(img);
}
else
if((img->comps[0].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[2].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[0].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[2].dy == 1))/* no sub-sample */
{
sycc444_to_rgb(img);
}
else
{
fprintf(stderr,"%s:%d:color_sycc_to_rgb\n\tCAN NOT CONVERT\n", __FILE__,__LINE__);
return;
}
img->color_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_SRGB;
}/* color_sycc_to_rgb() */
Commit Message: Fix Out-Of-Bounds Read in sycc42x_to_rgb function (#745)
42x Images with an odd x0/y0 lead to subsampled component starting at the
2nd column/line.
That is offset = comp->dx * comp->x0 - image->x0 = 1
Fix #726
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void color_sycc_to_rgb(opj_image_t *img)
{
if(img->numcomps < 3)
{
img->color_space = OPJ_CLRSPC_GRAY;
return;
}
if((img->comps[0].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dx == 2)
&& (img->comps[2].dx == 2)
&& (img->comps[0].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dy == 2)
&& (img->comps[2].dy == 2))/* horizontal and vertical sub-sample */
{
sycc420_to_rgb(img);
}
else
if((img->comps[0].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dx == 2)
&& (img->comps[2].dx == 2)
&& (img->comps[0].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[2].dy == 1))/* horizontal sub-sample only */
{
sycc422_to_rgb(img);
}
else
if((img->comps[0].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[2].dx == 1)
&& (img->comps[0].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[1].dy == 1)
&& (img->comps[2].dy == 1))/* no sub-sample */
{
sycc444_to_rgb(img);
}
else
{
fprintf(stderr,"%s:%d:color_sycc_to_rgb\n\tCAN NOT CONVERT\n", __FILE__,__LINE__);
return;
}
}/* color_sycc_to_rgb() */
| 168,838 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ManifestUmaUtil::FetchFailed(FetchFailureReason reason) {
ManifestFetchResultType fetch_result_type = MANIFEST_FETCH_RESULT_TYPE_COUNT;
switch (reason) {
case FETCH_EMPTY_URL:
fetch_result_type = MANIFEST_FETCH_ERROR_EMPTY_URL;
break;
case FETCH_UNSPECIFIED_REASON:
fetch_result_type = MANIFEST_FETCH_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED;
break;
}
DCHECK_NE(fetch_result_type, MANIFEST_FETCH_RESULT_TYPE_COUNT);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(kUMANameFetchResult,
fetch_result_type,
MANIFEST_FETCH_RESULT_TYPE_COUNT);
}
Commit Message: Fail the web app manifest fetch if the document is sandboxed.
This ensures that sandboxed pages are regarded as non-PWAs, and that
other features in the browser process which trust the web manifest do
not receive the manifest at all if the document itself cannot access the
manifest.
BUG=771709
Change-Id: Ifd4d00c2fccff8cc0e5e8d2457bd55b992b0a8f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/866529
Commit-Queue: Dominick Ng <dominickn@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531121}
CWE ID: | void ManifestUmaUtil::FetchFailed(FetchFailureReason reason) {
ManifestFetchResultType fetch_result_type = MANIFEST_FETCH_RESULT_TYPE_COUNT;
switch (reason) {
case FETCH_EMPTY_URL:
fetch_result_type = MANIFEST_FETCH_ERROR_EMPTY_URL;
break;
case FETCH_FROM_UNIQUE_ORIGIN:
fetch_result_type = MANIFEST_FETCH_ERROR_FROM_UNIQUE_ORIGIN;
break;
case FETCH_UNSPECIFIED_REASON:
fetch_result_type = MANIFEST_FETCH_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED;
break;
}
DCHECK_NE(fetch_result_type, MANIFEST_FETCH_RESULT_TYPE_COUNT);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION(kUMANameFetchResult,
fetch_result_type,
MANIFEST_FETCH_RESULT_TYPE_COUNT);
}
| 172,922 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int proxy_authentication(zval* this_ptr, smart_str* soap_headers TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval **login, **password;
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_proxy_login", sizeof("_proxy_login"), (void **)&login) == SUCCESS) {
unsigned char* buf;
int len;
smart_str auth = {0};
smart_str_appendl(&auth, Z_STRVAL_PP(login), Z_STRLEN_PP(login));
smart_str_appendc(&auth, ':');
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_proxy_password", sizeof("_proxy_password"), (void **)&password) == SUCCESS) {
smart_str_appendl(&auth, Z_STRVAL_PP(password), Z_STRLEN_PP(password));
}
smart_str_0(&auth);
smart_str_appendl(soap_headers, (char*)buf, len);
smart_str_append_const(soap_headers, "\r\n");
efree(buf);
smart_str_free(&auth);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | int proxy_authentication(zval* this_ptr, smart_str* soap_headers TSRMLS_DC)
{
zval **login, **password;
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_proxy_login", sizeof("_proxy_login"), (void **)&login) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(login) == IS_STRING) {
unsigned char* buf;
int len;
smart_str auth = {0};
smart_str_appendl(&auth, Z_STRVAL_PP(login), Z_STRLEN_PP(login));
smart_str_appendc(&auth, ':');
if (zend_hash_find(Z_OBJPROP_P(this_ptr), "_proxy_password", sizeof("_proxy_password"), (void **)&password) == SUCCESS &&
Z_TYPE_PP(password) == IS_STRING) {
smart_str_appendl(&auth, Z_STRVAL_PP(password), Z_STRLEN_PP(password));
}
smart_str_0(&auth);
smart_str_appendl(soap_headers, (char*)buf, len);
smart_str_append_const(soap_headers, "\r\n");
efree(buf);
smart_str_free(&auth);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
| 165,306 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ReverbConvolverStage::ReverbConvolverStage(const float* impulseResponse, size_t, size_t reverbTotalLatency, size_t stageOffset, size_t stageLength,
size_t fftSize, size_t renderPhase, size_t renderSliceSize, ReverbAccumulationBuffer* accumulationBuffer, bool directMode)
: m_accumulationBuffer(accumulationBuffer)
, m_accumulationReadIndex(0)
, m_inputReadIndex(0)
, m_directMode(directMode)
{
ASSERT(impulseResponse);
ASSERT(accumulationBuffer);
if (!m_directMode) {
m_fftKernel = adoptPtr(new FFTFrame(fftSize));
m_fftKernel->doPaddedFFT(impulseResponse + stageOffset, stageLength);
m_fftConvolver = adoptPtr(new FFTConvolver(fftSize));
} else {
m_directKernel = adoptPtr(new AudioFloatArray(fftSize / 2));
m_directKernel->copyToRange(impulseResponse + stageOffset, 0, fftSize / 2);
m_directConvolver = adoptPtr(new DirectConvolver(renderSliceSize));
}
m_temporaryBuffer.allocate(renderSliceSize);
size_t totalDelay = stageOffset + reverbTotalLatency;
size_t halfSize = fftSize / 2;
if (!m_directMode) {
ASSERT(totalDelay >= halfSize);
if (totalDelay >= halfSize)
totalDelay -= halfSize;
}
int maxPreDelayLength = std::min(halfSize, totalDelay);
m_preDelayLength = totalDelay > 0 ? renderPhase % maxPreDelayLength : 0;
if (m_preDelayLength > totalDelay)
m_preDelayLength = 0;
m_postDelayLength = totalDelay - m_preDelayLength;
m_preReadWriteIndex = 0;
m_framesProcessed = 0; // total frames processed so far
size_t delayBufferSize = m_preDelayLength < fftSize ? fftSize : m_preDelayLength;
delayBufferSize = delayBufferSize < renderSliceSize ? renderSliceSize : delayBufferSize;
m_preDelayBuffer.allocate(delayBufferSize);
}
Commit Message: Don't read past the end of the impulseResponse array
BUG=281480
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23689004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@157007 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ReverbConvolverStage::ReverbConvolverStage(const float* impulseResponse, size_t, size_t reverbTotalLatency, size_t stageOffset, size_t stageLength,
size_t fftSize, size_t renderPhase, size_t renderSliceSize, ReverbAccumulationBuffer* accumulationBuffer, bool directMode)
: m_accumulationBuffer(accumulationBuffer)
, m_accumulationReadIndex(0)
, m_inputReadIndex(0)
, m_directMode(directMode)
{
ASSERT(impulseResponse);
ASSERT(accumulationBuffer);
if (!m_directMode) {
m_fftKernel = adoptPtr(new FFTFrame(fftSize));
m_fftKernel->doPaddedFFT(impulseResponse + stageOffset, stageLength);
m_fftConvolver = adoptPtr(new FFTConvolver(fftSize));
} else {
ASSERT(!stageOffset);
ASSERT(stageLength <= fftSize / 2);
m_directKernel = adoptPtr(new AudioFloatArray(fftSize / 2));
m_directKernel->copyToRange(impulseResponse, 0, stageLength);
m_directConvolver = adoptPtr(new DirectConvolver(renderSliceSize));
}
m_temporaryBuffer.allocate(renderSliceSize);
size_t totalDelay = stageOffset + reverbTotalLatency;
size_t halfSize = fftSize / 2;
if (!m_directMode) {
ASSERT(totalDelay >= halfSize);
if (totalDelay >= halfSize)
totalDelay -= halfSize;
}
int maxPreDelayLength = std::min(halfSize, totalDelay);
m_preDelayLength = totalDelay > 0 ? renderPhase % maxPreDelayLength : 0;
if (m_preDelayLength > totalDelay)
m_preDelayLength = 0;
m_postDelayLength = totalDelay - m_preDelayLength;
m_preReadWriteIndex = 0;
m_framesProcessed = 0; // total frames processed so far
size_t delayBufferSize = m_preDelayLength < fftSize ? fftSize : m_preDelayLength;
delayBufferSize = delayBufferSize < renderSliceSize ? renderSliceSize : delayBufferSize;
m_preDelayBuffer.allocate(delayBufferSize);
}
| 171,191 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long Cluster::GetTimeCode() const
{
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Load(pos, len);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
return m_timecode;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long long Cluster::GetTimeCode() const
const long status = Load(pos, len);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
return m_timecode;
}
long long Cluster::GetTime() const {
const long long tc = GetTimeCode();
if (tc < 0)
return tc;
const SegmentInfo* const pInfo = m_pSegment->GetInfo();
assert(pInfo);
const long long scale = pInfo->GetTimeCodeScale();
assert(scale >= 1);
const long long t = m_timecode * scale;
return t;
}
long long Cluster::GetFirstTime() const {
const BlockEntry* pEntry;
const long status = GetFirst(pEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (pEntry == NULL) // empty cluster
return GetTime();
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
return pBlock->GetTime(this);
}
long long Cluster::GetLastTime() const {
const BlockEntry* pEntry;
const long status = GetLast(pEntry);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (pEntry == NULL) // empty cluster
return GetTime();
const Block* const pBlock = pEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
return pBlock->GetTime(this);
}
long Cluster::CreateBlock(long long id,
long long pos, // absolute pos of payload
long long size, long long discard_padding) {
assert((id == 0x20) || (id == 0x23)); // BlockGroup or SimpleBlock
if (m_entries_count < 0) { // haven't parsed anything yet
assert(m_entries == NULL);
assert(m_entries_size == 0);
m_entries_size = 1024;
m_entries = new BlockEntry* [m_entries_size];
m_entries_count = 0;
} else {
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_size > 0);
assert(m_entries_count <= m_entries_size);
if (m_entries_count >= m_entries_size) {
const long entries_size = 2 * m_entries_size;
BlockEntry** const entries = new BlockEntry* [entries_size];
assert(entries);
BlockEntry** src = m_entries;
BlockEntry** const src_end = src + m_entries_count;
BlockEntry** dst = entries;
while (src != src_end)
*dst++ = *src++;
delete[] m_entries;
m_entries = entries;
m_entries_size = entries_size;
}
}
if (id == 0x20) // BlockGroup ID
return CreateBlockGroup(pos, size, discard_padding);
else // SimpleBlock ID
return CreateSimpleBlock(pos, size);
}
long Cluster::CreateBlockGroup(long long start_offset, long long size,
long long discard_padding) {
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_size > 0);
assert(m_entries_count >= 0);
assert(m_entries_count < m_entries_size);
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = start_offset;
const long long stop = start_offset + size;
// For WebM files, there is a bias towards previous reference times
//(in order to support alt-ref frames, which refer back to the previous
// keyframe). Normally a 0 value is not possible, but here we tenatively
// allow 0 as the value of a reference frame, with the interpretation
// that this is a "previous" reference time.
long long prev = 1; // nonce
long long next = 0; // nonce
long long duration = -1; // really, this is unsigned
long long bpos = -1;
long long bsize = -1;
while (pos < stop) {
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume size
if (id == 0x21) { // Block ID
if (bpos < 0) { // Block ID
bpos = pos;
bsize = size;
}
} else if (id == 0x1B) { // Duration ID
assert(size <= 8);
duration = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
assert(duration >= 0); // TODO
} else if (id == 0x7B) { // ReferenceBlock
assert(size <= 8);
const long size_ = static_cast<long>(size);
long long time;
long status = UnserializeInt(pReader, pos, size_, time);
assert(status == 0);
if (status != 0)
return -1;
if (time <= 0) // see note above
prev = time;
else // weird
next = time;
}
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
assert(bpos >= 0);
assert(bsize >= 0);
const long idx = m_entries_count;
BlockEntry** const ppEntry = m_entries + idx;
BlockEntry*& pEntry = *ppEntry;
pEntry = new (std::nothrow)
BlockGroup(this, idx, bpos, bsize, prev, next, duration, discard_padding);
if (pEntry == NULL)
return -1; // generic error
BlockGroup* const p = static_cast<BlockGroup*>(pEntry);
const long status = p->Parse();
if (status == 0) { // success
++m_entries_count;
return 0;
}
delete pEntry;
pEntry = 0;
return status;
}
long Cluster::CreateSimpleBlock(long long st, long long sz) {
assert(m_entries);
assert(m_entries_size > 0);
assert(m_entries_count >= 0);
assert(m_entries_count < m_entries_size);
const long idx = m_entries_count;
BlockEntry** const ppEntry = m_entries + idx;
BlockEntry*& pEntry = *ppEntry;
pEntry = new (std::nothrow) SimpleBlock(this, idx, st, sz);
if (pEntry == NULL)
return -1; // generic error
SimpleBlock* const p = static_cast<SimpleBlock*>(pEntry);
const long status = p->Parse();
if (status == 0) {
++m_entries_count;
return 0;
}
delete pEntry;
pEntry = 0;
return status;
}
long Cluster::GetFirst(const BlockEntry*& pFirst) const {
if (m_entries_count <= 0) {
long long pos;
long len;
const long status = Parse(pos, len);
| 174,365 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderProcessHostImpl::RegisterProcessHostForSite(
BrowserContext* browser_context,
RenderProcessHost* process,
const GURL& url) {
SiteProcessMap* map =
GetSiteProcessMapForBrowserContext(browser_context);
std::string site = SiteInstance::GetSiteForURL(browser_context, url)
.possibly_invalid_spec();
map->RegisterProcess(site, process);
}
Commit Message: Check for appropriate bindings in process-per-site mode.
BUG=174059
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12188025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@181386 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void RenderProcessHostImpl::RegisterProcessHostForSite(
BrowserContext* browser_context,
RenderProcessHost* process,
const GURL& url) {
SiteProcessMap* map =
GetSiteProcessMapForBrowserContext(browser_context);
// Only register valid, non-empty sites. Empty or invalid sites will not
// use process-per-site mode. We cannot check whether the process has
// appropriate bindings here, because the bindings have not yet been granted.
std::string site = SiteInstance::GetSiteForURL(browser_context, url)
.possibly_invalid_spec();
if (!site.empty())
map->RegisterProcess(site, process);
}
| 171,468 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ThreadableBlobRegistry::registerStreamURL(const KURL& url, const String& type)
{
if (isMainThread()) {
blobRegistry().registerStreamURL(url, type);
} else {
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> context = adoptPtr(new BlobRegistryContext(url, type));
callOnMainThread(®isterStreamURLTask, context.leakPtr());
}
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | void ThreadableBlobRegistry::registerStreamURL(const KURL& url, const String& type)
void BlobRegistry::registerStreamURL(const KURL& url, const String& type)
{
if (isMainThread()) {
if (WebBlobRegistry* registry = blobRegistry())
registry->registerStreamURL(url, type);
} else {
OwnPtr<BlobRegistryContext> context = adoptPtr(new BlobRegistryContext(url, type));
callOnMainThread(®isterStreamURLTask, context.leakPtr());
}
}
| 170,688 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void qrio_prstcfg(u8 bit, u8 mode)
{
u32 prstcfg;
u8 i;
void __iomem *qrio_base = (void *)CONFIG_SYS_QRIO_BASE;
prstcfg = in_be32(qrio_base + PRSTCFG_OFF);
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
if (mode & (1<<i))
set_bit(2*bit+i, &prstcfg);
else
clear_bit(2*bit+i, &prstcfg);
}
out_be32(qrio_base + PRSTCFG_OFF, prstcfg);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | void qrio_prstcfg(u8 bit, u8 mode)
{
u32 prstcfg;
u8 i;
void __iomem *qrio_base = (void *)CONFIG_SYS_QRIO_BASE;
prstcfg = in_be32(qrio_base + PRSTCFG_OFF);
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
if (mode & (1 << i))
set_bit(2 * bit + i, &prstcfg);
else
clear_bit(2 * bit + i, &prstcfg);
}
out_be32(qrio_base + PRSTCFG_OFF, prstcfg);
}
| 169,625 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static struct super_block *alloc_super(struct file_system_type *type, int flags)
{
struct super_block *s = kzalloc(sizeof(struct super_block), GFP_USER);
static const struct super_operations default_op;
int i;
if (!s)
return NULL;
if (security_sb_alloc(s))
goto fail;
#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
s->s_files = alloc_percpu(struct list_head);
if (!s->s_files)
goto fail;
for_each_possible_cpu(i)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(per_cpu_ptr(s->s_files, i));
#else
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&s->s_files);
#endif
for (i = 0; i < SB_FREEZE_LEVELS; i++) {
if (percpu_counter_init(&s->s_writers.counter[i], 0) < 0)
goto fail;
lockdep_init_map(&s->s_writers.lock_map[i], sb_writers_name[i],
&type->s_writers_key[i], 0);
}
init_waitqueue_head(&s->s_writers.wait);
init_waitqueue_head(&s->s_writers.wait_unfrozen);
s->s_flags = flags;
s->s_bdi = &default_backing_dev_info;
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&s->s_instances);
INIT_HLIST_BL_HEAD(&s->s_anon);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&s->s_inodes);
if (list_lru_init(&s->s_dentry_lru))
goto fail;
if (list_lru_init(&s->s_inode_lru))
goto fail;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&s->s_mounts);
init_rwsem(&s->s_umount);
lockdep_set_class(&s->s_umount, &type->s_umount_key);
/*
* sget() can have s_umount recursion.
*
* When it cannot find a suitable sb, it allocates a new
* one (this one), and tries again to find a suitable old
* one.
*
* In case that succeeds, it will acquire the s_umount
* lock of the old one. Since these are clearly distrinct
* locks, and this object isn't exposed yet, there's no
* risk of deadlocks.
*
* Annotate this by putting this lock in a different
* subclass.
*/
down_write_nested(&s->s_umount, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
s->s_count = 1;
atomic_set(&s->s_active, 1);
mutex_init(&s->s_vfs_rename_mutex);
lockdep_set_class(&s->s_vfs_rename_mutex, &type->s_vfs_rename_key);
mutex_init(&s->s_dquot.dqio_mutex);
mutex_init(&s->s_dquot.dqonoff_mutex);
init_rwsem(&s->s_dquot.dqptr_sem);
s->s_maxbytes = MAX_NON_LFS;
s->s_op = &default_op;
s->s_time_gran = 1000000000;
s->cleancache_poolid = -1;
s->s_shrink.seeks = DEFAULT_SEEKS;
s->s_shrink.scan_objects = super_cache_scan;
s->s_shrink.count_objects = super_cache_count;
s->s_shrink.batch = 1024;
s->s_shrink.flags = SHRINKER_NUMA_AWARE;
return s;
fail:
destroy_super(s);
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | static struct super_block *alloc_super(struct file_system_type *type, int flags)
{
struct super_block *s = kzalloc(sizeof(struct super_block), GFP_USER);
static const struct super_operations default_op;
int i;
if (!s)
return NULL;
if (security_sb_alloc(s))
goto fail;
for (i = 0; i < SB_FREEZE_LEVELS; i++) {
if (percpu_counter_init(&s->s_writers.counter[i], 0) < 0)
goto fail;
lockdep_init_map(&s->s_writers.lock_map[i], sb_writers_name[i],
&type->s_writers_key[i], 0);
}
init_waitqueue_head(&s->s_writers.wait);
init_waitqueue_head(&s->s_writers.wait_unfrozen);
s->s_flags = flags;
s->s_bdi = &default_backing_dev_info;
INIT_HLIST_NODE(&s->s_instances);
INIT_HLIST_BL_HEAD(&s->s_anon);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&s->s_inodes);
if (list_lru_init(&s->s_dentry_lru))
goto fail;
if (list_lru_init(&s->s_inode_lru))
goto fail;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&s->s_mounts);
init_rwsem(&s->s_umount);
lockdep_set_class(&s->s_umount, &type->s_umount_key);
/*
* sget() can have s_umount recursion.
*
* When it cannot find a suitable sb, it allocates a new
* one (this one), and tries again to find a suitable old
* one.
*
* In case that succeeds, it will acquire the s_umount
* lock of the old one. Since these are clearly distrinct
* locks, and this object isn't exposed yet, there's no
* risk of deadlocks.
*
* Annotate this by putting this lock in a different
* subclass.
*/
down_write_nested(&s->s_umount, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
s->s_count = 1;
atomic_set(&s->s_active, 1);
mutex_init(&s->s_vfs_rename_mutex);
lockdep_set_class(&s->s_vfs_rename_mutex, &type->s_vfs_rename_key);
mutex_init(&s->s_dquot.dqio_mutex);
mutex_init(&s->s_dquot.dqonoff_mutex);
init_rwsem(&s->s_dquot.dqptr_sem);
s->s_maxbytes = MAX_NON_LFS;
s->s_op = &default_op;
s->s_time_gran = 1000000000;
s->cleancache_poolid = -1;
s->s_shrink.seeks = DEFAULT_SEEKS;
s->s_shrink.scan_objects = super_cache_scan;
s->s_shrink.count_objects = super_cache_count;
s->s_shrink.batch = 1024;
s->s_shrink.flags = SHRINKER_NUMA_AWARE;
return s;
fail:
destroy_super(s);
return NULL;
}
| 166,806 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool_t xdr_nullstring(XDR *xdrs, char **objp)
{
u_int size;
if (xdrs->x_op == XDR_ENCODE) {
if (*objp == NULL)
size = 0;
else
size = strlen(*objp) + 1;
}
if (! xdr_u_int(xdrs, &size)) {
return FALSE;
}
switch (xdrs->x_op) {
case XDR_DECODE:
if (size == 0) {
*objp = NULL;
return TRUE;
} else if (*objp == NULL) {
*objp = (char *) mem_alloc(size);
if (*objp == NULL) {
errno = ENOMEM;
return FALSE;
}
}
return (xdr_opaque(xdrs, *objp, size));
case XDR_ENCODE:
if (size != 0)
return (xdr_opaque(xdrs, *objp, size));
return TRUE;
case XDR_FREE:
if (*objp != NULL)
mem_free(*objp, size);
*objp = NULL;
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message: Verify decoded kadmin C strings [CVE-2015-8629]
In xdr_nullstring(), check that the decoded string is terminated with
a zero byte and does not contain any internal zero bytes.
CVE-2015-8629:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to read beyond the end of allocated memory by sending a string
without a terminating zero byte. Information leakage may be possible
for an attacker with permission to modify the database.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:H/Au:S/C:P/I:N/A:N/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8341 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool_t xdr_nullstring(XDR *xdrs, char **objp)
{
u_int size;
if (xdrs->x_op == XDR_ENCODE) {
if (*objp == NULL)
size = 0;
else
size = strlen(*objp) + 1;
}
if (! xdr_u_int(xdrs, &size)) {
return FALSE;
}
switch (xdrs->x_op) {
case XDR_DECODE:
if (size == 0) {
*objp = NULL;
return TRUE;
} else if (*objp == NULL) {
*objp = (char *) mem_alloc(size);
if (*objp == NULL) {
errno = ENOMEM;
return FALSE;
}
}
if (!xdr_opaque(xdrs, *objp, size))
return FALSE;
/* Check that the unmarshalled bytes are a C string. */
if ((*objp)[size - 1] != '\0')
return FALSE;
if (memchr(*objp, '\0', size - 1) != NULL)
return FALSE;
return TRUE;
case XDR_ENCODE:
if (size != 0)
return (xdr_opaque(xdrs, *objp, size));
return TRUE;
case XDR_FREE:
if (*objp != NULL)
mem_free(*objp, size);
*objp = NULL;
return TRUE;
}
return FALSE;
}
| 167,530 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: gfx::Size ShellWindowFrameView::GetMaximumSize() {
gfx::Size max_size = frame_->client_view()->GetMaximumSize();
if (!max_size.IsEmpty()) {
gfx::Rect client_bounds = GetBoundsForClientView();
max_size.Enlarge(0, client_bounds.y());
}
return max_size;
}
Commit Message: [views] Remove header bar on shell windows created with {frame: none}.
BUG=130182
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10597003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143439 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-79 | gfx::Size ShellWindowFrameView::GetMaximumSize() {
gfx::Size max_size = frame_->client_view()->GetMaximumSize();
if (is_frameless_)
return max_size;
if (!max_size.IsEmpty()) {
gfx::Rect client_bounds = GetBoundsForClientView();
max_size.Enlarge(0, client_bounds.y());
}
return max_size;
}
| 170,712 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ZSTD_buildCTable(void* dst, size_t dstCapacity,
FSE_CTable* nextCTable, U32 FSELog, symbolEncodingType_e type,
U32* count, U32 max,
const BYTE* codeTable, size_t nbSeq,
const S16* defaultNorm, U32 defaultNormLog, U32 defaultMax,
const FSE_CTable* prevCTable, size_t prevCTableSize,
void* workspace, size_t workspaceSize)
{
BYTE* op = (BYTE*)dst;
const BYTE* const oend = op + dstCapacity;
switch (type) {
case set_rle:
*op = codeTable[0];
CHECK_F(FSE_buildCTable_rle(nextCTable, (BYTE)max));
return 1;
case set_repeat:
memcpy(nextCTable, prevCTable, prevCTableSize);
return 0;
case set_basic:
CHECK_F(FSE_buildCTable_wksp(nextCTable, defaultNorm, defaultMax, defaultNormLog, workspace, workspaceSize)); /* note : could be pre-calculated */
return 0;
case set_compressed: {
S16 norm[MaxSeq + 1];
size_t nbSeq_1 = nbSeq;
const U32 tableLog = FSE_optimalTableLog(FSELog, nbSeq, max);
if (count[codeTable[nbSeq-1]] > 1) {
count[codeTable[nbSeq-1]]--;
nbSeq_1--;
}
assert(nbSeq_1 > 1);
CHECK_F(FSE_normalizeCount(norm, tableLog, count, nbSeq_1, max));
{ size_t const NCountSize = FSE_writeNCount(op, oend - op, norm, max, tableLog); /* overflow protected */
if (FSE_isError(NCountSize)) return NCountSize;
CHECK_F(FSE_buildCTable_wksp(nextCTable, norm, max, tableLog, workspace, workspaceSize));
return NCountSize;
}
}
default: return assert(0), ERROR(GENERIC);
}
}
Commit Message: fixed T36302429
CWE ID: CWE-362 | ZSTD_buildCTable(void* dst, size_t dstCapacity,
FSE_CTable* nextCTable, U32 FSELog, symbolEncodingType_e type,
U32* count, U32 max,
const BYTE* codeTable, size_t nbSeq,
const S16* defaultNorm, U32 defaultNormLog, U32 defaultMax,
const FSE_CTable* prevCTable, size_t prevCTableSize,
void* workspace, size_t workspaceSize)
{
BYTE* op = (BYTE*)dst;
const BYTE* const oend = op + dstCapacity;
DEBUGLOG(6, "ZSTD_buildCTable (dstCapacity=%u)", (unsigned)dstCapacity);
switch (type) {
case set_rle:
CHECK_F(FSE_buildCTable_rle(nextCTable, (BYTE)max));
if (dstCapacity==0) return ERROR(dstSize_tooSmall);
*op = codeTable[0];
return 1;
case set_repeat:
memcpy(nextCTable, prevCTable, prevCTableSize);
return 0;
case set_basic:
CHECK_F(FSE_buildCTable_wksp(nextCTable, defaultNorm, defaultMax, defaultNormLog, workspace, workspaceSize)); /* note : could be pre-calculated */
return 0;
case set_compressed: {
S16 norm[MaxSeq + 1];
size_t nbSeq_1 = nbSeq;
const U32 tableLog = FSE_optimalTableLog(FSELog, nbSeq, max);
if (count[codeTable[nbSeq-1]] > 1) {
count[codeTable[nbSeq-1]]--;
nbSeq_1--;
}
assert(nbSeq_1 > 1);
CHECK_F(FSE_normalizeCount(norm, tableLog, count, nbSeq_1, max));
{ size_t const NCountSize = FSE_writeNCount(op, oend - op, norm, max, tableLog); /* overflow protected */
if (FSE_isError(NCountSize)) return NCountSize;
CHECK_F(FSE_buildCTable_wksp(nextCTable, norm, max, tableLog, workspace, workspaceSize));
return NCountSize;
}
}
default: return assert(0), ERROR(GENERIC);
}
}
| 169,671 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int nbd_negotiate_write(QIOChannel *ioc, const void *buffer, size_t size)
{
ssize_t ret;
guint watch;
assert(qemu_in_coroutine());
/* Negotiation are always in main loop. */
watch = qio_channel_add_watch(ioc,
G_IO_OUT,
nbd_negotiate_continue,
qemu_coroutine_self(),
NULL);
ret = nbd_write(ioc, buffer, size, NULL);
g_source_remove(watch);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int nbd_negotiate_write(QIOChannel *ioc, const void *buffer, size_t size)
| 165,455 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: char* _multi_string_alloc_and_copy( LPCWSTR in )
{
char *chr;
int len = 0;
if ( !in )
{
return in;
}
while ( in[ len ] != 0 || in[ len + 1 ] != 0 )
{
len ++;
}
chr = malloc( len + 2 );
len = 0;
while ( in[ len ] != 0 || in[ len + 1 ] != 0 )
{
chr[ len ] = 0xFF & in[ len ];
len ++;
}
chr[ len ++ ] = '\0';
chr[ len ++ ] = '\0';
return chr;
}
Commit Message: New Pre Source
CWE ID: CWE-119 | char* _multi_string_alloc_and_copy( LPCWSTR in )
{
char *chr;
int len = 0;
if ( !in )
{
return NULL;
}
while ( in[ len ] != 0 || in[ len + 1 ] != 0 )
{
len ++;
}
chr = malloc( len + 2 );
len = 0;
while ( in[ len ] != 0 || in[ len + 1 ] != 0 )
{
chr[ len ] = 0xFF & in[ len ];
len ++;
}
chr[ len ++ ] = '\0';
chr[ len ++ ] = '\0';
return chr;
}
| 169,313 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Track::GetNumber() const
{
return m_info.number;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Track::GetNumber() const
| 174,349 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintPages() {
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame;
if (!GetPrintFrame(&frame))
return;
auto plugin = delegate_->GetPdfElement(frame);
Print(frame, plugin, false);
}
Commit Message: Crash on nested IPC handlers in PrintWebViewHelper
Class is not designed to handle nested IPC. Regular flows also does not
expect them. Still during printing of plugging them may show message
boxes and start nested message loops.
For now we are going just crash. If stats show us that this case is
frequent we will have to do something more complicated.
BUG=502562
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1228693002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338100}
CWE ID: | void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintPages() {
CHECK_LE(ipc_nesting_level_, 1);
blink::WebLocalFrame* frame;
if (!GetPrintFrame(&frame))
return;
auto plugin = delegate_->GetPdfElement(frame);
Print(frame, plugin, false);
}
| 171,875 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void InitializePrinting(content::WebContents* web_contents) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINT_PREVIEW)
printing::PrintViewManager::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
printing::PrintPreviewMessageHandler::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
#else
printing::PrintViewManagerBasic::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINT_PREVIEW)
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | void InitializePrinting(content::WebContents* web_contents) {
#if BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINT_PREVIEW)
printing::PrintViewManager::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
printing::PrintPreviewMessageHandler::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
#else
printing::PrintViewManagerBasic::CreateForWebContents(web_contents);
#endif // BUILDFLAG(ENABLE_PRINT_PREVIEW)
CreateCompositeClientIfNeeded(web_contents, false /* for_preview */);
}
| 171,894 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_slice(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
UWORD32 u4_slice_vertical_position;
UWORD32 u4_slice_vertical_position_extension;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* All the profiles supported require restricted slice structure. Hence */
/* there is no need to store slice_vertical_position. Note that max */
/* height supported does not exceed 2800 and scalablity is not supported */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Remove the slice start code */
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_PREFIX_LEN);
u4_slice_vertical_position = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream, 8);
if(u4_slice_vertical_position > 2800)
{
u4_slice_vertical_position_extension = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream, 3);
u4_slice_vertical_position += (u4_slice_vertical_position_extension << 7);
}
if((u4_slice_vertical_position > ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb) ||
(u4_slice_vertical_position == 0))
{
return IMPEG2D_INVALID_VERT_SIZE;
}
u4_slice_vertical_position--;
if (ps_dec->u2_mb_y != u4_slice_vertical_position)
{
ps_dec->u2_mb_y = u4_slice_vertical_position;
ps_dec->u2_mb_x = 0;
}
ps_dec->u2_first_mb = 1;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Quant scale code decoding */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
UWORD16 u2_quant_scale_code;
u2_quant_scale_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,5);
ps_dec->u1_quant_scale = (ps_dec->u2_q_scale_type) ?
gau1_impeg2_non_linear_quant_scale[u2_quant_scale_code] : (u2_quant_scale_code << 1);
}
if (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,1) == 1)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,9);
/* Flush extra bit information */
while (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,1) == 1)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,9);
}
}
impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
/* Reset the DC predictors to reset values given in Table 7.2 at the start*/
/* of slice data */
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[Y_LUMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[U_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[V_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* dec->DecMBsinSlice() implements the following psuedo code from standard*/
/* do */
/* { */
/* macroblock() */
/* } while (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt() != '000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000') */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
e_error = ps_dec->pf_decode_slice(ps_dec);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
return e_error;
}
/* Check for the MBy index instead of number of MBs left, because the
* number of MBs left in case of multi-thread decode is the number of MBs
* in that row only
*/
if(ps_dec->u2_mb_y < ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb)
impeg2d_next_start_code(ps_dec);
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
}
Commit Message: Fixed bit stream access to make sure that it is not read beyond the allocated size.
Bug: 25765591
Change-Id: I98c23a3c3f84f6710f29bffe5ed73adcf51d47f6
CWE ID: CWE-254 | IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T impeg2d_dec_slice(dec_state_t *ps_dec)
{
stream_t *ps_stream;
UWORD32 u4_slice_vertical_position;
UWORD32 u4_slice_vertical_position_extension;
IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T e_error;
ps_stream = &ps_dec->s_bit_stream;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* All the profiles supported require restricted slice structure. Hence */
/* there is no need to store slice_vertical_position. Note that max */
/* height supported does not exceed 2800 and scalablity is not supported */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Remove the slice start code */
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,START_CODE_PREFIX_LEN);
u4_slice_vertical_position = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream, 8);
if(u4_slice_vertical_position > 2800)
{
u4_slice_vertical_position_extension = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream, 3);
u4_slice_vertical_position += (u4_slice_vertical_position_extension << 7);
}
if((u4_slice_vertical_position > ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb) ||
(u4_slice_vertical_position == 0))
{
return IMPEG2D_INVALID_VERT_SIZE;
}
u4_slice_vertical_position--;
if (ps_dec->u2_mb_y != u4_slice_vertical_position)
{
ps_dec->u2_mb_y = u4_slice_vertical_position;
ps_dec->u2_mb_x = 0;
}
ps_dec->u2_first_mb = 1;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* Quant scale code decoding */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
{
UWORD16 u2_quant_scale_code;
u2_quant_scale_code = impeg2d_bit_stream_get(ps_stream,5);
ps_dec->u1_quant_scale = (ps_dec->u2_q_scale_type) ?
gau1_impeg2_non_linear_quant_scale[u2_quant_scale_code] : (u2_quant_scale_code << 1);
}
if (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,1) == 1)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,9);
/* Flush extra bit information */
while (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt(ps_stream,1) == 1 &&
ps_stream->u4_offset < ps_stream->u4_max_offset)
{
impeg2d_bit_stream_flush(ps_stream,9);
}
}
impeg2d_bit_stream_get_bit(ps_stream);
/* Reset the DC predictors to reset values given in Table 7.2 at the start*/
/* of slice data */
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[Y_LUMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[U_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
ps_dec->u2_def_dc_pred[V_CHROMA] = 128 << ps_dec->u2_intra_dc_precision;
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
/* dec->DecMBsinSlice() implements the following psuedo code from standard*/
/* do */
/* { */
/* macroblock() */
/* } while (impeg2d_bit_stream_nxt() != '000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000') */
/*------------------------------------------------------------------------*/
e_error = ps_dec->pf_decode_slice(ps_dec);
if ((IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE != e_error)
{
return e_error;
}
/* Check for the MBy index instead of number of MBs left, because the
* number of MBs left in case of multi-thread decode is the number of MBs
* in that row only
*/
if(ps_dec->u2_mb_y < ps_dec->u2_num_vert_mb)
impeg2d_next_start_code(ps_dec);
return (IMPEG2D_ERROR_CODES_T)IVD_ERROR_NONE;
}
| 173,947 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int vcc_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct atm_vcc *vcc;
int len;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (__SO_LEVEL_MATCH(optname, level) && len != __SO_SIZE(optname))
return -EINVAL;
vcc = ATM_SD(sock);
switch (optname) {
case SO_ATMQOS:
if (!test_bit(ATM_VF_HASQOS, &vcc->flags))
return -EINVAL;
return copy_to_user(optval, &vcc->qos, sizeof(vcc->qos))
? -EFAULT : 0;
case SO_SETCLP:
return put_user(vcc->atm_options & ATM_ATMOPT_CLP ? 1 : 0,
(unsigned long __user *)optval) ? -EFAULT : 0;
case SO_ATMPVC:
{
struct sockaddr_atmpvc pvc;
if (!vcc->dev || !test_bit(ATM_VF_ADDR, &vcc->flags))
return -ENOTCONN;
pvc.sap_family = AF_ATMPVC;
pvc.sap_addr.itf = vcc->dev->number;
pvc.sap_addr.vpi = vcc->vpi;
pvc.sap_addr.vci = vcc->vci;
return copy_to_user(optval, &pvc, sizeof(pvc)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
default:
if (level == SOL_SOCKET)
return -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (!vcc->dev || !vcc->dev->ops->getsockopt)
return -EINVAL;
return vcc->dev->ops->getsockopt(vcc, level, optname, optval, len);
}
Commit Message: atm: fix info leak in getsockopt(SO_ATMPVC)
The ATM code fails to initialize the two padding bytes of struct
sockaddr_atmpvc inserted for alignment. Add an explicit memset(0)
before filling the structure to avoid the info leak.
Signed-off-by: Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | int vcc_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
char __user *optval, int __user *optlen)
{
struct atm_vcc *vcc;
int len;
if (get_user(len, optlen))
return -EFAULT;
if (__SO_LEVEL_MATCH(optname, level) && len != __SO_SIZE(optname))
return -EINVAL;
vcc = ATM_SD(sock);
switch (optname) {
case SO_ATMQOS:
if (!test_bit(ATM_VF_HASQOS, &vcc->flags))
return -EINVAL;
return copy_to_user(optval, &vcc->qos, sizeof(vcc->qos))
? -EFAULT : 0;
case SO_SETCLP:
return put_user(vcc->atm_options & ATM_ATMOPT_CLP ? 1 : 0,
(unsigned long __user *)optval) ? -EFAULT : 0;
case SO_ATMPVC:
{
struct sockaddr_atmpvc pvc;
if (!vcc->dev || !test_bit(ATM_VF_ADDR, &vcc->flags))
return -ENOTCONN;
memset(&pvc, 0, sizeof(pvc));
pvc.sap_family = AF_ATMPVC;
pvc.sap_addr.itf = vcc->dev->number;
pvc.sap_addr.vpi = vcc->vpi;
pvc.sap_addr.vci = vcc->vci;
return copy_to_user(optval, &pvc, sizeof(pvc)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
default:
if (level == SOL_SOCKET)
return -EINVAL;
break;
}
if (!vcc->dev || !vcc->dev->ops->getsockopt)
return -EINVAL;
return vcc->dev->ops->getsockopt(vcc, level, optname, optval, len);
}
| 166,180 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: uint8_t smb2cli_session_security_mode(struct smbXcli_session *session)
{
struct smbXcli_conn *conn = session->conn;
uint8_t security_mode = 0;
if (conn == NULL) {
return security_mode;
}
security_mode = SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_ENABLED;
if (conn->mandatory_signing) {
security_mode |= SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_REQUIRED;
}
return security_mode;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | uint8_t smb2cli_session_security_mode(struct smbXcli_session *session)
{
struct smbXcli_conn *conn = session->conn;
uint8_t security_mode = 0;
if (conn == NULL) {
return security_mode;
}
security_mode = SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_ENABLED;
if (conn->mandatory_signing) {
security_mode |= SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_REQUIRED;
}
if (session->smb2->should_sign) {
security_mode |= SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_REQUIRED;
}
return security_mode;
}
| 164,675 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: vips_malloc( VipsObject *object, size_t size )
{
void *buf;
buf = g_malloc( size );
if( object ) {
g_signal_connect( object, "postclose",
G_CALLBACK( vips_malloc_cb ), buf );
object->local_memory += size;
}
return( buf );
}
Commit Message: zero memory on malloc
to prevent write of uninit memory under some error conditions
thanks Balint
CWE ID: CWE-200 | vips_malloc( VipsObject *object, size_t size )
{
void *buf;
buf = g_malloc0( size );
if( object ) {
g_signal_connect( object, "postclose",
G_CALLBACK( vips_malloc_cb ), buf );
object->local_memory += size;
}
return( buf );
}
| 169,739 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(
char *key,
char *value,
struct iscsi_param_list *param_list)
{
struct iscsi_extra_response *extra_response;
if (strlen(value) > VALUE_MAXLEN) {
pr_err("Value for notunderstood key \"%s\" exceeds %d,"
" protocol error.\n", key, VALUE_MAXLEN);
return -1;
}
extra_response = kzalloc(sizeof(struct iscsi_extra_response), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!extra_response) {
pr_err("Unable to allocate memory for"
" struct iscsi_extra_response.\n");
return -1;
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&extra_response->er_list);
strncpy(extra_response->key, key, strlen(key) + 1);
strncpy(extra_response->value, NOTUNDERSTOOD,
strlen(NOTUNDERSTOOD) + 1);
list_add_tail(&extra_response->er_list,
¶m_list->extra_response_list);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: iscsi-target: fix heap buffer overflow on error
If a key was larger than 64 bytes, as checked by iscsi_check_key(), the
error response packet, generated by iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(),
would still attempt to copy the entire key into the packet, overflowing
the structure on the heap.
Remote preauthentication kernel memory corruption was possible if a
target was configured and listening on the network.
CVE-2013-2850
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(
char *key,
char *value,
struct iscsi_param_list *param_list)
{
struct iscsi_extra_response *extra_response;
if (strlen(value) > VALUE_MAXLEN) {
pr_err("Value for notunderstood key \"%s\" exceeds %d,"
" protocol error.\n", key, VALUE_MAXLEN);
return -1;
}
extra_response = kzalloc(sizeof(struct iscsi_extra_response), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!extra_response) {
pr_err("Unable to allocate memory for"
" struct iscsi_extra_response.\n");
return -1;
}
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&extra_response->er_list);
strlcpy(extra_response->key, key, sizeof(extra_response->key));
strlcpy(extra_response->value, NOTUNDERSTOOD,
sizeof(extra_response->value));
list_add_tail(&extra_response->er_list,
¶m_list->extra_response_list);
return 0;
}
| 166,050 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType WriteRGFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
int
bit;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
byte;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(exception != (ExceptionInfo *) NULL);
assert(exception->signature == MagickSignature);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if((image->columns > 255L) || (image->rows > 255L))
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"Dimensions must be less than 255x255");
/*
Write header (just the image dimensions)
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,image->columns & 0xff);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,image->rows & 0xff);
/*
Convert MIFF to bit pixels.
*/
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType);
x=0;
y=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte>>=1;
if (GetPixelLuma(image,p) < (QuantumRange/2.0))
byte|=0x80;
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
{
/*
Write a bitmap byte to the image file.
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,byte);
bit=0;
byte=0;
}
p++;
}
if (bit != 0)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,byte);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message: Fix abort when writing to rgf format
The rgf format (LEGO MINDSTORMS EV3 images) caused a software abort because
exception == NULL. When WriteRGFImage is called from WriteImage, it is only
passed two parameters, not three. So, removed the extra parameter and use
image->exception instead as in other coders.
CWE ID: CWE-19 | static MagickBooleanType WriteRGFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image,
static MagickBooleanType WriteRGFImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,Image *image)
{
MagickBooleanType
status;
int
bit;
register const PixelPacket
*p;
register ssize_t
x;
ssize_t
y;
unsigned char
byte;
/*
Open output image file.
*/
assert(image_info != (const ImageInfo *) NULL);
assert(image_info->signature == MagickSignature);
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
status=OpenBlob(image_info,image,WriteBinaryBlobMode,&image->exception);
if (status == MagickFalse)
return(status);
(void) TransformImageColorspace(image,sRGBColorspace);
if((image->columns > 255L) || (image->rows > 255L))
ThrowWriterException(ImageError,"Dimensions must be less than 255x255");
/*
Write header (just the image dimensions)
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,image->columns & 0xff);
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,image->rows & 0xff);
/*
Convert MIFF to bit pixels.
*/
(void) SetImageType(image,BilevelType);
x=0;
y=0;
for (y=0; y < (ssize_t) image->rows; y++)
{
p=GetVirtualPixels(image,0,y,image->columns,1,&image->exception);
if (p == (const PixelPacket *) NULL)
break;
bit=0;
byte=0;
for (x=0; x < (ssize_t) image->columns; x++)
{
byte>>=1;
if (GetPixelLuma(image,p) < (QuantumRange/2.0))
byte|=0x80;
bit++;
if (bit == 8)
{
/*
Write a bitmap byte to the image file.
*/
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,byte);
bit=0;
byte=0;
}
p++;
}
if (bit != 0)
(void) WriteBlobByte(image,byte);
status=SetImageProgress(image,SaveImageTag,(MagickOffsetType) y,
image->rows);
if (status == MagickFalse)
break;
}
(void) CloseBlob(image);
return(MagickTrue);
}
| 168,786 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int dnxhd_find_frame_end(DNXHDParserContext *dctx,
const uint8_t *buf, int buf_size)
{
ParseContext *pc = &dctx->pc;
uint64_t state = pc->state64;
int pic_found = pc->frame_start_found;
int i = 0;
int interlaced = dctx->interlaced;
int cur_field = dctx->cur_field;
if (!pic_found) {
for (i = 0; i < buf_size; i++) {
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (ff_dnxhd_check_header_prefix(state & 0xffffffffff00LL) != 0) {
i++;
pic_found = 1;
interlaced = (state&2)>>1; /* byte following the 5-byte header prefix */
cur_field = state&1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
break;
}
}
}
if (pic_found && !dctx->remaining) {
if (!buf_size) /* EOF considered as end of frame */
return 0;
for (; i < buf_size; i++) {
dctx->cur_byte++;
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (dctx->cur_byte == 24) {
dctx->h = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 26) {
dctx->w = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 42) {
int cid = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFF;
if (cid <= 0)
continue;
dctx->remaining = avpriv_dnxhd_get_frame_size(cid);
if (dctx->remaining <= 0) {
dctx->remaining = dnxhd_get_hr_frame_size(cid, dctx->w, dctx->h);
if (dctx->remaining <= 0)
return dctx->remaining;
}
if (buf_size - i >= dctx->remaining && (!dctx->interlaced || dctx->cur_field)) {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->interlaced = interlaced;
dctx->cur_field = 0;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
} else {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
}
}
}
} else if (pic_found) {
if (dctx->remaining > buf_size) {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
} else {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->interlaced = interlaced;
dctx->cur_field = 0;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
}
}
pc->frame_start_found = pic_found;
pc->state64 = state;
dctx->interlaced = interlaced;
dctx->cur_field = cur_field;
return END_NOT_FOUND;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dnxhd_parser: Do not return invalid value from dnxhd_find_frame_end() on error
Fixes: Null pointer dereference
Fixes: CVE-2017-9608
Found-by: Yihan Lian
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
(cherry picked from commit 611b35627488a8d0763e75c25ee0875c5b7987dd)
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int dnxhd_find_frame_end(DNXHDParserContext *dctx,
const uint8_t *buf, int buf_size)
{
ParseContext *pc = &dctx->pc;
uint64_t state = pc->state64;
int pic_found = pc->frame_start_found;
int i = 0;
int interlaced = dctx->interlaced;
int cur_field = dctx->cur_field;
if (!pic_found) {
for (i = 0; i < buf_size; i++) {
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (ff_dnxhd_check_header_prefix(state & 0xffffffffff00LL) != 0) {
i++;
pic_found = 1;
interlaced = (state&2)>>1; /* byte following the 5-byte header prefix */
cur_field = state&1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
break;
}
}
}
if (pic_found && !dctx->remaining) {
if (!buf_size) /* EOF considered as end of frame */
return 0;
for (; i < buf_size; i++) {
dctx->cur_byte++;
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (dctx->cur_byte == 24) {
dctx->h = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 26) {
dctx->w = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 42) {
int cid = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFF;
int remaining;
if (cid <= 0)
continue;
remaining = avpriv_dnxhd_get_frame_size(cid);
if (remaining <= 0) {
remaining = dnxhd_get_hr_frame_size(cid, dctx->w, dctx->h);
if (remaining <= 0)
continue;
}
dctx->remaining = remaining;
if (buf_size - i >= dctx->remaining && (!dctx->interlaced || dctx->cur_field)) {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->interlaced = interlaced;
dctx->cur_field = 0;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
} else {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
}
}
}
} else if (pic_found) {
if (dctx->remaining > buf_size) {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
} else {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->interlaced = interlaced;
dctx->cur_field = 0;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
}
}
pc->frame_start_found = pic_found;
pc->state64 = state;
dctx->interlaced = interlaced;
dctx->cur_field = cur_field;
return END_NOT_FOUND;
}
| 168,092 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int uinput_create(char *name)
{
struct uinput_dev dev;
int fd, x = 0;
for(x=0; x < MAX_UINPUT_PATHS; x++)
{
fd = open(uinput_dev_path[x], O_RDWR);
if (fd < 0)
continue;
break;
}
if (x == MAX_UINPUT_PATHS) {
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("%s ERROR: uinput device open failed", __FUNCTION__);
return -1;
}
memset(&dev, 0, sizeof(dev));
if (name)
strncpy(dev.name, name, UINPUT_MAX_NAME_SIZE-1);
dev.id.bustype = BUS_BLUETOOTH;
dev.id.vendor = 0x0000;
dev.id.product = 0x0000;
dev.id.version = 0x0000;
if (write(fd, &dev, sizeof(dev)) < 0) {
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("%s Unable to write device information", __FUNCTION__);
close(fd);
return -1;
}
ioctl(fd, UI_SET_EVBIT, EV_KEY);
ioctl(fd, UI_SET_EVBIT, EV_REL);
ioctl(fd, UI_SET_EVBIT, EV_SYN);
for (x = 0; key_map[x].name != NULL; x++)
ioctl(fd, UI_SET_KEYBIT, key_map[x].mapped_id);
if (ioctl(fd, UI_DEV_CREATE, NULL) < 0) {
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("%s Unable to create uinput device", __FUNCTION__);
close(fd);
return -1;
}
return fd;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | int uinput_create(char *name)
{
struct uinput_dev dev;
int fd, x = 0;
for(x=0; x < MAX_UINPUT_PATHS; x++)
{
fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open(uinput_dev_path[x], O_RDWR));
if (fd < 0)
continue;
break;
}
if (x == MAX_UINPUT_PATHS) {
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("%s ERROR: uinput device open failed", __FUNCTION__);
return -1;
}
memset(&dev, 0, sizeof(dev));
if (name)
strncpy(dev.name, name, UINPUT_MAX_NAME_SIZE-1);
dev.id.bustype = BUS_BLUETOOTH;
dev.id.vendor = 0x0000;
dev.id.product = 0x0000;
dev.id.version = 0x0000;
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(write(fd, &dev, sizeof(dev))) < 0) {
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("%s Unable to write device information", __FUNCTION__);
close(fd);
return -1;
}
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(ioctl(fd, UI_SET_EVBIT, EV_KEY));
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(ioctl(fd, UI_SET_EVBIT, EV_REL));
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(ioctl(fd, UI_SET_EVBIT, EV_SYN));
for (x = 0; key_map[x].name != NULL; x++)
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(ioctl(fd, UI_SET_KEYBIT, key_map[x].mapped_id));
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(ioctl(fd, UI_DEV_CREATE, NULL)) < 0) {
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("%s Unable to create uinput device", __FUNCTION__);
close(fd);
return -1;
}
return fd;
}
| 173,452 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void a2dp_open_ctrl_path(struct a2dp_stream_common *common)
{
int i;
/* retry logic to catch any timing variations on control channel */
for (i = 0; i < CTRL_CHAN_RETRY_COUNT; i++)
{
/* connect control channel if not already connected */
if ((common->ctrl_fd = skt_connect(A2DP_CTRL_PATH, common->buffer_sz)) > 0)
{
/* success, now check if stack is ready */
if (check_a2dp_ready(common) == 0)
break;
ERROR("error : a2dp not ready, wait 250 ms and retry");
usleep(250000);
skt_disconnect(common->ctrl_fd);
common->ctrl_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
}
/* ctrl channel not ready, wait a bit */
usleep(250000);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static void a2dp_open_ctrl_path(struct a2dp_stream_common *common)
{
int i;
/* retry logic to catch any timing variations on control channel */
for (i = 0; i < CTRL_CHAN_RETRY_COUNT; i++)
{
/* connect control channel if not already connected */
if ((common->ctrl_fd = skt_connect(A2DP_CTRL_PATH, common->buffer_sz)) > 0)
{
/* success, now check if stack is ready */
if (check_a2dp_ready(common) == 0)
break;
ERROR("error : a2dp not ready, wait 250 ms and retry");
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(usleep(250000));
skt_disconnect(common->ctrl_fd);
common->ctrl_fd = AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED;
}
/* ctrl channel not ready, wait a bit */
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(usleep(250000));
}
}
| 173,424 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void NavigationControllerImpl::DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal() {
if (pending_entry_index_ == -1)
delete pending_entry_;
pending_entry_ = NULL;
pending_entry_index_ = -1;
DiscardTransientEntry();
}
Commit Message: Delete unneeded pending entries in DidFailProvisionalLoad to prevent a spoof.
BUG=280512
BUG=278899
TEST=See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/23978003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@222146 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void NavigationControllerImpl::DiscardNonCommittedEntriesInternal() {
DiscardPendingEntry();
DiscardTransientEntry();
}
void NavigationControllerImpl::DiscardPendingEntry() {
if (pending_entry_index_ == -1)
delete pending_entry_;
pending_entry_ = NULL;
pending_entry_index_ = -1;
}
| 171,188 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_add(image_transform *this,
PNG_CONST image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
/* 'expand' should do nothing for RGBA or GA input - no tRNS and the bit
* depth is at least 8 already.
*/
return (colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) == 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_expand_add(image_transform *this,
const image_transform **that, png_byte colour_type, png_byte bit_depth)
{
UNUSED(bit_depth)
this->next = *that;
*that = this;
/* 'expand' should do nothing for RGBA or GA input - no tRNS and the bit
* depth is at least 8 already.
*/
return (colour_type & PNG_COLOR_MASK_ALPHA) == 0;
}
| 173,629 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: dophn_core(struct magic_set *ms, int clazz, int swap, int fd, off_t off,
int num, size_t size, off_t fsize, int *flags)
{
Elf32_Phdr ph32;
Elf64_Phdr ph64;
size_t offset, len;
unsigned char nbuf[BUFSIZ];
ssize_t bufsize;
if (size != xph_sizeof) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", corrupted program header size") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/*
* Loop through all the program headers.
*/
for ( ; num; num--) {
if (pread(fd, xph_addr, xph_sizeof, off) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
off += size;
if (fsize != SIZE_UNKNOWN && xph_offset > fsize) {
/* Perhaps warn here */
continue;
}
if (xph_type != PT_NOTE)
continue;
/*
* This is a PT_NOTE section; loop through all the notes
* in the section.
*/
len = xph_filesz < sizeof(nbuf) ? xph_filesz : sizeof(nbuf);
if ((bufsize = pread(fd, nbuf, len, xph_offset)) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
offset = 0;
for (;;) {
if (offset >= (size_t)bufsize)
break;
offset = donote(ms, nbuf, offset, (size_t)bufsize,
clazz, swap, 4, flags);
if (offset == 0)
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Bail out on partial reads, from Alexander Cherepanov
CWE ID: CWE-20 | dophn_core(struct magic_set *ms, int clazz, int swap, int fd, off_t off,
int num, size_t size, off_t fsize, int *flags)
{
Elf32_Phdr ph32;
Elf64_Phdr ph64;
size_t offset, len;
unsigned char nbuf[BUFSIZ];
ssize_t bufsize;
if (size != xph_sizeof) {
if (file_printf(ms, ", corrupted program header size") == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
/*
* Loop through all the program headers.
*/
for ( ; num; num--) {
if (pread(fd, xph_addr, xph_sizeof, off) < (ssize_t)xph_sizeof) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
off += size;
if (fsize != SIZE_UNKNOWN && xph_offset > fsize) {
/* Perhaps warn here */
continue;
}
if (xph_type != PT_NOTE)
continue;
/*
* This is a PT_NOTE section; loop through all the notes
* in the section.
*/
len = xph_filesz < sizeof(nbuf) ? xph_filesz : sizeof(nbuf);
if ((bufsize = pread(fd, nbuf, len, xph_offset)) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
offset = 0;
for (;;) {
if (offset >= (size_t)bufsize)
break;
offset = donote(ms, nbuf, offset, (size_t)bufsize,
clazz, swap, 4, flags);
if (offset == 0)
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 166,767 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static base::Callback<void(const gfx::Image&)> Wrap(
const base::Callback<void(const SkBitmap&)>& image_decoded_callback) {
auto* handler = new ImageDecodedHandlerWithTimeout(image_decoded_callback);
base::ThreadTaskRunnerHandle::Get()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&ImageDecodedHandlerWithTimeout::OnImageDecoded,
handler->weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), gfx::Image()),
base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(kDecodeLogoTimeoutSeconds));
return base::Bind(&ImageDecodedHandlerWithTimeout::OnImageDecoded,
handler->weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr());
}
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <sfiera@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static base::Callback<void(const gfx::Image&)> Wrap(
| 171,961 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void LocalFileSystem::resolveURLInternal(
PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ExecutionContext> context,
const KURL& fileSystemURL,
PassRefPtr<CallbackWrapper> callbacks)
{
if (!fileSystem()) {
fileSystemNotAvailable(context, callbacks);
return;
}
fileSystem()->resolveURL(fileSystemURL, callbacks->release());
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void LocalFileSystem::resolveURLInternal(
PassRefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ExecutionContext> context,
const KURL& fileSystemURL,
CallbackWrapper* callbacks)
{
if (!fileSystem()) {
fileSystemNotAvailable(context, callbacks);
return;
}
fileSystem()->resolveURL(fileSystemURL, callbacks->release());
}
| 171,431 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: daemon_msg_open_req(uint8 ver, struct daemon_slpars *pars, uint32 plen,
char *source, size_t sourcelen)
{
char errbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; // buffer for network errors
char errmsgbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; // buffer for errors to send to the client
pcap_t *fp; // pcap_t main variable
int nread;
char sendbuf[RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE]; // temporary buffer in which data to be sent is buffered
int sendbufidx = 0; // index which keeps the number of bytes currently buffered
struct rpcap_openreply *openreply; // open reply message
if (plen > sourcelen - 1)
{
pcap_snprintf(errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Source string too long");
goto error;
}
nread = sock_recv(pars->sockctrl, source, plen,
SOCK_RECEIVEALL_YES|SOCK_EOF_IS_ERROR, errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE);
if (nread == -1)
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Read from client failed: %s", errbuf);
return -1;
}
source[nread] = '\0';
plen -= nread;
if ((fp = pcap_open_live(source,
1500 /* fake snaplen */,
0 /* no promis */,
1000 /* fake timeout */,
errmsgbuf)) == NULL)
goto error;
if (sock_bufferize(NULL, sizeof(struct rpcap_header), NULL, &sendbufidx,
RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE, SOCKBUF_CHECKONLY, errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
goto error;
rpcap_createhdr((struct rpcap_header *) sendbuf, ver,
RPCAP_MSG_OPEN_REPLY, 0, sizeof(struct rpcap_openreply));
openreply = (struct rpcap_openreply *) &sendbuf[sendbufidx];
if (sock_bufferize(NULL, sizeof(struct rpcap_openreply), NULL, &sendbufidx,
RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE, SOCKBUF_CHECKONLY, errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
goto error;
memset(openreply, 0, sizeof(struct rpcap_openreply));
openreply->linktype = htonl(pcap_datalink(fp));
openreply->tzoff = 0; /* This is always 0 for live captures */
pcap_close(fp);
if (sock_send(pars->sockctrl, sendbuf, sendbufidx, errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Send to client failed: %s", errbuf);
return -1;
}
return 0;
error:
if (rpcap_senderror(pars->sockctrl, ver, PCAP_ERR_OPEN,
errmsgbuf, errbuf) == -1)
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Send to client failed: %s", errbuf);
return -1;
}
if (rpcapd_discard(pars->sockctrl, plen) == -1)
{
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: In the open request, reject capture sources that are URLs.
You shouldn't be able to ask a server to open a remote device on some
*other* server; just open it yourself.
This addresses Include Security issue F13: [libpcap] Remote Packet
Capture Daemon Allows Opening Capture URLs.
CWE ID: CWE-918 | daemon_msg_open_req(uint8 ver, struct daemon_slpars *pars, uint32 plen,
char *source, size_t sourcelen)
{
char errbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; // buffer for network errors
char errmsgbuf[PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE]; // buffer for errors to send to the client
pcap_t *fp; // pcap_t main variable
int nread;
char sendbuf[RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE]; // temporary buffer in which data to be sent is buffered
int sendbufidx = 0; // index which keeps the number of bytes currently buffered
struct rpcap_openreply *openreply; // open reply message
if (plen > sourcelen - 1)
{
pcap_snprintf(errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Source string too long");
goto error;
}
nread = sock_recv(pars->sockctrl, source, plen,
SOCK_RECEIVEALL_YES|SOCK_EOF_IS_ERROR, errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE);
if (nread == -1)
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Read from client failed: %s", errbuf);
return -1;
}
source[nread] = '\0';
plen -= nread;
// Is this a URL rather than a device?
// If so, reject it.
if (is_url(source))
{
pcap_snprintf(errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE, "Source string refers to a remote device");
goto error;
}
if ((fp = pcap_open_live(source,
1500 /* fake snaplen */,
0 /* no promis */,
1000 /* fake timeout */,
errmsgbuf)) == NULL)
goto error;
if (sock_bufferize(NULL, sizeof(struct rpcap_header), NULL, &sendbufidx,
RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE, SOCKBUF_CHECKONLY, errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
goto error;
rpcap_createhdr((struct rpcap_header *) sendbuf, ver,
RPCAP_MSG_OPEN_REPLY, 0, sizeof(struct rpcap_openreply));
openreply = (struct rpcap_openreply *) &sendbuf[sendbufidx];
if (sock_bufferize(NULL, sizeof(struct rpcap_openreply), NULL, &sendbufidx,
RPCAP_NETBUF_SIZE, SOCKBUF_CHECKONLY, errmsgbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
goto error;
memset(openreply, 0, sizeof(struct rpcap_openreply));
openreply->linktype = htonl(pcap_datalink(fp));
openreply->tzoff = 0; /* This is always 0 for live captures */
pcap_close(fp);
if (sock_send(pars->sockctrl, sendbuf, sendbufidx, errbuf, PCAP_ERRBUF_SIZE) == -1)
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Send to client failed: %s", errbuf);
return -1;
}
return 0;
error:
if (rpcap_senderror(pars->sockctrl, ver, PCAP_ERR_OPEN,
errmsgbuf, errbuf) == -1)
{
rpcapd_log(LOGPRIO_ERROR, "Send to client failed: %s", errbuf);
return -1;
}
if (rpcapd_discard(pars->sockctrl, plen) == -1)
{
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
| 169,540 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void handle_pxe_menu(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, struct pxe_menu *cfg)
{
void *choice;
struct menu *m;
int err;
#ifdef CONFIG_CMD_BMP
/* display BMP if available */
if (cfg->bmp) {
if (get_relfile(cmdtp, cfg->bmp, image_load_addr)) {
run_command("cls", 0);
bmp_display(image_load_addr,
BMP_ALIGN_CENTER, BMP_ALIGN_CENTER);
} else {
printf("Skipping background bmp %s for failure\n",
cfg->bmp);
}
}
#endif
m = pxe_menu_to_menu(cfg);
if (!m)
return;
err = menu_get_choice(m, &choice);
menu_destroy(m);
/*
* err == 1 means we got a choice back from menu_get_choice.
*
* err == -ENOENT if the menu was setup to select the default but no
* default was set. in that case, we should continue trying to boot
* labels that haven't been attempted yet.
*
* otherwise, the user interrupted or there was some other error and
* we give up.
*/
if (err == 1) {
err = label_boot(cmdtp, choice);
if (!err)
return;
} else if (err != -ENOENT) {
return;
}
boot_unattempted_labels(cmdtp, cfg);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch '2020-01-22-master-imports'
- Re-add U8500 platform support
- Add bcm968360bg support
- Assorted Keymile fixes
- Other assorted bugfixes
CWE ID: CWE-787 | void handle_pxe_menu(cmd_tbl_t *cmdtp, struct pxe_menu *cfg)
{
void *choice;
struct menu *m;
int err;
#ifdef CONFIG_CMD_BMP
/* display BMP if available */
if (cfg->bmp) {
if (get_relfile(cmdtp, cfg->bmp, image_load_addr)) {
if (CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(CMD_CLS))
run_command("cls", 0);
bmp_display(image_load_addr,
BMP_ALIGN_CENTER, BMP_ALIGN_CENTER);
} else {
printf("Skipping background bmp %s for failure\n",
cfg->bmp);
}
}
#endif
m = pxe_menu_to_menu(cfg);
if (!m)
return;
err = menu_get_choice(m, &choice);
menu_destroy(m);
/*
* err == 1 means we got a choice back from menu_get_choice.
*
* err == -ENOENT if the menu was setup to select the default but no
* default was set. in that case, we should continue trying to boot
* labels that haven't been attempted yet.
*
* otherwise, the user interrupted or there was some other error and
* we give up.
*/
if (err == 1) {
err = label_boot(cmdtp, choice);
if (!err)
return;
} else if (err != -ENOENT) {
return;
}
boot_unattempted_labels(cmdtp, cfg);
}
| 169,637 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xmlParseInternalSubset(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
/*
* Is there any DTD definition ?
*/
if (RAW == '[') {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
NEXT;
/*
* Parse the succession of Markup declarations and
* PEReferences.
* Subsequence (markupdecl | PEReference | S)*
*/
while (RAW != ']') {
const xmlChar *check = CUR_PTR;
unsigned int cons = ctxt->input->consumed;
SKIP_BLANKS;
xmlParseMarkupDecl(ctxt);
xmlParsePEReference(ctxt);
/*
* Pop-up of finished entities.
*/
while ((RAW == 0) && (ctxt->inputNr > 1))
xmlPopInput(ctxt);
if ((CUR_PTR == check) && (cons == ctxt->input->consumed)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"xmlParseInternalSubset: error detected in Markup declaration\n");
break;
}
}
if (RAW == ']') {
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
}
}
/*
* We should be at the end of the DOCTYPE declaration.
*/
if (RAW != '>') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCTYPE_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
}
NEXT;
}
Commit Message: libxml: XML_PARSER_EOF checks from upstream
BUG=229019
TBR=cpu
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/14053009
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@196804 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xmlParseInternalSubset(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt) {
/*
* Is there any DTD definition ?
*/
if (RAW == '[') {
ctxt->instate = XML_PARSER_DTD;
NEXT;
/*
* Parse the succession of Markup declarations and
* PEReferences.
* Subsequence (markupdecl | PEReference | S)*
*/
while ((RAW != ']') && (ctxt->instate != XML_PARSER_EOF)) {
const xmlChar *check = CUR_PTR;
unsigned int cons = ctxt->input->consumed;
SKIP_BLANKS;
xmlParseMarkupDecl(ctxt);
xmlParsePEReference(ctxt);
/*
* Pop-up of finished entities.
*/
while ((RAW == 0) && (ctxt->inputNr > 1))
xmlPopInput(ctxt);
if ((CUR_PTR == check) && (cons == ctxt->input->consumed)) {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"xmlParseInternalSubset: error detected in Markup declaration\n");
break;
}
}
if (RAW == ']') {
NEXT;
SKIP_BLANKS;
}
}
/*
* We should be at the end of the DOCTYPE declaration.
*/
if (RAW != '>') {
xmlFatalErr(ctxt, XML_ERR_DOCTYPE_NOT_FINISHED, NULL);
}
NEXT;
}
| 171,293 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: media::interfaces::ServiceFactory* RenderFrameImpl::GetMediaServiceFactory() {
if (!media_service_factory_) {
mojo::InterfacePtr<mojo::Shell> shell_ptr;
GetServiceRegistry()->ConnectToRemoteService(mojo::GetProxy(&shell_ptr));
mojo::ServiceProviderPtr service_provider;
mojo::URLRequestPtr request(mojo::URLRequest::New());
request->url = mojo::String::From("mojo:media");
shell_ptr->ConnectToApplication(request.Pass(), GetProxy(&service_provider),
nullptr, nullptr);
mojo::ConnectToService(service_provider.get(), &media_service_factory_);
media_service_factory_.set_connection_error_handler(
base::Bind(&RenderFrameImpl::OnMediaServiceFactoryConnectionError,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
return media_service_factory_.get();
}
Commit Message: Connect WebUSB client interface to the devices app
This provides a basic WebUSB client interface in
content/renderer. Most of the interface is unimplemented,
but this CL hooks up navigator.usb.getDevices() to the
browser's Mojo devices app to enumerate available USB
devices.
BUG=492204
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1293253002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#344881}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | media::interfaces::ServiceFactory* RenderFrameImpl::GetMediaServiceFactory() {
if (!media_service_factory_) {
mojo::ServiceProviderPtr service_provider =
ConnectToApplication(GURL("mojo:media"));
mojo::ConnectToService(service_provider.get(), &media_service_factory_);
media_service_factory_.set_connection_error_handler(
base::Bind(&RenderFrameImpl::OnMediaServiceFactoryConnectionError,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
return media_service_factory_.get();
}
| 171,696 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(DirectoryIterator, next)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
int skip_dots = SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_DIR_SKIPDOTS);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern->u.dir.index++;
do {
spl_filesystem_dir_read(intern TSRMLS_CC);
} while (skip_dots && spl_filesystem_is_dot(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name));
if (intern->file_name) {
efree(intern->file_name);
intern->file_name = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SPL_METHOD(DirectoryIterator, next)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
int skip_dots = SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_DIR_SKIPDOTS);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern->u.dir.index++;
do {
spl_filesystem_dir_read(intern TSRMLS_CC);
} while (skip_dots && spl_filesystem_is_dot(intern->u.dir.entry.d_name));
if (intern->file_name) {
efree(intern->file_name);
intern->file_name = NULL;
}
}
| 167,029 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: EBMLHeader::EBMLHeader() :
m_docType(NULL)
{
Init();
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | EBMLHeader::EBMLHeader() :
| 174,269 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int Downmix_Reset(downmix_object_t *pDownmixer, bool init) {
return 0;
}
Commit Message: audio effects: fix heap overflow
Check consistency of effect command reply sizes before
copying to reply address.
Also add null pointer check on reply size.
Also remove unused parameter warning.
Bug: 21953516.
Change-Id: I4cf00c12eaed696af28f3b7613f7e36f47a160c4
(cherry picked from commit 0f714a464d2425afe00d6450535e763131b40844)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int Downmix_Reset(downmix_object_t *pDownmixer, bool init) {
int Downmix_Reset(downmix_object_t *pDownmixer __unused, bool init __unused) {
return 0;
}
| 173,345 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void pin_remove(struct fs_pin *pin)
{
spin_lock(&pin_lock);
hlist_del(&pin->m_list);
hlist_del(&pin->s_list);
spin_unlock(&pin_lock);
spin_lock_irq(&pin->wait.lock);
pin->done = 1;
wake_up_locked(&pin->wait);
spin_unlock_irq(&pin->wait.lock);
}
Commit Message: fs_pin: Allow for the possibility that m_list or s_list go unused.
This is needed to support lazily umounting locked mounts. Because the
entire unmounted subtree needs to stay together until there are no
users with references to any part of the subtree.
To support this guarantee that the fs_pin m_list and s_list nodes
are initialized by initializing them in init_fs_pin allowing
for the possibility that pin_insert_group does not touch them.
Further use hlist_del_init in pin_remove so that there is
a hlist_unhashed test before the list we attempt to update
the previous list item.
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: | void pin_remove(struct fs_pin *pin)
{
spin_lock(&pin_lock);
hlist_del_init(&pin->m_list);
hlist_del_init(&pin->s_list);
spin_unlock(&pin_lock);
spin_lock_irq(&pin->wait.lock);
pin->done = 1;
wake_up_locked(&pin->wait);
spin_unlock_irq(&pin->wait.lock);
}
| 167,562 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ActionReply Smb4KMountHelper::mount(const QVariantMap &args)
{
ActionReply reply;
reply.addData("mh_mountpoint", args["mh_mountpoint"]);
command << args["mh_unc"].toString();
command << args["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
command << args["mh_options"].toStringList();
#elif defined(Q_OS_FREEBSD) || defined(Q_OS_NETBSD)
command << args["mh_command"].toString();
command << args["mh_options"].toStringList();
command << args["mh_unc"].toString();
command << args["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
#else
#endif
proc.setProgram(command);
proc.start();
if (proc.waitForStarted(-1))
{
bool user_kill = false;
QStringList command;
#if defined(Q_OS_LINUX)
command << args["mh_command"].toString();
command << args["mh_unc"].toString();
command << args["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
command << args["mh_options"].toStringList();
#elif defined(Q_OS_FREEBSD) || defined(Q_OS_NETBSD)
command << args["mh_command"].toString();
command << args["mh_options"].toStringList();
command << args["mh_unc"].toString();
command << args["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
{
}
if (HelperSupport::isStopped())
{
proc.kill();
user_kill = true;
break;
}
else
{
}
}
if (proc.exitStatus() == KProcess::CrashExit)
{
if (!user_kill)
{
reply.setErrorCode(ActionReply::HelperError);
reply.setErrorDescription(i18n("The mount process crashed."));
return reply;
}
else
{
}
}
else
{
QString stdErr = QString::fromUtf8(proc.readAllStandardError());
reply.addData("mh_error_message", stdErr.trimmed());
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | ActionReply Smb4KMountHelper::mount(const QVariantMap &args)
{
ActionReply reply;
//
// Get the mount executable
//
const QString mount = findMountExecutable();
//
// Check the executable
//
if (mount != args["mh_command"].toString())
{
// Something weird is going on, bail out.
reply.setErrorCode(ActionReply::HelperError);
reply.setErrorDescription(i18n("Wrong executable passed. Bailing out."));
return reply;
}
else
{
// Do nothing
}
reply.addData("mh_mountpoint", args["mh_mountpoint"]);
command << args["mh_unc"].toString();
command << args["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
command << args["mh_options"].toStringList();
#elif defined(Q_OS_FREEBSD) || defined(Q_OS_NETBSD)
command << args["mh_command"].toString();
command << args["mh_options"].toStringList();
command << args["mh_unc"].toString();
command << args["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
#else
#endif
proc.setProgram(command);
proc.start();
if (proc.waitForStarted(-1))
{
bool user_kill = false;
QStringList command;
#if defined(Q_OS_LINUX)
command << mount;
command << args["mh_unc"].toString();
command << args["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
command << args["mh_options"].toStringList();
#elif defined(Q_OS_FREEBSD) || defined(Q_OS_NETBSD)
command << mount;
command << args["mh_options"].toStringList();
command << args["mh_unc"].toString();
command << args["mh_mountpoint"].toString();
{
}
if (HelperSupport::isStopped())
{
proc.kill();
user_kill = true;
break;
}
else
{
}
}
if (proc.exitStatus() == KProcess::CrashExit)
{
if (!user_kill)
{
reply.setErrorCode(ActionReply::HelperError);
reply.setErrorDescription(i18n("The mount process crashed."));
return reply;
}
else
{
}
}
else
{
QString stdErr = QString::fromUtf8(proc.readAllStandardError());
reply.addData("mh_error_message", stdErr.trimmed());
}
}
| 164,826 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WorkerProcessLauncherTest::SetUp() {
task_runner_ = new AutoThreadTaskRunner(
message_loop_.message_loop_proxy(),
base::Bind(&WorkerProcessLauncherTest::QuitMainMessageLoop,
base::Unretained(this)));
exit_code_ = STILL_ACTIVE;
launcher_delegate_.reset(new MockProcessLauncherDelegate());
EXPECT_CALL(*launcher_delegate_, Send(_))
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly(Return(false));
EXPECT_CALL(*launcher_delegate_, GetExitCode())
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly(ReturnPointee(&exit_code_));
EXPECT_CALL(*launcher_delegate_, KillProcess(_))
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly(Invoke(this, &WorkerProcessLauncherTest::KillProcess));
EXPECT_CALL(ipc_delegate_, OnMessageReceived(_))
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly(Return(false));
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void WorkerProcessLauncherTest::SetUp() {
task_runner_ = new AutoThreadTaskRunner(
message_loop_.message_loop_proxy(),
base::Bind(&WorkerProcessLauncherTest::QuitMainMessageLoop,
base::Unretained(this)));
launcher_delegate_.reset(new MockProcessLauncherDelegate());
EXPECT_CALL(*launcher_delegate_, Send(_))
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly(Return(false));
EXPECT_CALL(*launcher_delegate_, GetProcessId())
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly(ReturnPointee(&client_pid_));
EXPECT_CALL(*launcher_delegate_, IsPermanentError(_))
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly(ReturnPointee(&permanent_error_));
EXPECT_CALL(*launcher_delegate_, KillProcess(_))
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly(Invoke(this, &WorkerProcessLauncherTest::KillProcess));
EXPECT_CALL(ipc_delegate_, OnMessageReceived(_))
.Times(AnyNumber())
.WillRepeatedly(Return(false));
}
| 171,552 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: pgp_enumerate_blob(sc_card_t *card, pgp_blob_t *blob)
{
const u8 *in;
int r;
if (blob->files != NULL)
return SC_SUCCESS;
if ((r = pgp_read_blob(card, blob)) < 0)
return r;
in = blob->data;
while ((int) blob->len > (in - blob->data)) {
unsigned int cla, tag, tmptag;
size_t len;
const u8 *data = in;
pgp_blob_t *new;
r = sc_asn1_read_tag(&data, blob->len - (in - blob->data),
&cla, &tag, &len);
if (r < 0 || data == NULL) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Unexpected end of contents\n");
return SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_VALID;
}
/* undo ASN1's split of tag & class */
for (tmptag = tag; tmptag > 0x0FF; tmptag >>= 8) {
cla <<= 8;
}
tag |= cla;
/* Awful hack for composite DOs that have
* a TLV with the DO's id encompassing the
* entire blob. Example: Yubikey Neo */
if (tag == blob->id) {
in = data;
continue;
}
/* create fake file system hierarchy by
* using constructed DOs as DF */
if ((new = pgp_new_blob(card, blob, tag, sc_file_new())) == NULL)
return SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
pgp_set_blob(new, data, len);
in = data + len;
}
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | pgp_enumerate_blob(sc_card_t *card, pgp_blob_t *blob)
{
const u8 *in;
int r;
if (blob->files != NULL)
return SC_SUCCESS;
if ((r = pgp_read_blob(card, blob)) < 0)
return r;
in = blob->data;
while ((int) blob->len > (in - blob->data)) {
unsigned int cla, tag, tmptag;
size_t len;
const u8 *data = in;
pgp_blob_t *new;
if (!in)
return SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_VALID;
r = sc_asn1_read_tag(&data, blob->len - (in - blob->data),
&cla, &tag, &len);
if (r < 0 || data == NULL) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL,
"Unexpected end of contents\n");
return SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_VALID;
}
if (data + len > blob->data + blob->len)
return SC_ERROR_OBJECT_NOT_VALID;
/* undo ASN1's split of tag & class */
for (tmptag = tag; tmptag > 0x0FF; tmptag >>= 8) {
cla <<= 8;
}
tag |= cla;
/* Awful hack for composite DOs that have
* a TLV with the DO's id encompassing the
* entire blob. Example: Yubikey Neo */
if (tag == blob->id) {
in = data;
continue;
}
/* create fake file system hierarchy by
* using constructed DOs as DF */
if ((new = pgp_new_blob(card, blob, tag, sc_file_new())) == NULL)
return SC_ERROR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
pgp_set_blob(new, data, len);
in = data + len;
}
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
| 169,060 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(locale_get_primary_language )
{
get_icu_value_src_php( LOC_LANG_TAG , INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU );
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | PHP_FUNCTION(locale_get_primary_language )
PHP_FUNCTION(locale_get_primary_language )
{
get_icu_value_src_php( LOC_LANG_TAG , INTERNAL_FUNCTION_PARAM_PASSTHRU );
}
| 167,184 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: newEntry(struct rx_call *call, char aname[], afs_int32 flag, afs_int32 oid,
afs_int32 *aid, afs_int32 *cid)
{
afs_int32 code;
struct ubik_trans *tt;
int admin;
char cname[PR_MAXNAMELEN];
stolower(aname);
code = Initdb();
if (code)
return code;
code = ubik_BeginTrans(dbase, UBIK_WRITETRANS, &tt);
if (code)
return code;
code = ubik_SetLock(tt, 1, 1, LOCKWRITE);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
code = read_DbHeader(tt);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
/* this is for cross-cell self registration. It is not added in the
* SPR_INewEntry because we want self-registration to only do
* automatic id assignment.
*/
code = WhoIsThisWithName(call, tt, cid, cname);
if (code != 2) { /* 2 specifies that this is a foreign cell request */
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, PRPERM);
admin = IsAMemberOf(tt, *cid, SYSADMINID);
} else {
admin = ((!restricted && !strcmp(aname, cname))) || IsAMemberOf(tt, *cid, SYSADMINID);
oid = *cid = SYSADMINID;
}
if (!CreateOK(tt, *cid, oid, flag, admin))
ABORT_WITH(tt, PRPERM);
if (code)
return code;
return PRSUCCESS;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284 | newEntry(struct rx_call *call, char aname[], afs_int32 flag, afs_int32 oid,
afs_int32 *aid, afs_int32 *cid)
{
afs_int32 code;
struct ubik_trans *tt;
int admin;
char cname[PR_MAXNAMELEN];
stolower(aname);
code = Initdb();
if (code)
return code;
code = ubik_BeginTrans(dbase, UBIK_WRITETRANS, &tt);
if (code)
return code;
code = ubik_SetLock(tt, 1, 1, LOCKWRITE);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
code = read_DbHeader(tt);
if (code)
ABORT_WITH(tt, code);
/* this is for cross-cell self registration. It is not added in the
* SPR_INewEntry because we want self-registration to only do
* automatic id assignment.
*/
code = WhoIsThisWithName(call, tt, cid, cname);
if (code && code != 2)
ABORT_WITH(tt, PRPERM);
admin = IsAMemberOf(tt, *cid, SYSADMINID);
if (code == 2 /* foreign cell request */) {
if (!restricted && (strcmp(aname, cname) == 0)) {
/* can't autoregister while providing an owner id */
if (oid != 0)
ABORT_WITH(tt, PRPERM);
admin = 1;
oid = SYSADMINID;
*cid = SYSADMINID;
}
}
if (!CreateOK(tt, *cid, oid, flag, admin))
ABORT_WITH(tt, PRPERM);
if (code)
return code;
return PRSUCCESS;
}
| 165,179 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool TranslateInfoBarDelegate::IsTranslatableLanguageByPrefs() {
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(GetWebContents()->GetBrowserContext());
Profile* original_profile = profile->GetOriginalProfile();
scoped_ptr<TranslatePrefs> translate_prefs(
TranslateTabHelper::CreateTranslatePrefs(original_profile->GetPrefs()));
TranslateAcceptLanguages* accept_languages =
TranslateTabHelper::GetTranslateAcceptLanguages(original_profile);
return translate_prefs->CanTranslateLanguage(accept_languages,
original_language_code());
}
Commit Message: Remove dependency of TranslateInfobarDelegate on profile
This CL uses TranslateTabHelper instead of Profile and also cleans up
some unused code and irrelevant dependencies.
BUG=371845
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/286973003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@270758 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | bool TranslateInfoBarDelegate::IsTranslatableLanguageByPrefs() {
TranslateTabHelper* translate_tab_helper =
TranslateTabHelper::FromWebContents(GetWebContents());
scoped_ptr<TranslatePrefs> translate_prefs(
TranslateTabHelper::CreateTranslatePrefs(
translate_tab_helper->GetPrefs()));
TranslateAcceptLanguages* accept_languages =
translate_tab_helper->GetTranslateAcceptLanguages();
return translate_prefs->CanTranslateLanguage(accept_languages,
original_language_code());
}
| 171,174 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Cues::Init() const {
if (m_cue_points)
return;
assert(m_count == 0);
assert(m_preload_count == 0);
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
long long pos = m_start;
long cue_points_size = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
const long long idpos = pos;
long len;
const long long id = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(id >= 0); // TODO
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
assert(size >= 0);
assert((pos + len) <= stop);
pos += len; // consume Size field
assert((pos + size) <= stop);
if (id == 0x3B) // CuePoint ID
PreloadCuePoint(cue_points_size, idpos);
pos += size; // consume payload
assert(pos <= stop);
}
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void Cues::Init() const {
bool Cues::Init() const {
if (m_cue_points)
return true;
if (m_count != 0 || m_preload_count != 0)
return false;
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
long long pos = m_start;
long cue_points_size = 0;
while (pos < stop) {
const long long idpos = pos;
long len;
const long long id = ReadID(pReader, pos, len);
if (id < 0 || (pos + len) > stop) {
return false;
}
pos += len; // consume ID
const long long size = ReadUInt(pReader, pos, len);
if (size < 0 || (pos + len > stop)) {
return false;
}
pos += len; // consume Size field
if (pos + size > stop) {
return false;
}
if (id == 0x3B) { // CuePoint ID
if (!PreloadCuePoint(cue_points_size, idpos))
return false;
}
pos += size; // skip payload
}
return true;
}
| 173,827 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: UINT32 UIPC_Read(tUIPC_CH_ID ch_id, UINT16 *p_msg_evt, UINT8 *p_buf, UINT32 len)
{
int n;
int n_read = 0;
int fd = uipc_main.ch[ch_id].fd;
struct pollfd pfd;
UNUSED(p_msg_evt);
if (ch_id >= UIPC_CH_NUM)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("UIPC_Read : invalid ch id %d", ch_id);
return 0;
}
if (fd == UIPC_DISCONNECTED)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("UIPC_Read : channel %d closed", ch_id);
return 0;
}
while (n_read < (int)len)
{
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN|POLLHUP;
/* make sure there is data prior to attempting read to avoid blocking
a read for more than poll timeout */
if (poll(&pfd, 1, uipc_main.ch[ch_id].read_poll_tmo_ms) == 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("poll timeout (%d ms)", uipc_main.ch[ch_id].read_poll_tmo_ms);
break;
}
if (pfd.revents & (POLLHUP|POLLNVAL) )
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("poll : channel detached remotely");
UIPC_LOCK();
uipc_close_locked(ch_id);
UIPC_UNLOCK();
return 0;
}
n = recv(fd, p_buf+n_read, len-n_read, 0);
if (n == 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC_Read : channel detached remotely");
UIPC_LOCK();
uipc_close_locked(ch_id);
UIPC_UNLOCK();
return 0;
}
if (n < 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC_Read : read failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
return 0;
}
n_read+=n;
}
return n_read;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | UINT32 UIPC_Read(tUIPC_CH_ID ch_id, UINT16 *p_msg_evt, UINT8 *p_buf, UINT32 len)
{
int n;
int n_read = 0;
int fd = uipc_main.ch[ch_id].fd;
struct pollfd pfd;
UNUSED(p_msg_evt);
if (ch_id >= UIPC_CH_NUM)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("UIPC_Read : invalid ch id %d", ch_id);
return 0;
}
if (fd == UIPC_DISCONNECTED)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("UIPC_Read : channel %d closed", ch_id);
return 0;
}
while (n_read < (int)len)
{
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN|POLLHUP;
/* make sure there is data prior to attempting read to avoid blocking
a read for more than poll timeout */
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(poll(&pfd, 1, uipc_main.ch[ch_id].read_poll_tmo_ms)) == 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("poll timeout (%d ms)", uipc_main.ch[ch_id].read_poll_tmo_ms);
break;
}
if (pfd.revents & (POLLHUP|POLLNVAL) )
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("poll : channel detached remotely");
UIPC_LOCK();
uipc_close_locked(ch_id);
UIPC_UNLOCK();
return 0;
}
n = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(recv(fd, p_buf+n_read, len-n_read, 0));
if (n == 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC_Read : channel detached remotely");
UIPC_LOCK();
uipc_close_locked(ch_id);
UIPC_UNLOCK();
return 0;
}
if (n < 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_EVENT("UIPC_Read : read failed (%s)", strerror(errno));
return 0;
}
n_read+=n;
}
return n_read;
}
| 173,493 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BrowserCommandController::RemoveInterstitialObservers(
TabContents* contents) {
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_ATTACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents->web_contents()));
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_DETACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents->web_contents()));
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void BrowserCommandController::RemoveInterstitialObservers(
WebContents* contents) {
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_ATTACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents));
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_DETACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents));
}
| 171,510 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Segment::PreloadCluster(Cluster* pCluster, ptrdiff_t idx) {
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index < 0);
assert(idx >= m_clusterCount);
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
long& size = m_clusterSize;
assert(size >= count);
if (count >= size) {
const long n = (size <= 0) ? 2048 : 2 * size;
Cluster** const qq = new Cluster* [n];
Cluster** q = qq;
Cluster** p = m_clusters;
Cluster** const pp = p + count;
while (p != pp)
*q++ = *p++;
delete[] m_clusters;
m_clusters = qq;
size = n;
}
assert(m_clusters);
Cluster** const p = m_clusters + idx;
Cluster** q = m_clusters + count;
assert(q >= p);
assert(q < (m_clusters + size));
while (q > p) {
Cluster** const qq = q - 1;
assert((*qq)->m_index < 0);
*q = *qq;
q = qq;
}
m_clusters[idx] = pCluster;
++m_clusterPreloadCount;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void Segment::PreloadCluster(Cluster* pCluster, ptrdiff_t idx) {
bool Segment::PreloadCluster(Cluster* pCluster, ptrdiff_t idx) {
assert(pCluster);
assert(pCluster->m_index < 0);
assert(idx >= m_clusterCount);
const long count = m_clusterCount + m_clusterPreloadCount;
long& size = m_clusterSize;
assert(size >= count);
if (count >= size) {
const long n = (size <= 0) ? 2048 : 2 * size;
Cluster** const qq = new (std::nothrow) Cluster*[n];
if (qq == NULL)
return false;
Cluster** q = qq;
Cluster** p = m_clusters;
Cluster** const pp = p + count;
while (p != pp)
*q++ = *p++;
delete[] m_clusters;
m_clusters = qq;
size = n;
}
assert(m_clusters);
Cluster** const p = m_clusters + idx;
Cluster** q = m_clusters + count;
assert(q >= p);
assert(q < (m_clusters + size));
while (q > p) {
Cluster** const qq = q - 1;
assert((*qq)->m_index < 0);
*q = *qq;
q = qq;
}
m_clusters[idx] = pCluster;
++m_clusterPreloadCount;
return true;
}
| 173,860 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static long vhost_net_set_backend(struct vhost_net *n, unsigned index, int fd)
{
struct socket *sock, *oldsock;
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq;
struct vhost_net_virtqueue *nvq;
struct vhost_net_ubuf_ref *ubufs, *oldubufs = NULL;
int r;
mutex_lock(&n->dev.mutex);
r = vhost_dev_check_owner(&n->dev);
if (r)
goto err;
if (index >= VHOST_NET_VQ_MAX) {
r = -ENOBUFS;
goto err;
}
vq = &n->vqs[index].vq;
nvq = &n->vqs[index];
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
/* Verify that ring has been setup correctly. */
if (!vhost_vq_access_ok(vq)) {
r = -EFAULT;
goto err_vq;
}
sock = get_socket(fd);
if (IS_ERR(sock)) {
r = PTR_ERR(sock);
goto err_vq;
}
/* start polling new socket */
oldsock = rcu_dereference_protected(vq->private_data,
lockdep_is_held(&vq->mutex));
if (sock != oldsock) {
ubufs = vhost_net_ubuf_alloc(vq,
sock && vhost_sock_zcopy(sock));
if (IS_ERR(ubufs)) {
r = PTR_ERR(ubufs);
goto err_ubufs;
}
vhost_net_disable_vq(n, vq);
rcu_assign_pointer(vq->private_data, sock);
r = vhost_init_used(vq);
if (r)
goto err_used;
r = vhost_net_enable_vq(n, vq);
if (r)
goto err_used;
oldubufs = nvq->ubufs;
nvq->ubufs = ubufs;
n->tx_packets = 0;
n->tx_zcopy_err = 0;
n->tx_flush = false;
}
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
if (oldubufs) {
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait(oldubufs);
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
vhost_zerocopy_signal_used(n, vq);
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
}
if (oldsock) {
vhost_net_flush_vq(n, index);
fput(oldsock->file);
}
mutex_unlock(&n->dev.mutex);
return 0;
err_used:
rcu_assign_pointer(vq->private_data, oldsock);
vhost_net_enable_vq(n, vq);
if (ubufs)
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait(ubufs);
err_ubufs:
fput(sock->file);
err_vq:
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
err:
mutex_unlock(&n->dev.mutex);
return r;
}
Commit Message: vhost-net: fix use-after-free in vhost_net_flush
vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait has a confusing name:
it will actually also free it's argument.
Thus since commit 1280c27f8e29acf4af2da914e80ec27c3dbd5c01
"vhost-net: flush outstanding DMAs on memory change"
vhost_net_flush tries to use the argument after passing it
to vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait, this results
in use after free.
To fix, don't free the argument in vhost_net_ubuf_put_and_wait,
add an new API for callers that want to free ubufs.
Acked-by: Asias He <asias@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static long vhost_net_set_backend(struct vhost_net *n, unsigned index, int fd)
{
struct socket *sock, *oldsock;
struct vhost_virtqueue *vq;
struct vhost_net_virtqueue *nvq;
struct vhost_net_ubuf_ref *ubufs, *oldubufs = NULL;
int r;
mutex_lock(&n->dev.mutex);
r = vhost_dev_check_owner(&n->dev);
if (r)
goto err;
if (index >= VHOST_NET_VQ_MAX) {
r = -ENOBUFS;
goto err;
}
vq = &n->vqs[index].vq;
nvq = &n->vqs[index];
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
/* Verify that ring has been setup correctly. */
if (!vhost_vq_access_ok(vq)) {
r = -EFAULT;
goto err_vq;
}
sock = get_socket(fd);
if (IS_ERR(sock)) {
r = PTR_ERR(sock);
goto err_vq;
}
/* start polling new socket */
oldsock = rcu_dereference_protected(vq->private_data,
lockdep_is_held(&vq->mutex));
if (sock != oldsock) {
ubufs = vhost_net_ubuf_alloc(vq,
sock && vhost_sock_zcopy(sock));
if (IS_ERR(ubufs)) {
r = PTR_ERR(ubufs);
goto err_ubufs;
}
vhost_net_disable_vq(n, vq);
rcu_assign_pointer(vq->private_data, sock);
r = vhost_init_used(vq);
if (r)
goto err_used;
r = vhost_net_enable_vq(n, vq);
if (r)
goto err_used;
oldubufs = nvq->ubufs;
nvq->ubufs = ubufs;
n->tx_packets = 0;
n->tx_zcopy_err = 0;
n->tx_flush = false;
}
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
if (oldubufs) {
vhost_net_ubuf_put_wait_and_free(oldubufs);
mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
vhost_zerocopy_signal_used(n, vq);
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
}
if (oldsock) {
vhost_net_flush_vq(n, index);
fput(oldsock->file);
}
mutex_unlock(&n->dev.mutex);
return 0;
err_used:
rcu_assign_pointer(vq->private_data, oldsock);
vhost_net_enable_vq(n, vq);
if (ubufs)
vhost_net_ubuf_put_wait_and_free(ubufs);
err_ubufs:
fput(sock->file);
err_vq:
mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
err:
mutex_unlock(&n->dev.mutex);
return r;
}
| 166,020 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: t42_parse_font_matrix( T42_Face face,
T42_Loader loader )
{
T42_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
FT_Matrix* matrix = &face->type1.font_matrix;
FT_Vector* offset = &face->type1.font_offset;
FT_Face root = (FT_Face)&face->root;
FT_Fixed temp[6];
FT_Fixed temp_scale;
(void)T1_ToFixedArray( parser, 6, temp, 3 );
temp_scale = FT_ABS( temp[3] );
/* Set Units per EM based on FontMatrix values. We set the value to */
/* 1000 / temp_scale, because temp_scale was already multiplied by */
/* 1000 (in t1_tofixed, from psobjs.c). */
matrix->xx = temp[0];
matrix->yx = temp[1];
matrix->xy = temp[2];
matrix->yy = temp[3];
/* note that the offsets must be expressed in integer font units */
offset->x = temp[4] >> 16;
offset->y = temp[5] >> 16;
temp[2] = FT_DivFix( temp[2], temp_scale );
temp[4] = FT_DivFix( temp[4], temp_scale );
temp[5] = FT_DivFix( temp[5], temp_scale );
temp[3] = 0x10000L;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | t42_parse_font_matrix( T42_Face face,
T42_Loader loader )
{
T42_Parser parser = &loader->parser;
FT_Matrix* matrix = &face->type1.font_matrix;
FT_Vector* offset = &face->type1.font_offset;
FT_Face root = (FT_Face)&face->root;
FT_Fixed temp[6];
FT_Fixed temp_scale;
FT_Int result;
result = T1_ToFixedArray( parser, 6, temp, 3 );
if ( result < 6 )
{
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
return;
}
temp_scale = FT_ABS( temp[3] );
if ( temp_scale == 0 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "t1_parse_font_matrix: invalid font matrix\n" ));
parser->root.error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
return;
}
/* Set Units per EM based on FontMatrix values. We set the value to */
/* 1000 / temp_scale, because temp_scale was already multiplied by */
/* 1000 (in t1_tofixed, from psobjs.c). */
matrix->xx = temp[0];
matrix->yx = temp[1];
matrix->xy = temp[2];
matrix->yy = temp[3];
/* note that the offsets must be expressed in integer font units */
offset->x = temp[4] >> 16;
offset->y = temp[5] >> 16;
temp[2] = FT_DivFix( temp[2], temp_scale );
temp[4] = FT_DivFix( temp[4], temp_scale );
temp[5] = FT_DivFix( temp[5], temp_scale );
temp[3] = temp[3] < 0 ? -0x10000L : 0x10000L;
}
| 165,343 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static UINT drdynvc_process_data_first(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc, int Sp,
int cbChId, wStream* s)
{
UINT status;
UINT32 Length;
UINT32 ChannelId;
ChannelId = drdynvc_read_variable_uint(s, cbChId);
Length = drdynvc_read_variable_uint(s, Sp);
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_DEBUG,
"process_data_first: Sp=%d cbChId=%d, ChannelId=%"PRIu32" Length=%"PRIu32"", Sp,
cbChId, ChannelId, Length);
status = dvcman_receive_channel_data_first(drdynvc, drdynvc->channel_mgr, ChannelId,
Length);
if (status)
return status;
return dvcman_receive_channel_data(drdynvc, drdynvc->channel_mgr, ChannelId, s);
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID: | static UINT drdynvc_process_data_first(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc, int Sp,
int cbChId, wStream* s)
{
UINT status;
UINT32 Length;
UINT32 ChannelId;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < drdynvc_cblen_to_bytes(cbChId) + drdynvc_cblen_to_bytes(Sp))
return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
ChannelId = drdynvc_read_variable_uint(s, cbChId);
Length = drdynvc_read_variable_uint(s, Sp);
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_DEBUG,
"process_data_first: Sp=%d cbChId=%d, ChannelId=%"PRIu32" Length=%"PRIu32"", Sp,
cbChId, ChannelId, Length);
status = dvcman_receive_channel_data_first(drdynvc, drdynvc->channel_mgr, ChannelId,
Length);
if (status)
return status;
return dvcman_receive_channel_data(drdynvc, drdynvc->channel_mgr, ChannelId, s);
}
| 168,938 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SoftGSM::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while (!inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen > kMaxNumSamplesPerFrame) {
ALOGE("input buffer too large (%d).", inHeader->nFilledLen);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
}
if(((inHeader->nFilledLen / kMSGSMFrameSize) * kMSGSMFrameSize) != inHeader->nFilledLen) {
ALOGE("input buffer not multiple of %d (%d).", kMSGSMFrameSize, inHeader->nFilledLen);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
}
uint8_t *inputptr = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
int n = mSignalledError ? 0 : DecodeGSM(mGsm,
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer), inputptr, inHeader->nFilledLen);
outHeader->nTimeStamp = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = n * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
}
Commit Message: codecs: check OMX buffer size before use in (gsm|g711)dec
Bug: 27793163
Bug: 27793367
Change-Id: Iec3de8a237ee2379d87a8371c13e543878c6652c
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void SoftGSM::onQueueFilled(OMX_U32 /* portIndex */) {
if (mSignalledError) {
return;
}
List<BufferInfo *> &inQueue = getPortQueue(0);
List<BufferInfo *> &outQueue = getPortQueue(1);
while (!inQueue.empty() && !outQueue.empty()) {
BufferInfo *inInfo = *inQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *inHeader = inInfo->mHeader;
BufferInfo *outInfo = *outQueue.begin();
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *outHeader = outInfo->mHeader;
if (inHeader->nFlags & OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS) {
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
outHeader->nFilledLen = 0;
outHeader->nFlags = OMX_BUFFERFLAG_EOS;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
return;
}
if (inHeader->nFilledLen > kMaxNumSamplesPerFrame) {
ALOGE("input buffer too large (%d).", inHeader->nFilledLen);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
}
if(((inHeader->nFilledLen / kMSGSMFrameSize) * kMSGSMFrameSize) != inHeader->nFilledLen) {
ALOGE("input buffer not multiple of %d (%d).", kMSGSMFrameSize, inHeader->nFilledLen);
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
}
if (outHeader->nAllocLen < (inHeader->nFilledLen / kMSGSMFrameSize) * 320) {
ALOGE("output buffer is not large enough (%d).", outHeader->nAllocLen);
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "27793367");
notify(OMX_EventError, OMX_ErrorUndefined, 0, NULL);
mSignalledError = true;
return;
}
uint8_t *inputptr = inHeader->pBuffer + inHeader->nOffset;
int n = mSignalledError ? 0 : DecodeGSM(mGsm,
reinterpret_cast<int16_t *>(outHeader->pBuffer), inputptr, inHeader->nFilledLen);
outHeader->nTimeStamp = inHeader->nTimeStamp;
outHeader->nOffset = 0;
outHeader->nFilledLen = n * sizeof(int16_t);
outHeader->nFlags = 0;
inInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
inQueue.erase(inQueue.begin());
inInfo = NULL;
notifyEmptyBufferDone(inHeader);
inHeader = NULL;
outInfo->mOwnedByUs = false;
outQueue.erase(outQueue.begin());
outInfo = NULL;
notifyFillBufferDone(outHeader);
outHeader = NULL;
}
}
| 173,779 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: sp<ABuffer> decodeBase64(const AString &s) {
size_t n = s.size();
if ((n % 4) != 0) {
return NULL;
}
size_t padding = 0;
if (n >= 1 && s.c_str()[n - 1] == '=') {
padding = 1;
if (n >= 2 && s.c_str()[n - 2] == '=') {
padding = 2;
if (n >= 3 && s.c_str()[n - 3] == '=') {
padding = 3;
}
}
}
size_t outLen = (n / 4) * 3 - padding;
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(outLen);
uint8_t *out = buffer->data();
if (out == NULL || buffer->size() < outLen) {
return NULL;
}
size_t j = 0;
uint32_t accum = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
char c = s.c_str()[i];
unsigned value;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') {
value = c - 'A';
} else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') {
value = 26 + c - 'a';
} else if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
value = 52 + c - '0';
} else if (c == '+') {
value = 62;
} else if (c == '/') {
value = 63;
} else if (c != '=') {
return NULL;
} else {
if (i < n - padding) {
return NULL;
}
value = 0;
}
accum = (accum << 6) | value;
if (((i + 1) % 4) == 0) {
out[j++] = (accum >> 16);
if (j < outLen) { out[j++] = (accum >> 8) & 0xff; }
if (j < outLen) { out[j++] = accum & 0xff; }
accum = 0;
}
}
return buffer;
}
Commit Message: stagefright: avoid buffer overflow in base64 decoder
Bug: 62673128
Change-Id: Id5f04b772aaca3184879bd5bca453ad9e82c7f94
(cherry picked from commit 5e96386ab7a5391185f6b3ed9ea06f3e23ed253b)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | sp<ABuffer> decodeBase64(const AString &s) {
size_t n = s.size();
if ((n % 4) != 0) {
return NULL;
}
size_t padding = 0;
if (n >= 1 && s.c_str()[n - 1] == '=') {
padding = 1;
if (n >= 2 && s.c_str()[n - 2] == '=') {
padding = 2;
if (n >= 3 && s.c_str()[n - 3] == '=') {
padding = 3;
}
}
}
size_t outLen = (n / 4) * 3 - padding;
sp<ABuffer> buffer = new ABuffer(outLen);
uint8_t *out = buffer->data();
if (out == NULL || buffer->size() < outLen) {
return NULL;
}
size_t j = 0;
uint32_t accum = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
char c = s.c_str()[i];
unsigned value;
if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') {
value = c - 'A';
} else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') {
value = 26 + c - 'a';
} else if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
value = 52 + c - '0';
} else if (c == '+') {
value = 62;
} else if (c == '/') {
value = 63;
} else if (c != '=') {
return NULL;
} else {
if (i < n - padding) {
return NULL;
}
value = 0;
}
accum = (accum << 6) | value;
if (((i + 1) % 4) == 0) {
if (j < outLen) { out[j++] = (accum >> 16); }
if (j < outLen) { out[j++] = (accum >> 8) & 0xff; }
if (j < outLen) { out[j++] = accum & 0xff; }
accum = 0;
}
}
return buffer;
}
| 173,996 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WM_SYMBOL midi *WildMidi_Open(const char *midifile) {
uint8_t *mididata = NULL;
uint32_t midisize = 0;
uint8_t mus_hdr[] = { 'M', 'U', 'S', 0x1A };
uint8_t xmi_hdr[] = { 'F', 'O', 'R', 'M' };
midi * ret = NULL;
if (!WM_Initialized) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_INIT, NULL, 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (midifile == NULL) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_INVALID_ARG, "(NULL filename)", 0);
return (NULL);
}
if ((mididata = (uint8_t *) _WM_BufferFile(midifile, &midisize)) == NULL) {
return (NULL);
}
if (memcmp(mididata,"HMIMIDIP", 8) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewHmp(mididata, midisize);
} else if (memcmp(mididata, "HMI-MIDISONG061595", 18) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewHmi(mididata, midisize);
} else if (memcmp(mididata, mus_hdr, 4) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewMus(mididata, midisize);
} else if (memcmp(mididata, xmi_hdr, 4) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewXmi(mididata, midisize);
} else {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewMidi(mididata, midisize);
}
free(mididata);
if (ret) {
if (add_handle(ret) != 0) {
WildMidi_Close(ret);
ret = NULL;
}
}
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: wildmidi_lib.c (WildMidi_Open, WildMidi_OpenBuffer): refuse to proceed if less then 18 bytes of input
Fixes bug #178.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | WM_SYMBOL midi *WildMidi_Open(const char *midifile) {
uint8_t *mididata = NULL;
uint32_t midisize = 0;
uint8_t mus_hdr[] = { 'M', 'U', 'S', 0x1A };
uint8_t xmi_hdr[] = { 'F', 'O', 'R', 'M' };
midi * ret = NULL;
if (!WM_Initialized) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_INIT, NULL, 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (midifile == NULL) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_INVALID_ARG, "(NULL filename)", 0);
return (NULL);
}
if ((mididata = (uint8_t *) _WM_BufferFile(midifile, &midisize)) == NULL) {
return (NULL);
}
if (midisize < 18) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, "(too short)", 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (memcmp(mididata,"HMIMIDIP", 8) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewHmp(mididata, midisize);
} else if (memcmp(mididata, "HMI-MIDISONG061595", 18) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewHmi(mididata, midisize);
} else if (memcmp(mididata, mus_hdr, 4) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewMus(mididata, midisize);
} else if (memcmp(mididata, xmi_hdr, 4) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewXmi(mididata, midisize);
} else {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewMidi(mididata, midisize);
}
free(mididata);
if (ret) {
if (add_handle(ret) != 0) {
WildMidi_Close(ret);
ret = NULL;
}
}
return (ret);
}
| 169,369 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: std::string* GetTestingDMToken() {
static std::string dm_token;
return &dm_token;
}
Commit Message: Migrate download_protection code to new DM token class.
Migrates RetrieveDMToken calls to use the new BrowserDMToken class.
Bug: 1020296
Change-Id: Icef580e243430d73b6c1c42b273a8540277481d9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1904234
Commit-Queue: Dominique Fauteux-Chapleau <domfc@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tien Mai <tienmai@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Rubery <drubery@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#714196}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | std::string* GetTestingDMToken() {
const char** GetTestingDMTokenStorage() {
static const char* dm_token = "";
return &dm_token;
}
| 172,354 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: MagickExport MagickBooleanType SetQuantumDepth(const Image *image,
QuantumInfo *quantum_info,const size_t depth)
{
size_t
extent,
quantum;
/*
Allocate the quantum pixel buffer.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickSignature);
quantum_info->depth=depth;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
if (quantum_info->depth > 32)
quantum_info->depth=64;
else
if (quantum_info->depth > 16)
quantum_info->depth=32;
else
quantum_info->depth=16;
}
if (quantum_info->pixels != (unsigned char **) NULL)
DestroyQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
quantum=(quantum_info->pad+6)*(quantum_info->depth+7)/8;
extent=image->columns*quantum;
if (quantum != (extent/image->columns))
return(MagickFalse);
return(AcquireQuantumPixels(quantum_info,extent));
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/110
CWE ID: CWE-369 | MagickExport MagickBooleanType SetQuantumDepth(const Image *image,
QuantumInfo *quantum_info,const size_t depth)
{
size_t
extent,
quantum;
/*
Allocate the quantum pixel buffer.
*/
assert(image != (Image *) NULL);
assert(image->signature == MagickSignature);
if (image->debug != MagickFalse)
(void) LogMagickEvent(TraceEvent,GetMagickModule(),"%s",image->filename);
assert(quantum_info != (QuantumInfo *) NULL);
assert(quantum_info->signature == MagickSignature);
quantum_info->depth=depth;
if (quantum_info->format == FloatingPointQuantumFormat)
{
if (quantum_info->depth > 32)
quantum_info->depth=64;
else
if (quantum_info->depth > 16)
quantum_info->depth=32;
else
quantum_info->depth=16;
}
if (quantum_info->pixels != (unsigned char **) NULL)
DestroyQuantumPixels(quantum_info);
quantum=(quantum_info->pad+6)*(quantum_info->depth+7)/8;
extent=image->columns*quantum;
if ((image->columns != 0) && (quantum != (extent/image->columns)))
return(MagickFalse);
return(AcquireQuantumPixels(quantum_info,extent));
}
| 170,113 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FrameFetchContext::AddResourceTiming(const ResourceTimingInfo& info) {
if (!document_)
return;
LocalFrame* frame = document_->GetFrame();
if (!frame)
return;
if (info.IsMainResource()) {
DCHECK(frame->Owner());
frame->Owner()->AddResourceTiming(info);
frame->DidSendResourceTimingInfoToParent();
return;
}
DOMWindowPerformance::performance(*document_->domWindow())
->GenerateAndAddResourceTiming(info);
}
Commit Message: Do not forward resource timing to parent frame after back-forward navigation
LocalFrame has |should_send_resource_timing_info_to_parent_| flag not to
send timing info to parent except for the first navigation. This flag is
cleared when the first timing is sent to parent, however this does not happen
if iframe's first navigation was by back-forward navigation. For such
iframes, we shouldn't send timings to parent at all.
Bug: 876822
Change-Id: I128b51a82ef278c439548afc8283ae63abdef5c5
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1186215
Reviewed-by: Kinuko Yasuda <kinuko@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Kunihiko Sakamoto <ksakamoto@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#585736}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void FrameFetchContext::AddResourceTiming(const ResourceTimingInfo& info) {
if (!document_)
return;
LocalFrame* frame = document_->GetFrame();
if (!frame)
return;
if (info.IsMainResource()) {
DCHECK(frame->Owner());
frame->Owner()->AddResourceTiming(info);
frame->SetShouldSendResourceTimingInfoToParent(false);
return;
}
DOMWindowPerformance::performance(*document_->domWindow())
->GenerateAndAddResourceTiming(info);
}
| 172,656 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static opj_bool pi_next_rpcl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
int compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0; pi->resno < pi->poc.resno1; pi->resno++) {
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
if (pi->resno >= comp->numresolutions) {
continue;
}
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
Commit Message: [MJ2] To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift
Signed-off-by: Young_X <YangX92@hotmail.com>
CWE ID: CWE-369 | static opj_bool pi_next_rpcl(opj_pi_iterator_t * pi)
{
opj_pi_comp_t *comp = NULL;
opj_pi_resolution_t *res = NULL;
long index = 0;
if (!pi->first) {
goto LABEL_SKIP;
} else {
int compno, resno;
pi->first = 0;
pi->dx = 0;
pi->dy = 0;
for (compno = 0; compno < pi->numcomps; compno++) {
comp = &pi->comps[compno];
for (resno = 0; resno < comp->numresolutions; resno++) {
int dx, dy;
res = &comp->resolutions[resno];
dx = comp->dx * (1 << (res->pdx + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
dy = comp->dy * (1 << (res->pdy + comp->numresolutions - 1 - resno));
pi->dx = !pi->dx ? dx : int_min(pi->dx, dx);
pi->dy = !pi->dy ? dy : int_min(pi->dy, dy);
}
}
}
if (!pi->tp_on) {
pi->poc.ty0 = pi->ty0;
pi->poc.tx0 = pi->tx0;
pi->poc.ty1 = pi->ty1;
pi->poc.tx1 = pi->tx1;
}
for (pi->resno = pi->poc.resno0; pi->resno < pi->poc.resno1; pi->resno++) {
for (pi->y = pi->poc.ty0; pi->y < pi->poc.ty1;
pi->y += pi->dy - (pi->y % pi->dy)) {
for (pi->x = pi->poc.tx0; pi->x < pi->poc.tx1;
pi->x += pi->dx - (pi->x % pi->dx)) {
for (pi->compno = pi->poc.compno0; pi->compno < pi->poc.compno1; pi->compno++) {
int levelno;
int trx0, try0;
int trx1, try1;
int rpx, rpy;
int prci, prcj;
comp = &pi->comps[pi->compno];
if (pi->resno >= comp->numresolutions) {
continue;
}
res = &comp->resolutions[pi->resno];
levelno = comp->numresolutions - 1 - pi->resno;
trx0 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx0, comp->dx << levelno);
try0 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty0, comp->dy << levelno);
trx1 = int_ceildiv(pi->tx1, comp->dx << levelno);
try1 = int_ceildiv(pi->ty1, comp->dy << levelno);
rpx = res->pdx + levelno;
rpy = res->pdy + levelno;
/* To avoid divisions by zero / undefined behaviour on shift */
if (rpx >= 31 || ((comp->dx << rpx) >> rpx) != comp->dx ||
rpy >= 31 || ((comp->dy << rpy) >> rpy) != comp->dy) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->y % (comp->dy << rpy) == 0) || ((pi->y == pi->ty0) &&
((try0 << levelno) % (1 << rpy))))) {
continue;
}
if (!((pi->x % (comp->dx << rpx) == 0) || ((pi->x == pi->tx0) &&
((trx0 << levelno) % (1 << rpx))))) {
continue;
}
if ((res->pw == 0) || (res->ph == 0)) {
continue;
}
if ((trx0 == trx1) || (try0 == try1)) {
continue;
}
prci = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->x, comp->dx << levelno), res->pdx)
- int_floordivpow2(trx0, res->pdx);
prcj = int_floordivpow2(int_ceildiv(pi->y, comp->dy << levelno), res->pdy)
- int_floordivpow2(try0, res->pdy);
pi->precno = prci + prcj * res->pw;
for (pi->layno = pi->poc.layno0; pi->layno < pi->poc.layno1; pi->layno++) {
index = pi->layno * pi->step_l + pi->resno * pi->step_r + pi->compno *
pi->step_c + pi->precno * pi->step_p;
if (!pi->include[index]) {
pi->include[index] = 1;
return OPJ_TRUE;
}
LABEL_SKIP:
;
}
}
}
}
}
return OPJ_FALSE;
}
| 169,774 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void *bpf_obj_do_get(const struct filename *pathname,
enum bpf_type *type)
{
struct inode *inode;
struct path path;
void *raw;
int ret;
ret = kern_path(pathname->name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path);
if (ret)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
inode = d_backing_inode(path.dentry);
ret = inode_permission(inode, MAY_WRITE);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = bpf_inode_type(inode, type);
if (ret)
goto out;
raw = bpf_any_get(inode->i_private, *type);
touch_atime(&path);
path_put(&path);
return raw;
out:
path_put(&path);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | static void *bpf_obj_do_get(const struct filename *pathname,
enum bpf_type *type)
{
struct inode *inode;
struct path path;
void *raw;
int ret;
ret = kern_path(pathname->name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &path);
if (ret)
return ERR_PTR(ret);
inode = d_backing_inode(path.dentry);
ret = inode_permission(inode, MAY_WRITE);
if (ret)
goto out;
ret = bpf_inode_type(inode, type);
if (ret)
goto out;
raw = bpf_any_get(inode->i_private, *type);
if (!IS_ERR(raw))
touch_atime(&path);
path_put(&path);
return raw;
out:
path_put(&path);
return ERR_PTR(ret);
}
| 167,251 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void __fput_sync(struct file *file)
{
if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&file->f_count)) {
struct task_struct *task = current;
file_sb_list_del(file);
BUG_ON(!(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD));
__fput(file);
}
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | void __fput_sync(struct file *file)
{
if (atomic_long_dec_and_test(&file->f_count)) {
struct task_struct *task = current;
BUG_ON(!(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD));
__fput(file);
}
}
| 166,796 |
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