instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
(BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) {
verbose("BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX &&
((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM &&
BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_XADD) || insn->imm != 0)) {
verbose("BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) {
struct bpf_map *map;
struct fd f;
if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 ||
insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 ||
insn[1].off != 0) {
verbose("invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn->src_reg == 0)
/* valid generic load 64-bit imm */
goto next_insn;
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) {
verbose("unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
f = fdget(insn->imm);
map = __bpf_map_get(f);
if (IS_ERR(map)) {
verbose("fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n",
insn->imm);
return PTR_ERR(map);
}
/* store map pointer inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
insn[0].imm = (u32) (unsigned long) map;
insn[1].imm = ((u64) (unsigned long) map) >> 32;
/* check whether we recorded this map already */
for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++)
if (env->used_maps[j] == map) {
fdput(f);
goto next_insn;
}
if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) {
fdput(f);
return -E2BIG;
}
/* remember this map */
env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map;
/* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier,
* the map will be released by release_maps() or it
* will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded
* and all maps are released in free_bpf_prog_info()
*/
bpf_map_inc(map, false);
fdput(f);
next_insn:
insn++;
i++;
}
}
/* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid
* 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd.
* These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access.
*/
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | static int replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr(struct verifier_env *env)
{
struct bpf_insn *insn = env->prog->insnsi;
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len;
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_LDX &&
(BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM || insn->imm != 0)) {
verbose("BPF_LDX uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (BPF_CLASS(insn->code) == BPF_STX &&
((BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_MEM &&
BPF_MODE(insn->code) != BPF_XADD) || insn->imm != 0)) {
verbose("BPF_STX uses reserved fields\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn[0].code == (BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW)) {
struct bpf_map *map;
struct fd f;
if (i == insn_cnt - 1 || insn[1].code != 0 ||
insn[1].dst_reg != 0 || insn[1].src_reg != 0 ||
insn[1].off != 0) {
verbose("invalid bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (insn->src_reg == 0)
/* valid generic load 64-bit imm */
goto next_insn;
if (insn->src_reg != BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD) {
verbose("unrecognized bpf_ld_imm64 insn\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
f = fdget(insn->imm);
map = __bpf_map_get(f);
if (IS_ERR(map)) {
verbose("fd %d is not pointing to valid bpf_map\n",
insn->imm);
return PTR_ERR(map);
}
/* store map pointer inside BPF_LD_IMM64 instruction */
insn[0].imm = (u32) (unsigned long) map;
insn[1].imm = ((u64) (unsigned long) map) >> 32;
/* check whether we recorded this map already */
for (j = 0; j < env->used_map_cnt; j++)
if (env->used_maps[j] == map) {
fdput(f);
goto next_insn;
}
if (env->used_map_cnt >= MAX_USED_MAPS) {
fdput(f);
return -E2BIG;
}
/* hold the map. If the program is rejected by verifier,
* the map will be released by release_maps() or it
* will be used by the valid program until it's unloaded
* and all maps are released in free_bpf_prog_info()
*/
map = bpf_map_inc(map, false);
if (IS_ERR(map)) {
fdput(f);
return PTR_ERR(map);
}
env->used_maps[env->used_map_cnt++] = map;
fdput(f);
next_insn:
insn++;
i++;
}
}
/* now all pseudo BPF_LD_IMM64 instructions load valid
* 'struct bpf_map *' into a register instead of user map_fd.
* These pointers will be used later by verifier to validate map access.
*/
return 0;
}
| 167,255 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static PassRefPtr<StaticBitmapImage> cropImage(
Image* image,
const ParsedOptions& parsedOptions,
AlphaDisposition imageFormat = PremultiplyAlpha,
ImageDecoder::ColorSpaceOption colorSpaceOp =
ImageDecoder::ColorSpaceApplied) {
ASSERT(image);
IntRect imgRect(IntPoint(), IntSize(image->width(), image->height()));
const IntRect srcRect = intersection(imgRect, parsedOptions.cropRect);
if (srcRect.isEmpty() && !parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha) {
SkImageInfo info =
SkImageInfo::Make(parsedOptions.resizeWidth, parsedOptions.resizeHeight,
kN32_SkColorType, kUnpremul_SkAlphaType);
RefPtr<ArrayBuffer> dstBuffer = ArrayBuffer::createOrNull(
static_cast<size_t>(info.width()) * info.height(),
info.bytesPerPixel());
if (!dstBuffer)
return nullptr;
RefPtr<Uint8Array> dstPixels =
Uint8Array::create(dstBuffer, 0, dstBuffer->byteLength());
return StaticBitmapImage::create(newSkImageFromRaster(
info, std::move(dstPixels),
static_cast<size_t>(info.width()) * info.bytesPerPixel()));
}
sk_sp<SkImage> skiaImage = image->imageForCurrentFrame();
if ((((!parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha && !skiaImage->isOpaque()) ||
!skiaImage) &&
image->data() && imageFormat == PremultiplyAlpha) ||
colorSpaceOp == ImageDecoder::ColorSpaceIgnored) {
std::unique_ptr<ImageDecoder> decoder(ImageDecoder::create(
image->data(), true,
parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha ? ImageDecoder::AlphaPremultiplied
: ImageDecoder::AlphaNotPremultiplied,
colorSpaceOp));
if (!decoder)
return nullptr;
skiaImage = ImageBitmap::getSkImageFromDecoder(std::move(decoder));
if (!skiaImage)
return nullptr;
}
if (parsedOptions.cropRect == srcRect && !parsedOptions.shouldScaleInput) {
sk_sp<SkImage> croppedSkImage = skiaImage->makeSubset(srcRect);
if (parsedOptions.flipY)
return StaticBitmapImage::create(flipSkImageVertically(
croppedSkImage.get(), parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha
? PremultiplyAlpha
: DontPremultiplyAlpha));
if (parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha && imageFormat == DontPremultiplyAlpha)
return StaticBitmapImage::create(
unPremulSkImageToPremul(croppedSkImage.get()));
croppedSkImage->preroll();
return StaticBitmapImage::create(std::move(croppedSkImage));
}
sk_sp<SkSurface> surface = SkSurface::MakeRasterN32Premul(
parsedOptions.resizeWidth, parsedOptions.resizeHeight);
if (!surface)
return nullptr;
if (srcRect.isEmpty())
return StaticBitmapImage::create(surface->makeImageSnapshot());
SkScalar dstLeft = std::min(0, -parsedOptions.cropRect.x());
SkScalar dstTop = std::min(0, -parsedOptions.cropRect.y());
if (parsedOptions.cropRect.x() < 0)
dstLeft = -parsedOptions.cropRect.x();
if (parsedOptions.cropRect.y() < 0)
dstTop = -parsedOptions.cropRect.y();
if (parsedOptions.flipY) {
surface->getCanvas()->translate(0, surface->height());
surface->getCanvas()->scale(1, -1);
}
if (parsedOptions.shouldScaleInput) {
SkRect drawSrcRect = SkRect::MakeXYWH(
parsedOptions.cropRect.x(), parsedOptions.cropRect.y(),
parsedOptions.cropRect.width(), parsedOptions.cropRect.height());
SkRect drawDstRect = SkRect::MakeXYWH(0, 0, parsedOptions.resizeWidth,
parsedOptions.resizeHeight);
SkPaint paint;
paint.setFilterQuality(parsedOptions.resizeQuality);
surface->getCanvas()->drawImageRect(skiaImage, drawSrcRect, drawDstRect,
&paint);
} else {
surface->getCanvas()->drawImage(skiaImage, dstLeft, dstTop);
}
skiaImage = surface->makeImageSnapshot();
if (parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha) {
if (imageFormat == DontPremultiplyAlpha)
return StaticBitmapImage::create(
unPremulSkImageToPremul(skiaImage.get()));
return StaticBitmapImage::create(std::move(skiaImage));
}
return StaticBitmapImage::create(premulSkImageToUnPremul(skiaImage.get()));
}
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static PassRefPtr<StaticBitmapImage> cropImage(
Image* image,
const ParsedOptions& parsedOptions,
AlphaDisposition imageFormat = PremultiplyAlpha,
ImageDecoder::ColorSpaceOption colorSpaceOp =
ImageDecoder::ColorSpaceApplied) {
ASSERT(image);
IntRect imgRect(IntPoint(), IntSize(image->width(), image->height()));
const IntRect srcRect = intersection(imgRect, parsedOptions.cropRect);
if (srcRect.isEmpty() && !parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha) {
SkImageInfo info =
SkImageInfo::Make(parsedOptions.resizeWidth, parsedOptions.resizeHeight,
kN32_SkColorType, kUnpremul_SkAlphaType);
RefPtr<ArrayBuffer> dstBuffer = ArrayBuffer::createOrNull(
static_cast<unsigned>(info.width()) * info.height(),
info.bytesPerPixel());
if (!dstBuffer)
return nullptr;
RefPtr<Uint8Array> dstPixels =
Uint8Array::create(dstBuffer, 0, dstBuffer->byteLength());
return StaticBitmapImage::create(newSkImageFromRaster(
info, std::move(dstPixels),
static_cast<unsigned>(info.width()) * info.bytesPerPixel()));
}
sk_sp<SkImage> skiaImage = image->imageForCurrentFrame();
if ((((!parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha && !skiaImage->isOpaque()) ||
!skiaImage) &&
image->data() && imageFormat == PremultiplyAlpha) ||
colorSpaceOp == ImageDecoder::ColorSpaceIgnored) {
std::unique_ptr<ImageDecoder> decoder(ImageDecoder::create(
image->data(), true,
parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha ? ImageDecoder::AlphaPremultiplied
: ImageDecoder::AlphaNotPremultiplied,
colorSpaceOp));
if (!decoder)
return nullptr;
skiaImage = ImageBitmap::getSkImageFromDecoder(std::move(decoder));
if (!skiaImage)
return nullptr;
}
if (parsedOptions.cropRect == srcRect && !parsedOptions.shouldScaleInput) {
sk_sp<SkImage> croppedSkImage = skiaImage->makeSubset(srcRect);
if (parsedOptions.flipY)
return StaticBitmapImage::create(flipSkImageVertically(
croppedSkImage.get(), parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha
? PremultiplyAlpha
: DontPremultiplyAlpha));
if (parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha && imageFormat == DontPremultiplyAlpha)
return StaticBitmapImage::create(
unPremulSkImageToPremul(croppedSkImage.get()));
croppedSkImage->preroll();
return StaticBitmapImage::create(std::move(croppedSkImage));
}
sk_sp<SkSurface> surface = SkSurface::MakeRasterN32Premul(
parsedOptions.resizeWidth, parsedOptions.resizeHeight);
if (!surface)
return nullptr;
if (srcRect.isEmpty())
return StaticBitmapImage::create(surface->makeImageSnapshot());
SkScalar dstLeft = std::min(0, -parsedOptions.cropRect.x());
SkScalar dstTop = std::min(0, -parsedOptions.cropRect.y());
if (parsedOptions.cropRect.x() < 0)
dstLeft = -parsedOptions.cropRect.x();
if (parsedOptions.cropRect.y() < 0)
dstTop = -parsedOptions.cropRect.y();
if (parsedOptions.flipY) {
surface->getCanvas()->translate(0, surface->height());
surface->getCanvas()->scale(1, -1);
}
if (parsedOptions.shouldScaleInput) {
SkRect drawSrcRect = SkRect::MakeXYWH(
parsedOptions.cropRect.x(), parsedOptions.cropRect.y(),
parsedOptions.cropRect.width(), parsedOptions.cropRect.height());
SkRect drawDstRect = SkRect::MakeXYWH(0, 0, parsedOptions.resizeWidth,
parsedOptions.resizeHeight);
SkPaint paint;
paint.setFilterQuality(parsedOptions.resizeQuality);
surface->getCanvas()->drawImageRect(skiaImage, drawSrcRect, drawDstRect,
&paint);
} else {
surface->getCanvas()->drawImage(skiaImage, dstLeft, dstTop);
}
skiaImage = surface->makeImageSnapshot();
if (parsedOptions.premultiplyAlpha) {
if (imageFormat == DontPremultiplyAlpha)
return StaticBitmapImage::create(
unPremulSkImageToPremul(skiaImage.get()));
return StaticBitmapImage::create(std::move(skiaImage));
}
return StaticBitmapImage::create(premulSkImageToUnPremul(skiaImage.get()));
}
| 172,500 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int inet6_csk_xmit(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl_unused)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int res;
dst = inet6_csk_route_socket(sk, &fl6);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
sk->sk_err_soft = -PTR_ERR(dst);
sk->sk_route_caps = 0;
kfree_skb(skb);
return PTR_ERR(dst);
}
rcu_read_lock();
skb_dst_set_noref(skb, dst);
/* Restore final destination back after routing done */
fl6.daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
res = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, np->opt, np->tclass);
rcu_read_unlock();
return res;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | int inet6_csk_xmit(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct flowi *fl_unused)
{
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct flowi6 fl6;
struct dst_entry *dst;
int res;
dst = inet6_csk_route_socket(sk, &fl6);
if (IS_ERR(dst)) {
sk->sk_err_soft = -PTR_ERR(dst);
sk->sk_route_caps = 0;
kfree_skb(skb);
return PTR_ERR(dst);
}
rcu_read_lock();
skb_dst_set_noref(skb, dst);
/* Restore final destination back after routing done */
fl6.daddr = sk->sk_v6_daddr;
res = ip6_xmit(sk, skb, &fl6, rcu_dereference(np->opt),
np->tclass);
rcu_read_unlock();
return res;
}
| 167,334 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE6(mbind, compat_ulong_t, start, compat_ulong_t, len,
compat_ulong_t, mode, compat_ulong_t __user *, nmask,
compat_ulong_t, maxnode, compat_ulong_t, flags)
{
long err = 0;
unsigned long __user *nm = NULL;
unsigned long nr_bits, alloc_size;
nodemask_t bm;
nr_bits = min_t(unsigned long, maxnode-1, MAX_NUMNODES);
alloc_size = ALIGN(nr_bits, BITS_PER_LONG) / 8;
if (nmask) {
err = compat_get_bitmap(nodes_addr(bm), nmask, nr_bits);
nm = compat_alloc_user_space(alloc_size);
err |= copy_to_user(nm, nodes_addr(bm), alloc_size);
}
if (err)
return -EFAULT;
return sys_mbind(start, len, mode, nm, nr_bits+1, flags);
}
Commit Message: mm/mempolicy.c: fix error handling in set_mempolicy and mbind.
In the case that compat_get_bitmap fails we do not want to copy the
bitmap to the user as it will contain uninitialized stack data and leak
sensitive data.
Signed-off-by: Chris Salls <salls@cs.ucsb.edu>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-388 | COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE6(mbind, compat_ulong_t, start, compat_ulong_t, len,
compat_ulong_t, mode, compat_ulong_t __user *, nmask,
compat_ulong_t, maxnode, compat_ulong_t, flags)
{
unsigned long __user *nm = NULL;
unsigned long nr_bits, alloc_size;
nodemask_t bm;
nr_bits = min_t(unsigned long, maxnode-1, MAX_NUMNODES);
alloc_size = ALIGN(nr_bits, BITS_PER_LONG) / 8;
if (nmask) {
if (compat_get_bitmap(nodes_addr(bm), nmask, nr_bits))
return -EFAULT;
nm = compat_alloc_user_space(alloc_size);
if (copy_to_user(nm, nodes_addr(bm), alloc_size))
return -EFAULT;
}
return sys_mbind(start, len, mode, nm, nr_bits+1, flags);
}
| 168,258 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int *size,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
const char *name)
{
struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
unsigned int entry_offset;
unsigned int j;
int ret, off, h;
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) >= limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset < sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) +
sizeof(struct compat_xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
ret = check_entry((struct ip6t_entry *)e);
if (ret)
return ret;
off = sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry);
entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
j = 0;
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
ret = compat_find_calc_match(ematch, name, &e->ipv6, &off);
if (ret != 0)
goto release_matches;
++j;
}
t = compat_ip6t_get_target(e);
target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_IPV6, t->u.user.name,
t->u.user.revision);
if (IS_ERR(target)) {
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks: `%s' not found\n",
t->u.user.name);
ret = PTR_ERR(target);
goto release_matches;
}
t->u.kernel.target = target;
off += xt_compat_target_offset(target);
*size += off;
ret = xt_compat_add_offset(AF_INET6, entry_offset, off);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
out:
module_put(t->u.kernel.target->me);
release_matches:
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
if (j-- == 0)
break;
module_put(ematch->u.kernel.match->me);
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: x_tables: make sure e->next_offset covers remaining blob size
Otherwise this function may read data beyond the ruleset blob.
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks(struct compat_ip6t_entry *e,
struct xt_table_info *newinfo,
unsigned int *size,
const unsigned char *base,
const unsigned char *limit,
const unsigned int *hook_entries,
const unsigned int *underflows,
const char *name)
{
struct xt_entry_match *ematch;
struct xt_entry_target *t;
struct xt_target *target;
unsigned int entry_offset;
unsigned int j;
int ret, off, h;
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks %p\n", e);
if ((unsigned long)e % __alignof__(struct compat_ip6t_entry) != 0 ||
(unsigned char *)e + sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) >= limit ||
(unsigned char *)e + e->next_offset > limit) {
duprintf("Bad offset %p, limit = %p\n", e, limit);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (e->next_offset < sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry) +
sizeof(struct compat_xt_entry_target)) {
duprintf("checking: element %p size %u\n",
e, e->next_offset);
return -EINVAL;
}
/* For purposes of check_entry casting the compat entry is fine */
ret = check_entry((struct ip6t_entry *)e);
if (ret)
return ret;
off = sizeof(struct ip6t_entry) - sizeof(struct compat_ip6t_entry);
entry_offset = (void *)e - (void *)base;
j = 0;
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
ret = compat_find_calc_match(ematch, name, &e->ipv6, &off);
if (ret != 0)
goto release_matches;
++j;
}
t = compat_ip6t_get_target(e);
target = xt_request_find_target(NFPROTO_IPV6, t->u.user.name,
t->u.user.revision);
if (IS_ERR(target)) {
duprintf("check_compat_entry_size_and_hooks: `%s' not found\n",
t->u.user.name);
ret = PTR_ERR(target);
goto release_matches;
}
t->u.kernel.target = target;
off += xt_compat_target_offset(target);
*size += off;
ret = xt_compat_add_offset(AF_INET6, entry_offset, off);
if (ret)
goto out;
/* Check hooks & underflows */
for (h = 0; h < NF_INET_NUMHOOKS; h++) {
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == hook_entries[h])
newinfo->hook_entry[h] = hook_entries[h];
if ((unsigned char *)e - base == underflows[h])
newinfo->underflow[h] = underflows[h];
}
/* Clear counters and comefrom */
memset(&e->counters, 0, sizeof(e->counters));
e->comefrom = 0;
return 0;
out:
module_put(t->u.kernel.target->me);
release_matches:
xt_ematch_foreach(ematch, e) {
if (j-- == 0)
break;
module_put(ematch->u.kernel.match->me);
}
return ret;
}
| 167,213 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void IBusBusGlobalEngineChangedCallback(
IBusBus* bus, const gchar* engine_name, gpointer user_data) {
DCHECK(engine_name);
DLOG(INFO) << "Global engine is changed to " << engine_name;
g_return_if_fail(user_data);
InputMethodStatusConnection* self
= static_cast<InputMethodStatusConnection*>(user_data);
self->UpdateUI(engine_name);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void IBusBusGlobalEngineChangedCallback(
void IBusBusGlobalEngineChanged(IBusBus* bus, const gchar* engine_name) {
DCHECK(engine_name);
VLOG(1) << "Global engine is changed to " << engine_name;
UpdateUI(engine_name);
}
| 170,538 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(locale_accept_from_http)
{
UEnumeration *available;
char *http_accept = NULL;
int http_accept_len;
UErrorCode status = 0;
int len;
char resultLocale[INTL_MAX_LOCALE_LEN+1];
UAcceptResult outResult;
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &http_accept, &http_accept_len) == FAILURE)
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_accept_from_http: unable to parse input parameters", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
available = ures_openAvailableLocales(NULL, &status);
INTL_CHECK_STATUS(status, "locale_accept_from_http: failed to retrieve locale list");
len = uloc_acceptLanguageFromHTTP(resultLocale, INTL_MAX_LOCALE_LEN,
&outResult, http_accept, available, &status);
uenum_close(available);
INTL_CHECK_STATUS(status, "locale_accept_from_http: failed to find acceptable locale");
if (len < 0 || outResult == ULOC_ACCEPT_FAILED) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_STRINGL(resultLocale, len, 1);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | PHP_FUNCTION(locale_accept_from_http)
{
UEnumeration *available;
char *http_accept = NULL;
int http_accept_len;
UErrorCode status = 0;
int len;
char resultLocale[INTL_MAX_LOCALE_LEN+1];
UAcceptResult outResult;
if(zend_parse_parameters( ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "s", &http_accept, &http_accept_len) == FAILURE)
{
intl_error_set( NULL, U_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR,
"locale_accept_from_http: unable to parse input parameters", 0 TSRMLS_CC );
RETURN_FALSE;
}
available = ures_openAvailableLocales(NULL, &status);
INTL_CHECK_STATUS(status, "locale_accept_from_http: failed to retrieve locale list");
len = uloc_acceptLanguageFromHTTP(resultLocale, INTL_MAX_LOCALE_LEN,
&outResult, http_accept, available, &status);
uenum_close(available);
INTL_CHECK_STATUS(status, "locale_accept_from_http: failed to find acceptable locale");
if (len < 0 || outResult == ULOC_ACCEPT_FAILED) {
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_STRINGL(resultLocale, len, 1);
}
| 167,195 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ff_h264_free_tables(H264Context *h, int free_rbsp)
{
int i;
H264Context *hx;
av_freep(&h->intra4x4_pred_mode);
av_freep(&h->chroma_pred_mode_table);
av_freep(&h->cbp_table);
av_freep(&h->mvd_table[0]);
av_freep(&h->mvd_table[1]);
av_freep(&h->direct_table);
av_freep(&h->non_zero_count);
av_freep(&h->slice_table_base);
h->slice_table = NULL;
av_freep(&h->list_counts);
av_freep(&h->mb2b_xy);
av_freep(&h->mb2br_xy);
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->qscale_table_pool);
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->mb_type_pool);
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->motion_val_pool);
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->ref_index_pool);
if (free_rbsp && h->DPB) {
for (i = 0; i < H264_MAX_PICTURE_COUNT; i++)
ff_h264_unref_picture(h, &h->DPB[i]);
av_freep(&h->DPB);
} else if (h->DPB) {
for (i = 0; i < H264_MAX_PICTURE_COUNT; i++)
h->DPB[i].needs_realloc = 1;
}
h->cur_pic_ptr = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < H264_MAX_THREADS; i++) {
hx = h->thread_context[i];
if (!hx)
continue;
av_freep(&hx->top_borders[1]);
av_freep(&hx->top_borders[0]);
av_freep(&hx->bipred_scratchpad);
av_freep(&hx->edge_emu_buffer);
av_freep(&hx->dc_val_base);
av_freep(&hx->er.mb_index2xy);
av_freep(&hx->er.error_status_table);
av_freep(&hx->er.er_temp_buffer);
av_freep(&hx->er.mbintra_table);
av_freep(&hx->er.mbskip_table);
if (free_rbsp) {
av_freep(&hx->rbsp_buffer[1]);
av_freep(&hx->rbsp_buffer[0]);
hx->rbsp_buffer_size[0] = 0;
hx->rbsp_buffer_size[1] = 0;
}
if (i)
av_freep(&h->thread_context[i]);
}
}
Commit Message: avcodec/h264: Clear delayed_pic on deallocation
Fixes use of freed memory
Fixes: case5_av_frame_copy_props.mp4
Found-by: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@coredump.cx>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: | void ff_h264_free_tables(H264Context *h, int free_rbsp)
{
int i;
H264Context *hx;
av_freep(&h->intra4x4_pred_mode);
av_freep(&h->chroma_pred_mode_table);
av_freep(&h->cbp_table);
av_freep(&h->mvd_table[0]);
av_freep(&h->mvd_table[1]);
av_freep(&h->direct_table);
av_freep(&h->non_zero_count);
av_freep(&h->slice_table_base);
h->slice_table = NULL;
av_freep(&h->list_counts);
av_freep(&h->mb2b_xy);
av_freep(&h->mb2br_xy);
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->qscale_table_pool);
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->mb_type_pool);
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->motion_val_pool);
av_buffer_pool_uninit(&h->ref_index_pool);
if (free_rbsp && h->DPB) {
for (i = 0; i < H264_MAX_PICTURE_COUNT; i++)
ff_h264_unref_picture(h, &h->DPB[i]);
memset(h->delayed_pic, 0, sizeof(h->delayed_pic));
av_freep(&h->DPB);
} else if (h->DPB) {
for (i = 0; i < H264_MAX_PICTURE_COUNT; i++)
h->DPB[i].needs_realloc = 1;
}
h->cur_pic_ptr = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < H264_MAX_THREADS; i++) {
hx = h->thread_context[i];
if (!hx)
continue;
av_freep(&hx->top_borders[1]);
av_freep(&hx->top_borders[0]);
av_freep(&hx->bipred_scratchpad);
av_freep(&hx->edge_emu_buffer);
av_freep(&hx->dc_val_base);
av_freep(&hx->er.mb_index2xy);
av_freep(&hx->er.error_status_table);
av_freep(&hx->er.er_temp_buffer);
av_freep(&hx->er.mbintra_table);
av_freep(&hx->er.mbskip_table);
if (free_rbsp) {
av_freep(&hx->rbsp_buffer[1]);
av_freep(&hx->rbsp_buffer[0]);
hx->rbsp_buffer_size[0] = 0;
hx->rbsp_buffer_size[1] = 0;
}
if (i)
av_freep(&h->thread_context[i]);
}
}
| 166,624 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE3(rt_sigqueueinfo, pid_t, pid, int, sig,
siginfo_t __user *, uinfo)
{
siginfo_t info;
if (copy_from_user(&info, uinfo, sizeof(siginfo_t)))
return -EFAULT;
/* Not even root can pretend to send signals from the kernel.
Nor can they impersonate a kill(), which adds source info. */
if (info.si_code >= 0)
return -EPERM;
info.si_signo = sig;
/* POSIX.1b doesn't mention process groups. */
return kill_proc_info(sig, &info, pid);
}
Commit Message: Prevent rt_sigqueueinfo and rt_tgsigqueueinfo from spoofing the signal code
Userland should be able to trust the pid and uid of the sender of a
signal if the si_code is SI_TKILL.
Unfortunately, the kernel has historically allowed sigqueueinfo() to
send any si_code at all (as long as it was negative - to distinguish it
from kernel-generated signals like SIGILL etc), so it could spoof a
SI_TKILL with incorrect siginfo values.
Happily, it looks like glibc has always set si_code to the appropriate
SI_QUEUE, so there are probably no actual user code that ever uses
anything but the appropriate SI_QUEUE flag.
So just tighten the check for si_code (we used to allow any negative
value), and add a (one-time) warning in case there are binaries out
there that might depend on using other si_code values.
Signed-off-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@google.com>
Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: | SYSCALL_DEFINE3(rt_sigqueueinfo, pid_t, pid, int, sig,
siginfo_t __user *, uinfo)
{
siginfo_t info;
if (copy_from_user(&info, uinfo, sizeof(siginfo_t)))
return -EFAULT;
/* Not even root can pretend to send signals from the kernel.
* Nor can they impersonate a kill()/tgkill(), which adds source info.
*/
if (info.si_code != SI_QUEUE) {
/* We used to allow any < 0 si_code */
WARN_ON_ONCE(info.si_code < 0);
return -EPERM;
}
info.si_signo = sig;
/* POSIX.1b doesn't mention process groups. */
return kill_proc_info(sig, &info, pid);
}
| 166,231 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ebt_size_mwt(struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *match32,
unsigned int size_left, enum compat_mwt type,
struct ebt_entries_buf_state *state, const void *base)
{
int growth = 0;
char *buf;
if (size_left == 0)
return 0;
buf = (char *) match32;
while (size_left >= sizeof(*match32)) {
struct ebt_entry_match *match_kern;
int ret;
match_kern = (struct ebt_entry_match *) state->buf_kern_start;
if (match_kern) {
char *tmp;
tmp = state->buf_kern_start + state->buf_kern_offset;
match_kern = (struct ebt_entry_match *) tmp;
}
ret = ebt_buf_add(state, buf, sizeof(*match32));
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
size_left -= sizeof(*match32);
/* add padding before match->data (if any) */
ret = ebt_buf_add_pad(state, ebt_compat_entry_padsize());
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (match32->match_size > size_left)
return -EINVAL;
size_left -= match32->match_size;
ret = compat_mtw_from_user(match32, type, state, base);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (WARN_ON(ret < match32->match_size))
return -EINVAL;
growth += ret - match32->match_size;
growth += ebt_compat_entry_padsize();
buf += sizeof(*match32);
buf += match32->match_size;
if (match_kern)
match_kern->match_size = ret;
WARN_ON(type == EBT_COMPAT_TARGET && size_left);
match32 = (struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *) buf;
}
return growth;
}
Commit Message: netfilter: ebtables: CONFIG_COMPAT: don't trust userland offsets
We need to make sure the offsets are not out of range of the
total size.
Also check that they are in ascending order.
The WARN_ON triggered by syzkaller (it sets panic_on_warn) is
changed to also bail out, no point in continuing parsing.
Briefly tested with simple ruleset of
-A INPUT --limit 1/s' --log
plus jump to custom chains using 32bit ebtables binary.
Reported-by: <syzbot+845a53d13171abf8bf29@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static int ebt_size_mwt(struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *match32,
unsigned int size_left, enum compat_mwt type,
struct ebt_entries_buf_state *state, const void *base)
{
int growth = 0;
char *buf;
if (size_left == 0)
return 0;
buf = (char *) match32;
while (size_left >= sizeof(*match32)) {
struct ebt_entry_match *match_kern;
int ret;
match_kern = (struct ebt_entry_match *) state->buf_kern_start;
if (match_kern) {
char *tmp;
tmp = state->buf_kern_start + state->buf_kern_offset;
match_kern = (struct ebt_entry_match *) tmp;
}
ret = ebt_buf_add(state, buf, sizeof(*match32));
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
size_left -= sizeof(*match32);
/* add padding before match->data (if any) */
ret = ebt_buf_add_pad(state, ebt_compat_entry_padsize());
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (match32->match_size > size_left)
return -EINVAL;
size_left -= match32->match_size;
ret = compat_mtw_from_user(match32, type, state, base);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
if (WARN_ON(ret < match32->match_size))
return -EINVAL;
growth += ret - match32->match_size;
growth += ebt_compat_entry_padsize();
buf += sizeof(*match32);
buf += match32->match_size;
if (match_kern)
match_kern->match_size = ret;
if (WARN_ON(type == EBT_COMPAT_TARGET && size_left))
return -EINVAL;
match32 = (struct compat_ebt_entry_mwt *) buf;
}
return growth;
}
| 169,357 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: initpyfribidi (void)
{
PyObject *module;
/* XXX What should be done if we fail here? */
module = Py_InitModule3 ("pyfribidi", PyfribidiMethods,
_pyfribidi__doc__);
PyModule_AddIntConstant (module, "RTL", (long) FRIBIDI_TYPE_RTL);
PyModule_AddIntConstant (module, "LTR", (long) FRIBIDI_TYPE_LTR);
PyModule_AddIntConstant (module, "ON", (long) FRIBIDI_TYPE_ON);
PyModule_AddStringConstant (module, "__author__",
"Yaacov Zamir and Nir Soffer");
}
Commit Message: refactor pyfribidi.c module
pyfribidi.c is now compiled as _pyfribidi. This module only handles
unicode internally and doesn't use the fribidi_utf8_to_unicode
function (which can't handle 4 byte utf-8 sequences). This fixes the
buffer overflow in issue #2.
The code is now also much simpler: pyfribidi.c is down from 280 to 130
lines of code.
We now ship a pure python pyfribidi that handles the case when
non-unicode strings are passed in.
We now also adapt the size of the output string if clean=True is
passed.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | initpyfribidi (void)
init_pyfribidi (void)
{
PyObject *module = Py_InitModule ("_pyfribidi", PyfribidiMethods);
PyModule_AddIntConstant (module, "RTL", (long) FRIBIDI_TYPE_RTL);
PyModule_AddIntConstant (module, "LTR", (long) FRIBIDI_TYPE_LTR);
PyModule_AddIntConstant (module, "ON", (long) FRIBIDI_TYPE_ON);
}
| 165,639 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int DefragTrackerReuseTest(void)
{
int ret = 0;
int id = 1;
Packet *p1 = NULL;
DefragTracker *tracker1 = NULL, *tracker2 = NULL;
DefragInit();
/* Build a packet, its not a fragment but shouldn't matter for
* this test. */
p1 = BuildTestPacket(id, 0, 0, 'A', 8);
if (p1 == NULL) {
goto end;
}
/* Get a tracker. It shouldn't look like its already in use. */
tracker1 = DefragGetTracker(NULL, NULL, p1);
if (tracker1 == NULL) {
goto end;
}
if (tracker1->seen_last) {
goto end;
}
if (tracker1->remove) {
goto end;
}
DefragTrackerRelease(tracker1);
/* Get a tracker again, it should be the same one. */
tracker2 = DefragGetTracker(NULL, NULL, p1);
if (tracker2 == NULL) {
goto end;
}
if (tracker2 != tracker1) {
goto end;
}
DefragTrackerRelease(tracker1);
/* Now mark the tracker for removal. It should not be returned
* when we get a tracker for a packet that may have the same
* attributes. */
tracker1->remove = 1;
tracker2 = DefragGetTracker(NULL, NULL, p1);
if (tracker2 == NULL) {
goto end;
}
if (tracker2 == tracker1) {
goto end;
}
if (tracker2->remove) {
goto end;
}
ret = 1;
end:
if (p1 != NULL) {
SCFree(p1);
}
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
Commit Message: defrag - take protocol into account during re-assembly
The IP protocol was not being used to match fragments with
their packets allowing a carefully constructed packet
with a different protocol to be matched, allowing re-assembly
to complete, creating a packet that would not be re-assembled
by the destination host.
CWE ID: CWE-358 | static int DefragTrackerReuseTest(void)
{
int ret = 0;
int id = 1;
Packet *p1 = NULL;
DefragTracker *tracker1 = NULL, *tracker2 = NULL;
DefragInit();
/* Build a packet, its not a fragment but shouldn't matter for
* this test. */
p1 = BuildTestPacket(IPPROTO_ICMP, id, 0, 0, 'A', 8);
if (p1 == NULL) {
goto end;
}
/* Get a tracker. It shouldn't look like its already in use. */
tracker1 = DefragGetTracker(NULL, NULL, p1);
if (tracker1 == NULL) {
goto end;
}
if (tracker1->seen_last) {
goto end;
}
if (tracker1->remove) {
goto end;
}
DefragTrackerRelease(tracker1);
/* Get a tracker again, it should be the same one. */
tracker2 = DefragGetTracker(NULL, NULL, p1);
if (tracker2 == NULL) {
goto end;
}
if (tracker2 != tracker1) {
goto end;
}
DefragTrackerRelease(tracker1);
/* Now mark the tracker for removal. It should not be returned
* when we get a tracker for a packet that may have the same
* attributes. */
tracker1->remove = 1;
tracker2 = DefragGetTracker(NULL, NULL, p1);
if (tracker2 == NULL) {
goto end;
}
if (tracker2 == tracker1) {
goto end;
}
if (tracker2->remove) {
goto end;
}
ret = 1;
end:
if (p1 != NULL) {
SCFree(p1);
}
DefragDestroy();
return ret;
}
| 168,304 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Chapters::ParseEdition(
long long pos,
long long size)
{
if (!ExpandEditionsArray())
return -1;
Edition& e = m_editions[m_editions_count++];
e.Init();
return e.Parse(m_pSegment->m_pReader, pos, size);
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Chapters::ParseEdition(
Atom& a = m_atoms[m_atoms_count++];
a.Init();
return a.Parse(pReader, pos, size);
}
| 174,423 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ProxyClientSocket::SanitizeProxyRedirect(HttpResponseInfo* response,
const GURL& url) {
//// static
DCHECK(response && response->headers.get());
std::string location;
if (!response->headers->IsRedirect(&location))
return false;
std::string fake_response_headers =
base::StringPrintf("HTTP/1.0 302 Found\n"
"Location: %s\n"
"Content-length: 0\n"
"Connection: close\n"
"\n",
location.c_str());
std::string raw_headers =
HttpUtil::AssembleRawHeaders(fake_response_headers.data(),
fake_response_headers.length());
response->headers = new HttpResponseHeaders(raw_headers);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Sanitize headers in Proxy Authentication Required responses
BUG=431504
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/769043003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#310014}
CWE ID: CWE-19 | bool ProxyClientSocket::SanitizeProxyRedirect(HttpResponseInfo* response,
bool ProxyClientSocket::SanitizeProxyAuth(HttpResponseInfo* response) {
DCHECK(response && response->headers.get());
scoped_refptr<HttpResponseHeaders> old_headers = response->headers;
const char kHeaders[] = "HTTP/1.1 407 Proxy Authentication Required\n\n";
scoped_refptr<HttpResponseHeaders> new_headers = new HttpResponseHeaders(
HttpUtil::AssembleRawHeaders(kHeaders, arraysize(kHeaders)));
new_headers->ReplaceStatusLine(old_headers->GetStatusLine());
CopyHeaderValues(old_headers, new_headers, "Connection");
CopyHeaderValues(old_headers, new_headers, "Proxy-Authenticate");
response->headers = new_headers;
return true;
}
//// static
bool ProxyClientSocket::SanitizeProxyRedirect(HttpResponseInfo* response) {
DCHECK(response && response->headers.get());
std::string location;
if (!response->headers->IsRedirect(&location))
return false;
// Return minimal headers; set "Content-Length: 0" to ignore response body.
std::string fake_response_headers = base::StringPrintf(
"HTTP/1.0 302 Found\n"
"Location: %s\n"
"Content-Length: 0\n"
"Connection: close\n"
"\n",
location.c_str());
std::string raw_headers =
HttpUtil::AssembleRawHeaders(fake_response_headers.data(),
fake_response_headers.length());
response->headers = new HttpResponseHeaders(raw_headers);
return true;
}
| 172,040 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool FakePluginServiceFilter::IsPluginEnabled(int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
const void* context,
const GURL& url,
const GURL& policy_url,
webkit::WebPluginInfo* plugin) {
std::map<FilePath, bool>::iterator it = plugin_state_.find(plugin->path);
if (it == plugin_state_.end()) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "No plug-in state for '" << plugin->path.value() << "'";
return false;
}
return it->second;
}
Commit Message: Follow-on fixes and naming changes for https://codereview.chromium.org/12086077/
BUG=172573
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/12177018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@180600 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-287 | bool FakePluginServiceFilter::IsPluginEnabled(int render_process_id,
bool FakePluginServiceFilter::IsPluginAvailable(int render_process_id,
int render_view_id,
const void* context,
const GURL& url,
const GURL& policy_url,
webkit::WebPluginInfo* plugin) {
std::map<FilePath, bool>::iterator it = plugin_state_.find(plugin->path);
if (it == plugin_state_.end()) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "No plug-in state for '" << plugin->path.value() << "'";
return false;
}
return it->second;
}
| 171,474 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DataReductionProxyConfigServiceClient::RetrieveRemoteConfig() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
CreateClientConfigRequest request;
std::string serialized_request;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
request.set_telephony_network_operator(
net::android::GetTelephonyNetworkOperator());
#endif
data_reduction_proxy::ConfigDeviceInfo* device_info =
request.mutable_device_info();
device_info->set_total_device_memory_kb(
base::SysInfo::AmountOfPhysicalMemory() / 1024);
const std::string& session_key = request_options_->GetSecureSession();
if (!session_key.empty())
request.set_session_key(request_options_->GetSecureSession());
request.set_dogfood_group(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kDogfood)
? CreateClientConfigRequest_DogfoodGroup_DOGFOOD
: CreateClientConfigRequest_DogfoodGroup_NONDOGFOOD);
data_reduction_proxy::VersionInfo* version_info =
request.mutable_version_info();
uint32_t build;
uint32_t patch;
util::GetChromiumBuildAndPatchAsInts(util::ChromiumVersion(), &build, &patch);
version_info->set_client(util::GetStringForClient(io_data_->client()));
version_info->set_build(build);
version_info->set_patch(patch);
version_info->set_channel(io_data_->channel());
request.SerializeToString(&serialized_request);
net::NetworkTrafficAnnotationTag traffic_annotation =
net::DefineNetworkTrafficAnnotation("data_reduction_proxy_config", R"(
semantics {
sender: "Data Reduction Proxy"
description:
"Requests a configuration that specifies how to connect to the "
"data reduction proxy."
trigger:
"Requested when Data Saver is enabled and the browser does not "
"have a configuration that is not older than a threshold set by "
"the server."
data: "None."
destination: GOOGLE_OWNED_SERVICE
}
policy {
cookies_allowed: NO
setting:
"Users can control Data Saver on Android via 'Data Saver' setting. "
"Data Saver is not available on iOS, and on desktop it is enabled "
"by insalling the Data Saver extension."
policy_exception_justification: "Not implemented."
})");
fetch_in_progress_ = true;
auto resource_request = std::make_unique<network::ResourceRequest>();
resource_request->url = config_service_url_;
resource_request->method = "POST";
resource_request->load_flags = net::LOAD_BYPASS_PROXY;
resource_request->allow_credentials = false;
url_loader_ = variations::CreateSimpleURLLoaderWithVariationsHeader(
std::move(resource_request), variations::InIncognito::kNo,
variations::SignedIn::kNo, traffic_annotation);
url_loader_->AttachStringForUpload(serialized_request,
"application/x-protobuf");
static const int kMaxRetries = 5;
url_loader_->SetRetryOptions(
kMaxRetries, network::SimpleURLLoader::RETRY_ON_NETWORK_CHANGE);
url_loader_->DownloadToStringOfUnboundedSizeUntilCrashAndDie(
url_loader_factory_.get(),
base::BindOnce(&DataReductionProxyConfigServiceClient::OnURLLoadComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void DataReductionProxyConfigServiceClient::RetrieveRemoteConfig() {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(!params::IsIncludedInHoldbackFieldTrial());
CreateClientConfigRequest request;
std::string serialized_request;
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
request.set_telephony_network_operator(
net::android::GetTelephonyNetworkOperator());
#endif
data_reduction_proxy::ConfigDeviceInfo* device_info =
request.mutable_device_info();
device_info->set_total_device_memory_kb(
base::SysInfo::AmountOfPhysicalMemory() / 1024);
const std::string& session_key = request_options_->GetSecureSession();
if (!session_key.empty())
request.set_session_key(request_options_->GetSecureSession());
request.set_dogfood_group(
base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(features::kDogfood)
? CreateClientConfigRequest_DogfoodGroup_DOGFOOD
: CreateClientConfigRequest_DogfoodGroup_NONDOGFOOD);
data_reduction_proxy::VersionInfo* version_info =
request.mutable_version_info();
uint32_t build;
uint32_t patch;
util::GetChromiumBuildAndPatchAsInts(util::ChromiumVersion(), &build, &patch);
version_info->set_client(util::GetStringForClient(io_data_->client()));
version_info->set_build(build);
version_info->set_patch(patch);
version_info->set_channel(io_data_->channel());
request.SerializeToString(&serialized_request);
net::NetworkTrafficAnnotationTag traffic_annotation =
net::DefineNetworkTrafficAnnotation("data_reduction_proxy_config", R"(
semantics {
sender: "Data Reduction Proxy"
description:
"Requests a configuration that specifies how to connect to the "
"data reduction proxy."
trigger:
"Requested when Data Saver is enabled and the browser does not "
"have a configuration that is not older than a threshold set by "
"the server."
data: "None."
destination: GOOGLE_OWNED_SERVICE
}
policy {
cookies_allowed: NO
setting:
"Users can control Data Saver on Android via 'Data Saver' setting. "
"Data Saver is not available on iOS, and on desktop it is enabled "
"by insalling the Data Saver extension."
policy_exception_justification: "Not implemented."
})");
fetch_in_progress_ = true;
auto resource_request = std::make_unique<network::ResourceRequest>();
resource_request->url = config_service_url_;
resource_request->method = "POST";
resource_request->load_flags = net::LOAD_BYPASS_PROXY;
resource_request->allow_credentials = false;
url_loader_ = variations::CreateSimpleURLLoaderWithVariationsHeader(
std::move(resource_request), variations::InIncognito::kNo,
variations::SignedIn::kNo, traffic_annotation);
url_loader_->AttachStringForUpload(serialized_request,
"application/x-protobuf");
static const int kMaxRetries = 5;
url_loader_->SetRetryOptions(
kMaxRetries, network::SimpleURLLoader::RETRY_ON_NETWORK_CHANGE);
url_loader_->DownloadToStringOfUnboundedSizeUntilCrashAndDie(
url_loader_factory_.get(),
base::BindOnce(&DataReductionProxyConfigServiceClient::OnURLLoadComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 172,420 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CtcpHandler::defaultHandler(const QString &cmd, CtcpType ctcptype, const QString &prefix, const QString &target, const QString ¶m) {
Q_UNUSED(ctcptype);
Q_UNUSED(target);
if(!_ignoreListManager->ctcpMatch(prefix, network()->networkName())) {
QString str = tr("Received unknown CTCP %1 by %2").arg(cmd).arg(prefix);
if(!param.isEmpty())
str.append(tr(" with arguments: %1").arg(param));
emit displayMsg(Message::Error, BufferInfo::StatusBuffer, "", str);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void CtcpHandler::defaultHandler(const QString &cmd, CtcpType ctcptype, const QString &prefix, const QString &target, const QString ¶m) {
void CtcpHandler::defaultHandler(const QString &cmd, CtcpType ctcptype, const QString &prefix, const QString &target, const QString ¶m, QString &reply) {
Q_UNUSED(ctcptype);
Q_UNUSED(target);
Q_UNUSED(reply);
QString str = tr("Received unknown CTCP %1 by %2").arg(cmd).arg(prefix);
if(!param.isEmpty())
str.append(tr(" with arguments: %1").arg(param));
emit displayMsg(Message::Error, BufferInfo::StatusBuffer, "", str);
}
| 164,876 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void SetUp() {
const tuple<int, int, SubpelVarianceFunctionType>& params =
this->GetParam();
log2width_ = get<0>(params);
width_ = 1 << log2width_;
log2height_ = get<1>(params);
height_ = 1 << log2height_;
subpel_variance_ = get<2>(params);
rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
block_size_ = width_ * height_;
src_ = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(vpx_memalign(16, block_size_));
sec_ = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(vpx_memalign(16, block_size_));
ref_ = new uint8_t[block_size_ + width_ + height_ + 1];
ASSERT_TRUE(src_ != NULL);
ASSERT_TRUE(sec_ != NULL);
ASSERT_TRUE(ref_ != NULL);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void SetUp() {
const tuple<int, int, MseFunctionType>& params = this->GetParam();
log2width_ = get<0>(params);
width_ = 1 << log2width_;
log2height_ = get<1>(params);
height_ = 1 << log2height_;
mse_ = get<2>(params);
rnd(ACMRandom::DeterministicSeed());
block_size_ = width_ * height_;
src_ = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(vpx_memalign(16, block_size_));
ref_ = new uint8_t[block_size_];
ASSERT_TRUE(src_ != NULL);
ASSERT_TRUE(ref_ != NULL);
}
| 174,590 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BlobURLRequestJob::CountSize() {
error_ = false;
pending_get_file_info_count_ = 0;
total_size_ = 0;
item_length_list_.resize(blob_data_->items().size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < blob_data_->items().size(); ++i) {
const BlobData::Item& item = blob_data_->items().at(i);
if (IsFileType(item.type())) {
++pending_get_file_info_count_;
GetFileStreamReader(i)->GetLength(
base::Bind(&BlobURLRequestJob::DidGetFileItemLength,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), i));
continue;
}
int64 item_length = static_cast<int64>(item.length());
item_length_list_[i] = item_length;
total_size_ += item_length;
}
if (pending_get_file_info_count_ == 0)
DidCountSize(net::OK);
}
Commit Message: Avoid integer overflows in BlobURLRequestJob.
BUG=169685
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12047012
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@179154 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void BlobURLRequestJob::CountSize() {
error_ = false;
pending_get_file_info_count_ = 0;
total_size_ = 0;
item_length_list_.resize(blob_data_->items().size());
for (size_t i = 0; i < blob_data_->items().size(); ++i) {
const BlobData::Item& item = blob_data_->items().at(i);
if (IsFileType(item.type())) {
++pending_get_file_info_count_;
GetFileStreamReader(i)->GetLength(
base::Bind(&BlobURLRequestJob::DidGetFileItemLength,
weak_factory_.GetWeakPtr(), i));
continue;
}
if (!AddItemLength(i, item.length()))
return;
}
if (pending_get_file_info_count_ == 0)
DidCountSize(net::OK);
}
| 171,398 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: l2tp_proxy_auth_id_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr) & L2TP_PROXY_AUTH_ID_MASK));
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13006/L2TP: Check whether an AVP's content exceeds the AVP length.
It's not good enough to check whether all the data specified by the AVP
length was captured - you also have to check whether that length is
large enough for all the required data in the AVP.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Yannick Formaggio.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | l2tp_proxy_auth_id_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat)
l2tp_proxy_auth_id_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const u_char *dat, u_int length)
{
const uint16_t *ptr = (const uint16_t *)dat;
if (length < 2) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "AVP too short"));
return;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%u", EXTRACT_16BITS(ptr) & L2TP_PROXY_AUTH_ID_MASK));
}
| 167,899 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: file_add_mapi_attrs (File* file, MAPI_Attr** attrs)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; attrs[i]; i++)
{
MAPI_Attr* a = attrs[i];
if (a->num_values)
{
switch (a->name)
{
case MAPI_ATTACH_LONG_FILENAME:
if (file->name) XFREE(file->name);
file->name = strdup( (char*)a->values[0].data.buf );
break;
case MAPI_ATTACH_DATA_OBJ:
file->len = a->values[0].len;
if (file->data) XFREE (file->data);
file->data = CHECKED_XMALLOC (unsigned char, file->len);
memmove (file->data, a->values[0].data.buf, file->len);
break;
case MAPI_ATTACH_MIME_TAG:
if (file->mime_type) XFREE (file->mime_type);
file->mime_type = CHECKED_XMALLOC (char, a->values[0].len);
memmove (file->mime_type, a->values[0].data.buf, a->values[0].len);
break;
case MAPI_ATTACH_CONTENT_ID:
if (file->content_id) XFREE(file->content_id);
file->content_id = CHECKED_XMALLOC (char, a->values[0].len);
memmove (file->content_id, a->values[0].data.buf, a->values[0].len);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
}
Commit Message: Check types to avoid invalid reads/writes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | file_add_mapi_attrs (File* file, MAPI_Attr** attrs)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; attrs[i]; i++)
{
MAPI_Attr* a = attrs[i];
if (a->num_values)
{
switch (a->name)
{
case MAPI_ATTACH_LONG_FILENAME:
assert(a->type == szMAPI_STRING);
if (file->name) XFREE(file->name);
file->name = strdup( (char*)a->values[0].data.buf );
break;
case MAPI_ATTACH_DATA_OBJ:
assert((a->type == szMAPI_BINARY) || (a->type == szMAPI_OBJECT));
file->len = a->values[0].len;
if (file->data) XFREE (file->data);
file->data = CHECKED_XMALLOC (unsigned char, file->len);
memmove (file->data, a->values[0].data.buf, file->len);
break;
case MAPI_ATTACH_MIME_TAG:
assert(a->type == szMAPI_STRING);
if (file->mime_type) XFREE (file->mime_type);
file->mime_type = CHECKED_XMALLOC (char, a->values[0].len);
memmove (file->mime_type, a->values[0].data.buf, a->values[0].len);
break;
case MAPI_ATTACH_CONTENT_ID:
assert(a->type == szMAPI_STRING);
if (file->content_id) XFREE(file->content_id);
file->content_id = CHECKED_XMALLOC (char, a->values[0].len);
memmove (file->content_id, a->values[0].data.buf, a->values[0].len);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
}
| 168,351 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_transform_png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8_set(
PNG_CONST image_transform *this, transform_display *that, png_structp pp,
png_infop pi)
{
png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8(pp);
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_transform_png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8_set(
const image_transform *this, transform_display *that, png_structp pp,
png_infop pi)
{
png_set_expand_gray_1_2_4_to_8(pp);
/* NOTE: don't expect this to expand tRNS */
this->next->set(this->next, that, pp, pi);
}
| 173,632 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int crypto_rng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
{
u8 *buf = NULL;
int err;
if (!seed && slen) {
buf = kmalloc(slen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
get_random_bytes(buf, slen);
seed = buf;
}
err = tfm->seed(tfm, seed, slen);
kfree(buf);
return err;
}
Commit Message: crypto: rng - Remove old low-level rng interface
Now that all rng implementations have switched over to the new
interface, we can remove the old low-level interface.
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | int crypto_rng_reset(struct crypto_rng *tfm, const u8 *seed, unsigned int slen)
{
u8 *buf = NULL;
int err;
if (!seed && slen) {
buf = kmalloc(slen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
get_random_bytes(buf, slen);
seed = buf;
}
err = crypto_rng_alg(tfm)->seed(tfm, seed, slen);
kfree(buf);
return err;
}
| 167,732 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> PersistentHistogramAllocator::AllocateHistogram(
HistogramType histogram_type,
const std::string& name,
int minimum,
int maximum,
const BucketRanges* bucket_ranges,
int32_t flags,
Reference* ref_ptr) {
if (memory_allocator_->IsCorrupt()) {
RecordCreateHistogramResult(CREATE_HISTOGRAM_ALLOCATOR_CORRUPT);
return nullptr;
}
PersistentHistogramData* histogram_data =
memory_allocator_->New<PersistentHistogramData>(
offsetof(PersistentHistogramData, name) + name.length() + 1);
if (histogram_data) {
memcpy(histogram_data->name, name.c_str(), name.size() + 1);
histogram_data->histogram_type = histogram_type;
histogram_data->flags = flags | HistogramBase::kIsPersistent;
}
if (histogram_type != SPARSE_HISTOGRAM) {
size_t bucket_count = bucket_ranges->bucket_count();
size_t counts_bytes = CalculateRequiredCountsBytes(bucket_count);
if (counts_bytes == 0) {
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
DCHECK_EQ(this, GlobalHistogramAllocator::Get());
PersistentMemoryAllocator::Reference ranges_ref =
bucket_ranges->persistent_reference();
if (!ranges_ref) {
size_t ranges_count = bucket_count + 1;
size_t ranges_bytes = ranges_count * sizeof(HistogramBase::Sample);
ranges_ref =
memory_allocator_->Allocate(ranges_bytes, kTypeIdRangesArray);
if (ranges_ref) {
HistogramBase::Sample* ranges_data =
memory_allocator_->GetAsArray<HistogramBase::Sample>(
ranges_ref, kTypeIdRangesArray, ranges_count);
if (ranges_data) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < bucket_ranges->size(); ++i)
ranges_data[i] = bucket_ranges->range(i);
bucket_ranges->set_persistent_reference(ranges_ref);
} else {
NOTREACHED();
ranges_ref = PersistentMemoryAllocator::kReferenceNull;
}
}
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(kTypeIdRangesArray, memory_allocator_->GetType(ranges_ref));
}
if (ranges_ref && histogram_data) {
histogram_data->minimum = minimum;
histogram_data->maximum = maximum;
histogram_data->bucket_count = static_cast<uint32_t>(bucket_count);
histogram_data->ranges_ref = ranges_ref;
histogram_data->ranges_checksum = bucket_ranges->checksum();
} else {
histogram_data = nullptr; // Clear this for proper handling below.
}
}
if (histogram_data) {
std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> histogram = CreateHistogram(histogram_data);
DCHECK(histogram);
DCHECK_NE(0U, histogram_data->samples_metadata.id);
DCHECK_NE(0U, histogram_data->logged_metadata.id);
PersistentMemoryAllocator::Reference histogram_ref =
memory_allocator_->GetAsReference(histogram_data);
if (ref_ptr != nullptr)
*ref_ptr = histogram_ref;
subtle::NoBarrier_Store(&last_created_, histogram_ref);
return histogram;
}
CreateHistogramResultType result;
if (memory_allocator_->IsCorrupt()) {
RecordCreateHistogramResult(CREATE_HISTOGRAM_ALLOCATOR_NEWLY_CORRUPT);
result = CREATE_HISTOGRAM_ALLOCATOR_CORRUPT;
} else if (memory_allocator_->IsFull()) {
result = CREATE_HISTOGRAM_ALLOCATOR_FULL;
} else {
result = CREATE_HISTOGRAM_ALLOCATOR_ERROR;
}
RecordCreateHistogramResult(result);
if (result != CREATE_HISTOGRAM_ALLOCATOR_FULL)
NOTREACHED() << memory_allocator_->Name() << ", error=" << result;
return nullptr;
}
Commit Message: Remove UMA.CreatePersistentHistogram.Result
This histogram isn't showing anything meaningful and the problems it
could show are better observed by looking at the allocators directly.
Bug: 831013
Change-Id: Ibe968597758230192e53a7675e7390e968c9e5b9
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1008047
Commit-Queue: Brian White <bcwhite@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#549986}
CWE ID: CWE-264 | std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> PersistentHistogramAllocator::AllocateHistogram(
HistogramType histogram_type,
const std::string& name,
int minimum,
int maximum,
const BucketRanges* bucket_ranges,
int32_t flags,
Reference* ref_ptr) {
if (memory_allocator_->IsCorrupt())
return nullptr;
PersistentHistogramData* histogram_data =
memory_allocator_->New<PersistentHistogramData>(
offsetof(PersistentHistogramData, name) + name.length() + 1);
if (histogram_data) {
memcpy(histogram_data->name, name.c_str(), name.size() + 1);
histogram_data->histogram_type = histogram_type;
histogram_data->flags = flags | HistogramBase::kIsPersistent;
}
if (histogram_type != SPARSE_HISTOGRAM) {
size_t bucket_count = bucket_ranges->bucket_count();
size_t counts_bytes = CalculateRequiredCountsBytes(bucket_count);
if (counts_bytes == 0) {
NOTREACHED();
return nullptr;
}
DCHECK_EQ(this, GlobalHistogramAllocator::Get());
PersistentMemoryAllocator::Reference ranges_ref =
bucket_ranges->persistent_reference();
if (!ranges_ref) {
size_t ranges_count = bucket_count + 1;
size_t ranges_bytes = ranges_count * sizeof(HistogramBase::Sample);
ranges_ref =
memory_allocator_->Allocate(ranges_bytes, kTypeIdRangesArray);
if (ranges_ref) {
HistogramBase::Sample* ranges_data =
memory_allocator_->GetAsArray<HistogramBase::Sample>(
ranges_ref, kTypeIdRangesArray, ranges_count);
if (ranges_data) {
for (size_t i = 0; i < bucket_ranges->size(); ++i)
ranges_data[i] = bucket_ranges->range(i);
bucket_ranges->set_persistent_reference(ranges_ref);
} else {
NOTREACHED();
ranges_ref = PersistentMemoryAllocator::kReferenceNull;
}
}
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(kTypeIdRangesArray, memory_allocator_->GetType(ranges_ref));
}
if (ranges_ref && histogram_data) {
histogram_data->minimum = minimum;
histogram_data->maximum = maximum;
histogram_data->bucket_count = static_cast<uint32_t>(bucket_count);
histogram_data->ranges_ref = ranges_ref;
histogram_data->ranges_checksum = bucket_ranges->checksum();
} else {
histogram_data = nullptr; // Clear this for proper handling below.
}
}
if (histogram_data) {
std::unique_ptr<HistogramBase> histogram = CreateHistogram(histogram_data);
DCHECK(histogram);
DCHECK_NE(0U, histogram_data->samples_metadata.id);
DCHECK_NE(0U, histogram_data->logged_metadata.id);
PersistentMemoryAllocator::Reference histogram_ref =
memory_allocator_->GetAsReference(histogram_data);
if (ref_ptr != nullptr)
*ref_ptr = histogram_ref;
subtle::NoBarrier_Store(&last_created_, histogram_ref);
return histogram;
}
if (memory_allocator_->IsCorrupt())
NOTREACHED() << memory_allocator_->Name() << " is corrupt!";
return nullptr;
}
| 172,131 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ikev2_gen_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), e.critical);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13690/IKEv2: Fix some bounds checks.
Use a pointer of the correct type in ND_TCHECK(), or use ND_TCHECK2()
and provide the correct length.
While we're at it, remove the blank line between some checks and the
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY()s they protect.
Also, note the places where we print the entire payload.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Bhargava Shastry,
SecT/TU Berlin.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ikev2_gen_print(netdissect_options *ndo, u_char tpay,
const struct isakmp_gen *ext)
{
struct isakmp_gen e;
ND_TCHECK(*ext);
UNALIGNED_MEMCPY(&e, ext, sizeof(e));
ikev2_pay_print(ndo, NPSTR(tpay), e.critical);
ND_PRINT((ndo," len=%d", ntohs(e.len) - 4));
if (2 < ndo->ndo_vflag && 4 < ntohs(e.len)) {
/* Print the entire payload in hex */
ND_PRINT((ndo," "));
if (!rawprint(ndo, (const uint8_t *)(ext + 1), ntohs(e.len) - 4))
goto trunc;
}
return (const u_char *)ext + ntohs(e.len);
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|%s]", NPSTR(tpay)));
return NULL;
}
| 167,798 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Document::InitContentSecurityPolicy(ContentSecurityPolicy* csp) {
//// the first parameter specifies a policy to use as the document csp meaning
//// the document will take ownership of the policy
//// the second parameter specifies a policy to inherit meaning the document
//// will attempt to copy over the policy
SetContentSecurityPolicy(csp ? csp : ContentSecurityPolicy::Create());
if (frame_) {
Frame* inherit_from = frame_->Tree().Parent() ? frame_->Tree().Parent()
: frame_->Client()->Opener();
if (inherit_from && frame_ != inherit_from) {
DCHECK(inherit_from->GetSecurityContext() &&
inherit_from->GetSecurityContext()->GetContentSecurityPolicy());
ContentSecurityPolicy* policy_to_inherit =
inherit_from->GetSecurityContext()->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
if (url_.IsEmpty() || url_.ProtocolIsAbout() || url_.ProtocolIsData() ||
url_.ProtocolIs("blob") || url_.ProtocolIs("filesystem")) {
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->CopyStateFrom(policy_to_inherit);
}
if (IsPluginDocument())
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->CopyPluginTypesFrom(policy_to_inherit);
}
}
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->BindToExecutionContext(this);
}
Commit Message: Inherit CSP when we inherit the security origin
This prevents attacks that use main window navigation to get out of the
existing csp constraints such as the related bug
Bug: 747847
Change-Id: I1e57b50da17f65d38088205b0a3c7c49ef2ae4d8
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/592027
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#492333}
CWE ID: CWE-732 | void Document::InitContentSecurityPolicy(ContentSecurityPolicy* csp) {
//// the first parameter specifies a policy to use as the document csp meaning
//// the document will take ownership of the policy
//// the second parameter specifies a policy to inherit meaning the document
//// will attempt to copy over the policy
void Document::InitContentSecurityPolicy(
ContentSecurityPolicy* csp,
const ContentSecurityPolicy* policy_to_inherit) {
SetContentSecurityPolicy(csp ? csp : ContentSecurityPolicy::Create());
if (policy_to_inherit) {
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->CopyStateFrom(policy_to_inherit);
} else if (frame_) {
Frame* inherit_from = frame_->Tree().Parent() ? frame_->Tree().Parent()
: frame_->Client()->Opener();
if (inherit_from && frame_ != inherit_from) {
DCHECK(inherit_from->GetSecurityContext() &&
inherit_from->GetSecurityContext()->GetContentSecurityPolicy());
policy_to_inherit =
inherit_from->GetSecurityContext()->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
if (url_.IsEmpty() || url_.ProtocolIsAbout() || url_.ProtocolIsData() ||
url_.ProtocolIs("blob") || url_.ProtocolIs("filesystem")) {
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->CopyStateFrom(policy_to_inherit);
}
}
}
// Plugin documents inherit their parent/opener's 'plugin-types' directive
// regardless of URL.
if (policy_to_inherit && IsPluginDocument())
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->CopyPluginTypesFrom(policy_to_inherit);
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->BindToExecutionContext(this);
}
| 172,299 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: png_write_init_3(png_structpp ptr_ptr, png_const_charp user_png_ver,
png_size_t png_struct_size)
{
png_structp png_ptr = *ptr_ptr;
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
jmp_buf tmp_jmp; /* to save current jump buffer */
#endif
int i = 0;
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return;
do
{
if (user_png_ver[i] != png_libpng_ver[i])
{
#ifdef PNG_LEGACY_SUPPORTED
png_ptr->flags |= PNG_FLAG_LIBRARY_MISMATCH;
#else
png_ptr->warning_fn = NULL;
png_warning(png_ptr,
"Application uses deprecated png_write_init() and should be recompiled.");
#endif
}
i++;
} while (png_libpng_ver[i] != 0 && user_png_ver[i] != 0);
png_debug(1, "in png_write_init_3");
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
/* Save jump buffer and error functions */
png_memcpy(tmp_jmp, png_ptr->jmpbuf, png_sizeof(jmp_buf));
#endif
if (png_sizeof(png_struct) > png_struct_size)
{
png_destroy_struct(png_ptr);
png_ptr = (png_structp)png_create_struct(PNG_STRUCT_PNG);
*ptr_ptr = png_ptr;
}
/* Reset all variables to 0 */
png_memset(png_ptr, 0, png_sizeof(png_struct));
/* Added at libpng-1.2.6 */
#ifdef PNG_SET_USER_LIMITS_SUPPORTED
png_ptr->user_width_max = PNG_USER_WIDTH_MAX;
png_ptr->user_height_max = PNG_USER_HEIGHT_MAX;
#endif
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
/* Restore jump buffer */
png_memcpy(png_ptr->jmpbuf, tmp_jmp, png_sizeof(jmp_buf));
#endif
png_set_write_fn(png_ptr, png_voidp_NULL, png_rw_ptr_NULL,
png_flush_ptr_NULL);
/* Initialize zbuf - compression buffer */
png_ptr->zbuf_size = PNG_ZBUF_SIZE;
png_ptr->zbuf = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)png_ptr->zbuf_size);
#ifdef PNG_WRITE_WEIGHTED_FILTER_SUPPORTED
png_set_filter_heuristics(png_ptr, PNG_FILTER_HEURISTIC_DEFAULT,
1, png_doublep_NULL, png_doublep_NULL);
#endif
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | png_write_init_3(png_structpp ptr_ptr, png_const_charp user_png_ver,
png_size_t png_struct_size)
{
png_structp png_ptr = *ptr_ptr;
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
jmp_buf tmp_jmp; /* to save current jump buffer */
#endif
int i = 0;
if (png_ptr == NULL)
return;
do
{
if (user_png_ver[i] != png_libpng_ver[i])
{
#ifdef PNG_LEGACY_SUPPORTED
png_ptr->flags |= PNG_FLAG_LIBRARY_MISMATCH;
#else
png_ptr->warning_fn = NULL;
png_warning(png_ptr,
"Application uses deprecated png_write_init() and should be recompiled.");
#endif
}
i++;
} while (png_libpng_ver[i] != 0 && user_png_ver[i] != 0);
png_debug(1, "in png_write_init_3");
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
/* Save jump buffer and error functions */
png_memcpy(tmp_jmp, png_ptr->jmpbuf, png_sizeof(jmp_buf));
#endif
if (png_sizeof(png_struct) > png_struct_size)
{
png_destroy_struct(png_ptr);
png_ptr = (png_structp)png_create_struct(PNG_STRUCT_PNG);
*ptr_ptr = png_ptr;
}
/* Reset all variables to 0 */
png_memset(png_ptr, 0, png_sizeof(png_struct));
/* Added at libpng-1.2.6 */
#ifdef PNG_SET_USER_LIMITS_SUPPORTED
png_ptr->user_width_max = PNG_USER_WIDTH_MAX;
png_ptr->user_height_max = PNG_USER_HEIGHT_MAX;
#endif
#ifdef PNG_SETJMP_SUPPORTED
/* Restore jump buffer */
png_memcpy(png_ptr->jmpbuf, tmp_jmp, png_sizeof(jmp_buf));
#endif
png_set_write_fn(png_ptr, png_voidp_NULL, png_rw_ptr_NULL,
png_flush_ptr_NULL);
/* Initialize zbuf - compression buffer */
png_ptr->zbuf_size = PNG_ZBUF_SIZE;
png_ptr->zbuf = (png_bytep)png_malloc(png_ptr,
(png_uint_32)png_ptr->zbuf_size);
}
| 172,190 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
int off, i, slot, spi;
if (regs[regno].type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
/* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */
if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 &&
register_is_null(regs[regno]))
return 0;
verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
reg_type_str[regs[regno].type],
reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]);
return -EACCES;
}
/* Only allow fixed-offset stack reads */
if (!tnum_is_const(regs[regno].var_off)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), regs[regno].var_off);
verbose(env, "invalid variable stack read R%d var_off=%s\n",
regno, tn_buf);
}
off = regs[regno].off + regs[regno].var_off.value;
if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
access_size < 0 || (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed)) {
verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
regno, off, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
if (env->prog->aux->stack_depth < -off)
env->prog->aux->stack_depth = -off;
if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
meta->access_size = access_size;
meta->regno = regno;
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) {
slot = -(off + i) - 1;
spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
if (state->allocated_stack <= slot ||
state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] !=
STACK_MISC) {
verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
off, i, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: bpf: fix missing error return in check_stack_boundary()
Prevent indirect stack accesses at non-constant addresses, which would
permit reading and corrupting spilled pointers.
Fixes: f1174f77b50c ("bpf/verifier: rework value tracking")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,
struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *state = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs = state->regs;
int off, i, slot, spi;
if (regs[regno].type != PTR_TO_STACK) {
/* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */
if (zero_size_allowed && access_size == 0 &&
register_is_null(regs[regno]))
return 0;
verbose(env, "R%d type=%s expected=%s\n", regno,
reg_type_str[regs[regno].type],
reg_type_str[PTR_TO_STACK]);
return -EACCES;
}
/* Only allow fixed-offset stack reads */
if (!tnum_is_const(regs[regno].var_off)) {
char tn_buf[48];
tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), regs[regno].var_off);
verbose(env, "invalid variable stack read R%d var_off=%s\n",
regno, tn_buf);
return -EACCES;
}
off = regs[regno].off + regs[regno].var_off.value;
if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK || off + access_size > 0 ||
access_size < 0 || (access_size == 0 && !zero_size_allowed)) {
verbose(env, "invalid stack type R%d off=%d access_size=%d\n",
regno, off, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
if (env->prog->aux->stack_depth < -off)
env->prog->aux->stack_depth = -off;
if (meta && meta->raw_mode) {
meta->access_size = access_size;
meta->regno = regno;
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < access_size; i++) {
slot = -(off + i) - 1;
spi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;
if (state->allocated_stack <= slot ||
state->stack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE] !=
STACK_MISC) {
verbose(env, "invalid indirect read from stack off %d+%d size %d\n",
off, i, access_size);
return -EACCES;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 167,640 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static Image *ExtractPostscript(Image *image,const ImageInfo *image_info,
MagickOffsetType PS_Offset,ssize_t PS_Size,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
postscript_file[MaxTextExtent];
const MagicInfo
*magic_info;
FILE
*ps_file;
ImageInfo
*clone_info;
Image
*image2;
unsigned char
magick[2*MaxTextExtent];
if ((clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info)) == NULL)
return(image);
clone_info->blob=(void *) NULL;
clone_info->length=0;
/* Obtain temporary file */
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(postscript_file);
ps_file=fopen_utf8(postscript_file,"wb");
if (ps_file == (FILE *) NULL)
goto FINISH;
/* Copy postscript to temporary file */
(void) SeekBlob(image,PS_Offset,SEEK_SET);
(void) ReadBlob(image, 2*MaxTextExtent, magick);
(void) SeekBlob(image,PS_Offset,SEEK_SET);
while(PS_Size-- > 0)
{
(void) fputc(ReadBlobByte(image),ps_file);
}
(void) fclose(ps_file);
/* Detect file format - Check magic.mgk configuration file. */
magic_info=GetMagicInfo(magick,2*MaxTextExtent,exception);
if(magic_info == (const MagicInfo *) NULL) goto FINISH_UNL;
/* printf("Detected:%s \n",magic_info->name); */
if(exception->severity != UndefinedException) goto FINISH_UNL;
if(magic_info->name == (char *) NULL) goto FINISH_UNL;
(void) strncpy(clone_info->magick,magic_info->name,MaxTextExtent);
/* Read nested image */
/*FormatString(clone_info->filename,"%s:%s",magic_info->name,postscript_file);*/
FormatLocaleString(clone_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"%s",postscript_file);
image2=ReadImage(clone_info,exception);
if (!image2)
goto FINISH_UNL;
/*
Replace current image with new image while copying base image
attributes.
*/
(void) CopyMagickString(image2->filename,image->filename,MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(image2->magick_filename,image->magick_filename,MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(image2->magick,image->magick,MaxTextExtent);
image2->depth=image->depth;
DestroyBlob(image2);
image2->blob=ReferenceBlob(image->blob);
if ((image->rows == 0) || (image->columns == 0))
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,image2);
FINISH_UNL:
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(postscript_file);
FINISH:
DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
return(image);
}
Commit Message: ...
CWE ID: CWE-189 | static Image *ExtractPostscript(Image *image,const ImageInfo *image_info,
MagickOffsetType PS_Offset,ssize_t PS_Size,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
char
postscript_file[MaxTextExtent];
const MagicInfo
*magic_info;
FILE
*ps_file;
ImageInfo
*clone_info;
Image
*image2;
unsigned char
magick[2*MaxTextExtent];
if ((clone_info=CloneImageInfo(image_info)) == NULL)
return(image);
clone_info->blob=(void *) NULL;
clone_info->length=0;
/* Obtain temporary file */
(void) AcquireUniqueFilename(postscript_file);
ps_file=fopen_utf8(postscript_file,"wb");
if (ps_file == (FILE *) NULL)
goto FINISH;
/* Copy postscript to temporary file */
(void) SeekBlob(image,PS_Offset,SEEK_SET);
(void) ReadBlob(image, 2*MaxTextExtent, magick);
(void) SeekBlob(image,PS_Offset,SEEK_SET);
while(PS_Size-- > 0)
{
(void) fputc(ReadBlobByte(image),ps_file);
}
(void) fclose(ps_file);
/* Detect file format - Check magic.mgk configuration file. */
magic_info=GetMagicInfo(magick,2*MaxTextExtent,exception);
if(magic_info == (const MagicInfo *) NULL) goto FINISH_UNL;
/* printf("Detected:%s \n",magic_info->name); */
if(exception->severity != UndefinedException) goto FINISH_UNL;
if(magic_info->name == (char *) NULL) goto FINISH_UNL;
(void) strncpy(clone_info->magick,magic_info->name,MaxTextExtent-1);
/* Read nested image */
/*FormatString(clone_info->filename,"%s:%s",magic_info->name,postscript_file);*/
FormatLocaleString(clone_info->filename,MaxTextExtent,"%s",postscript_file);
image2=ReadImage(clone_info,exception);
if (!image2)
goto FINISH_UNL;
/*
Replace current image with new image while copying base image
attributes.
*/
(void) CopyMagickString(image2->filename,image->filename,MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(image2->magick_filename,image->magick_filename,MaxTextExtent);
(void) CopyMagickString(image2->magick,image->magick,MaxTextExtent);
image2->depth=image->depth;
DestroyBlob(image2);
image2->blob=ReferenceBlob(image->blob);
if ((image->rows == 0) || (image->columns == 0))
DeleteImageFromList(&image);
AppendImageToList(&image,image2);
FINISH_UNL:
(void) RelinquishUniqueFileResource(postscript_file);
FINISH:
DestroyImageInfo(clone_info);
return(image);
}
| 168,524 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: explicit LogoDelegateImpl(
std::unique_ptr<image_fetcher::ImageDecoder> image_decoder)
: image_decoder_(std::move(image_decoder)) {}
Commit Message: Local NTP: add smoke tests for doodles
Split LogoService into LogoService interface and LogoServiceImpl to make
it easier to provide fake data to the test.
Bug: 768419
Cq-Include-Trybots: master.tryserver.chromium.linux:closure_compilation
Change-Id: I84639189d2db1b24a2e139936c99369352bab587
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/690198
Reviewed-by: Sylvain Defresne <sdefresne@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Chris Pickel <sfiera@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#505374}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | explicit LogoDelegateImpl(
| 171,954 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: XIQueryDevice(Display *dpy, int deviceid, int *ndevices_return)
{
XIDeviceInfo *info = NULL;
xXIQueryDeviceReq *req;
xXIQueryDeviceReq *req;
xXIQueryDeviceReply reply;
char *ptr;
int i;
char *buf;
LockDisplay(dpy);
if (_XiCheckExtInit(dpy, XInput_2_0, extinfo) == -1)
goto error_unlocked;
GetReq(XIQueryDevice, req);
req->reqType = extinfo->codes->major_opcode;
req->ReqType = X_XIQueryDevice;
req->deviceid = deviceid;
if (!_XReply(dpy, (xReply*) &reply, 0, xFalse))
goto error;
if (!_XReply(dpy, (xReply*) &reply, 0, xFalse))
goto error;
*ndevices_return = reply.num_devices;
info = Xmalloc((reply.num_devices + 1) * sizeof(XIDeviceInfo));
if (!info)
goto error;
buf = Xmalloc(reply.length * 4);
_XRead(dpy, buf, reply.length * 4);
ptr = buf;
/* info is a null-terminated array */
info[reply.num_devices].name = NULL;
nclasses = wire->num_classes;
ptr += sizeof(xXIDeviceInfo);
lib->name = Xcalloc(wire->name_len + 1, 1);
XIDeviceInfo *lib = &info[i];
xXIDeviceInfo *wire = (xXIDeviceInfo*)ptr;
lib->deviceid = wire->deviceid;
lib->use = wire->use;
lib->attachment = wire->attachment;
Xfree(buf);
ptr += sizeof(xXIDeviceInfo);
lib->name = Xcalloc(wire->name_len + 1, 1);
strncpy(lib->name, ptr, wire->name_len);
ptr += ((wire->name_len + 3)/4) * 4;
sz = size_classes((xXIAnyInfo*)ptr, nclasses);
lib->classes = Xmalloc(sz);
ptr += copy_classes(lib, (xXIAnyInfo*)ptr, &nclasses);
/* We skip over unused classes */
lib->num_classes = nclasses;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284 | XIQueryDevice(Display *dpy, int deviceid, int *ndevices_return)
{
XIDeviceInfo *info = NULL;
xXIQueryDeviceReq *req;
xXIQueryDeviceReq *req;
xXIQueryDeviceReply reply;
char *ptr;
char *end;
int i;
char *buf;
LockDisplay(dpy);
if (_XiCheckExtInit(dpy, XInput_2_0, extinfo) == -1)
goto error_unlocked;
GetReq(XIQueryDevice, req);
req->reqType = extinfo->codes->major_opcode;
req->ReqType = X_XIQueryDevice;
req->deviceid = deviceid;
if (!_XReply(dpy, (xReply*) &reply, 0, xFalse))
goto error;
if (!_XReply(dpy, (xReply*) &reply, 0, xFalse))
goto error;
if (reply.length < INT_MAX / 4)
{
*ndevices_return = reply.num_devices;
info = Xmalloc((reply.num_devices + 1) * sizeof(XIDeviceInfo));
}
else
{
*ndevices_return = 0;
info = NULL;
}
if (!info)
goto error;
buf = Xmalloc(reply.length * 4);
_XRead(dpy, buf, reply.length * 4);
ptr = buf;
end = buf + reply.length * 4;
/* info is a null-terminated array */
info[reply.num_devices].name = NULL;
nclasses = wire->num_classes;
ptr += sizeof(xXIDeviceInfo);
lib->name = Xcalloc(wire->name_len + 1, 1);
XIDeviceInfo *lib = &info[i];
xXIDeviceInfo *wire = (xXIDeviceInfo*)ptr;
if (ptr + sizeof(xXIDeviceInfo) > end)
goto error_loop;
lib->deviceid = wire->deviceid;
lib->use = wire->use;
lib->attachment = wire->attachment;
Xfree(buf);
ptr += sizeof(xXIDeviceInfo);
if (ptr + wire->name_len > end)
goto error_loop;
lib->name = Xcalloc(wire->name_len + 1, 1);
if (lib->name == NULL)
goto error_loop;
strncpy(lib->name, ptr, wire->name_len);
lib->name[wire->name_len] = '\0';
ptr += ((wire->name_len + 3)/4) * 4;
sz = size_classes((xXIAnyInfo*)ptr, nclasses);
lib->classes = Xmalloc(sz);
if (lib->classes == NULL)
{
Xfree(lib->name);
goto error_loop;
}
ptr += copy_classes(lib, (xXIAnyInfo*)ptr, &nclasses);
/* We skip over unused classes */
lib->num_classes = nclasses;
}
| 164,920 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: rename_principal_2_svc(rprinc_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg1,
*prime_arg2;
gss_buffer_desc client_name,
service_name;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
restriction_t *rp;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
size_t tlen1, tlen2, clen, slen;
char *tdots1, *tdots2, *cdots, *sdots;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->src, &prime_arg1) ||
krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->dest, &prime_arg2)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
tlen1 = strlen(prime_arg1);
trunc_name(&tlen1, &tdots1);
tlen2 = strlen(prime_arg2);
trunc_name(&tlen2, &tdots2);
clen = client_name.length;
trunc_name(&clen, &cdots);
slen = service_name.length;
trunc_name(&slen, &sdots);
ret.code = KADM5_OK;
if (! CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) {
if (!kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_DELETE, arg->src, NULL))
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_DELETE;
/* any restrictions at all on the ADD kills the RENAME */
if (!kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_ADD, arg->dest, &rp) || rp) {
if (ret.code == KADM5_AUTH_DELETE)
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_INSUFFICIENT;
else
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_ADD;
}
} else
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_INSUFFICIENT;
if (ret.code != KADM5_OK) {
/* okay to cast lengths to int because trunc_name limits max value */
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
_("Unauthorized request: kadm5_rename_principal, "
"%.*s%s to %.*s%s, "
"client=%.*s%s, service=%.*s%s, addr=%s"),
(int)tlen1, prime_arg1, tdots1,
(int)tlen2, prime_arg2, tdots2,
(int)clen, (char *)client_name.value, cdots,
(int)slen, (char *)service_name.value, sdots,
client_addr(rqstp->rq_xprt));
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_rename_principal((void *)handle, arg->src,
arg->dest);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
/* okay to cast lengths to int because trunc_name limits max value */
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
_("Request: kadm5_rename_principal, "
"%.*s%s to %.*s%s, %s, "
"client=%.*s%s, service=%.*s%s, addr=%s"),
(int)tlen1, prime_arg1, tdots1,
(int)tlen2, prime_arg2, tdots2,
errmsg ? errmsg : _("success"),
(int)clen, (char *)client_name.value, cdots,
(int)slen, (char *)service_name.value, sdots,
client_addr(rqstp->rq_xprt));
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
free(prime_arg1);
free(prime_arg2);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
exit_func:
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix leaks in kadmin server stubs [CVE-2015-8631]
In each kadmind server stub, initialize the client_name and
server_name variables, and release them in the cleanup handler. Many
of the stubs will otherwise leak the client and server name if
krb5_unparse_name() fails. Also make sure to free the prime_arg
variables in rename_principal_2_svc(), or we can leak the first one if
unparsing the second one fails. Discovered by Simo Sorce.
CVE-2015-8631:
In all versions of MIT krb5, an authenticated attacker can cause
kadmind to leak memory by supplying a null principal name in a request
which uses one. Repeating these requests will eventually cause
kadmind to exhaust all available memory.
CVSSv2 Vector: AV:N/AC:L/Au:S/C:N/I:N/A:C/E:POC/RL:OF/RC:C
ticket: 8343 (new)
target_version: 1.14-next
target_version: 1.13-next
tags: pullup
CWE ID: CWE-119 | rename_principal_2_svc(rprinc_arg *arg, struct svc_req *rqstp)
{
static generic_ret ret;
char *prime_arg1 = NULL, *prime_arg2 = NULL;
gss_buffer_desc client_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc service_name = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 minor_stat;
kadm5_server_handle_t handle;
restriction_t *rp;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
size_t tlen1, tlen2, clen, slen;
char *tdots1, *tdots2, *cdots, *sdots;
xdr_free(xdr_generic_ret, &ret);
if ((ret.code = new_server_handle(arg->api_version, rqstp, &handle)))
goto exit_func;
if ((ret.code = check_handle((void *)handle)))
goto exit_func;
if (setup_gss_names(rqstp, &client_name, &service_name) < 0) {
ret.code = KADM5_FAILURE;
goto exit_func;
}
if (krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->src, &prime_arg1) ||
krb5_unparse_name(handle->context, arg->dest, &prime_arg2)) {
ret.code = KADM5_BAD_PRINCIPAL;
goto exit_func;
}
tlen1 = strlen(prime_arg1);
trunc_name(&tlen1, &tdots1);
tlen2 = strlen(prime_arg2);
trunc_name(&tlen2, &tdots2);
clen = client_name.length;
trunc_name(&clen, &cdots);
slen = service_name.length;
trunc_name(&slen, &sdots);
ret.code = KADM5_OK;
if (! CHANGEPW_SERVICE(rqstp)) {
if (!kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_DELETE, arg->src, NULL))
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_DELETE;
/* any restrictions at all on the ADD kills the RENAME */
if (!kadm5int_acl_check(handle->context, rqst2name(rqstp),
ACL_ADD, arg->dest, &rp) || rp) {
if (ret.code == KADM5_AUTH_DELETE)
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_INSUFFICIENT;
else
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_ADD;
}
} else
ret.code = KADM5_AUTH_INSUFFICIENT;
if (ret.code != KADM5_OK) {
/* okay to cast lengths to int because trunc_name limits max value */
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
_("Unauthorized request: kadm5_rename_principal, "
"%.*s%s to %.*s%s, "
"client=%.*s%s, service=%.*s%s, addr=%s"),
(int)tlen1, prime_arg1, tdots1,
(int)tlen2, prime_arg2, tdots2,
(int)clen, (char *)client_name.value, cdots,
(int)slen, (char *)service_name.value, sdots,
client_addr(rqstp->rq_xprt));
} else {
ret.code = kadm5_rename_principal((void *)handle, arg->src,
arg->dest);
if( ret.code != 0 )
errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(handle->context, ret.code);
/* okay to cast lengths to int because trunc_name limits max value */
krb5_klog_syslog(LOG_NOTICE,
_("Request: kadm5_rename_principal, "
"%.*s%s to %.*s%s, %s, "
"client=%.*s%s, service=%.*s%s, addr=%s"),
(int)tlen1, prime_arg1, tdots1,
(int)tlen2, prime_arg2, tdots2,
errmsg ? errmsg : _("success"),
(int)clen, (char *)client_name.value, cdots,
(int)slen, (char *)service_name.value, sdots,
client_addr(rqstp->rq_xprt));
if (errmsg != NULL)
krb5_free_error_message(handle->context, errmsg);
}
exit_func:
free(prime_arg1);
free(prime_arg2);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &client_name);
gss_release_buffer(&minor_stat, &service_name);
free_server_handle(handle);
return &ret;
}
| 167,523 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FeatureInfo::EnableOESTextureHalfFloatLinear() {
if (!oes_texture_half_float_linear_available_)
return;
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_texture_half_float_linear");
feature_flags_.enable_texture_half_float_linear = true;
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(gfx::BufferFormat::RGBA_F16);
}
Commit Message: gpu: Disallow use of IOSurfaces for half-float format with swiftshader.
R=kbr@chromium.org
Bug: 998038
Change-Id: Ic31d28938ef205b36657fc7bd297fe8a63d08543
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1798052
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Auto-Submit: Khushal <khushalsagar@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#695826}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void FeatureInfo::EnableOESTextureHalfFloatLinear() {
if (!oes_texture_half_float_linear_available_)
return;
AddExtensionString("GL_OES_texture_half_float_linear");
feature_flags_.enable_texture_half_float_linear = true;
// TODO(capn) : Re-enable this once we have ANGLE+SwiftShader supporting
// IOSurfaces.
if (workarounds_.disable_half_float_for_gmb)
return;
feature_flags_.gpu_memory_buffer_formats.Add(gfx::BufferFormat::RGBA_F16);
}
| 172,387 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: LogLuvSetupEncode(TIFF* tif)
{
static const char module[] = "LogLuvSetupEncode";
LogLuvState* sp = EncoderState(tif);
TIFFDirectory* td = &tif->tif_dir;
switch (td->td_photometric) {
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGLUV:
if (!LogLuvInitState(tif))
break;
if (td->td_compression == COMPRESSION_SGILOG24) {
tif->tif_encoderow = LogLuvEncode24;
switch (sp->user_datafmt) {
case SGILOGDATAFMT_FLOAT:
sp->tfunc = Luv24fromXYZ;
break;
case SGILOGDATAFMT_16BIT:
sp->tfunc = Luv24fromLuv48;
break;
case SGILOGDATAFMT_RAW:
break;
default:
goto notsupported;
}
} else {
tif->tif_encoderow = LogLuvEncode32;
switch (sp->user_datafmt) {
case SGILOGDATAFMT_FLOAT:
sp->tfunc = Luv32fromXYZ;
break;
case SGILOGDATAFMT_16BIT:
sp->tfunc = Luv32fromLuv48;
break;
case SGILOGDATAFMT_RAW:
break;
default:
goto notsupported;
}
}
break;
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL:
if (!LogL16InitState(tif))
break;
tif->tif_encoderow = LogL16Encode;
switch (sp->user_datafmt) {
case SGILOGDATAFMT_FLOAT:
sp->tfunc = L16fromY;
break;
case SGILOGDATAFMT_16BIT:
break;
default:
goto notsupported;
}
break;
default:
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Inappropriate photometric interpretation %d for SGILog compression; %s",
td->td_photometric, "must be either LogLUV or LogL");
break;
}
return (1);
notsupported:
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"SGILog compression supported only for %s, or raw data",
td->td_photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL ? "Y, L" : "XYZ, Luv");
return (0);
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based buffer
overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with
ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample.
The fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind
of issue of PixarLog.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
CWE ID: CWE-125 | LogLuvSetupEncode(TIFF* tif)
{
static const char module[] = "LogLuvSetupEncode";
LogLuvState* sp = EncoderState(tif);
TIFFDirectory* td = &tif->tif_dir;
switch (td->td_photometric) {
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGLUV:
if (!LogLuvInitState(tif))
break;
if (td->td_compression == COMPRESSION_SGILOG24) {
tif->tif_encoderow = LogLuvEncode24;
switch (sp->user_datafmt) {
case SGILOGDATAFMT_FLOAT:
sp->tfunc = Luv24fromXYZ;
break;
case SGILOGDATAFMT_16BIT:
sp->tfunc = Luv24fromLuv48;
break;
case SGILOGDATAFMT_RAW:
break;
default:
goto notsupported;
}
} else {
tif->tif_encoderow = LogLuvEncode32;
switch (sp->user_datafmt) {
case SGILOGDATAFMT_FLOAT:
sp->tfunc = Luv32fromXYZ;
break;
case SGILOGDATAFMT_16BIT:
sp->tfunc = Luv32fromLuv48;
break;
case SGILOGDATAFMT_RAW:
break;
default:
goto notsupported;
}
}
break;
case PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL:
if (!LogL16InitState(tif))
break;
tif->tif_encoderow = LogL16Encode;
switch (sp->user_datafmt) {
case SGILOGDATAFMT_FLOAT:
sp->tfunc = L16fromY;
break;
case SGILOGDATAFMT_16BIT:
break;
default:
goto notsupported;
}
break;
default:
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"Inappropriate photometric interpretation %d for SGILog compression; %s",
td->td_photometric, "must be either LogLUV or LogL");
break;
}
sp->encoder_state = 1;
return (1);
notsupported:
TIFFErrorExt(tif->tif_clientdata, module,
"SGILog compression supported only for %s, or raw data",
td->td_photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL ? "Y, L" : "XYZ, Luv");
return (0);
}
| 168,465 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void TestPlaybackRate(double playback_rate) {
static const int kDefaultBufferSize = kSamplesPerSecond / 10;
static const int kDefaultFramesRequested = 5 * kSamplesPerSecond;
TestPlaybackRate(playback_rate, kDefaultBufferSize,
kDefaultFramesRequested);
}
Commit Message: Protect AudioRendererAlgorithm from invalid step sizes.
BUG=165430
TEST=unittests and asan pass.
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/11573023
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@173249 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void TestPlaybackRate(double playback_rate) {
const int kDefaultBufferSize = algorithm_.samples_per_second() / 10;
const int kDefaultFramesRequested = 2 * algorithm_.samples_per_second();
TestPlaybackRate(playback_rate, kDefaultBufferSize,
kDefaultFramesRequested);
}
| 171,535 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool WebContentsImpl::IsLoading() const {
return frame_tree_.IsLoading() &&
!(ShowingInterstitialPage() &&
GetRenderManager()->interstitial_page()->pause_throbber());
}
Commit Message: Don't show current RenderWidgetHostView while interstitial is showing.
Also moves interstitial page tracking from RenderFrameHostManager to
WebContents, since interstitial pages are not frame-specific. This was
necessary for subframes to detect if an interstitial page is showing.
BUG=729105
TEST=See comment 13 of bug for repro steps
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2938313002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#480117}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool WebContentsImpl::IsLoading() const {
return frame_tree_.IsLoading() &&
!(ShowingInterstitialPage() && interstitial_page_->pause_throbber());
}
| 172,331 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintPreviewUI::OnPrintPreviewRequest(int request_id) {
g_print_preview_request_id_map.Get().Set(preview_ui_addr_str_, request_id);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void PrintPreviewUI::OnPrintPreviewRequest(int request_id) {
g_print_preview_request_id_map.Get().Set(id_, request_id);
}
| 170,839 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const char* Chapters::Display::GetLanguage() const
{
return m_language;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const char* Chapters::Display::GetLanguage() const
| 174,336 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SchedulerObject::setAttribute(std::string key,
std::string name,
std::string value,
std::string &text)
{
PROC_ID id = getProcByString(key.c_str());
if (id.cluster < 0 || id.proc < 0) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "SetAttribute: Failed to parse id: %s\n", key.c_str());
text = "Invalid Id";
return false;
}
if (isSubmissionChange(name.c_str())) {
text = "Changes to submission name not allowed";
return false;
}
if (isKeyword(name.c_str())) {
text = "Attribute name is reserved: " + name;
return false;
}
if (!isValidAttributeName(name,text)) {
return false;
}
if (::SetAttribute(id.cluster,
id.proc,
name.c_str(),
value.c_str())) {
text = "Failed to set attribute " + name + " to " + value;
return false;
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | SchedulerObject::setAttribute(std::string key,
std::string name,
std::string value,
std::string &text)
{
PROC_ID id = getProcByString(key.c_str());
if (id.cluster <= 0 || id.proc < 0) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "SetAttribute: Failed to parse id: %s\n", key.c_str());
text = "Invalid Id";
return false;
}
if (isSubmissionChange(name.c_str())) {
text = "Changes to submission name not allowed";
return false;
}
if (isKeyword(name.c_str())) {
text = "Attribute name is reserved: " + name;
return false;
}
if (!isValidAttributeName(name,text)) {
return false;
}
if (::SetAttribute(id.cluster,
id.proc,
name.c_str(),
value.c_str())) {
text = "Failed to set attribute " + name + " to " + value;
return false;
}
return true;
}
| 164,835 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static char* allocFromUTF32(const char32_t* in, size_t len)
{
if (len == 0) {
return getEmptyString();
}
const ssize_t bytes = utf32_to_utf8_length(in, len);
if (bytes < 0) {
return getEmptyString();
}
SharedBuffer* buf = SharedBuffer::alloc(bytes+1);
ALOG_ASSERT(buf, "Unable to allocate shared buffer");
if (!buf) {
return getEmptyString();
}
char* str = (char*) buf->data();
utf32_to_utf8(in, len, str);
return str;
}
Commit Message: libutils/Unicode.cpp: Correct length computation and add checks for utf16->utf8
Inconsistent behaviour between utf16_to_utf8 and utf16_to_utf8_length
is causing a heap overflow.
Correcting the length computation and adding bound checks to the
conversion functions.
Test: ran libutils_tests
Bug: 29250543
Change-Id: I6115e3357141ed245c63c6eb25fc0fd0a9a7a2bb
(cherry picked from commit c4966a363e46d2e1074d1a365e232af0dcedd6a1)
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static char* allocFromUTF32(const char32_t* in, size_t len)
{
if (len == 0) {
return getEmptyString();
}
const ssize_t resultStrLen = utf32_to_utf8_length(in, len) + 1;
if (resultStrLen < 1) {
return getEmptyString();
}
SharedBuffer* buf = SharedBuffer::alloc(resultStrLen);
ALOG_ASSERT(buf, "Unable to allocate shared buffer");
if (!buf) {
return getEmptyString();
}
char* resultStr = (char*) buf->data();
utf32_to_utf8(in, len, resultStr, resultStrLen);
return resultStr;
}
| 173,418 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool AXTableCell::isColumnHeaderCell() const {
const AtomicString& scope = getAttribute(scopeAttr);
return equalIgnoringCase(scope, "col") ||
equalIgnoringCase(scope, "colgroup");
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | bool AXTableCell::isColumnHeaderCell() const {
const AtomicString& scope = getAttribute(scopeAttr);
return equalIgnoringASCIICase(scope, "col") ||
equalIgnoringASCIICase(scope, "colgroup");
}
| 171,932 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int sock_send_all(int sock_fd, const uint8_t* buf, int len)
{
int s = len;
int ret;
while(s)
{
do ret = send(sock_fd, buf, s, 0);
while(ret < 0 && errno == EINTR);
if(ret <= 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("sock fd:%d send errno:%d, ret:%d", sock_fd, errno, ret);
return -1;
}
buf += ret;
s -= ret;
}
return len;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | int sock_send_all(int sock_fd, const uint8_t* buf, int len)
{
int s = len;
int ret;
while(s)
{
do ret = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(sock_fd, buf, s, 0));
while(ret < 0 && errno == EINTR);
if(ret <= 0)
{
BTIF_TRACE_ERROR("sock fd:%d send errno:%d, ret:%d", sock_fd, errno, ret);
return -1;
}
buf += ret;
s -= ret;
}
return len;
}
| 173,469 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void UpdateContentLengthPrefs(
int received_content_length, int original_content_length,
bool with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled, bool via_data_reduction_proxy,
PrefService* prefs) {
int64 total_received = prefs->GetInt64(prefs::kHttpReceivedContentLength);
int64 total_original = prefs->GetInt64(prefs::kHttpOriginalContentLength);
total_received += received_content_length;
total_original += original_content_length;
prefs->SetInt64(prefs::kHttpReceivedContentLength, total_received);
prefs->SetInt64(prefs::kHttpOriginalContentLength, total_original);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_IOS)
UpdateContentLengthPrefsForDataReductionProxy(
received_content_length,
original_content_length,
with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled,
via_data_reduction_proxy,
base::Time::Now(),
prefs);
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_IOS)
}
Commit Message: Added daily UMA for non-data-reduction-proxy data usage when the proxy is enabled.
BUG=325325
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/106113002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@239897 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void UpdateContentLengthPrefs(
int received_content_length,
int original_content_length,
bool with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled,
DataReductionRequestType data_reduction_type,
PrefService* prefs) {
int64 total_received = prefs->GetInt64(prefs::kHttpReceivedContentLength);
int64 total_original = prefs->GetInt64(prefs::kHttpOriginalContentLength);
total_received += received_content_length;
total_original += original_content_length;
prefs->SetInt64(prefs::kHttpReceivedContentLength, total_received);
prefs->SetInt64(prefs::kHttpOriginalContentLength, total_original);
#if defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_IOS)
UpdateContentLengthPrefsForDataReductionProxy(
received_content_length,
original_content_length,
with_data_reduction_proxy_enabled,
data_reduction_type,
base::Time::Now(),
prefs);
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID) || defined(OS_IOS)
}
| 171,327 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RilSapSocket::sendDisconnect() {
size_t encoded_size = 0;
uint32_t written_size;
size_t buffer_size = 0;
pb_ostream_t ostream;
bool success = false;
RIL_SIM_SAP_DISCONNECT_REQ disconnectReq;
if ((success = pb_get_encoded_size(&encoded_size, RIL_SIM_SAP_DISCONNECT_REQ_fields,
&disconnectReq)) && encoded_size <= INT32_MAX) {
buffer_size = encoded_size + sizeof(uint32_t);
uint8_t buffer[buffer_size];
written_size = htonl((uint32_t) encoded_size);
ostream = pb_ostream_from_buffer(buffer, buffer_size);
pb_write(&ostream, (uint8_t *)&written_size, sizeof(written_size));
success = pb_encode(&ostream, RIL_SIM_SAP_DISCONNECT_REQ_fields, buffer);
if(success) {
pb_bytes_array_t *payload = (pb_bytes_array_t *)calloc(1,
sizeof(pb_bytes_array_t) + written_size);
if (!payload) {
RLOGE("sendDisconnect: OOM");
return;
}
memcpy(payload->bytes, buffer, written_size);
payload->size = written_size;
MsgHeader *hdr = (MsgHeader *)malloc(sizeof(MsgHeader));
if (!hdr) {
RLOGE("sendDisconnect: OOM");
free(payload);
return;
}
hdr->payload = payload;
hdr->type = MsgType_REQUEST;
hdr->id = MsgId_RIL_SIM_SAP_DISCONNECT;
hdr->error = Error_RIL_E_SUCCESS;
dispatchDisconnect(hdr);
}
else {
RLOGE("Encode failed in send disconnect!");
}
}
}
Commit Message: Replace variable-length arrays on stack with malloc.
Bug: 30202619
Change-Id: Ib95e08a1c009d88a4b4fd8d8fdba0641c6129008
(cherry picked from commit 943905bb9f99e3caa856b42c531e2be752da8834)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | void RilSapSocket::sendDisconnect() {
size_t encoded_size = 0;
uint32_t written_size;
size_t buffer_size = 0;
pb_ostream_t ostream;
bool success = false;
RIL_SIM_SAP_DISCONNECT_REQ disconnectReq;
if ((success = pb_get_encoded_size(&encoded_size, RIL_SIM_SAP_DISCONNECT_REQ_fields,
&disconnectReq)) && encoded_size <= INT32_MAX) {
buffer_size = encoded_size + sizeof(uint32_t);
uint8_t* buffer = (uint8_t*)malloc(buffer_size);
if (!buffer) {
RLOGE("sendDisconnect: OOM");
return;
}
written_size = htonl((uint32_t) encoded_size);
ostream = pb_ostream_from_buffer(buffer, buffer_size);
pb_write(&ostream, (uint8_t *)&written_size, sizeof(written_size));
success = pb_encode(&ostream, RIL_SIM_SAP_DISCONNECT_REQ_fields, buffer);
if(success) {
pb_bytes_array_t *payload = (pb_bytes_array_t *)calloc(1,
sizeof(pb_bytes_array_t) + written_size);
if (!payload) {
RLOGE("sendDisconnect: OOM");
return;
}
memcpy(payload->bytes, buffer, written_size);
payload->size = written_size;
MsgHeader *hdr = (MsgHeader *)malloc(sizeof(MsgHeader));
if (!hdr) {
RLOGE("sendDisconnect: OOM");
free(payload);
return;
}
hdr->payload = payload;
hdr->type = MsgType_REQUEST;
hdr->id = MsgId_RIL_SIM_SAP_DISCONNECT;
hdr->error = Error_RIL_E_SUCCESS;
dispatchDisconnect(hdr);
}
else {
RLOGE("Encode failed in send disconnect!");
}
free(buffer);
}
}
| 173,388 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MemoryInstrumentation::GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(
RequestGlobalDumpCallback callback) {
const auto& coordinator = GetCoordinatorBindingForCurrentThread();
coordinator->GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(callback);
}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269 | void MemoryInstrumentation::GetVmRegionsForHeapProfiler(
| 172,918 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: Chapters::Display::~Display()
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | Chapters::Display::~Display()
| 174,464 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: _php_mb_regex_init_options(const char *parg, int narg, OnigOptionType *option, OnigSyntaxType **syntax, int *eval)
{
int n;
char c;
int optm = 0;
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_RUBY;
if (parg != NULL) {
n = 0;
while(n < narg) {
c = parg[n++];
switch (c) {
case 'i':
optm |= ONIG_OPTION_IGNORECASE;
break;
case 'x':
optm |= ONIG_OPTION_EXTEND;
break;
case 'm':
optm |= ONIG_OPTION_MULTILINE;
break;
case 's':
optm |= ONIG_OPTION_SINGLELINE;
break;
case 'p':
optm |= ONIG_OPTION_MULTILINE | ONIG_OPTION_SINGLELINE;
break;
case 'l':
optm |= ONIG_OPTION_FIND_LONGEST;
break;
case 'n':
optm |= ONIG_OPTION_FIND_NOT_EMPTY;
break;
case 'j':
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_JAVA;
break;
case 'u':
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_GNU_REGEX;
break;
case 'g':
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_GREP;
break;
case 'c':
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_EMACS;
break;
case 'r':
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_RUBY;
break;
case 'z':
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_PERL;
break;
case 'b':
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_POSIX_BASIC;
break;
case 'd':
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_POSIX_EXTENDED;
break;
case 'e':
if (eval != NULL) *eval = 1;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (option != NULL) *option|=optm;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72402: _php_mb_regex_ereg_replace_exec - double free
CWE ID: CWE-415 | _php_mb_regex_init_options(const char *parg, int narg, OnigOptionType *option, OnigSyntaxType **syntax, int *eval)
_php_mb_regex_init_options(const char *parg, int narg, OnigOptionType *option, OnigSyntaxType **syntax, int *eval)
{
int n;
char c;
int optm = 0;
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_RUBY;
if (parg != NULL) {
n = 0;
while(n < narg) {
c = parg[n++];
switch (c) {
case 'i':
optm |= ONIG_OPTION_IGNORECASE;
break;
case 'x':
optm |= ONIG_OPTION_EXTEND;
break;
case 'm':
optm |= ONIG_OPTION_MULTILINE;
break;
case 's':
optm |= ONIG_OPTION_SINGLELINE;
break;
case 'p':
optm |= ONIG_OPTION_MULTILINE | ONIG_OPTION_SINGLELINE;
break;
case 'l':
optm |= ONIG_OPTION_FIND_LONGEST;
break;
case 'n':
optm |= ONIG_OPTION_FIND_NOT_EMPTY;
break;
case 'j':
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_JAVA;
break;
case 'u':
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_GNU_REGEX;
break;
case 'g':
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_GREP;
break;
case 'c':
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_EMACS;
break;
case 'r':
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_RUBY;
break;
case 'z':
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_PERL;
break;
case 'b':
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_POSIX_BASIC;
break;
case 'd':
*syntax = ONIG_SYNTAX_POSIX_EXTENDED;
break;
case 'e':
if (eval != NULL) *eval = 1;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (option != NULL) *option|=optm;
}
}
| 167,120 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: jbig2_end_of_stripe(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Segment *segment, const uint8_t *segment_data)
{
Jbig2Page page = ctx->pages[ctx->current_page];
int end_row;
end_row = jbig2_get_int32(segment_data);
if (end_row < page.end_row) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, segment->number,
"end of stripe segment with non-positive end row advance" " (new end row %d vs current end row %d)", end_row, page.end_row);
} else {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_INFO, segment->number, "end of stripe: advancing end row to %d", end_row);
}
page.end_row = end_row;
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | jbig2_end_of_stripe(Jbig2Ctx *ctx, Jbig2Segment *segment, const uint8_t *segment_data)
{
Jbig2Page page = ctx->pages[ctx->current_page];
uint32_t end_row;
end_row = jbig2_get_uint32(segment_data);
if (end_row < page.end_row) {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_WARNING, segment->number,
"end of stripe segment with non-positive end row advance" " (new end row %d vs current end row %d)", end_row, page.end_row);
} else {
jbig2_error(ctx, JBIG2_SEVERITY_INFO, segment->number, "end of stripe: advancing end row to %d", end_row);
}
page.end_row = end_row;
return 0;
}
| 165,495 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GpuProcessHostUIShim::OnAcceleratedSurfacePostSubBuffer(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfacePostSubBuffer_Params& params) {
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer",
"GpuProcessHostUIShim::OnAcceleratedSurfacePostSubBuffer");
ScopedSendOnIOThread delayed_send(
host_id_,
new AcceleratedSurfaceMsg_BufferPresented(params.route_id, false, 0));
RenderWidgetHostViewPort* view =
GetRenderWidgetHostViewFromSurfaceID(params.surface_id);
if (!view)
return;
delayed_send.Cancel();
view->AcceleratedSurfacePostSubBuffer(params, host_id_);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void GpuProcessHostUIShim::OnAcceleratedSurfacePostSubBuffer(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfacePostSubBuffer_Params& params) {
TRACE_EVENT0("renderer",
"GpuProcessHostUIShim::OnAcceleratedSurfacePostSubBuffer");
ScopedSendOnIOThread delayed_send(
host_id_,
new AcceleratedSurfaceMsg_BufferPresented(params.route_id,
params.surface_handle,
0));
RenderWidgetHostViewPort* view =
GetRenderWidgetHostViewFromSurfaceID(params.surface_id);
if (!view)
return;
delayed_send.Cancel();
view->AcceleratedSurfacePostSubBuffer(params, host_id_);
}
| 171,359 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static struct desc_struct *get_desc(unsigned short sel)
{
struct desc_ptr gdt_desc = {0, 0};
unsigned long desc_base;
#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
if ((sel & SEGMENT_TI_MASK) == SEGMENT_LDT) {
struct desc_struct *desc = NULL;
struct ldt_struct *ldt;
/* Bits [15:3] contain the index of the desired entry. */
sel >>= 3;
mutex_lock(¤t->active_mm->context.lock);
ldt = current->active_mm->context.ldt;
if (ldt && sel < ldt->nr_entries)
desc = &ldt->entries[sel];
mutex_unlock(¤t->active_mm->context.lock);
return desc;
}
#endif
native_store_gdt(&gdt_desc);
/*
* Segment descriptors have a size of 8 bytes. Thus, the index is
* multiplied by 8 to obtain the memory offset of the desired descriptor
* from the base of the GDT. As bits [15:3] of the segment selector
* contain the index, it can be regarded as multiplied by 8 already.
* All that remains is to clear bits [2:0].
*/
desc_base = sel & ~(SEGMENT_RPL_MASK | SEGMENT_TI_MASK);
if (desc_base > gdt_desc.size)
return NULL;
return (struct desc_struct *)(gdt_desc.address + desc_base);
}
Commit Message: x86/insn-eval: Fix use-after-free access to LDT entry
get_desc() computes a pointer into the LDT while holding a lock that
protects the LDT from being freed, but then drops the lock and returns the
(now potentially dangling) pointer to its caller.
Fix it by giving the caller a copy of the LDT entry instead.
Fixes: 670f928ba09b ("x86/insn-eval: Add utility function to get segment descriptor")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | static struct desc_struct *get_desc(unsigned short sel)
static bool get_desc(struct desc_struct *out, unsigned short sel)
{
struct desc_ptr gdt_desc = {0, 0};
unsigned long desc_base;
#ifdef CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL
if ((sel & SEGMENT_TI_MASK) == SEGMENT_LDT) {
bool success = false;
struct ldt_struct *ldt;
/* Bits [15:3] contain the index of the desired entry. */
sel >>= 3;
mutex_lock(¤t->active_mm->context.lock);
ldt = current->active_mm->context.ldt;
if (ldt && sel < ldt->nr_entries) {
*out = ldt->entries[sel];
success = true;
}
mutex_unlock(¤t->active_mm->context.lock);
return success;
}
#endif
native_store_gdt(&gdt_desc);
/*
* Segment descriptors have a size of 8 bytes. Thus, the index is
* multiplied by 8 to obtain the memory offset of the desired descriptor
* from the base of the GDT. As bits [15:3] of the segment selector
* contain the index, it can be regarded as multiplied by 8 already.
* All that remains is to clear bits [2:0].
*/
desc_base = sel & ~(SEGMENT_RPL_MASK | SEGMENT_TI_MASK);
if (desc_base > gdt_desc.size)
return false;
*out = *(struct desc_struct *)(gdt_desc.address + desc_base);
return true;
}
| 169,607 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ext4_get_block_write(struct inode *inode, sector_t iblock,
struct buffer_head *bh_result, int create)
{
handle_t *handle = NULL;
int ret = 0;
unsigned max_blocks = bh_result->b_size >> inode->i_blkbits;
int dio_credits;
ext4_debug("ext4_get_block_write: inode %lu, create flag %d\n",
inode->i_ino, create);
/*
* ext4_get_block in prepare for a DIO write or buffer write.
* We allocate an uinitialized extent if blocks haven't been allocated.
* The extent will be converted to initialized after IO complete.
*/
create = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_IO_CREATE_EXT;
if (max_blocks > DIO_MAX_BLOCKS)
max_blocks = DIO_MAX_BLOCKS;
dio_credits = ext4_chunk_trans_blocks(inode, max_blocks);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, dio_credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
goto out;
}
ret = ext4_get_blocks(handle, inode, iblock, max_blocks, bh_result,
create);
if (ret > 0) {
bh_result->b_size = (ret << inode->i_blkbits);
ret = 0;
}
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out:
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ext4: use ext4_get_block_write in buffer write
Allocate uninitialized extent before ext4 buffer write and
convert the extent to initialized after io completes.
The purpose is to make sure an extent can only be marked
initialized after it has been written with new data so
we can safely drop the i_mutex lock in ext4 DIO read without
exposing stale data. This helps to improve multi-thread DIO
read performance on high-speed disks.
Skip the nobh and data=journal mount cases to make things simple for now.
Signed-off-by: Jiaying Zhang <jiayingz@google.com>
Signed-off-by: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CWE ID: | static int ext4_get_block_write(struct inode *inode, sector_t iblock,
struct buffer_head *bh_result, int create)
{
handle_t *handle = ext4_journal_current_handle();
int ret = 0;
unsigned max_blocks = bh_result->b_size >> inode->i_blkbits;
int dio_credits;
int started = 0;
ext4_debug("ext4_get_block_write: inode %lu, create flag %d\n",
inode->i_ino, create);
/*
* ext4_get_block in prepare for a DIO write or buffer write.
* We allocate an uinitialized extent if blocks haven't been allocated.
* The extent will be converted to initialized after IO complete.
*/
create = EXT4_GET_BLOCKS_IO_CREATE_EXT;
if (!handle) {
if (max_blocks > DIO_MAX_BLOCKS)
max_blocks = DIO_MAX_BLOCKS;
dio_credits = ext4_chunk_trans_blocks(inode, max_blocks);
handle = ext4_journal_start(inode, dio_credits);
if (IS_ERR(handle)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(handle);
goto out;
}
started = 1;
}
ret = ext4_get_blocks(handle, inode, iblock, max_blocks, bh_result,
create);
if (ret > 0) {
bh_result->b_size = (ret << inode->i_blkbits);
ret = 0;
}
if (started)
ext4_journal_stop(handle);
out:
return ret;
}
| 167,545 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: FT_Stream_EnterFrame( FT_Stream stream,
FT_ULong count )
{
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
FT_ULong read_bytes;
/* check for nested frame access */
FT_ASSERT( stream && stream->cursor == 0 );
if ( stream->read )
{
/* allocate the frame in memory */
FT_Memory memory = stream->memory;
/* simple sanity check */
if ( count > stream->size )
{
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_EnterFrame:"
" frame size (%lu) larger than stream size (%lu)\n",
count, stream->size ));
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
goto Exit;
}
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_MEMORY
/* assume _ft_debug_file and _ft_debug_lineno are already set */
stream->base = (unsigned char*)ft_mem_qalloc( memory, count, &error );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
#else
if ( FT_QALLOC( stream->base, count ) )
goto Exit;
#endif
/* read it */
read_bytes = stream->read( stream, stream->pos,
stream->base, count );
if ( read_bytes < count )
{
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_EnterFrame:"
" invalid read; expected %lu bytes, got %lu\n",
count, read_bytes ));
FT_FREE( stream->base );
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
}
stream->cursor = stream->base;
stream->limit = stream->cursor + count;
stream->pos += read_bytes;
}
else
{
/* check current and new position */
if ( stream->pos >= stream->size ||
stream->pos + count > stream->size )
{
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_EnterFrame:"
" invalid i/o; pos = 0x%lx, count = %lu, size = 0x%lx\n",
stream->pos, count, stream->size ));
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
goto Exit;
}
/* set cursor */
stream->cursor = stream->base + stream->pos;
stream->limit = stream->cursor + count;
stream->pos += count;
}
Exit:
return error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | FT_Stream_EnterFrame( FT_Stream stream,
FT_ULong count )
{
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
FT_ULong read_bytes;
/* check for nested frame access */
FT_ASSERT( stream && stream->cursor == 0 );
if ( stream->read )
{
/* allocate the frame in memory */
FT_Memory memory = stream->memory;
/* simple sanity check */
if ( count > stream->size )
{
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_EnterFrame:"
" frame size (%lu) larger than stream size (%lu)\n",
count, stream->size ));
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
goto Exit;
}
#ifdef FT_DEBUG_MEMORY
/* assume _ft_debug_file and _ft_debug_lineno are already set */
stream->base = (unsigned char*)ft_mem_qalloc( memory, count, &error );
if ( error )
goto Exit;
#else
if ( FT_QALLOC( stream->base, count ) )
goto Exit;
#endif
/* read it */
read_bytes = stream->read( stream, stream->pos,
stream->base, count );
if ( read_bytes < count )
{
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_EnterFrame:"
" invalid read; expected %lu bytes, got %lu\n",
count, read_bytes ));
FT_FREE( stream->base );
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
}
stream->cursor = stream->base;
stream->limit = stream->cursor + count;
stream->pos += read_bytes;
}
else
{
/* check current and new position */
if ( stream->pos >= stream->size ||
stream->size - stream->pos < count )
{
FT_ERROR(( "FT_Stream_EnterFrame:"
" invalid i/o; pos = 0x%lx, count = %lu, size = 0x%lx\n",
stream->pos, count, stream->size ));
error = FT_Err_Invalid_Stream_Operation;
goto Exit;
}
/* set cursor */
stream->cursor = stream->base + stream->pos;
stream->limit = stream->cursor + count;
stream->pos += count;
}
Exit:
return error;
}
| 164,986 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AudioOutputDevice::ShutDownOnIOThread() {
DCHECK(message_loop()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (stream_id_) {
is_started_ = false;
if (ipc_) {
ipc_->CloseStream(stream_id_);
ipc_->RemoveDelegate(stream_id_);
}
stream_id_ = 0;
}
base::AutoLock auto_lock_(audio_thread_lock_);
if (!audio_thread_.get())
return;
base::ThreadRestrictions::ScopedAllowIO allow_io;
audio_thread_->Stop(NULL);
audio_thread_.reset();
audio_callback_.reset();
}
Commit Message: Revert r157378 as it caused WebRTC to dereference null pointers when restarting a call.
I've kept my unit test changes intact but disabled until I get a proper fix.
BUG=147499,150805
TBR=henrika
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/10946040
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@157626 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-362 | void AudioOutputDevice::ShutDownOnIOThread() {
DCHECK(message_loop()->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (stream_id_) {
is_started_ = false;
if (ipc_) {
ipc_->CloseStream(stream_id_);
ipc_->RemoveDelegate(stream_id_);
}
stream_id_ = 0;
}
base::ThreadRestrictions::ScopedAllowIO allow_io;
audio_thread_.Stop(NULL);
audio_callback_.reset();
}
| 170,706 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void copyMultiCh16(short *dst, const int *const *src, unsigned nSamples, unsigned nChannels)
{
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
for (unsigned c = 0; c < nChannels; ++c) {
*dst++ = src[c][i];
}
}
}
Commit Message: FLACExtractor: copy protect mWriteBuffer
Bug: 30895578
Change-Id: I4cba36bbe3502678210e5925181683df9726b431
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void copyMultiCh16(short *dst, const int *const *src, unsigned nSamples, unsigned nChannels)
static void copyMultiCh16(short *dst, const int * src[FLACParser::kMaxChannels], unsigned nSamples, unsigned nChannels)
{
for (unsigned i = 0; i < nSamples; ++i) {
for (unsigned c = 0; c < nChannels; ++c) {
*dst++ = src[c][i];
}
}
}
| 174,018 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool SubsetterImpl::ResolveCompositeGlyphs(const unsigned int* glyph_ids,
size_t glyph_count,
IntegerSet* glyph_id_processed) {
if (glyph_ids == NULL || glyph_count == 0 || glyph_id_processed == NULL) {
return false;
}
GlyphTablePtr glyph_table =
down_cast<GlyphTable*>(font_->GetTable(Tag::glyf));
LocaTablePtr loca_table = down_cast<LocaTable*>(font_->GetTable(Tag::loca));
if (glyph_table == NULL || loca_table == NULL) {
return false;
}
IntegerSet glyph_id_remaining;
glyph_id_remaining.insert(0); // Always include glyph id 0.
for (size_t i = 0; i < glyph_count; ++i) {
glyph_id_remaining.insert(glyph_ids[i]);
}
while (!glyph_id_remaining.empty()) {
IntegerSet comp_glyph_id;
for (IntegerSet::iterator i = glyph_id_remaining.begin(),
e = glyph_id_remaining.end(); i != e; ++i) {
if (*i < 0 || *i >= loca_table->NumGlyphs()) {
continue;
}
int32_t length = loca_table->GlyphLength(*i);
if (length == 0) {
continue;
}
int32_t offset = loca_table->GlyphOffset(*i);
GlyphPtr glyph;
glyph.Attach(glyph_table->GetGlyph(offset, length));
if (glyph == NULL) {
continue;
}
if (glyph->GlyphType() == GlyphType::kComposite) {
Ptr<GlyphTable::CompositeGlyph> comp_glyph =
down_cast<GlyphTable::CompositeGlyph*>(glyph.p_);
for (int32_t j = 0; j < comp_glyph->NumGlyphs(); ++j) {
int32_t glyph_id = comp_glyph->GlyphIndex(j);
if (glyph_id_processed->find(glyph_id) == glyph_id_processed->end() &&
glyph_id_remaining.find(glyph_id) == glyph_id_remaining.end()) {
comp_glyph_id.insert(comp_glyph->GlyphIndex(j));
}
}
}
glyph_id_processed->insert(*i);
}
glyph_id_remaining.clear();
glyph_id_remaining = comp_glyph_id;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix compile warning.
BUG=none
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7572039
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@95563 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool SubsetterImpl::ResolveCompositeGlyphs(const unsigned int* glyph_ids,
size_t glyph_count,
IntegerSet* glyph_id_processed) {
if (glyph_ids == NULL || glyph_count == 0 || glyph_id_processed == NULL) {
return false;
}
GlyphTablePtr glyph_table =
down_cast<GlyphTable*>(font_->GetTable(Tag::glyf));
LocaTablePtr loca_table = down_cast<LocaTable*>(font_->GetTable(Tag::loca));
if (glyph_table == NULL || loca_table == NULL) {
return false;
}
IntegerSet glyph_id_remaining;
glyph_id_remaining.insert(0); // Always include glyph id 0.
for (size_t i = 0; i < glyph_count; ++i) {
glyph_id_remaining.insert(glyph_ids[i]);
}
while (!glyph_id_remaining.empty()) {
IntegerSet comp_glyph_id;
for (IntegerSet::iterator i = glyph_id_remaining.begin(),
e = glyph_id_remaining.end(); i != e; ++i) {
if (*i < 0 || *i >= loca_table->NumGlyphs()) {
continue;
}
int32_t length = loca_table->GlyphLength(*i);
if (length == 0) {
continue;
}
int32_t offset = loca_table->GlyphOffset(*i);
GlyphPtr glyph;
glyph.Attach(glyph_table->GetGlyph(offset, length));
if (glyph == NULL) {
continue;
}
if (glyph->GlyphType() == GlyphType::kComposite) {
Ptr<GlyphTable::CompositeGlyph> comp_glyph =
down_cast<GlyphTable::CompositeGlyph*>(glyph.p_);
for (int32_t j = 0; j < comp_glyph->NumGlyphs(); ++j) {
int32_t glyph_id = comp_glyph->GlyphIndex(j);
if (glyph_id_processed->find(glyph_id) == glyph_id_processed->end() &&
glyph_id_remaining.find(glyph_id) == glyph_id_remaining.end()) {
comp_glyph_id.insert(comp_glyph->GlyphIndex(j));
}
}
}
glyph_id_processed->insert(*i);
}
glyph_id_remaining.clear();
glyph_id_remaining = comp_glyph_id;
}
return true;
}
| 170,329 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: asmlinkage long sys_oabi_semtimedop(int semid,
struct oabi_sembuf __user *tsops,
unsigned nsops,
const struct timespec __user *timeout)
{
struct sembuf *sops;
struct timespec local_timeout;
long err;
int i;
if (nsops < 1)
return -EINVAL;
sops = kmalloc(sizeof(*sops) * nsops, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sops)
return -ENOMEM;
err = 0;
for (i = 0; i < nsops; i++) {
__get_user_error(sops[i].sem_num, &tsops->sem_num, err);
__get_user_error(sops[i].sem_op, &tsops->sem_op, err);
__get_user_error(sops[i].sem_flg, &tsops->sem_flg, err);
tsops++;
}
if (timeout) {
/* copy this as well before changing domain protection */
err |= copy_from_user(&local_timeout, timeout, sizeof(*timeout));
timeout = &local_timeout;
}
if (err) {
err = -EFAULT;
} else {
mm_segment_t fs = get_fs();
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
err = sys_semtimedop(semid, sops, nsops, timeout);
set_fs(fs);
}
kfree(sops);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ARM: 6891/1: prevent heap corruption in OABI semtimedop
When CONFIG_OABI_COMPAT is set, the wrapper for semtimedop does not
bound the nsops argument. A sufficiently large value will cause an
integer overflow in allocation size, followed by copying too much data
into the allocated buffer. Fix this by restricting nsops to SEMOPM.
Untested.
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-189 | asmlinkage long sys_oabi_semtimedop(int semid,
struct oabi_sembuf __user *tsops,
unsigned nsops,
const struct timespec __user *timeout)
{
struct sembuf *sops;
struct timespec local_timeout;
long err;
int i;
if (nsops < 1 || nsops > SEMOPM)
return -EINVAL;
sops = kmalloc(sizeof(*sops) * nsops, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sops)
return -ENOMEM;
err = 0;
for (i = 0; i < nsops; i++) {
__get_user_error(sops[i].sem_num, &tsops->sem_num, err);
__get_user_error(sops[i].sem_op, &tsops->sem_op, err);
__get_user_error(sops[i].sem_flg, &tsops->sem_flg, err);
tsops++;
}
if (timeout) {
/* copy this as well before changing domain protection */
err |= copy_from_user(&local_timeout, timeout, sizeof(*timeout));
timeout = &local_timeout;
}
if (err) {
err = -EFAULT;
} else {
mm_segment_t fs = get_fs();
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
err = sys_semtimedop(semid, sops, nsops, timeout);
set_fs(fs);
}
kfree(sops);
return err;
}
| 165,885 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WebString WebPageSerializer::generateMetaCharsetDeclaration(const WebString& charset)
{
String charsetString = "<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=" + static_cast<const String&>(charset) + "\">";
return charsetString;
}
Commit Message: Escape "--" in the page URL at page serialization
This patch makes page serializer to escape the page URL embed into a HTML
comment of result HTML[1] to avoid inserting text as HTML from URL by
introducing a static member function |PageSerialzier::markOfTheWebDeclaration()|
for sharing it between |PageSerialzier| and |WebPageSerialzier| classes.
[1] We use following format for serialized HTML:
saved from url=(${lengthOfURL})${URL}
BUG=503217
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=PageSerializerTest.markOfTheWebDeclaration
TEST=webkit_unit_tests --gtest_filter=WebPageSerializerTest.fromUrlWithMinusMinu
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1371323003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#351736}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | WebString WebPageSerializer::generateMetaCharsetDeclaration(const WebString& charset)
{
// TODO(yosin) We should call |PageSerializer::metaCharsetDeclarationOf()|.
String charsetString = "<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"text/html; charset=" + static_cast<const String&>(charset) + "\">";
return charsetString;
}
| 171,788 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void WillDispatchTabUpdatedEvent(WebContents* contents,
Profile* profile,
const Extension* extension,
ListValue* event_args) {
DictionaryValue* tab_value = ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
contents, extension);
}
Commit Message: Do not pass URLs in onUpdated events to extensions unless they have the
"tabs" permission.
BUG=168442
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11824004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@176406 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static void WillDispatchTabUpdatedEvent(WebContents* contents,
static void WillDispatchTabUpdatedEvent(
WebContents* contents,
const DictionaryValue* changed_properties,
Profile* profile,
const Extension* extension,
ListValue* event_args) {
// Overwrite the second argument with the appropriate properties dictionary,
// depending on extension permissions.
DictionaryValue* properties_value = changed_properties->DeepCopy();
ExtensionTabUtil::ScrubTabValueForExtension(contents, extension,
properties_value);
event_args->Set(1, properties_value);
// Overwrite the third arg with our tab value as seen by this extension.
DictionaryValue* tab_value = ExtensionTabUtil::CreateTabValue(
contents, extension);
}
| 171,453 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void AutocompleteEditModel::OpenMatch(const AutocompleteMatch& match,
WindowOpenDisposition disposition,
const GURL& alternate_nav_url,
size_t index) {
if (popup_->IsOpen()) {
AutocompleteLog log(
autocomplete_controller_->input().text(),
just_deleted_text_,
autocomplete_controller_->input().type(),
popup_->selected_line(),
-1, // don't yet know tab ID; set later if appropriate
ClassifyPage(controller_->GetTabContentsWrapper()->
web_contents()->GetURL()),
base::TimeTicks::Now() - time_user_first_modified_omnibox_,
0, // inline autocomplete length; possibly set later
result());
DCHECK(user_input_in_progress_) << "We didn't get here through the "
"expected series of calls. time_user_first_modified_omnibox_ is "
"not set correctly and other things may be wrong.";
if (index != AutocompletePopupModel::kNoMatch)
log.selected_index = index;
else if (!has_temporary_text_)
log.inline_autocompleted_length = inline_autocomplete_text_.length();
if (disposition == CURRENT_TAB) {
log.tab_id = controller_->GetTabContentsWrapper()->
restore_tab_helper()->session_id().id();
}
content::NotificationService::current()->Notify(
chrome::NOTIFICATION_OMNIBOX_OPENED_URL,
content::Source<Profile>(profile_),
content::Details<AutocompleteLog>(&log));
}
TemplateURL* template_url = match.GetTemplateURL(profile_);
if (template_url) {
if (match.transition == content::PAGE_TRANSITION_KEYWORD) {
if (template_url->IsExtensionKeyword()) {
AutocompleteMatch current_match;
GetInfoForCurrentText(¤t_match, NULL);
const AutocompleteMatch& match =
(index == AutocompletePopupModel::kNoMatch) ?
current_match : result().match_at(index);
size_t prefix_length = match.keyword.length() + 1;
extensions::ExtensionOmniboxEventRouter::OnInputEntered(profile_,
template_url->GetExtensionId(),
UTF16ToUTF8(match.fill_into_edit.substr(prefix_length)));
view_->RevertAll();
return;
}
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("AcceptedKeyword"));
TemplateURLServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_)->IncrementUsageCount(
template_url);
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(content::PAGE_TRANSITION_GENERATED, match.transition);
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Omnibox.SearchEngine",
template_url->prepopulate_id(),
TemplateURLPrepopulateData::kMaxPrepopulatedEngineID);
}
if (disposition != NEW_BACKGROUND_TAB) {
in_revert_ = true;
view_->RevertAll(); // Revert the box to its unedited state
}
if (match.type == AutocompleteMatch::EXTENSION_APP) {
extensions::LaunchAppFromOmnibox(match, profile_, disposition);
} else {
controller_->OnAutocompleteAccept(match.destination_url, disposition,
match.transition, alternate_nav_url);
}
if (match.starred)
bookmark_utils::RecordBookmarkLaunch(bookmark_utils::LAUNCH_OMNIBOX);
InstantController* instant = controller_->GetInstant();
if (instant && !popup_->IsOpen())
instant->DestroyPreviewContents();
in_revert_ = false;
}
Commit Message: Adds per-provider information to omnibox UMA logs.
Adds a fairly general structure to omnibox logs that can be used to pass information (that's not per-result information) from providers to the UMA logs. Right now it's only used to pass whether the asynchronous pass of a provider has finished, but it will probably be used for other things in the future.
BUG=
TEST=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10380007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137288 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void AutocompleteEditModel::OpenMatch(const AutocompleteMatch& match,
WindowOpenDisposition disposition,
const GURL& alternate_nav_url,
size_t index) {
if (popup_->IsOpen()) {
AutocompleteLog log(
autocomplete_controller_->input().text(),
just_deleted_text_,
autocomplete_controller_->input().type(),
popup_->selected_line(),
-1, // don't yet know tab ID; set later if appropriate
ClassifyPage(controller_->GetTabContentsWrapper()->
web_contents()->GetURL()),
base::TimeTicks::Now() - time_user_first_modified_omnibox_,
0, // inline autocomplete length; possibly set later
result());
DCHECK(user_input_in_progress_) << "We didn't get here through the "
"expected series of calls. time_user_first_modified_omnibox_ is "
"not set correctly and other things may be wrong.";
if (index != AutocompletePopupModel::kNoMatch)
log.selected_index = index;
else if (!has_temporary_text_)
log.inline_autocompleted_length = inline_autocomplete_text_.length();
if (disposition == CURRENT_TAB) {
log.tab_id = controller_->GetTabContentsWrapper()->
restore_tab_helper()->session_id().id();
}
autocomplete_controller_->AddProvidersInfo(&log.providers_info);
content::NotificationService::current()->Notify(
chrome::NOTIFICATION_OMNIBOX_OPENED_URL,
content::Source<Profile>(profile_),
content::Details<AutocompleteLog>(&log));
}
TemplateURL* template_url = match.GetTemplateURL(profile_);
if (template_url) {
if (match.transition == content::PAGE_TRANSITION_KEYWORD) {
if (template_url->IsExtensionKeyword()) {
AutocompleteMatch current_match;
GetInfoForCurrentText(¤t_match, NULL);
const AutocompleteMatch& match =
(index == AutocompletePopupModel::kNoMatch) ?
current_match : result().match_at(index);
size_t prefix_length = match.keyword.length() + 1;
extensions::ExtensionOmniboxEventRouter::OnInputEntered(profile_,
template_url->GetExtensionId(),
UTF16ToUTF8(match.fill_into_edit.substr(prefix_length)));
view_->RevertAll();
return;
}
content::RecordAction(UserMetricsAction("AcceptedKeyword"));
TemplateURLServiceFactory::GetForProfile(profile_)->IncrementUsageCount(
template_url);
} else {
DCHECK_EQ(content::PAGE_TRANSITION_GENERATED, match.transition);
}
UMA_HISTOGRAM_ENUMERATION("Omnibox.SearchEngine",
template_url->prepopulate_id(),
TemplateURLPrepopulateData::kMaxPrepopulatedEngineID);
}
if (disposition != NEW_BACKGROUND_TAB) {
in_revert_ = true;
view_->RevertAll(); // Revert the box to its unedited state
}
if (match.type == AutocompleteMatch::EXTENSION_APP) {
extensions::LaunchAppFromOmnibox(match, profile_, disposition);
} else {
controller_->OnAutocompleteAccept(match.destination_url, disposition,
match.transition, alternate_nav_url);
}
if (match.starred)
bookmark_utils::RecordBookmarkLaunch(bookmark_utils::LAUNCH_OMNIBOX);
InstantController* instant = controller_->GetInstant();
if (instant && !popup_->IsOpen())
instant->DestroyPreviewContents();
in_revert_ = false;
}
| 170,758 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int GetAvailableDraftPageCount() {
int page_data_map_size = page_data_map_.size();
if (page_data_map_.find(printing::COMPLETE_PREVIEW_DOCUMENT_INDEX) !=
page_data_map_.end()) {
page_data_map_size--;
}
return page_data_map_size;
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | int GetAvailableDraftPageCount() {
int page_data_map_size = page_data_map_.size();
if (ContainsKey(page_data_map_, printing::COMPLETE_PREVIEW_DOCUMENT_INDEX))
page_data_map_size--;
return page_data_map_size;
}
| 170,819 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ModuleExport size_t RegisterXWDImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("XWD","XWD","X Windows system window dump (color)");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_X11_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadXWDImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteXWDImage;
#endif
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsXWD;
entry->flags^=CoderAdjoinFlag;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1553
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ModuleExport size_t RegisterXWDImage(void)
{
MagickInfo
*entry;
entry=AcquireMagickInfo("XWD","XWD","X Windows system window dump (color)");
#if defined(MAGICKCORE_X11_DELEGATE)
entry->decoder=(DecodeImageHandler *) ReadXWDImage;
entry->encoder=(EncodeImageHandler *) WriteXWDImage;
#endif
entry->magick=(IsImageFormatHandler *) IsXWD;
entry->flags|=CoderDecoderSeekableStreamFlag;
entry->flags^=CoderAdjoinFlag;
(void) RegisterMagickInfo(entry);
return(MagickImageCoderSignature);
}
| 169,557 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void InitNavigateParams(FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params* params,
int nav_entry_id,
bool did_create_new_entry,
const GURL& url,
ui::PageTransition transition) {
params->nav_entry_id = nav_entry_id;
params->url = url;
params->referrer = Referrer();
params->transition = transition;
params->redirects = std::vector<GURL>();
params->should_update_history = false;
params->searchable_form_url = GURL();
params->searchable_form_encoding = std::string();
params->did_create_new_entry = did_create_new_entry;
params->gesture = NavigationGestureUser;
params->was_within_same_document = false;
params->method = "GET";
params->page_state = PageState::CreateFromURL(url);
}
Commit Message: Correctly reset FP in RFHI whenever origin changes
Bug: 713364
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
CQ_INCLUDE_TRYBOTS=master.tryserver.chromium.linux:linux_site_isolation
Change-Id: Id8bb923750e20f3db6fc9358b1d44120513ac95f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/482380
Commit-Queue: Ian Clelland <iclelland@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Charles Reis <creis@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#466778}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | void InitNavigateParams(FrameHostMsg_DidCommitProvisionalLoad_Params* params,
int nav_entry_id,
bool did_create_new_entry,
const GURL& url,
ui::PageTransition transition) {
params->nav_entry_id = nav_entry_id;
params->url = url;
params->origin = url::Origin(url);
params->referrer = Referrer();
params->transition = transition;
params->redirects = std::vector<GURL>();
params->should_update_history = false;
params->searchable_form_url = GURL();
params->searchable_form_encoding = std::string();
params->did_create_new_entry = did_create_new_entry;
params->gesture = NavigationGestureUser;
params->was_within_same_document = false;
params->method = "GET";
params->page_state = PageState::CreateFromURL(url);
}
| 171,965 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnGetDefaultPrintSettings(
PrintMsg_Print_Params* params) {
if (printer_.get())
printer_->GetDefaultPrintSettings(params);
}
Commit Message: Print preview: Use an ID instead of memory pointer string in WebUI.
BUG=144051
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10870003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@153342 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void ChromeMockRenderThread::OnGetDefaultPrintSettings(
PrintMsg_Print_Params* params) {
printer_->GetDefaultPrintSettings(params);
}
| 170,851 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool on_accept(private_stroke_socket_t *this, stream_t *stream)
{
stroke_msg_t *msg;
uint16_t len;
FILE *out;
/* read length */
if (!stream->read_all(stream, &len, sizeof(len)))
{
if (errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "reading length of stroke message failed: %s",
strerror(errno));
}
return FALSE;
}
/* read message (we need an additional byte to terminate the buffer) */
msg = malloc(len + 1);
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "reading stroke message failed: %s", strerror(errno));
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static bool on_accept(private_stroke_socket_t *this, stream_t *stream)
{
stroke_msg_t *msg;
uint16_t len;
FILE *out;
/* read length */
if (!stream->read_all(stream, &len, sizeof(len)))
{
if (errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "reading length of stroke message failed: %s",
strerror(errno));
}
return FALSE;
}
if (len < offsetof(stroke_msg_t, buffer))
{
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "invalid stroke message length %d", len);
return FALSE;
}
/* read message (we need an additional byte to terminate the buffer) */
msg = malloc(len + 1);
DBG1(DBG_CFG, "reading stroke message failed: %s", strerror(errno));
}
| 165,152 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SegmentInfo::SegmentInfo(
Segment* pSegment,
long long start,
long long size_,
long long element_start,
long long element_size) :
m_pSegment(pSegment),
m_start(start),
m_size(size_),
m_element_start(element_start),
m_element_size(element_size),
m_pMuxingAppAsUTF8(NULL),
m_pWritingAppAsUTF8(NULL),
m_pTitleAsUTF8(NULL)
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | SegmentInfo::SegmentInfo(
| 174,439 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static MagickBooleanType SkipDXTMipmaps(Image *image,DDSInfo *dds_info,
int texel_size,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
register ssize_t
i;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
size_t
h,
w;
/*
Only skip mipmaps for textures and cube maps
*/
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_MIPMAP
&& (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_TEXTURE
|| dds_info->ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP))
{
w = DIV2(dds_info->width);
h = DIV2(dds_info->height);
/*
Mipmapcount includes the main image, so start from one
*/
for (i = 1; (i < (ssize_t) dds_info->mipmapcount) && w && h; i++)
{
offset = (MagickOffsetType) ((w + 3) / 4) * ((h + 3) / 4) * texel_size;
(void) SeekBlob(image, offset, SEEK_CUR);
w = DIV2(w);
h = DIV2(h);
}
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static MagickBooleanType SkipDXTMipmaps(Image *image,DDSInfo *dds_info,
int texel_size,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
register ssize_t
i;
MagickOffsetType
offset;
size_t
h,
w;
/*
Only skip mipmaps for textures and cube maps
*/
if (EOFBlob(image) != MagickFalse)
{
ThrowFileException(exception,CorruptImageError,"UnexpectedEndOfFile",
image->filename);
return(MagickFalse);
}
if (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_MIPMAP
&& (dds_info->ddscaps1 & DDSCAPS_TEXTURE
|| dds_info->ddscaps2 & DDSCAPS2_CUBEMAP))
{
w = DIV2(dds_info->width);
h = DIV2(dds_info->height);
/*
Mipmapcount includes the main image, so start from one
*/
for (i = 1; (i < (ssize_t) dds_info->mipmapcount) && w && h; i++)
{
offset = (MagickOffsetType) ((w + 3) / 4) * ((h + 3) / 4) * texel_size;
if (SeekBlob(image,offset,SEEK_CUR) < 0)
break;
w = DIV2(w);
h = DIV2(h);
}
}
return(MagickTrue);
}
| 168,853 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ResourceTracker::UnrefResource(PP_Resource res) {
DLOG_IF(ERROR, !CheckIdType(res, PP_ID_TYPE_RESOURCE))
<< res << " is not a PP_Resource.";
ResourceMap::iterator i = live_resources_.find(res);
if (i != live_resources_.end()) {
if (!--i->second.second) {
Resource* to_release = i->second.first;
PP_Instance instance = to_release->instance()->pp_instance();
to_release->LastPluginRefWasDeleted(false);
instance_map_[instance]->resources.erase(res);
live_resources_.erase(i);
}
return true;
} else {
return false;
}
}
Commit Message: Maintain a map of all resources in the resource tracker and clear instance back pointers when needed,
BUG=85808
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7196001
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89746 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool ResourceTracker::UnrefResource(PP_Resource res) {
DLOG_IF(ERROR, !CheckIdType(res, PP_ID_TYPE_RESOURCE))
<< res << " is not a PP_Resource.";
ResourceMap::iterator i = live_resources_.find(res);
if (i != live_resources_.end()) {
if (!--i->second.second) {
Resource* to_release = i->second.first;
PP_Instance instance = to_release->instance()->pp_instance();
to_release->LastPluginRefWasDeleted();
instance_map_[instance]->ref_resources.erase(res);
live_resources_.erase(i);
}
return true;
} else {
return false;
}
}
| 170,419 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void usage_exit() {
fprintf(stderr,
"Usage: %s <codec> <width> <height> <infile> <outfile> "
"<keyframe-interval> [<error-resilient>]\nSee comments in "
"simple_encoder.c for more information.\n",
exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void usage_exit() {
void usage_exit(void) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Usage: %s <codec> <width> <height> <infile> <outfile> "
"<keyframe-interval> [<error-resilient>]\nSee comments in "
"simple_encoder.c for more information.\n",
exec_name);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
| 174,490 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void OnReadAllMetadata(
const SessionStore::SessionInfo& session_info,
SessionStore::FactoryCompletionCallback callback,
std::unique_ptr<ModelTypeStore> store,
std::unique_ptr<ModelTypeStore::RecordList> record_list,
const base::Optional<syncer::ModelError>& error,
std::unique_ptr<syncer::MetadataBatch> metadata_batch) {
if (error) {
std::move(callback).Run(error, /*store=*/nullptr,
/*metadata_batch=*/nullptr);
return;
}
std::map<std::string, sync_pb::SessionSpecifics> initial_data;
for (ModelTypeStore::Record& record : *record_list) {
const std::string& storage_key = record.id;
SessionSpecifics specifics;
if (storage_key.empty() ||
!specifics.ParseFromString(std::move(record.value))) {
DVLOG(1) << "Ignoring corrupt database entry with key: " << storage_key;
continue;
}
initial_data[storage_key].Swap(&specifics);
}
auto session_store = std::make_unique<SessionStore>(
sessions_client_, session_info, std::move(store),
std::move(initial_data), metadata_batch->GetAllMetadata(),
restored_foreign_tab_callback_);
std::move(callback).Run(/*error=*/base::nullopt, std::move(session_store),
std::move(metadata_batch));
}
Commit Message: Add trace event to sync_sessions::OnReadAllMetadata()
It is likely a cause of janks on UI thread on Android.
Add a trace event to get metrics about the duration.
BUG=902203
Change-Id: I4c4e9c2a20790264b982007ea7ee88ddfa7b972c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1319369
Reviewed-by: Mikel Astiz <mastiz@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: ssid <ssid@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#606104}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void OnReadAllMetadata(
const SessionStore::SessionInfo& session_info,
SessionStore::FactoryCompletionCallback callback,
std::unique_ptr<ModelTypeStore> store,
std::unique_ptr<ModelTypeStore::RecordList> record_list,
const base::Optional<syncer::ModelError>& error,
std::unique_ptr<syncer::MetadataBatch> metadata_batch) {
// Remove after fixing https://crbug.com/902203.
TRACE_EVENT0("browser", "FactoryImpl::OnReadAllMetadata");
if (error) {
std::move(callback).Run(error, /*store=*/nullptr,
/*metadata_batch=*/nullptr);
return;
}
std::map<std::string, sync_pb::SessionSpecifics> initial_data;
for (ModelTypeStore::Record& record : *record_list) {
const std::string& storage_key = record.id;
SessionSpecifics specifics;
if (storage_key.empty() ||
!specifics.ParseFromString(std::move(record.value))) {
DVLOG(1) << "Ignoring corrupt database entry with key: " << storage_key;
continue;
}
initial_data[storage_key].Swap(&specifics);
}
auto session_store = std::make_unique<SessionStore>(
sessions_client_, session_info, std::move(store),
std::move(initial_data), metadata_batch->GetAllMetadata(),
restored_foreign_tab_callback_);
std::move(callback).Run(/*error=*/base::nullopt, std::move(session_store),
std::move(metadata_batch));
}
| 172,612 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void DataReductionProxySettings::SetDataReductionProxyEnabled(bool enabled) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(data_reduction_proxy_service_->compression_stats());
if (spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.GetValue() != enabled) {
spdy_proxy_auth_enabled_.SetValue(enabled);
OnProxyEnabledPrefChange();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
data_reduction_proxy_service_->compression_stats()
->SetDataUsageReportingEnabled(enabled);
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID)
}
}
Commit Message: Move IsDataSaverEnabledByUser to be a static method and use it
This method now officially becomes the source of truth that
everything in the code base eventually calls into to determine whether
or not DataSaver is enabled.
Bug: 934399
Change-Id: Iae837b710ace8cc3101188f79d02cbc2d4f0fd93
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1537242
Reviewed-by: Joshua Pawlicki <waffles@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#643948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void DataReductionProxySettings::SetDataReductionProxyEnabled(bool enabled) {
DCHECK(thread_checker_.CalledOnValidThread());
DCHECK(data_reduction_proxy_service_->compression_stats());
if (GetOriginalProfilePrefs()->GetBoolean(prefs::kDataSaverEnabled) !=
enabled) {
GetOriginalProfilePrefs()->SetBoolean(prefs::kDataSaverEnabled, enabled);
OnProxyEnabledPrefChange();
#if defined(OS_ANDROID)
data_reduction_proxy_service_->compression_stats()
->SetDataUsageReportingEnabled(enabled);
#endif // defined(OS_ANDROID)
}
}
| 172,558 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void HTMLScriptRunner::executePendingScriptAndDispatchEvent(PendingScript& pendingScript, PendingScript::Type pendingScriptType)
{
bool errorOccurred = false;
double loadFinishTime = pendingScript.resource() && pendingScript.resource()->url().protocolIsInHTTPFamily() ? pendingScript.resource()->loadFinishTime() : 0;
ScriptSourceCode sourceCode = pendingScript.getSource(documentURLForScriptExecution(m_document), errorOccurred);
pendingScript.stopWatchingForLoad(this);
if (!isExecutingScript()) {
Microtask::performCheckpoint();
if (pendingScriptType == PendingScript::ParsingBlocking) {
m_hasScriptsWaitingForResources = !m_document->isScriptExecutionReady();
if (m_hasScriptsWaitingForResources)
return;
}
}
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Element> element = pendingScript.releaseElementAndClear();
double compilationFinishTime = 0;
if (ScriptLoader* scriptLoader = toScriptLoaderIfPossible(element.get())) {
NestingLevelIncrementer nestingLevelIncrementer(m_scriptNestingLevel);
IgnoreDestructiveWriteCountIncrementer ignoreDestructiveWriteCountIncrementer(m_document);
if (errorOccurred)
scriptLoader->dispatchErrorEvent();
else {
ASSERT(isExecutingScript());
if (!scriptLoader->executeScript(sourceCode, &compilationFinishTime)) {
scriptLoader->dispatchErrorEvent();
} else {
element->dispatchEvent(createScriptLoadEvent());
}
}
}
const double epsilon = 1;
if (pendingScriptType == PendingScript::ParsingBlocking && !m_parserBlockingScriptAlreadyLoaded && compilationFinishTime > epsilon && loadFinishTime > epsilon) {
Platform::current()->histogramCustomCounts("WebCore.Scripts.ParsingBlocking.TimeBetweenLoadedAndCompiled", (compilationFinishTime - loadFinishTime) * 1000, 0, 10000, 50);
}
ASSERT(!isExecutingScript());
}
Commit Message: Correctly keep track of isolates for microtask execution
BUG=487155
R=haraken@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1161823002
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@195985 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-254 | void HTMLScriptRunner::executePendingScriptAndDispatchEvent(PendingScript& pendingScript, PendingScript::Type pendingScriptType)
{
bool errorOccurred = false;
double loadFinishTime = pendingScript.resource() && pendingScript.resource()->url().protocolIsInHTTPFamily() ? pendingScript.resource()->loadFinishTime() : 0;
ScriptSourceCode sourceCode = pendingScript.getSource(documentURLForScriptExecution(m_document), errorOccurred);
pendingScript.stopWatchingForLoad(this);
if (!isExecutingScript()) {
Microtask::performCheckpoint(V8PerIsolateData::mainThreadIsolate());
if (pendingScriptType == PendingScript::ParsingBlocking) {
m_hasScriptsWaitingForResources = !m_document->isScriptExecutionReady();
if (m_hasScriptsWaitingForResources)
return;
}
}
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<Element> element = pendingScript.releaseElementAndClear();
double compilationFinishTime = 0;
if (ScriptLoader* scriptLoader = toScriptLoaderIfPossible(element.get())) {
NestingLevelIncrementer nestingLevelIncrementer(m_scriptNestingLevel);
IgnoreDestructiveWriteCountIncrementer ignoreDestructiveWriteCountIncrementer(m_document);
if (errorOccurred)
scriptLoader->dispatchErrorEvent();
else {
ASSERT(isExecutingScript());
if (!scriptLoader->executeScript(sourceCode, &compilationFinishTime)) {
scriptLoader->dispatchErrorEvent();
} else {
element->dispatchEvent(createScriptLoadEvent());
}
}
}
const double epsilon = 1;
if (pendingScriptType == PendingScript::ParsingBlocking && !m_parserBlockingScriptAlreadyLoaded && compilationFinishTime > epsilon && loadFinishTime > epsilon) {
Platform::current()->histogramCustomCounts("WebCore.Scripts.ParsingBlocking.TimeBetweenLoadedAndCompiled", (compilationFinishTime - loadFinishTime) * 1000, 0, 10000, 50);
}
ASSERT(!isExecutingScript());
}
| 171,946 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: monitor_init(void)
{
struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */
struct monitor *mon;
mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
/* Used to share zlib space across processes */
if (options.compression) {
mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE);
mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE);
/* Compression needs to share state across borders */
ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, mon->m_zlib,
(ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc,
(ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree);
}
return mon;
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | monitor_init(void)
{
struct monitor *mon;
mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
return mon;
}
| 168,649 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int use_env()
{
int indent;
size_t flags = 0;
json_t *json;
json_error_t error;
#ifdef _WIN32
/* On Windows, set stdout and stderr to binary mode to avoid
outputting DOS line terminators */
_setmode(_fileno(stdout), _O_BINARY);
_setmode(_fileno(stderr), _O_BINARY);
#endif
indent = getenv_int("JSON_INDENT");
if(indent < 0 || indent > 255) {
fprintf(stderr, "invalid value for JSON_INDENT: %d\n", indent);
return 2;
}
if(indent > 0)
flags |= JSON_INDENT(indent);
if(getenv_int("JSON_COMPACT") > 0)
flags |= JSON_COMPACT;
if(getenv_int("JSON_ENSURE_ASCII"))
flags |= JSON_ENSURE_ASCII;
if(getenv_int("JSON_PRESERVE_ORDER"))
flags |= JSON_PRESERVE_ORDER;
if(getenv_int("JSON_SORT_KEYS"))
flags |= JSON_SORT_KEYS;
if(getenv_int("STRIP")) {
/* Load to memory, strip leading and trailing whitespace */
size_t size = 0, used = 0;
char *buffer = NULL;
while(1) {
size_t count;
size = (size == 0 ? 128 : size * 2);
buffer = realloc(buffer, size);
if(!buffer) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to allocate %d bytes\n", (int)size);
return 1;
}
count = fread(buffer + used, 1, size - used, stdin);
if(count < size - used) {
buffer[used + count] = '\0';
break;
}
used += count;
}
json = json_loads(strip(buffer), 0, &error);
free(buffer);
}
else
json = json_loadf(stdin, 0, &error);
if(!json) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d %d %d\n%s\n",
error.line, error.column,
error.position, error.text);
return 1;
}
json_dumpf(json, stdout, flags);
json_decref(json);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2013-6401: Change hash function, randomize hashes
Thanks to Florian Weimer and Eric Sesterhenn for reporting, reviewing
and testing.
CWE ID: CWE-310 | int use_env()
{
int indent;
size_t flags = 0;
json_t *json;
json_error_t error;
#ifdef _WIN32
/* On Windows, set stdout and stderr to binary mode to avoid
outputting DOS line terminators */
_setmode(_fileno(stdout), _O_BINARY);
_setmode(_fileno(stderr), _O_BINARY);
#endif
indent = getenv_int("JSON_INDENT");
if(indent < 0 || indent > 255) {
fprintf(stderr, "invalid value for JSON_INDENT: %d\n", indent);
return 2;
}
if(indent > 0)
flags |= JSON_INDENT(indent);
if(getenv_int("JSON_COMPACT") > 0)
flags |= JSON_COMPACT;
if(getenv_int("JSON_ENSURE_ASCII"))
flags |= JSON_ENSURE_ASCII;
if(getenv_int("JSON_PRESERVE_ORDER"))
flags |= JSON_PRESERVE_ORDER;
if(getenv_int("JSON_SORT_KEYS"))
flags |= JSON_SORT_KEYS;
if(getenv("HASHSEED"))
json_object_seed(getenv_int("HASHSEED"));
if(getenv_int("STRIP")) {
/* Load to memory, strip leading and trailing whitespace */
size_t size = 0, used = 0;
char *buffer = NULL;
while(1) {
size_t count;
size = (size == 0 ? 128 : size * 2);
buffer = realloc(buffer, size);
if(!buffer) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unable to allocate %d bytes\n", (int)size);
return 1;
}
count = fread(buffer + used, 1, size - used, stdin);
if(count < size - used) {
buffer[used + count] = '\0';
break;
}
used += count;
}
json = json_loads(strip(buffer), 0, &error);
free(buffer);
}
else
json = json_loadf(stdin, 0, &error);
if(!json) {
fprintf(stderr, "%d %d %d\n%s\n",
error.line, error.column,
error.position, error.text);
return 1;
}
json_dumpf(json, stdout, flags);
json_decref(json);
return 0;
}
| 166,538 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t Parcel::appendFrom(const Parcel *parcel, size_t offset, size_t len)
{
const sp<ProcessState> proc(ProcessState::self());
status_t err;
const uint8_t *data = parcel->mData;
const binder_size_t *objects = parcel->mObjects;
size_t size = parcel->mObjectsSize;
int startPos = mDataPos;
int firstIndex = -1, lastIndex = -2;
if (len == 0) {
return NO_ERROR;
}
if ((offset > parcel->mDataSize)
|| (len > parcel->mDataSize)
|| (offset + len > parcel->mDataSize)) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
for (int i = 0; i < (int) size; i++) {
size_t off = objects[i];
if ((off >= offset) && (off < offset + len)) {
if (firstIndex == -1) {
firstIndex = i;
}
lastIndex = i;
}
}
int numObjects = lastIndex - firstIndex + 1;
if ((mDataSize+len) > mDataCapacity) {
err = growData(len);
if (err != NO_ERROR) {
return err;
}
}
memcpy(mData + mDataPos, data + offset, len);
mDataPos += len;
mDataSize += len;
err = NO_ERROR;
if (numObjects > 0) {
if (mObjectsCapacity < mObjectsSize + numObjects) {
int newSize = ((mObjectsSize + numObjects)*3)/2;
binder_size_t *objects =
(binder_size_t*)realloc(mObjects, newSize*sizeof(binder_size_t));
if (objects == (binder_size_t*)0) {
return NO_MEMORY;
}
mObjects = objects;
mObjectsCapacity = newSize;
}
int idx = mObjectsSize;
for (int i = firstIndex; i <= lastIndex; i++) {
size_t off = objects[i] - offset + startPos;
mObjects[idx++] = off;
mObjectsSize++;
flat_binder_object* flat
= reinterpret_cast<flat_binder_object*>(mData + off);
acquire_object(proc, *flat, this);
if (flat->type == BINDER_TYPE_FD) {
flat->handle = dup(flat->handle);
flat->cookie = 1;
mHasFds = mFdsKnown = true;
if (!mAllowFds) {
err = FDS_NOT_ALLOWED;
}
}
}
}
return err;
}
Commit Message: Disregard alleged binder entities beyond parcel bounds
When appending one parcel's contents to another, ignore binder
objects within the source Parcel that appear to lie beyond the
formal bounds of that Parcel's data buffer.
Bug 17312693
Change-Id: If592a260f3fcd9a56fc160e7feb2c8b44c73f514
(cherry picked from commit 27182be9f20f4f5b48316666429f09b9ecc1f22e)
CWE ID: CWE-264 | status_t Parcel::appendFrom(const Parcel *parcel, size_t offset, size_t len)
{
const sp<ProcessState> proc(ProcessState::self());
status_t err;
const uint8_t *data = parcel->mData;
const binder_size_t *objects = parcel->mObjects;
size_t size = parcel->mObjectsSize;
int startPos = mDataPos;
int firstIndex = -1, lastIndex = -2;
if (len == 0) {
return NO_ERROR;
}
if ((offset > parcel->mDataSize)
|| (len > parcel->mDataSize)
|| (offset + len > parcel->mDataSize)) {
return BAD_VALUE;
}
for (int i = 0; i < (int) size; i++) {
size_t off = objects[i];
if ((off >= offset) && (off + sizeof(flat_binder_object) <= offset + len)) {
if (firstIndex == -1) {
firstIndex = i;
}
lastIndex = i;
}
}
int numObjects = lastIndex - firstIndex + 1;
if ((mDataSize+len) > mDataCapacity) {
err = growData(len);
if (err != NO_ERROR) {
return err;
}
}
memcpy(mData + mDataPos, data + offset, len);
mDataPos += len;
mDataSize += len;
err = NO_ERROR;
if (numObjects > 0) {
if (mObjectsCapacity < mObjectsSize + numObjects) {
int newSize = ((mObjectsSize + numObjects)*3)/2;
binder_size_t *objects =
(binder_size_t*)realloc(mObjects, newSize*sizeof(binder_size_t));
if (objects == (binder_size_t*)0) {
return NO_MEMORY;
}
mObjects = objects;
mObjectsCapacity = newSize;
}
int idx = mObjectsSize;
for (int i = firstIndex; i <= lastIndex; i++) {
size_t off = objects[i] - offset + startPos;
mObjects[idx++] = off;
mObjectsSize++;
flat_binder_object* flat
= reinterpret_cast<flat_binder_object*>(mData + off);
acquire_object(proc, *flat, this);
if (flat->type == BINDER_TYPE_FD) {
flat->handle = dup(flat->handle);
flat->cookie = 1;
mHasFds = mFdsKnown = true;
if (!mAllowFds) {
err = FDS_NOT_ALLOWED;
}
}
}
}
return err;
}
| 173,342 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WebSocketJob::WebSocketJob(SocketStream::Delegate* delegate)
: delegate_(delegate),
state_(INITIALIZED),
waiting_(false),
callback_(NULL),
handshake_request_(new WebSocketHandshakeRequestHandler),
handshake_response_(new WebSocketHandshakeResponseHandler),
started_to_send_handshake_request_(false),
handshake_request_sent_(0),
response_cookies_save_index_(0),
send_frame_handler_(new WebSocketFrameHandler),
receive_frame_handler_(new WebSocketFrameHandler) {
}
Commit Message: Use ScopedRunnableMethodFactory in WebSocketJob
Don't post SendPending if it is already posted.
BUG=89795
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7488007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@93599 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | WebSocketJob::WebSocketJob(SocketStream::Delegate* delegate)
: delegate_(delegate),
state_(INITIALIZED),
waiting_(false),
callback_(NULL),
handshake_request_(new WebSocketHandshakeRequestHandler),
handshake_response_(new WebSocketHandshakeResponseHandler),
started_to_send_handshake_request_(false),
handshake_request_sent_(0),
response_cookies_save_index_(0),
send_frame_handler_(new WebSocketFrameHandler),
receive_frame_handler_(new WebSocketFrameHandler),
ALLOW_THIS_IN_INITIALIZER_LIST(method_factory_(this)) {
}
| 170,308 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const Tracks* Segment::GetTracks() const
{
return m_pTracks;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const Tracks* Segment::GetTracks() const
const SegmentInfo* Segment::GetInfo() const { return m_pInfo; }
const Cues* Segment::GetCues() const { return m_pCues; }
const Chapters* Segment::GetChapters() const { return m_pChapters; }
const SeekHead* Segment::GetSeekHead() const { return m_pSeekHead; }
long long Segment::GetDuration() const {
assert(m_pInfo);
return m_pInfo->GetDuration();
}
| 174,373 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void btif_config_save(void) {
assert(alarm_timer != NULL);
assert(config != NULL);
alarm_set(alarm_timer, CONFIG_SETTLE_PERIOD_MS, timer_config_save, NULL);
}
Commit Message: Fix crashes with lots of discovered LE devices
When loads of devices are discovered a config file which is too large
can be written out, which causes the BT daemon to crash on startup.
This limits the number of config entries for unpaired devices which
are initialized, and prevents a large number from being saved to the
filesystem.
Bug: 26071376
Change-Id: I4a74094f57a82b17f94e99a819974b8bc8082184
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void btif_config_save(void) {
assert(alarm_timer != NULL);
assert(config != NULL);
alarm_set(alarm_timer, CONFIG_SETTLE_PERIOD_MS, timer_config_save_cb, NULL);
}
| 173,929 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int iscsi_decode_text_input(
u8 phase,
u8 sender,
char *textbuf,
u32 length,
struct iscsi_conn *conn)
{
struct iscsi_param_list *param_list = conn->param_list;
char *tmpbuf, *start = NULL, *end = NULL;
tmpbuf = kzalloc(length + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tmpbuf) {
pr_err("Unable to allocate memory for tmpbuf.\n");
return -1;
}
memcpy(tmpbuf, textbuf, length);
tmpbuf[length] = '\0';
start = tmpbuf;
end = (start + length);
while (start < end) {
char *key, *value;
struct iscsi_param *param;
if (iscsi_extract_key_value(start, &key, &value) < 0) {
kfree(tmpbuf);
return -1;
}
pr_debug("Got key: %s=%s\n", key, value);
if (phase & PHASE_SECURITY) {
if (iscsi_check_for_auth_key(key) > 0) {
char *tmpptr = key + strlen(key);
*tmpptr = '=';
kfree(tmpbuf);
return 1;
}
}
param = iscsi_check_key(key, phase, sender, param_list);
if (!param) {
if (iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(key,
value, param_list) < 0) {
kfree(tmpbuf);
return -1;
}
start += strlen(key) + strlen(value) + 2;
continue;
}
if (iscsi_check_value(param, value) < 0) {
kfree(tmpbuf);
return -1;
}
start += strlen(key) + strlen(value) + 2;
if (IS_PSTATE_PROPOSER(param)) {
if (iscsi_check_proposer_state(param, value) < 0) {
kfree(tmpbuf);
return -1;
}
SET_PSTATE_RESPONSE_GOT(param);
} else {
if (iscsi_check_acceptor_state(param, value, conn) < 0) {
kfree(tmpbuf);
return -1;
}
SET_PSTATE_ACCEPTOR(param);
}
}
kfree(tmpbuf);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: iscsi-target: fix heap buffer overflow on error
If a key was larger than 64 bytes, as checked by iscsi_check_key(), the
error response packet, generated by iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(),
would still attempt to copy the entire key into the packet, overflowing
the structure on the heap.
Remote preauthentication kernel memory corruption was possible if a
target was configured and listening on the network.
CVE-2013-2850
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int iscsi_decode_text_input(
u8 phase,
u8 sender,
char *textbuf,
u32 length,
struct iscsi_conn *conn)
{
struct iscsi_param_list *param_list = conn->param_list;
char *tmpbuf, *start = NULL, *end = NULL;
tmpbuf = kzalloc(length + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!tmpbuf) {
pr_err("Unable to allocate memory for tmpbuf.\n");
return -1;
}
memcpy(tmpbuf, textbuf, length);
tmpbuf[length] = '\0';
start = tmpbuf;
end = (start + length);
while (start < end) {
char *key, *value;
struct iscsi_param *param;
if (iscsi_extract_key_value(start, &key, &value) < 0) {
kfree(tmpbuf);
return -1;
}
pr_debug("Got key: %s=%s\n", key, value);
if (phase & PHASE_SECURITY) {
if (iscsi_check_for_auth_key(key) > 0) {
kfree(tmpbuf);
return 1;
}
}
param = iscsi_check_key(key, phase, sender, param_list);
if (!param) {
if (iscsi_add_notunderstood_response(key,
value, param_list) < 0) {
kfree(tmpbuf);
return -1;
}
start += strlen(key) + strlen(value) + 2;
continue;
}
if (iscsi_check_value(param, value) < 0) {
kfree(tmpbuf);
return -1;
}
start += strlen(key) + strlen(value) + 2;
if (IS_PSTATE_PROPOSER(param)) {
if (iscsi_check_proposer_state(param, value) < 0) {
kfree(tmpbuf);
return -1;
}
SET_PSTATE_RESPONSE_GOT(param);
} else {
if (iscsi_check_acceptor_state(param, value, conn) < 0) {
kfree(tmpbuf);
return -1;
}
SET_PSTATE_ACCEPTOR(param);
}
}
kfree(tmpbuf);
return 0;
}
| 166,051 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Track::GetFirst(const BlockEntry*& pBlockEntry) const
{
const Cluster* pCluster = m_pSegment->GetFirst();
for (int i = 0; ; )
{
if (pCluster == NULL)
{
pBlockEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
if (pCluster->EOS())
{
#if 0
if (m_pSegment->Unparsed() <= 0) //all clusters have been loaded
{
pBlockEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
#else
if (m_pSegment->DoneParsing())
{
pBlockEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
#endif
pBlockEntry = 0;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long status = pCluster->GetFirst(pBlockEntry);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (pBlockEntry == 0) //empty cluster
{
pCluster = m_pSegment->GetNext(pCluster);
continue;
}
for (;;)
{
const Block* const pBlock = pBlockEntry->GetBlock();
assert(pBlock);
const long long tn = pBlock->GetTrackNumber();
if ((tn == m_info.number) && VetEntry(pBlockEntry))
return 0;
const BlockEntry* pNextEntry;
status = pCluster->GetNext(pBlockEntry, pNextEntry);
if (status < 0) //error
return status;
if (pNextEntry == 0)
break;
pBlockEntry = pNextEntry;
}
++i;
if (i >= 100)
break;
pCluster = m_pSegment->GetNext(pCluster);
}
pBlockEntry = GetEOS(); //so we can return a non-NULL value
return 1;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Track::GetFirst(const BlockEntry*& pBlockEntry) const
if (pCluster->EOS()) {
#if 0
if (m_pSegment->Unparsed() <= 0) { //all clusters have been loaded
pBlockEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
#else
if (m_pSegment->DoneParsing()) {
pBlockEntry = GetEOS();
return 1;
}
#endif
pBlockEntry = 0;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
long status = pCluster->GetFirst(pBlockEntry);
| 174,319 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ResourceCoordinatorService::OnStart() {
ref_factory_.reset(new service_manager::ServiceContextRefFactory(
base::Bind(&service_manager::ServiceContext::RequestQuit,
base::Unretained(context()))));
ukm_recorder_ = ukm::MojoUkmRecorder::Create(context()->connector());
registry_.AddInterface(
base::Bind(&CoordinationUnitIntrospectorImpl::BindToInterface,
base::Unretained(&introspector_)));
auto page_signal_generator_impl = std::make_unique<PageSignalGeneratorImpl>();
registry_.AddInterface(
base::Bind(&PageSignalGeneratorImpl::BindToInterface,
base::Unretained(page_signal_generator_impl.get())));
coordination_unit_manager_.RegisterObserver(
std::move(page_signal_generator_impl));
coordination_unit_manager_.RegisterObserver(
std::make_unique<MetricsCollector>());
coordination_unit_manager_.RegisterObserver(
std::make_unique<IPCVolumeReporter>(
std::make_unique<base::OneShotTimer>()));
coordination_unit_manager_.OnStart(®istry_, ref_factory_.get());
coordination_unit_manager_.set_ukm_recorder(ukm_recorder_.get());
memory_instrumentation_coordinator_ =
std::make_unique<memory_instrumentation::CoordinatorImpl>(
context()->connector());
registry_.AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&memory_instrumentation::CoordinatorImpl::BindCoordinatorRequest,
base::Unretained(memory_instrumentation_coordinator_.get())));
tracing_agent_registry_ = std::make_unique<tracing::AgentRegistry>();
registry_.AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&tracing::AgentRegistry::BindAgentRegistryRequest,
base::Unretained(tracing_agent_registry_.get())));
tracing_coordinator_ = std::make_unique<tracing::Coordinator>();
registry_.AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&tracing::Coordinator::BindCoordinatorRequest,
base::Unretained(tracing_coordinator_.get())));
}
Commit Message: memory-infra: split up memory-infra coordinator service into two
This allows for heap profiler to use its own service with correct
capabilities and all other instances to use the existing coordinator
service.
Bug: 792028
Change-Id: I84e4ec71f5f1d00991c0516b1424ce7334bcd3cd
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/836896
Commit-Queue: Lalit Maganti <lalitm@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: oysteine <oysteine@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Albert J. Wong <ajwong@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Hector Dearman <hjd@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#529059}
CWE ID: CWE-269 | void ResourceCoordinatorService::OnStart() {
ref_factory_.reset(new service_manager::ServiceContextRefFactory(
base::Bind(&service_manager::ServiceContext::RequestQuit,
base::Unretained(context()))));
ukm_recorder_ = ukm::MojoUkmRecorder::Create(context()->connector());
registry_.AddInterface(
base::Bind(&CoordinationUnitIntrospectorImpl::BindToInterface,
base::Unretained(&introspector_)));
auto page_signal_generator_impl = std::make_unique<PageSignalGeneratorImpl>();
registry_.AddInterface(
base::Bind(&PageSignalGeneratorImpl::BindToInterface,
base::Unretained(page_signal_generator_impl.get())));
coordination_unit_manager_.RegisterObserver(
std::move(page_signal_generator_impl));
coordination_unit_manager_.RegisterObserver(
std::make_unique<MetricsCollector>());
coordination_unit_manager_.RegisterObserver(
std::make_unique<IPCVolumeReporter>(
std::make_unique<base::OneShotTimer>()));
coordination_unit_manager_.OnStart(®istry_, ref_factory_.get());
coordination_unit_manager_.set_ukm_recorder(ukm_recorder_.get());
memory_instrumentation_coordinator_ =
std::make_unique<memory_instrumentation::CoordinatorImpl>(
context()->connector());
registry_.AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&memory_instrumentation::CoordinatorImpl::BindCoordinatorRequest,
base::Unretained(memory_instrumentation_coordinator_.get())));
registry_.AddInterface(base::BindRepeating(
&memory_instrumentation::CoordinatorImpl::BindHeapProfilerHelperRequest,
base::Unretained(memory_instrumentation_coordinator_.get())));
tracing_agent_registry_ = std::make_unique<tracing::AgentRegistry>();
registry_.AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&tracing::AgentRegistry::BindAgentRegistryRequest,
base::Unretained(tracing_agent_registry_.get())));
tracing_coordinator_ = std::make_unique<tracing::Coordinator>();
registry_.AddInterface(
base::BindRepeating(&tracing::Coordinator::BindCoordinatorRequest,
base::Unretained(tracing_coordinator_.get())));
}
| 172,919 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void test_base64_lengths(void)
{
const char *in = "FuseMuse";
char out1[32];
char out2[32];
size_t enclen;
int declen;
/* Encoding a zero-length string should fail */
enclen = mutt_b64_encode(out1, in, 0, 32);
if (!TEST_CHECK(enclen == 0))
{
TEST_MSG("Expected: %zu", 0);
TEST_MSG("Actual : %zu", enclen);
}
/* Decoding a zero-length string should fail, too */
out1[0] = '\0';
declen = mutt_b64_decode(out2, out1);
if (!TEST_CHECK(declen == -1))
{
TEST_MSG("Expected: %zu", -1);
TEST_MSG("Actual : %zu", declen);
}
/* Encode one to eight bytes, check the lengths of the returned string */
for (size_t i = 1; i <= 8; ++i)
{
enclen = mutt_b64_encode(out1, in, i, 32);
size_t exp = ((i + 2) / 3) << 2;
if (!TEST_CHECK(enclen == exp))
{
TEST_MSG("Expected: %zu", exp);
TEST_MSG("Actual : %zu", enclen);
}
declen = mutt_b64_decode(out2, out1);
if (!TEST_CHECK(declen == i))
{
TEST_MSG("Expected: %zu", i);
TEST_MSG("Actual : %zu", declen);
}
out2[declen] = '\0';
if (!TEST_CHECK(strncmp(out2, in, i) == 0))
{
TEST_MSG("Expected: %s", in);
TEST_MSG("Actual : %s", out2);
}
}
}
Commit Message: Check outbuf length in mutt_to_base64()
The obuf can be overflowed in auth_cram.c, and possibly auth_gss.c.
Thanks to Jeriko One for the bug report.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void test_base64_lengths(void)
{
const char *in = "FuseMuse";
char out1[32];
char out2[32];
size_t enclen;
int declen;
/* Encoding a zero-length string should fail */
enclen = mutt_b64_encode(out1, in, 0, 32);
if (!TEST_CHECK(enclen == 0))
{
TEST_MSG("Expected: %zu", 0);
TEST_MSG("Actual : %zu", enclen);
}
/* Decoding a zero-length string should fail, too */
out1[0] = '\0';
declen = mutt_b64_decode(out2, out1, sizeof(out2));
if (!TEST_CHECK(declen == -1))
{
TEST_MSG("Expected: %zu", -1);
TEST_MSG("Actual : %zu", declen);
}
/* Encode one to eight bytes, check the lengths of the returned string */
for (size_t i = 1; i <= 8; ++i)
{
enclen = mutt_b64_encode(out1, in, i, 32);
size_t exp = ((i + 2) / 3) << 2;
if (!TEST_CHECK(enclen == exp))
{
TEST_MSG("Expected: %zu", exp);
TEST_MSG("Actual : %zu", enclen);
}
declen = mutt_b64_decode(out2, out1, sizeof(out2));
if (!TEST_CHECK(declen == i))
{
TEST_MSG("Expected: %zu", i);
TEST_MSG("Actual : %zu", declen);
}
out2[declen] = '\0';
if (!TEST_CHECK(strncmp(out2, in, i) == 0))
{
TEST_MSG("Expected: %s", in);
TEST_MSG("Actual : %s", out2);
}
}
}
| 169,131 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: NativeBrowserFrame* NativeBrowserFrame::CreateNativeBrowserFrame(
BrowserFrame* browser_frame,
BrowserView* browser_view) {
if (views::Widget::IsPureViews())
return new BrowserFrameViews(browser_frame, browser_view);
return new BrowserFrameGtk(browser_frame, browser_view);
}
Commit Message: Fixed brekage when PureViews are enable but Desktop is not
TBR=ben@chromium.org
BUG=none
TEST=chrome starts with --use-pure-views with touchui
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7210037
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91197 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | NativeBrowserFrame* NativeBrowserFrame::CreateNativeBrowserFrame(
BrowserFrame* browser_frame,
BrowserView* browser_view) {
if (views::Widget::IsPureViews() &&
views::ViewsDelegate::views_delegate->GetDefaultParentView())
return new BrowserFrameViews(browser_frame, browser_view);
return new BrowserFrameGtk(browser_frame, browser_view);
}
| 170,315 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: CursorImpl::IDBThreadHelper::~IDBThreadHelper() {
cursor_->RemoveCursorFromTransaction();
}
Commit Message: [IndexedDB] Fix Cursor UAF
If the connection is closed before we return a cursor, it dies in
IndexedDBCallbacks::IOThreadHelper::SendSuccessCursor. It's deleted on
the correct thread, but we also need to makes sure to remove it from its
transaction.
To make things simpler, we have the cursor remove itself from its
transaction on destruction.
R: pwnall@chromium.org
Bug: 728887
Change-Id: I8c76e6195c2490137a05213e47c635d12f4d3dd2
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/526284
Commit-Queue: Daniel Murphy <dmurph@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Victor Costan <pwnall@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#477504}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | CursorImpl::IDBThreadHelper::~IDBThreadHelper() {
| 172,306 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void cJSON_AddItemReferenceToArray( cJSON *array, cJSON *item )
{
cJSON_AddItemToArray( array, create_reference( item ) );
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void cJSON_AddItemReferenceToArray( cJSON *array, cJSON *item )
| 167,265 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t ucma_process_join(struct ucma_file *file,
struct rdma_ucm_join_mcast *cmd, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_create_id_resp resp;
struct ucma_context *ctx;
struct ucma_multicast *mc;
struct sockaddr *addr;
int ret;
u8 join_state;
if (out_len < sizeof(resp))
return -ENOSPC;
addr = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd->addr;
if (cmd->addr_size != rdma_addr_size(addr))
return -EINVAL;
if (cmd->join_flags == RDMA_MC_JOIN_FLAG_FULLMEMBER)
join_state = BIT(FULLMEMBER_JOIN);
else if (cmd->join_flags == RDMA_MC_JOIN_FLAG_SENDONLY_FULLMEMBER)
join_state = BIT(SENDONLY_FULLMEMBER_JOIN);
else
return -EINVAL;
ctx = ucma_get_ctx_dev(file, cmd->id);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
return PTR_ERR(ctx);
mutex_lock(&file->mut);
mc = ucma_alloc_multicast(ctx);
if (!mc) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err1;
}
mc->join_state = join_state;
mc->uid = cmd->uid;
memcpy(&mc->addr, addr, cmd->addr_size);
ret = rdma_join_multicast(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *)&mc->addr,
join_state, mc);
if (ret)
goto err2;
resp.id = mc->id;
if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(cmd->response),
&resp, sizeof(resp))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err3;
}
mutex_unlock(&file->mut);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return 0;
err3:
rdma_leave_multicast(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &mc->addr);
ucma_cleanup_mc_events(mc);
err2:
mutex_lock(&mut);
idr_remove(&multicast_idr, mc->id);
mutex_unlock(&mut);
list_del(&mc->list);
kfree(mc);
err1:
mutex_unlock(&file->mut);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: infiniband: fix a possible use-after-free bug
ucma_process_join() will free the new allocated "mc" struct,
if there is any error after that, especially the copy_to_user().
But in parallel, ucma_leave_multicast() could find this "mc"
through idr_find() before ucma_process_join() frees it, since it
is already published.
So "mc" could be used in ucma_leave_multicast() after it is been
allocated and freed in ucma_process_join(), since we don't refcnt
it.
Fix this by separating "publish" from ID allocation, so that we
can get an ID first and publish it later after copy_to_user().
Fixes: c8f6a362bf3e ("RDMA/cma: Add multicast communication support")
Reported-by: Noam Rathaus <noamr@beyondsecurity.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | static ssize_t ucma_process_join(struct ucma_file *file,
struct rdma_ucm_join_mcast *cmd, int out_len)
{
struct rdma_ucm_create_id_resp resp;
struct ucma_context *ctx;
struct ucma_multicast *mc;
struct sockaddr *addr;
int ret;
u8 join_state;
if (out_len < sizeof(resp))
return -ENOSPC;
addr = (struct sockaddr *) &cmd->addr;
if (cmd->addr_size != rdma_addr_size(addr))
return -EINVAL;
if (cmd->join_flags == RDMA_MC_JOIN_FLAG_FULLMEMBER)
join_state = BIT(FULLMEMBER_JOIN);
else if (cmd->join_flags == RDMA_MC_JOIN_FLAG_SENDONLY_FULLMEMBER)
join_state = BIT(SENDONLY_FULLMEMBER_JOIN);
else
return -EINVAL;
ctx = ucma_get_ctx_dev(file, cmd->id);
if (IS_ERR(ctx))
return PTR_ERR(ctx);
mutex_lock(&file->mut);
mc = ucma_alloc_multicast(ctx);
if (!mc) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto err1;
}
mc->join_state = join_state;
mc->uid = cmd->uid;
memcpy(&mc->addr, addr, cmd->addr_size);
ret = rdma_join_multicast(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *)&mc->addr,
join_state, mc);
if (ret)
goto err2;
resp.id = mc->id;
if (copy_to_user(u64_to_user_ptr(cmd->response),
&resp, sizeof(resp))) {
ret = -EFAULT;
goto err3;
}
mutex_lock(&mut);
idr_replace(&multicast_idr, mc, mc->id);
mutex_unlock(&mut);
mutex_unlock(&file->mut);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return 0;
err3:
rdma_leave_multicast(ctx->cm_id, (struct sockaddr *) &mc->addr);
ucma_cleanup_mc_events(mc);
err2:
mutex_lock(&mut);
idr_remove(&multicast_idr, mc->id);
mutex_unlock(&mut);
list_del(&mc->list);
kfree(mc);
err1:
mutex_unlock(&file->mut);
ucma_put_ctx(ctx);
return ret;
}
| 169,110 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int remove_bond(const bt_bdaddr_t *bd_addr)
{
/* sanity check */
if (interface_ready() == FALSE)
return BT_STATUS_NOT_READY;
return btif_dm_remove_bond(bd_addr);
}
Commit Message: Add guest mode functionality (2/3)
Add a flag to enable() to start Bluetooth in restricted
mode. In restricted mode, all devices that are paired during
restricted mode are deleted upon leaving restricted mode.
Right now restricted mode is only entered while a guest
user is active.
Bug: 27410683
Change-Id: I8f23d28ef0aa3a8df13d469c73005c8e1b894d19
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int remove_bond(const bt_bdaddr_t *bd_addr)
{
if (is_restricted_mode() && !btif_storage_is_restricted_device(bd_addr))
return BT_STATUS_SUCCESS;
/* sanity check */
if (interface_ready() == FALSE)
return BT_STATUS_NOT_READY;
return btif_dm_remove_bond(bd_addr);
}
| 173,552 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Reset() {
error_nframes_ = 0;
droppable_nframes_ = 0;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void Reset() {
error_nframes_ = 0;
droppable_nframes_ = 0;
pattern_switch_ = 0;
}
| 174,543 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: epass2003_sm_unwrap_apdu(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_apdu *sm, struct sc_apdu *plain)
{
int r;
size_t len = 0;
epass2003_exdata *exdata = NULL;
if (!card->drv_data)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
exdata = (epass2003_exdata *)card->drv_data;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
r = sc_check_sw(card, sm->sw1, sm->sw2);
if (r == SC_SUCCESS) {
if (exdata->sm) {
if (0 != decrypt_response(card, sm->resp, plain->resp, &len))
return SC_ERROR_CARD_CMD_FAILED;
}
else {
memcpy(plain->resp, sm->resp, sm->resplen);
len = sm->resplen;
}
}
plain->resplen = len;
plain->sw1 = sm->sw1;
plain->sw2 = sm->sw2;
sc_log(card->ctx,
"unwrapped APDU: resplen %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u, SW %02X%02X",
plain->resplen, plain->sw1, plain->sw2);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | epass2003_sm_unwrap_apdu(struct sc_card *card, struct sc_apdu *sm, struct sc_apdu *plain)
{
int r;
size_t len = 0;
epass2003_exdata *exdata = NULL;
if (!card->drv_data)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
exdata = (epass2003_exdata *)card->drv_data;
LOG_FUNC_CALLED(card->ctx);
r = sc_check_sw(card, sm->sw1, sm->sw2);
if (r == SC_SUCCESS) {
if (exdata->sm) {
if (0 != decrypt_response(card, sm->resp, sm->resplen, plain->resp, &len))
return SC_ERROR_CARD_CMD_FAILED;
}
else {
memcpy(plain->resp, sm->resp, sm->resplen);
len = sm->resplen;
}
}
plain->resplen = len;
plain->sw1 = sm->sw1;
plain->sw2 = sm->sw2;
sc_log(card->ctx,
"unwrapped APDU: resplen %"SC_FORMAT_LEN_SIZE_T"u, SW %02X%02X",
plain->resplen, plain->sw1, plain->sw2);
LOG_FUNC_RETURN(card->ctx, SC_SUCCESS);
}
| 169,055 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int is_rndis(USBNetState *s)
{
return s->dev.config->bConfigurationValue == DEV_RNDIS_CONFIG_VALUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: | static int is_rndis(USBNetState *s)
{
return s->dev.config ?
s->dev.config->bConfigurationValue == DEV_RNDIS_CONFIG_VALUE : 0;
}
| 165,187 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: uint32_t GetPayloadTime(size_t handle, uint32_t index, float *in, float *out)
{
mp4object *mp4 = (mp4object *)handle;
if (mp4 == NULL) return 0;
if (mp4->metaoffsets == 0 || mp4->basemetadataduration == 0 || mp4->meta_clockdemon == 0 || in == NULL || out == NULL) return 1;
*in = (float)((double)index * (double)mp4->basemetadataduration / (double)mp4->meta_clockdemon);
*out = (float)((double)(index + 1) * (double)mp4->basemetadataduration / (double)mp4->meta_clockdemon);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed many security issues with the too crude mp4 reader
CWE ID: CWE-787 | uint32_t GetPayloadTime(size_t handle, uint32_t index, float *in, float *out)
uint32_t GetPayloadTime(size_t handle, uint32_t index, double *in, double *out)
{
mp4object *mp4 = (mp4object *)handle;
if (mp4 == NULL) return GPMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
if (mp4->metaoffsets == 0 || mp4->basemetadataduration == 0 || mp4->meta_clockdemon == 0 || in == NULL || out == NULL) return GPMF_ERROR_MEMORY;
*in = ((double)index * (double)mp4->basemetadataduration / (double)mp4->meta_clockdemon);
*out = ((double)(index + 1) * (double)mp4->basemetadataduration / (double)mp4->meta_clockdemon);
return GPMF_OK;
}
| 169,549 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: INST_HANDLER (sts) { // STS k, Rr
int r = ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf) | ((buf[1] & 0x1) << 4);
int k = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
op->ptr = k;
ESIL_A ("r%d,", r);
__generic_ld_st (op, "ram", 0, 1, 0, k, 1);
op->cycles = 2;
}
Commit Message: Fix #10091 - crash in AVR analysis
CWE ID: CWE-125 | INST_HANDLER (sts) { // STS k, Rr
if (len < 4) {
return;
}
int r = ((buf[0] >> 4) & 0xf) | ((buf[1] & 0x1) << 4);
int k = (buf[3] << 8) | buf[2];
op->ptr = k;
ESIL_A ("r%d,", r);
__generic_ld_st (op, "ram", 0, 1, 0, k, 1);
op->cycles = 2;
}
| 169,223 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: null_if_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *p)
{
u_int length = h->len;
u_int caplen = h->caplen;
u_int family;
if (caplen < NULL_HDRLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|null]"));
return (NULL_HDRLEN);
}
memcpy((char *)&family, (const char *)p, sizeof(family));
/*
* This isn't necessarily in our host byte order; if this is
* a DLT_LOOP capture, it's in network byte order, and if
* this is a DLT_NULL capture from a machine with the opposite
* byte-order, it's in the opposite byte order from ours.
*
* If the upper 16 bits aren't all zero, assume it's byte-swapped.
*/
if ((family & 0xFFFF0000) != 0)
family = SWAPLONG(family);
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
null_hdr_print(ndo, family, length);
length -= NULL_HDRLEN;
caplen -= NULL_HDRLEN;
p += NULL_HDRLEN;
switch (family) {
case BSD_AFNUM_INET:
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case BSD_AFNUM_INET6_BSD:
case BSD_AFNUM_INET6_FREEBSD:
case BSD_AFNUM_INET6_DARWIN:
ip6_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case BSD_AFNUM_ISO:
isoclns_print(ndo, p, length, caplen);
break;
case BSD_AFNUM_APPLETALK:
atalk_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case BSD_AFNUM_IPX:
ipx_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
default:
/* unknown AF_ value */
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
null_hdr_print(ndo, family, length + NULL_HDRLEN);
if (!ndo->ndo_suppress_default_print)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p, caplen);
}
return (NULL_HDRLEN);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12897/ISO CLNS: Use ND_TTEST() for the bounds checks in isoclns_print().
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kamil Frankowicz.
Don't pass the remaining caplen - that's too hard to get right, and we
were getting it wrong in at least one case; just use ND_TTEST().
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | null_if_print(netdissect_options *ndo, const struct pcap_pkthdr *h, const u_char *p)
{
u_int length = h->len;
u_int caplen = h->caplen;
u_int family;
if (caplen < NULL_HDRLEN) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, "[|null]"));
return (NULL_HDRLEN);
}
memcpy((char *)&family, (const char *)p, sizeof(family));
/*
* This isn't necessarily in our host byte order; if this is
* a DLT_LOOP capture, it's in network byte order, and if
* this is a DLT_NULL capture from a machine with the opposite
* byte-order, it's in the opposite byte order from ours.
*
* If the upper 16 bits aren't all zero, assume it's byte-swapped.
*/
if ((family & 0xFFFF0000) != 0)
family = SWAPLONG(family);
if (ndo->ndo_eflag)
null_hdr_print(ndo, family, length);
length -= NULL_HDRLEN;
caplen -= NULL_HDRLEN;
p += NULL_HDRLEN;
switch (family) {
case BSD_AFNUM_INET:
ip_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case BSD_AFNUM_INET6_BSD:
case BSD_AFNUM_INET6_FREEBSD:
case BSD_AFNUM_INET6_DARWIN:
ip6_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case BSD_AFNUM_ISO:
isoclns_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case BSD_AFNUM_APPLETALK:
atalk_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
case BSD_AFNUM_IPX:
ipx_print(ndo, p, length);
break;
default:
/* unknown AF_ value */
if (!ndo->ndo_eflag)
null_hdr_print(ndo, family, length + NULL_HDRLEN);
if (!ndo->ndo_suppress_default_print)
ND_DEFAULTPRINT(p, caplen);
}
return (NULL_HDRLEN);
}
| 167,955 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int DecodeTeredo(ThreadVars *tv, DecodeThreadVars *dtv, Packet *p, uint8_t *pkt, uint16_t len, PacketQueue *pq)
{
if (!g_teredo_enabled)
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
uint8_t *start = pkt;
/* Is this packet to short to contain an IPv6 packet ? */
if (len < IPV6_HEADER_LEN)
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
/* Teredo encapsulate IPv6 in UDP and can add some custom message
* part before the IPv6 packet. In our case, we just want to get
* over an ORIGIN indication. So we just make one offset if needed. */
if (start[0] == 0x0) {
switch (start[1]) {
/* origin indication: compatible with tunnel */
case 0x0:
/* offset is coherent with len and presence of an IPv6 header */
if (len >= TEREDO_ORIG_INDICATION_LENGTH + IPV6_HEADER_LEN)
start += TEREDO_ORIG_INDICATION_LENGTH;
else
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
break;
/* authentication: negotiation not real tunnel */
case 0x1:
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
/* this case is not possible in Teredo: not that protocol */
default:
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
}
}
/* There is no specific field that we can check to prove that the packet
* is a Teredo packet. We've zapped here all the possible Teredo header
* and we should have an IPv6 packet at the start pointer.
* We then can only do two checks before sending the encapsulated packets
* to decoding:
* - The packet has a protocol version which is IPv6.
* - The IPv6 length of the packet matches what remains in buffer.
*/
if (IP_GET_RAW_VER(start) == 6) {
IPV6Hdr *thdr = (IPV6Hdr *)start;
if (len == IPV6_HEADER_LEN +
IPV6_GET_RAW_PLEN(thdr) + (start - pkt)) {
if (pq != NULL) {
int blen = len - (start - pkt);
/* spawn off tunnel packet */
Packet *tp = PacketTunnelPktSetup(tv, dtv, p, start, blen,
DECODE_TUNNEL_IPV6, pq);
if (tp != NULL) {
PKT_SET_SRC(tp, PKT_SRC_DECODER_TEREDO);
/* add the tp to the packet queue. */
PacketEnqueue(pq,tp);
StatsIncr(tv, dtv->counter_teredo);
return TM_ECODE_OK;
}
}
}
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
}
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
}
Commit Message: teredo: be stricter on what to consider valid teredo
Invalid Teredo can lead to valid DNS traffic (or other UDP traffic)
being misdetected as Teredo. This leads to false negatives in the
UDP payload inspection.
Make the teredo code only consider a packet teredo if the encapsulated
data was decoded without any 'invalid' events being set.
Bug #2736.
CWE ID: CWE-20 | int DecodeTeredo(ThreadVars *tv, DecodeThreadVars *dtv, Packet *p, uint8_t *pkt, uint16_t len, PacketQueue *pq)
{
if (!g_teredo_enabled)
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
uint8_t *start = pkt;
/* Is this packet to short to contain an IPv6 packet ? */
if (len < IPV6_HEADER_LEN)
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
/* Teredo encapsulate IPv6 in UDP and can add some custom message
* part before the IPv6 packet. In our case, we just want to get
* over an ORIGIN indication. So we just make one offset if needed. */
if (start[0] == 0x0) {
switch (start[1]) {
/* origin indication: compatible with tunnel */
case 0x0:
/* offset is coherent with len and presence of an IPv6 header */
if (len >= TEREDO_ORIG_INDICATION_LENGTH + IPV6_HEADER_LEN)
start += TEREDO_ORIG_INDICATION_LENGTH;
else
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
break;
/* authentication: negotiation not real tunnel */
case 0x1:
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
/* this case is not possible in Teredo: not that protocol */
default:
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
}
}
/* There is no specific field that we can check to prove that the packet
* is a Teredo packet. We've zapped here all the possible Teredo header
* and we should have an IPv6 packet at the start pointer.
* We then can only do a few checks before sending the encapsulated packets
* to decoding:
* - The packet has a protocol version which is IPv6.
* - The IPv6 length of the packet matches what remains in buffer.
* - HLIM is 0. This would technically be valid, but still weird.
* - NH 0 (HOP) and not enough data.
*
* If all these conditions are met, the tunnel decoder will be called.
* If the packet gets an invalid event set, it will still be rejected.
*/
if (IP_GET_RAW_VER(start) == 6) {
IPV6Hdr *thdr = (IPV6Hdr *)start;
/* ignore hoplimit 0 packets, most likely an artifact of bad detection */
if (IPV6_GET_RAW_HLIM(thdr) == 0)
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
/* if nh is 0 (HOP) with little data we have a bogus packet */
if (IPV6_GET_RAW_NH(thdr) == 0 && IPV6_GET_RAW_PLEN(thdr) < 8)
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
if (len == IPV6_HEADER_LEN +
IPV6_GET_RAW_PLEN(thdr) + (start - pkt)) {
if (pq != NULL) {
int blen = len - (start - pkt);
/* spawn off tunnel packet */
Packet *tp = PacketTunnelPktSetup(tv, dtv, p, start, blen,
DECODE_TUNNEL_IPV6_TEREDO, pq);
if (tp != NULL) {
PKT_SET_SRC(tp, PKT_SRC_DECODER_TEREDO);
/* add the tp to the packet queue. */
PacketEnqueue(pq,tp);
StatsIncr(tv, dtv->counter_teredo);
return TM_ECODE_OK;
}
}
}
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
}
return TM_ECODE_FAILED;
}
| 169,477 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage(
sk_sp<SkImage> image,
base::WeakPtr<WebGraphicsContext3DProviderWrapper>&&
context_provider_wrapper)
: paint_image_content_id_(cc::PaintImage::GetNextContentId()) {
CHECK(image && image->isTextureBacked());
texture_holder_ = std::make_unique<SkiaTextureHolder>(
std::move(image), std::move(context_provider_wrapper));
thread_checker_.DetachFromThread();
}
Commit Message: Fix *StaticBitmapImage ThreadChecker and unaccelerated SkImage destroy
- AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage was misusing ThreadChecker by having its
own detach logic. Using proper DetachThread is simpler, cleaner and
correct.
- UnacceleratedStaticBitmapImage didn't destroy the SkImage in the
proper thread, leading to GrContext/SkSp problems.
Bug: 890576
Change-Id: Ic71e7f7322b0b851774628247aa5256664bc0723
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1307775
Reviewed-by: Gabriel Charette <gab@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Roman <jbroman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fernando Serboncini <fserb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#604427}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage::AcceleratedStaticBitmapImage(
sk_sp<SkImage> image,
base::WeakPtr<WebGraphicsContext3DProviderWrapper>&&
context_provider_wrapper)
: paint_image_content_id_(cc::PaintImage::GetNextContentId()) {
CHECK(image && image->isTextureBacked());
texture_holder_ = std::make_unique<SkiaTextureHolder>(
std::move(image), std::move(context_provider_wrapper));
}
| 172,588 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ps_parser_skip_PS_token( PS_Parser parser )
{
/* Note: PostScript allows any non-delimiting, non-whitespace */
/* character in a name (PS Ref Manual, 3rd ed, p31). */
/* PostScript delimiters are (, ), <, >, [, ], {, }, /, and %. */
FT_Byte* cur = parser->cursor;
FT_Byte* limit = parser->limit;
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
skip_spaces( &cur, limit ); /* this also skips comments */
if ( cur >= limit )
goto Exit;
/* self-delimiting, single-character tokens */
if ( *cur == '[' || *cur == ']' )
{
cur++;
goto Exit;
}
/* skip balanced expressions (procedures and strings) */
if ( *cur == '{' ) /* {...} */
{
error = skip_procedure( &cur, limit );
goto Exit;
}
if ( *cur == '(' ) /* (...) */
{
error = skip_literal_string( &cur, limit );
goto Exit;
}
if ( *cur == '<' ) /* <...> */
{
if ( cur + 1 < limit && *(cur + 1) == '<' ) /* << */
{
cur++;
cur++;
}
else
error = skip_string( &cur, limit );
goto Exit;
}
if ( *cur == '>' )
{
cur++;
if ( cur >= limit || *cur != '>' ) /* >> */
{
FT_ERROR(( "ps_parser_skip_PS_token:"
" unexpected closing delimiter `>'\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
cur++;
goto Exit;
}
if ( *cur == '/' )
cur++;
/* anything else */
while ( cur < limit )
{
/* *cur might be invalid (e.g., ')' or '}'), but this */
/* is handled by the test `cur == parser->cursor' below */
if ( IS_PS_DELIM( *cur ) )
break;
cur++;
}
Exit:
if ( cur < limit && cur == parser->cursor )
{
FT_ERROR(( "ps_parser_skip_PS_token:"
" current token is `%c' which is self-delimiting\n"
" "
" but invalid at this point\n",
*cur ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
}
parser->error = error;
parser->cursor = cur;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-125 | ps_parser_skip_PS_token( PS_Parser parser )
{
/* Note: PostScript allows any non-delimiting, non-whitespace */
/* character in a name (PS Ref Manual, 3rd ed, p31). */
/* PostScript delimiters are (, ), <, >, [, ], {, }, /, and %. */
FT_Byte* cur = parser->cursor;
FT_Byte* limit = parser->limit;
FT_Error error = FT_Err_Ok;
skip_spaces( &cur, limit ); /* this also skips comments */
if ( cur >= limit )
goto Exit;
/* self-delimiting, single-character tokens */
if ( *cur == '[' || *cur == ']' )
{
cur++;
goto Exit;
}
/* skip balanced expressions (procedures and strings) */
if ( *cur == '{' ) /* {...} */
{
error = skip_procedure( &cur, limit );
goto Exit;
}
if ( *cur == '(' ) /* (...) */
{
error = skip_literal_string( &cur, limit );
goto Exit;
}
if ( *cur == '<' ) /* <...> */
{
if ( cur + 1 < limit && *(cur + 1) == '<' ) /* << */
{
cur++;
cur++;
}
else
error = skip_string( &cur, limit );
goto Exit;
}
if ( *cur == '>' )
{
cur++;
if ( cur >= limit || *cur != '>' ) /* >> */
{
FT_ERROR(( "ps_parser_skip_PS_token:"
" unexpected closing delimiter `>'\n" ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
goto Exit;
}
cur++;
goto Exit;
}
if ( *cur == '/' )
cur++;
/* anything else */
while ( cur < limit )
{
/* *cur might be invalid (e.g., ')' or '}'), but this */
/* is handled by the test `cur == parser->cursor' below */
if ( IS_PS_DELIM( *cur ) )
break;
cur++;
}
Exit:
if ( cur < limit && cur == parser->cursor )
{
FT_ERROR(( "ps_parser_skip_PS_token:"
" current token is `%c' which is self-delimiting\n"
" "
" but invalid at this point\n",
*cur ));
error = FT_THROW( Invalid_File_Format );
}
if ( cur > limit )
cur = limit;
parser->error = error;
parser->cursor = cur;
}
| 165,427 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SendStatus(struct mg_connection* connection,
const struct mg_request_info* request_info,
void* user_data) {
std::string response = "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n"
"Content-Length:2\r\n\r\n"
"ok";
mg_write(connection, response.data(), response.length());
}
Commit Message: In chromedriver, add /log url to get the contents of the chromedriver log
remotely. Also add a 'chrome.verbose' boolean startup option.
Remove usage of VLOG(1) in chromedriver. We do not need as complicated
logging as in Chrome.
BUG=85241
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7104085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@88591 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void SendStatus(struct mg_connection* connection,
void SendOkWithBody(struct mg_connection* connection,
const std::string& content) {
const char* response_fmt = "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n"
"Content-Length:%d\r\n\r\n"
"%s";
std::string response = base::StringPrintf(
response_fmt, content.length(), content.c_str());
mg_write(connection, response.data(), response.length());
}
| 170,458 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int cloop_open(BlockDriverState *bs, QDict *options, int flags,
Error **errp)
{
BDRVCloopState *s = bs->opaque;
uint32_t offsets_size, max_compressed_block_size = 1, i;
int ret;
bs->read_only = 1;
/* read header */
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 128, &s->block_size, 4);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
s->block_size = be32_to_cpu(s->block_size);
if (s->block_size % 512) {
error_setg(errp, "block_size %u must be a multiple of 512",
s->block_size);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (s->block_size == 0) {
error_setg(errp, "block_size cannot be zero");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* cloop's create_compressed_fs.c warns about block sizes beyond 256 KB but
* we can accept more. Prevent ridiculous values like 4 GB - 1 since we
* need a buffer this big.
*/
if (s->block_size > MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) {
error_setg(errp, "block_size %u must be %u MB or less",
s->block_size,
MAX_BLOCK_SIZE / (1024 * 1024));
return -EINVAL;
}
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 128 + 4, &s->n_blocks, 4);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
s->n_blocks = be32_to_cpu(s->n_blocks);
/* read offsets */
offsets_size = s->n_blocks * sizeof(uint64_t);
s->offsets = g_malloc(offsets_size);
if (i > 0) {
uint32_t size = s->offsets[i] - s->offsets[i - 1];
if (size > max_compressed_block_size) {
max_compressed_block_size = size;
}
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static int cloop_open(BlockDriverState *bs, QDict *options, int flags,
Error **errp)
{
BDRVCloopState *s = bs->opaque;
uint32_t offsets_size, max_compressed_block_size = 1, i;
int ret;
bs->read_only = 1;
/* read header */
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 128, &s->block_size, 4);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
s->block_size = be32_to_cpu(s->block_size);
if (s->block_size % 512) {
error_setg(errp, "block_size %u must be a multiple of 512",
s->block_size);
return -EINVAL;
}
if (s->block_size == 0) {
error_setg(errp, "block_size cannot be zero");
return -EINVAL;
}
/* cloop's create_compressed_fs.c warns about block sizes beyond 256 KB but
* we can accept more. Prevent ridiculous values like 4 GB - 1 since we
* need a buffer this big.
*/
if (s->block_size > MAX_BLOCK_SIZE) {
error_setg(errp, "block_size %u must be %u MB or less",
s->block_size,
MAX_BLOCK_SIZE / (1024 * 1024));
return -EINVAL;
}
ret = bdrv_pread(bs->file, 128 + 4, &s->n_blocks, 4);
if (ret < 0) {
return ret;
}
s->n_blocks = be32_to_cpu(s->n_blocks);
/* read offsets */
if (s->n_blocks > UINT32_MAX / sizeof(uint64_t)) {
/* Prevent integer overflow */
error_setg(errp, "n_blocks %u must be %zu or less",
s->n_blocks,
UINT32_MAX / sizeof(uint64_t));
return -EINVAL;
}
offsets_size = s->n_blocks * sizeof(uint64_t);
s->offsets = g_malloc(offsets_size);
if (i > 0) {
uint32_t size = s->offsets[i] - s->offsets[i - 1];
if (size > max_compressed_block_size) {
max_compressed_block_size = size;
}
}
}
| 165,403 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: svc_set_num_threads(struct svc_serv *serv, struct svc_pool *pool, int nrservs)
{
struct svc_rqst *rqstp;
struct task_struct *task;
struct svc_pool *chosen_pool;
int error = 0;
unsigned int state = serv->sv_nrthreads-1;
int node;
if (pool == NULL) {
/* The -1 assumes caller has done a svc_get() */
nrservs -= (serv->sv_nrthreads-1);
} else {
spin_lock_bh(&pool->sp_lock);
nrservs -= pool->sp_nrthreads;
spin_unlock_bh(&pool->sp_lock);
}
/* create new threads */
while (nrservs > 0) {
nrservs--;
chosen_pool = choose_pool(serv, pool, &state);
node = svc_pool_map_get_node(chosen_pool->sp_id);
rqstp = svc_prepare_thread(serv, chosen_pool, node);
if (IS_ERR(rqstp)) {
error = PTR_ERR(rqstp);
break;
}
__module_get(serv->sv_ops->svo_module);
task = kthread_create_on_node(serv->sv_ops->svo_function, rqstp,
node, "%s", serv->sv_name);
if (IS_ERR(task)) {
error = PTR_ERR(task);
module_put(serv->sv_ops->svo_module);
svc_exit_thread(rqstp);
break;
}
rqstp->rq_task = task;
if (serv->sv_nrpools > 1)
svc_pool_map_set_cpumask(task, chosen_pool->sp_id);
svc_sock_update_bufs(serv);
wake_up_process(task);
}
/* destroy old threads */
while (nrservs < 0 &&
(task = choose_victim(serv, pool, &state)) != NULL) {
send_sig(SIGINT, task, 1);
nrservs++;
}
return error;
}
Commit Message: Merge tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux
Pull nfsd updates from Bruce Fields:
"Another RDMA update from Chuck Lever, and a bunch of miscellaneous
bugfixes"
* tag 'nfsd-4.12' of git://linux-nfs.org/~bfields/linux: (26 commits)
nfsd: Fix up the "supattr_exclcreat" attributes
nfsd: encoders mustn't use unitialized values in error cases
nfsd: fix undefined behavior in nfsd4_layout_verify
lockd: fix lockd shutdown race
NFSv4: Fix callback server shutdown
SUNRPC: Refactor svc_set_num_threads()
NFSv4.x/callback: Create the callback service through svc_create_pooled
lockd: remove redundant check on block
svcrdma: Clean out old XDR encoders
svcrdma: Remove the req_map cache
svcrdma: Remove unused RDMA Write completion handler
svcrdma: Reduce size of sge array in struct svc_rdma_op_ctxt
svcrdma: Clean up RPC-over-RDMA backchannel reply processing
svcrdma: Report Write/Reply chunk overruns
svcrdma: Clean up RDMA_ERROR path
svcrdma: Use rdma_rw API in RPC reply path
svcrdma: Introduce local rdma_rw API helpers
svcrdma: Clean up svc_rdma_get_inv_rkey()
svcrdma: Add helper to save pages under I/O
svcrdma: Eliminate RPCRDMA_SQ_DEPTH_MULT
...
CWE ID: CWE-404 | svc_set_num_threads(struct svc_serv *serv, struct svc_pool *pool, int nrservs)
/* create new threads */
static int
svc_start_kthreads(struct svc_serv *serv, struct svc_pool *pool, int nrservs)
{
struct svc_rqst *rqstp;
struct task_struct *task;
struct svc_pool *chosen_pool;
unsigned int state = serv->sv_nrthreads-1;
int node;
do {
nrservs--;
chosen_pool = choose_pool(serv, pool, &state);
node = svc_pool_map_get_node(chosen_pool->sp_id);
rqstp = svc_prepare_thread(serv, chosen_pool, node);
if (IS_ERR(rqstp))
return PTR_ERR(rqstp);
__module_get(serv->sv_ops->svo_module);
task = kthread_create_on_node(serv->sv_ops->svo_function, rqstp,
node, "%s", serv->sv_name);
if (IS_ERR(task)) {
module_put(serv->sv_ops->svo_module);
svc_exit_thread(rqstp);
return PTR_ERR(task);
}
rqstp->rq_task = task;
if (serv->sv_nrpools > 1)
svc_pool_map_set_cpumask(task, chosen_pool->sp_id);
svc_sock_update_bufs(serv);
wake_up_process(task);
} while (nrservs > 0);
return 0;
}
/* destroy old threads */
static int
svc_signal_kthreads(struct svc_serv *serv, struct svc_pool *pool, int nrservs)
{
struct task_struct *task;
unsigned int state = serv->sv_nrthreads-1;
/* destroy old threads */
do {
task = choose_victim(serv, pool, &state);
if (task == NULL)
break;
send_sig(SIGINT, task, 1);
nrservs++;
} while (nrservs < 0);
return 0;
}
/*
* Create or destroy enough new threads to make the number
* of threads the given number. If `pool' is non-NULL, applies
* only to threads in that pool, otherwise round-robins between
* all pools. Caller must ensure that mutual exclusion between this and
* server startup or shutdown.
*
* Destroying threads relies on the service threads filling in
* rqstp->rq_task, which only the nfs ones do. Assumes the serv
* has been created using svc_create_pooled().
*
* Based on code that used to be in nfsd_svc() but tweaked
* to be pool-aware.
*/
int
svc_set_num_threads(struct svc_serv *serv, struct svc_pool *pool, int nrservs)
{
if (pool == NULL) {
/* The -1 assumes caller has done a svc_get() */
nrservs -= (serv->sv_nrthreads-1);
} else {
spin_lock_bh(&pool->sp_lock);
nrservs -= pool->sp_nrthreads;
spin_unlock_bh(&pool->sp_lock);
}
if (nrservs > 0)
return svc_start_kthreads(serv, pool, nrservs);
if (nrservs < 0)
return svc_signal_kthreads(serv, pool, nrservs);
return 0;
}
| 168,155 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int pptp_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr,
int sockaddr_len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_pppox *sp = (struct sockaddr_pppox *) uservaddr;
struct pppox_sock *po = pppox_sk(sk);
struct pptp_opt *opt = &po->proto.pptp;
struct rtable *rt;
struct flowi4 fl4;
int error = 0;
if (sp->sa_protocol != PX_PROTO_PPTP)
return -EINVAL;
if (lookup_chan_dst(sp->sa_addr.pptp.call_id, sp->sa_addr.pptp.sin_addr.s_addr))
return -EALREADY;
lock_sock(sk);
/* Check for already bound sockets */
if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_CONNECTED) {
error = -EBUSY;
goto end;
}
/* Check for already disconnected sockets, on attempts to disconnect */
if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_DEAD) {
error = -EALREADY;
goto end;
}
if (!opt->src_addr.sin_addr.s_addr || !sp->sa_addr.pptp.sin_addr.s_addr) {
error = -EINVAL;
goto end;
}
po->chan.private = sk;
po->chan.ops = &pptp_chan_ops;
rt = ip_route_output_ports(sock_net(sk), &fl4, sk,
opt->dst_addr.sin_addr.s_addr,
opt->src_addr.sin_addr.s_addr,
0, 0,
IPPROTO_GRE, RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk), 0);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
error = -EHOSTUNREACH;
goto end;
}
sk_setup_caps(sk, &rt->dst);
po->chan.mtu = dst_mtu(&rt->dst);
if (!po->chan.mtu)
po->chan.mtu = PPP_MRU;
ip_rt_put(rt);
po->chan.mtu -= PPTP_HEADER_OVERHEAD;
po->chan.hdrlen = 2 + sizeof(struct pptp_gre_header);
error = ppp_register_channel(&po->chan);
if (error) {
pr_err("PPTP: failed to register PPP channel (%d)\n", error);
goto end;
}
opt->dst_addr = sp->sa_addr.pptp;
sk->sk_state = PPPOX_CONNECTED;
end:
release_sock(sk);
return error;
}
Commit Message: pptp: verify sockaddr_len in pptp_bind() and pptp_connect()
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-200 | static int pptp_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uservaddr,
int sockaddr_len, int flags)
{
struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
struct sockaddr_pppox *sp = (struct sockaddr_pppox *) uservaddr;
struct pppox_sock *po = pppox_sk(sk);
struct pptp_opt *opt = &po->proto.pptp;
struct rtable *rt;
struct flowi4 fl4;
int error = 0;
if (sockaddr_len < sizeof(struct sockaddr_pppox))
return -EINVAL;
if (sp->sa_protocol != PX_PROTO_PPTP)
return -EINVAL;
if (lookup_chan_dst(sp->sa_addr.pptp.call_id, sp->sa_addr.pptp.sin_addr.s_addr))
return -EALREADY;
lock_sock(sk);
/* Check for already bound sockets */
if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_CONNECTED) {
error = -EBUSY;
goto end;
}
/* Check for already disconnected sockets, on attempts to disconnect */
if (sk->sk_state & PPPOX_DEAD) {
error = -EALREADY;
goto end;
}
if (!opt->src_addr.sin_addr.s_addr || !sp->sa_addr.pptp.sin_addr.s_addr) {
error = -EINVAL;
goto end;
}
po->chan.private = sk;
po->chan.ops = &pptp_chan_ops;
rt = ip_route_output_ports(sock_net(sk), &fl4, sk,
opt->dst_addr.sin_addr.s_addr,
opt->src_addr.sin_addr.s_addr,
0, 0,
IPPROTO_GRE, RT_CONN_FLAGS(sk), 0);
if (IS_ERR(rt)) {
error = -EHOSTUNREACH;
goto end;
}
sk_setup_caps(sk, &rt->dst);
po->chan.mtu = dst_mtu(&rt->dst);
if (!po->chan.mtu)
po->chan.mtu = PPP_MRU;
ip_rt_put(rt);
po->chan.mtu -= PPTP_HEADER_OVERHEAD;
po->chan.hdrlen = 2 + sizeof(struct pptp_gre_header);
error = ppp_register_channel(&po->chan);
if (error) {
pr_err("PPTP: failed to register PPP channel (%d)\n", error);
goto end;
}
opt->dst_addr = sp->sa_addr.pptp;
sk->sk_state = PPPOX_CONNECTED;
end:
release_sock(sk);
return error;
}
| 166,561 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: rpl_dao_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
const struct nd_rpl_dao *dao = (const struct nd_rpl_dao *)bp;
const char *dagid_str = "<elided>";
ND_TCHECK(*dao);
if (length < ND_RPL_DAO_MIN_LEN)
goto tooshort;
bp += ND_RPL_DAO_MIN_LEN;
length -= ND_RPL_DAO_MIN_LEN;
if(RPL_DAO_D(dao->rpl_flags)) {
ND_TCHECK2(dao->rpl_dagid, DAGID_LEN);
if (length < DAGID_LEN)
goto tooshort;
dagid_str = ip6addr_string (ndo, dao->rpl_dagid);
bp += DAGID_LEN;
length -= DAGID_LEN;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [dagid:%s,seq:%u,instance:%u%s%s,%02x]",
dagid_str,
dao->rpl_daoseq,
dao->rpl_instanceid,
RPL_DAO_K(dao->rpl_flags) ? ",acK":"",
RPL_DAO_D(dao->rpl_flags) ? ",Dagid":"",
dao->rpl_flags));
if(ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
const struct rpl_dio_genoption *opt = (const struct rpl_dio_genoption *)bp;
rpl_dio_printopt(ndo, opt, length);
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|truncated]"));
return;
tooshort:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|length too short]"));
return;
}
Commit Message: (for 4.9.3) CVE-2018-14882/ICMP6 RPL: Add a missing bounds check
Moreover:
Add and use *_tstr[] strings.
Update four tests outputs accordingly.
Fix a space.
Wang Junjie of 360 ESG Codesafe Team had independently identified this
vulnerability in 2018 by means of fuzzing and provided the packet capture
file for the test.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | rpl_dao_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *bp, u_int length)
{
const struct nd_rpl_dao *dao = (const struct nd_rpl_dao *)bp;
const char *dagid_str = "<elided>";
ND_TCHECK(*dao);
if (length < ND_RPL_DAO_MIN_LEN)
goto tooshort;
bp += ND_RPL_DAO_MIN_LEN;
length -= ND_RPL_DAO_MIN_LEN;
if(RPL_DAO_D(dao->rpl_flags)) {
ND_TCHECK2(dao->rpl_dagid, DAGID_LEN);
if (length < DAGID_LEN)
goto tooshort;
dagid_str = ip6addr_string (ndo, dao->rpl_dagid);
bp += DAGID_LEN;
length -= DAGID_LEN;
}
ND_PRINT((ndo, " [dagid:%s,seq:%u,instance:%u%s%s,%02x]",
dagid_str,
dao->rpl_daoseq,
dao->rpl_instanceid,
RPL_DAO_K(dao->rpl_flags) ? ",acK":"",
RPL_DAO_D(dao->rpl_flags) ? ",Dagid":"",
dao->rpl_flags));
if(ndo->ndo_vflag > 1) {
const struct rpl_dio_genoption *opt = (const struct rpl_dio_genoption *)bp;
rpl_dio_printopt(ndo, opt, length);
}
return;
trunc:
ND_PRINT((ndo, "%s", rpl_tstr));
return;
tooshort:
ND_PRINT((ndo," [|length too short]"));
return;
}
| 169,828 |
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