instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RunCallbacksWithDisabled(LogoCallbacks callbacks) {
if (callbacks.on_cached_encoded_logo_available) {
std::move(callbacks.on_cached_encoded_logo_available)
.Run(LogoCallbackReason::DISABLED, base::nullopt);
}
if (callbacks.on_cached_decoded_logo_available) {
std::move(callbacks.on_cached_decoded_logo_available)
.Run(LogoCallbackReason::DISABLED, base::nullopt);
}
if (callbacks.on_fresh_encoded_logo_available) {
std::move(callbacks.on_fresh_encoded_logo_available)
.Run(LogoCallbackReason::DISABLED, base::nullopt);
}
if (callbacks.on_fresh_decoded_logo_available) {
std::move(callbacks.on_fresh_decoded_logo_available)
.Run(LogoCallbackReason::DISABLED, base::nullopt);
}
}
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <sfiera@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void RunCallbacksWithDisabled(LogoCallbacks callbacks) {
| 171,958 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ztype(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
ref tnref;
int code = array_get(imemory, op, (long)r_btype(op - 1), &tnref);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (!r_has_type(&tnref, t_name)) {
/* Must be either a stack underflow or a t_[a]struct. */
check_op(2);
{ /* Get the type name from the structure. */
if (op[-1].value.pstruct != 0x00) {
const char *sname =
gs_struct_type_name_string(gs_object_type(imemory,
op[-1].value.pstruct));
int code = name_ref(imemory, (const byte *)sname, strlen(sname),
(ref *) (op - 1), 0);
if (code < 0)
return code;
} else
return_error(gs_error_stackunderflow);
}
r_set_attrs(op - 1, a_executable);
} else {
ref_assign(op - 1, &tnref);
}
pop(1);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-704 | ztype(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
ref tnref;
int code = array_get(imemory, op, (long)r_btype(op - 1), &tnref);
if (code < 0)
return code;
if (!r_has_type(&tnref, t_name)) {
/* Must be either a stack underflow or a t_[a]struct. */
check_op(2);
{ /* Get the type name from the structure. */
if ((r_has_type(&op[-1], t_struct) || r_has_type(&op[-1], t_astruct)) && op[-1].value.pstruct != 0x00) {
const char *sname =
gs_struct_type_name_string(gs_object_type(imemory,
op[-1].value.pstruct));
int code = name_ref(imemory, (const byte *)sname, strlen(sname),
(ref *) (op - 1), 0);
if (code < 0)
return code;
} else
return_error(gs_error_stackunderflow);
}
r_set_attrs(op - 1, a_executable);
} else {
ref_assign(op - 1, &tnref);
}
pop(1);
return 0;
}
| 164,698 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Chapters::Display::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long size) {
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x05) { // ChapterString ID
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_string);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x037C) { // ChapterLanguage ID
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_language);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x037E) { // ChapterCountry ID
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_country);
if (status)
return status;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | long Chapters::Display::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long size) {
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x05) { // ChapterString ID
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_string);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x037C) { // ChapterLanguage ID
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_language);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x037E) { // ChapterCountry ID
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_country);
if (status)
return status;
}
pos += size;
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (pos != stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
Tags::Tags(Segment* pSegment, long long payload_start, long long payload_size,
long long element_start, long long element_size)
: m_pSegment(pSegment),
m_start(payload_start),
m_size(payload_size),
m_element_start(element_start),
m_element_size(element_size),
m_tags(NULL),
m_tags_size(0),
m_tags_count(0) {}
Tags::~Tags() {
while (m_tags_count > 0) {
Tag& t = m_tags[--m_tags_count];
t.Clear();
}
delete[] m_tags;
}
long Tags::Parse() {
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = m_start; // payload start
const long long stop = pos + m_size; // payload stop
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (size == 0) // 0 length tag, read another
continue;
if (id == 0x3373) { // Tag ID
status = ParseTag(pos, size);
if (status < 0)
return status;
}
pos += size;
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (pos != stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
int Tags::GetTagCount() const { return m_tags_count; }
const Tags::Tag* Tags::GetTag(int idx) const {
if (idx < 0)
return NULL;
if (idx >= m_tags_count)
return NULL;
return m_tags + idx;
}
bool Tags::ExpandTagsArray() {
if (m_tags_size > m_tags_count)
return true; // nothing else to do
const int size = (m_tags_size == 0) ? 1 : 2 * m_tags_size;
Tag* const tags = new (std::nothrow) Tag[size];
if (tags == NULL)
return false;
for (int idx = 0; idx < m_tags_count; ++idx) {
m_tags[idx].ShallowCopy(tags[idx]);
}
delete[] m_tags;
m_tags = tags;
m_tags_size = size;
return true;
}
long Tags::ParseTag(long long pos, long long size) {
if (!ExpandTagsArray())
return -1;
Tag& t = m_tags[m_tags_count++];
t.Init();
return t.Parse(m_pSegment->m_pReader, pos, size);
}
Tags::Tag::Tag() {}
Tags::Tag::~Tag() {}
int Tags::Tag::GetSimpleTagCount() const { return m_simple_tags_count; }
const Tags::SimpleTag* Tags::Tag::GetSimpleTag(int index) const {
if (index < 0)
return NULL;
if (index >= m_simple_tags_count)
return NULL;
return m_simple_tags + index;
}
void Tags::Tag::Init() {
m_simple_tags = NULL;
m_simple_tags_size = 0;
m_simple_tags_count = 0;
}
void Tags::Tag::ShallowCopy(Tag& rhs) const {
rhs.m_simple_tags = m_simple_tags;
rhs.m_simple_tags_size = m_simple_tags_size;
rhs.m_simple_tags_count = m_simple_tags_count;
}
void Tags::Tag::Clear() {
while (m_simple_tags_count > 0) {
SimpleTag& d = m_simple_tags[--m_simple_tags_count];
d.Clear();
}
delete[] m_simple_tags;
m_simple_tags = NULL;
m_simple_tags_size = 0;
}
long Tags::Tag::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long long size) {
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (size == 0) // 0 length tag, read another
continue;
if (id == 0x27C8) { // SimpleTag ID
status = ParseSimpleTag(pReader, pos, size);
if (status < 0)
return status;
}
pos += size;
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (pos != stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
long Tags::Tag::ParseSimpleTag(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long size) {
if (!ExpandSimpleTagsArray())
return -1;
SimpleTag& st = m_simple_tags[m_simple_tags_count++];
st.Init();
return st.Parse(pReader, pos, size);
}
bool Tags::Tag::ExpandSimpleTagsArray() {
if (m_simple_tags_size > m_simple_tags_count)
return true; // nothing else to do
const int size = (m_simple_tags_size == 0) ? 1 : 2 * m_simple_tags_size;
SimpleTag* const displays = new (std::nothrow) SimpleTag[size];
if (displays == NULL)
return false;
for (int idx = 0; idx < m_simple_tags_count; ++idx) {
m_simple_tags[idx].ShallowCopy(displays[idx]);
}
delete[] m_simple_tags;
m_simple_tags = displays;
m_simple_tags_size = size;
return true;
}
Tags::SimpleTag::SimpleTag() {}
Tags::SimpleTag::~SimpleTag() {}
const char* Tags::SimpleTag::GetTagName() const { return m_tag_name; }
const char* Tags::SimpleTag::GetTagString() const { return m_tag_string; }
void Tags::SimpleTag::Init() {
m_tag_name = NULL;
m_tag_string = NULL;
}
void Tags::SimpleTag::ShallowCopy(SimpleTag& rhs) const {
rhs.m_tag_name = m_tag_name;
rhs.m_tag_string = m_tag_string;
}
void Tags::SimpleTag::Clear() {
delete[] m_tag_name;
m_tag_name = NULL;
delete[] m_tag_string;
m_tag_string = NULL;
}
long Tags::SimpleTag::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos,
long long size) {
const long long stop = pos + size;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (size == 0) // weird
continue;
if (id == 0x5A3) { // TagName ID
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_tag_name);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x487) { // TagString ID
status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_tag_string);
if (status)
return status;
}
pos += size;
if (pos > stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
}
if (pos != stop)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
return 0;
}
| 173,841 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool RenderFrameHostManager::CanSubframeSwapProcess(
const GURL& dest_url,
SiteInstance* source_instance,
SiteInstance* dest_instance,
bool was_server_redirect) {
DCHECK(!source_instance || !dest_instance);
GURL resolved_url = dest_url;
if (url::Origin::Create(resolved_url).unique()) {
if (source_instance) {
resolved_url = source_instance->GetSiteURL();
} else if (dest_instance) {
resolved_url = dest_instance->GetSiteURL();
} else {
if (!was_server_redirect)
return false;
}
}
if (!IsRendererTransferNeededForNavigation(render_frame_host_.get(),
resolved_url)) {
DCHECK(!dest_instance ||
dest_instance == render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance());
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Use unique processes for data URLs on restore.
Data URLs are usually put into the process that created them, but this
info is not tracked after a tab restore. Ensure that they do not end up
in the parent frame's process (or each other's process), in case they
are malicious.
BUG=863069
Change-Id: Ib391f90c7bdf28a0a9c057c5cc7918c10aed968b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1150767
Reviewed-by: Alex Moshchuk <alexmos@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Charlie Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#581023}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | bool RenderFrameHostManager::CanSubframeSwapProcess(
const GURL& dest_url,
SiteInstance* source_instance,
SiteInstance* dest_instance) {
DCHECK(!source_instance || !dest_instance);
GURL resolved_url = dest_url;
if (url::Origin::Create(resolved_url).unique()) {
if (source_instance) {
resolved_url = source_instance->GetSiteURL();
} else if (dest_instance) {
resolved_url = dest_instance->GetSiteURL();
} else {
// then check whether it is safe to put into the parent frame's process.
// This is the case for about:blank URLs (with or without fragments),
// since they contain no active data. This is also the case for
// about:srcdoc, since such URLs only get active content from their parent
// frame. Using the parent frame's process avoids putting blank frames
// into OOPIFs and preserves scripting for about:srcdoc.
//
// Allow a process swap for other unique origin URLs, such as data: URLs.
// These have active content and may have come from an untrusted source,
// such as a restored frame from a different site or a redirect.
// (Normally, redirects to data: or about: URLs are disallowed as
// example, see ExtensionWebRequestApiTest.WebRequestDeclarative1).)
if (resolved_url.IsAboutBlank() ||
resolved_url == GURL(content::kAboutSrcDocURL)) {
return false;
}
}
}
if (!IsRendererTransferNeededForNavigation(render_frame_host_.get(),
resolved_url)) {
DCHECK(!dest_instance ||
dest_instance == render_frame_host_->GetSiteInstance());
return false;
}
return true;
}
| 173,181 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void HeapObjectHeader::Finalize(Address object, size_t object_size) {
HeapAllocHooks::FreeHookIfEnabled(object);
const GCInfo* gc_info = ThreadHeap::GcInfo(GcInfoIndex());
if (gc_info->HasFinalizer())
gc_info->finalize_(object);
ASAN_RETIRE_CONTAINER_ANNOTATION(object, object_size);
}
Commit Message: [oilpan] Fix GCInfoTable for multiple threads
Previously, grow and access from different threads could lead to a race
on the table backing; see bug.
- Rework the table to work on an existing reservation.
- Commit upon growing, avoiding any copies.
Drive-by: Fix over-allocation of table.
Bug: chromium:841280
Change-Id: I329cb6f40091e14e8c05334ba1104a9440c31d43
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1061525
Commit-Queue: Michael Lippautz <mlippautz@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#560434}
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void HeapObjectHeader::Finalize(Address object, size_t object_size) {
HeapAllocHooks::FreeHookIfEnabled(object);
const GCInfo* gc_info = GCInfoTable::Get().GCInfoFromIndex(GcInfoIndex());
if (gc_info->HasFinalizer())
gc_info->finalize_(object);
ASAN_RETIRE_CONTAINER_ANNOTATION(object, object_size);
}
| 173,139 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FrameSelection::Clear() {
granularity_ = TextGranularity::kCharacter;
if (granularity_strategy_)
granularity_strategy_->Clear();
SetSelection(SelectionInDOMTree());
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void FrameSelection::Clear() {
granularity_ = TextGranularity::kCharacter;
if (granularity_strategy_)
granularity_strategy_->Clear();
SetSelection(SelectionInDOMTree());
is_handle_visible_ = false;
}
| 171,754 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: std::string ContextualSearchDelegate::BuildRequestUrl(std::string selection) {
if (!template_url_service_ ||
!template_url_service_->GetDefaultSearchProvider()) {
return std::string();
}
std::string selected_text(net::EscapeQueryParamValue(selection, true));
TemplateURL* template_url = template_url_service_->GetDefaultSearchProvider();
TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs search_terms_args =
TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs(base::string16());
int now_on_tap_version =
field_trial_->IsNowOnTapBarIntegrationEnabled() ? kNowOnTapVersion : 0;
TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs::ContextualSearchParams params(
kContextualSearchRequestVersion, selected_text, std::string(),
now_on_tap_version);
search_terms_args.contextual_search_params = params;
std::string request(
template_url->contextual_search_url_ref().ReplaceSearchTerms(
search_terms_args,
template_url_service_->search_terms_data(),
NULL));
std::string replacement_url = field_trial_->GetResolverURLPrefix();
if (!replacement_url.empty()) {
size_t pos = request.find(kContextualSearchServerEndpoint);
if (pos != std::string::npos) {
request.replace(0, pos + strlen(kContextualSearchServerEndpoint),
replacement_url);
}
}
return request;
}
Commit Message: [Contextual Search] Change "Now on Tap" to "Contextual Cards"
BUG=644934
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2361163003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#420899}
CWE ID: | std::string ContextualSearchDelegate::BuildRequestUrl(std::string selection) {
if (!template_url_service_ ||
!template_url_service_->GetDefaultSearchProvider()) {
return std::string();
}
std::string selected_text(net::EscapeQueryParamValue(selection, true));
TemplateURL* template_url = template_url_service_->GetDefaultSearchProvider();
TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs search_terms_args =
TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs(base::string16());
int contextual_cards_version =
field_trial_->IsContextualCardsBarIntegrationEnabled()
? kContextualCardsVersion : 0;
TemplateURLRef::SearchTermsArgs::ContextualSearchParams params(
kContextualSearchRequestVersion, selected_text, std::string(),
contextual_cards_version);
search_terms_args.contextual_search_params = params;
std::string request(
template_url->contextual_search_url_ref().ReplaceSearchTerms(
search_terms_args,
template_url_service_->search_terms_data(),
NULL));
std::string replacement_url = field_trial_->GetResolverURLPrefix();
if (!replacement_url.empty()) {
size_t pos = request.find(kContextualSearchServerEndpoint);
if (pos != std::string::npos) {
request.replace(0, pos + strlen(kContextualSearchServerEndpoint),
replacement_url);
}
}
return request;
}
| 171,641 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int asepcos_parse_sec_attr(sc_card_t *card, sc_file_t *file, const u8 *buf,
size_t len)
{
const u8 *p = buf;
while (len != 0) {
unsigned int amode, tlen = 3;
if (len < 5 && p[0] != 0x80 && p[1] != 0x01) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "invalid access mode encoding");
return SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
}
amode = p[2];
if (p[3] == 0x90 && p[4] == 0x00) {
int r = set_sec_attr(file, amode, 0, SC_AC_NONE);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return r;
tlen += 2;
} else if (p[3] == 0x97 && p[4] == 0x00) {
int r = set_sec_attr(file, amode, 0, SC_AC_NEVER);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return r;
tlen += 2;
} else if (p[3] == 0xA0 && len >= 4U + p[4]) {
/* TODO: support OR expressions */
int r = set_sec_attr(file, amode, p[5], SC_AC_CHV);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return r;
tlen += 2 + p[4]; /* FIXME */
} else if (p[3] == 0xAF && len >= 4U + p[4]) {
/* TODO: support AND expressions */
int r = set_sec_attr(file, amode, p[5], SC_AC_CHV);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return r;
tlen += 2 + p[4]; /* FIXME */
} else {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "invalid security condition");
return SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
}
p += tlen;
len -= tlen;
}
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int asepcos_parse_sec_attr(sc_card_t *card, sc_file_t *file, const u8 *buf,
size_t len)
{
const u8 *p = buf;
while (len != 0) {
unsigned int amode, tlen = 3;
if (len < 5 || p[0] != 0x80 || p[1] != 0x01) {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "invalid access mode encoding");
return SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
}
amode = p[2];
if (p[3] == 0x90 && p[4] == 0x00) {
int r = set_sec_attr(file, amode, 0, SC_AC_NONE);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return r;
tlen += 2;
} else if (p[3] == 0x97 && p[4] == 0x00) {
int r = set_sec_attr(file, amode, 0, SC_AC_NEVER);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return r;
tlen += 2;
} else if (p[3] == 0xA0 && len >= 4U + p[4]) {
/* TODO: support OR expressions */
int r = set_sec_attr(file, amode, p[5], SC_AC_CHV);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return r;
tlen += 2 + p[4]; /* FIXME */
} else if (p[3] == 0xAF && len >= 4U + p[4]) {
/* TODO: support AND expressions */
int r = set_sec_attr(file, amode, p[5], SC_AC_CHV);
if (r != SC_SUCCESS)
return r;
tlen += 2 + p[4]; /* FIXME */
} else {
sc_debug(card->ctx, SC_LOG_DEBUG_NORMAL, "invalid security condition");
return SC_ERROR_INTERNAL;
}
p += tlen;
len -= tlen;
}
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
| 169,047 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *in)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
FlipContext *s = ctx->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = ctx->outputs[0];
AVFrame *out;
uint8_t *inrow, *outrow;
int i, j, plane, step;
out = ff_get_video_buffer(outlink, outlink->w, outlink->h);
if (!out) {
av_frame_free(&in);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
av_frame_copy_props(out, in);
/* copy palette if required */
if (av_pix_fmt_desc_get(inlink->format)->flags & AV_PIX_FMT_FLAG_PAL)
memcpy(out->data[1], in->data[1], AVPALETTE_SIZE);
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && in->data[plane]; plane++) {
const int width = (plane == 1 || plane == 2) ? FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->w, s->hsub) : inlink->w;
const int height = (plane == 1 || plane == 2) ? FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->h, s->vsub) : inlink->h;
step = s->max_step[plane];
outrow = out->data[plane];
inrow = in ->data[plane] + (width - 1) * step;
for (i = 0; i < height; i++) {
switch (step) {
case 1:
for (j = 0; j < width; j++)
outrow[j] = inrow[-j];
break;
case 2:
{
uint16_t *outrow16 = (uint16_t *)outrow;
uint16_t * inrow16 = (uint16_t *) inrow;
for (j = 0; j < width; j++)
outrow16[j] = inrow16[-j];
}
break;
case 3:
{
uint8_t *in = inrow;
uint8_t *out = outrow;
for (j = 0; j < width; j++, out += 3, in -= 3) {
int32_t v = AV_RB24(in);
AV_WB24(out, v);
}
}
break;
case 4:
{
uint32_t *outrow32 = (uint32_t *)outrow;
uint32_t * inrow32 = (uint32_t *) inrow;
for (j = 0; j < width; j++)
outrow32[j] = inrow32[-j];
}
break;
default:
for (j = 0; j < width; j++)
memcpy(outrow + j*step, inrow - j*step, step);
}
inrow += in ->linesize[plane];
outrow += out->linesize[plane];
}
}
av_frame_free(&in);
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, out);
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *in)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
FlipContext *s = ctx->priv;
AVFilterLink *outlink = ctx->outputs[0];
AVFrame *out;
uint8_t *inrow, *outrow;
int i, j, plane, step;
out = ff_get_video_buffer(outlink, outlink->w, outlink->h);
if (!out) {
av_frame_free(&in);
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
av_frame_copy_props(out, in);
/* copy palette if required */
if (av_pix_fmt_desc_get(inlink->format)->flags & AV_PIX_FMT_FLAG_PAL)
memcpy(out->data[1], in->data[1], AVPALETTE_SIZE);
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && in->data[plane] && in->linesize[plane]; plane++) {
const int width = (plane == 1 || plane == 2) ? FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->w, s->hsub) : inlink->w;
const int height = (plane == 1 || plane == 2) ? FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->h, s->vsub) : inlink->h;
step = s->max_step[plane];
outrow = out->data[plane];
inrow = in ->data[plane] + (width - 1) * step;
for (i = 0; i < height; i++) {
switch (step) {
case 1:
for (j = 0; j < width; j++)
outrow[j] = inrow[-j];
break;
case 2:
{
uint16_t *outrow16 = (uint16_t *)outrow;
uint16_t * inrow16 = (uint16_t *) inrow;
for (j = 0; j < width; j++)
outrow16[j] = inrow16[-j];
}
break;
case 3:
{
uint8_t *in = inrow;
uint8_t *out = outrow;
for (j = 0; j < width; j++, out += 3, in -= 3) {
int32_t v = AV_RB24(in);
AV_WB24(out, v);
}
}
break;
case 4:
{
uint32_t *outrow32 = (uint32_t *)outrow;
uint32_t * inrow32 = (uint32_t *) inrow;
for (j = 0; j < width; j++)
outrow32[j] = inrow32[-j];
}
break;
default:
for (j = 0; j < width; j++)
memcpy(outrow + j*step, inrow - j*step, step);
}
inrow += in ->linesize[plane];
outrow += out->linesize[plane];
}
}
av_frame_free(&in);
return ff_filter_frame(outlink, out);
}
| 166,002 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: transform_display_init(transform_display *dp, png_modifier *pm, png_uint_32 id,
PNG_CONST image_transform *transform_list)
{
memset(dp, 0, sizeof *dp);
/* Standard fields */
standard_display_init(&dp->this, &pm->this, id, 0/*do_interlace*/,
pm->use_update_info);
/* Parameter fields */
dp->pm = pm;
dp->transform_list = transform_list;
/* Local variable fields */
dp->output_colour_type = 255; /* invalid */
dp->output_bit_depth = 255; /* invalid */
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | transform_display_init(transform_display *dp, png_modifier *pm, png_uint_32 id,
const image_transform *transform_list)
{
memset(dp, 0, sizeof *dp);
/* Standard fields */
standard_display_init(&dp->this, &pm->this, id, do_read_interlace,
pm->use_update_info);
/* Parameter fields */
dp->pm = pm;
dp->transform_list = transform_list;
dp->max_gamma_8 = 16;
/* Local variable fields */
dp->output_colour_type = 255; /* invalid */
dp->output_bit_depth = 255; /* invalid */
dp->unpacked = 0; /* not unpacked */
}
| 173,712 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ext4_xattr_create_cache(char *name)
{
return mb_cache_create(name, HASH_BUCKET_BITS);
}
Commit Message: ext4: convert to mbcache2
The conversion is generally straightforward. The only tricky part is
that xattr block corresponding to found mbcache entry can get freed
before we get buffer lock for that block. So we have to check whether
the entry is still valid after getting buffer lock.
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: CWE-19 | ext4_xattr_create_cache(char *name)
struct mb2_cache *
ext4_xattr_create_cache(void)
{
return mb2_cache_create(HASH_BUCKET_BITS);
}
| 169,993 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xps_true_callback_glyph_name(gs_font *pfont, gs_glyph glyph, gs_const_string *pstr)
{
/* This function is copied verbatim from plfont.c */
int table_length;
int table_offset;
ulong format;
uint numGlyphs;
uint glyph_name_index;
const byte *postp; /* post table pointer */
/* guess if the font type is not truetype */
if ( pfont->FontType != ft_TrueType )
{
pstr->size = strlen((char*)pstr->data);
return 0;
}
else
{
return gs_throw1(-1, "glyph index %lu out of range", (ulong)glyph);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | xps_true_callback_glyph_name(gs_font *pfont, gs_glyph glyph, gs_const_string *pstr)
{
/* This function is copied verbatim from plfont.c */
int table_length;
int table_offset;
ulong format;
int numGlyphs;
uint glyph_name_index;
const byte *postp; /* post table pointer */
if (glyph >= GS_MIN_GLYPH_INDEX) {
glyph -= GS_MIN_GLYPH_INDEX;
}
/* guess if the font type is not truetype */
if ( pfont->FontType != ft_TrueType )
{
pstr->size = strlen((char*)pstr->data);
return 0;
}
else
{
return gs_throw1(-1, "glyph index %lu out of range", (ulong)glyph);
}
}
| 164,784 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ChromeContentRendererClient::RenderThreadStarted() {
chrome_observer_.reset(new ChromeRenderProcessObserver());
extension_dispatcher_.reset(new ExtensionDispatcher());
histogram_snapshots_.reset(new RendererHistogramSnapshots());
net_predictor_.reset(new RendererNetPredictor());
spellcheck_.reset(new SpellCheck());
visited_link_slave_.reset(new VisitedLinkSlave());
phishing_classifier_.reset(safe_browsing::PhishingClassifierFilter::Create());
RenderThread* thread = RenderThread::current();
thread->AddFilter(new DevToolsAgentFilter());
thread->AddObserver(chrome_observer_.get());
thread->AddObserver(extension_dispatcher_.get());
thread->AddObserver(histogram_snapshots_.get());
thread->AddObserver(phishing_classifier_.get());
thread->AddObserver(spellcheck_.get());
thread->AddObserver(visited_link_slave_.get());
thread->RegisterExtension(extensions_v8::ExternalExtension::Get());
thread->RegisterExtension(extensions_v8::LoadTimesExtension::Get());
thread->RegisterExtension(extensions_v8::SearchBoxExtension::Get());
v8::Extension* search_extension = extensions_v8::SearchExtension::Get();
if (search_extension)
thread->RegisterExtension(search_extension);
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDomAutomationController)) {
thread->RegisterExtension(DomAutomationV8Extension::Get());
}
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableIPCFuzzing)) {
thread->channel()->set_outgoing_message_filter(LoadExternalIPCFuzzer());
}
WebString chrome_ui_scheme(ASCIIToUTF16(chrome::kChromeUIScheme));
WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsDisplayIsolated(chrome_ui_scheme);
WebString extension_scheme(ASCIIToUTF16(chrome::kExtensionScheme));
WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsSecure(extension_scheme);
}
Commit Message: Prevent navigation to chrome-devtools: and chrome-internal: schemas from http
BUG=87815
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7275032
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91002 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void ChromeContentRendererClient::RenderThreadStarted() {
chrome_observer_.reset(new ChromeRenderProcessObserver());
extension_dispatcher_.reset(new ExtensionDispatcher());
histogram_snapshots_.reset(new RendererHistogramSnapshots());
net_predictor_.reset(new RendererNetPredictor());
spellcheck_.reset(new SpellCheck());
visited_link_slave_.reset(new VisitedLinkSlave());
phishing_classifier_.reset(safe_browsing::PhishingClassifierFilter::Create());
RenderThread* thread = RenderThread::current();
thread->AddFilter(new DevToolsAgentFilter());
thread->AddObserver(chrome_observer_.get());
thread->AddObserver(extension_dispatcher_.get());
thread->AddObserver(histogram_snapshots_.get());
thread->AddObserver(phishing_classifier_.get());
thread->AddObserver(spellcheck_.get());
thread->AddObserver(visited_link_slave_.get());
thread->RegisterExtension(extensions_v8::ExternalExtension::Get());
thread->RegisterExtension(extensions_v8::LoadTimesExtension::Get());
thread->RegisterExtension(extensions_v8::SearchBoxExtension::Get());
v8::Extension* search_extension = extensions_v8::SearchExtension::Get();
if (search_extension)
thread->RegisterExtension(search_extension);
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDomAutomationController)) {
thread->RegisterExtension(DomAutomationV8Extension::Get());
}
if (CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kEnableIPCFuzzing)) {
thread->channel()->set_outgoing_message_filter(LoadExternalIPCFuzzer());
}
// chrome:, chrome-devtools:, and chrome-internal: pages should not be
// accessible by normal content, and should also be unable to script
// anything but themselves (to help limit the damage that a corrupt
// page could cause).
WebString chrome_ui_scheme(ASCIIToUTF16(chrome::kChromeUIScheme));
WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsDisplayIsolated(chrome_ui_scheme);
WebString dev_tools_scheme(ASCIIToUTF16(chrome::kChromeDevToolsScheme));
WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsDisplayIsolated(dev_tools_scheme);
WebString internal_scheme(ASCIIToUTF16(chrome::kChromeInternalScheme));
WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsDisplayIsolated(internal_scheme);
WebString extension_scheme(ASCIIToUTF16(chrome::kExtensionScheme));
WebSecurityPolicy::registerURLSchemeAsSecure(extension_scheme);
}
| 170,448 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: transform_disable(PNG_CONST char *name)
{
image_transform *list = image_transform_first;
while (list != &image_transform_end)
{
if (strcmp(list->name, name) == 0)
{
list->enable = 0;
return;
}
list = list->list;
}
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: --transform-disable=%s: unknown transform\n",
name);
exit(99);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | transform_disable(PNG_CONST char *name)
transform_disable(const char *name)
{
image_transform *list = image_transform_first;
while (list != &image_transform_end)
{
if (strcmp(list->name, name) == 0)
{
list->enable = 0;
return;
}
list = list->list;
}
fprintf(stderr, "pngvalid: --transform-disable=%s: unknown transform\n",
name);
exit(99);
}
| 173,711 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static scoped_refptr<Extension> MakeSyncTestExtension(
SyncTestExtensionType type,
const GURL& update_url,
const GURL& launch_url,
Manifest::Location location,
int num_plugins,
const base::FilePath& extension_path,
int creation_flags) {
base::DictionaryValue source;
source.SetString(keys::kName, "PossiblySyncableExtension");
source.SetString(keys::kVersion, "0.0.0.0");
if (type == APP)
source.SetString(keys::kApp, "true");
if (type == THEME)
source.Set(keys::kTheme, new base::DictionaryValue());
if (!update_url.is_empty()) {
source.SetString(keys::kUpdateURL, update_url.spec());
}
if (!launch_url.is_empty()) {
source.SetString(keys::kLaunchWebURL, launch_url.spec());
}
if (type != THEME) {
source.SetBoolean(keys::kConvertedFromUserScript, type == USER_SCRIPT);
base::ListValue* plugins = new base::ListValue();
for (int i = 0; i < num_plugins; ++i) {
base::DictionaryValue* plugin = new base::DictionaryValue();
plugin->SetString(keys::kPluginsPath, std::string());
plugins->Set(i, plugin);
}
source.Set(keys::kPlugins, plugins);
}
std::string error;
scoped_refptr<Extension> extension = Extension::Create(
extension_path, location, source, creation_flags, &error);
EXPECT_TRUE(extension.get());
EXPECT_EQ("", error);
return extension;
}
Commit Message: Fix syncing of NPAPI plugins.
This fix adds a check for |plugin| permission
while syncing NPAPI plugins.
BUG=252034
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16816024
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207830 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | static scoped_refptr<Extension> MakeSyncTestExtension(
static scoped_refptr<Extension> MakeSyncTestExtensionWithPluginPermission(
SyncTestExtensionType type,
const GURL& update_url,
const GURL& launch_url,
Manifest::Location location,
int num_plugins,
const base::FilePath& extension_path,
int creation_flags,
bool has_plugin_permission) {
base::DictionaryValue source;
source.SetString(keys::kName, "PossiblySyncableExtension");
source.SetString(keys::kVersion, "0.0.0.0");
if (type == APP)
source.SetString(keys::kApp, "true");
if (type == THEME)
source.Set(keys::kTheme, new base::DictionaryValue());
if (!update_url.is_empty()) {
source.SetString(keys::kUpdateURL, update_url.spec());
}
if (!launch_url.is_empty()) {
source.SetString(keys::kLaunchWebURL, launch_url.spec());
}
if (type != THEME) {
source.SetBoolean(keys::kConvertedFromUserScript, type == USER_SCRIPT);
base::ListValue* plugins = new base::ListValue();
for (int i = 0; i < num_plugins; ++i) {
base::DictionaryValue* plugin = new base::DictionaryValue();
plugin->SetString(keys::kPluginsPath, std::string());
plugins->Set(i, plugin);
}
source.Set(keys::kPlugins, plugins);
}
if (has_plugin_permission) {
ListValue* plugins = new ListValue();
plugins->Set(0, new StringValue("plugin"));
source.Set(keys::kPermissions, plugins);
}
std::string error;
scoped_refptr<Extension> extension = Extension::Create(
extension_path, location, source, creation_flags, &error);
EXPECT_TRUE(extension.get());
EXPECT_EQ("", error);
return extension;
}
| 171,249 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: build_principal_va(krb5_context context, krb5_principal princ,
unsigned int rlen, const char *realm, va_list ap)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
char *r = NULL;
krb5_data *data = NULL;
krb5_int32 count = 0;
krb5_int32 size = 2; /* initial guess at needed space */
char *component = NULL;
data = malloc(size * sizeof(krb5_data));
if (!data) { retval = ENOMEM; }
if (!retval) {
r = strdup(realm);
if (!r) { retval = ENOMEM; }
}
while (!retval && (component = va_arg(ap, char *))) {
if (count == size) {
krb5_data *new_data = NULL;
size *= 2;
new_data = realloc(data, size * sizeof(krb5_data));
if (new_data) {
data = new_data;
} else {
retval = ENOMEM;
}
}
if (!retval) {
data[count].length = strlen(component);
data[count].data = strdup(component);
if (!data[count].data) { retval = ENOMEM; }
count++;
}
}
if (!retval) {
princ->type = KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN;
princ->magic = KV5M_PRINCIPAL;
princ->realm = make_data(r, rlen);
princ->data = data;
princ->length = count;
r = NULL; /* take ownership */
data = NULL; /* take ownership */
}
if (data) {
while (--count >= 0) {
free(data[count].data);
}
free(data);
}
free(r);
return retval;
}
Commit Message: Fix build_principal memory bug [CVE-2015-2697]
In build_principal_va(), use k5memdup0() instead of strdup() to make a
copy of the realm, to ensure that we allocate the correct number of
bytes and do not read past the end of the input string. This bug
affects krb5_build_principal(), krb5_build_principal_va(), and
krb5_build_principal_alloc_va(). krb5_build_principal_ext() is not
affected.
CVE-2015-2697:
In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker may be able to
cause a KDC to crash using a TGS request with a large realm field
beginning with a null byte. If the KDC attempts to find a referral to
answer the request, it constructs a principal name for lookup using
krb5_build_principal() with the requested realm. Due to a bug in this
function, the null byte causes only one byte be allocated for the
realm field of the constructed principal, far less than its length.
Subsequent operations on the lookup principal may cause a read beyond
the end of the mapped memory region, causing the KDC process to crash.
CVSSv2: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8252 (new)
target_version: 1.14
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | build_principal_va(krb5_context context, krb5_principal princ,
unsigned int rlen, const char *realm, va_list ap)
{
krb5_error_code retval = 0;
char *r = NULL;
krb5_data *data = NULL;
krb5_int32 count = 0;
krb5_int32 size = 2; /* initial guess at needed space */
char *component = NULL;
data = malloc(size * sizeof(krb5_data));
if (!data) { retval = ENOMEM; }
if (!retval)
r = k5memdup0(realm, rlen, &retval);
while (!retval && (component = va_arg(ap, char *))) {
if (count == size) {
krb5_data *new_data = NULL;
size *= 2;
new_data = realloc(data, size * sizeof(krb5_data));
if (new_data) {
data = new_data;
} else {
retval = ENOMEM;
}
}
if (!retval) {
data[count].length = strlen(component);
data[count].data = strdup(component);
if (!data[count].data) { retval = ENOMEM; }
count++;
}
}
if (!retval) {
princ->type = KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN;
princ->magic = KV5M_PRINCIPAL;
princ->realm = make_data(r, rlen);
princ->data = data;
princ->length = count;
r = NULL; /* take ownership */
data = NULL; /* take ownership */
}
if (data) {
while (--count >= 0) {
free(data[count].data);
}
free(data);
}
free(r);
return retval;
}
| 166,641 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(unserialize)
{
char *buf = NULL;
size_t buf_len;
const unsigned char *p;
php_unserialize_data_t var_hash;
zval *options = NULL, *classes = NULL;
HashTable *class_hash = NULL;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s|a", &buf, &buf_len, &options) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (buf_len == 0) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
p = (const unsigned char*) buf;
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_INIT(var_hash);
if(options != NULL) {
classes = zend_hash_str_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(options), "allowed_classes", sizeof("allowed_classes")-1);
if(classes && (Z_TYPE_P(classes) == IS_ARRAY || !zend_is_true(classes))) {
ALLOC_HASHTABLE(class_hash);
zend_hash_init(class_hash, (Z_TYPE_P(classes) == IS_ARRAY)?zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(classes)):0, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
if(class_hash && Z_TYPE_P(classes) == IS_ARRAY) {
zval *entry;
zend_string *lcname;
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_VAL(Z_ARRVAL_P(classes), entry) {
convert_to_string_ex(entry);
lcname = zend_string_tolower(Z_STR_P(entry));
zend_hash_add_empty_element(class_hash, lcname);
zend_string_release(lcname);
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
}
}
if (!php_var_unserialize_ex(return_value, &p, p + buf_len, &var_hash, class_hash)) {
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
if (class_hash) {
zend_hash_destroy(class_hash);
FREE_HASHTABLE(class_hash);
}
zval_ptr_dtor(return_value);
if (!EG(exception)) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_NOTICE, "Error at offset " ZEND_LONG_FMT " of %zd bytes",
(zend_long)((char*)p - buf), buf_len);
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
/* We should keep an reference to return_value to prevent it from being dtor
in case nesting calls to unserialize */
var_push_dtor(&var_hash, return_value);
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
if (class_hash) {
zend_hash_destroy(class_hash);
FREE_HASHTABLE(class_hash);
}
}
Commit Message: Complete the fix of bug #70172 for PHP 7
CWE ID: CWE-416 | PHP_FUNCTION(unserialize)
{
char *buf = NULL;
size_t buf_len;
const unsigned char *p;
php_unserialize_data_t var_hash;
zval *options = NULL, *classes = NULL;
zval *retval;
HashTable *class_hash = NULL;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s|a", &buf, &buf_len, &options) == FAILURE) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
if (buf_len == 0) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
p = (const unsigned char*) buf;
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_INIT(var_hash);
if(options != NULL) {
classes = zend_hash_str_find(Z_ARRVAL_P(options), "allowed_classes", sizeof("allowed_classes")-1);
if(classes && (Z_TYPE_P(classes) == IS_ARRAY || !zend_is_true(classes))) {
ALLOC_HASHTABLE(class_hash);
zend_hash_init(class_hash, (Z_TYPE_P(classes) == IS_ARRAY)?zend_hash_num_elements(Z_ARRVAL_P(classes)):0, NULL, NULL, 0);
}
if(class_hash && Z_TYPE_P(classes) == IS_ARRAY) {
zval *entry;
zend_string *lcname;
ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_VAL(Z_ARRVAL_P(classes), entry) {
convert_to_string_ex(entry);
lcname = zend_string_tolower(Z_STR_P(entry));
zend_hash_add_empty_element(class_hash, lcname);
zend_string_release(lcname);
} ZEND_HASH_FOREACH_END();
}
}
retval = var_tmp_var(&var_hash);
if (!php_var_unserialize_ex(retval, &p, p + buf_len, &var_hash, class_hash)) {
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
if (class_hash) {
zend_hash_destroy(class_hash);
FREE_HASHTABLE(class_hash);
}
if (!EG(exception)) {
php_error_docref(NULL, E_NOTICE, "Error at offset " ZEND_LONG_FMT " of %zd bytes",
(zend_long)((char*)p - buf), buf_len);
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
ZVAL_COPY(return_value, retval);
PHP_VAR_UNSERIALIZE_DESTROY(var_hash);
if (class_hash) {
zend_hash_destroy(class_hash);
FREE_HASHTABLE(class_hash);
}
}
| 168,666 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BrowserContext* SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::GetBrowserContext() {
RenderProcessHost* rph = GetProcess();
return rph ? rph->GetBrowserContext() : nullptr;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | BrowserContext* SharedWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::GetBrowserContext() {
if (!worker_host_)
return nullptr;
RenderProcessHost* rph =
RenderProcessHost::FromID(worker_host_->process_id());
return rph ? rph->GetBrowserContext() : nullptr;
}
| 172,788 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool IsSiteMuted(const TabStripModel& tab_strip, const int index) {
content::WebContents* web_contents = tab_strip.GetWebContentsAt(index);
GURL url = web_contents->GetLastCommittedURL();
if (url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIScheme)) {
return web_contents->IsAudioMuted() &&
GetTabAudioMutedReason(web_contents) ==
TabMutedReason::CONTENT_SETTING_CHROME;
}
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
HostContentSettingsMap* settings =
HostContentSettingsMapFactory::GetForProfile(profile);
return settings->GetContentSetting(url, url, CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_SOUND,
std::string()) == CONTENT_SETTING_BLOCK;
}
Commit Message: Fix nullptr crash in IsSiteMuted
This CL adds a nullptr check in IsSiteMuted to prevent a crash on Mac.
Bug: 797647
Change-Id: Ic36f0fb39f2dbdf49d2bec9e548a4a6e339dc9a2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/848245
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yuri Wiitala <miu@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Tommy Steimel <steimel@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#526825}
CWE ID: | bool IsSiteMuted(const TabStripModel& tab_strip, const int index) {
content::WebContents* web_contents = tab_strip.GetWebContentsAt(index);
// TODO(steimel): Why was this not a problem for AreAllTabsMuted? Is this
// going to be a problem for SetSitesMuted?
// Prevent crashes with null WebContents (https://crbug.com/797647).
if (!web_contents)
return false;
GURL url = web_contents->GetLastCommittedURL();
if (url.SchemeIs(content::kChromeUIScheme)) {
return web_contents->IsAudioMuted() &&
GetTabAudioMutedReason(web_contents) ==
TabMutedReason::CONTENT_SETTING_CHROME;
}
Profile* profile =
Profile::FromBrowserContext(web_contents->GetBrowserContext());
HostContentSettingsMap* settings =
HostContentSettingsMapFactory::GetForProfile(profile);
return settings->GetContentSetting(url, url, CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_SOUND,
std::string()) == CONTENT_SETTING_BLOCK;
}
| 171,897 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: validate_T(void)
/* Validate the above table - this just builds the above values */
{
unsigned int i;
for (i=0; i<TTABLE_SIZE; ++i)
{
if (transform_info[i].when & TRANSFORM_R)
read_transforms |= transform_info[i].transform;
if (transform_info[i].when & TRANSFORM_W)
write_transforms |= transform_info[i].transform;
}
/* Reversible transforms are those which are supported on both read and
* write.
*/
rw_transforms = read_transforms & write_transforms;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | validate_T(void)
/* Validate the above table - this just builds the above values */
{
unsigned int i;
for (i=0; i<TTABLE_SIZE; ++i) if (transform_info[i].name != NULL)
{
if (transform_info[i].when & TRANSFORM_R)
read_transforms |= transform_info[i].transform;
if (transform_info[i].when & TRANSFORM_W)
write_transforms |= transform_info[i].transform;
}
/* Reversible transforms are those which are supported on both read and
* write.
*/
rw_transforms = read_transforms & write_transforms;
}
| 173,592 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: header_put_be_short (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ if (psf->headindex < SIGNED_SIZEOF (psf->header) - 2)
{ psf->header [psf->headindex++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header [psf->headindex++] = x ;
} ;
} /* header_put_be_short */
Commit Message: src/ : Move to a variable length header buffer
Previously, the `psf->header` buffer was a fixed length specified by
`SF_HEADER_LEN` which was set to `12292`. This was problematic for
two reasons; this value was un-necessarily large for the majority
of files and too small for some others.
Now the size of the header buffer starts at 256 bytes and grows as
necessary up to a maximum of 100k.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | header_put_be_short (SF_PRIVATE *psf, int x)
{ psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = (x >> 8) ;
psf->header.ptr [psf->header.indx++] = x ;
} /* header_put_be_short */
| 170,052 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void test_base64_decode(void)
{
char buffer[16];
int len = mutt_b64_decode(buffer, encoded);
if (!TEST_CHECK(len == sizeof(clear) - 1))
{
TEST_MSG("Expected: %zu", sizeof(clear) - 1);
TEST_MSG("Actual : %zu", len);
}
buffer[len] = '\0';
if (!TEST_CHECK(strcmp(buffer, clear) == 0))
{
TEST_MSG("Expected: %s", clear);
TEST_MSG("Actual : %s", buffer);
}
}
Commit Message: Check outbuf length in mutt_to_base64()
The obuf can be overflowed in auth_cram.c, and possibly auth_gss.c.
Thanks to Jeriko One for the bug report.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void test_base64_decode(void)
{
char buffer[16];
int len = mutt_b64_decode(buffer, encoded, sizeof(buffer));
if (!TEST_CHECK(len == sizeof(clear) - 1))
{
TEST_MSG("Expected: %zu", sizeof(clear) - 1);
TEST_MSG("Actual : %zu", len);
}
buffer[len] = '\0';
if (!TEST_CHECK(strcmp(buffer, clear) == 0))
{
TEST_MSG("Expected: %s", clear);
TEST_MSG("Actual : %s", buffer);
}
}
| 169,130 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static struct posix_acl *jffs2_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
{
struct jffs2_inode_info *f = JFFS2_INODE_INFO(inode);
struct posix_acl *acl;
char *value = NULL;
int rc, xprefix;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
acl = jffs2_iget_acl(inode, &f->i_acl_access);
if (acl != JFFS2_ACL_NOT_CACHED)
return acl;
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_ACCESS;
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
acl = jffs2_iget_acl(inode, &f->i_acl_default);
if (acl != JFFS2_ACL_NOT_CACHED)
return acl;
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
rc = do_jffs2_getxattr(inode, xprefix, "", NULL, 0);
if (rc > 0) {
value = kmalloc(rc, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!value)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
rc = do_jffs2_getxattr(inode, xprefix, "", value, rc);
}
if (rc > 0) {
acl = jffs2_acl_from_medium(value, rc);
} else if (rc == -ENODATA || rc == -ENOSYS) {
acl = NULL;
} else {
acl = ERR_PTR(rc);
}
if (value)
kfree(value);
if (!IS_ERR(acl)) {
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
jffs2_iset_acl(inode, &f->i_acl_access, acl);
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
jffs2_iset_acl(inode, &f->i_acl_default, acl);
break;
}
}
return acl;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static struct posix_acl *jffs2_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
struct posix_acl *jffs2_get_acl(struct inode *inode, int type)
{
struct jffs2_inode_info *f = JFFS2_INODE_INFO(inode);
struct posix_acl *acl;
char *value = NULL;
int rc, xprefix;
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
acl = jffs2_iget_acl(inode, &f->i_acl_access);
if (acl != JFFS2_ACL_NOT_CACHED)
return acl;
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_ACCESS;
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
acl = jffs2_iget_acl(inode, &f->i_acl_default);
if (acl != JFFS2_ACL_NOT_CACHED)
return acl;
xprefix = JFFS2_XPREFIX_ACL_DEFAULT;
break;
default:
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}
rc = do_jffs2_getxattr(inode, xprefix, "", NULL, 0);
if (rc > 0) {
value = kmalloc(rc, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!value)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
rc = do_jffs2_getxattr(inode, xprefix, "", value, rc);
}
if (rc > 0) {
acl = jffs2_acl_from_medium(value, rc);
} else if (rc == -ENODATA || rc == -ENOSYS) {
acl = NULL;
} else {
acl = ERR_PTR(rc);
}
if (value)
kfree(value);
if (!IS_ERR(acl)) {
switch (type) {
case ACL_TYPE_ACCESS:
jffs2_iset_acl(inode, &f->i_acl_access, acl);
break;
case ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT:
jffs2_iset_acl(inode, &f->i_acl_default, acl);
break;
}
}
return acl;
}
| 164,655 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ras_getcmap(jas_stream_t *in, ras_hdr_t *hdr, ras_cmap_t *cmap)
{
int i;
int j;
int x;
int c;
int numcolors;
int actualnumcolors;
switch (hdr->maptype) {
case RAS_MT_NONE:
break;
case RAS_MT_EQUALRGB:
{
jas_eprintf("warning: palettized images not fully supported\n");
numcolors = 1 << hdr->depth;
assert(numcolors <= RAS_CMAP_MAXSIZ);
actualnumcolors = hdr->maplength / 3;
for (i = 0; i < numcolors; i++) {
cmap->data[i] = 0;
}
if ((hdr->maplength % 3) || hdr->maplength < 0 ||
hdr->maplength > 3 * numcolors) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < actualnumcolors; j++) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
x = 0;
switch (i) {
case 0:
x = RAS_RED(c);
break;
case 1:
x = RAS_GREEN(c);
break;
case 2:
x = RAS_BLUE(c);
break;
}
cmap->data[j] |= x;
}
}
}
break;
default:
return -1;
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a few bugs in the RAS encoder and decoder where errors were tested
with assertions instead of being gracefully handled.
CWE ID: | static int ras_getcmap(jas_stream_t *in, ras_hdr_t *hdr, ras_cmap_t *cmap)
{
int i;
int j;
int x;
int c;
int numcolors;
int actualnumcolors;
switch (hdr->maptype) {
case RAS_MT_NONE:
break;
case RAS_MT_EQUALRGB:
{
jas_eprintf("warning: palettized images not fully supported\n");
numcolors = 1 << hdr->depth;
if (numcolors > RAS_CMAP_MAXSIZ) {
return -1;
}
actualnumcolors = hdr->maplength / 3;
for (i = 0; i < numcolors; i++) {
cmap->data[i] = 0;
}
if ((hdr->maplength % 3) || hdr->maplength < 0 ||
hdr->maplength > 3 * numcolors) {
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < actualnumcolors; j++) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
x = 0;
switch (i) {
case 0:
x = RAS_RED(c);
break;
case 1:
x = RAS_GREEN(c);
break;
case 2:
x = RAS_BLUE(c);
break;
}
cmap->data[j] |= x;
}
}
}
break;
default:
return -1;
break;
}
return 0;
}
| 168,739 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: FileManagerPrivateCustomBindings::FileManagerPrivateCustomBindings(
ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction(
"GetFileSystem",
base::Bind(&FileManagerPrivateCustomBindings::GetFileSystem,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add more bindings access checks
BUG=598165
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1854983002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#385282}
CWE ID: | FileManagerPrivateCustomBindings::FileManagerPrivateCustomBindings(
ScriptContext* context)
: ObjectBackedNativeHandler(context) {
RouteFunction("GetFileSystem", "fileManagerPrivate",
base::Bind(&FileManagerPrivateCustomBindings::GetFileSystem,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction(
"GetExternalFileEntry", "fileManagerPrivate",
base::Bind(&FileManagerPrivateCustomBindings::GetExternalFileEntry,
base::Unretained(this)));
RouteFunction("GetEntryURL", "fileManagerPrivate",
base::Bind(&FileManagerPrivateCustomBindings::GetEntryURL,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 173,274 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void _moddeinit(module_unload_intent_t intent)
{
service_named_unbind_command("chanserv", &cs_flags);
}
Commit Message: chanserv/flags: make Anope FLAGS compatibility an option
Previously, ChanServ FLAGS behavior could be modified by registering or
dropping the keyword nicks "LIST", "CLEAR", and "MODIFY".
Now, a configuration option is available that when turned on (default),
disables registration of these keyword nicks and enables this
compatibility feature. When turned off, registration of these keyword
nicks is possible, and compatibility to Anope's FLAGS command is
disabled.
Fixes atheme/atheme#397
CWE ID: CWE-284 | void _moddeinit(module_unload_intent_t intent)
{
service_named_unbind_command("chanserv", &cs_flags);
hook_del_nick_can_register(check_registration_keywords);
hook_del_user_can_register(check_registration_keywords);
del_conf_item("ANOPE_FLAGS_COMPAT", &chansvs.me->conf_table);
}
| 167,585 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long vorbis_book_decodevs_add(codebook *book,ogg_int32_t *a,
oggpack_buffer *b,int n,int point){
if(book->used_entries>0){
int step=n/book->dim;
ogg_int32_t *v = book->dec_buf;//(ogg_int32_t *)alloca(sizeof(*v)*book->dim);
int i,j,o;
if (!v) return -1;
for (j=0;j<step;j++){
if(decode_map(book,b,v,point))return -1;
for(i=0,o=j;i<book->dim;i++,o+=step)
a[o]+=v[i];
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix out of bounds access in codebook processing
Bug: 62800140
Test: ran poc, CTS
Change-Id: I9960d507be62ee0a3b0aa991240951d5a0784f37
(cherry picked from commit 2c4c4bd895f01fdecb90ebdd0412b60608a9ccf0)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | long vorbis_book_decodevs_add(codebook *book,ogg_int32_t *a,
oggpack_buffer *b,int n,int point){
if(book->used_entries>0){
int step=n/book->dim;
ogg_int32_t *v = book->dec_buf;//(ogg_int32_t *)alloca(sizeof(*v)*book->dim);
int i,j,o;
if (!v) return -1;
for (j=0;j<step;j++){
if(decode_map(book,b,v,point))return -1;
for(i=0,o=j;i<book->dim;i++,o+=step)
a[o]+=v[i];
}
}
return 0;
}
| 173,988 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Browser::TabDetachedAtImpl(TabContents* contents, int index,
DetachType type) {
if (type == DETACH_TYPE_DETACH) {
if (contents == chrome::GetActiveTabContents(this)) {
LocationBar* location_bar = window()->GetLocationBar();
if (location_bar)
location_bar->SaveStateToContents(contents->web_contents());
}
if (!tab_strip_model_->closing_all())
SyncHistoryWithTabs(0);
}
SetAsDelegate(contents->web_contents(), NULL);
RemoveScheduledUpdatesFor(contents->web_contents());
if (find_bar_controller_.get() && index == active_index()) {
find_bar_controller_->ChangeWebContents(NULL);
}
search_delegate_->OnTabDetached(contents->web_contents());
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_ATTACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents->web_contents()));
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_DETACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents->web_contents()));
}
Commit Message: Remove TabContents from TabStripModelObserver::TabDetachedAt.
BUG=107201
TEST=no visible change
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11293205
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@167122 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void Browser::TabDetachedAtImpl(TabContents* contents, int index,
void Browser::TabDetachedAtImpl(content::WebContents* contents,
int index,
DetachType type) {
if (type == DETACH_TYPE_DETACH) {
if (contents == chrome::GetActiveWebContents(this)) {
LocationBar* location_bar = window()->GetLocationBar();
if (location_bar)
location_bar->SaveStateToContents(contents);
}
if (!tab_strip_model_->closing_all())
SyncHistoryWithTabs(0);
}
SetAsDelegate(contents, NULL);
RemoveScheduledUpdatesFor(contents);
if (find_bar_controller_.get() && index == active_index()) {
find_bar_controller_->ChangeWebContents(NULL);
}
search_delegate_->OnTabDetached(contents);
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_ATTACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents));
registrar_.Remove(this, content::NOTIFICATION_INTERSTITIAL_DETACHED,
content::Source<WebContents>(contents));
}
| 171,508 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: string16 ExtensionGlobalError::GenerateMessageSection(
const ExtensionIdSet* extensions,
int template_message_id) {
CHECK(extensions);
CHECK(template_message_id);
string16 message;
for (ExtensionIdSet::const_iterator iter = extensions->begin();
iter != extensions->end(); ++iter) {
const Extension* e = extension_service_->GetExtensionById(*iter, true);
message += l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
template_message_id,
string16(ASCIIToUTF16(e->name())),
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_SHORT_PRODUCT_NAME));
}
return message;
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | string16 ExtensionGlobalError::GenerateMessageSection(
const ExtensionIdSet* extensions,
int template_message_id) {
CHECK(extensions);
CHECK(template_message_id);
string16 message;
for (ExtensionIdSet::const_iterator iter = extensions->begin();
iter != extensions->end(); ++iter) {
const Extension* e = extension_service_->GetExtensionById(*iter, true);
message += l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(template_message_id,
string16(ASCIIToUTF16(e->name())));
}
return message;
}
| 170,980 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BlobDataHandle::~BlobDataHandle()
{
ThreadableBlobRegistry::unregisterBlobURL(m_internalURL);
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | BlobDataHandle::~BlobDataHandle()
{
BlobRegistry::unregisterBlobURL(m_internalURL);
}
| 170,695 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool Chapters::Edition::ExpandAtomsArray()
{
if (m_atoms_size > m_atoms_count)
return true; // nothing else to do
const int size = (m_atoms_size == 0) ? 1 : 2 * m_atoms_size;
Atom* const atoms = new (std::nothrow) Atom[size];
if (atoms == NULL)
return false;
for (int idx = 0; idx < m_atoms_count; ++idx)
{
m_atoms[idx].ShallowCopy(atoms[idx]);
}
delete[] m_atoms;
m_atoms = atoms;
m_atoms_size = size;
return true;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool Chapters::Edition::ExpandAtomsArray()
IMkvReader* const pReader = m_pSegment->m_pReader;
long long pos = m_start;
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
m_timecodeScale = 1000000;
m_duration = -1;
while (pos < stop) {
long long id, size;
const long status = ParseElementHeader(pReader, pos, stop, id, size);
if (status < 0) // error
return status;
if (id == 0x0AD7B1) { // Timecode Scale
m_timecodeScale = UnserializeUInt(pReader, pos, size);
if (m_timecodeScale <= 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x0489) { // Segment duration
const long status = UnserializeFloat(pReader, pos, size, m_duration);
if (status < 0)
return status;
if (m_duration < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
} else if (id == 0x0D80) { // MuxingApp
const long status =
UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_pMuxingAppAsUTF8);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x1741) { // WritingApp
const long status =
UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_pWritingAppAsUTF8);
if (status)
return status;
} else if (id == 0x3BA9) { // Title
const long status = UnserializeString(pReader, pos, size, m_pTitleAsUTF8);
if (status)
return status;
}
pos += size;
assert(pos <= stop);
}
assert(pos == stop);
return 0;
}
| 174,274 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void _xml_unparsedEntityDeclHandler(void *userData,
const XML_Char *entityName,
const XML_Char *base,
const XML_Char *systemId,
const XML_Char *publicId,
const XML_Char *notationName)
{
xml_parser *parser = (xml_parser *)userData;
if (parser && parser->unparsedEntityDeclHandler) {
zval *retval, *args[6];
args[0] = _xml_resource_zval(parser->index);
args[1] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(entityName, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[2] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(base, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[3] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(systemId, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[4] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(publicId, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[5] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(notationName, 0, parser->target_encoding);
if ((retval = xml_call_handler(parser, parser->unparsedEntityDeclHandler, parser->unparsedEntityDeclPtr, 6, args))) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void _xml_unparsedEntityDeclHandler(void *userData,
void _xml_unparsedEntityDeclHandler(void *userData,
const XML_Char *entityName,
const XML_Char *base,
const XML_Char *systemId,
const XML_Char *publicId,
const XML_Char *notationName)
{
xml_parser *parser = (xml_parser *)userData;
if (parser && parser->unparsedEntityDeclHandler) {
zval *retval, *args[6];
args[0] = _xml_resource_zval(parser->index);
args[1] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(entityName, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[2] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(base, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[3] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(systemId, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[4] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(publicId, 0, parser->target_encoding);
args[5] = _xml_xmlchar_zval(notationName, 0, parser->target_encoding);
if ((retval = xml_call_handler(parser, parser->unparsedEntityDeclHandler, parser->unparsedEntityDeclPtr, 6, args))) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&retval);
}
}
}
| 165,043 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int sco_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
int addr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_sco *sa = (struct sockaddr_sco *) addr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p %pMR", sk, &sa->sco_bdaddr);
if (!addr || addr->sa_family != AF_BLUETOOTH)
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN) {
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
bacpy(&sco_pi(sk)->src, &sa->sco_bdaddr);
sk->sk_state = BT_BOUND;
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
Commit Message: bluetooth: Validate socket address length in sco_sock_bind().
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int sco_sock_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
int addr_len)
{
struct sockaddr_sco *sa = (struct sockaddr_sco *) addr;
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
int err = 0;
BT_DBG("sk %p %pMR", sk, &sa->sco_bdaddr);
if (!addr || addr->sa_family != AF_BLUETOOTH)
return -EINVAL;
if (addr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_sco))
return -EINVAL;
lock_sock(sk);
if (sk->sk_state != BT_OPEN) {
err = -EBADFD;
goto done;
}
if (sk->sk_type != SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto done;
}
bacpy(&sco_pi(sk)->src, &sa->sco_bdaddr);
sk->sk_state = BT_BOUND;
done:
release_sock(sk);
return err;
}
| 167,532 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int do_remount_sb(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data, int force)
{
int retval;
int remount_ro;
if (sb->s_writers.frozen != SB_UNFROZEN)
return -EBUSY;
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
if (!(flags & MS_RDONLY) && bdev_read_only(sb->s_bdev))
return -EACCES;
#endif
if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
acct_auto_close(sb);
shrink_dcache_sb(sb);
sync_filesystem(sb);
remount_ro = (flags & MS_RDONLY) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY);
/* If we are remounting RDONLY and current sb is read/write,
make sure there are no rw files opened */
if (remount_ro) {
if (force) {
mark_files_ro(sb);
} else {
retval = sb_prepare_remount_readonly(sb);
if (retval)
return retval;
}
}
if (sb->s_op->remount_fs) {
retval = sb->s_op->remount_fs(sb, &flags, data);
if (retval) {
if (!force)
goto cancel_readonly;
/* If forced remount, go ahead despite any errors */
WARN(1, "forced remount of a %s fs returned %i\n",
sb->s_type->name, retval);
}
}
sb->s_flags = (sb->s_flags & ~MS_RMT_MASK) | (flags & MS_RMT_MASK);
/* Needs to be ordered wrt mnt_is_readonly() */
smp_wmb();
sb->s_readonly_remount = 0;
/*
* Some filesystems modify their metadata via some other path than the
* bdev buffer cache (eg. use a private mapping, or directories in
* pagecache, etc). Also file data modifications go via their own
* mappings. So If we try to mount readonly then copy the filesystem
* from bdev, we could get stale data, so invalidate it to give a best
* effort at coherency.
*/
if (remount_ro && sb->s_bdev)
invalidate_bdev(sb->s_bdev);
return 0;
cancel_readonly:
sb->s_readonly_remount = 0;
return retval;
}
Commit Message: get rid of s_files and files_lock
The only thing we need it for is alt-sysrq-r (emergency remount r/o)
and these days we can do just as well without going through the
list of files.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-17 | int do_remount_sb(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data, int force)
{
int retval;
int remount_ro;
if (sb->s_writers.frozen != SB_UNFROZEN)
return -EBUSY;
#ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
if (!(flags & MS_RDONLY) && bdev_read_only(sb->s_bdev))
return -EACCES;
#endif
if (flags & MS_RDONLY)
acct_auto_close(sb);
shrink_dcache_sb(sb);
sync_filesystem(sb);
remount_ro = (flags & MS_RDONLY) && !(sb->s_flags & MS_RDONLY);
/* If we are remounting RDONLY and current sb is read/write,
make sure there are no rw files opened */
if (remount_ro) {
if (force) {
sb->s_readonly_remount = 1;
smp_wmb();
} else {
retval = sb_prepare_remount_readonly(sb);
if (retval)
return retval;
}
}
if (sb->s_op->remount_fs) {
retval = sb->s_op->remount_fs(sb, &flags, data);
if (retval) {
if (!force)
goto cancel_readonly;
/* If forced remount, go ahead despite any errors */
WARN(1, "forced remount of a %s fs returned %i\n",
sb->s_type->name, retval);
}
}
sb->s_flags = (sb->s_flags & ~MS_RMT_MASK) | (flags & MS_RMT_MASK);
/* Needs to be ordered wrt mnt_is_readonly() */
smp_wmb();
sb->s_readonly_remount = 0;
/*
* Some filesystems modify their metadata via some other path than the
* bdev buffer cache (eg. use a private mapping, or directories in
* pagecache, etc). Also file data modifications go via their own
* mappings. So If we try to mount readonly then copy the filesystem
* from bdev, we could get stale data, so invalidate it to give a best
* effort at coherency.
*/
if (remount_ro && sb->s_bdev)
invalidate_bdev(sb->s_bdev);
return 0;
cancel_readonly:
sb->s_readonly_remount = 0;
return retval;
}
| 166,808 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: file_tryelf(struct magic_set *ms, int fd, const unsigned char *buf,
size_t nbytes)
{
union {
int32_t l;
char c[sizeof (int32_t)];
} u;
int clazz;
int swap;
struct stat st;
off_t fsize;
int flags = 0;
Elf32_Ehdr elf32hdr;
Elf64_Ehdr elf64hdr;
uint16_t type, phnum, shnum;
if (ms->flags & (MAGIC_MIME|MAGIC_APPLE))
return 0;
/*
* ELF executables have multiple section headers in arbitrary
* file locations and thus file(1) cannot determine it from easily.
* Instead we traverse thru all section headers until a symbol table
* one is found or else the binary is stripped.
* Return immediately if it's not ELF (so we avoid pipe2file unless needed).
*/
if (buf[EI_MAG0] != ELFMAG0
|| (buf[EI_MAG1] != ELFMAG1 && buf[EI_MAG1] != OLFMAG1)
|| buf[EI_MAG2] != ELFMAG2 || buf[EI_MAG3] != ELFMAG3)
return 0;
/*
* If we cannot seek, it must be a pipe, socket or fifo.
*/
if((lseek(fd, (off_t)0, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) && (errno == ESPIPE))
fd = file_pipe2file(ms, fd, buf, nbytes);
if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) || st.st_size != 0)
fsize = st.st_size;
else
fsize = SIZE_UNKNOWN;
clazz = buf[EI_CLASS];
switch (clazz) {
case ELFCLASS32:
#undef elf_getu
#define elf_getu(a, b) elf_getu32(a, b)
#undef elfhdr
#define elfhdr elf32hdr
#include "elfclass.h"
case ELFCLASS64:
#undef elf_getu
#define elf_getu(a, b) elf_getu64(a, b)
#undef elfhdr
#define elfhdr elf64hdr
#include "elfclass.h"
default:
if (file_printf(ms, ", unknown class %d", clazz) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: - Add a limit to the number of ELF notes processed (Suggested by Alexander
Cherepanov)
- Restructure ELF note printing so that we don't print the same message
multiple times on repeated notes of the same kind.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | file_tryelf(struct magic_set *ms, int fd, const unsigned char *buf,
size_t nbytes)
{
union {
int32_t l;
char c[sizeof (int32_t)];
} u;
int clazz;
int swap;
struct stat st;
off_t fsize;
int flags = 0;
Elf32_Ehdr elf32hdr;
Elf64_Ehdr elf64hdr;
uint16_t type, phnum, shnum, notecount;
if (ms->flags & (MAGIC_MIME|MAGIC_APPLE))
return 0;
/*
* ELF executables have multiple section headers in arbitrary
* file locations and thus file(1) cannot determine it from easily.
* Instead we traverse thru all section headers until a symbol table
* one is found or else the binary is stripped.
* Return immediately if it's not ELF (so we avoid pipe2file unless needed).
*/
if (buf[EI_MAG0] != ELFMAG0
|| (buf[EI_MAG1] != ELFMAG1 && buf[EI_MAG1] != OLFMAG1)
|| buf[EI_MAG2] != ELFMAG2 || buf[EI_MAG3] != ELFMAG3)
return 0;
/*
* If we cannot seek, it must be a pipe, socket or fifo.
*/
if((lseek(fd, (off_t)0, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) && (errno == ESPIPE))
fd = file_pipe2file(ms, fd, buf, nbytes);
if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
file_badread(ms);
return -1;
}
if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) || st.st_size != 0)
fsize = st.st_size;
else
fsize = SIZE_UNKNOWN;
clazz = buf[EI_CLASS];
switch (clazz) {
case ELFCLASS32:
#undef elf_getu
#define elf_getu(a, b) elf_getu32(a, b)
#undef elfhdr
#define elfhdr elf32hdr
#include "elfclass.h"
case ELFCLASS64:
#undef elf_getu
#define elf_getu(a, b) elf_getu64(a, b)
#undef elfhdr
#define elfhdr elf64hdr
#include "elfclass.h"
default:
if (file_printf(ms, ", unknown class %d", clazz) == -1)
return -1;
break;
}
return 0;
}
| 166,780 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: GURL DecorateFrontendURL(const GURL& base_url) {
std::string frontend_url = base_url.spec();
std::string url_string(
frontend_url +
((frontend_url.find("?") == std::string::npos) ? "?" : "&") +
"dockSide=undocked"); // TODO(dgozman): remove this support in M38.
base::CommandLine* command_line = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableDevToolsExperiments))
url_string += "&experiments=true";
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDevToolsFlags)) {
std::string flags = command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kDevToolsFlags);
flags = net::EscapeQueryParamValue(flags, false);
url_string += "&flags=" + flags;
}
#if defined(DEBUG_DEVTOOLS)
url_string += "&debugFrontend=true";
#endif // defined(DEBUG_DEVTOOLS)
return GURL(url_string);
}
Commit Message: [DevTools] Move sanitize url to devtools_ui.cc.
Compatibility script is not reliable enough.
BUG=653134
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2403633002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#425814}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | GURL DecorateFrontendURL(const GURL& base_url) {
std::string frontend_url = base_url.spec();
std::string url_string(
frontend_url +
((frontend_url.find("?") == std::string::npos) ? "?" : "&") +
"dockSide=undocked"); // TODO(dgozman): remove this support in M38.
base::CommandLine* command_line = base::CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableDevToolsExperiments))
url_string += "&experiments=true";
if (command_line->HasSwitch(switches::kDevToolsFlags)) {
url_string += "&" + command_line->GetSwitchValueASCII(
switches::kDevToolsFlags);
}
#if defined(DEBUG_DEVTOOLS)
url_string += "&debugFrontend=true";
#endif // defined(DEBUG_DEVTOOLS)
return GURL(url_string);
}
| 172,508 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: GBool SplashFTFont::makeGlyph(int c, int xFrac, int yFrac,
SplashGlyphBitmap *bitmap, int x0, int y0, SplashClip *clip, SplashClipResult *clipRes) {
SplashFTFontFile *ff;
FT_Vector offset;
FT_GlyphSlot slot;
FT_UInt gid;
int rowSize;
Guchar *p, *q;
int i;
ff = (SplashFTFontFile *)fontFile;
ff->face->size = sizeObj;
offset.x = (FT_Pos)(int)((SplashCoord)xFrac * splashFontFractionMul * 64);
offset.y = 0;
FT_Set_Transform(ff->face, &matrix, &offset);
slot = ff->face->glyph;
if (ff->codeToGID && c < ff->codeToGIDLen) {
gid = (FT_UInt)ff->codeToGID[c];
} else {
gid = (FT_UInt)c;
}
if (ff->trueType && gid == 0) {
return gFalse;
}
#ifdef TT_CONFIG_OPTION_BYTECODE_INTERPRETER
if (FT_Load_Glyph(ff->face, gid,
aa ? FT_LOAD_NO_BITMAP : FT_LOAD_DEFAULT)) {
return gFalse;
}
#else
if (FT_Load_Glyph(ff->face, gid,
aa ? FT_LOAD_NO_HINTING | FT_LOAD_NO_BITMAP
: FT_LOAD_DEFAULT)) {
return gFalse;
}
#endif
FT_Glyph_Metrics *glyphMetrics = &(ff->face->glyph->metrics);
bitmap->x = splashRound(-glyphMetrics->horiBearingX / 64.0);
bitmap->y = splashRound(glyphMetrics->horiBearingY / 64.0);
bitmap->w = splashRound(glyphMetrics->width / 64.0);
bitmap->h = splashRound(glyphMetrics->height / 64.0);
*clipRes = clip->testRect(x0 - bitmap->x,
y0 - bitmap->y,
x0 - bitmap->x + bitmap->w,
y0 - bitmap->y + bitmap->h);
if (*clipRes == splashClipAllOutside) {
bitmap->freeData = gFalse;
return gTrue;
}
if (FT_Render_Glyph(slot, aa ? ft_render_mode_normal
: ft_render_mode_mono)) {
return gFalse;
}
bitmap->x = -slot->bitmap_left;
bitmap->y = slot->bitmap_top;
bitmap->w = slot->bitmap.width;
bitmap->h = slot->bitmap.rows;
bitmap->aa = aa;
if (aa) {
rowSize = bitmap->w;
} else {
rowSize = (bitmap->w + 7) >> 3;
}
bitmap->data = (Guchar *)gmalloc(rowSize * bitmap->h);
bitmap->freeData = gTrue;
for (i = 0, p = bitmap->data, q = slot->bitmap.buffer;
i < bitmap->h;
++i, p += rowSize, q += slot->bitmap.pitch) {
memcpy(p, q, rowSize);
}
return gTrue;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | GBool SplashFTFont::makeGlyph(int c, int xFrac, int yFrac,
SplashGlyphBitmap *bitmap, int x0, int y0, SplashClip *clip, SplashClipResult *clipRes) {
SplashFTFontFile *ff;
FT_Vector offset;
FT_GlyphSlot slot;
FT_UInt gid;
int rowSize;
Guchar *p, *q;
int i;
ff = (SplashFTFontFile *)fontFile;
ff->face->size = sizeObj;
offset.x = (FT_Pos)(int)((SplashCoord)xFrac * splashFontFractionMul * 64);
offset.y = 0;
FT_Set_Transform(ff->face, &matrix, &offset);
slot = ff->face->glyph;
if (ff->codeToGID && c < ff->codeToGIDLen) {
gid = (FT_UInt)ff->codeToGID[c];
} else {
gid = (FT_UInt)c;
}
if (ff->trueType && gid == 0) {
return gFalse;
}
#ifdef TT_CONFIG_OPTION_BYTECODE_INTERPRETER
if (FT_Load_Glyph(ff->face, gid,
aa ? FT_LOAD_NO_BITMAP : FT_LOAD_DEFAULT)) {
return gFalse;
}
#else
if (FT_Load_Glyph(ff->face, gid,
aa ? FT_LOAD_NO_HINTING | FT_LOAD_NO_BITMAP
: FT_LOAD_DEFAULT)) {
return gFalse;
}
#endif
FT_Glyph_Metrics *glyphMetrics = &(ff->face->glyph->metrics);
bitmap->x = splashRound(-glyphMetrics->horiBearingX / 64.0);
bitmap->y = splashRound(glyphMetrics->horiBearingY / 64.0);
bitmap->w = splashRound(glyphMetrics->width / 64.0);
bitmap->h = splashRound(glyphMetrics->height / 64.0);
*clipRes = clip->testRect(x0 - bitmap->x,
y0 - bitmap->y,
x0 - bitmap->x + bitmap->w,
y0 - bitmap->y + bitmap->h);
if (*clipRes == splashClipAllOutside) {
bitmap->freeData = gFalse;
return gTrue;
}
if (FT_Render_Glyph(slot, aa ? ft_render_mode_normal
: ft_render_mode_mono)) {
return gFalse;
}
bitmap->x = -slot->bitmap_left;
bitmap->y = slot->bitmap_top;
bitmap->w = slot->bitmap.width;
bitmap->h = slot->bitmap.rows;
bitmap->aa = aa;
if (aa) {
rowSize = bitmap->w;
} else {
rowSize = (bitmap->w + 7) >> 3;
}
bitmap->data = (Guchar *)gmallocn(rowSize, bitmap->h);
bitmap->freeData = gTrue;
for (i = 0, p = bitmap->data, q = slot->bitmap.buffer;
i < bitmap->h;
++i, p += rowSize, q += slot->bitmap.pitch) {
memcpy(p, q, rowSize);
}
return gTrue;
}
| 164,621 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CreateTwoTabs(bool focus_tab_strip,
LifecycleUnit** first_lifecycle_unit,
LifecycleUnit** second_lifecycle_unit) {
if (focus_tab_strip)
source_->SetFocusedTabStripModelForTesting(tab_strip_model_.get());
task_runner_->FastForwardBy(kShortDelay);
auto time_before_first_tab = NowTicks();
EXPECT_CALL(source_observer_, OnLifecycleUnitCreated(testing::_))
.WillOnce(testing::Invoke([&](LifecycleUnit* lifecycle_unit) {
*first_lifecycle_unit = lifecycle_unit;
if (focus_tab_strip) {
EXPECT_TRUE(IsFocused(*first_lifecycle_unit));
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(time_before_first_tab,
(*first_lifecycle_unit)->GetLastFocusedTime());
}
}));
std::unique_ptr<content::WebContents> first_web_contents =
CreateAndNavigateWebContents();
content::WebContents* raw_first_web_contents = first_web_contents.get();
tab_strip_model_->AppendWebContents(std::move(first_web_contents), true);
testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&source_observer_);
EXPECT_TRUE(source_->GetTabLifecycleUnitExternal(raw_first_web_contents));
task_runner_->FastForwardBy(kShortDelay);
auto time_before_second_tab = NowTicks();
EXPECT_CALL(source_observer_, OnLifecycleUnitCreated(testing::_))
.WillOnce(testing::Invoke([&](LifecycleUnit* lifecycle_unit) {
*second_lifecycle_unit = lifecycle_unit;
if (focus_tab_strip) {
EXPECT_EQ(time_before_second_tab,
(*first_lifecycle_unit)->GetLastFocusedTime());
EXPECT_TRUE(IsFocused(*second_lifecycle_unit));
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(time_before_first_tab,
(*first_lifecycle_unit)->GetLastFocusedTime());
EXPECT_EQ(time_before_second_tab,
(*second_lifecycle_unit)->GetLastFocusedTime());
}
}));
std::unique_ptr<content::WebContents> second_web_contents =
CreateAndNavigateWebContents();
content::WebContents* raw_second_web_contents = second_web_contents.get();
tab_strip_model_->AppendWebContents(std::move(second_web_contents), true);
testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&source_observer_);
EXPECT_TRUE(source_->GetTabLifecycleUnitExternal(raw_second_web_contents));
raw_first_web_contents->WasHidden();
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | void CreateTwoTabs(bool focus_tab_strip,
LifecycleUnit** first_lifecycle_unit,
LifecycleUnit** second_lifecycle_unit) {
if (focus_tab_strip)
source_->SetFocusedTabStripModelForTesting(tab_strip_model_.get());
task_runner_->FastForwardBy(kShortDelay);
auto time_before_first_tab = NowTicks();
EXPECT_CALL(source_observer_, OnLifecycleUnitCreated(::testing::_))
.WillOnce(::testing::Invoke([&](LifecycleUnit* lifecycle_unit) {
*first_lifecycle_unit = lifecycle_unit;
if (focus_tab_strip) {
EXPECT_TRUE(IsFocused(*first_lifecycle_unit));
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(time_before_first_tab,
(*first_lifecycle_unit)->GetLastFocusedTime());
}
}));
std::unique_ptr<content::WebContents> first_web_contents =
CreateAndNavigateWebContents();
content::WebContents* raw_first_web_contents = first_web_contents.get();
tab_strip_model_->AppendWebContents(std::move(first_web_contents), true);
::testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&source_observer_);
EXPECT_TRUE(source_->GetTabLifecycleUnitExternal(raw_first_web_contents));
base::RepeatingClosure run_loop_cb = base::BindRepeating(
&base::TestMockTimeTaskRunner::RunUntilIdle, task_runner_);
testing::WaitForLocalDBEntryToBeInitialized(raw_first_web_contents,
run_loop_cb);
testing::ExpireLocalDBObservationWindows(raw_first_web_contents);
task_runner_->FastForwardBy(kShortDelay);
auto time_before_second_tab = NowTicks();
EXPECT_CALL(source_observer_, OnLifecycleUnitCreated(::testing::_))
.WillOnce(::testing::Invoke([&](LifecycleUnit* lifecycle_unit) {
*second_lifecycle_unit = lifecycle_unit;
if (focus_tab_strip) {
EXPECT_EQ(time_before_second_tab,
(*first_lifecycle_unit)->GetLastFocusedTime());
EXPECT_TRUE(IsFocused(*second_lifecycle_unit));
} else {
EXPECT_EQ(time_before_first_tab,
(*first_lifecycle_unit)->GetLastFocusedTime());
EXPECT_EQ(time_before_second_tab,
(*second_lifecycle_unit)->GetLastFocusedTime());
}
}));
std::unique_ptr<content::WebContents> second_web_contents =
CreateAndNavigateWebContents();
content::WebContents* raw_second_web_contents = second_web_contents.get();
tab_strip_model_->AppendWebContents(std::move(second_web_contents), true);
::testing::Mock::VerifyAndClear(&source_observer_);
EXPECT_TRUE(source_->GetTabLifecycleUnitExternal(raw_second_web_contents));
testing::WaitForLocalDBEntryToBeInitialized(raw_second_web_contents,
run_loop_cb);
testing::ExpireLocalDBObservationWindows(raw_second_web_contents);
raw_first_web_contents->WasHidden();
}
| 172,222 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int skt_read(int fd, void *p, size_t len)
{
int read;
struct pollfd pfd;
struct timespec ts;
FNLOG();
ts_log("skt_read recv", len, NULL);
if ((read = recv(fd, p, len, MSG_NOSIGNAL)) == -1)
{
ERROR("write failed with errno=%d\n", errno);
return -1;
}
return read;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static int skt_read(int fd, void *p, size_t len)
{
int read;
struct pollfd pfd;
struct timespec ts;
FNLOG();
ts_log("skt_read recv", len, NULL);
if ((read = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(recv(fd, p, len, MSG_NOSIGNAL))) == -1)
{
ERROR("write failed with errno=%d\n", errno);
return -1;
}
return read;
}
| 173,428 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: gsicc_open_search(const char* pname, int namelen, gs_memory_t *mem_gc,
const char* dirname, int dirlen, stream**strp)
{
char *buffer;
stream* str;
/* Check if we need to prepend the file name */
if ( dirname != NULL) {
/* If this fails, we will still try the file by itself and with
%rom% since someone may have left a space some of the spaces
as our defaults, even if they defined the directory to use.
This will occur only after searching the defined directory.
A warning is noted. */
buffer = (char *) gs_alloc_bytes(mem_gc, namelen + dirlen + 1,
"gsicc_open_search");
if (buffer == NULL)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
strcpy(buffer, dirname);
strcat(buffer, pname);
/* Just to make sure we were null terminated */
buffer[namelen + dirlen] = '\0';
str = sfopen(buffer, "r", mem_gc);
gs_free_object(mem_gc, buffer, "gsicc_open_search");
if (str != NULL) {
*strp = str;
return 0;
}
}
/* First just try it like it is */
str = sfopen(pname, "r", mem_gc);
if (str != NULL) {
*strp = str;
return 0;
}
/* If that fails, try %rom% */ /* FIXME: Not sure this is needed or correct */
strlen(DEFAULT_DIR_ICC),"gsicc_open_search");
if (buffer == NULL)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
strcpy(buffer, DEFAULT_DIR_ICC);
strcat(buffer, pname);
/* Just to make sure we were null terminated */
buffer[namelen + strlen(DEFAULT_DIR_ICC)] = '\0';
str = sfopen(buffer, "r", mem_gc);
gs_free_object(mem_gc, buffer, "gsicc_open_search");
if (str == NULL) {
gs_warn1("Could not find %s ",pname);
}
*strp = str;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | gsicc_open_search(const char* pname, int namelen, gs_memory_t *mem_gc,
const char* dirname, int dirlen, stream**strp)
{
char *buffer;
stream* str;
/* Check if we need to prepend the file name */
if ( dirname != NULL) {
/* If this fails, we will still try the file by itself and with
%rom% since someone may have left a space some of the spaces
as our defaults, even if they defined the directory to use.
This will occur only after searching the defined directory.
A warning is noted. */
buffer = (char *) gs_alloc_bytes(mem_gc, namelen + dirlen + 1,
"gsicc_open_search");
if (buffer == NULL)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
strcpy(buffer, dirname);
strcat(buffer, pname);
/* Just to make sure we were null terminated */
buffer[namelen + dirlen] = '\0';
str = sfopen(buffer, "r", mem_gc);
gs_free_object(mem_gc, buffer, "gsicc_open_search");
if (str != NULL) {
*strp = str;
return 0;
}
}
/* First just try it like it is */
if (gs_check_file_permission(mem_gc, pname, namelen, "r") >= 0) {
str = sfopen(pname, "r", mem_gc);
if (str != NULL) {
*strp = str;
return 0;
}
}
/* If that fails, try %rom% */ /* FIXME: Not sure this is needed or correct */
strlen(DEFAULT_DIR_ICC),"gsicc_open_search");
if (buffer == NULL)
return_error(gs_error_VMerror);
strcpy(buffer, DEFAULT_DIR_ICC);
strcat(buffer, pname);
/* Just to make sure we were null terminated */
buffer[namelen + strlen(DEFAULT_DIR_ICC)] = '\0';
str = sfopen(buffer, "r", mem_gc);
gs_free_object(mem_gc, buffer, "gsicc_open_search");
if (str == NULL) {
gs_warn1("Could not find %s ",pname);
}
*strp = str;
return 0;
}
| 165,265 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: asocket* find_local_socket(unsigned local_id, unsigned peer_id) {
asocket* s;
asocket* result = NULL;
adb_mutex_lock(&socket_list_lock);
for (s = local_socket_list.next; s != &local_socket_list; s = s->next) {
if (s->id != local_id) {
continue;
}
if (peer_id == 0 || (s->peer && s->peer->id == peer_id)) {
result = s;
}
break;
}
adb_mutex_unlock(&socket_list_lock);
return result;
}
Commit Message: adb: switch the socket list mutex to a recursive_mutex.
sockets.cpp was branching on whether a socket close function was
local_socket_close in order to avoid a potential deadlock if the socket
list lock was held while closing a peer socket.
Bug: http://b/28347842
Change-Id: I5e56f17fa54275284787f0f1dc150d1960256ab3
(cherry picked from commit 9b587dec6d0a57c8fe1083c1c543fbeb163d65fa)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | asocket* find_local_socket(unsigned local_id, unsigned peer_id) {
asocket* s;
asocket* result = NULL;
std::lock_guard<std::recursive_mutex> lock(local_socket_list_lock);
for (s = local_socket_list.next; s != &local_socket_list; s = s->next) {
if (s->id != local_id) {
continue;
}
if (peer_id == 0 || (s->peer && s->peer->id == peer_id)) {
result = s;
}
break;
}
return result;
}
| 174,151 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition:
{
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *defParams =
(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *)params;
if (defParams->nPortIndex >= mPorts.size()
|| defParams->nSize
!= sizeof(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
const PortInfo *port =
&mPorts.itemAt(defParams->nPortIndex);
memcpy(defParams, &port->mDef, sizeof(port->mDef));
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalGetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamPortDefinition:
{
OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *defParams =
(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(defParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (defParams->nPortIndex >= mPorts.size()
|| defParams->nSize
!= sizeof(OMX_PARAM_PORTDEFINITIONTYPE)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
const PortInfo *port =
&mPorts.itemAt(defParams->nPortIndex);
memcpy(defParams, &port->mDef, sizeof(port->mDef));
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return OMX_ErrorUnsupportedIndex;
}
}
| 174,222 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void EBMLHeader::Init()
{
m_version = 1;
m_readVersion = 1;
m_maxIdLength = 4;
m_maxSizeLength = 8;
if (m_docType)
{
delete[] m_docType;
m_docType = NULL;
}
m_docTypeVersion = 1;
m_docTypeReadVersion = 1;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void EBMLHeader::Init()
long long EBMLHeader::Parse(IMkvReader* pReader, long long& pos) {
assert(pReader);
long long total, available;
| 174,389 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static spl_filesystem_object * spl_filesystem_object_create_type(int ht, spl_filesystem_object *source, int type, zend_class_entry *ce, zval *return_value TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern;
zend_bool use_include_path = 0;
zval *arg1, *arg2;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_RuntimeException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
switch (source->type) {
case SPL_FS_INFO:
case SPL_FS_FILE:
break;
case SPL_FS_DIR:
if (!source->u.dir.entry.d_name[0]) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Could not open file");
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return NULL;
}
}
switch (type) {
case SPL_FS_INFO:
ce = ce ? ce : source->info_class;
zend_update_class_constants(ce TSRMLS_CC);
return_value->value.obj = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(ce, &intern TSRMLS_CC);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_OBJECT;
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(source TSRMLS_CC);
if (ce->constructor->common.scope != spl_ce_SplFileInfo) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(arg1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(arg1, source->file_name, source->file_name_len, 1);
zend_call_method_with_1_params(&return_value, ce, &ce->constructor, "__construct", NULL, arg1);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg1);
} else {
intern->file_name = estrndup(source->file_name, source->file_name_len);
intern->file_name_len = source->file_name_len;
intern->_path = spl_filesystem_object_get_path(source, &intern->_path_len TSRMLS_CC);
intern->_path = estrndup(intern->_path, intern->_path_len);
}
break;
case SPL_FS_FILE:
ce = ce ? ce : source->file_class;
zend_update_class_constants(ce TSRMLS_CC);
return_value->value.obj = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(ce, &intern TSRMLS_CC);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_OBJECT;
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(source TSRMLS_CC);
if (ce->constructor->common.scope != spl_ce_SplFileObject) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(arg1);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(arg2);
ZVAL_STRINGL(arg1, source->file_name, source->file_name_len, 1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(arg2, "r", 1, 1);
zend_call_method_with_2_params(&return_value, ce, &ce->constructor, "__construct", NULL, arg1, arg2);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg1);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg2);
} else {
intern->file_name = source->file_name;
intern->file_name_len = source->file_name_len;
intern->_path = spl_filesystem_object_get_path(source, &intern->_path_len TSRMLS_CC);
intern->_path = estrndup(intern->_path, intern->_path_len);
intern->u.file.open_mode = "r";
intern->u.file.open_mode_len = 1;
if (ht && zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|sbr",
&intern->u.file.open_mode, &intern->u.file.open_mode_len,
&use_include_path, &intern->u.file.zcontext) == FAILURE) {
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
intern->u.file.open_mode = NULL;
intern->file_name = NULL;
zval_dtor(return_value);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_NULL;
return NULL;
}
if (spl_filesystem_file_open(intern, use_include_path, 0 TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
zval_dtor(return_value);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_NULL;
return NULL;
}
}
break;
case SPL_FS_DIR:
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Operation not supported");
return NULL;
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return NULL;
} /* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static spl_filesystem_object * spl_filesystem_object_create_type(int ht, spl_filesystem_object *source, int type, zend_class_entry *ce, zval *return_value TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern;
zend_bool use_include_path = 0;
zval *arg1, *arg2;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_RuntimeException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
switch (source->type) {
case SPL_FS_INFO:
case SPL_FS_FILE:
break;
case SPL_FS_DIR:
if (!source->u.dir.entry.d_name[0]) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Could not open file");
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return NULL;
}
}
switch (type) {
case SPL_FS_INFO:
ce = ce ? ce : source->info_class;
zend_update_class_constants(ce TSRMLS_CC);
return_value->value.obj = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(ce, &intern TSRMLS_CC);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_OBJECT;
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(source TSRMLS_CC);
if (ce->constructor->common.scope != spl_ce_SplFileInfo) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(arg1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(arg1, source->file_name, source->file_name_len, 1);
zend_call_method_with_1_params(&return_value, ce, &ce->constructor, "__construct", NULL, arg1);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg1);
} else {
intern->file_name = estrndup(source->file_name, source->file_name_len);
intern->file_name_len = source->file_name_len;
intern->_path = spl_filesystem_object_get_path(source, &intern->_path_len TSRMLS_CC);
intern->_path = estrndup(intern->_path, intern->_path_len);
}
break;
case SPL_FS_FILE:
ce = ce ? ce : source->file_class;
zend_update_class_constants(ce TSRMLS_CC);
return_value->value.obj = spl_filesystem_object_new_ex(ce, &intern TSRMLS_CC);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_OBJECT;
spl_filesystem_object_get_file_name(source TSRMLS_CC);
if (ce->constructor->common.scope != spl_ce_SplFileObject) {
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(arg1);
MAKE_STD_ZVAL(arg2);
ZVAL_STRINGL(arg1, source->file_name, source->file_name_len, 1);
ZVAL_STRINGL(arg2, "r", 1, 1);
zend_call_method_with_2_params(&return_value, ce, &ce->constructor, "__construct", NULL, arg1, arg2);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg1);
zval_ptr_dtor(&arg2);
} else {
intern->file_name = source->file_name;
intern->file_name_len = source->file_name_len;
intern->_path = spl_filesystem_object_get_path(source, &intern->_path_len TSRMLS_CC);
intern->_path = estrndup(intern->_path, intern->_path_len);
intern->u.file.open_mode = "r";
intern->u.file.open_mode_len = 1;
if (ht && zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "|sbr",
&intern->u.file.open_mode, &intern->u.file.open_mode_len,
&use_include_path, &intern->u.file.zcontext) == FAILURE) {
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
intern->u.file.open_mode = NULL;
intern->file_name = NULL;
zval_dtor(return_value);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_NULL;
return NULL;
}
if (spl_filesystem_file_open(intern, use_include_path, 0 TSRMLS_CC) == FAILURE) {
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
zval_dtor(return_value);
Z_TYPE_P(return_value) = IS_NULL;
return NULL;
}
}
break;
case SPL_FS_DIR:
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "Operation not supported");
return NULL;
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return NULL;
} /* }}} */
| 167,082 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int php_stream_temp_set_option(php_stream *stream, int option, int value, void *ptrparam TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
php_stream_temp_data *ts = (php_stream_temp_data*)stream->abstract;
switch(option) {
case PHP_STREAM_OPTION_META_DATA_API:
if (ts->meta) {
zend_hash_copy(Z_ARRVAL_P((zval*)ptrparam), Z_ARRVAL_P(ts->meta), (copy_ctor_func_t) zval_add_ref, NULL, sizeof(zval*));
}
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_OK;
default:
if (ts->innerstream) {
return php_stream_set_option(ts->innerstream, option, value, ptrparam);
}
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_NOTIMPL;
}
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int php_stream_temp_set_option(php_stream *stream, int option, int value, void *ptrparam TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
php_stream_temp_data *ts = (php_stream_temp_data*)stream->abstract;
switch(option) {
case PHP_STREAM_OPTION_META_DATA_API:
if (ts->meta) {
zend_hash_copy(Z_ARRVAL_P((zval*)ptrparam), Z_ARRVAL_P(ts->meta), (copy_ctor_func_t) zval_add_ref, NULL, sizeof(zval*));
}
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_OK;
default:
if (ts->innerstream) {
return php_stream_set_option(ts->innerstream, option, value, ptrparam);
}
return PHP_STREAM_OPTION_RETURN_NOTIMPL;
}
}
/* }}} */
| 165,482 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void HistogramsCallback() {
MockHistogramsCallback();
QuitMessageLoop();
}
Commit Message: Migrate ServiceProcessControl tests off of QuitCurrent*Deprecated().
Bug: 844016
Change-Id: I9403b850456c8ee06cd2539f7cec9599302e81a0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1126576
Commit-Queue: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573131}
CWE ID: CWE-94 | void HistogramsCallback() {
void HistogramsCallback(base::RepeatingClosure on_done) {
MockHistogramsCallback();
on_done.Run();
}
| 172,050 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FaviconSource::SendDefaultResponse(int request_id) {
if (!default_favicon_.get()) {
default_favicon_ =
ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().LoadDataResourceBytes(
IDR_DEFAULT_FAVICON);
}
SendResponse(request_id, default_favicon_);
}
Commit Message: ntp4: show larger favicons in most visited page
extend favicon source to provide larger icons. For now, larger means at most 32x32. Also, the only icon we actually support at this resolution is the default (globe).
BUG=none
TEST=manual
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7300017
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91517 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void FaviconSource::SendDefaultResponse(int request_id) {
RefCountedMemory* bytes = NULL;
if (request_size_map_[request_id] == 32) {
if (!default_favicon_large_.get()) {
default_favicon_large_ =
ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().LoadDataResourceBytes(
IDR_DEFAULT_LARGE_FAVICON);
}
bytes = default_favicon_large_;
} else {
if (!default_favicon_.get()) {
default_favicon_ =
ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance().LoadDataResourceBytes(
IDR_DEFAULT_FAVICON);
}
bytes = default_favicon_;
}
request_size_map_.erase(request_id);
SendResponse(request_id, bytes);
}
| 170,367 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void UninstallExtension(ExtensionService* service, const std::string& id) {
if (service && service->GetInstalledExtension(id)) {
service->UninstallExtension(id,
extensions::UNINSTALL_REASON_SYNC,
base::Bind(&base::DoNothing),
NULL);
}
}
Commit Message: [Extensions] Add GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry
This CL adds GetInstalledExtension() method to ExtensionRegistry and
uses it instead of deprecated ExtensionService::GetInstalledExtension()
in chrome/browser/ui/app_list/.
Part of removing the deprecated GetInstalledExtension() call
from the ExtensionService.
BUG=489687
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1130353010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#333036}
CWE ID: | void UninstallExtension(ExtensionService* service, const std::string& id) {
if (service) {
ExtensionService::UninstallExtensionHelper(
service, id, extensions::UNINSTALL_REASON_SYNC);
}
}
| 171,722 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool IsIDNComponentSafe(base::StringPiece16 label) {
return g_idn_spoof_checker.Get().Check(label);
}
Commit Message: Block domain labels made of Cyrillic letters that look alike Latin
Block a label made entirely of Latin-look-alike Cyrillic letters when the TLD is not an IDN (i.e. this check is ON only for TLDs like 'com', 'net', 'uk', but not applied for IDN TLDs like рф.
BUG=683314
TEST=components_unittests --gtest_filter=U*IDN*
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2683793010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#459226}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool IsIDNComponentSafe(base::StringPiece16 label) {
bool IsIDNComponentSafe(base::StringPiece16 label, bool is_tld_ascii) {
return g_idn_spoof_checker.Get().Check(label, is_tld_ascii);
}
| 172,392 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ssize_t utf16_to_utf8_length(const char16_t *src, size_t src_len)
{
if (src == NULL || src_len == 0) {
return -1;
}
size_t ret = 0;
const char16_t* const end = src + src_len;
while (src < end) {
if ((*src & 0xFC00) == 0xD800 && (src + 1) < end
&& (*++src & 0xFC00) == 0xDC00) {
ret += 4;
src++;
} else {
ret += utf32_codepoint_utf8_length((char32_t) *src++);
}
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ssize_t utf16_to_utf8_length(const char16_t *src, size_t src_len)
{
if (src == NULL || src_len == 0) {
return -1;
}
size_t ret = 0;
const char16_t* const end = src + src_len;
while (src < end) {
if ((*src & 0xFC00) == 0xD800 && (src + 1) < end
&& (*(src + 1) & 0xFC00) == 0xDC00) {
ret += 4;
src += 2;
} else {
ret += utf32_codepoint_utf8_length((char32_t) *src++);
}
}
return ret;
}
| 173,420 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RunInvTxfm(int16_t *out, uint8_t *dst, int stride) {
inv_txfm_(out, dst, stride, tx_type_);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void RunInvTxfm(int16_t *out, uint8_t *dst, int stride) {
void RunInvTxfm(tran_low_t *out, uint8_t *dst, int stride) {
inv_txfm_(out, dst, stride, tx_type_);
}
| 174,525 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool NavigationRateLimiter::CanProceed() {
if (!enabled)
return true;
static constexpr int kStateUpdateLimit = 200;
static constexpr base::TimeDelta kStateUpdateLimitResetInterval =
base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(10);
if (++count_ <= kStateUpdateLimit)
return true;
const base::TimeTicks now = base::TimeTicks::Now();
if (now - time_first_count_ > kStateUpdateLimitResetInterval) {
time_first_count_ = now;
count_ = 1;
error_message_sent_ = false;
return true;
}
if (!error_message_sent_) {
error_message_sent_ = true;
if (auto* local_frame = DynamicTo<LocalFrame>(frame_.Get())) {
local_frame->Console().AddMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
mojom::ConsoleMessageSource::kJavaScript,
mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel::kWarning,
"Throttling navigation to prevent the browser from hanging. See "
"https://crbug.com/882238. Command line switch "
"--disable-ipc-flooding-protection can be used to bypass the "
"protection"));
}
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Convert FrameHostMsg_DidAddMessageToConsole to Mojo.
Note: Since this required changing the test
RenderViewImplTest.DispatchBeforeUnloadCanDetachFrame, I manually
re-introduced https://crbug.com/666714 locally (the bug the test was
added for), and reran the test to confirm that it still covers the bug.
Bug: 786836
Change-Id: I110668fa6f0f261fd2ac36bb91a8d8b31c99f4f1
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1526270
Commit-Queue: Lowell Manners <lowell@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Camille Lamy <clamy@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#653137}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | bool NavigationRateLimiter::CanProceed() {
if (!enabled)
return true;
static constexpr int kStateUpdateLimit = 200;
static constexpr base::TimeDelta kStateUpdateLimitResetInterval =
base::TimeDelta::FromSeconds(10);
if (++count_ <= kStateUpdateLimit)
return true;
const base::TimeTicks now = base::TimeTicks::Now();
if (now - time_first_count_ > kStateUpdateLimitResetInterval) {
time_first_count_ = now;
count_ = 1;
error_message_sent_ = false;
return true;
}
// the browser process with the DidAddMessageToConsole Mojo call.
if (!error_message_sent_) {
error_message_sent_ = true;
if (auto* local_frame = DynamicTo<LocalFrame>(frame_.Get())) {
local_frame->Console().AddMessage(ConsoleMessage::Create(
mojom::ConsoleMessageSource::kJavaScript,
mojom::ConsoleMessageLevel::kWarning,
"Throttling navigation to prevent the browser from hanging. See "
"https://crbug.com/882238. Command line switch "
"--disable-ipc-flooding-protection can be used to bypass the "
"protection"));
}
}
return false;
}
| 172,491 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int write_output(void)
{
int fd;
struct filter_op *fop;
struct filter_header fh;
size_t ninst, i;
u_char *data;
/* conver the tree to an array of filter_op */
ninst = compile_tree(&fop);
if (fop == NULL)
return -E_NOTHANDLED;
/* create the file */
fd = open(EF_GBL_OPTIONS->output_file, O_CREAT | O_RDWR | O_TRUNC | O_BINARY, 0644);
ON_ERROR(fd, -1, "Can't create file %s", EF_GBL_OPTIONS->output_file);
/* display the message */
fprintf(stdout, " Writing output to \'%s\' ", EF_GBL_OPTIONS->output_file);
fflush(stdout);
/* compute the header */
fh.magic = htons(EC_FILTER_MAGIC);
strncpy(fh.version, EC_VERSION, sizeof(fh.version));
fh.data = sizeof(fh);
data = create_data_segment(&fh, fop, ninst);
/* write the header */
write(fd, &fh, sizeof(struct filter_header));
/* write the data segment */
write(fd, data, fh.code - fh.data);
/* write the instructions */
for (i = 0; i <= ninst; i++) {
print_progress_bar(&fop[i]);
write(fd, &fop[i], sizeof(struct filter_op));
}
close(fd);
fprintf(stdout, " done.\n\n");
fprintf(stdout, " -> Script encoded into %d instructions.\n\n", (int)(i - 1));
return E_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Exit gracefully in case of corrupted filters (Closes issue #782)
CWE ID: CWE-125 | int write_output(void)
{
int fd;
struct filter_op *fop;
struct filter_header fh;
size_t ninst, i;
u_char *data;
/* conver the tree to an array of filter_op */
ninst = compile_tree(&fop);
if (fop == NULL)
return -E_NOTHANDLED;
if (ninst == 0)
return -E_INVALID;
/* create the file */
fd = open(EF_GBL_OPTIONS->output_file, O_CREAT | O_RDWR | O_TRUNC | O_BINARY, 0644);
ON_ERROR(fd, -1, "Can't create file %s", EF_GBL_OPTIONS->output_file);
/* display the message */
fprintf(stdout, " Writing output to \'%s\' ", EF_GBL_OPTIONS->output_file);
fflush(stdout);
/* compute the header */
fh.magic = htons(EC_FILTER_MAGIC);
strncpy(fh.version, EC_VERSION, sizeof(fh.version));
fh.data = sizeof(fh);
data = create_data_segment(&fh, fop, ninst);
/* write the header */
write(fd, &fh, sizeof(struct filter_header));
/* write the data segment */
write(fd, data, fh.code - fh.data);
/* write the instructions */
for (i = 0; i <= ninst; i++) {
print_progress_bar(&fop[i]);
write(fd, &fop[i], sizeof(struct filter_op));
}
close(fd);
fprintf(stdout, " done.\n\n");
fprintf(stdout, " -> Script encoded into %d instructions.\n\n", (int)(i - 1));
return E_SUCCESS;
}
| 168,338 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: kdc_process_s4u_x509_user(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_pa_data *pa_data,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_subkey,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_session,
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user **s4u_x509_user,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_data req_data;
req_data.length = pa_data->length;
req_data.data = (char *)pa_data->contents;
code = decode_krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user(&req_data, s4u_x509_user);
if (code)
return code;
code = verify_s4u_x509_user_checksum(context,
tgs_subkey ? tgs_subkey :
tgs_session,
&req_data,
request->nonce, *s4u_x509_user);
if (code) {
*status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_CHECKSUM";
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(context, *s4u_x509_user);
*s4u_x509_user = NULL;
return code;
}
if (krb5_princ_size(context, (*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.user) == 0 ||
(*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.subject_cert.length != 0) {
*status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_REQUEST";
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(context, *s4u_x509_user);
*s4u_x509_user = NULL;
return KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Prevent KDC unset status assertion failures
Assign status values if S4U2Self padata fails to decode, if an
S4U2Proxy request uses invalid KDC options, or if an S4U2Proxy request
uses an evidence ticket which does not match the canonicalized request
server principal name. Reported by Samuel Cabrero.
If a status value is not assigned during KDC processing, default to
"UNKNOWN_REASON" rather than failing an assertion. This change will
prevent future denial of service bugs due to similar mistakes, and
will allow us to omit assigning status values for unlikely errors such
as small memory allocation failures.
CVE-2017-11368:
In MIT krb5 1.7 and later, an authenticated attacker can cause an
assertion failure in krb5kdc by sending an invalid S4U2Self or
S4U2Proxy request.
CVSSv3 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H/E:H/RL:O/RC:C
ticket: 8599 (new)
target_version: 1.15-next
target_version: 1.14-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-617 | kdc_process_s4u_x509_user(krb5_context context,
krb5_kdc_req *request,
krb5_pa_data *pa_data,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_subkey,
krb5_keyblock *tgs_session,
krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user **s4u_x509_user,
const char **status)
{
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_data req_data;
req_data.length = pa_data->length;
req_data.data = (char *)pa_data->contents;
code = decode_krb5_pa_s4u_x509_user(&req_data, s4u_x509_user);
if (code) {
*status = "DECODE_PA_S4U_X509_USER";
return code;
}
code = verify_s4u_x509_user_checksum(context,
tgs_subkey ? tgs_subkey :
tgs_session,
&req_data,
request->nonce, *s4u_x509_user);
if (code) {
*status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_CHECKSUM";
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(context, *s4u_x509_user);
*s4u_x509_user = NULL;
return code;
}
if (krb5_princ_size(context, (*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.user) == 0 ||
(*s4u_x509_user)->user_id.subject_cert.length != 0) {
*status = "INVALID_S4U2SELF_REQUEST";
krb5_free_pa_s4u_x509_user(context, *s4u_x509_user);
*s4u_x509_user = NULL;
return KRB5KDC_ERR_C_PRINCIPAL_UNKNOWN;
}
return 0;
}
| 168,043 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: char **XListExtensions(
register Display *dpy,
int *nextensions) /* RETURN */
{
xListExtensionsReply rep;
char **list = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
_X_UNUSED register xReq *req;
unsigned long rlen = 0;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq (ListExtensions, req);
if (! _XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse)) {
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
if (rep.nExtensions) {
list = Xmalloc (rep.nExtensions * sizeof (char *));
if (rep.length > 0 && rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
rlen = rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc (rlen + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((!list) || (!ch)) {
Xfree(list);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, rlen);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chend = ch + rlen;
length = *ch;
for (i = 0; i < rep.nExtensions; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
list[i] = ch+1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
length = *ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else
list[i] = NULL;
}
}
*nextensions = count;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (list);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | char **XListExtensions(
register Display *dpy,
int *nextensions) /* RETURN */
{
xListExtensionsReply rep;
char **list = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
_X_UNUSED register xReq *req;
unsigned long rlen = 0;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetEmptyReq (ListExtensions, req);
if (! _XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, 0, xFalse)) {
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
if (rep.nExtensions) {
list = Xmalloc (rep.nExtensions * sizeof (char *));
if (rep.length > 0 && rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
rlen = rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc (rlen + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((!list) || (!ch)) {
Xfree(list);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, rlen);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chend = ch + rlen;
length = *(unsigned char *)ch;
for (i = 0; i < rep.nExtensions; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
list[i] = ch+1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
length = *(unsigned char *)ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else
list[i] = NULL;
}
}
*nextensions = count;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (list);
}
| 164,746 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_do_nothing (MyObject *obj, GError **error)
{
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_do_nothing (MyObject *obj, GError **error)
| 165,092 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: XRRGetOutputInfo (Display *dpy, XRRScreenResources *resources, RROutput output)
{
XExtDisplayInfo *info = XRRFindDisplay(dpy);
xRRGetOutputInfoReply rep;
xRRGetOutputInfoReq *req;
int nbytes, nbytesRead, rbytes;
XRROutputInfo *xoi;
RRCheckExtension (dpy, info, NULL);
LockDisplay (dpy);
GetReq (RRGetOutputInfo, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->randrReqType = X_RRGetOutputInfo;
req->output = output;
req->configTimestamp = resources->configTimestamp;
if (!_XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, OutputInfoExtra >> 2, xFalse))
{
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return NULL;
return NULL;
}
nbytes = ((long) (rep.length) << 2) - OutputInfoExtra;
nbytesRead = (long) (rep.nCrtcs * 4 +
rep.nCrtcs * sizeof (RRCrtc) +
rep.nModes * sizeof (RRMode) +
rep.nClones * sizeof (RROutput) +
rep.nameLength + 1); /* '\0' terminate name */
xoi = (XRROutputInfo *) Xmalloc(rbytes);
if (xoi == NULL) {
_XEatDataWords (dpy, rep.length - (OutputInfoExtra >> 2));
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return NULL;
}
xoi->timestamp = rep.timestamp;
xoi->crtc = rep.crtc;
xoi->mm_width = rep.mmWidth;
xoi->mm_height = rep.mmHeight;
xoi->connection = rep.connection;
xoi->subpixel_order = rep.subpixelOrder;
xoi->ncrtc = rep.nCrtcs;
xoi->crtcs = (RRCrtc *) (xoi + 1);
xoi->nmode = rep.nModes;
xoi->npreferred = rep.nPreferred;
xoi->modes = (RRMode *) (xoi->crtcs + rep.nCrtcs);
xoi->nclone = rep.nClones;
xoi->clones = (RROutput *) (xoi->modes + rep.nModes);
xoi->name = (char *) (xoi->clones + rep.nClones);
_XRead32 (dpy, (long *) xoi->crtcs, rep.nCrtcs << 2);
_XRead32 (dpy, (long *) xoi->modes, rep.nModes << 2);
_XRead32 (dpy, (long *) xoi->clones, rep.nClones << 2);
/*
* Read name and '\0' terminate
*/
_XReadPad (dpy, xoi->name, rep.nameLength);
xoi->name[rep.nameLength] = '\0';
xoi->nameLen = rep.nameLength;
/*
* Skip any extra data
*/
if (nbytes > nbytesRead)
_XEatData (dpy, (unsigned long) (nbytes - nbytesRead));
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return (XRROutputInfo *) xoi;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | XRRGetOutputInfo (Display *dpy, XRRScreenResources *resources, RROutput output)
{
XExtDisplayInfo *info = XRRFindDisplay(dpy);
xRRGetOutputInfoReply rep;
xRRGetOutputInfoReq *req;
int nbytes, nbytesRead, rbytes;
XRROutputInfo *xoi;
RRCheckExtension (dpy, info, NULL);
LockDisplay (dpy);
GetReq (RRGetOutputInfo, req);
req->reqType = info->codes->major_opcode;
req->randrReqType = X_RRGetOutputInfo;
req->output = output;
req->configTimestamp = resources->configTimestamp;
if (!_XReply (dpy, (xReply *) &rep, OutputInfoExtra >> 2, xFalse))
{
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return NULL;
return NULL;
}
if (rep.length > INT_MAX >> 2 || rep.length < (OutputInfoExtra >> 2))
{
if (rep.length > (OutputInfoExtra >> 2))
_XEatDataWords (dpy, rep.length - (OutputInfoExtra >> 2));
else
_XEatDataWords (dpy, rep.length);
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return NULL;
}
nbytes = ((long) (rep.length) << 2) - OutputInfoExtra;
nbytesRead = (long) (rep.nCrtcs * 4 +
rep.nCrtcs * sizeof (RRCrtc) +
rep.nModes * sizeof (RRMode) +
rep.nClones * sizeof (RROutput) +
rep.nameLength + 1); /* '\0' terminate name */
xoi = (XRROutputInfo *) Xmalloc(rbytes);
if (xoi == NULL) {
_XEatDataWords (dpy, rep.length - (OutputInfoExtra >> 2));
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return NULL;
}
xoi->timestamp = rep.timestamp;
xoi->crtc = rep.crtc;
xoi->mm_width = rep.mmWidth;
xoi->mm_height = rep.mmHeight;
xoi->connection = rep.connection;
xoi->subpixel_order = rep.subpixelOrder;
xoi->ncrtc = rep.nCrtcs;
xoi->crtcs = (RRCrtc *) (xoi + 1);
xoi->nmode = rep.nModes;
xoi->npreferred = rep.nPreferred;
xoi->modes = (RRMode *) (xoi->crtcs + rep.nCrtcs);
xoi->nclone = rep.nClones;
xoi->clones = (RROutput *) (xoi->modes + rep.nModes);
xoi->name = (char *) (xoi->clones + rep.nClones);
_XRead32 (dpy, (long *) xoi->crtcs, rep.nCrtcs << 2);
_XRead32 (dpy, (long *) xoi->modes, rep.nModes << 2);
_XRead32 (dpy, (long *) xoi->clones, rep.nClones << 2);
/*
* Read name and '\0' terminate
*/
_XReadPad (dpy, xoi->name, rep.nameLength);
xoi->name[rep.nameLength] = '\0';
xoi->nameLen = rep.nameLength;
/*
* Skip any extra data
*/
if (nbytes > nbytesRead)
_XEatData (dpy, (unsigned long) (nbytes - nbytesRead));
UnlockDisplay (dpy);
SyncHandle ();
return (XRROutputInfo *) xoi;
}
| 164,915 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void reference_32x32_dct_1d(const double in[32], double out[32], int stride) {
const double kInvSqrt2 = 0.707106781186547524400844362104;
for (int k = 0; k < 32; k++) {
out[k] = 0.0;
for (int n = 0; n < 32; n++)
out[k] += in[n] * cos(kPi * (2 * n + 1) * k / 64.0);
if (k == 0)
out[k] = out[k] * kInvSqrt2;
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void reference_32x32_dct_1d(const double in[32], double out[32], int stride) {
void reference_32x32_dct_1d(const double in[32], double out[32]) {
const double kInvSqrt2 = 0.707106781186547524400844362104;
for (int k = 0; k < 32; k++) {
out[k] = 0.0;
for (int n = 0; n < 32; n++)
out[k] += in[n] * cos(kPi * (2 * n + 1) * k / 64.0);
if (k == 0)
out[k] = out[k] * kInvSqrt2;
}
}
| 174,532 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::CopyToTexture(
gpu::gles2::GLES2Interface* dest_gl,
GLenum dest_target,
GLuint dest_texture_id,
bool unpack_premultiply_alpha,
bool unpack_flip_y,
const IntPoint& dest_point,
const IntRect& source_sub_rectangle) {
CheckThread();
if (!IsValid())
return false;
DCHECK(texture_holder_->IsCrossThread() ||
dest_gl != ContextProviderWrapper()->ContextProvider()->ContextGL());
EnsureMailbox(kUnverifiedSyncToken, GL_NEAREST);
dest_gl->WaitSyncTokenCHROMIUM(
texture_holder_->GetSyncToken().GetConstData());
GLuint source_texture_id = dest_gl->CreateAndConsumeTextureCHROMIUM(
texture_holder_->GetMailbox().name);
dest_gl->CopySubTextureCHROMIUM(
source_texture_id, 0, dest_target, dest_texture_id, 0, dest_point.X(),
dest_point.Y(), source_sub_rectangle.X(), source_sub_rectangle.Y(),
source_sub_rectangle.Width(), source_sub_rectangle.Height(),
unpack_flip_y ? GL_FALSE : GL_TRUE, GL_FALSE,
unpack_premultiply_alpha ? GL_FALSE : GL_TRUE);
dest_gl->DeleteTextures(1, &source_texture_id);
gpu::SyncToken sync_token;
dest_gl->GenUnverifiedSyncTokenCHROMIUM(sync_token.GetData());
texture_holder_->UpdateSyncToken(sync_token);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::CopyToTexture(
gpu::gles2::GLES2Interface* dest_gl,
GLenum dest_target,
GLuint dest_texture_id,
bool unpack_premultiply_alpha,
bool unpack_flip_y,
const IntPoint& dest_point,
const IntRect& source_sub_rectangle) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_THREAD(thread_checker_);
if (!IsValid())
return false;
DCHECK(texture_holder_->IsCrossThread() ||
dest_gl != ContextProviderWrapper()->ContextProvider()->ContextGL());
EnsureMailbox(kUnverifiedSyncToken, GL_NEAREST);
dest_gl->WaitSyncTokenCHROMIUM(
texture_holder_->GetSyncToken().GetConstData());
GLuint source_texture_id = dest_gl->CreateAndConsumeTextureCHROMIUM(
texture_holder_->GetMailbox().name);
dest_gl->CopySubTextureCHROMIUM(
source_texture_id, 0, dest_target, dest_texture_id, 0, dest_point.X(),
dest_point.Y(), source_sub_rectangle.X(), source_sub_rectangle.Y(),
source_sub_rectangle.Width(), source_sub_rectangle.Height(),
unpack_flip_y ? GL_FALSE : GL_TRUE, GL_FALSE,
unpack_premultiply_alpha ? GL_FALSE : GL_TRUE);
dest_gl->DeleteTextures(1, &source_texture_id);
gpu::SyncToken sync_token;
dest_gl->GenUnverifiedSyncTokenCHROMIUM(sync_token.GetData());
texture_holder_->UpdateSyncToken(sync_token);
return true;
}
| 172,591 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: file_continue(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
es_ptr pscratch = esp - 2;
file_enum *pfen = r_ptr(esp - 1, file_enum);
int devlen = esp[-3].value.intval;
gx_io_device *iodev = r_ptr(esp - 4, gx_io_device);
uint len = r_size(pscratch);
uint code;
if (len < devlen)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck); /* not even room for device len */
do {
memcpy((char *)pscratch->value.bytes, iodev->dname, devlen);
code = iodev->procs.enumerate_next(pfen, (char *)pscratch->value.bytes + devlen,
len - devlen);
if (code == ~(uint) 0) { /* all done */
esp -= 5; /* pop proc, pfen, devlen, iodev , mark */
return o_pop_estack;
} else if (code > len) /* overran string */
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
else if (iodev != iodev_default(imemory)
|| (check_file_permissions_reduced(i_ctx_p, (char *)pscratch->value.bytes, code + devlen, iodev, "PermitFileReading")) == 0) {
push(1);
ref_assign(op, pscratch);
r_set_size(op, code + devlen);
push_op_estack(file_continue); /* come again */
*++esp = pscratch[2]; /* proc */
return o_push_estack;
}
} while(1);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | file_continue(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
es_ptr pscratch = esp - 2;
file_enum *pfen = r_ptr(esp - 1, file_enum);
int devlen = esp[-3].value.intval;
gx_io_device *iodev = r_ptr(esp - 4, gx_io_device);
uint len = r_size(pscratch);
uint code;
if (len < devlen)
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck); /* not even room for device len */
do {
memcpy((char *)pscratch->value.bytes, iodev->dname, devlen);
code = iodev->procs.enumerate_next(pfen, (char *)pscratch->value.bytes + devlen,
len - devlen);
if (code == ~(uint) 0) { /* all done */
esp -= 5; /* pop proc, pfen, devlen, iodev , mark */
return o_pop_estack;
} else if (code > len) /* overran string */
return_error(gs_error_rangecheck);
else if (iodev != iodev_default(imemory)
|| (check_file_permissions(i_ctx_p, (char *)pscratch->value.bytes, code + devlen, iodev, "PermitFileReading")) == 0) {
push(1);
ref_assign(op, pscratch);
r_set_size(op, code + devlen);
push_op_estack(file_continue); /* come again */
*++esp = pscratch[2]; /* proc */
return o_push_estack;
}
} while(1);
}
| 165,389 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ParamTraits<GURL>::Write(Message* m, const GURL& p) {
DCHECK(p.possibly_invalid_spec().length() <= content::kMaxURLChars);
m->WriteString(p.possibly_invalid_spec());
}
Commit Message: Beware of print-read inconsistency when serializing GURLs.
BUG=165622
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11576038
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173583 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void ParamTraits<GURL>::Write(Message* m, const GURL& p) {
DCHECK(p.possibly_invalid_spec().length() <= content::kMaxURLChars);
// Beware of print-parse inconsistency which would change an invalid
// URL into a valid one. Ideally, the message would contain this flag
// so that the read side could make the check, but performing it here
// avoids changing the on-the-wire representation of such a fundamental
// type as GURL. See https://crbug.com/166486 for additional work in
// this area.
if (!p.is_valid()) {
GURL reconstructed_url(p.possibly_invalid_spec());
if (reconstructed_url.is_valid()) {
DLOG(WARNING) << "GURL string " << p.possibly_invalid_spec()
<< " (marked invalid) but parsed as valid.";
m->WriteString(std::string());
return;
}
}
m->WriteString(p.possibly_invalid_spec());
}
| 171,503 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CaptivePortalDetector::DetectCaptivePortal(
const GURL& url,
const DetectionCallback& detection_callback) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(!FetchingURL());
DCHECK(detection_callback_.is_null());
detection_callback_ = detection_callback;
url_fetcher_ = net::URLFetcher::Create(0, url, net::URLFetcher::GET, this);
url_fetcher_->SetAutomaticallyRetryOn5xx(false);
url_fetcher_->SetRequestContext(request_context_.get());
url_fetcher_->SetLoadFlags(
net::LOAD_BYPASS_CACHE |
net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SAVE_COOKIES |
net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SEND_COOKIES |
net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SEND_AUTH_DATA);
url_fetcher_->Start();
}
Commit Message: Add data usage tracking for chrome services
Add data usage tracking for captive portal, web resource and signin services
BUG=655749
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2643013004
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#445810}
CWE ID: CWE-190 | void CaptivePortalDetector::DetectCaptivePortal(
const GURL& url,
const DetectionCallback& detection_callback) {
DCHECK(CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(!FetchingURL());
DCHECK(detection_callback_.is_null());
detection_callback_ = detection_callback;
url_fetcher_ = net::URLFetcher::Create(0, url, net::URLFetcher::GET, this);
url_fetcher_->SetAutomaticallyRetryOn5xx(false);
url_fetcher_->SetRequestContext(request_context_.get());
data_use_measurement::DataUseUserData::AttachToFetcher(
url_fetcher_.get(),
data_use_measurement::DataUseUserData::CAPTIVE_PORTAL);
url_fetcher_->SetLoadFlags(
net::LOAD_BYPASS_CACHE |
net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SAVE_COOKIES |
net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SEND_COOKIES |
net::LOAD_DO_NOT_SEND_AUTH_DATA);
url_fetcher_->Start();
}
| 172,017 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: horAcc32(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
uint32* wp = (uint32*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 4;
assert((cc%(4*stride))==0);
if (wc > stride) {
wc -= stride;
do {
REPEAT4(stride, wp[stride] += wp[0]; wp++)
wc -= stride;
} while (wc > 0);
}
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_predict.h, libtiff/tif_predict.c:
Replace assertions by runtime checks to avoid assertions in debug mode,
or buffer overflows in release mode. Can happen when dealing with
unusual tile size like YCbCr with subsampling. Reported as MSVR 35105
by Axel Souchet & Vishal Chauhan from the MSRC Vulnerabilities & Mitigations
team.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | horAcc32(TIFF* tif, uint8* cp0, tmsize_t cc)
{
tmsize_t stride = PredictorState(tif)->stride;
uint32* wp = (uint32*) cp0;
tmsize_t wc = cc / 4;
if((cc%(4*stride))!=0)
{
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, "horAcc32",
"%s", "cc%(4*stride))!=0");
return 0;
}
if (wc > stride) {
wc -= stride;
do {
REPEAT4(stride, wp[stride] += wp[0]; wp++)
wc -= stride;
} while (wc > 0);
}
return 1;
}
| 166,883 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SyncTest::AddOptionalTypesToCommandLine(CommandLine* cl) {
if (!cl->HasSwitch(switches::kEnableSyncTabs))
cl->AppendSwitch(switches::kEnableSyncTabs);
}
Commit Message: [Sync] Cleanup all tab sync enabling logic now that its on by default.
BUG=none
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10443046
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@139462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void SyncTest::AddOptionalTypesToCommandLine(CommandLine* cl) {
| 170,789 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, hasChildren)
{
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_FALSE;
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool SplFileObject::getChildren()
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, hasChildren)
{
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
RETURN_FALSE;
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto bool SplFileObject::getChildren()
| 167,060 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: archive_read_format_cpio_read_header(struct archive_read *a,
struct archive_entry *entry)
{
struct cpio *cpio;
const void *h;
struct archive_string_conv *sconv;
size_t namelength;
size_t name_pad;
int r;
cpio = (struct cpio *)(a->format->data);
sconv = cpio->opt_sconv;
if (sconv == NULL) {
if (!cpio->init_default_conversion) {
cpio->sconv_default =
archive_string_default_conversion_for_read(
&(a->archive));
cpio->init_default_conversion = 1;
}
sconv = cpio->sconv_default;
}
r = (cpio->read_header(a, cpio, entry, &namelength, &name_pad));
if (r < ARCHIVE_WARN)
return (r);
/* Read name from buffer. */
h = __archive_read_ahead(a, namelength + name_pad, NULL);
if (h == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
if (archive_entry_copy_pathname_l(entry,
(const char *)h, namelength, sconv) != 0) {
if (errno == ENOMEM) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate memory for Pathname");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Pathname can't be converted from %s to current locale.",
archive_string_conversion_charset_name(sconv));
r = ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
cpio->entry_offset = 0;
__archive_read_consume(a, namelength + name_pad);
/* If this is a symlink, read the link contents. */
if (archive_entry_filetype(entry) == AE_IFLNK) {
h = __archive_read_ahead(a,
(size_t)cpio->entry_bytes_remaining, NULL);
if (h == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
if (archive_entry_copy_symlink_l(entry, (const char *)h,
(size_t)cpio->entry_bytes_remaining, sconv) != 0) {
if (errno == ENOMEM) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate memory for Linkname");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Linkname can't be converted from %s to "
"current locale.",
archive_string_conversion_charset_name(sconv));
r = ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
__archive_read_consume(a, cpio->entry_bytes_remaining);
cpio->entry_bytes_remaining = 0;
}
/* XXX TODO: If the full mode is 0160200, then this is a Solaris
* ACL description for the following entry. Read this body
* and parse it as a Solaris-style ACL, then read the next
* header. XXX */
/* Compare name to "TRAILER!!!" to test for end-of-archive. */
if (namelength == 11 && strcmp((const char *)h, "TRAILER!!!") == 0) {
/* TODO: Store file location of start of block. */
archive_clear_error(&a->archive);
return (ARCHIVE_EOF);
}
/* Detect and record hardlinks to previously-extracted entries. */
if (record_hardlink(a, cpio, entry) != ARCHIVE_OK) {
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
return (r);
}
Commit Message: Reject cpio symlinks that exceed 1MB
CWE ID: CWE-20 | archive_read_format_cpio_read_header(struct archive_read *a,
struct archive_entry *entry)
{
struct cpio *cpio;
const void *h;
struct archive_string_conv *sconv;
size_t namelength;
size_t name_pad;
int r;
cpio = (struct cpio *)(a->format->data);
sconv = cpio->opt_sconv;
if (sconv == NULL) {
if (!cpio->init_default_conversion) {
cpio->sconv_default =
archive_string_default_conversion_for_read(
&(a->archive));
cpio->init_default_conversion = 1;
}
sconv = cpio->sconv_default;
}
r = (cpio->read_header(a, cpio, entry, &namelength, &name_pad));
if (r < ARCHIVE_WARN)
return (r);
/* Read name from buffer. */
h = __archive_read_ahead(a, namelength + name_pad, NULL);
if (h == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
if (archive_entry_copy_pathname_l(entry,
(const char *)h, namelength, sconv) != 0) {
if (errno == ENOMEM) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate memory for Pathname");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Pathname can't be converted from %s to current locale.",
archive_string_conversion_charset_name(sconv));
r = ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
cpio->entry_offset = 0;
__archive_read_consume(a, namelength + name_pad);
/* If this is a symlink, read the link contents. */
if (archive_entry_filetype(entry) == AE_IFLNK) {
if (cpio->entry_bytes_remaining > 1024 * 1024) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Rejecting malformed cpio archive: symlink contents exceed 1 megabyte");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
h = __archive_read_ahead(a,
(size_t)cpio->entry_bytes_remaining, NULL);
if (h == NULL)
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
if (archive_entry_copy_symlink_l(entry, (const char *)h,
(size_t)cpio->entry_bytes_remaining, sconv) != 0) {
if (errno == ENOMEM) {
archive_set_error(&a->archive, ENOMEM,
"Can't allocate memory for Linkname");
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
archive_set_error(&a->archive,
ARCHIVE_ERRNO_FILE_FORMAT,
"Linkname can't be converted from %s to "
"current locale.",
archive_string_conversion_charset_name(sconv));
r = ARCHIVE_WARN;
}
__archive_read_consume(a, cpio->entry_bytes_remaining);
cpio->entry_bytes_remaining = 0;
}
/* XXX TODO: If the full mode is 0160200, then this is a Solaris
* ACL description for the following entry. Read this body
* and parse it as a Solaris-style ACL, then read the next
* header. XXX */
/* Compare name to "TRAILER!!!" to test for end-of-archive. */
if (namelength == 11 && strcmp((const char *)h, "TRAILER!!!") == 0) {
/* TODO: Store file location of start of block. */
archive_clear_error(&a->archive);
return (ARCHIVE_EOF);
}
/* Detect and record hardlinks to previously-extracted entries. */
if (record_hardlink(a, cpio, entry) != ARCHIVE_OK) {
return (ARCHIVE_FATAL);
}
return (r);
}
| 167,228 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ntlm_read_message_header(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_HEADER* header)
{
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 12)
return -1;
Stream_Read(s, header->Signature, 8);
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, header->MessageType);
if (strncmp((char*) header->Signature, NTLM_SIGNATURE, 8) != 0)
return -1;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8789
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | int ntlm_read_message_header(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_HEADER* header)
static int ntlm_read_message_header(wStream* s, NTLM_MESSAGE_HEADER* header)
{
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 12)
return -1;
Stream_Read(s, header->Signature, 8);
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, header->MessageType);
if (strncmp((char*) header->Signature, NTLM_SIGNATURE, 8) != 0)
return -1;
return 1;
}
| 169,278 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void msleep(uint64_t ms) {
usleep(ms * 1000);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static void msleep(uint64_t ms) {
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(usleep(ms * 1000));
}
| 173,489 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void snd_timer_user_tinterrupt(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri,
unsigned long resolution,
unsigned long ticks)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu = timeri->callback_data;
struct snd_timer_tread *r, r1;
struct timespec tstamp;
int prev, append = 0;
memset(&tstamp, 0, sizeof(tstamp));
spin_lock(&tu->qlock);
if ((tu->filter & ((1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION) |
(1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK))) == 0) {
spin_unlock(&tu->qlock);
return;
}
if (tu->last_resolution != resolution || ticks > 0) {
if (timer_tstamp_monotonic)
ktime_get_ts(&tstamp);
else
getnstimeofday(&tstamp);
}
if ((tu->filter & (1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION)) &&
tu->last_resolution != resolution) {
r1.event = SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION;
r1.tstamp = tstamp;
r1.val = resolution;
snd_timer_user_append_to_tqueue(tu, &r1);
tu->last_resolution = resolution;
append++;
}
if ((tu->filter & (1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK)) == 0)
goto __wake;
if (ticks == 0)
goto __wake;
if (tu->qused > 0) {
prev = tu->qtail == 0 ? tu->queue_size - 1 : tu->qtail - 1;
r = &tu->tqueue[prev];
if (r->event == SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK) {
r->tstamp = tstamp;
r->val += ticks;
append++;
goto __wake;
}
}
r1.event = SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK;
r1.tstamp = tstamp;
r1.val = ticks;
snd_timer_user_append_to_tqueue(tu, &r1);
append++;
__wake:
spin_unlock(&tu->qlock);
if (append == 0)
return;
kill_fasync(&tu->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
wake_up(&tu->qchange_sleep);
}
Commit Message: ALSA: timer: Fix leak in events via snd_timer_user_tinterrupt
The stack object “r1” has a total size of 32 bytes. Its field
“event” and “val” both contain 4 bytes padding. These 8 bytes
padding bytes are sent to user without being initialized.
Signed-off-by: Kangjie Lu <kjlu@gatech.edu>
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static void snd_timer_user_tinterrupt(struct snd_timer_instance *timeri,
unsigned long resolution,
unsigned long ticks)
{
struct snd_timer_user *tu = timeri->callback_data;
struct snd_timer_tread *r, r1;
struct timespec tstamp;
int prev, append = 0;
memset(&tstamp, 0, sizeof(tstamp));
spin_lock(&tu->qlock);
if ((tu->filter & ((1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION) |
(1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK))) == 0) {
spin_unlock(&tu->qlock);
return;
}
if (tu->last_resolution != resolution || ticks > 0) {
if (timer_tstamp_monotonic)
ktime_get_ts(&tstamp);
else
getnstimeofday(&tstamp);
}
if ((tu->filter & (1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION)) &&
tu->last_resolution != resolution) {
memset(&r1, 0, sizeof(r1));
r1.event = SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_RESOLUTION;
r1.tstamp = tstamp;
r1.val = resolution;
snd_timer_user_append_to_tqueue(tu, &r1);
tu->last_resolution = resolution;
append++;
}
if ((tu->filter & (1 << SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK)) == 0)
goto __wake;
if (ticks == 0)
goto __wake;
if (tu->qused > 0) {
prev = tu->qtail == 0 ? tu->queue_size - 1 : tu->qtail - 1;
r = &tu->tqueue[prev];
if (r->event == SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK) {
r->tstamp = tstamp;
r->val += ticks;
append++;
goto __wake;
}
}
r1.event = SNDRV_TIMER_EVENT_TICK;
r1.tstamp = tstamp;
r1.val = ticks;
snd_timer_user_append_to_tqueue(tu, &r1);
append++;
__wake:
spin_unlock(&tu->qlock);
if (append == 0)
return;
kill_fasync(&tu->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
wake_up(&tu->qchange_sleep);
}
| 167,236 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static zval **spl_array_get_dimension_ptr_ptr(int check_inherited, zval *object, zval *offset, int type TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
zval **retval;
char *key;
uint len;
long index;
HashTable *ht = spl_array_get_hash_table(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
if (!offset) {
return &EG(uninitialized_zval_ptr);
}
if ((type == BP_VAR_W || type == BP_VAR_RW) && (ht->nApplyCount > 0)) {
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Modification of ArrayObject during sorting is prohibited");
return &EG(error_zval_ptr);;
}
switch (Z_TYPE_P(offset)) {
case IS_STRING:
key = Z_STRVAL_P(offset);
len = Z_STRLEN_P(offset) + 1;
string_offest:
if (zend_symtable_find(ht, key, len, (void **) &retval) == FAILURE) {
switch (type) {
case BP_VAR_R:
zend_error(E_NOTICE, "Undefined index: %s", key);
case BP_VAR_UNSET:
case BP_VAR_IS:
retval = &EG(uninitialized_zval_ptr);
break;
case BP_VAR_RW:
zend_error(E_NOTICE,"Undefined index: %s", key);
case BP_VAR_W: {
zval *value;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(value);
zend_symtable_update(ht, key, len, (void**)&value, sizeof(void*), (void **)&retval);
}
}
}
return retval;
case IS_NULL:
key = "";
len = 1;
goto string_offest;
case IS_RESOURCE:
zend_error(E_STRICT, "Resource ID#%ld used as offset, casting to integer (%ld)", Z_LVAL_P(offset), Z_LVAL_P(offset));
case IS_DOUBLE:
case IS_BOOL:
case IS_LONG:
if (offset->type == IS_DOUBLE) {
index = (long)Z_DVAL_P(offset);
} else {
index = Z_LVAL_P(offset);
}
if (zend_hash_index_find(ht, index, (void **) &retval) == FAILURE) {
switch (type) {
case BP_VAR_R:
zend_error(E_NOTICE, "Undefined offset: %ld", index);
case BP_VAR_UNSET:
case BP_VAR_IS:
retval = &EG(uninitialized_zval_ptr);
break;
case BP_VAR_RW:
zend_error(E_NOTICE, "Undefined offset: %ld", index);
case BP_VAR_W: {
zval *value;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(value);
zend_hash_index_update(ht, index, (void**)&value, sizeof(void*), (void **)&retval);
}
}
}
return retval;
default:
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Illegal offset type");
return (type == BP_VAR_W || type == BP_VAR_RW) ?
&EG(error_zval_ptr) : &EG(uninitialized_zval_ptr);
}
} /* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #73029 - Missing type check when unserializing SplArray
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static zval **spl_array_get_dimension_ptr_ptr(int check_inherited, zval *object, zval *offset, int type TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
spl_array_object *intern = (spl_array_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(object TSRMLS_CC);
zval **retval;
char *key;
uint len;
long index;
HashTable *ht = spl_array_get_hash_table(intern, 0 TSRMLS_CC);
if (!offset || !ht) {
return &EG(uninitialized_zval_ptr);
}
if ((type == BP_VAR_W || type == BP_VAR_RW) && (ht->nApplyCount > 0)) {
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Modification of ArrayObject during sorting is prohibited");
return &EG(error_zval_ptr);;
}
switch (Z_TYPE_P(offset)) {
case IS_STRING:
key = Z_STRVAL_P(offset);
len = Z_STRLEN_P(offset) + 1;
string_offest:
if (zend_symtable_find(ht, key, len, (void **) &retval) == FAILURE) {
switch (type) {
case BP_VAR_R:
zend_error(E_NOTICE, "Undefined index: %s", key);
case BP_VAR_UNSET:
case BP_VAR_IS:
retval = &EG(uninitialized_zval_ptr);
break;
case BP_VAR_RW:
zend_error(E_NOTICE,"Undefined index: %s", key);
case BP_VAR_W: {
zval *value;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(value);
zend_symtable_update(ht, key, len, (void**)&value, sizeof(void*), (void **)&retval);
}
}
}
return retval;
case IS_NULL:
key = "";
len = 1;
goto string_offest;
case IS_RESOURCE:
zend_error(E_STRICT, "Resource ID#%ld used as offset, casting to integer (%ld)", Z_LVAL_P(offset), Z_LVAL_P(offset));
case IS_DOUBLE:
case IS_BOOL:
case IS_LONG:
if (offset->type == IS_DOUBLE) {
index = (long)Z_DVAL_P(offset);
} else {
index = Z_LVAL_P(offset);
}
if (zend_hash_index_find(ht, index, (void **) &retval) == FAILURE) {
switch (type) {
case BP_VAR_R:
zend_error(E_NOTICE, "Undefined offset: %ld", index);
case BP_VAR_UNSET:
case BP_VAR_IS:
retval = &EG(uninitialized_zval_ptr);
break;
case BP_VAR_RW:
zend_error(E_NOTICE, "Undefined offset: %ld", index);
case BP_VAR_W: {
zval *value;
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(value);
zend_hash_index_update(ht, index, (void**)&value, sizeof(void*), (void **)&retval);
}
}
}
return retval;
default:
zend_error(E_WARNING, "Illegal offset type");
return (type == BP_VAR_W || type == BP_VAR_RW) ?
&EG(error_zval_ptr) : &EG(uninitialized_zval_ptr);
}
} /* }}} */
| 166,931 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int bnep_add_connection(struct bnep_connadd_req *req, struct socket *sock)
{
struct net_device *dev;
struct bnep_session *s, *ss;
u8 dst[ETH_ALEN], src[ETH_ALEN];
int err;
BT_DBG("");
baswap((void *) dst, &l2cap_pi(sock->sk)->chan->dst);
baswap((void *) src, &l2cap_pi(sock->sk)->chan->src);
/* session struct allocated as private part of net_device */
dev = alloc_netdev(sizeof(struct bnep_session),
(*req->device) ? req->device : "bnep%d",
NET_NAME_UNKNOWN,
bnep_net_setup);
if (!dev)
return -ENOMEM;
down_write(&bnep_session_sem);
ss = __bnep_get_session(dst);
if (ss && ss->state == BT_CONNECTED) {
err = -EEXIST;
goto failed;
}
s = netdev_priv(dev);
/* This is rx header therefore addresses are swapped.
* ie. eh.h_dest is our local address. */
memcpy(s->eh.h_dest, &src, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(s->eh.h_source, &dst, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(dev->dev_addr, s->eh.h_dest, ETH_ALEN);
s->dev = dev;
s->sock = sock;
s->role = req->role;
s->state = BT_CONNECTED;
s->msg.msg_flags = MSG_NOSIGNAL;
#ifdef CONFIG_BT_BNEP_MC_FILTER
/* Set default mc filter */
set_bit(bnep_mc_hash(dev->broadcast), (ulong *) &s->mc_filter);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_BT_BNEP_PROTO_FILTER
/* Set default protocol filter */
bnep_set_default_proto_filter(s);
#endif
SET_NETDEV_DEV(dev, bnep_get_device(s));
SET_NETDEV_DEVTYPE(dev, &bnep_type);
err = register_netdev(dev);
if (err)
goto failed;
__bnep_link_session(s);
__module_get(THIS_MODULE);
s->task = kthread_run(bnep_session, s, "kbnepd %s", dev->name);
if (IS_ERR(s->task)) {
/* Session thread start failed, gotta cleanup. */
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
unregister_netdev(dev);
__bnep_unlink_session(s);
err = PTR_ERR(s->task);
goto failed;
}
up_write(&bnep_session_sem);
strcpy(req->device, dev->name);
return 0;
failed:
up_write(&bnep_session_sem);
free_netdev(dev);
return err;
}
Commit Message: Bluetooth: bnep: bnep_add_connection() should verify that it's dealing with l2cap socket
same story as cmtp
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | int bnep_add_connection(struct bnep_connadd_req *req, struct socket *sock)
{
struct net_device *dev;
struct bnep_session *s, *ss;
u8 dst[ETH_ALEN], src[ETH_ALEN];
int err;
BT_DBG("");
if (!l2cap_is_socket(sock))
return -EBADFD;
baswap((void *) dst, &l2cap_pi(sock->sk)->chan->dst);
baswap((void *) src, &l2cap_pi(sock->sk)->chan->src);
/* session struct allocated as private part of net_device */
dev = alloc_netdev(sizeof(struct bnep_session),
(*req->device) ? req->device : "bnep%d",
NET_NAME_UNKNOWN,
bnep_net_setup);
if (!dev)
return -ENOMEM;
down_write(&bnep_session_sem);
ss = __bnep_get_session(dst);
if (ss && ss->state == BT_CONNECTED) {
err = -EEXIST;
goto failed;
}
s = netdev_priv(dev);
/* This is rx header therefore addresses are swapped.
* ie. eh.h_dest is our local address. */
memcpy(s->eh.h_dest, &src, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(s->eh.h_source, &dst, ETH_ALEN);
memcpy(dev->dev_addr, s->eh.h_dest, ETH_ALEN);
s->dev = dev;
s->sock = sock;
s->role = req->role;
s->state = BT_CONNECTED;
s->msg.msg_flags = MSG_NOSIGNAL;
#ifdef CONFIG_BT_BNEP_MC_FILTER
/* Set default mc filter */
set_bit(bnep_mc_hash(dev->broadcast), (ulong *) &s->mc_filter);
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_BT_BNEP_PROTO_FILTER
/* Set default protocol filter */
bnep_set_default_proto_filter(s);
#endif
SET_NETDEV_DEV(dev, bnep_get_device(s));
SET_NETDEV_DEVTYPE(dev, &bnep_type);
err = register_netdev(dev);
if (err)
goto failed;
__bnep_link_session(s);
__module_get(THIS_MODULE);
s->task = kthread_run(bnep_session, s, "kbnepd %s", dev->name);
if (IS_ERR(s->task)) {
/* Session thread start failed, gotta cleanup. */
module_put(THIS_MODULE);
unregister_netdev(dev);
__bnep_unlink_session(s);
err = PTR_ERR(s->task);
goto failed;
}
up_write(&bnep_session_sem);
strcpy(req->device, dev->name);
return 0;
failed:
up_write(&bnep_session_sem);
free_netdev(dev);
return err;
}
| 167,716 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cid_parse_font_matrix( CID_Face face,
CID_Parser* parser )
{
CID_FaceDict dict;
FT_Face root = (FT_Face)&face->root;
FT_Fixed temp[6];
FT_Fixed temp_scale;
if ( parser->num_dict >= 0 && parser->num_dict < face->cid.num_dicts )
{
FT_Matrix* matrix;
FT_Vector* offset;
dict = face->cid.font_dicts + parser->num_dict;
matrix = &dict->font_matrix;
offset = &dict->font_offset;
(void)cid_parser_to_fixed_array( parser, 6, temp, 3 );
temp_scale = FT_ABS( temp[3] );
/* Set Units per EM based on FontMatrix values. We set the value to */
/* 1000 / temp_scale, because temp_scale was already multiplied by */
/* 1000 (in t1_tofixed, from psobjs.c). */
temp[5] = FT_DivFix( temp[5], temp_scale );
temp[3] = 0x10000L;
}
matrix->xx = temp[0];
matrix->yx = temp[1];
matrix->xy = temp[2];
matrix->yy = temp[3];
temp[2] = FT_DivFix( temp[2], temp_scale );
temp[4] = FT_DivFix( temp[4], temp_scale );
temp[5] = FT_DivFix( temp[5], temp_scale );
temp[3] = 0x10000L;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | cid_parse_font_matrix( CID_Face face,
CID_Parser* parser )
{
CID_FaceDict dict;
FT_Face root = (FT_Face)&face->root;
FT_Fixed temp[6];
FT_Fixed temp_scale;
if ( parser->num_dict >= 0 && parser->num_dict < face->cid.num_dicts )
{
FT_Matrix* matrix;
FT_Vector* offset;
FT_Int result;
dict = face->cid.font_dicts + parser->num_dict;
matrix = &dict->font_matrix;
offset = &dict->font_offset;
result = cid_parser_to_fixed_array( parser, 6, temp, 3 );
if ( result < 6 )
return FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
temp_scale = FT_ABS( temp[3] );
if ( temp_scale == 0 )
{
FT_ERROR(( "cid_parse_font_matrix: invalid font matrix\n" ));
return FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
}
/* Set Units per EM based on FontMatrix values. We set the value to */
/* 1000 / temp_scale, because temp_scale was already multiplied by */
/* 1000 (in t1_tofixed, from psobjs.c). */
temp[5] = FT_DivFix( temp[5], temp_scale );
temp[3] = 0x10000L;
}
matrix->xx = temp[0];
matrix->yx = temp[1];
matrix->xy = temp[2];
matrix->yy = temp[3];
temp[2] = FT_DivFix( temp[2], temp_scale );
temp[4] = FT_DivFix( temp[4], temp_scale );
temp[5] = FT_DivFix( temp[5], temp_scale );
temp[3] = temp[3] < 0 ? -0x10000L : 0x10000L;
}
| 165,341 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SocketStream::Connect() {
DCHECK(base::MessageLoop::current())
<< "The current base::MessageLoop must exist";
DCHECK_EQ(base::MessageLoop::TYPE_IO, base::MessageLoop::current()->type())
<< "The current base::MessageLoop must be TYPE_IO";
if (context_.get()) {
context_->ssl_config_service()->GetSSLConfig(&server_ssl_config_);
proxy_ssl_config_ = server_ssl_config_;
}
CheckPrivacyMode();
DCHECK_EQ(next_state_, STATE_NONE);
AddRef(); // Released in Finish()
next_state_ = STATE_BEFORE_CONNECT;
net_log_.BeginEvent(
NetLog::TYPE_SOCKET_STREAM_CONNECT,
NetLog::StringCallback("url", &url_.possibly_invalid_spec()));
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&SocketStream::DoLoop, this, OK));
}
Commit Message: Revert a workaround commit for a Use-After-Free crash.
Revert a workaround commit r20158 for a Use-After-Free issue (http://crbug.com/244746) because a cleaner CL r207218 is landed.
URLRequestContext does not inherit SupportsWeakPtr now.
R=mmenke
BUG=244746
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/16870008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@207811 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void SocketStream::Connect() {
DCHECK(base::MessageLoop::current())
<< "The current base::MessageLoop must exist";
DCHECK_EQ(base::MessageLoop::TYPE_IO, base::MessageLoop::current()->type())
<< "The current base::MessageLoop must be TYPE_IO";
if (context_) {
context_->ssl_config_service()->GetSSLConfig(&server_ssl_config_);
proxy_ssl_config_ = server_ssl_config_;
}
CheckPrivacyMode();
DCHECK_EQ(next_state_, STATE_NONE);
AddRef(); // Released in Finish()
next_state_ = STATE_BEFORE_CONNECT;
net_log_.BeginEvent(
NetLog::TYPE_SOCKET_STREAM_CONNECT,
NetLog::StringCallback("url", &url_.possibly_invalid_spec()));
base::MessageLoop::current()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::Bind(&SocketStream::DoLoop, this, OK));
}
| 171,252 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle(SWFShape shape, SWFFillStyle fill)
{
ShapeRecord record;
int idx;
if ( shape->isEnded || shape->isMorph )
return;
if(fill == NOFILL)
{
record = addStyleRecord(shape);
record.record.stateChange->leftFill = 0;
record.record.stateChange->flags |= SWF_SHAPE_FILLSTYLE0FLAG;
return;
}
idx = getFillIdx(shape, fill);
if(idx == 0) // fill not present in array
{
SWFFillStyle_addDependency(fill, (SWFCharacter)shape);
if(addFillStyle(shape, fill) < 0)
return;
idx = getFillIdx(shape, fill);
}
record = addStyleRecord(shape);
record.record.stateChange->leftFill = idx;
record.record.stateChange->flags |= SWF_SHAPE_FILLSTYLE0FLAG;
}
Commit Message: SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle: prevent fill overflow
CWE ID: CWE-119 | SWFShape_setLeftFillStyle(SWFShape shape, SWFFillStyle fill)
{
ShapeRecord record;
int idx;
if ( shape->isEnded || shape->isMorph )
return;
if(fill == NOFILL)
{
record = addStyleRecord(shape);
record.record.stateChange->leftFill = 0;
record.record.stateChange->flags |= SWF_SHAPE_FILLSTYLE0FLAG;
return;
}
idx = getFillIdx(shape, fill);
if(idx == 0) // fill not present in array
{
SWFFillStyle_addDependency(fill, (SWFCharacter)shape);
if(addFillStyle(shape, fill) < 0)
return;
idx = getFillIdx(shape, fill);
}
else if (idx >= 255 && shape->useVersion == SWF_SHAPE1)
{
SWF_error("Too many fills for SWFShape V1.\n"
"Use a higher SWFShape version\n");
}
record = addStyleRecord(shape);
record.record.stateChange->leftFill = idx;
record.record.stateChange->flags |= SWF_SHAPE_FILLSTYLE0FLAG;
}
| 169,647 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int BN_hex2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
{
BIGNUM *ret = NULL;
BN_ULONG l = 0;
int neg = 0, h, m, i, j, k, c;
int num;
if ((a == NULL) || (*a == '\0'))
return (0);
if (*a == '-') {
neg = 1;
a++;
a++;
}
for (i = 0; isxdigit((unsigned char)a[i]); i++) ;
num = i + neg;
if (bn == NULL)
return (0);
} else {
ret = *bn;
BN_zero(ret);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | int BN_hex2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
{
BIGNUM *ret = NULL;
BN_ULONG l = 0;
int neg = 0, h, m, i, j, k, c;
int num;
if ((a == NULL) || (*a == '\0'))
return (0);
if (*a == '-') {
neg = 1;
a++;
a++;
}
for (i = 0; i <= (INT_MAX/4) && isxdigit((unsigned char)a[i]); i++)
continue;
if (i > INT_MAX/4)
goto err;
num = i + neg;
if (bn == NULL)
return (0);
} else {
ret = *bn;
BN_zero(ret);
}
| 165,250 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static double outlog(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth)
{
/* The command line parameters are either 8 bit (0..255) or 16 bit (0..65535)
* and so must be adjusted for low bit depth grayscale:
*/
if (out_depth <= 8)
{
if (pm->log8 == 0) /* switched off */
return 256;
if (out_depth < 8)
return pm->log8 / 255 * ((1<<out_depth)-1);
return pm->log8;
}
if ((pm->calculations_use_input_precision ? in_depth : out_depth) == 16)
{
if (pm->log16 == 0)
return 65536;
return pm->log16;
}
/* This is the case where the value was calculated at 8-bit precision then
* scaled to 16 bits.
*/
if (pm->log8 == 0)
return 65536;
return pm->log8 * 257;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | static double outlog(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth)
static double outlog(const png_modifier *pm, int in_depth, int out_depth)
{
/* The command line parameters are either 8 bit (0..255) or 16 bit (0..65535)
* and so must be adjusted for low bit depth grayscale:
*/
if (out_depth <= 8)
{
if (pm->log8 == 0) /* switched off */
return 256;
if (out_depth < 8)
return pm->log8 / 255 * ((1<<out_depth)-1);
return pm->log8;
}
if ((pm->calculations_use_input_precision ? in_depth : out_depth) == 16)
{
if (pm->log16 == 0)
return 65536;
return pm->log16;
}
/* This is the case where the value was calculated at 8-bit precision then
* scaled to 16 bits.
*/
if (pm->log8 == 0)
return 65536;
return pm->log8 * 257;
}
| 173,675 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::useBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<IMemory> ¶ms,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer, OMX_U32 allottedSize) {
if (params == NULL || buffer == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (allottedSize > params->size()) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(params, portIndex);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_UseBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta,
allottedSize, static_cast<OMX_U8 *>(params->pointer()));
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(useBuffer, err, SIMPLE_BUFFER(
portIndex, (size_t)allottedSize, params->pointer()));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(useBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "%u(%zu)@%p", allottedSize, params->size(), params->pointer()));
return OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | status_t OMXNodeInstance::useBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, const sp<IMemory> ¶ms,
OMX::buffer_id *buffer, OMX_U32 allottedSize) {
if (params == NULL || buffer == NULL) {
ALOGE("b/25884056");
return BAD_VALUE;
}
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (allottedSize > params->size() || portIndex >= NELEM(mNumPortBuffers)) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
// metadata buffers are not connected cross process
// use a backup buffer instead of the actual buffer
BufferMeta *buffer_meta;
bool useBackup = mMetadataType[portIndex] != kMetadataBufferTypeInvalid;
OMX_U8 *data = static_cast<OMX_U8 *>(params->pointer());
// allocate backup buffer
if (useBackup) {
data = new (std::nothrow) OMX_U8[allottedSize];
if (data == NULL) {
return NO_MEMORY;
}
memset(data, 0, allottedSize);
// if we are not connecting the buffers, the sizes must match
if (allottedSize != params->size()) {
CLOG_ERROR(useBuffer, BAD_VALUE, SIMPLE_BUFFER(portIndex, (size_t)allottedSize, data));
delete[] data;
return BAD_VALUE;
}
buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(
params, portIndex, false /* copyToOmx */, false /* copyFromOmx */, data);
} else {
buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(
params, portIndex, false /* copyFromOmx */, false /* copyToOmx */, NULL);
}
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_UseBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta,
allottedSize, data);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(useBuffer, err, SIMPLE_BUFFER(
portIndex, (size_t)allottedSize, data));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(useBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(
*buffer, portIndex, "%u(%zu)@%p", allottedSize, params->size(), params->pointer()));
return OK;
}
| 174,143 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PSIR_FileWriter::ParseFileResources ( XMP_IO* fileRef, XMP_Uns32 length )
{
static const size_t kMinPSIRSize = 12; // 4+2+1+1+4
this->DeleteExistingInfo();
this->fileParsed = true;
if ( length == 0 ) return;
XMP_Int64 psirOrigin = fileRef->Offset(); // Need this to determine the resource data offsets.
XMP_Int64 fileEnd = psirOrigin + length;
char nameBuffer [260]; // The name is a PString, at 1+255+1 including length and pad.
while ( fileRef->Offset() < fileEnd ) {
if ( ! XIO::CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, kMinPSIRSize ) ) break; // Bad image resource.
XMP_Int64 thisRsrcPos = fileRef->Offset();
XMP_Uns32 type = XIO::ReadUns32_BE ( fileRef );
XMP_Uns16 id = XIO::ReadUns16_BE ( fileRef );
XMP_Uns8 nameLen = XIO::ReadUns8 ( fileRef ); // ! The length for the Pascal string.
XMP_Uns16 paddedLen = (nameLen + 2) & 0xFFFE; // ! Round up to an even total. Yes, +2!
if ( ! XIO::CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, paddedLen+4 ) ) break; // Bad image resource.
nameBuffer[0] = nameLen;
fileRef->ReadAll ( &nameBuffer[1], paddedLen-1 ); // Include the pad byte, present for zero nameLen.
XMP_Uns32 dataLen = XIO::ReadUns32_BE ( fileRef );
XMP_Uns32 dataTotal = ((dataLen + 1) & 0xFFFFFFFEUL); // Round up to an even total.
if ( ! XIO::CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, dataTotal ) ) break; // Bad image resource.
XMP_Int64 thisDataPos = fileRef->Offset();
continue;
}
InternalRsrcInfo newInfo ( id, dataLen, kIsFileBased );
InternalRsrcMap::iterator rsrcPos = this->imgRsrcs.find ( id );
if ( rsrcPos == this->imgRsrcs.end() ) {
rsrcPos = this->imgRsrcs.insert ( rsrcPos, InternalRsrcMap::value_type ( id, newInfo ) );
} else if ( (rsrcPos->second.dataLen == 0) && (newInfo.dataLen != 0) ) {
rsrcPos->second = newInfo;
} else {
fileRef->Seek ( nextRsrcPos, kXMP_SeekFromStart );
continue;
}
InternalRsrcInfo* rsrcPtr = &rsrcPos->second;
rsrcPtr->origOffset = (XMP_Uns32)thisDataPos;
if ( nameLen > 0 ) {
rsrcPtr->rsrcName = (XMP_Uns8*) malloc ( paddedLen );
if ( rsrcPtr->rsrcName == 0 ) XMP_Throw ( "Out of memory", kXMPErr_NoMemory );
memcpy ( (void*)rsrcPtr->rsrcName, nameBuffer, paddedLen ); // AUDIT: Safe, allocated enough bytes above.
}
if ( ! IsMetadataImgRsrc ( id ) ) {
fileRef->Seek ( nextRsrcPos, kXMP_SeekFromStart );
continue;
}
rsrcPtr->dataPtr = malloc ( dataTotal ); // ! Allocate after the IsMetadataImgRsrc check.
if ( rsrcPtr->dataPtr == 0 ) XMP_Throw ( "Out of memory", kXMPErr_NoMemory );
fileRef->ReadAll ( (void*)rsrcPtr->dataPtr, dataTotal );
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void PSIR_FileWriter::ParseFileResources ( XMP_IO* fileRef, XMP_Uns32 length )
{
static const size_t kMinPSIRSize = 12; // 4+2+1+1+4
this->DeleteExistingInfo();
this->fileParsed = true;
if ( length == 0 ) return;
XMP_Int64 psirOrigin = fileRef->Offset(); // Need this to determine the resource data offsets.
XMP_Int64 fileEnd = psirOrigin + length;
char nameBuffer [260]; // The name is a PString, at 1+255+1 including length and pad.
while ( fileRef->Offset() < fileEnd ) {
if ( ! XIO::CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, kMinPSIRSize ) ) break; // Bad image resource.
XMP_Int64 thisRsrcPos = fileRef->Offset();
XMP_Uns32 type = XIO::ReadUns32_BE ( fileRef );
XMP_Uns16 id = XIO::ReadUns16_BE ( fileRef );
XMP_Uns8 nameLen = XIO::ReadUns8 ( fileRef ); // ! The length for the Pascal string.
XMP_Uns16 paddedLen = (nameLen + 2) & 0xFFFE; // ! Round up to an even total. Yes, +2!
if ( ! XIO::CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, paddedLen+4 ) ) break; // Bad image resource.
nameBuffer[0] = nameLen;
fileRef->ReadAll ( &nameBuffer[1], paddedLen-1 ); // Include the pad byte, present for zero nameLen.
XMP_Uns32 dataLen = XIO::ReadUns32_BE ( fileRef );
XMP_Uns32 dataTotal = ((dataLen + 1) & 0xFFFFFFFEUL); // Round up to an even total.
// See bug https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=105204
// If dataLen is 0xffffffff, then dataTotal might be 0
// and therefor make the CheckFileSpace test pass.
if (dataTotal < dataLen) {
break;
}
if ( ! XIO::CheckFileSpace ( fileRef, dataTotal ) ) break; // Bad image resource.
XMP_Int64 thisDataPos = fileRef->Offset();
continue;
}
InternalRsrcInfo newInfo ( id, dataLen, kIsFileBased );
InternalRsrcMap::iterator rsrcPos = this->imgRsrcs.find ( id );
if ( rsrcPos == this->imgRsrcs.end() ) {
rsrcPos = this->imgRsrcs.insert ( rsrcPos, InternalRsrcMap::value_type ( id, newInfo ) );
} else if ( (rsrcPos->second.dataLen == 0) && (newInfo.dataLen != 0) ) {
rsrcPos->second = newInfo;
} else {
fileRef->Seek ( nextRsrcPos, kXMP_SeekFromStart );
continue;
}
InternalRsrcInfo* rsrcPtr = &rsrcPos->second;
rsrcPtr->origOffset = (XMP_Uns32)thisDataPos;
if ( nameLen > 0 ) {
rsrcPtr->rsrcName = (XMP_Uns8*) malloc ( paddedLen );
if ( rsrcPtr->rsrcName == 0 ) XMP_Throw ( "Out of memory", kXMPErr_NoMemory );
memcpy ( (void*)rsrcPtr->rsrcName, nameBuffer, paddedLen ); // AUDIT: Safe, allocated enough bytes above.
}
if ( ! IsMetadataImgRsrc ( id ) ) {
fileRef->Seek ( nextRsrcPos, kXMP_SeekFromStart );
continue;
}
rsrcPtr->dataPtr = malloc ( dataTotal ); // ! Allocate after the IsMetadataImgRsrc check.
if ( rsrcPtr->dataPtr == 0 ) XMP_Throw ( "Out of memory", kXMPErr_NoMemory );
fileRef->ReadAll ( (void*)rsrcPtr->dataPtr, dataTotal );
}
| 164,994 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PromoResourceService::PostNotification(int64 delay_ms) {
if (web_resource_update_scheduled_)
return;
if (delay_ms > 0) {
web_resource_update_scheduled_ = true;
MessageLoop::current()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&PromoResourceService::PromoResourceStateChange,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(delay_ms));
} else if (delay_ms == 0) {
PromoResourceStateChange();
}
}
Commit Message: Refresh promo notifications as they're fetched
The "guard" existed for notification scheduling was preventing
"turn-off a promo" and "update a promo" scenarios.
Yet I do not believe it was adding any actual safety: if things
on a server backend go wrong, the clients will be affected one
way or the other, and it is better to have an option to shut
the malformed promo down "as quickly as possible" (~in 12-24 hours).
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10696204
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@146462 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void PromoResourceService::PostNotification(int64 delay_ms) {
// Note that this could cause re-issuing a notification every time
// we receive an update from a server if something goes wrong.
// Given that this couldn't happen more frequently than every
// kCacheUpdateDelay milliseconds, we should be fine.
if (delay_ms > 0) {
MessageLoop::current()->PostDelayedTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(&PromoResourceService::PromoResourceStateChange,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr()),
base::TimeDelta::FromMilliseconds(delay_ms));
} else if (delay_ms == 0) {
PromoResourceStateChange();
}
}
| 170,781 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ntlm_populate_message_header(NTLM_MESSAGE_HEADER* header, UINT32 MessageType)
{
CopyMemory(header->Signature, NTLM_SIGNATURE, sizeof(NTLM_SIGNATURE));
header->MessageType = MessageType;
}
Commit Message: Fixed CVE-2018-8789
Thanks to Eyal Itkin from Check Point Software Technologies.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void ntlm_populate_message_header(NTLM_MESSAGE_HEADER* header, UINT32 MessageType)
static void ntlm_populate_message_header(NTLM_MESSAGE_HEADER* header, UINT32 MessageType)
{
CopyMemory(header->Signature, NTLM_SIGNATURE, sizeof(NTLM_SIGNATURE));
header->MessageType = MessageType;
}
| 169,273 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Core(const OAuthProviderInfo& info,
net::URLRequestContextGetter* request_context_getter)
: provider_info_(info),
request_context_getter_(request_context_getter),
delegate_(NULL) {
}
Commit Message: Remove UrlFetcher from remoting and use the one in net instead.
BUG=133790
TEST=Stop and restart the Me2Me host. It should still work.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10637008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@143798 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | Core(const OAuthProviderInfo& info,
net::URLRequestContextGetter* request_context_getter)
: provider_info_(info),
request_context_getter_(request_context_getter),
delegate_(NULL),
url_fetcher_type_(URL_FETCHER_NONE) {
}
| 170,805 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int jpc_pi_nextrlcp(register jpc_pi_t *pi)
{
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
int *prclyrno;
pchg = pi->pchg;
if (!pi->prgvolfirst) {
assert(pi->prcno < pi->pirlvl->numprcs);
prclyrno = &pi->pirlvl->prclyrnos[pi->prcno];
goto skip;
} else {
pi->prgvolfirst = 0;
}
for (pi->rlvlno = pchg->rlvlnostart; pi->rlvlno < pi->maxrlvls &&
pi->rlvlno < pchg->rlvlnoend; ++pi->rlvlno) {
for (pi->lyrno = 0; pi->lyrno < pi->numlyrs && pi->lyrno <
JAS_CAST(int, pchg->lyrnoend); ++pi->lyrno) {
for (pi->compno = pchg->compnostart, pi->picomp =
&pi->picomps[pi->compno]; pi->compno < pi->numcomps &&
pi->compno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->compnoend); ++pi->compno, ++pi->picomp) {
if (pi->rlvlno >= pi->picomp->numrlvls) {
continue;
}
pi->pirlvl = &pi->picomp->pirlvls[pi->rlvlno];
for (pi->prcno = 0, prclyrno = pi->pirlvl->prclyrnos;
pi->prcno < pi->pirlvl->numprcs; ++pi->prcno, ++prclyrno) {
if (pi->lyrno >= *prclyrno) {
*prclyrno = pi->lyrno;
++(*prclyrno);
return 0;
}
skip:
;
}
}
}
}
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fixed numerous integer overflow problems in the code for packet iterators
in the JPC decoder.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int jpc_pi_nextrlcp(register jpc_pi_t *pi)
{
jpc_pchg_t *pchg;
int *prclyrno;
pchg = pi->pchg;
if (!pi->prgvolfirst) {
assert(pi->prcno < pi->pirlvl->numprcs);
prclyrno = &pi->pirlvl->prclyrnos[pi->prcno];
goto skip;
} else {
pi->prgvolfirst = 0;
}
for (pi->rlvlno = pchg->rlvlnostart; pi->rlvlno < pi->maxrlvls &&
pi->rlvlno < pchg->rlvlnoend; ++pi->rlvlno) {
for (pi->lyrno = 0; pi->lyrno < pi->numlyrs && pi->lyrno <
JAS_CAST(int, pchg->lyrnoend); ++pi->lyrno) {
for (pi->compno = pchg->compnostart, pi->picomp =
&pi->picomps[pi->compno]; pi->compno < pi->numcomps &&
pi->compno < JAS_CAST(int, pchg->compnoend); ++pi->compno,
++pi->picomp) {
if (pi->rlvlno >= pi->picomp->numrlvls) {
continue;
}
pi->pirlvl = &pi->picomp->pirlvls[pi->rlvlno];
for (pi->prcno = 0, prclyrno = pi->pirlvl->prclyrnos;
pi->prcno < pi->pirlvl->numprcs; ++pi->prcno, ++prclyrno) {
if (pi->lyrno >= *prclyrno) {
*prclyrno = pi->lyrno;
++(*prclyrno);
return 0;
}
skip:
;
}
}
}
}
return 1;
}
| 169,441 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int mpeg4_decode_profile_level(MpegEncContext *s, GetBitContext *gb)
{
s->avctx->profile = get_bits(gb, 4);
s->avctx->level = get_bits(gb, 4);
if (s->avctx->profile == 0 && s->avctx->level == 8) {
s->avctx->level = 0;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Check read profile before setting it
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_7.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru Razvan Caciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int mpeg4_decode_profile_level(MpegEncContext *s, GetBitContext *gb)
static int mpeg4_decode_profile_level(MpegEncContext *s, GetBitContext *gb, int *profile, int *level)
{
*profile = get_bits(gb, 4);
*level = get_bits(gb, 4);
if (*profile == 0 && *level == 8) {
*level = 0;
}
return 0;
}
| 169,161 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void usage_exit() {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <codec> <width> <height> <infile> <outfile>\n",
exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void usage_exit() {
void usage_exit(void) {
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s <codec> <width> <height> <infile> <outfile>\n",
exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
| 174,486 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: _gnutls_server_name_recv_params (gnutls_session_t session,
const opaque * data, size_t _data_size)
{
int i;
const unsigned char *p;
uint16_t len, type;
ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
int server_names = 0;
if (session->security_parameters.entity == GNUTLS_SERVER)
{
DECR_LENGTH_RET (data_size, 2, 0);
len = _gnutls_read_uint16 (data);
if (len != data_size)
{
/* This is unexpected packet length, but
* just ignore it, for now.
*/
gnutls_assert ();
return 0;
}
p = data + 2;
/* Count all server_names in the packet. */
while (data_size > 0)
{
DECR_LENGTH_RET (data_size, 1, 0);
p++;
DECR_LEN (data_size, 2);
len = _gnutls_read_uint16 (p);
p += 2;
DECR_LENGTH_RET (data_size, len, 0);
server_names++;
p += len;
}
session->security_parameters.extensions.server_names_size =
if (server_names == 0)
return 0; /* no names found */
/* we cannot accept more server names.
*/
if (server_names > MAX_SERVER_NAME_EXTENSIONS)
server_names = MAX_SERVER_NAME_EXTENSIONS;
p = data + 2;
for (i = 0; i < server_names; i++)
server_names[i].name, p, len);
session->security_parameters.extensions.
server_names[i].name_length = len;
session->security_parameters.extensions.
server_names[i].type = GNUTLS_NAME_DNS;
break;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | _gnutls_server_name_recv_params (gnutls_session_t session,
const opaque * data, size_t _data_size)
{
int i;
const unsigned char *p;
uint16_t len, type;
ssize_t data_size = _data_size;
int server_names = 0;
if (session->security_parameters.entity == GNUTLS_SERVER)
{
DECR_LENGTH_RET (data_size, 2, 0);
len = _gnutls_read_uint16 (data);
if (len != data_size)
{
/* This is unexpected packet length, but
* just ignore it, for now.
*/
gnutls_assert ();
return 0;
}
p = data + 2;
/* Count all server_names in the packet. */
while (data_size > 0)
{
DECR_LENGTH_RET (data_size, 1, 0);
p++;
DECR_LEN (data_size, 2);
len = _gnutls_read_uint16 (p);
p += 2;
if (len > 0)
{
DECR_LENGTH_RET (data_size, len, 0);
server_names++;
p += len;
}
else
_gnutls_handshake_log
("HSK[%x]: Received zero size server name (under attack?)\n",
session);
}
/* we cannot accept more server names.
*/
if (server_names > MAX_SERVER_NAME_EXTENSIONS)
{
_gnutls_handshake_log
("HSK[%x]: Too many server names received (under attack?)\n",
session);
server_names = MAX_SERVER_NAME_EXTENSIONS;
}
session->security_parameters.extensions.server_names_size =
if (server_names == 0)
return 0; /* no names found */
p = data + 2;
for (i = 0; i < server_names; i++)
server_names[i].name, p, len);
session->security_parameters.extensions.
server_names[i].name_length = len;
session->security_parameters.extensions.
server_names[i].type = GNUTLS_NAME_DNS;
break;
}
}
| 165,145 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ext4_ext_grow_indepth(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct ext4_extent_header *neh;
struct buffer_head *bh;
ext4_fsblk_t newblock, goal = 0;
struct ext4_super_block *es = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_es;
int err = 0;
/* Try to prepend new index to old one */
if (ext_depth(inode))
goal = ext4_idx_pblock(EXT_FIRST_INDEX(ext_inode_hdr(inode)));
if (goal > le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block)) {
flags |= EXT4_MB_HINT_TRY_GOAL;
goal--;
} else
goal = ext4_inode_to_goal_block(inode);
newblock = ext4_new_meta_blocks(handle, inode, goal, flags,
NULL, &err);
if (newblock == 0)
return err;
bh = sb_getblk_gfp(inode->i_sb, newblock, __GFP_MOVABLE | GFP_NOFS);
if (unlikely(!bh))
return -ENOMEM;
lock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_journal_get_create_access(handle, bh);
if (err) {
unlock_buffer(bh);
goto out;
}
/* move top-level index/leaf into new block */
memmove(bh->b_data, EXT4_I(inode)->i_data,
sizeof(EXT4_I(inode)->i_data));
/* set size of new block */
neh = ext_block_hdr(bh);
/* old root could have indexes or leaves
* so calculate e_max right way */
if (ext_depth(inode))
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_block_idx(inode, 0));
else
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_block(inode, 0));
neh->eh_magic = EXT4_EXT_MAGIC;
ext4_extent_block_csum_set(inode, neh);
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, inode, bh);
if (err)
goto out;
/* Update top-level index: num,max,pointer */
neh = ext_inode_hdr(inode);
neh->eh_entries = cpu_to_le16(1);
ext4_idx_store_pblock(EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh), newblock);
if (neh->eh_depth == 0) {
/* Root extent block becomes index block */
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_root_idx(inode, 0));
EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh)->ei_block =
EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(neh)->ee_block;
}
ext_debug("new root: num %d(%d), lblock %d, ptr %llu\n",
le16_to_cpu(neh->eh_entries), le16_to_cpu(neh->eh_max),
le32_to_cpu(EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh)->ei_block),
ext4_idx_pblock(EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh)));
le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_depth, 1);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
out:
brelse(bh);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ext4: zero out the unused memory region in the extent tree block
This commit zeroes out the unused memory region in the buffer_head
corresponding to the extent metablock after writing the extent header
and the corresponding extent node entries.
This is done to prevent random uninitialized data from getting into
the filesystem when the extent block is synced.
This fixes CVE-2019-11833.
Signed-off-by: Sriram Rajagopalan <sriramr@arista.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int ext4_ext_grow_indepth(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct ext4_extent_header *neh;
struct buffer_head *bh;
ext4_fsblk_t newblock, goal = 0;
struct ext4_super_block *es = EXT4_SB(inode->i_sb)->s_es;
int err = 0;
size_t ext_size = 0;
/* Try to prepend new index to old one */
if (ext_depth(inode))
goal = ext4_idx_pblock(EXT_FIRST_INDEX(ext_inode_hdr(inode)));
if (goal > le32_to_cpu(es->s_first_data_block)) {
flags |= EXT4_MB_HINT_TRY_GOAL;
goal--;
} else
goal = ext4_inode_to_goal_block(inode);
newblock = ext4_new_meta_blocks(handle, inode, goal, flags,
NULL, &err);
if (newblock == 0)
return err;
bh = sb_getblk_gfp(inode->i_sb, newblock, __GFP_MOVABLE | GFP_NOFS);
if (unlikely(!bh))
return -ENOMEM;
lock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_journal_get_create_access(handle, bh);
if (err) {
unlock_buffer(bh);
goto out;
}
ext_size = sizeof(EXT4_I(inode)->i_data);
/* move top-level index/leaf into new block */
memmove(bh->b_data, EXT4_I(inode)->i_data, ext_size);
/* zero out unused area in the extent block */
memset(bh->b_data + ext_size, 0, inode->i_sb->s_blocksize - ext_size);
/* set size of new block */
neh = ext_block_hdr(bh);
/* old root could have indexes or leaves
* so calculate e_max right way */
if (ext_depth(inode))
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_block_idx(inode, 0));
else
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_block(inode, 0));
neh->eh_magic = EXT4_EXT_MAGIC;
ext4_extent_block_csum_set(inode, neh);
set_buffer_uptodate(bh);
unlock_buffer(bh);
err = ext4_handle_dirty_metadata(handle, inode, bh);
if (err)
goto out;
/* Update top-level index: num,max,pointer */
neh = ext_inode_hdr(inode);
neh->eh_entries = cpu_to_le16(1);
ext4_idx_store_pblock(EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh), newblock);
if (neh->eh_depth == 0) {
/* Root extent block becomes index block */
neh->eh_max = cpu_to_le16(ext4_ext_space_root_idx(inode, 0));
EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh)->ei_block =
EXT_FIRST_EXTENT(neh)->ee_block;
}
ext_debug("new root: num %d(%d), lblock %d, ptr %llu\n",
le16_to_cpu(neh->eh_entries), le16_to_cpu(neh->eh_max),
le32_to_cpu(EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh)->ei_block),
ext4_idx_pblock(EXT_FIRST_INDEX(neh)));
le16_add_cpu(&neh->eh_depth, 1);
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, inode);
out:
brelse(bh);
return err;
}
| 169,677 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void swizzleImageData(unsigned char* srcAddr,
size_t height,
size_t bytesPerRow,
bool flipY) {
if (flipY) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < height / 2; i++) {
size_t topRowStartPosition = i * bytesPerRow;
size_t bottomRowStartPosition = (height - 1 - i) * bytesPerRow;
if (kN32_SkColorType == kBGRA_8888_SkColorType) { // needs to swizzle
for (size_t j = 0; j < bytesPerRow; j += 4) {
std::swap(srcAddr[topRowStartPosition + j],
srcAddr[bottomRowStartPosition + j + 2]);
std::swap(srcAddr[topRowStartPosition + j + 1],
srcAddr[bottomRowStartPosition + j + 1]);
std::swap(srcAddr[topRowStartPosition + j + 2],
srcAddr[bottomRowStartPosition + j]);
std::swap(srcAddr[topRowStartPosition + j + 3],
srcAddr[bottomRowStartPosition + j + 3]);
}
} else {
std::swap_ranges(srcAddr + topRowStartPosition,
srcAddr + topRowStartPosition + bytesPerRow,
srcAddr + bottomRowStartPosition);
}
}
} else {
if (kN32_SkColorType == kBGRA_8888_SkColorType) // needs to swizzle
for (size_t i = 0; i < height * bytesPerRow; i += 4)
std::swap(srcAddr[i], srcAddr[i + 2]);
}
}
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static void swizzleImageData(unsigned char* srcAddr,
unsigned height,
unsigned bytesPerRow,
bool flipY) {
if (flipY) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < height / 2; i++) {
unsigned topRowStartPosition = i * bytesPerRow;
unsigned bottomRowStartPosition = (height - 1 - i) * bytesPerRow;
if (kN32_SkColorType == kBGRA_8888_SkColorType) { // needs to swizzle
for (unsigned j = 0; j < bytesPerRow; j += 4) {
std::swap(srcAddr[topRowStartPosition + j],
srcAddr[bottomRowStartPosition + j + 2]);
std::swap(srcAddr[topRowStartPosition + j + 1],
srcAddr[bottomRowStartPosition + j + 1]);
std::swap(srcAddr[topRowStartPosition + j + 2],
srcAddr[bottomRowStartPosition + j]);
std::swap(srcAddr[topRowStartPosition + j + 3],
srcAddr[bottomRowStartPosition + j + 3]);
}
} else {
std::swap_ranges(srcAddr + topRowStartPosition,
srcAddr + topRowStartPosition + bytesPerRow,
srcAddr + bottomRowStartPosition);
}
}
} else {
if (kN32_SkColorType == kBGRA_8888_SkColorType) // needs to swizzle
for (unsigned i = 0; i < height * bytesPerRow; i += 4)
std::swap(srcAddr[i], srcAddr[i + 2]);
}
}
| 172,506 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: delete_principal_2_svc(dprinc_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)
|| !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp), ACL_DELETE,
arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_DELETE;
log_unauth("kadm5_delete_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_delete_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_delete_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | delete_principal_2_svc(dprinc_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
ret.api_version = handle->api_version;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->princ, &prime_arg)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
if (CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)
|| !kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp), ACL_DELETE,
arg->princ, NULL)) {
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_DELETE;
log_unauth("kadm5_delete_principal", prime_arg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_delete_principal((void *)handle, arg->princ);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
log_done("kadm5_delete_principal", prime_arg, errmsg,
&client_name, &service_name, rqstp);
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg);
exit_func:
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
| 167,512 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: on_handler_vanished(GDBusConnection *connection,
const gchar *name,
gpointer user_data)
{
struct tcmur_handler *handler = user_data;
struct dbus_info *info = handler->opaque;
if (info->register_invocation) {
char *reason;
reason = g_strdup_printf("Cannot find handler bus name: "
"org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.%s",
handler->subtype);
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(info->register_invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", FALSE, reason));
g_free(reason);
}
tcmur_unregister_handler(handler);
dbus_unexport_handler(handler);
}
Commit Message: only allow dynamic UnregisterHandler for external handlers, thereby fixing DoS
Trying to unregister an internal handler ended up in a SEGFAULT, because
the tcmur_handler->opaque was NULL. Way to reproduce:
dbus-send --system --print-reply --dest=org.kernel.TCMUService1 /org/kernel/TCMUService1/HandlerManager1 org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.UnregisterHandler string:qcow
we use a newly introduced boolean in struct tcmur_handler for keeping
track of external handlers. As suggested by mikechristie adjusting the
public data structure is acceptable.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | on_handler_vanished(GDBusConnection *connection,
const gchar *name,
gpointer user_data)
{
struct tcmur_handler *handler = user_data;
struct dbus_info *info = handler->opaque;
if (info->register_invocation) {
char *reason;
reason = g_strdup_printf("Cannot find handler bus name: "
"org.kernel.TCMUService1.HandlerManager1.%s",
handler->subtype);
g_dbus_method_invocation_return_value(info->register_invocation,
g_variant_new("(bs)", FALSE, reason));
g_free(reason);
}
tcmur_unregister_dbus_handler(handler);
dbus_unexport_handler(handler);
}
| 167,632 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool omx_vdec::release_output_done(void)
{
bool bRet = false;
unsigned i=0,j=0;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Value of m_out_mem_ptr %p",m_inp_mem_ptr);
if (m_out_mem_ptr) {
for (; j < drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount ; j++) {
if (BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_out_bm_count,j)) {
break;
}
}
if (j == drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount) {
m_out_bm_count = 0;
bRet = true;
}
} else {
m_out_bm_count = 0;
bRet = true;
}
return bRet;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE mm-video-v4l2: vdec: add safety checks for freeing buffers
Allow only up to 64 buffers on input/output port (since the
allocation bitmap is only 64-wide).
Do not allow changing theactual buffer count while still
holding allocation (Client can technically negotiate
buffer count on a free/disabled port)
Add safety checks to free only as many buffers were allocated.
Fixes: Security Vulnerability - Heap Overflow and Possible Local
Privilege Escalation in MediaServer (libOmxVdec problem #3)
Bug: 27532282 27661749
Change-Id: I06dd680d43feaef3efdc87311e8a6703e234b523
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool omx_vdec::release_output_done(void)
{
bool bRet = false;
unsigned i=0,j=0;
DEBUG_PRINT_LOW("Value of m_out_mem_ptr %p",m_out_mem_ptr);
if (m_out_mem_ptr) {
for (; j < drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount ; j++) {
if (BITMASK_PRESENT(&m_out_bm_count,j)) {
break;
}
}
if (j == drv_ctx.op_buf.actualcount) {
m_out_bm_count = 0;
bRet = true;
}
} else {
m_out_bm_count = 0;
bRet = true;
}
return bRet;
}
| 173,786 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool GesturePoint::IsSecondClickInsideManhattanSquare(
const TouchEvent& event) const {
int manhattanDistance = abs(event.x() - last_tap_position_.x()) +
abs(event.y() - last_tap_position_.y());
return manhattanDistance < kMaximumTouchMoveInPixelsForClick;
}
Commit Message: Add setters for the aura gesture recognizer constants.
BUG=113227
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9372040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@122586 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool GesturePoint::IsSecondClickInsideManhattanSquare(
const TouchEvent& event) const {
int manhattanDistance = abs(event.x() - last_tap_position_.x()) +
abs(event.y() - last_tap_position_.y());
return manhattanDistance <
GestureConfiguration::max_touch_move_in_pixels_for_click();
}
| 171,046 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: php_stream *php_stream_zip_open(char *filename, char *path, char *mode STREAMS_DC TSRMLS_DC)
{
struct zip_file *zf = NULL;
int err = 0;
php_stream *stream = NULL;
struct php_zip_stream_data_t *self;
struct zip *stream_za;
if (strncmp(mode,"r", strlen("r")) != 0) {
return NULL;
}
if (filename) {
if (ZIP_OPENBASEDIR_CHECKPATH(filename)) {
return NULL;
}
/* duplicate to make the stream za independent (esp. for MSHUTDOWN) */
stream_za = zip_open(filename, ZIP_CREATE, &err);
if (!stream_za) {
return NULL;
}
zf = zip_fopen(stream_za, path, 0);
if (zf) {
self = emalloc(sizeof(*self));
self->za = stream_za;
self->zf = zf;
self->stream = NULL;
self->cursor = 0;
stream = php_stream_alloc(&php_stream_zipio_ops, self, NULL, mode);
stream->orig_path = estrdup(path);
} else {
zip_close(stream_za);
}
}
if (!stream) {
return NULL;
} else {
return stream;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | php_stream *php_stream_zip_open(char *filename, char *path, char *mode STREAMS_DC TSRMLS_DC)
{
struct zip_file *zf = NULL;
int err = 0;
php_stream *stream = NULL;
struct php_zip_stream_data_t *self;
struct zip *stream_za;
if (strncmp(mode,"r", strlen("r")) != 0) {
return NULL;
}
if (filename) {
if (ZIP_OPENBASEDIR_CHECKPATH(filename)) {
return NULL;
}
/* duplicate to make the stream za independent (esp. for MSHUTDOWN) */
stream_za = zip_open(filename, ZIP_CREATE, &err);
if (!stream_za) {
return NULL;
}
zf = zip_fopen(stream_za, path, 0);
if (zf) {
self = emalloc(sizeof(*self));
self->za = stream_za;
self->zf = zf;
self->stream = NULL;
self->cursor = 0;
stream = php_stream_alloc(&php_stream_zipio_ops, self, NULL, mode);
stream->orig_path = estrdup(path);
} else {
zip_close(stream_za);
}
}
if (!stream) {
return NULL;
} else {
return stream;
}
}
| 164,968 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void Process_ipfix_template_withdraw(exporter_ipfix_domain_t *exporter, void *DataPtr, uint32_t size_left, FlowSource_t *fs) {
ipfix_template_record_t *ipfix_template_record;
while ( size_left ) {
uint32_t id;
ipfix_template_record = (ipfix_template_record_t *)DataPtr;
size_left -= 4;
id = ntohs(ipfix_template_record->TemplateID);
if ( id == IPFIX_TEMPLATE_FLOWSET_ID ) {
remove_all_translation_tables(exporter);
ReInitExtensionMapList(fs);
} else {
remove_translation_table(fs, exporter, id);
}
DataPtr = DataPtr + 4;
if ( size_left < 4 ) {
dbg_printf("Skip %u bytes padding\n", size_left);
size_left = 0;
}
}
} // End of Process_ipfix_template_withdraw
Commit Message: Fix potential unsigned integer underflow
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static void Process_ipfix_template_withdraw(exporter_ipfix_domain_t *exporter, void *DataPtr, uint32_t size_left, FlowSource_t *fs) {
ipfix_template_record_t *ipfix_template_record;
while ( size_left ) {
uint32_t id;
if ( size_left < 4 ) {
LogError("Process_ipfix [%u] Template withdraw size error at %s line %u" ,
exporter->info.id, __FILE__, __LINE__, strerror (errno));
size_left = 0;
continue;
}
ipfix_template_record = (ipfix_template_record_t *)DataPtr;
size_left -= 4;
id = ntohs(ipfix_template_record->TemplateID);
if ( id == IPFIX_TEMPLATE_FLOWSET_ID ) {
remove_all_translation_tables(exporter);
ReInitExtensionMapList(fs);
} else {
remove_translation_table(fs, exporter, id);
}
DataPtr = DataPtr + 4;
if ( size_left < 4 ) {
dbg_printf("Skip %u bytes padding\n", size_left);
size_left = 0;
}
}
} // End of Process_ipfix_template_withdraw
| 169,583 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool AddInitialUrlToPreconnectPrediction(const GURL& initial_url,
PreconnectPrediction* prediction) {
GURL initial_origin = initial_url.GetOrigin();
static const int kMinSockets = 2;
if (!prediction->requests.empty() &&
prediction->requests.front().origin == initial_origin) {
prediction->requests.front().num_sockets =
std::max(prediction->requests.front().num_sockets, kMinSockets);
} else if (initial_origin.is_valid() &&
initial_origin.SchemeIsHTTPOrHTTPS()) {
url::Origin origin = url::Origin::Create(initial_origin);
prediction->requests.emplace(prediction->requests.begin(), initial_origin,
kMinSockets,
net::NetworkIsolationKey(origin, origin));
}
return !prediction->requests.empty();
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | bool AddInitialUrlToPreconnectPrediction(const GURL& initial_url,
PreconnectPrediction* prediction) {
url::Origin initial_origin = url::Origin::Create(initial_url);
static const int kMinSockets = 2;
if (!prediction->requests.empty() &&
prediction->requests.front().origin == initial_origin) {
prediction->requests.front().num_sockets =
std::max(prediction->requests.front().num_sockets, kMinSockets);
} else if (!initial_origin.opaque() &&
(initial_origin.scheme() == url::kHttpScheme ||
initial_origin.scheme() == url::kHttpsScheme)) {
prediction->requests.emplace(
prediction->requests.begin(), initial_origin, kMinSockets,
net::NetworkIsolationKey(initial_origin, initial_origin));
}
return !prediction->requests.empty();
}
| 172,369 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: LocalSiteCharacteristicsWebContentsObserverTest() {
scoped_feature_list_.InitAndEnableFeature(
features::kSiteCharacteristicsDatabase);
}
Commit Message: Connect the LocalDB to TabManager.
Bug: 773382
Change-Id: Iec8fe5226ee175105d51f300f30b4865478ac099
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1118611
Commit-Queue: Sébastien Marchand <sebmarchand@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: François Doray <fdoray@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572871}
CWE ID: | LocalSiteCharacteristicsWebContentsObserverTest() {
| 172,217 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void *_zend_shared_memdup(void *source, size_t size, zend_bool free_source)
{
void *old_p, *retval;
if ((old_p = zend_hash_index_find_ptr(&xlat_table, (zend_ulong)source)) != NULL) {
/* we already duplicated this pointer */
return old_p;
}
retval = ZCG(mem);
ZCG(mem) = (void*)(((char*)ZCG(mem)) + ZEND_ALIGNED_SIZE(size));
memcpy(retval, source, size);
if (free_source) {
efree(source);
}
zend_shared_alloc_register_xlat_entry(source, retval);
return retval;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void *_zend_shared_memdup(void *source, size_t size, zend_bool free_source)
{
void *old_p, *retval;
if ((old_p = zend_hash_index_find_ptr(&xlat_table, (zend_ulong)source)) != NULL) {
/* we already duplicated this pointer */
return old_p;
}
retval = ZCG(mem);
ZCG(mem) = (void*)(((char*)ZCG(mem)) + ZEND_ALIGNED_SIZE(size));
memcpy(retval, source, size);
zend_shared_alloc_register_xlat_entry(source, retval);
if (free_source) {
efree(source);
}
return retval;
}
| 164,770 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ClipboardMessageFilter::OnWriteObjectsAsync(
const ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap& objects) {
scoped_ptr<ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap> sanitized_objects(
new ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap(objects));
sanitized_objects->erase(ui::Clipboard::CBF_SMBITMAP);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(
&WriteObjectsOnUIThread, base::Owned(sanitized_objects.release())));
#else
GetClipboard()->WriteObjects(
ui::CLIPBOARD_TYPE_COPY_PASTE, *sanitized_objects.get());
#endif
}
Commit Message: Refactor ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap sanitization in ClipboardMsgFilter.
BUG=352395
R=tony@chromium.org
TBR=creis@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/200523004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@257164 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void ClipboardMessageFilter::OnWriteObjectsAsync(
const ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap& objects) {
scoped_ptr<ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap> sanitized_objects(
new ui::Clipboard::ObjectMap(objects));
SanitizeObjectMap(sanitized_objects.get(), kFilterBitmap);
#if defined(OS_WIN)
BrowserThread::PostTask(
BrowserThread::UI,
FROM_HERE,
base::Bind(
&WriteObjectsOnUIThread, base::Owned(sanitized_objects.release())));
#else
GetClipboard()->WriteObjects(
ui::CLIPBOARD_TYPE_COPY_PASTE, *sanitized_objects.get());
#endif
}
| 171,691 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintForPrintPreview(
const DictionaryValue& job_settings) {
DCHECK(is_preview_);
if (print_web_view_)
return;
if (!render_view()->webview())
return;
WebFrame* main_frame = render_view()->webview()->mainFrame();
if (!main_frame)
return;
WebDocument document = main_frame->document();
WebElement pdf_element = document.getElementById("pdf-viewer");
if (pdf_element.isNull()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
WebFrame* pdf_frame = pdf_element.document().frame();
scoped_ptr<PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint> prepare;
if (!InitPrintSettingsAndPrepareFrame(pdf_frame, &pdf_element, &prepare)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to initialize print page settings";
return;
}
if (!UpdatePrintSettings(job_settings, false)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "UpdatePrintSettings failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
return;
}
if (!RenderPagesForPrint(pdf_frame, &pdf_element, prepare.get())) {
LOG(ERROR) << "RenderPagesForPrint failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void PrintWebViewHelper::OnPrintForPrintPreview(
const DictionaryValue& job_settings) {
DCHECK(is_preview_);
if (print_web_view_)
return;
if (!render_view()->webview())
return;
WebFrame* main_frame = render_view()->webview()->mainFrame();
if (!main_frame)
return;
WebDocument document = main_frame->document();
WebElement pdf_element = document.getElementById("pdf-viewer");
if (pdf_element.isNull()) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
if (!UpdatePrintSettings(job_settings, false)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "UpdatePrintSettings failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
return;
}
WebFrame* pdf_frame = pdf_element.document().frame();
scoped_ptr<PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint> prepare;
prepare.reset(new PrepareFrameAndViewForPrint(print_pages_params_->params,
pdf_frame, &pdf_element));
UpdatePrintableSizeInPrintParameters(pdf_frame, &pdf_element, prepare.get(),
&print_pages_params_->params);
if (!RenderPagesForPrint(pdf_frame, &pdf_element, prepare.get())) {
LOG(ERROR) << "RenderPagesForPrint failed";
DidFinishPrinting(FAIL_PRINT);
}
}
| 170,261 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int extract_status_code(char *buffer, size_t size)
{
char *buf_code;
char *begin;
char *end = buffer + size;
size_t inc = 0;
int code;
/* Allocate the room */
buf_code = (char *)MALLOC(10);
/* Status-Code extraction */
while (buffer < end && *buffer++ != ' ') ;
begin = buffer;
while (buffer < end && *buffer++ != ' ')
inc++;
strncat(buf_code, begin, inc);
code = atoi(buf_code);
FREE(buf_code);
return code;
}
Commit Message: Fix buffer overflow in extract_status_code()
Issue #960 identified that the buffer allocated for copying the
HTTP status code could overflow if the http response was corrupted.
This commit changes the way the status code is read, avoids copying
data, and also ensures that the status code is three digits long,
is non-negative and occurs on the first line of the response.
Signed-off-by: Quentin Armitage <quentin@armitage.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int extract_status_code(char *buffer, size_t size)
{
char *end = buffer + size;
unsigned long code;
/* Status-Code extraction */
while (buffer < end && *buffer != ' ' && *buffer != '\r')
buffer++;
buffer++;
if (buffer + 3 >= end || *buffer == ' ' || buffer[3] != ' ')
return 0;
code = strtoul(buffer, &end, 10);
if (buffer + 3 != end)
return 0;
return code;
}
| 168,978 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static UINT drdynvc_virtual_channel_event_data_received(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc,
void* pData, UINT32 dataLength, UINT32 totalLength, UINT32 dataFlags)
{
wStream* data_in;
if ((dataFlags & CHANNEL_FLAG_SUSPEND) || (dataFlags & CHANNEL_FLAG_RESUME))
{
return CHANNEL_RC_OK;
}
if (dataFlags & CHANNEL_FLAG_FIRST)
{
if (drdynvc->data_in)
Stream_Free(drdynvc->data_in, TRUE);
drdynvc->data_in = Stream_New(NULL, totalLength);
}
if (!(data_in = drdynvc->data_in))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "Stream_New failed!");
return CHANNEL_RC_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!Stream_EnsureRemainingCapacity(data_in, (int) dataLength))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "Stream_EnsureRemainingCapacity failed!");
Stream_Free(drdynvc->data_in, TRUE);
drdynvc->data_in = NULL;
return ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
Stream_Write(data_in, pData, dataLength);
if (dataFlags & CHANNEL_FLAG_LAST)
{
if (Stream_Capacity(data_in) != Stream_GetPosition(data_in))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "drdynvc_plugin_process_received: read error");
return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
}
drdynvc->data_in = NULL;
Stream_SealLength(data_in);
Stream_SetPosition(data_in, 0);
if (!MessageQueue_Post(drdynvc->queue, NULL, 0, (void*) data_in, NULL))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "MessageQueue_Post failed!");
return ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
}
return CHANNEL_RC_OK;
}
Commit Message: Fix for #4866: Added additional length checks
CWE ID: | static UINT drdynvc_virtual_channel_event_data_received(drdynvcPlugin* drdynvc,
void* pData, UINT32 dataLength, UINT32 totalLength, UINT32 dataFlags)
{
wStream* data_in;
if ((dataFlags & CHANNEL_FLAG_SUSPEND) || (dataFlags & CHANNEL_FLAG_RESUME))
{
return CHANNEL_RC_OK;
}
if (dataFlags & CHANNEL_FLAG_FIRST)
{
if (drdynvc->data_in)
Stream_Free(drdynvc->data_in, TRUE);
drdynvc->data_in = Stream_New(NULL, totalLength);
}
if (!(data_in = drdynvc->data_in))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "Stream_New failed!");
return CHANNEL_RC_NO_MEMORY;
}
if (!Stream_EnsureRemainingCapacity(data_in, dataLength))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "Stream_EnsureRemainingCapacity failed!");
Stream_Free(drdynvc->data_in, TRUE);
drdynvc->data_in = NULL;
return ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
Stream_Write(data_in, pData, dataLength);
if (dataFlags & CHANNEL_FLAG_LAST)
{
if (Stream_Capacity(data_in) != Stream_GetPosition(data_in))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "drdynvc_plugin_process_received: read error");
return ERROR_INVALID_DATA;
}
drdynvc->data_in = NULL;
Stream_SealLength(data_in);
Stream_SetPosition(data_in, 0);
if (!MessageQueue_Post(drdynvc->queue, NULL, 0, (void*) data_in, NULL))
{
WLog_Print(drdynvc->log, WLOG_ERROR, "MessageQueue_Post failed!");
return ERROR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
}
return CHANNEL_RC_OK;
}
| 168,939 |
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