instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void EncoderTest::RunLoop(VideoSource *video) {
vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t dec_cfg = {0};
stats_.Reset();
ASSERT_TRUE(passes_ == 1 || passes_ == 2);
for (unsigned int pass = 0; pass < passes_; pass++) {
last_pts_ = 0;
if (passes_ == 1)
cfg_.g_pass = VPX_RC_ONE_PASS;
else if (pass == 0)
cfg_.g_pass = VPX_RC_FIRST_PASS;
else
cfg_.g_pass = VPX_RC_LAST_PASS;
BeginPassHook(pass);
Encoder* const encoder = codec_->CreateEncoder(cfg_, deadline_, init_flags_,
&stats_);
ASSERT_TRUE(encoder != NULL);
Decoder* const decoder = codec_->CreateDecoder(dec_cfg, 0);
bool again;
for (again = true, video->Begin(); again; video->Next()) {
again = (video->img() != NULL);
PreEncodeFrameHook(video);
PreEncodeFrameHook(video, encoder);
encoder->EncodeFrame(video, frame_flags_);
CxDataIterator iter = encoder->GetCxData();
bool has_cxdata = false;
bool has_dxdata = false;
while (const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt = iter.Next()) {
pkt = MutateEncoderOutputHook(pkt);
again = true;
switch (pkt->kind) {
case VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT:
has_cxdata = true;
if (decoder && DoDecode()) {
vpx_codec_err_t res_dec = decoder->DecodeFrame(
(const uint8_t*)pkt->data.frame.buf, pkt->data.frame.sz);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res_dec) << decoder->DecodeError();
has_dxdata = true;
}
ASSERT_GE(pkt->data.frame.pts, last_pts_);
last_pts_ = pkt->data.frame.pts;
FramePktHook(pkt);
break;
case VPX_CODEC_PSNR_PKT:
PSNRPktHook(pkt);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
if (has_dxdata && has_cxdata) {
const vpx_image_t *img_enc = encoder->GetPreviewFrame();
DxDataIterator dec_iter = decoder->GetDxData();
const vpx_image_t *img_dec = dec_iter.Next();
if (img_enc && img_dec) {
const bool res = compare_img(img_enc, img_dec);
if (!res) { // Mismatch
MismatchHook(img_enc, img_dec);
}
}
if (img_dec)
DecompressedFrameHook(*img_dec, video->pts());
}
if (!Continue())
break;
}
EndPassHook();
if (decoder)
delete decoder;
delete encoder;
if (!Continue())
break;
}
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void EncoderTest::RunLoop(VideoSource *video) {
vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t dec_cfg = vpx_codec_dec_cfg_t();
stats_.Reset();
ASSERT_TRUE(passes_ == 1 || passes_ == 2);
for (unsigned int pass = 0; pass < passes_; pass++) {
last_pts_ = 0;
if (passes_ == 1)
cfg_.g_pass = VPX_RC_ONE_PASS;
else if (pass == 0)
cfg_.g_pass = VPX_RC_FIRST_PASS;
else
cfg_.g_pass = VPX_RC_LAST_PASS;
BeginPassHook(pass);
Encoder* const encoder = codec_->CreateEncoder(cfg_, deadline_, init_flags_,
&stats_);
ASSERT_TRUE(encoder != NULL);
video->Begin();
encoder->InitEncoder(video);
unsigned long dec_init_flags = 0; // NOLINT
// Use fragment decoder if encoder outputs partitions.
// NOTE: fragment decoder and partition encoder are only supported by VP8.
if (init_flags_ & VPX_CODEC_USE_OUTPUT_PARTITION)
dec_init_flags |= VPX_CODEC_USE_INPUT_FRAGMENTS;
Decoder* const decoder = codec_->CreateDecoder(dec_cfg, dec_init_flags, 0);
bool again;
for (again = true; again; video->Next()) {
again = (video->img() != NULL);
PreEncodeFrameHook(video);
PreEncodeFrameHook(video, encoder);
encoder->EncodeFrame(video, frame_flags_);
CxDataIterator iter = encoder->GetCxData();
bool has_cxdata = false;
bool has_dxdata = false;
while (const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *pkt = iter.Next()) {
pkt = MutateEncoderOutputHook(pkt);
again = true;
switch (pkt->kind) {
case VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT:
has_cxdata = true;
if (decoder && DoDecode()) {
vpx_codec_err_t res_dec = decoder->DecodeFrame(
(const uint8_t*)pkt->data.frame.buf, pkt->data.frame.sz);
if (!HandleDecodeResult(res_dec, *video, decoder))
break;
has_dxdata = true;
}
ASSERT_GE(pkt->data.frame.pts, last_pts_);
last_pts_ = pkt->data.frame.pts;
FramePktHook(pkt);
break;
case VPX_CODEC_PSNR_PKT:
PSNRPktHook(pkt);
break;
default:
break;
}
}
// Flush the decoder when there are no more fragments.
if ((init_flags_ & VPX_CODEC_USE_OUTPUT_PARTITION) && has_dxdata) {
const vpx_codec_err_t res_dec = decoder->DecodeFrame(NULL, 0);
if (!HandleDecodeResult(res_dec, *video, decoder))
break;
}
if (has_dxdata && has_cxdata) {
const vpx_image_t *img_enc = encoder->GetPreviewFrame();
DxDataIterator dec_iter = decoder->GetDxData();
const vpx_image_t *img_dec = dec_iter.Next();
if (img_enc && img_dec) {
const bool res = compare_img(img_enc, img_dec);
if (!res) { // Mismatch
MismatchHook(img_enc, img_dec);
}
}
if (img_dec)
DecompressedFrameHook(*img_dec, video->pts());
}
if (!Continue())
break;
}
EndPassHook();
if (decoder)
delete decoder;
delete encoder;
if (!Continue())
break;
}
}
| 174,540 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void InspectorPageAgent::setDeviceOrientationOverride(ErrorString* error, double alpha, double beta, double gamma)
{
DeviceOrientationController* controller = DeviceOrientationController::from(mainFrame()->document());
if (!controller) {
*error = "Internal error: unable to override device orientation";
return;
}
controller->didChangeDeviceOrientation(DeviceOrientationData::create(true, alpha, true, beta, true, gamma).get());
}
Commit Message: DevTools: remove references to modules/device_orientation from core
BUG=340221
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/150913003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@166493 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | void InspectorPageAgent::setDeviceOrientationOverride(ErrorString* error, double alpha, double beta, double gamma)
| 171,403 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(DirectoryIterator, rewind)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern->u.dir.index = 0;
if (intern->u.dir.dirp) {
php_stream_rewinddir(intern->u.dir.dirp);
}
spl_filesystem_dir_read(intern TSRMLS_CC);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SPL_METHOD(DirectoryIterator, rewind)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
intern->u.dir.index = 0;
if (intern->u.dir.dirp) {
php_stream_rewinddir(intern->u.dir.dirp);
}
spl_filesystem_dir_read(intern TSRMLS_CC);
}
| 167,027 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: gnutls_session_get_data (gnutls_session_t session,
void *session_data, size_t * session_data_size)
{
gnutls_datum_t psession;
int ret;
if (session->internals.resumable == RESUME_FALSE)
return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_SESSION;
psession.data = session_data;
ret = _gnutls_session_pack (session, &psession);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
if (psession.size > *session_data_size)
{
ret = GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER;
goto error;
}
if (session_data != NULL)
memcpy (session_data, psession.data, psession.size);
ret = 0;
error:
_gnutls_free_datum (&psession);
return ret;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | gnutls_session_get_data (gnutls_session_t session,
void *session_data, size_t * session_data_size)
{
gnutls_datum_t psession;
int ret;
if (session->internals.resumable == RESUME_FALSE)
return GNUTLS_E_INVALID_SESSION;
psession.data = session_data;
ret = _gnutls_session_pack (session, &psession);
if (ret < 0)
{
gnutls_assert ();
return ret;
}
if (psession.size > *session_data_size)
{
*session_data_size = psession.size;
ret = GNUTLS_E_SHORT_MEMORY_BUFFER;
goto error;
}
if (session_data != NULL)
memcpy (session_data, psession.data, psession.size);
ret = 0;
error:
_gnutls_free_datum (&psession);
return ret;
}
| 164,570 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAMRNBEncoder::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_encoder.amrnb",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if ((formatParams->nPortIndex == 0
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM)
|| (formatParams->nPortIndex == 1
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingAMR)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAmr:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *amrParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *)params;
if (amrParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (amrParams->nChannels != 1
|| amrParams->eAMRDTXMode != OMX_AUDIO_AMRDTXModeOff
|| amrParams->eAMRFrameFormat
!= OMX_AUDIO_AMRFrameFormatFSF
|| amrParams->eAMRBandMode < OMX_AUDIO_AMRBandModeNB0
|| amrParams->eAMRBandMode > OMX_AUDIO_AMRBandModeNB7) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mBitRate = amrParams->nBitRate;
mMode = amrParams->eAMRBandMode - 1;
amrParams->eAMRDTXMode = OMX_AUDIO_AMRDTXModeOff;
amrParams->eAMRFrameFormat = OMX_AUDIO_AMRFrameFormatFSF;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (pcmParams->nChannels != 1
|| pcmParams->nSamplingRate != (OMX_U32)kSampleRate) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Verify OMX buffer sizes prior to access
Bug: 27207275
Change-Id: I4412825d1ee233d993af0a67708bea54304ff62d
CWE ID: CWE-119 | OMX_ERRORTYPE SoftAMRNBEncoder::internalSetParameter(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, const OMX_PTR params) {
switch (index) {
case OMX_IndexParamStandardComponentRole:
{
const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *roleParams =
(const OMX_PARAM_COMPONENTROLETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(roleParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (strncmp((const char *)roleParams->cRole,
"audio_encoder.amrnb",
OMX_MAX_STRINGNAME_SIZE - 1)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPortFormat:
{
const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *formatParams =
(const OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PORTFORMATTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(formatParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (formatParams->nPortIndex > 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (formatParams->nIndex > 0) {
return OMX_ErrorNoMore;
}
if ((formatParams->nPortIndex == 0
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingPCM)
|| (formatParams->nPortIndex == 1
&& formatParams->eEncoding != OMX_AUDIO_CodingAMR)) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioAmr:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *amrParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_AMRTYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(amrParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (amrParams->nPortIndex != 1) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (amrParams->nChannels != 1
|| amrParams->eAMRDTXMode != OMX_AUDIO_AMRDTXModeOff
|| amrParams->eAMRFrameFormat
!= OMX_AUDIO_AMRFrameFormatFSF
|| amrParams->eAMRBandMode < OMX_AUDIO_AMRBandModeNB0
|| amrParams->eAMRBandMode > OMX_AUDIO_AMRBandModeNB7) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
mBitRate = amrParams->nBitRate;
mMode = amrParams->eAMRBandMode - 1;
amrParams->eAMRDTXMode = OMX_AUDIO_AMRDTXModeOff;
amrParams->eAMRFrameFormat = OMX_AUDIO_AMRFrameFormatFSF;
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
case OMX_IndexParamAudioPcm:
{
OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *pcmParams =
(OMX_AUDIO_PARAM_PCMMODETYPE *)params;
if (!isValidOMXParam(pcmParams)) {
return OMX_ErrorBadParameter;
}
if (pcmParams->nPortIndex != 0) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
if (pcmParams->nChannels != 1
|| pcmParams->nSamplingRate != (OMX_U32)kSampleRate) {
return OMX_ErrorUndefined;
}
return OMX_ErrorNone;
}
default:
return SimpleSoftOMXComponent::internalSetParameter(index, params);
}
}
| 174,195 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: xfs_file_splice_write(
struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,
struct file *outfilp,
loff_t *ppos,
size_t count,
unsigned int flags)
{
struct inode *inode = outfilp->f_mapping->host;
struct xfs_inode *ip = XFS_I(inode);
int ioflags = 0;
ssize_t ret;
XFS_STATS_INC(xs_write_calls);
if (outfilp->f_mode & FMODE_NOCMTIME)
ioflags |= IO_INVIS;
if (XFS_FORCED_SHUTDOWN(ip->i_mount))
return -EIO;
xfs_ilock(ip, XFS_IOLOCK_EXCL);
trace_xfs_file_splice_write(ip, count, *ppos, ioflags);
ret = generic_file_splice_write(pipe, outfilp, ppos, count, flags);
if (ret > 0)
XFS_STATS_ADD(xs_write_bytes, ret);
xfs_iunlock(ip, XFS_IOLOCK_EXCL);
return ret;
}
Commit Message: ->splice_write() via ->write_iter()
iter_file_splice_write() - a ->splice_write() instance that gathers the
pipe buffers, builds a bio_vec-based iov_iter covering those and feeds
it to ->write_iter(). A bunch of simple cases coverted to that...
[AV: fixed the braino spotted by Cyrill]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | xfs_file_splice_write(
| 166,810 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetKeyboardLibrary(
KeyboardLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->keyboard_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetKeyboardLibrary(
| 170,639 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void locationWithCallWithAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* proxyImp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
TestNode* imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->locationWithCallWith());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHrefCallWith(callingDOMWindow(info.GetIsolate()), enteredDOMWindow(info.GetIsolate()), cppValue);
}
Commit Message: document.location bindings fix
BUG=352374
R=jochen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/196343011
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@169176 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void locationWithCallWithAttributeSetter(v8::Local<v8::Value> jsValue, const v8::PropertyCallbackInfo<void>& info)
{
TestObjectPython* proxyImp = V8TestObjectPython::toNative(info.Holder());
RefPtr<TestNode> imp = WTF::getPtr(proxyImp->locationWithCallWith());
if (!imp)
return;
V8TRYCATCH_FOR_V8STRINGRESOURCE_VOID(V8StringResource<>, cppValue, jsValue);
imp->setHrefCallWith(callingDOMWindow(info.GetIsolate()), enteredDOMWindow(info.GetIsolate()), cppValue);
}
| 171,687 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int sc_asn1_read_tag(const u8 ** buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int *cla_out,
unsigned int *tag_out, size_t *taglen)
{
const u8 *p = *buf;
size_t left = buflen, len;
unsigned int cla, tag, i;
if (left < 2)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ASN1_OBJECT;
*buf = NULL;
if (*p == 0xff || *p == 0) {
/* end of data reached */
*taglen = 0;
*tag_out = SC_ASN1_TAG_EOC;
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
/* parse tag byte(s)
* Resulted tag is presented by integer that has not to be
* confused with the 'tag number' part of ASN.1 tag.
*/
cla = (*p & SC_ASN1_TAG_CLASS) | (*p & SC_ASN1_TAG_CONSTRUCTED);
tag = *p & SC_ASN1_TAG_PRIMITIVE;
p++;
left--;
if (tag == SC_ASN1_TAG_PRIMITIVE) {
/* high tag number */
size_t n = SC_ASN1_TAGNUM_SIZE - 1;
/* search the last tag octet */
while (left-- != 0 && n != 0) {
tag <<= 8;
tag |= *p;
if ((*p++ & 0x80) == 0)
break;
n--;
}
if (left == 0 || n == 0)
/* either an invalid tag or it doesn't fit in
* unsigned int */
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ASN1_OBJECT;
}
/* parse length byte(s) */
len = *p & 0x7f;
if (*p++ & 0x80) {
unsigned int a = 0;
if (len > 4 || len > left)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ASN1_OBJECT;
left -= len;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
a <<= 8;
a |= *p;
p++;
}
len = a;
}
*cla_out = cla;
*tag_out = tag;
*taglen = len;
*buf = p;
if (len > left)
return SC_ERROR_ASN1_END_OF_CONTENTS;
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | int sc_asn1_read_tag(const u8 ** buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int *cla_out,
unsigned int *tag_out, size_t *taglen)
{
const u8 *p = *buf;
size_t left = buflen, len;
unsigned int cla, tag, i;
if (left < 2)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ASN1_OBJECT;
*buf = NULL;
if (*p == 0xff || *p == 0) {
/* end of data reached */
*taglen = 0;
*tag_out = SC_ASN1_TAG_EOC;
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
/* parse tag byte(s)
* Resulted tag is presented by integer that has not to be
* confused with the 'tag number' part of ASN.1 tag.
*/
cla = (*p & SC_ASN1_TAG_CLASS) | (*p & SC_ASN1_TAG_CONSTRUCTED);
tag = *p & SC_ASN1_TAG_PRIMITIVE;
p++;
left--;
if (tag == SC_ASN1_TAG_PRIMITIVE) {
/* high tag number */
size_t n = SC_ASN1_TAGNUM_SIZE - 1;
/* search the last tag octet */
while (left-- != 0 && n != 0) {
tag <<= 8;
tag |= *p;
if ((*p++ & 0x80) == 0)
break;
n--;
}
if (left == 0 || n == 0)
/* either an invalid tag or it doesn't fit in
* unsigned int */
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ASN1_OBJECT;
}
/* parse length byte(s) */
len = *p & 0x7f;
if (*p++ & 0x80) {
unsigned int a = 0;
left--;
if (len > 4 || len > left)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ASN1_OBJECT;
left -= len;
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
a <<= 8;
a |= *p;
p++;
}
len = a;
}
*cla_out = cla;
*tag_out = tag;
*taglen = len;
*buf = p;
if (len > left)
return SC_ERROR_ASN1_END_OF_CONTENTS;
return SC_SUCCESS;
}
| 169,046 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool LocalFrame::ShouldReuseDefaultView(const KURL& url) const {
if (!Loader().StateMachine()->IsDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument())
return false;
return GetDocument()->IsSecureTransitionTo(url);
}
Commit Message: Prevent sandboxed documents from reusing the default window
Bug: 377995
Change-Id: Iff66c6d214dfd0cb7ea9c80f83afeedfff703541
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/983558
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#567663}
CWE ID: CWE-285 | bool LocalFrame::ShouldReuseDefaultView(const KURL& url) const {
bool LocalFrame::ShouldReuseDefaultView(
const KURL& url,
const ContentSecurityPolicy* csp) const {
if (!Loader().StateMachine()->IsDisplayingInitialEmptyDocument())
return false;
// The Window object should only be re-used if it is same-origin.
// Since sandboxing turns the origin into an opaque origin it needs to also
// be considered when deciding whether to reuse it.
// Spec:
// https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/browsing-the-web.html#initialise-the-document-object
if (csp &&
SecurityContext::IsSandboxed(kSandboxOrigin, csp->GetSandboxMask())) {
return false;
}
return GetDocument()->IsSecureTransitionTo(url);
}
| 173,196 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHPAPI char *php_unescape_html_entities(unsigned char *old, size_t oldlen, size_t *newlen, int all, int flags, char *hint_charset TSRMLS_DC)
{
size_t retlen;
char *ret;
enum entity_charset charset;
const entity_ht *inverse_map = NULL;
size_t new_size = TRAVERSE_FOR_ENTITIES_EXPAND_SIZE(oldlen);
if (all) {
charset = determine_charset(hint_charset TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
charset = cs_8859_1; /* charset shouldn't matter, use ISO-8859-1 for performance */
}
/* don't use LIMIT_ALL! */
if (oldlen > new_size) {
/* overflow, refuse to do anything */
ret = estrndup((char*)old, oldlen);
retlen = oldlen;
goto empty_source;
}
ret = emalloc(new_size);
*ret = '\0';
retlen = oldlen;
if (retlen == 0) {
goto empty_source;
}
inverse_map = unescape_inverse_map(all, flags);
/* replace numeric entities */
traverse_for_entities(old, oldlen, ret, &retlen, all, flags, inverse_map, charset);
empty_source:
*newlen = retlen;
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72135 - don't create strings with lengths outside int range
CWE ID: CWE-190 | PHPAPI char *php_unescape_html_entities(unsigned char *old, size_t oldlen, size_t *newlen, int all, int flags, char *hint_charset TSRMLS_DC)
{
size_t retlen;
char *ret;
enum entity_charset charset;
const entity_ht *inverse_map = NULL;
size_t new_size = TRAVERSE_FOR_ENTITIES_EXPAND_SIZE(oldlen);
if (all) {
charset = determine_charset(hint_charset TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
charset = cs_8859_1; /* charset shouldn't matter, use ISO-8859-1 for performance */
}
/* don't use LIMIT_ALL! */
if (oldlen > new_size) {
/* overflow, refuse to do anything */
ret = estrndup((char*)old, oldlen);
retlen = oldlen;
goto empty_source;
}
ret = emalloc(new_size);
*ret = '\0';
retlen = oldlen;
if (retlen == 0) {
goto empty_source;
}
inverse_map = unescape_inverse_map(all, flags);
/* replace numeric entities */
traverse_for_entities(old, oldlen, ret, &retlen, all, flags, inverse_map, charset);
empty_source:
*newlen = retlen;
return ret;
}
| 167,176 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, __construct)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
zend_bool use_include_path = 0;
char *p1, *p2;
char *tmp_path;
int tmp_path_len;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_RuntimeException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
intern->u.file.open_mode = NULL;
intern->u.file.open_mode_len = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "p|sbr!",
&intern->file_name, &intern->file_name_len,
&intern->u.file.open_mode, &intern->u.file.open_mode_len,
&use_include_path, &intern->u.file.zcontext) == FAILURE) {
intern->u.file.open_mode = NULL;
intern->file_name = NULL;
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
if (intern->u.file.open_mode == NULL) {
intern->u.file.open_mode = "r";
intern->u.file.open_mode_len = 1;
}
if (spl_filesystem_file_open(intern, use_include_path, 0 TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
tmp_path_len = strlen(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path);
if (tmp_path_len > 1 && IS_SLASH_AT(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path, tmp_path_len-1)) {
tmp_path_len--;
}
tmp_path = estrndup(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path, tmp_path_len);
p1 = strrchr(tmp_path, '/');
#if defined(PHP_WIN32) || defined(NETWARE)
p2 = strrchr(tmp_path, '\\');
#else
p2 = 0;
#endif
if (p1 || p2) {
intern->_path_len = (p1 > p2 ? p1 : p2) - tmp_path;
} else {
intern->_path_len = 0;
}
efree(tmp_path);
intern->_path = estrndup(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path, intern->_path_len);
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void SplTempFileObject::__construct([int max_memory])
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | SPL_METHOD(SplFileObject, __construct)
{
spl_filesystem_object *intern = (spl_filesystem_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
zend_bool use_include_path = 0;
char *p1, *p2;
char *tmp_path;
int tmp_path_len;
zend_error_handling error_handling;
zend_replace_error_handling(EH_THROW, spl_ce_RuntimeException, &error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
intern->u.file.open_mode = NULL;
intern->u.file.open_mode_len = 0;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "p|sbr!",
&intern->file_name, &intern->file_name_len,
&intern->u.file.open_mode, &intern->u.file.open_mode_len,
&use_include_path, &intern->u.file.zcontext) == FAILURE) {
intern->u.file.open_mode = NULL;
intern->file_name = NULL;
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
return;
}
if (intern->u.file.open_mode == NULL) {
intern->u.file.open_mode = "r";
intern->u.file.open_mode_len = 1;
}
if (spl_filesystem_file_open(intern, use_include_path, 0 TSRMLS_CC) == SUCCESS) {
tmp_path_len = strlen(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path);
if (tmp_path_len > 1 && IS_SLASH_AT(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path, tmp_path_len-1)) {
tmp_path_len--;
}
tmp_path = estrndup(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path, tmp_path_len);
p1 = strrchr(tmp_path, '/');
#if defined(PHP_WIN32) || defined(NETWARE)
p2 = strrchr(tmp_path, '\\');
#else
p2 = 0;
#endif
if (p1 || p2) {
intern->_path_len = (p1 > p2 ? p1 : p2) - tmp_path;
} else {
intern->_path_len = 0;
}
efree(tmp_path);
intern->_path = estrndup(intern->u.file.stream->orig_path, intern->_path_len);
}
zend_restore_error_handling(&error_handling TSRMLS_CC);
} /* }}} */
/* {{{ proto void SplTempFileObject::__construct([int max_memory])
| 167,049 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static PassRefPtr<Uint8Array> copySkImageData(SkImage* input,
const SkImageInfo& info) {
size_t width = static_cast<size_t>(input->width());
RefPtr<ArrayBuffer> dstBuffer =
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull(width * input->height(), info.bytesPerPixel());
if (!dstBuffer)
return nullptr;
RefPtr<Uint8Array> dstPixels =
Uint8Array::create(dstBuffer, 0, dstBuffer->byteLength());
input->readPixels(info, dstPixels->data(), width * info.bytesPerPixel(), 0,
0);
return dstPixels;
}
Commit Message: Prevent bad casting in ImageBitmap when calling ArrayBuffer::createOrNull
Currently when ImageBitmap's constructor is invoked, we check whether
dstSize will overflow size_t or not. The problem comes when we call
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull some times in the code.
Both parameters of ArrayBuffer::createOrNull are unsigned. In ImageBitmap
when we call this method, the first parameter is usually width * height.
This could overflow unsigned even if it has been checked safe with size_t,
the reason is that unsigned is a 32-bit value on 64-bit systems, while
size_t is a 64-bit value.
This CL makes a change such that we check whether the dstSize will overflow
unsigned or not. In this case, we can guarantee that createOrNull will not have
any crash.
BUG=664139
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2500493002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#431936}
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static PassRefPtr<Uint8Array> copySkImageData(SkImage* input,
const SkImageInfo& info) {
// width * height * bytesPerPixel will never overflow unsigned.
unsigned width = static_cast<unsigned>(input->width());
RefPtr<ArrayBuffer> dstBuffer =
ArrayBuffer::createOrNull(width * input->height(), info.bytesPerPixel());
if (!dstBuffer)
return nullptr;
RefPtr<Uint8Array> dstPixels =
Uint8Array::create(dstBuffer, 0, dstBuffer->byteLength());
input->readPixels(info, dstPixels->data(), width * info.bytesPerPixel(), 0,
0);
return dstPixels;
}
| 172,499 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp)
{
int pad = 0, ret, i, neg;
unsigned char *p, *n, pb = 0;
if (a == NULL)
return (0);
neg = a->type & V_ASN1_NEG;
if (a->length == 0)
ret = 1;
else {
ret = a->length;
i = a->data[0];
if (!neg && (i > 127)) {
pad = 1;
pb = 0;
pad = 1;
pb = 0xFF;
} else if (i == 128) {
/*
* Special case: if any other bytes non zero we pad:
* otherwise we don't.
*/
for (i = 1; i < a->length; i++)
if (a->data[i]) {
pad = 1;
pb = 0xFF;
break;
}
}
}
ret += pad;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a, unsigned char **pp)
{
int pad = 0, ret, i, neg;
unsigned char *p, *n, pb = 0;
if (a == NULL)
return (0);
neg = a->type & V_ASN1_NEG;
if (a->length == 0)
ret = 1;
else {
ret = a->length;
i = a->data[0];
if (ret == 1 && i == 0)
neg = 0;
if (!neg && (i > 127)) {
pad = 1;
pb = 0;
pad = 1;
pb = 0xFF;
} else if (i == 128) {
/*
* Special case: if any other bytes non zero we pad:
* otherwise we don't.
*/
for (i = 1; i < a->length; i++)
if (a->data[i]) {
pad = 1;
pb = 0xFF;
break;
}
}
}
ret += pad;
}
| 165,210 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: XListFonts(
register Display *dpy,
_Xconst char *pattern, /* null-terminated */
int maxNames,
int *actualCount) /* RETURN */
{
register long nbytes;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
char **flist = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
xListFontsReply rep;
register xListFontsReq *req;
unsigned long rlen = 0;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetReq(ListFonts, req);
req->maxNames = maxNames;
nbytes = req->nbytes = pattern ? strlen (pattern) : 0;
req->length += (nbytes + 3) >> 2;
_XSend (dpy, pattern, nbytes);
/* use _XSend instead of Data, since following _XReply will flush buffer */
if (!_XReply (dpy, (xReply *)&rep, 0, xFalse)) {
*actualCount = 0;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
if (rep.nFonts) {
flist = Xmalloc (rep.nFonts * sizeof(char *));
if (rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
rlen = rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc(rlen + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((! flist) || (! ch)) {
Xfree(flist);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
*actualCount = 0;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, rlen);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chend = ch + (rlen + 1);
length = *(unsigned char *)ch;
*ch = 1; /* make sure it is non-zero for XFreeFontNames */
for (i = 0; i < rep.nFonts; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
flist[i] = ch + 1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
length = *(unsigned char *)ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else
flist[i] = NULL;
}
}
*actualCount = count;
for (names = list+1; *names; names++)
Xfree (*names);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-787 | XListFonts(
register Display *dpy,
_Xconst char *pattern, /* null-terminated */
int maxNames,
int *actualCount) /* RETURN */
{
register long nbytes;
register unsigned i;
register int length;
char **flist = NULL;
char *ch = NULL;
char *chend;
int count = 0;
xListFontsReply rep;
register xListFontsReq *req;
unsigned long rlen = 0;
LockDisplay(dpy);
GetReq(ListFonts, req);
req->maxNames = maxNames;
nbytes = req->nbytes = pattern ? strlen (pattern) : 0;
req->length += (nbytes + 3) >> 2;
_XSend (dpy, pattern, nbytes);
/* use _XSend instead of Data, since following _XReply will flush buffer */
if (!_XReply (dpy, (xReply *)&rep, 0, xFalse)) {
*actualCount = 0;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
if (rep.nFonts) {
flist = Xmalloc (rep.nFonts * sizeof(char *));
if (rep.length > 0 && rep.length < (INT_MAX >> 2)) {
rlen = rep.length << 2;
ch = Xmalloc(rlen + 1);
/* +1 to leave room for last null-terminator */
}
if ((! flist) || (! ch)) {
Xfree(flist);
Xfree(ch);
_XEatDataWords(dpy, rep.length);
*actualCount = 0;
UnlockDisplay(dpy);
SyncHandle();
return (char **) NULL;
}
_XReadPad (dpy, ch, rlen);
/*
* unpack into null terminated strings.
*/
chend = ch + (rlen + 1);
length = *(unsigned char *)ch;
*ch = 1; /* make sure it is non-zero for XFreeFontNames */
for (i = 0; i < rep.nFonts; i++) {
if (ch + length < chend) {
flist[i] = ch + 1; /* skip over length */
ch += length + 1; /* find next length ... */
if (ch <= chend) {
length = *(unsigned char *)ch;
*ch = '\0'; /* and replace with null-termination */
count++;
} else {
Xfree(flist);
flist = NULL;
count = 0;
break;
}
} else {
Xfree(flist);
flist = NULL;
count = 0;
break;
}
}
}
*actualCount = count;
for (names = list+1; *names; names++)
Xfree (*names);
}
| 164,923 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WarmupURLFetcher::FetchWarmupURLNow(
const DataReductionProxyServer& proxy_server) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
UMA_HISTOGRAM_EXACT_LINEAR("DataReductionProxy.WarmupURL.FetchInitiated", 1,
2);
net::NetworkTrafficAnnotationTag traffic_annotation =
net::DefineNetworkTrafficAnnotation("data_reduction_proxy_warmup", R"(
semantics {
sender: "Data Reduction Proxy"
description:
"Sends a request to the Data Reduction Proxy server to warm up "
"the connection to the proxy."
trigger:
"A network change while the data reduction proxy is enabled will "
"trigger this request."
data: "A specific URL, not related to user data."
destination: GOOGLE_OWNED_SERVICE
}
policy {
cookies_allowed: NO
setting:
"Users can control Data Saver on Android via the 'Data Saver' "
"setting. Data Saver is not available on iOS, and on desktop it "
"is enabled by installing the Data Saver extension."
policy_exception_justification: "Not implemented."
})");
GURL warmup_url_with_query_params;
GetWarmupURLWithQueryParam(&warmup_url_with_query_params);
url_loader_.reset();
fetch_timeout_timer_.Stop();
is_fetch_in_flight_ = true;
auto resource_request = std::make_unique<network::ResourceRequest>();
resource_request->url = warmup_url_with_query_params;
resource_request->load_flags = net::LOAD_BYPASS_CACHE;
resource_request->render_frame_id = MSG_ROUTING_CONTROL;
url_loader_ = network::SimpleURLLoader::Create(std::move(resource_request),
traffic_annotation);
static const int kMaxRetries = 5;
url_loader_->SetRetryOptions(
kMaxRetries, network::SimpleURLLoader::RETRY_ON_NETWORK_CHANGE);
url_loader_->SetAllowHttpErrorResults(true);
fetch_timeout_timer_.Start(FROM_HERE, GetFetchTimeout(), this,
&WarmupURLFetcher::OnFetchTimeout);
url_loader_->SetOnResponseStartedCallback(base::BindOnce(
&WarmupURLFetcher::OnURLLoadResponseStarted, base::Unretained(this)));
url_loader_->SetOnRedirectCallback(base::BindRepeating(
&WarmupURLFetcher::OnURLLoaderRedirect, base::Unretained(this)));
url_loader_->DownloadToStringOfUnboundedSizeUntilCrashAndDie(
GetNetworkServiceURLLoaderFactory(proxy_server),
base::BindOnce(&WarmupURLFetcher::OnURLLoadComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
Commit Message: Disable all DRP URL fetches when holdback is enabled
Disable secure proxy checker, warmup url fetcher
and client config fetch when the client is in DRP
(Data Reduction Proxy) holdback.
This CL does not disable pingbacks when client is in the
holdback, but the pingback code is going away soon.
Change-Id: Icbb59d814d1452123869c609e0770d1439c1db51
Bug: 984964
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1709965
Commit-Queue: Tarun Bansal <tbansal@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Robert Ogden <robertogden@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#679649}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void WarmupURLFetcher::FetchWarmupURLNow(
const DataReductionProxyServer& proxy_server) {
DCHECK_CALLED_ON_VALID_SEQUENCE(sequence_checker_);
DCHECK(!params::IsIncludedInHoldbackFieldTrial());
UMA_HISTOGRAM_EXACT_LINEAR("DataReductionProxy.WarmupURL.FetchInitiated", 1,
2);
net::NetworkTrafficAnnotationTag traffic_annotation =
net::DefineNetworkTrafficAnnotation("data_reduction_proxy_warmup", R"(
semantics {
sender: "Data Reduction Proxy"
description:
"Sends a request to the Data Reduction Proxy server to warm up "
"the connection to the proxy."
trigger:
"A network change while the data reduction proxy is enabled will "
"trigger this request."
data: "A specific URL, not related to user data."
destination: GOOGLE_OWNED_SERVICE
}
policy {
cookies_allowed: NO
setting:
"Users can control Data Saver on Android via the 'Data Saver' "
"setting. Data Saver is not available on iOS, and on desktop it "
"is enabled by installing the Data Saver extension."
policy_exception_justification: "Not implemented."
})");
GURL warmup_url_with_query_params;
GetWarmupURLWithQueryParam(&warmup_url_with_query_params);
url_loader_.reset();
fetch_timeout_timer_.Stop();
is_fetch_in_flight_ = true;
auto resource_request = std::make_unique<network::ResourceRequest>();
resource_request->url = warmup_url_with_query_params;
resource_request->load_flags = net::LOAD_BYPASS_CACHE;
resource_request->render_frame_id = MSG_ROUTING_CONTROL;
url_loader_ = network::SimpleURLLoader::Create(std::move(resource_request),
traffic_annotation);
static const int kMaxRetries = 5;
url_loader_->SetRetryOptions(
kMaxRetries, network::SimpleURLLoader::RETRY_ON_NETWORK_CHANGE);
url_loader_->SetAllowHttpErrorResults(true);
fetch_timeout_timer_.Start(FROM_HERE, GetFetchTimeout(), this,
&WarmupURLFetcher::OnFetchTimeout);
url_loader_->SetOnResponseStartedCallback(base::BindOnce(
&WarmupURLFetcher::OnURLLoadResponseStarted, base::Unretained(this)));
url_loader_->SetOnRedirectCallback(base::BindRepeating(
&WarmupURLFetcher::OnURLLoaderRedirect, base::Unretained(this)));
url_loader_->DownloadToStringOfUnboundedSizeUntilCrashAndDie(
GetNetworkServiceURLLoaderFactory(proxy_server),
base::BindOnce(&WarmupURLFetcher::OnURLLoadComplete,
base::Unretained(this)));
}
| 172,425 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int btsock_thread_post_cmd(int h, int type, const unsigned char* data, int size, uint32_t user_id)
{
if(h < 0 || h >= MAX_THREAD)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("invalid bt thread handle:%d", h);
return FALSE;
}
if(ts[h].cmd_fdw == -1)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("cmd socket is not created. socket thread may not initialized");
return FALSE;
}
sock_cmd_t cmd = {CMD_USER_PRIVATE, 0, type, size, user_id};
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("post cmd type:%d, size:%d, h:%d, ", type, size, h);
sock_cmd_t* cmd_send = &cmd;
int size_send = sizeof(cmd);
if(data && size)
{
size_send = sizeof(cmd) + size;
cmd_send = (sock_cmd_t*)alloca(size_send);
if(cmd_send)
{
*cmd_send = cmd;
memcpy(cmd_send + 1, data, size);
}
else
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("alloca failed at h:%d, cmd type:%d, size:%d", h, type, size_send);
return FALSE;
}
}
return send(ts[h].cmd_fdw, cmd_send, size_send, 0) == size_send;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | int btsock_thread_post_cmd(int h, int type, const unsigned char* data, int size, uint32_t user_id)
{
if(h < 0 || h >= MAX_THREAD)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("invalid bt thread handle:%d", h);
return FALSE;
}
if(ts[h].cmd_fdw == -1)
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("cmd socket is not created. socket thread may not initialized");
return FALSE;
}
sock_cmd_t cmd = {CMD_USER_PRIVATE, 0, type, size, user_id};
APPL_TRACE_DEBUG("post cmd type:%d, size:%d, h:%d, ", type, size, h);
sock_cmd_t* cmd_send = &cmd;
int size_send = sizeof(cmd);
if(data && size)
{
size_send = sizeof(cmd) + size;
cmd_send = (sock_cmd_t*)alloca(size_send);
if(cmd_send)
{
*cmd_send = cmd;
memcpy(cmd_send + 1, data, size);
}
else
{
APPL_TRACE_ERROR("alloca failed at h:%d, cmd type:%d, size:%d", h, type, size_send);
return FALSE;
}
}
return TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(ts[h].cmd_fdw, cmd_send, size_send, 0)) == size_send;
}
| 173,462 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ssize_t NuPlayer::NuPlayerStreamListener::read(
void *data, size_t size, sp<AMessage> *extra) {
CHECK_GT(size, 0u);
extra->clear();
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (mEOS) {
return 0;
}
if (mQueue.empty()) {
mSendDataNotification = true;
return -EWOULDBLOCK;
}
QueueEntry *entry = &*mQueue.begin();
if (entry->mIsCommand) {
switch (entry->mCommand) {
case EOS:
{
mQueue.erase(mQueue.begin());
entry = NULL;
mEOS = true;
return 0;
}
case DISCONTINUITY:
{
*extra = entry->mExtra;
mQueue.erase(mQueue.begin());
entry = NULL;
return INFO_DISCONTINUITY;
}
default:
TRESPASS();
break;
}
}
size_t copy = entry->mSize;
if (copy > size) {
copy = size;
}
memcpy(data,
(const uint8_t *)mBuffers.editItemAt(entry->mIndex)->pointer()
+ entry->mOffset,
copy);
entry->mOffset += copy;
entry->mSize -= copy;
if (entry->mSize == 0) {
mSource->onBufferAvailable(entry->mIndex);
mQueue.erase(mQueue.begin());
entry = NULL;
}
return copy;
}
Commit Message: NuPlayerStreamListener: NULL and bounds check before memcpy
Bug: 27533704
Change-Id: I992a7709b92b1cbc3114c97bec48a3fc5b22ba6e
CWE ID: CWE-264 | ssize_t NuPlayer::NuPlayerStreamListener::read(
void *data, size_t size, sp<AMessage> *extra) {
CHECK_GT(size, 0u);
extra->clear();
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (mEOS) {
return 0;
}
if (mQueue.empty()) {
mSendDataNotification = true;
return -EWOULDBLOCK;
}
QueueEntry *entry = &*mQueue.begin();
if (entry->mIsCommand) {
switch (entry->mCommand) {
case EOS:
{
mQueue.erase(mQueue.begin());
entry = NULL;
mEOS = true;
return 0;
}
case DISCONTINUITY:
{
*extra = entry->mExtra;
mQueue.erase(mQueue.begin());
entry = NULL;
return INFO_DISCONTINUITY;
}
default:
TRESPASS();
break;
}
}
size_t copy = entry->mSize;
if (copy > size) {
copy = size;
}
if (entry->mIndex >= mBuffers.size()) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
sp<IMemory> mem = mBuffers.editItemAt(entry->mIndex);
if (mem == NULL || mem->size() < copy || mem->size() - copy < entry->mOffset) {
return ERROR_MALFORMED;
}
memcpy(data,
(const uint8_t *)mem->pointer()
+ entry->mOffset,
copy);
entry->mOffset += copy;
entry->mSize -= copy;
if (entry->mSize == 0) {
mSource->onBufferAvailable(entry->mIndex);
mQueue.erase(mQueue.begin());
entry = NULL;
}
return copy;
}
| 173,884 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, addFile)
{
char *fname, *localname = NULL;
size_t fname_len, localname_len = 0;
php_stream *resource;
zval zresource;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s|s", &fname, &fname_len, &localname, &localname_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
#if PHP_API_VERSION < 20100412
if (PG(safe_mode) && (!php_checkuid(fname, NULL, CHECKUID_ALLOW_ONLY_FILE))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0, "phar error: unable to open file \"%s\" to add to phar archive, safe_mode restrictions prevent this", fname);
return;
}
#endif
if (!strstr(fname, "://") && php_check_open_basedir(fname)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0, "phar error: unable to open file \"%s\" to add to phar archive, open_basedir restrictions prevent this", fname);
return;
}
if (!(resource = php_stream_open_wrapper(fname, "rb", 0, NULL))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0, "phar error: unable to open file \"%s\" to add to phar archive", fname);
return;
}
if (localname) {
fname = localname;
fname_len = localname_len;
}
php_stream_to_zval(resource, &zresource);
phar_add_file(&(phar_obj->archive), fname, fname_len, NULL, 0, &zresource);
zval_ptr_dtor(&zresource);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | PHP_METHOD(Phar, addFile)
{
char *fname, *localname = NULL;
size_t fname_len, localname_len = 0;
php_stream *resource;
zval zresource;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "p|s", &fname, &fname_len, &localname, &localname_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
#if PHP_API_VERSION < 20100412
if (PG(safe_mode) && (!php_checkuid(fname, NULL, CHECKUID_ALLOW_ONLY_FILE))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0, "phar error: unable to open file \"%s\" to add to phar archive, safe_mode restrictions prevent this", fname);
return;
}
#endif
if (!strstr(fname, "://") && php_check_open_basedir(fname)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0, "phar error: unable to open file \"%s\" to add to phar archive, open_basedir restrictions prevent this", fname);
return;
}
if (!(resource = php_stream_open_wrapper(fname, "rb", 0, NULL))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0, "phar error: unable to open file \"%s\" to add to phar archive", fname);
return;
}
if (localname) {
fname = localname;
fname_len = localname_len;
}
php_stream_to_zval(resource, &zresource);
phar_add_file(&(phar_obj->archive), fname, fname_len, NULL, 0, &zresource);
zval_ptr_dtor(&zresource);
}
| 165,070 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleDrawArrays(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::DrawArrays& c) {
GLenum mode = static_cast<GLenum>(c.mode);
GLint first = static_cast<GLint>(c.first);
GLsizei count = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.count);
if (!validators_->draw_mode.IsValid(mode)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glDrawArrays: mode GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (count < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDrawArrays: count < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!CheckFramebufferComplete("glDrawArrays")) {
return error::kNoError;
}
if (first < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDrawArrays: first < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (count == 0) {
return error::kNoError;
}
GLuint max_vertex_accessed = first + count - 1;
if (IsDrawValid(max_vertex_accessed)) {
bool simulated_attrib_0 = SimulateAttrib0(max_vertex_accessed);
bool simulated_fixed_attribs = false;
if (SimulateFixedAttribs(max_vertex_accessed, &simulated_fixed_attribs)) {
bool textures_set = SetBlackTextureForNonRenderableTextures();
ApplyDirtyState();
glDrawArrays(mode, first, count);
if (textures_set) {
RestoreStateForNonRenderableTextures();
}
if (simulated_fixed_attribs) {
RestoreStateForSimulatedFixedAttribs();
}
}
if (simulated_attrib_0) {
RestoreStateForSimulatedAttrib0();
}
if (WasContextLost()) {
LOG(ERROR) << " GLES2DecoderImpl: Context lost during DrawArrays.";
return error::kLostContext;
}
}
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Revert "Revert 100494 - Fix bug in SimulateAttrib0."""
TEST=none
BUG=95625
TBR=apatrick@chromium.org
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7796016
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@100507 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | error::Error GLES2DecoderImpl::HandleDrawArrays(
uint32 immediate_data_size, const gles2::DrawArrays& c) {
GLenum mode = static_cast<GLenum>(c.mode);
GLint first = static_cast<GLint>(c.first);
GLsizei count = static_cast<GLsizei>(c.count);
if (!validators_->draw_mode.IsValid(mode)) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_ENUM, "glDrawArrays: mode GL_INVALID_ENUM");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (count < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDrawArrays: count < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (!CheckFramebufferComplete("glDrawArrays")) {
return error::kNoError;
}
if (first < 0) {
SetGLError(GL_INVALID_VALUE, "glDrawArrays: first < 0");
return error::kNoError;
}
if (count == 0) {
return error::kNoError;
}
GLuint max_vertex_accessed = first + count - 1;
if (IsDrawValid(max_vertex_accessed)) {
bool simulated_attrib_0 = false;
if (!SimulateAttrib0(max_vertex_accessed, &simulated_attrib_0)) {
return error::kNoError;
}
bool simulated_fixed_attribs = false;
if (SimulateFixedAttribs(max_vertex_accessed, &simulated_fixed_attribs)) {
bool textures_set = SetBlackTextureForNonRenderableTextures();
ApplyDirtyState();
glDrawArrays(mode, first, count);
if (textures_set) {
RestoreStateForNonRenderableTextures();
}
if (simulated_fixed_attribs) {
RestoreStateForSimulatedFixedAttribs();
}
}
if (simulated_attrib_0) {
RestoreStateForSimulatedAttrib0();
}
if (WasContextLost()) {
LOG(ERROR) << " GLES2DecoderImpl: Context lost during DrawArrays.";
return error::kLostContext;
}
}
return error::kNoError;
}
| 170,330 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: av_cold void ff_mpv_idct_init(MpegEncContext *s)
{
ff_idctdsp_init(&s->idsp, s->avctx);
/* load & permutate scantables
* note: only wmv uses different ones
*/
if (s->alternate_scan) {
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->inter_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
} else {
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->inter_scantable, ff_zigzag_direct);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_scantable, ff_zigzag_direct);
}
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_h_scantable, ff_alternate_horizontal_scan);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_v_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
}
Commit Message: avcodec/idctdsp: Transmit studio_profile to init instead of using AVCodecContext profile
These 2 fields are not always the same, it is simpler to always use the same field
for detecting studio profile
Fixes: null pointer dereference
Fixes: ffmpeg_crash_3.avi
Found-by: Thuan Pham <thuanpv@comp.nus.edu.sg>, Marcel Böhme, Andrew Santosa and Alexandru RazvanCaciulescu with AFLSmart
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | av_cold void ff_mpv_idct_init(MpegEncContext *s)
{
if (s->codec_id == AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4)
s->idsp.mpeg4_studio_profile = s->studio_profile;
ff_idctdsp_init(&s->idsp, s->avctx);
/* load & permutate scantables
* note: only wmv uses different ones
*/
if (s->alternate_scan) {
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->inter_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
} else {
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->inter_scantable, ff_zigzag_direct);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_scantable, ff_zigzag_direct);
}
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_h_scantable, ff_alternate_horizontal_scan);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_v_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
}
| 169,190 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static AVFrame *get_video_buffer(AVFilterLink *inlink, int w, int h)
{
PadContext *s = inlink->dst->priv;
AVFrame *frame = ff_get_video_buffer(inlink->dst->outputs[0],
w + (s->w - s->in_w),
h + (s->h - s->in_h));
int plane;
if (!frame)
return NULL;
frame->width = w;
frame->height = h;
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && frame->data[plane]; plane++) {
int hsub = s->draw.hsub[plane];
int vsub = s->draw.vsub[plane];
frame->data[plane] += (s->x >> hsub) * s->draw.pixelstep[plane] +
(s->y >> vsub) * frame->linesize[plane];
}
return frame;
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static AVFrame *get_video_buffer(AVFilterLink *inlink, int w, int h)
{
PadContext *s = inlink->dst->priv;
AVFrame *frame = ff_get_video_buffer(inlink->dst->outputs[0],
w + (s->w - s->in_w),
h + (s->h - s->in_h));
int plane;
if (!frame)
return NULL;
frame->width = w;
frame->height = h;
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && frame->data[plane] && frame->linesize[plane]; plane++) {
int hsub = s->draw.hsub[plane];
int vsub = s->draw.vsub[plane];
frame->data[plane] += (s->x >> hsub) * s->draw.pixelstep[plane] +
(s->y >> vsub) * frame->linesize[plane];
}
return frame;
}
| 166,006 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: mysqlnd_switch_to_ssl_if_needed(
MYSQLND_CONN_DATA * conn,
const MYSQLND_PACKET_GREET * const greet_packet,
const MYSQLND_OPTIONS * const options,
unsigned long mysql_flags
TSRMLS_DC
)
{
enum_func_status ret = FAIL;
const MYSQLND_CHARSET * charset;
MYSQLND_PACKET_AUTH * auth_packet;
DBG_ENTER("mysqlnd_switch_to_ssl_if_needed");
auth_packet = conn->protocol->m.get_auth_packet(conn->protocol, FALSE TSRMLS_CC);
if (!auth_packet) {
SET_OOM_ERROR(*conn->error_info);
goto end;
}
auth_packet->client_flags = mysql_flags;
auth_packet->max_packet_size = MYSQLND_ASSEMBLED_PACKET_MAX_SIZE;
if (options->charset_name && (charset = mysqlnd_find_charset_name(options->charset_name))) {
auth_packet->charset_no = charset->nr;
} else {
#if MYSQLND_UNICODE
auth_packet->charset_no = 200;/* utf8 - swedish collation, check mysqlnd_charset.c */
#else
auth_packet->charset_no = greet_packet->charset_no;
#endif
}
#ifdef MYSQLND_SSL_SUPPORTED
if ((greet_packet->server_capabilities & CLIENT_SSL) && (mysql_flags & CLIENT_SSL)) {
zend_bool verify = mysql_flags & CLIENT_SSL_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT? TRUE:FALSE;
DBG_INF("Switching to SSL");
if (!PACKET_WRITE(auth_packet, conn)) {
CONN_SET_STATE(conn, CONN_QUIT_SENT);
SET_CLIENT_ERROR(*conn->error_info, CR_SERVER_GONE_ERROR, UNKNOWN_SQLSTATE, mysqlnd_server_gone);
goto end;
}
conn->net->m.set_client_option(conn->net, MYSQL_OPT_SSL_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT, (const char *) &verify TSRMLS_CC);
if (FAIL == conn->net->m.enable_ssl(conn->net TSRMLS_CC)) {
goto end;
}
}
#endif
ret = PASS;
end:
PACKET_FREE(auth_packet);
DBG_RETURN(ret);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-284 | mysqlnd_switch_to_ssl_if_needed(
MYSQLND_CONN_DATA * conn,
const MYSQLND_PACKET_GREET * const greet_packet,
const MYSQLND_OPTIONS * const options,
unsigned long mysql_flags
TSRMLS_DC
)
{
enum_func_status ret = FAIL;
const MYSQLND_CHARSET * charset;
MYSQLND_PACKET_AUTH * auth_packet;
DBG_ENTER("mysqlnd_switch_to_ssl_if_needed");
auth_packet = conn->protocol->m.get_auth_packet(conn->protocol, FALSE TSRMLS_CC);
if (!auth_packet) {
SET_OOM_ERROR(*conn->error_info);
goto end;
}
auth_packet->client_flags = mysql_flags;
auth_packet->max_packet_size = MYSQLND_ASSEMBLED_PACKET_MAX_SIZE;
if (options->charset_name && (charset = mysqlnd_find_charset_name(options->charset_name))) {
auth_packet->charset_no = charset->nr;
} else {
#if MYSQLND_UNICODE
auth_packet->charset_no = 200;/* utf8 - swedish collation, check mysqlnd_charset.c */
#else
auth_packet->charset_no = greet_packet->charset_no;
#endif
}
#ifdef MYSQLND_SSL_SUPPORTED
if (mysql_flags & CLIENT_SSL) {
zend_bool server_has_ssl = (greet_packet->server_capabilities & CLIENT_SSL)? TRUE:FALSE;
if (server_has_ssl == FALSE) {
goto close_conn;
} else {
zend_bool verify = mysql_flags & CLIENT_SSL_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT? TRUE:FALSE;
DBG_INF("Switching to SSL");
if (!PACKET_WRITE(auth_packet, conn)) {
goto close_conn;
}
conn->net->m.set_client_option(conn->net, MYSQL_OPT_SSL_VERIFY_SERVER_CERT, (const char *) &verify TSRMLS_CC);
if (FAIL == conn->net->m.enable_ssl(conn->net TSRMLS_CC)) {
goto end;
}
}
}
#else
auth_packet->client_flags &= ~CLIENT_SSL;
if (!PACKET_WRITE(auth_packet, conn)) {
goto close_conn;
}
#endif
ret = PASS;
end:
PACKET_FREE(auth_packet);
DBG_RETURN(ret);
close_conn:
CONN_SET_STATE(conn, CONN_QUIT_SENT);
conn->m->send_close(conn TSRMLS_CC);
SET_CLIENT_ERROR(*conn->error_info, CR_SERVER_GONE_ERROR, UNKNOWN_SQLSTATE, mysqlnd_server_gone);
PACKET_FREE(auth_packet);
DBG_RETURN(ret);
}
| 165,275 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: AviaryScheddPlugin::processJob(const char *key,
const char *,
int )
{
PROC_ID id;
ClassAd *jobAd;
if (!IS_JOB(key)) return false;
id = getProcByString(key);
if (id.cluster < 0 || id.proc < 0) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "Failed to parse key: %s - skipping\n", key);
return false;
}
if (NULL == (jobAd = ::GetJobAd(id.cluster, id.proc, false))) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,
"NOTICE: Failed to lookup ad for %s - maybe deleted\n",
key);
return false;
}
MyString submissionName;
if (GetAttributeString(id.cluster, id.proc,
ATTR_JOB_SUBMISSION,
submissionName) < 0) {
PROC_ID dagman;
if (GetAttributeInt(id.cluster, id.proc,
ATTR_DAGMAN_JOB_ID,
&dagman.cluster) >= 0) {
dagman.proc = 0;
if (GetAttributeString(dagman.cluster, dagman.proc,
ATTR_JOB_SUBMISSION,
submissionName) < 0) {
submissionName.sprintf("%s#%d", Name, dagman.cluster);
}
} else {
submissionName.sprintf("%s#%d", Name, id.cluster);
}
MyString tmp;
tmp += "\"";
tmp += submissionName;
tmp += "\"";
SetAttribute(id.cluster, id.proc,
ATTR_JOB_SUBMISSION,
tmp.Value());
}
return true;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | AviaryScheddPlugin::processJob(const char *key,
const char *,
int )
{
PROC_ID id;
ClassAd *jobAd;
if (!IS_JOB(key)) return false;
id = getProcByString(key);
if (id.cluster <= 0 || id.proc < 0) {
dprintf(D_FULLDEBUG, "Failed to parse key: %s - skipping\n", key);
return false;
}
if (NULL == (jobAd = ::GetJobAd(id.cluster, id.proc, false))) {
dprintf(D_ALWAYS,
"NOTICE: Failed to lookup ad for %s - maybe deleted\n",
key);
return false;
}
MyString submissionName;
if (GetAttributeString(id.cluster, id.proc,
ATTR_JOB_SUBMISSION,
submissionName) < 0) {
PROC_ID dagman;
if (GetAttributeInt(id.cluster, id.proc,
ATTR_DAGMAN_JOB_ID,
&dagman.cluster) >= 0) {
dagman.proc = 0;
if (GetAttributeString(dagman.cluster, dagman.proc,
ATTR_JOB_SUBMISSION,
submissionName) < 0) {
submissionName.sprintf("%s#%d", Name, dagman.cluster);
}
} else {
submissionName.sprintf("%s#%d", Name, id.cluster);
}
MyString tmp;
tmp += "\"";
tmp += submissionName;
tmp += "\"";
SetAttribute(id.cluster, id.proc,
ATTR_JOB_SUBMISSION,
tmp.Value());
}
return true;
}
| 164,830 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void skel(const char *homedir, uid_t u, gid_t g) {
char *fname;
if (!arg_shell_none && (strcmp(cfg.shell,"/usr/bin/zsh") == 0 || strcmp(cfg.shell,"/bin/zsh") == 0)) {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.zshrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (stat("/etc/skel/.zshrc", &s) == 0) {
copy_file("/etc/skel/.zshrc", fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.zshrc");
}
else {
touch_file_as_user(fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger2("touch", fname);
}
free(fname);
}
else if (!arg_shell_none && strcmp(cfg.shell,"/bin/csh") == 0) {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.cshrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (stat("/etc/skel/.cshrc", &s) == 0) {
copy_file("/etc/skel/.cshrc", fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.cshrc");
}
else {
touch_file_as_user(fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger2("touch", fname);
}
free(fname);
}
else {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.bashrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (stat("/etc/skel/.bashrc", &s) == 0) {
copy_file("/etc/skel/.bashrc", fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.bashrc");
}
free(fname);
}
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: CWE-269 | static void skel(const char *homedir, uid_t u, gid_t g) {
char *fname;
if (!arg_shell_none && (strcmp(cfg.shell,"/usr/bin/zsh") == 0 || strcmp(cfg.shell,"/bin/zsh") == 0)) {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.zshrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (is_link(fname)) { // stat on dangling symlinks fails, try again using lstat
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid %s file\n", fname);
exit(1);
}
if (stat("/etc/skel/.zshrc", &s) == 0) {
copy_file_as_user("/etc/skel/.zshrc", fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.zshrc");
}
else {
touch_file_as_user(fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger2("touch", fname);
}
free(fname);
}
else if (!arg_shell_none && strcmp(cfg.shell,"/bin/csh") == 0) {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.cshrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (is_link(fname)) { // stat on dangling symlinks fails, try again using lstat
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid %s file\n", fname);
exit(1);
}
if (stat("/etc/skel/.cshrc", &s) == 0) {
copy_file_as_user("/etc/skel/.cshrc", fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.cshrc");
}
else {
touch_file_as_user(fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger2("touch", fname);
}
free(fname);
}
else {
if (asprintf(&fname, "%s/.bashrc", homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(fname, &s) == 0)
return;
if (is_link(fname)) { // stat on dangling symlinks fails, try again using lstat
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid %s file\n", fname);
exit(1);
}
if (stat("/etc/skel/.bashrc", &s) == 0) {
copy_file_as_user("/etc/skel/.bashrc", fname, u, g, 0644);
fs_logger("clone /etc/skel/.bashrc");
}
free(fname);
}
}
| 168,371 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::CreateDelegatedFrameHostClient() {
if (IsMus())
return;
cc::FrameSinkId frame_sink_id =
host_->AllocateFrameSinkId(is_guest_view_hack_);
if (!delegated_frame_host_client_) {
delegated_frame_host_client_ =
base::MakeUnique<DelegatedFrameHostClientAura>(this);
}
delegated_frame_host_ = base::MakeUnique<DelegatedFrameHost>(
frame_sink_id, delegated_frame_host_client_.get());
if (renderer_compositor_frame_sink_) {
delegated_frame_host_->DidCreateNewRendererCompositorFrameSink(
renderer_compositor_frame_sink_);
}
UpdateNeedsBeginFramesInternal();
if (host_->delegate() && host_->delegate()->GetInputEventRouter()) {
host_->delegate()->GetInputEventRouter()->AddFrameSinkIdOwner(
GetFrameSinkId(), this);
}
}
Commit Message: Allocate a FrameSinkId for RenderWidgetHostViewAura in mus+ash
RenderWidgetHostViewChildFrame expects its parent to have a valid
FrameSinkId. Make sure RenderWidgetHostViewAura has a FrameSinkId even
if DelegatedFrameHost is not used (in mus+ash).
BUG=706553
TBR=jam@chromium.org
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2847253003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#468179}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::CreateDelegatedFrameHostClient() {
if (IsMus())
return;
if (!delegated_frame_host_client_) {
delegated_frame_host_client_ =
base::MakeUnique<DelegatedFrameHostClientAura>(this);
}
delegated_frame_host_ = base::MakeUnique<DelegatedFrameHost>(
frame_sink_id_, delegated_frame_host_client_.get());
if (renderer_compositor_frame_sink_) {
delegated_frame_host_->DidCreateNewRendererCompositorFrameSink(
renderer_compositor_frame_sink_);
}
UpdateNeedsBeginFramesInternal();
if (host_->delegate() && host_->delegate()->GetInputEventRouter()) {
host_->delegate()->GetInputEventRouter()->AddFrameSinkIdOwner(
GetFrameSinkId(), this);
}
}
| 172,233 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void uwbd_start(struct uwb_rc *rc)
{
rc->uwbd.task = kthread_run(uwbd, rc, "uwbd");
if (rc->uwbd.task == NULL)
printk(KERN_ERR "UWB: Cannot start management daemon; "
"UWB won't work\n");
else
rc->uwbd.pid = rc->uwbd.task->pid;
}
Commit Message: uwb: properly check kthread_run return value
uwbd_start() calls kthread_run() and checks that the return value is
not NULL. But the return value is not NULL in case kthread_run() fails,
it takes the form of ERR_PTR(-EINTR).
Use IS_ERR() instead.
Also add a check to uwbd_stop().
Signed-off-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void uwbd_start(struct uwb_rc *rc)
{
struct task_struct *task = kthread_run(uwbd, rc, "uwbd");
if (IS_ERR(task)) {
rc->uwbd.task = NULL;
printk(KERN_ERR "UWB: Cannot start management daemon; "
"UWB won't work\n");
} else {
rc->uwbd.task = task;
rc->uwbd.pid = rc->uwbd.task->pid;
}
}
| 167,685 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cib_timeout_handler(gpointer data)
{
struct timer_rec_s *timer = data;
timer_expired = TRUE;
crm_err("Call %d timed out after %ds", timer->call_id, timer->timeout);
/* Always return TRUE, never remove the handler
* We do that after the while-loop in cib_native_perform_op()
*/
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: High: core: Internal tls api improvements for reuse with future LRMD tls backend.
CWE ID: CWE-399 | cib_timeout_handler(gpointer data)
| 166,154 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ServiceWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::WorkerReadyForInspection(
blink::mojom::DevToolsAgentAssociatedPtrInfo devtools_agent_ptr_info) {
DCHECK_EQ(WORKER_NOT_READY, state_);
state_ = WORKER_READY;
agent_ptr_.Bind(std::move(devtools_agent_ptr_info));
if (!sessions().empty()) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&SetDevToolsAttachedOnIO,
context_weak_, version_id_, true));
}
RenderProcessHost* host = RenderProcessHost::FromID(worker_process_id_);
for (DevToolsSession* session : sessions()) {
session->SetRenderer(host, nullptr);
session->AttachToAgent(agent_ptr_);
}
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void ServiceWorkerDevToolsAgentHost::WorkerReadyForInspection(
blink::mojom::DevToolsAgentAssociatedPtrInfo devtools_agent_ptr_info) {
DCHECK_EQ(WORKER_NOT_READY, state_);
state_ = WORKER_READY;
agent_ptr_.Bind(std::move(devtools_agent_ptr_info));
if (!sessions().empty()) {
BrowserThread::PostTask(BrowserThread::IO, FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&SetDevToolsAttachedOnIO,
context_weak_, version_id_, true));
}
for (DevToolsSession* session : sessions()) {
session->SetRenderer(worker_process_id_, nullptr);
session->AttachToAgent(agent_ptr_);
}
}
| 172,785 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
void *value, size_t size)
{
char *command, *args = value;
size_t arg_size;
int error;
if (size == 0)
return -EINVAL;
/* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requires that
* the buffer must be null terminated or have size <= PAGE_SIZE -1
* so that AppArmor can null terminate them
*/
if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
if (size == PAGE_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
args[size] = '\0';
}
/* task can only write its own attributes */
if (current != task)
return -EACCES;
args = value;
args = strim(args);
command = strsep(&args, " ");
if (!args)
return -EINVAL;
args = skip_spaces(args);
if (!*args)
return -EINVAL;
arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value);
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
!AA_DO_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
AA_DO_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
!AA_DO_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
AA_DO_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "permipc") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_permipc(args);
} else {
struct common_audit_data sa;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
sa.aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
sa.aad.info = name;
sa.aad.error = -EINVAL;
return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED, NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
&sa, NULL);
}
} else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
!AA_DO_TEST);
} else {
/* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!error)
error = size;
return error;
}
Commit Message: AppArmor: fix oops in apparmor_setprocattr
When invalid parameters are passed to apparmor_setprocattr a NULL deref
oops occurs when it tries to record an audit message. This is because
it is passing NULL for the profile parameter for aa_audit. But aa_audit
now requires that the profile passed is not NULL.
Fix this by passing the current profile on the task that is trying to
setprocattr.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@ubuntu.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static int apparmor_setprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,
void *value, size_t size)
{
char *command, *args = value;
size_t arg_size;
int error;
if (size == 0)
return -EINVAL;
/* args points to a PAGE_SIZE buffer, AppArmor requires that
* the buffer must be null terminated or have size <= PAGE_SIZE -1
* so that AppArmor can null terminate them
*/
if (args[size - 1] != '\0') {
if (size == PAGE_SIZE)
return -EINVAL;
args[size] = '\0';
}
/* task can only write its own attributes */
if (current != task)
return -EACCES;
args = value;
args = strim(args);
command = strsep(&args, " ");
if (!args)
return -EINVAL;
args = skip_spaces(args);
if (!*args)
return -EINVAL;
arg_size = size - (args - (char *) value);
if (strcmp(name, "current") == 0) {
if (strcmp(command, "changehat") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
!AA_DO_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "permhat") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changehat(args, arg_size,
AA_DO_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "changeprofile") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
!AA_DO_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "permprofile") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, !AA_ONEXEC,
AA_DO_TEST);
} else if (strcmp(command, "permipc") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_permipc(args);
} else {
struct common_audit_data sa;
COMMON_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&sa, NONE);
sa.aad.op = OP_SETPROCATTR;
sa.aad.info = name;
sa.aad.error = -EINVAL;
return aa_audit(AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED,
__aa_current_profile(), GFP_KERNEL,
&sa, NULL);
}
} else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0) {
error = aa_setprocattr_changeprofile(args, AA_ONEXEC,
!AA_DO_TEST);
} else {
/* only support the "current" and "exec" process attributes */
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!error)
error = size;
return error;
}
| 166,219 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static MagickPixelPacket **AcquirePixelThreadSet(const Image *images)
{
const Image
*next;
MagickPixelPacket
**pixels;
register ssize_t
i,
j;
size_t
columns,
number_threads;
number_threads=(size_t) GetMagickResourceLimit(ThreadResource);
pixels=(MagickPixelPacket **) AcquireQuantumMemory(number_threads,
sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (MagickPixelPacket **) NULL)
return((MagickPixelPacket **) NULL);
(void) memset(pixels,0,number_threads*sizeof(*pixels));
columns=images->columns;
for (next=images; next != (Image *) NULL; next=next->next)
columns=MagickMax(next->columns,columns);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) number_threads; i++)
{
pixels[i]=(MagickPixelPacket *) AcquireQuantumMemory(columns,
sizeof(**pixels));
if (pixels[i] == (MagickPixelPacket *) NULL)
return(DestroyPixelThreadSet(pixels));
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) columns; j++)
GetMagickPixelPacket(images,&pixels[i][j]);
}
return(pixels);
}
Commit Message: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1615
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static MagickPixelPacket **AcquirePixelThreadSet(const Image *images)
{
const Image
*next;
MagickPixelPacket
**pixels;
register ssize_t
i,
j;
size_t
columns,
rows;
rows=MagickMax(GetImageListLength(images),
(size_t) GetMagickResourceLimit(ThreadResource));
pixels=(MagickPixelPacket **) AcquireQuantumMemory(rows,sizeof(*pixels));
if (pixels == (MagickPixelPacket **) NULL)
return((MagickPixelPacket **) NULL);
columns=images->columns;
for (next=images; next != (Image *) NULL; next=next->next)
columns=MagickMax(next->columns,columns);
for (i=0; i < (ssize_t) rows; i++)
{
pixels[i]=(MagickPixelPacket *) AcquireQuantumMemory(columns,
sizeof(**pixels));
if (pixels[i] == (MagickPixelPacket *) NULL)
return(DestroyPixelThreadSet(pixels));
for (j=0; j < (ssize_t) columns; j++)
GetMagickPixelPacket(images,&pixels[i][j]);
}
return(pixels);
}
| 169,595 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void Document::InitContentSecurityPolicy(
ContentSecurityPolicy* csp,
const ContentSecurityPolicy* policy_to_inherit,
const ContentSecurityPolicy* previous_document_csp) {
SetContentSecurityPolicy(csp ? csp : ContentSecurityPolicy::Create());
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->BindToExecutionContext(this);
if (policy_to_inherit) {
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->CopyStateFrom(policy_to_inherit);
} else {
if (frame_) {
Frame* inherit_from = frame_->Tree().Parent()
? frame_->Tree().Parent()
: frame_->Client()->Opener();
if (inherit_from && frame_ != inherit_from) {
DCHECK(inherit_from->GetSecurityContext() &&
inherit_from->GetSecurityContext()->GetContentSecurityPolicy());
policy_to_inherit =
inherit_from->GetSecurityContext()->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
}
}
if (!policy_to_inherit)
policy_to_inherit = previous_document_csp;
if (policy_to_inherit &&
(url_.IsEmpty() || url_.ProtocolIsAbout() || url_.ProtocolIsData() ||
url_.ProtocolIs("blob") || url_.ProtocolIs("filesystem")))
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->CopyStateFrom(policy_to_inherit);
}
if (policy_to_inherit && IsPluginDocument())
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->CopyPluginTypesFrom(policy_to_inherit);
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void Document::InitContentSecurityPolicy(
void Document::InitContentSecurityPolicy(ContentSecurityPolicy* csp,
const Document* origin_document) {
SetContentSecurityPolicy(csp ? csp : ContentSecurityPolicy::Create());
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->BindToExecutionContext(this);
ContentSecurityPolicy* policy_to_inherit = nullptr;
if (origin_document)
policy_to_inherit = origin_document->GetContentSecurityPolicy();
// We should inherit the navigation initiator CSP if the document is loaded
// using a local-scheme url.
if (policy_to_inherit &&
(url_.IsEmpty() || url_.ProtocolIsAbout() || url_.ProtocolIsData() ||
url_.ProtocolIs("blob") || url_.ProtocolIs("filesystem"))) {
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->CopyStateFrom(policy_to_inherit);
}
if (IsPluginDocument()) {
// TODO(andypaicu): This should inherit the origin document's plugin types
// but because this could be a OOPIF document it might not have access.
// In this situation we fallback on using the parent/opener.
if (origin_document) {
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->CopyPluginTypesFrom(
origin_document->GetContentSecurityPolicy());
} else if (frame_) {
Frame* inherit_from = frame_->Tree().Parent()
? frame_->Tree().Parent()
: frame_->Client()->Opener();
if (inherit_from && frame_ != inherit_from) {
DCHECK(inherit_from->GetSecurityContext() &&
inherit_from->GetSecurityContext()->GetContentSecurityPolicy());
GetContentSecurityPolicy()->CopyPluginTypesFrom(
inherit_from->GetSecurityContext()->GetContentSecurityPolicy());
}
}
}
}
| 173,052 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool PlatformFontSkia::InitDefaultFont() {
if (g_default_font.Get())
return true;
bool success = false;
std::string family = kFallbackFontFamilyName;
int size_pixels = 12;
int style = Font::NORMAL;
Font::Weight weight = Font::Weight::NORMAL;
FontRenderParams params;
const SkiaFontDelegate* delegate = SkiaFontDelegate::instance();
if (delegate) {
delegate->GetDefaultFontDescription(&family, &size_pixels, &style, &weight,
¶ms);
} else if (default_font_description_) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
FontRenderParamsQuery query;
CHECK(FontList::ParseDescription(*default_font_description_,
&query.families, &query.style,
&query.pixel_size, &query.weight))
<< "Failed to parse font description " << *default_font_description_;
params = gfx::GetFontRenderParams(query, &family);
size_pixels = query.pixel_size;
style = query.style;
weight = query.weight;
#else
NOTREACHED();
#endif
}
sk_sp<SkTypeface> typeface =
CreateSkTypeface(style & Font::ITALIC, weight, &family, &success);
if (!success)
return false;
g_default_font.Get() = new PlatformFontSkia(
std::move(typeface), family, size_pixels, style, weight, params);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Take default system font size from PlatformFont
The default font returned by Skia should take the initial size from the
default value kDefaultBaseFontSize specified in PlatformFont.
R=robliao@chromium.org, asvitkine@chromium.org
CC=benck@google.com
Bug: 944227
Change-Id: I6b230b80c349abbe5968edb3cebdd6e89db4c4a6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1642738
Reviewed-by: Robert Liao <robliao@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexei Svitkine <asvitkine@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Etienne Bergeron <etienneb@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#666299}
CWE ID: CWE-862 | bool PlatformFontSkia::InitDefaultFont() {
if (g_default_font.Get())
return true;
bool success = false;
std::string family = kFallbackFontFamilyName;
int size_pixels = PlatformFont::kDefaultBaseFontSize;
int style = Font::NORMAL;
Font::Weight weight = Font::Weight::NORMAL;
FontRenderParams params;
const SkiaFontDelegate* delegate = SkiaFontDelegate::instance();
if (delegate) {
delegate->GetDefaultFontDescription(&family, &size_pixels, &style, &weight,
¶ms);
} else if (default_font_description_) {
#if defined(OS_CHROMEOS)
FontRenderParamsQuery query;
CHECK(FontList::ParseDescription(*default_font_description_,
&query.families, &query.style,
&query.pixel_size, &query.weight))
<< "Failed to parse font description " << *default_font_description_;
params = gfx::GetFontRenderParams(query, &family);
size_pixels = query.pixel_size;
style = query.style;
weight = query.weight;
#else
NOTREACHED();
#endif
}
sk_sp<SkTypeface> typeface =
CreateSkTypeface(style & Font::ITALIC, weight, &family, &success);
if (!success)
return false;
g_default_font.Get() = new PlatformFontSkia(
std::move(typeface), family, size_pixels, style, weight, params);
return true;
}
| 173,209 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::AdjustSurfaceProtection() {
bool surface_is_protected =
current_surface_ ||
!host_->is_hidden() ||
(current_surface_is_protected_ &&
(pending_thumbnail_tasks_ > 0 ||
current_surface_in_use_by_compositor_));
if (current_surface_is_protected_ == surface_is_protected)
return;
current_surface_is_protected_ = surface_is_protected;
++protection_state_id_;
if (!surface_route_id_ || !shared_surface_handle_.parent_gpu_process_id)
return;
RenderWidgetHostImpl::SendFrontSurfaceIsProtected(
surface_is_protected,
protection_state_id_,
surface_route_id_,
shared_surface_handle_.parent_gpu_process_id);
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::AdjustSurfaceProtection() {
void RenderWidgetHostViewAura::SetSurfaceNotInUseByCompositor(
scoped_refptr<ui::Texture>) {
}
| 171,376 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WebDevToolsAgentImpl::clearBrowserCookies()
{
m_client->clearBrowserCookies();
}
Commit Message: [4/4] Process clearBrowserCahce/cookies commands in browser.
BUG=366585
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/251183005
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@172984 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | void WebDevToolsAgentImpl::clearBrowserCookies()
| 171,349 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *frame)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
const AVPixFmtDescriptor *desc = av_pix_fmt_desc_get(inlink->format);
uint32_t plane_checksum[4] = {0}, checksum = 0;
int i, plane, vsub = desc->log2_chroma_h;
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && frame->data[plane]; plane++) {
int64_t linesize = av_image_get_linesize(frame->format, frame->width, plane);
uint8_t *data = frame->data[plane];
int h = plane == 1 || plane == 2 ? FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->h, vsub) : inlink->h;
if (linesize < 0)
return linesize;
for (i = 0; i < h; i++) {
plane_checksum[plane] = av_adler32_update(plane_checksum[plane], data, linesize);
checksum = av_adler32_update(checksum, data, linesize);
data += frame->linesize[plane];
}
}
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_INFO,
"n:%"PRId64" pts:%s pts_time:%s pos:%"PRId64" "
"fmt:%s sar:%d/%d s:%dx%d i:%c iskey:%d type:%c "
"checksum:%08X plane_checksum:[%08X",
inlink->frame_count,
av_ts2str(frame->pts), av_ts2timestr(frame->pts, &inlink->time_base), av_frame_get_pkt_pos(frame),
desc->name,
frame->sample_aspect_ratio.num, frame->sample_aspect_ratio.den,
frame->width, frame->height,
!frame->interlaced_frame ? 'P' : /* Progressive */
frame->top_field_first ? 'T' : 'B', /* Top / Bottom */
frame->key_frame,
av_get_picture_type_char(frame->pict_type),
checksum, plane_checksum[0]);
for (plane = 1; plane < 4 && frame->data[plane]; plane++)
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_INFO, " %08X", plane_checksum[plane]);
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_INFO, "]\n");
return ff_filter_frame(inlink->dst->outputs[0], frame);
}
Commit Message: avfilter: fix plane validity checks
Fixes out of array accesses
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int filter_frame(AVFilterLink *inlink, AVFrame *frame)
{
AVFilterContext *ctx = inlink->dst;
const AVPixFmtDescriptor *desc = av_pix_fmt_desc_get(inlink->format);
uint32_t plane_checksum[4] = {0}, checksum = 0;
int i, plane, vsub = desc->log2_chroma_h;
for (plane = 0; plane < 4 && frame->data[plane] && frame->linesize[plane]; plane++) {
int64_t linesize = av_image_get_linesize(frame->format, frame->width, plane);
uint8_t *data = frame->data[plane];
int h = plane == 1 || plane == 2 ? FF_CEIL_RSHIFT(inlink->h, vsub) : inlink->h;
if (linesize < 0)
return linesize;
for (i = 0; i < h; i++) {
plane_checksum[plane] = av_adler32_update(plane_checksum[plane], data, linesize);
checksum = av_adler32_update(checksum, data, linesize);
data += frame->linesize[plane];
}
}
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_INFO,
"n:%"PRId64" pts:%s pts_time:%s pos:%"PRId64" "
"fmt:%s sar:%d/%d s:%dx%d i:%c iskey:%d type:%c "
"checksum:%08X plane_checksum:[%08X",
inlink->frame_count,
av_ts2str(frame->pts), av_ts2timestr(frame->pts, &inlink->time_base), av_frame_get_pkt_pos(frame),
desc->name,
frame->sample_aspect_ratio.num, frame->sample_aspect_ratio.den,
frame->width, frame->height,
!frame->interlaced_frame ? 'P' : /* Progressive */
frame->top_field_first ? 'T' : 'B', /* Top / Bottom */
frame->key_frame,
av_get_picture_type_char(frame->pict_type),
checksum, plane_checksum[0]);
for (plane = 1; plane < 4 && frame->data[plane] && frame->linesize[plane]; plane++)
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_INFO, " %08X", plane_checksum[plane]);
av_log(ctx, AV_LOG_INFO, "]\n");
return ff_filter_frame(inlink->dst->outputs[0], frame);
}
| 166,007 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool MediaStreamDevicesController::IsRequestAllowedByDefault() const {
if (ShouldAlwaysAllowOrigin())
return true;
struct {
bool has_capability;
const char* policy_name;
const char* list_policy_name;
ContentSettingsType settings_type;
} device_checks[] = {
{ microphone_requested_, prefs::kAudioCaptureAllowed,
prefs::kAudioCaptureAllowedUrls, CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_MIC },
{ webcam_requested_, prefs::kVideoCaptureAllowed,
prefs::kVideoCaptureAllowedUrls,
CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_CAMERA },
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE(device_checks); ++i) {
if (!device_checks[i].has_capability)
continue;
DevicePolicy policy = GetDevicePolicy(device_checks[i].policy_name,
device_checks[i].list_policy_name);
if (policy == ALWAYS_DENY ||
(policy == POLICY_NOT_SET &&
profile_->GetHostContentSettingsMap()->GetContentSetting(
request_.security_origin, request_.security_origin,
device_checks[i].settings_type, NO_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER) !=
CONTENT_SETTING_ALLOW)) {
return false;
}
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Make the content setting for webcam/mic sticky for Pepper requests.
This makes the content setting sticky for webcam/mic requests from Pepper from non-https origins.
BUG=249335
R=xians@chromium.org, yzshen@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/17060006
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@206479 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | bool MediaStreamDevicesController::IsRequestAllowedByDefault() const {
if (ShouldAlwaysAllowOrigin())
return true;
struct {
bool has_capability;
const char* policy_name;
const char* list_policy_name;
ContentSettingsType settings_type;
} device_checks[] = {
{ microphone_requested_, prefs::kAudioCaptureAllowed,
prefs::kAudioCaptureAllowedUrls, CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_MIC },
{ webcam_requested_, prefs::kVideoCaptureAllowed,
prefs::kVideoCaptureAllowedUrls,
CONTENT_SETTINGS_TYPE_MEDIASTREAM_CAMERA },
};
for (size_t i = 0; i < ARRAYSIZE_UNSAFE(device_checks); ++i) {
if (!device_checks[i].has_capability)
continue;
DevicePolicy policy = GetDevicePolicy(device_checks[i].policy_name,
device_checks[i].list_policy_name);
if (policy == ALWAYS_DENY)
return false;
if (policy == POLICY_NOT_SET) {
// Only load content settings from secure origins unless it is a
// content::MEDIA_OPEN_DEVICE (Pepper) request.
if (!IsSchemeSecure() &&
request_.request_type != content::MEDIA_OPEN_DEVICE) {
return false;
}
if (profile_->GetHostContentSettingsMap()->GetContentSetting(
request_.security_origin, request_.security_origin,
device_checks[i].settings_type, NO_RESOURCE_IDENTIFIER) !=
CONTENT_SETTING_ALLOW) {
return false;
}
}
}
return true;
}
| 171,313 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: newkeys_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
struct sshcomp *comp;
struct sshenc *enc;
struct sshmac *mac;
struct newkeys *newkey = NULL;
size_t keylen, ivlen, maclen;
int r;
if ((newkey = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkey))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
enc = &newkey->enc;
mac = &newkey->mac;
comp = &newkey->comp;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &enc->name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get(b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&enc->enabled)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &enc->block_size)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->key, &keylen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->iv, &ivlen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &mac->name, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = mac_setup(mac, mac->name)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&mac->enabled)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &mac->key, &maclen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (maclen > mac->key_len) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
mac->key_len = maclen;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &comp->type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&comp->enabled)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &comp->name, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if (enc->name == NULL ||
cipher_by_name(enc->name) != enc->cipher) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
enc->key_len = keylen;
enc->iv_len = ivlen;
ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = newkey;
newkey = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
free(newkey);
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
Commit Message: Remove support for pre-authentication compression. Doing compression
early in the protocol probably seemed reasonable in the 1990s, but
today it's clearly a bad idea in terms of both cryptography (cf.
multiple compression oracle attacks in TLS) and attack surface.
Moreover, to support it across privilege-separation zlib needed
the assistance of a complex shared-memory manager that made the
required attack surface considerably larger.
Prompted by Guido Vranken pointing out a compiler-elided security
check in the shared memory manager found by Stack
(http://css.csail.mit.edu/stack/); ok deraadt@ markus@
NB. pre-auth authentication has been disabled by default in sshd
for >10 years.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | newkeys_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
struct sshcomp *comp;
struct sshenc *enc;
struct sshmac *mac;
struct newkeys *newkey = NULL;
size_t keylen, ivlen, maclen;
int r;
if ((newkey = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkey))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
enc = &newkey->enc;
mac = &newkey->mac;
comp = &newkey->comp;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &enc->name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get(b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&enc->enabled)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &enc->block_size)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->key, &keylen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->iv, &ivlen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &mac->name, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = mac_setup(mac, mac->name)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&mac->enabled)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &mac->key, &maclen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (maclen > mac->key_len) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
mac->key_len = maclen;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &comp->type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &comp->name, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if (enc->name == NULL ||
cipher_by_name(enc->name) != enc->cipher) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
enc->key_len = keylen;
enc->iv_len = ivlen;
ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = newkey;
newkey = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
free(newkey);
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
| 168,650 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void InputMethodChangedHandler(
void* object,
const chromeos::InputMethodDescriptor& current_input_method) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
InputMethodLibraryImpl* input_method_library =
static_cast<InputMethodLibraryImpl*>(object);
input_method_library->ChangeCurrentInputMethod(current_input_method);
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | static void InputMethodChangedHandler(
// IBusController override.
virtual void OnCurrentInputMethodChanged(
const input_method::InputMethodDescriptor& current_input_method) {
if (!BrowserThread::CurrentlyOn(BrowserThread::UI)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Not on UI thread";
return;
}
ChangeCurrentInputMethod(current_input_method);
}
| 170,495 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ssize_t socket_write(const socket_t *socket, const void *buf, size_t count) {
assert(socket != NULL);
assert(buf != NULL);
return send(socket->fd, buf, count, MSG_DONTWAIT);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | ssize_t socket_write(const socket_t *socket, const void *buf, size_t count) {
assert(socket != NULL);
assert(buf != NULL);
return TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(socket->fd, buf, count, MSG_DONTWAIT));
}
| 173,487 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int re_yylex_init_extra(YY_EXTRA_TYPE yy_user_defined,yyscan_t* ptr_yy_globals )
{
struct yyguts_t dummy_yyguts;
re_yyset_extra (yy_user_defined, &dummy_yyguts);
if (ptr_yy_globals == NULL){
errno = EINVAL;
return 1;
}
*ptr_yy_globals = (yyscan_t) re_yyalloc ( sizeof( struct yyguts_t ), &dummy_yyguts );
if (*ptr_yy_globals == NULL){
errno = ENOMEM;
return 1;
}
/* By setting to 0xAA, we expose bugs in
yy_init_globals. Leave at 0x00 for releases. */
memset(*ptr_yy_globals,0x00,sizeof(struct yyguts_t));
re_yyset_extra (yy_user_defined, *ptr_yy_globals);
return yy_init_globals ( *ptr_yy_globals );
}
Commit Message: re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust (#586)
* Add test for issue #503
* re_lexer: Make reading escape sequences more robust
This commit fixes parsing incomplete escape sequences at the end of a
regular expression and parsing things like \xxy (invalid hex digits)
which before were silently turned into (char)255.
Close #503
* Update re_lexer.c
CWE ID: CWE-476 | int re_yylex_init_extra(YY_EXTRA_TYPE yy_user_defined,yyscan_t* ptr_yy_globals )
{
struct yyguts_t dummy_yyguts;
re_yyset_extra (yy_user_defined, &dummy_yyguts);
if (ptr_yy_globals == NULL){
errno = EINVAL;
return 1;
}
*ptr_yy_globals = (yyscan_t) re_yyalloc ( sizeof( struct yyguts_t ), &dummy_yyguts );
if (*ptr_yy_globals == NULL){
errno = ENOMEM;
return 1;
}
/* By setting to 0xAA, we expose bugs in
yy_init_globals. Leave at 0x00 for releases. */
memset(*ptr_yy_globals,0x00,sizeof(struct yyguts_t));
re_yyset_extra (yy_user_defined, *ptr_yy_globals);
return yy_init_globals ( *ptr_yy_globals );
}
| 168,485 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void WorkerProcessLauncher::Core::StopWorker() {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
if (launch_success_timer_->IsRunning()) {
launch_success_timer_->Stop();
launch_backoff_.InformOfRequest(false);
}
self_ = this;
ipc_enabled_ = false;
if (process_watcher_.GetWatchedObject() != NULL) {
launcher_delegate_->KillProcess(CONTROL_C_EXIT);
return;
}
DCHECK(process_watcher_.GetWatchedObject() == NULL);
ipc_error_timer_->Stop();
process_exit_event_.Close();
if (stopping_) {
ipc_error_timer_.reset();
launch_timer_.reset();
self_ = NULL;
return;
}
self_ = NULL;
DWORD exit_code = launcher_delegate_->GetExitCode();
if (kMinPermanentErrorExitCode <= exit_code &&
exit_code <= kMaxPermanentErrorExitCode) {
worker_delegate_->OnPermanentError();
return;
}
launch_timer_->Start(FROM_HERE, launch_backoff_.GetTimeUntilRelease(),
this, &Core::LaunchWorker);
}
Commit Message: Validate and report peer's PID to WorkerProcessIpcDelegate so it will be able to duplicate handles to and from the worker process.
As a side effect WorkerProcessLauncher::Delegate is now responsible for retrieving the client's PID and deciding whether a launch failed due to a permanent error condition.
BUG=134694
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11143025
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@162778 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void WorkerProcessLauncher::Core::StopWorker() {
DCHECK(caller_task_runner_->BelongsToCurrentThread());
// Keep the object alive in case one of delegates decides to delete |this|.
scoped_refptr<Core> self = this;
if (launch_success_timer_->IsRunning()) {
launch_success_timer_->Stop();
launch_backoff_.InformOfRequest(false);
}
ipc_enabled_ = false;
if (process_watcher_.GetWatchedObject() != NULL) {
launcher_delegate_->KillProcess(CONTROL_C_EXIT);
// Wait until the process is actually stopped if the caller keeps
// a reference to |this|. Otherwise terminate everything right now - there
// won't be a second chance.
if (!stopping_)
return;
process_watcher_.StopWatching();
}
ipc_error_timer_->Stop();
process_exit_event_.Close();
if (stopping_) {
ipc_error_timer_.reset();
launch_timer_.reset();
return;
}
if (launcher_delegate_->IsPermanentError(launch_backoff_.failure_count())) {
if (!stopping_)
worker_delegate_->OnPermanentError();
} else {
// Schedule the next attempt to launch the worker process.
launch_timer_->Start(FROM_HERE, launch_backoff_.GetTimeUntilRelease(),
this, &Core::LaunchWorker);
}
}
| 171,549 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void grubfs_free (GrubFS *gf) {
if (gf) {
if (gf->file && gf->file->device)
free (gf->file->device->disk);
free (gf->file);
free (gf);
}
}
Commit Message: Fix #7723 - crash in ext2 GRUB code because of variable size array in stack
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void grubfs_free (GrubFS *gf) {
if (gf) {
if (gf->file && gf->file->device) {
free (gf->file->device->disk);
}
free (gf->file);
free (gf);
}
}
| 168,090 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int compile_search(struct Context *ctx, const struct Pattern *pat, struct Buffer *buf)
{
if (do_search(pat, 0) == 0)
return 0;
if (pat->not)
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "NOT ");
if (pat->child)
{
int clauses;
clauses = do_search(pat->child, 1);
if (clauses > 0)
{
const struct Pattern *clause = pat->child;
mutt_buffer_addch(buf, '(');
while (clauses)
{
if (do_search(clause, 0))
{
if (pat->op == MUTT_OR && clauses > 1)
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "OR ");
clauses--;
if (compile_search(ctx, clause, buf) < 0)
return -1;
if (clauses)
mutt_buffer_addch(buf, ' ');
}
clause = clause->next;
}
mutt_buffer_addch(buf, ')');
}
}
else
{
char term[STRING];
char *delim = NULL;
switch (pat->op)
{
case MUTT_HEADER:
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "HEADER ");
/* extract header name */
delim = strchr(pat->p.str, ':');
if (!delim)
{
mutt_error(_("Header search without header name: %s"), pat->p.str);
return -1;
}
*delim = '\0';
imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), pat->p.str);
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term);
mutt_buffer_addch(buf, ' ');
/* and field */
*delim = ':';
delim++;
SKIPWS(delim);
imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), delim);
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term);
break;
case MUTT_BODY:
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "BODY ");
imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), pat->p.str);
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term);
break;
case MUTT_WHOLE_MSG:
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "TEXT ");
imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), pat->p.str);
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term);
break;
case MUTT_SERVERSEARCH:
{
struct ImapData *idata = ctx->data;
if (!mutt_bit_isset(idata->capabilities, X_GM_EXT1))
{
mutt_error(_("Server-side custom search not supported: %s"), pat->p.str);
return -1;
}
}
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "X-GM-RAW ");
imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), pat->p.str);
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term);
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: quote imap strings more carefully
Co-authored-by: JerikoOne <jeriko.one@gmx.us>
CWE ID: CWE-77 | static int compile_search(struct Context *ctx, const struct Pattern *pat, struct Buffer *buf)
{
if (do_search(pat, 0) == 0)
return 0;
if (pat->not)
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "NOT ");
if (pat->child)
{
int clauses;
clauses = do_search(pat->child, 1);
if (clauses > 0)
{
const struct Pattern *clause = pat->child;
mutt_buffer_addch(buf, '(');
while (clauses)
{
if (do_search(clause, 0))
{
if (pat->op == MUTT_OR && clauses > 1)
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "OR ");
clauses--;
if (compile_search(ctx, clause, buf) < 0)
return -1;
if (clauses)
mutt_buffer_addch(buf, ' ');
}
clause = clause->next;
}
mutt_buffer_addch(buf, ')');
}
}
else
{
char term[STRING];
char *delim = NULL;
switch (pat->op)
{
case MUTT_HEADER:
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "HEADER ");
/* extract header name */
delim = strchr(pat->p.str, ':');
if (!delim)
{
mutt_error(_("Header search without header name: %s"), pat->p.str);
return -1;
}
*delim = '\0';
imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), pat->p.str, false);
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term);
mutt_buffer_addch(buf, ' ');
/* and field */
*delim = ':';
delim++;
SKIPWS(delim);
imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), delim, false);
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term);
break;
case MUTT_BODY:
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "BODY ");
imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), pat->p.str, false);
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term);
break;
case MUTT_WHOLE_MSG:
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "TEXT ");
imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), pat->p.str, false);
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term);
break;
case MUTT_SERVERSEARCH:
{
struct ImapData *idata = ctx->data;
if (!mutt_bit_isset(idata->capabilities, X_GM_EXT1))
{
mutt_error(_("Server-side custom search not supported: %s"), pat->p.str);
return -1;
}
}
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, "X-GM-RAW ");
imap_quote_string(term, sizeof(term), pat->p.str, false);
mutt_buffer_addstr(buf, term);
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
| 169,135 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ReleaseAccelerator(ui::KeyboardCode keycode,
bool shift_pressed,
bool ctrl_pressed,
bool alt_pressed)
: ui::Accelerator(keycode, shift_pressed, ctrl_pressed, alt_pressed) {
set_type(ui::ET_KEY_RELEASED);
}
Commit Message: accelerators: Remove deprecated Accelerator ctor that takes booleans.
BUG=128242
R=ben@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/10399085
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@137957 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | ReleaseAccelerator(ui::KeyboardCode keycode,
ReleaseAccelerator(ui::KeyboardCode keycode, int modifiers)
: ui::Accelerator(keycode, modifiers) {
set_type(ui::ET_KEY_RELEASED);
}
| 170,905 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void on_read(h2o_socket_t *sock, int status)
{
h2o_http2_conn_t *conn = sock->data;
if (status != 0) {
h2o_socket_read_stop(conn->sock);
close_connection(conn);
return;
}
update_idle_timeout(conn);
parse_input(conn);
/* write immediately, if there is no write in flight and if pending write exists */
if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)) {
h2o_timeout_unlink(&conn->_write.timeout_entry);
do_emit_writereq(conn);
}
}
Commit Message: h2: use after free on premature connection close #920
lib/http2/connection.c:on_read() calls parse_input(), which might free
`conn`. It does so in particular if the connection preface isn't
the expected one in expect_preface(). `conn` is then used after the free
in `if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)`.
We fix this by adding a return value to close_connection that returns a
negative value if `conn` has been free'd and can't be used anymore.
Credits for finding the bug to Tim Newsham.
CWE ID: | static void on_read(h2o_socket_t *sock, int status)
{
h2o_http2_conn_t *conn = sock->data;
if (status != 0) {
h2o_socket_read_stop(conn->sock);
close_connection(conn);
return;
}
update_idle_timeout(conn);
if (parse_input(conn) != 0)
return;
/* write immediately, if there is no write in flight and if pending write exists */
if (h2o_timeout_is_linked(&conn->_write.timeout_entry)) {
h2o_timeout_unlink(&conn->_write.timeout_entry);
do_emit_writereq(conn);
}
}
| 167,226 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
{
pitem *item;
item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
if (item)
{
/* Check if epoch is current. */
if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
return(1); /* Nothing to do. */
/* Process all the records. */
while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q))
{
dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
return(0);
dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
s->s3->rrec.seq_num);
}
}
/* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
* have been processed */
s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
return(1);
}
Commit Message: A memory leak can occur in dtls1_buffer_record if either of the calls to
ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a
malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate
record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should
be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue.
Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being
recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected.
Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in
dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker
could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch,
eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion.
Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial
analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by
Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team.
CVE-2015-0206
Reviewed-by: Dr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s)
{
pitem *item;
item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q);
if (item)
{
/* Check if epoch is current. */
if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch)
return(1); /* Nothing to do. */
/* Process all the records. */
while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q))
{
dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s);
if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s))
return(0);
if(dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds),
s->s3->rrec.seq_num)<0)
return -1;
}
}
/* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records
* have been processed */
s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch;
s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1;
return(1);
}
| 166,747 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: _asn1_extract_der_octet (asn1_node node, const unsigned char *der,
int der_len, unsigned flags)
{
int len2, len3;
int counter, counter_end;
int result;
len2 = asn1_get_length_der (der, der_len, &len3);
if (len2 < -1)
return ASN1_DER_ERROR;
counter = len3 + 1;
DECR_LEN(der_len, len3);
if (len2 == -1)
counter_end = der_len - 2;
else
counter_end = der_len;
while (counter < counter_end)
{
DECR_LEN(der_len, 1);
if (len2 >= 0)
{
DECR_LEN(der_len, len2+len3);
_asn1_append_value (node, der + counter + len3, len2);
}
else
{ /* indefinite */
DECR_LEN(der_len, len3);
result =
_asn1_extract_der_octet (node, der + counter + len3,
der_len, flags);
if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
return result;
len2 = 0;
}
counter += len2 + len3 + 1;
}
return ASN1_SUCCESS;
cleanup:
return result;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | _asn1_extract_der_octet (asn1_node node, const unsigned char *der,
int der_len, unsigned flags)
{
int len2, len3;
int counter, counter_end;
int result;
len2 = asn1_get_length_der (der, der_len, &len3);
if (len2 < -1)
return ASN1_DER_ERROR;
counter = len3 + 1;
DECR_LEN(der_len, len3);
if (len2 == -1)
{
if (der_len < 2)
return ASN1_DER_ERROR;
counter_end = der_len - 2;
}
else
counter_end = der_len;
if (counter_end < counter)
return ASN1_DER_ERROR;
while (counter < counter_end)
{
DECR_LEN(der_len, 1);
if (len2 >= 0)
{
DECR_LEN(der_len, len2+len3);
_asn1_append_value (node, der + counter + len3, len2);
}
else
{ /* indefinite */
DECR_LEN(der_len, len3);
result =
_asn1_extract_der_octet (node, der + counter + len3,
der_len, flags);
if (result != ASN1_SUCCESS)
return result;
len2 = 0;
}
counter += len2 + len3 + 1;
}
return ASN1_SUCCESS;
cleanup:
return result;
}
| 165,077 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: matchCurrentInput(
const InString *input, int pos, const widechar *passInstructions, int passIC) {
int k;
int kk = pos;
for (k = passIC + 2; k < passIC + 2 + passInstructions[passIC + 1]; k++)
if (input->chars[kk] == ENDSEGMENT || passInstructions[k] != input->chars[kk++])
return 0;
return 1;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow
Fixes #635
Thanks to HongxuChen for reporting it
CWE ID: CWE-125 | matchCurrentInput(
const InString *input, int pos, const widechar *passInstructions, int passIC) {
int k;
int kk = pos;
for (k = passIC + 2;
((k < passIC + 2 + passInstructions[passIC + 1]) && (kk < input->length));
k++)
if (input->chars[kk] == ENDSEGMENT || passInstructions[k] != input->chars[kk++])
return 0;
return 1;
}
| 169,022 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BlobDataHandle::BlobDataHandle(PassOwnPtr<BlobData> data, long long size)
{
UNUSED_PARAM(size);
m_internalURL = BlobURL::createInternalURL();
ThreadableBlobRegistry::registerBlobURL(m_internalURL, data);
}
Commit Message: Remove BlobRegistry indirection since there is only one implementation.
BUG=
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/15851008
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@152746 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: | BlobDataHandle::BlobDataHandle(PassOwnPtr<BlobData> data, long long size)
{
UNUSED_PARAM(size);
m_internalURL = BlobURL::createInternalURL();
BlobRegistry::registerBlobURL(m_internalURL, data);
}
| 170,694 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DrawingBuffer::DrawingBuffer(
std::unique_ptr<WebGraphicsContext3DProvider> context_provider,
std::unique_ptr<Extensions3DUtil> extensions_util,
Client* client,
bool discard_framebuffer_supported,
bool want_alpha_channel,
bool premultiplied_alpha,
PreserveDrawingBuffer preserve,
WebGLVersion web_gl_version,
bool want_depth,
bool want_stencil,
ChromiumImageUsage chromium_image_usage,
const CanvasColorParams& color_params)
: client_(client),
preserve_drawing_buffer_(preserve),
web_gl_version_(web_gl_version),
context_provider_(WTF::WrapUnique(new WebGraphicsContext3DProviderWrapper(
std::move(context_provider)))),
gl_(this->ContextProvider()->ContextGL()),
extensions_util_(std::move(extensions_util)),
discard_framebuffer_supported_(discard_framebuffer_supported),
want_alpha_channel_(want_alpha_channel),
premultiplied_alpha_(premultiplied_alpha),
software_rendering_(this->ContextProvider()->IsSoftwareRendering()),
want_depth_(want_depth),
want_stencil_(want_stencil),
color_space_(color_params.GetGfxColorSpace()),
chromium_image_usage_(chromium_image_usage) {
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT0("test_gpu", "DrawingBufferCreation",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_GLOBAL);
}
Commit Message: Reset ES3 pixel pack parameters and PIXEL_PACK_BUFFER binding in DrawingBuffer before ReadPixels() and recover them later.
BUG=740603
TEST=new conformance test
R=kbr@chromium.org,piman@chromium.org
Change-Id: I3ea54c6cc34f34e249f7c8b9f792d93c5e1958f4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/570840
Reviewed-by: Antoine Labour <piman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Zhenyao Mo <zmo@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#486518}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | DrawingBuffer::DrawingBuffer(
std::unique_ptr<WebGraphicsContext3DProvider> context_provider,
std::unique_ptr<Extensions3DUtil> extensions_util,
Client* client,
bool discard_framebuffer_supported,
bool want_alpha_channel,
bool premultiplied_alpha,
PreserveDrawingBuffer preserve,
WebGLVersion webgl_version,
bool want_depth,
bool want_stencil,
ChromiumImageUsage chromium_image_usage,
const CanvasColorParams& color_params)
: client_(client),
preserve_drawing_buffer_(preserve),
webgl_version_(webgl_version),
context_provider_(WTF::WrapUnique(new WebGraphicsContext3DProviderWrapper(
std::move(context_provider)))),
gl_(this->ContextProvider()->ContextGL()),
extensions_util_(std::move(extensions_util)),
discard_framebuffer_supported_(discard_framebuffer_supported),
want_alpha_channel_(want_alpha_channel),
premultiplied_alpha_(premultiplied_alpha),
software_rendering_(this->ContextProvider()->IsSoftwareRendering()),
want_depth_(want_depth),
want_stencil_(want_stencil),
color_space_(color_params.GetGfxColorSpace()),
chromium_image_usage_(chromium_image_usage) {
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT0("test_gpu", "DrawingBufferCreation",
TRACE_EVENT_SCOPE_GLOBAL);
}
| 172,291 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, creds->uid);
kgid_t gid = make_kgid(cred->user_ns, creds->gid);
if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid))
return -EINVAL;
if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) || nsown_capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) ||
uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) ||
gid_eq(gid, cred->sgid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))) {
return 0;
}
return -EPERM;
}
Commit Message: scm: Require CAP_SYS_ADMIN over the current pidns to spoof pids.
Don't allow spoofing pids over unix domain sockets in the corner
cases where a user has created a user namespace but has not yet
created a pid namespace.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
kuid_t uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, creds->uid);
kgid_t gid = make_kgid(cred->user_ns, creds->gid);
if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid))
return -EINVAL;
if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) ||
ns_capable(current->nsproxy->pid_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) ||
uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETUID)) &&
((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) ||
gid_eq(gid, cred->sgid)) || nsown_capable(CAP_SETGID))) {
return 0;
}
return -EPERM;
}
| 166,093 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PresentationConnectionProxy::DidChangeState(
content::PresentationConnectionState state) {
if (state == content::PRESENTATION_CONNECTION_STATE_CONNECTED) {
source_connection_->didChangeState(
blink::WebPresentationConnectionState::Connected);
} else if (state == content::PRESENTATION_CONNECTION_STATE_CLOSED) {
source_connection_->didChangeState(
blink::WebPresentationConnectionState::Closed);
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
}
Commit Message: [Presentation API] Add layout test for connection.close() and fix test failures
Add layout test.
1-UA connection.close() hits NOTREACHED() in PresentationConnection::didChangeState(). Use PresentationConnection::didClose() instead.
BUG=697719
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2730123003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#455225}
CWE ID: | void PresentationConnectionProxy::DidChangeState(
content::PresentationConnectionState state) {
if (state == content::PRESENTATION_CONNECTION_STATE_CONNECTED) {
source_connection_->didChangeState(
blink::WebPresentationConnectionState::Connected);
} else if (state == content::PRESENTATION_CONNECTION_STATE_CLOSED) {
source_connection_->didClose();
} else {
NOTREACHED();
}
}
| 172,044 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ff_combine_frame(ParseContext *pc, int next, const uint8_t **buf, int *buf_size)
{
if(pc->overread){
av_dlog(NULL, "overread %d, state:%X next:%d index:%d o_index:%d\n",
pc->overread, pc->state, next, pc->index, pc->overread_index);
av_dlog(NULL, "%X %X %X %X\n", (*buf)[0], (*buf)[1], (*buf)[2], (*buf)[3]);
}
/* Copy overread bytes from last frame into buffer. */
for(; pc->overread>0; pc->overread--){
pc->buffer[pc->index++]= pc->buffer[pc->overread_index++];
}
/* flush remaining if EOF */
if(!*buf_size && next == END_NOT_FOUND){
next= 0;
}
pc->last_index= pc->index;
/* copy into buffer end return */
if(next == END_NOT_FOUND){
void* new_buffer = av_fast_realloc(pc->buffer, &pc->buffer_size, (*buf_size) + pc->index + FF_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
if(!new_buffer)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
pc->buffer = new_buffer;
memcpy(&pc->buffer[pc->index], *buf, *buf_size);
pc->index += *buf_size;
return -1;
}
*buf_size=
pc->overread_index= pc->index + next;
/* append to buffer */
if(pc->index){
void* new_buffer = av_fast_realloc(pc->buffer, &pc->buffer_size, next + pc->index + FF_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
if(!new_buffer)
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
pc->buffer = new_buffer;
if (next > -FF_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE)
memcpy(&pc->buffer[pc->index], *buf,
next + FF_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
pc->index = 0;
*buf= pc->buffer;
}
/* store overread bytes */
for(;next < 0; next++){
pc->state = (pc->state<<8) | pc->buffer[pc->last_index + next];
pc->state64 = (pc->state64<<8) | pc->buffer[pc->last_index + next];
pc->overread++;
}
if(pc->overread){
av_dlog(NULL, "overread %d, state:%X next:%d index:%d o_index:%d\n",
pc->overread, pc->state, next, pc->index, pc->overread_index);
av_dlog(NULL, "%X %X %X %X\n", (*buf)[0], (*buf)[1],(*buf)[2],(*buf)[3]);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/parser: reset indexes on realloc failure
Fixes Ticket2982
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michaelni@gmx.at>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int ff_combine_frame(ParseContext *pc, int next, const uint8_t **buf, int *buf_size)
{
if(pc->overread){
av_dlog(NULL, "overread %d, state:%X next:%d index:%d o_index:%d\n",
pc->overread, pc->state, next, pc->index, pc->overread_index);
av_dlog(NULL, "%X %X %X %X\n", (*buf)[0], (*buf)[1], (*buf)[2], (*buf)[3]);
}
/* Copy overread bytes from last frame into buffer. */
for(; pc->overread>0; pc->overread--){
pc->buffer[pc->index++]= pc->buffer[pc->overread_index++];
}
/* flush remaining if EOF */
if(!*buf_size && next == END_NOT_FOUND){
next= 0;
}
pc->last_index= pc->index;
/* copy into buffer end return */
if(next == END_NOT_FOUND){
void* new_buffer = av_fast_realloc(pc->buffer, &pc->buffer_size, (*buf_size) + pc->index + FF_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
if(!new_buffer) {
pc->index = 0;
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
pc->buffer = new_buffer;
memcpy(&pc->buffer[pc->index], *buf, *buf_size);
pc->index += *buf_size;
return -1;
}
*buf_size=
pc->overread_index= pc->index + next;
/* append to buffer */
if(pc->index){
void* new_buffer = av_fast_realloc(pc->buffer, &pc->buffer_size, next + pc->index + FF_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
if(!new_buffer) {
pc->overread_index =
pc->index = 0;
return AVERROR(ENOMEM);
}
pc->buffer = new_buffer;
if (next > -FF_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE)
memcpy(&pc->buffer[pc->index], *buf,
next + FF_INPUT_BUFFER_PADDING_SIZE);
pc->index = 0;
*buf= pc->buffer;
}
/* store overread bytes */
for(;next < 0; next++){
pc->state = (pc->state<<8) | pc->buffer[pc->last_index + next];
pc->state64 = (pc->state64<<8) | pc->buffer[pc->last_index + next];
pc->overread++;
}
if(pc->overread){
av_dlog(NULL, "overread %d, state:%X next:%d index:%d o_index:%d\n",
pc->overread, pc->state, next, pc->index, pc->overread_index);
av_dlog(NULL, "%X %X %X %X\n", (*buf)[0], (*buf)[1],(*buf)[2],(*buf)[3]);
}
return 0;
}
| 165,914 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static OPCODE_DESC* avr_op_analyze(RAnal *anal, RAnalOp *op, ut64 addr, const ut8 *buf, int len, CPU_MODEL *cpu) {
OPCODE_DESC *opcode_desc;
ut16 ins = (buf[1] << 8) | buf[0];
int fail;
char *t;
memset (op, 0, sizeof (RAnalOp));
op->ptr = UT64_MAX;
op->val = UT64_MAX;
op->jump = UT64_MAX;
r_strbuf_init (&op->esil);
for (opcode_desc = opcodes; opcode_desc->handler; opcode_desc++) {
if ((ins & opcode_desc->mask) == opcode_desc->selector) {
fail = 0;
op->cycles = opcode_desc->cycles;
op->size = opcode_desc->size;
op->type = opcode_desc->type;
op->jump = UT64_MAX;
op->fail = UT64_MAX;
op->addr = addr;
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "");
opcode_desc->handler (anal, op, buf, len, &fail, cpu);
if (fail) {
goto INVALID_OP;
}
if (op->cycles <= 0) {
opcode_desc->cycles = 2;
}
op->nopcode = (op->type == R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_UNK);
t = r_strbuf_get (&op->esil);
if (t && strlen (t) > 1) {
t += strlen (t) - 1;
if (*t == ',') {
*t = '\0';
}
}
return opcode_desc;
}
}
if ((ins & 0xff00) == 0xff00 && (ins & 0xf) > 7) {
goto INVALID_OP;
}
INVALID_OP:
op->family = R_ANAL_OP_FAMILY_UNKNOWN;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_UNK;
op->addr = addr;
op->fail = UT64_MAX;
op->jump = UT64_MAX;
op->ptr = UT64_MAX;
op->val = UT64_MAX;
op->nopcode = 1;
op->cycles = 1;
op->size = 2;
r_strbuf_set (&op->esil, "1,$");
return NULL;
}
Commit Message: Fix oobread in avr
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static OPCODE_DESC* avr_op_analyze(RAnal *anal, RAnalOp *op, ut64 addr, const ut8 *buf, int len, CPU_MODEL *cpu) {
OPCODE_DESC *opcode_desc;
if (len < 2) {
return NULL;
}
ut16 ins = (buf[1] << 8) | buf[0];
int fail;
char *t;
memset (op, 0, sizeof (RAnalOp));
op->ptr = UT64_MAX;
op->val = UT64_MAX;
op->jump = UT64_MAX;
r_strbuf_init (&op->esil);
for (opcode_desc = opcodes; opcode_desc->handler; opcode_desc++) {
if ((ins & opcode_desc->mask) == opcode_desc->selector) {
fail = 0;
op->cycles = opcode_desc->cycles;
op->size = opcode_desc->size;
op->type = opcode_desc->type;
op->jump = UT64_MAX;
op->fail = UT64_MAX;
op->addr = addr;
r_strbuf_setf (&op->esil, "");
opcode_desc->handler (anal, op, buf, len, &fail, cpu);
if (fail) {
goto INVALID_OP;
}
if (op->cycles <= 0) {
opcode_desc->cycles = 2;
}
op->nopcode = (op->type == R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_UNK);
t = r_strbuf_get (&op->esil);
if (t && strlen (t) > 1) {
t += strlen (t) - 1;
if (*t == ',') {
*t = '\0';
}
}
return opcode_desc;
}
}
if ((ins & 0xff00) == 0xff00 && (ins & 0xf) > 7) {
goto INVALID_OP;
}
INVALID_OP:
op->family = R_ANAL_OP_FAMILY_UNKNOWN;
op->type = R_ANAL_OP_TYPE_UNK;
op->addr = addr;
op->fail = UT64_MAX;
op->jump = UT64_MAX;
op->ptr = UT64_MAX;
op->val = UT64_MAX;
op->nopcode = 1;
op->cycles = 1;
op->size = 2;
r_strbuf_set (&op->esil, "1,$");
return NULL;
}
| 170,162 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int sysMapBlockFile(FILE* mapf, MemMapping* pMap)
{
char block_dev[PATH_MAX+1];
size_t size;
unsigned int blksize;
unsigned int blocks;
unsigned int range_count;
unsigned int i;
if (fgets(block_dev, sizeof(block_dev), mapf) == NULL) {
LOGW("failed to read block device from header\n");
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(block_dev); ++i) {
if (block_dev[i] == '\n') {
block_dev[i] = 0;
break;
}
}
if (fscanf(mapf, "%zu %u\n%u\n", &size, &blksize, &range_count) != 3) {
LOGW("failed to parse block map header\n");
return -1;
}
blocks = ((size-1) / blksize) + 1;
pMap->range_count = range_count;
pMap->ranges = malloc(range_count * sizeof(MappedRange));
memset(pMap->ranges, 0, range_count * sizeof(MappedRange));
unsigned char* reserve;
reserve = mmap64(NULL, blocks * blksize, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0);
if (reserve == MAP_FAILED) {
LOGW("failed to reserve address space: %s\n", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
pMap->ranges[range_count-1].addr = reserve;
pMap->ranges[range_count-1].length = blocks * blksize;
int fd = open(block_dev, O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
LOGW("failed to open block device %s: %s\n", block_dev, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
unsigned char* next = reserve;
for (i = 0; i < range_count; ++i) {
int start, end;
if (fscanf(mapf, "%d %d\n", &start, &end) != 2) {
LOGW("failed to parse range %d in block map\n", i);
return -1;
}
void* addr = mmap64(next, (end-start)*blksize, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, fd, ((off64_t)start)*blksize);
if (addr == MAP_FAILED) {
LOGW("failed to map block %d: %s\n", i, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
pMap->ranges[i].addr = addr;
pMap->ranges[i].length = (end-start)*blksize;
next += pMap->ranges[i].length;
}
pMap->addr = reserve;
pMap->length = size;
LOGI("mmapped %d ranges\n", range_count);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fix integer overflows in recovery procedure.
Bug: 26960931
Change-Id: Ieae45caccfb4728fcf514f0d920976585d8e6caf
(cherry picked from commit 4f2df162c6ab4a71ca86e4b38735b681729c353b)
CWE ID: CWE-189 | static int sysMapBlockFile(FILE* mapf, MemMapping* pMap)
{
char block_dev[PATH_MAX+1];
size_t size;
unsigned int blksize;
size_t blocks;
unsigned int range_count;
unsigned int i;
if (fgets(block_dev, sizeof(block_dev), mapf) == NULL) {
LOGW("failed to read block device from header\n");
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(block_dev); ++i) {
if (block_dev[i] == '\n') {
block_dev[i] = 0;
break;
}
}
if (fscanf(mapf, "%zu %u\n%u\n", &size, &blksize, &range_count) != 3) {
LOGW("failed to parse block map header\n");
return -1;
}
if (blksize != 0) {
blocks = ((size-1) / blksize) + 1;
}
if (size == 0 || blksize == 0 || blocks > SIZE_MAX / blksize || range_count == 0) {
LOGE("invalid data in block map file: size %zu, blksize %u, range_count %u\n",
size, blksize, range_count);
return -1;
}
pMap->range_count = range_count;
pMap->ranges = calloc(range_count, sizeof(MappedRange));
if (pMap->ranges == NULL) {
LOGE("calloc(%u, %zu) failed: %s\n", range_count, sizeof(MappedRange), strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
unsigned char* reserve;
reserve = mmap64(NULL, blocks * blksize, PROT_NONE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0);
if (reserve == MAP_FAILED) {
LOGW("failed to reserve address space: %s\n", strerror(errno));
free(pMap->ranges);
return -1;
}
int fd = open(block_dev, O_RDONLY);
if (fd < 0) {
LOGW("failed to open block device %s: %s\n", block_dev, strerror(errno));
munmap(reserve, blocks * blksize);
free(pMap->ranges);
return -1;
}
unsigned char* next = reserve;
size_t remaining_size = blocks * blksize;
bool success = true;
for (i = 0; i < range_count; ++i) {
size_t start, end;
if (fscanf(mapf, "%zu %zu\n", &start, &end) != 2) {
LOGW("failed to parse range %d in block map\n", i);
success = false;
break;
}
size_t length = (end - start) * blksize;
if (end <= start || (end - start) > SIZE_MAX / blksize || length > remaining_size) {
LOGE("unexpected range in block map: %zu %zu\n", start, end);
success = false;
break;
}
void* addr = mmap64(next, length, PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED, fd, ((off64_t)start)*blksize);
if (addr == MAP_FAILED) {
LOGW("failed to map block %d: %s\n", i, strerror(errno));
success = false;
break;
}
pMap->ranges[i].addr = addr;
pMap->ranges[i].length = length;
next += length;
remaining_size -= length;
}
if (success && remaining_size != 0) {
LOGE("ranges in block map are invalid: remaining_size = %zu\n", remaining_size);
success = false;
}
if (!success) {
close(fd);
munmap(reserve, blocks * blksize);
free(pMap->ranges);
return -1;
}
close(fd);
pMap->addr = reserve;
pMap->length = size;
LOGI("mmapped %d ranges\n", range_count);
return 0;
}
| 173,903 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int jas_stream_pad(jas_stream_t *stream, int n, int c)
{
int m;
m = n;
for (m = n; m > 0; --m) {
if (jas_stream_putc(stream, c) == EOF)
return n - m;
}
return n;
}
Commit Message: Made some changes to the I/O stream library for memory streams.
There were a number of potential problems due to the possibility
of integer overflow.
Changed some integral types to the larger types size_t or ssize_t.
For example, the function mem_resize now takes the buffer size parameter
as a size_t.
Added a new function jas_stream_memopen2, which takes a
buffer size specified as a size_t instead of an int.
This can be used in jas_image_cmpt_create to avoid potential
overflow problems.
Added a new function jas_deprecated to warn about reliance on
deprecated library behavior.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | int jas_stream_pad(jas_stream_t *stream, int n, int c)
{
int m;
if (n < 0) {
jas_deprecated("negative count for jas_stream_pad");
}
m = n;
for (m = n; m > 0; --m) {
if (jas_stream_putc(stream, c) == EOF)
return n - m;
}
return n;
}
| 168,746 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_str_hash_len (MyObject *obj, GHashTable *table, guint *len, GError **error)
{
*len = 0;
g_hash_table_foreach (table, hash_foreach, len);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_str_hash_len (MyObject *obj, GHashTable *table, guint *len, GError **error)
| 165,121 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: read_pbm_integer(j_compress_ptr cinfo, FILE *infile, unsigned int maxval)
/* Read an unsigned decimal integer from the PPM file */
/* Swallows one trailing character after the integer */
/* Note that on a 16-bit-int machine, only values up to 64k can be read. */
/* This should not be a problem in practice. */
{
register int ch;
register unsigned int val;
/* Skip any leading whitespace */
do {
ch = pbm_getc(infile);
if (ch == EOF)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
} while (ch == ' ' || ch == '\t' || ch == '\n' || ch == '\r');
if (ch < '0' || ch > '9')
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_PPM_NONNUMERIC);
val = ch - '0';
while ((ch = pbm_getc(infile)) >= '0' && ch <= '9') {
val *= 10;
val += ch - '0';
}
if (val > maxval)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_PPM_TOOLARGE);
return val;
}
Commit Message: cjpeg: Fix OOB read caused by malformed 8-bit BMP
... in which one or more of the color indices is out of range for the
number of palette entries.
Fix partly borrowed from jpeg-9c. This commit also adopts Guido's
JERR_PPM_OUTOFRANGE enum value in lieu of our project-specific
JERR_PPM_TOOLARGE enum value.
Fixes #258
CWE ID: CWE-125 | read_pbm_integer(j_compress_ptr cinfo, FILE *infile, unsigned int maxval)
/* Read an unsigned decimal integer from the PPM file */
/* Swallows one trailing character after the integer */
/* Note that on a 16-bit-int machine, only values up to 64k can be read. */
/* This should not be a problem in practice. */
{
register int ch;
register unsigned int val;
/* Skip any leading whitespace */
do {
ch = pbm_getc(infile);
if (ch == EOF)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_INPUT_EOF);
} while (ch == ' ' || ch == '\t' || ch == '\n' || ch == '\r');
if (ch < '0' || ch > '9')
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_PPM_NONNUMERIC);
val = ch - '0';
while ((ch = pbm_getc(infile)) >= '0' && ch <= '9') {
val *= 10;
val += ch - '0';
}
if (val > maxval)
ERREXIT(cinfo, JERR_PPM_OUTOFRANGE);
return val;
}
| 169,840 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void __exit xfrm6_tunnel_fini(void)
{
unregister_pernet_subsys(&xfrm6_tunnel_net_ops);
xfrm6_tunnel_spi_fini();
xfrm6_tunnel_deregister(&xfrm46_tunnel_handler, AF_INET);
xfrm6_tunnel_deregister(&xfrm6_tunnel_handler, AF_INET6);
xfrm_unregister_type(&xfrm6_tunnel_type, AF_INET6);
}
Commit Message: tunnels: fix netns vs proto registration ordering
Same stuff as in ip_gre patch: receive hook can be called before netns
setup is done, oopsing in net_generic().
Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-362 | static void __exit xfrm6_tunnel_fini(void)
{
xfrm6_tunnel_deregister(&xfrm46_tunnel_handler, AF_INET);
xfrm6_tunnel_deregister(&xfrm6_tunnel_handler, AF_INET6);
xfrm_unregister_type(&xfrm6_tunnel_type, AF_INET6);
unregister_pernet_subsys(&xfrm6_tunnel_net_ops);
kmem_cache_destroy(xfrm6_tunnel_spi_kmem);
}
| 165,879 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: png_get_copyright(png_structp png_ptr)
{
PNG_UNUSED(png_ptr) /* Silence compiler warning about unused png_ptr */
#ifdef PNG_STRING_COPYRIGHT
return PNG_STRING_COPYRIGHT
#else
#ifdef __STDC__
return ((png_charp) PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"libpng version 1.2.52 - November 20, 2014" PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"Copyright (c) 1998-2014 Glenn Randers-Pehrson" PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"Copyright (c) 1996-1997 Andreas Dilger" PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"Copyright (c) 1995-1996 Guy Eric Schalnat, Group 42, Inc." \
PNG_STRING_NEWLINE);
#else
return ((png_charp) "libpng version 1.2.52 - November 20, 2014\
Copyright (c) 1998-2014 Glenn Randers-Pehrson\
Copyright (c) 1996-1997 Andreas Dilger\
Copyright (c) 1995-1996 Guy Eric Schalnat, Group 42, Inc.");
#endif
#endif
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | png_get_copyright(png_structp png_ptr)
{
PNG_UNUSED(png_ptr) /* Silence compiler warning about unused png_ptr */
#ifdef PNG_STRING_COPYRIGHT
return PNG_STRING_COPYRIGHT
#else
#ifdef __STDC__
return ((png_charp) PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"libpng version 1.2.54 - November 12, 2015" PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"Copyright (c) 1998-2015 Glenn Randers-Pehrson" PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"Copyright (c) 1996-1997 Andreas Dilger" PNG_STRING_NEWLINE \
"Copyright (c) 1995-1996 Guy Eric Schalnat, Group 42, Inc." \
PNG_STRING_NEWLINE);
#else
return ((png_charp) "libpng version 1.2.54 - November 12, 2015\
Copyright (c) 1998-2015 Glenn Randers-Pehrson\
Copyright (c) 1996-1997 Andreas Dilger\
Copyright (c) 1995-1996 Guy Eric Schalnat, Group 42, Inc.");
#endif
#endif
}
| 172,162 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: foreach_nfs_shareopt(const char *shareopts,
nfs_shareopt_callback_t callback, void *cookie)
{
char *shareopts_dup, *opt, *cur, *value;
int was_nul, rc;
if (shareopts == NULL)
return (SA_OK);
shareopts_dup = strdup(shareopts);
if (shareopts_dup == NULL)
return (SA_NO_MEMORY);
opt = shareopts_dup;
was_nul = 0;
while (1) {
cur = opt;
while (*cur != ',' && *cur != '\0')
cur++;
if (*cur == '\0')
was_nul = 1;
*cur = '\0';
if (cur > opt) {
value = strchr(opt, '=');
if (value != NULL) {
*value = '\0';
value++;
}
rc = callback(opt, value, cookie);
if (rc != SA_OK) {
free(shareopts_dup);
return (rc);
}
}
opt = cur + 1;
if (was_nul)
break;
}
free(shareopts_dup);
return (0);
}
Commit Message: Move nfs.c:foreach_nfs_shareopt() to libshare.c:foreach_shareopt()
so that it can be (re)used in other parts of libshare.
CWE ID: CWE-200 | foreach_nfs_shareopt(const char *shareopts,
| 170,133 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void LocalFileSystem::requestFileSystem(ExecutionContext* context, FileSystemType type, long long size, PassOwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks)
{
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ExecutionContext> contextPtr(context);
RefPtr<CallbackWrapper> wrapper = adoptRef(new CallbackWrapper(callbacks));
requestFileSystemAccessInternal(context,
bind(&LocalFileSystem::fileSystemAllowedInternal, this, contextPtr, type, wrapper),
bind(&LocalFileSystem::fileSystemNotAllowedInternal, this, contextPtr, wrapper));
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void LocalFileSystem::requestFileSystem(ExecutionContext* context, FileSystemType type, long long size, PassOwnPtr<AsyncFileSystemCallbacks> callbacks)
{
RefPtrWillBeRawPtr<ExecutionContext> contextPtr(context);
CallbackWrapper* wrapper = new CallbackWrapper(callbacks);
requestFileSystemAccessInternal(context,
bind(&LocalFileSystem::fileSystemAllowedInternal, this, contextPtr, type, wrapper),
bind(&LocalFileSystem::fileSystemNotAllowedInternal, this, contextPtr, wrapper));
}
| 171,429 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: emit_string(const char *str, FILE *out)
/* Print a string with spaces replaced by '_' and non-printing characters by
* an octal escape.
*/
{
for (; *str; ++str)
if (isgraph(UCHAR_MAX & *str))
putc(*str, out);
else if (isspace(UCHAR_MAX & *str))
putc('_', out);
else
fprintf(out, "\\%.3o", *str);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | emit_string(const char *str, FILE *out)
/* Print a string with spaces replaced by '_' and non-printing characters by
* an octal escape.
*/
{
for (; *str; ++str)
if (isgraph(UCHAR_MAX & *str))
putc(*str, out);
else if (isspace(UCHAR_MAX & *str))
putc('_', out);
else
fprintf(out, "\\%.3o", *str);
}
| 173,731 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: v8::Local<v8::Value> V8ValueConverterImpl::ToV8Array(
v8::Isolate* isolate,
v8::Local<v8::Object> creation_context,
const base::ListValue* val) const {
v8::Local<v8::Array> result(v8::Array::New(isolate, val->GetSize()));
for (size_t i = 0; i < val->GetSize(); ++i) {
const base::Value* child = NULL;
CHECK(val->Get(i, &child));
v8::Local<v8::Value> child_v8 =
ToV8ValueImpl(isolate, creation_context, child);
CHECK(!child_v8.IsEmpty());
v8::TryCatch try_catch(isolate);
result->Set(static_cast<uint32_t>(i), child_v8);
if (try_catch.HasCaught())
LOG(ERROR) << "Setter for index " << i << " threw an exception.";
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: V8ValueConverter::ToV8Value should not trigger setters
BUG=606390
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1918793003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#390045}
CWE ID: | v8::Local<v8::Value> V8ValueConverterImpl::ToV8Array(
v8::Isolate* isolate,
v8::Local<v8::Object> creation_context,
const base::ListValue* val) const {
v8::Local<v8::Array> result(v8::Array::New(isolate, val->GetSize()));
// TODO(robwu): Callers should pass in the context.
v8::Local<v8::Context> context = isolate->GetCurrentContext();
for (size_t i = 0; i < val->GetSize(); ++i) {
const base::Value* child = NULL;
CHECK(val->Get(i, &child));
v8::Local<v8::Value> child_v8 =
ToV8ValueImpl(isolate, creation_context, child);
CHECK(!child_v8.IsEmpty());
v8::Maybe<bool> maybe =
result->CreateDataProperty(context, static_cast<uint32_t>(i), child_v8);
if (!maybe.IsJust() || !maybe.FromJust())
LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to set value at index " << i;
}
return result;
}
| 173,283 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SandboxIPCHandler::HandleLocaltime(
int fd,
base::PickleIterator iter,
const std::vector<base::ScopedFD>& fds) {
std::string time_string;
if (!iter.ReadString(&time_string) || time_string.size() != sizeof(time_t))
return;
time_t time;
memcpy(&time, time_string.data(), sizeof(time));
const struct tm* expanded_time = localtime(&time);
std::string result_string;
const char* time_zone_string = "";
if (expanded_time) {
result_string = std::string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(expanded_time),
sizeof(struct tm));
time_zone_string = expanded_time->tm_zone;
}
base::Pickle reply;
reply.WriteString(result_string);
reply.WriteString(time_zone_string);
SendRendererReply(fds, reply, -1);
}
Commit Message: Serialize struct tm in a safe way.
BUG=765512
Change-Id: If235b8677eb527be2ac0fe621fc210e4116a7566
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/679441
Commit-Queue: Chris Palmer <palmer@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Julien Tinnes <jln@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#503948}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void SandboxIPCHandler::HandleLocaltime(
int fd,
base::PickleIterator iter,
const std::vector<base::ScopedFD>& fds) {
// The other side of this call is in |ProxyLocaltimeCallToBrowser|, in
// zygote_main_linux.cc.
std::string time_string;
if (!iter.ReadString(&time_string) || time_string.size() != sizeof(time_t))
return;
time_t time;
memcpy(&time, time_string.data(), sizeof(time));
// We use |localtime| here because we need the |tm_zone| field to be filled
const struct tm* expanded_time = localtime(&time);
base::Pickle reply;
if (expanded_time) {
WriteTimeStruct(&reply, expanded_time);
} else {
// The {} constructor ensures the struct is 0-initialized.
struct tm zeroed_time = {};
WriteTimeStruct(&reply, &zeroed_time);
}
SendRendererReply(fds, reply, -1);
}
| 172,925 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int dnxhd_find_frame_end(DNXHDParserContext *dctx,
const uint8_t *buf, int buf_size)
{
ParseContext *pc = &dctx->pc;
uint64_t state = pc->state64;
int pic_found = pc->frame_start_found;
int i = 0;
if (!pic_found) {
for (i = 0; i < buf_size; i++) {
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (ff_dnxhd_check_header_prefix(state & 0xffffffffff00LL) != 0) {
i++;
pic_found = 1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
break;
}
}
}
if (pic_found && !dctx->remaining) {
if (!buf_size) /* EOF considered as end of frame */
return 0;
for (; i < buf_size; i++) {
dctx->cur_byte++;
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (dctx->cur_byte == 24) {
dctx->h = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 26) {
dctx->w = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 42) {
int cid = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFF;
if (cid <= 0)
continue;
dctx->remaining = avpriv_dnxhd_get_frame_size(cid);
if (dctx->remaining <= 0) {
dctx->remaining = ff_dnxhd_get_hr_frame_size(cid, dctx->w, dctx->h);
if (dctx->remaining <= 0)
return dctx->remaining;
}
if (buf_size - i + 47 >= dctx->remaining) {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
} else {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
}
}
}
} else if (pic_found) {
if (dctx->remaining > buf_size) {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
} else {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
}
}
pc->frame_start_found = pic_found;
pc->state64 = state;
return END_NOT_FOUND;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/dnxhd_parser: Do not return invalid value from dnxhd_find_frame_end() on error
Fixes: Null pointer dereference
Fixes: CVE-2017-9608
Found-by: Yihan Lian
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int dnxhd_find_frame_end(DNXHDParserContext *dctx,
const uint8_t *buf, int buf_size)
{
ParseContext *pc = &dctx->pc;
uint64_t state = pc->state64;
int pic_found = pc->frame_start_found;
int i = 0;
if (!pic_found) {
for (i = 0; i < buf_size; i++) {
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (ff_dnxhd_check_header_prefix(state & 0xffffffffff00LL) != 0) {
i++;
pic_found = 1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
break;
}
}
}
if (pic_found && !dctx->remaining) {
if (!buf_size) /* EOF considered as end of frame */
return 0;
for (; i < buf_size; i++) {
dctx->cur_byte++;
state = (state << 8) | buf[i];
if (dctx->cur_byte == 24) {
dctx->h = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 26) {
dctx->w = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFF;
} else if (dctx->cur_byte == 42) {
int cid = (state >> 32) & 0xFFFFFFFF;
int remaining;
if (cid <= 0)
continue;
remaining = avpriv_dnxhd_get_frame_size(cid);
if (remaining <= 0) {
remaining = ff_dnxhd_get_hr_frame_size(cid, dctx->w, dctx->h);
if (remaining <= 0)
continue;
}
dctx->remaining = remaining;
if (buf_size - i + 47 >= dctx->remaining) {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
} else {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
}
}
}
} else if (pic_found) {
if (dctx->remaining > buf_size) {
dctx->remaining -= buf_size;
} else {
int remaining = dctx->remaining;
pc->frame_start_found = 0;
pc->state64 = -1;
dctx->cur_byte = 0;
dctx->remaining = 0;
return remaining;
}
}
pc->frame_start_found = pic_found;
pc->state64 = state;
return END_NOT_FOUND;
}
| 170,045 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int b_unpack (lua_State *L) {
Header h;
const char *fmt = luaL_checkstring(L, 1);
size_t ld;
const char *data = luaL_checklstring(L, 2, &ld);
size_t pos = luaL_optinteger(L, 3, 1) - 1;
defaultoptions(&h);
lua_settop(L, 2);
while (*fmt) {
int opt = *fmt++;
size_t size = optsize(L, opt, &fmt);
pos += gettoalign(pos, &h, opt, size);
luaL_argcheck(L, pos+size <= ld, 2, "data string too short");
luaL_checkstack(L, 1, "too many results");
switch (opt) {
case 'b': case 'B': case 'h': case 'H':
case 'l': case 'L': case 'T': case 'i': case 'I': { /* integer types */
int issigned = islower(opt);
lua_Number res = getinteger(data+pos, h.endian, issigned, size);
lua_pushnumber(L, res);
break;
}
case 'x': {
break;
}
case 'f': {
float f;
memcpy(&f, data+pos, size);
correctbytes((char *)&f, sizeof(f), h.endian);
lua_pushnumber(L, f);
break;
}
case 'd': {
double d;
memcpy(&d, data+pos, size);
correctbytes((char *)&d, sizeof(d), h.endian);
lua_pushnumber(L, d);
break;
}
case 'c': {
if (size == 0) {
if (!lua_isnumber(L, -1))
luaL_error(L, "format `c0' needs a previous size");
size = lua_tonumber(L, -1);
lua_pop(L, 1);
luaL_argcheck(L, pos+size <= ld, 2, "data string too short");
}
lua_pushlstring(L, data+pos, size);
break;
}
case 's': {
const char *e = (const char *)memchr(data+pos, '\0', ld - pos);
if (e == NULL)
luaL_error(L, "unfinished string in data");
size = (e - (data+pos)) + 1;
lua_pushlstring(L, data+pos, size - 1);
break;
}
default: controloptions(L, opt, &fmt, &h);
}
pos += size;
}
lua_pushinteger(L, pos + 1);
return lua_gettop(L) - 2;
}
Commit Message: Security: update Lua struct package for security.
During an auditing Apple found that the "struct" Lua package
we ship with Redis (http://www.inf.puc-rio.br/~roberto/struct/) contains
a security problem. A bound-checking statement fails because of integer
overflow. The bug exists since we initially integrated this package with
Lua, when scripting was introduced, so every version of Redis with
EVAL/EVALSHA capabilities exposed is affected.
Instead of just fixing the bug, the library was updated to the latest
version shipped by the author.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static int b_unpack (lua_State *L) {
Header h;
const char *fmt = luaL_checkstring(L, 1);
size_t ld;
const char *data = luaL_checklstring(L, 2, &ld);
size_t pos = luaL_optinteger(L, 3, 1) - 1;
int n = 0; /* number of results */
defaultoptions(&h);
while (*fmt) {
int opt = *fmt++;
size_t size = optsize(L, opt, &fmt);
pos += gettoalign(pos, &h, opt, size);
luaL_argcheck(L, pos+size <= ld, 2, "data string too short");
/* stack space for item + next position */
luaL_checkstack(L, 2, "too many results");
switch (opt) {
case 'b': case 'B': case 'h': case 'H':
case 'l': case 'L': case 'T': case 'i': case 'I': { /* integer types */
int issigned = islower(opt);
lua_Number res = getinteger(data+pos, h.endian, issigned, size);
lua_pushnumber(L, res); n++;
break;
}
case 'x': {
break;
}
case 'f': {
float f;
memcpy(&f, data+pos, size);
correctbytes((char *)&f, sizeof(f), h.endian);
lua_pushnumber(L, f); n++;
break;
}
case 'd': {
double d;
memcpy(&d, data+pos, size);
correctbytes((char *)&d, sizeof(d), h.endian);
lua_pushnumber(L, d); n++;
break;
}
case 'c': {
if (size == 0) {
if (n == 0 || !lua_isnumber(L, -1))
luaL_error(L, "format 'c0' needs a previous size");
size = lua_tonumber(L, -1);
lua_pop(L, 1); n--;
luaL_argcheck(L, size <= ld && pos <= ld - size,
2, "data string too short");
}
lua_pushlstring(L, data+pos, size); n++;
break;
}
case 's': {
const char *e = (const char *)memchr(data+pos, '\0', ld - pos);
if (e == NULL)
luaL_error(L, "unfinished string in data");
size = (e - (data+pos)) + 1;
lua_pushlstring(L, data+pos, size - 1); n++;
break;
}
default: controloptions(L, opt, &fmt, &h);
}
pos += size;
}
lua_pushinteger(L, pos + 1); /* next position */
return n + 1;
}
| 170,163 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ping_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len, int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *isk = inet_sk(sk);
int family = sk->sk_family;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied, err;
pr_debug("ping_recvmsg(sk=%p,sk->num=%u)\n", isk, isk->inet_num);
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
goto out;
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE) {
if (family == AF_INET) {
return ip_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else if (family == AF_INET6) {
return pingv6_ops.ipv6_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
#endif
}
}
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > len) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
/* Don't bother checking the checksum */
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err)
goto done;
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
/* Copy the address and add cmsg data. */
if (family == AF_INET) {
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
sin->sin_port = 0 /* skb->h.uh->source */;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
memset(sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin);
if (isk->cmsg_flags)
ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else if (family == AF_INET6) {
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct ipv6hdr *ip6 = ipv6_hdr(skb);
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 =
(struct sockaddr_in6 *)msg->msg_name;
sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin6->sin6_port = 0;
sin6->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
sin6->sin6_flowinfo = 0;
if (np->sndflow)
sin6->sin6_flowinfo = ip6_flowinfo(ip6);
sin6->sin6_scope_id = ipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin6->sin6_addr,
IP6CB(skb)->iif);
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin6);
if (inet6_sk(sk)->rxopt.all)
pingv6_ops.ip6_datagram_recv_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
#endif
} else {
BUG();
}
err = copied;
done:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out:
pr_debug("ping_recvmsg -> %d\n", err);
return err;
}
Commit Message: ping: prevent NULL pointer dereference on write to msg_name
A plain read() on a socket does set msg->msg_name to NULL. So check for
NULL pointer first.
Signed-off-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: | int ping_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
size_t len, int noblock, int flags, int *addr_len)
{
struct inet_sock *isk = inet_sk(sk);
int family = sk->sk_family;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int copied, err;
pr_debug("ping_recvmsg(sk=%p,sk->num=%u)\n", isk, isk->inet_num);
err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (flags & MSG_OOB)
goto out;
if (flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE) {
if (family == AF_INET) {
return ip_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else if (family == AF_INET6) {
return pingv6_ops.ipv6_recv_error(sk, msg, len);
#endif
}
}
skb = skb_recv_datagram(sk, flags, noblock, &err);
if (!skb)
goto out;
copied = skb->len;
if (copied > len) {
msg->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
copied = len;
}
/* Don't bother checking the checksum */
err = skb_copy_datagram_iovec(skb, 0, msg->msg_iov, copied);
if (err)
goto done;
sock_recv_timestamp(msg, sk, skb);
/* Copy the address and add cmsg data. */
if (family == AF_INET) {
struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)msg->msg_name;
if (sin) {
sin->sin_family = AF_INET;
sin->sin_port = 0 /* skb->h.uh->source */;
sin->sin_addr.s_addr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
memset(sin->sin_zero, 0, sizeof(sin->sin_zero));
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin);
}
if (isk->cmsg_flags)
ip_cmsg_recv(msg, skb);
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
} else if (family == AF_INET6) {
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
struct ipv6hdr *ip6 = ipv6_hdr(skb);
struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6 =
(struct sockaddr_in6 *)msg->msg_name;
if (sin6) {
sin6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
sin6->sin6_port = 0;
sin6->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
sin6->sin6_flowinfo = 0;
if (np->sndflow)
sin6->sin6_flowinfo = ip6_flowinfo(ip6);
sin6->sin6_scope_id =
ipv6_iface_scope_id(&sin6->sin6_addr,
IP6CB(skb)->iif);
*addr_len = sizeof(*sin6);
}
if (inet6_sk(sk)->rxopt.all)
pingv6_ops.ip6_datagram_recv_ctl(sk, msg, skb);
#endif
} else {
BUG();
}
err = copied;
done:
skb_free_datagram(sk, skb);
out:
pr_debug("ping_recvmsg -> %d\n", err);
return err;
}
| 165,937 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int ovl_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
{
int err;
struct dentry *upperdentry;
err = ovl_want_write(dentry);
if (err)
goto out;
upperdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry);
if (upperdentry) {
mutex_lock(&upperdentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
err = notify_change(upperdentry, attr, NULL);
mutex_unlock(&upperdentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
} else {
err = ovl_copy_up_last(dentry, attr, false);
}
ovl_drop_write(dentry);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: ovl: fix permission checking for setattr
[Al Viro] The bug is in being too enthusiastic about optimizing ->setattr()
away - instead of "copy verbatim with metadata" + "chmod/chown/utimes"
(with the former being always safe and the latter failing in case of
insufficient permissions) it tries to combine these two. Note that copyup
itself will have to do ->setattr() anyway; _that_ is where the elevated
capabilities are right. Having these two ->setattr() (one to set verbatim
copy of metadata, another to do what overlayfs ->setattr() had been asked
to do in the first place) combined is where it breaks.
Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | int ovl_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr)
{
int err;
struct dentry *upperdentry;
err = ovl_want_write(dentry);
if (err)
goto out;
err = ovl_copy_up(dentry);
if (!err) {
upperdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry);
mutex_lock(&upperdentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
err = notify_change(upperdentry, attr, NULL);
mutex_unlock(&upperdentry->d_inode->i_mutex);
}
ovl_drop_write(dentry);
out:
return err;
}
| 166,559 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int iwch_l2t_send(struct t3cdev *tdev, struct sk_buff *skb, struct l2t_entry *l2e)
{
int error = 0;
struct cxio_rdev *rdev;
rdev = (struct cxio_rdev *)tdev->ulp;
if (cxio_fatal_error(rdev)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EIO;
}
error = l2t_send(tdev, skb, l2e);
if (error < 0)
kfree_skb(skb);
return error;
}
Commit Message: iw_cxgb3: Fix incorrectly returning error on success
The cxgb3_*_send() functions return NET_XMIT_ values, which are
positive integers values. So don't treat positive return values
as an error.
Signed-off-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Hariprasad Shenai <hariprasad@chelsio.com>
Signed-off-by: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>
CWE ID: | static int iwch_l2t_send(struct t3cdev *tdev, struct sk_buff *skb, struct l2t_entry *l2e)
{
int error = 0;
struct cxio_rdev *rdev;
rdev = (struct cxio_rdev *)tdev->ulp;
if (cxio_fatal_error(rdev)) {
kfree_skb(skb);
return -EIO;
}
error = l2t_send(tdev, skb, l2e);
if (error < 0)
kfree_skb(skb);
return error < 0 ? error : 0;
}
| 167,496 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void * gdImageWBMPPtr (gdImagePtr im, int *size, int fg)
{
void *rv;
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewDynamicCtx(2048, NULL);
gdImageWBMPCtx(im, fg, out);
rv = gdDPExtractData(out, size);
out->gd_free(out);
return rv;
}
Commit Message: Sync with upstream
Even though libgd/libgd#492 is not a relevant bug fix for PHP, since
the binding doesn't use the `gdImage*Ptr()` functions at all, we're
porting the fix to stay in sync here.
CWE ID: CWE-415 | void * gdImageWBMPPtr (gdImagePtr im, int *size, int fg)
{
void *rv;
gdIOCtx *out = gdNewDynamicCtx(2048, NULL);
if (!_gdImageWBMPCtx(im, fg, out)) {
rv = gdDPExtractData(out, size);
} else {
rv = NULL;
}
out->gd_free(out);
return rv;
}
| 169,738 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long Cues::GetCount() const
{
if (m_cue_points == NULL)
return -1;
return m_count; //TODO: really ignore preload count?
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long Cues::GetCount() const
const long long stop = m_start + m_size;
| 174,298 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: kg_seal(minor_status, context_handle, conf_req_flag, qop_req,
input_message_buffer, conf_state, output_message_buffer, toktype)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
int conf_req_flag;
gss_qop_t qop_req;
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer;
int *conf_state;
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer;
int toktype;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_context context;
output_message_buffer->length = 0;
output_message_buffer->value = NULL;
/* Only default qop or matching established cryptosystem is allowed.
There are NO EXTENSIONS to this set for AES and friends! The
new spec says "just use 0". The old spec plus extensions would
actually allow for certain non-zero values. Fix this to handle
them later. */
if (qop_req != 0) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32) G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (! ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
context = ctx->k5_context;
switch (ctx->proto)
{
case 0:
code = make_seal_token_v1(context, ctx->enc, ctx->seq,
&ctx->seq_send, ctx->initiate,
input_message_buffer, output_message_buffer,
ctx->signalg, ctx->cksum_size, ctx->sealalg,
conf_req_flag, toktype, ctx->mech_used);
break;
case 1:
code = gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3(context, ctx,
input_message_buffer,
output_message_buffer,
conf_req_flag, toktype);
break;
default:
code = G_UNKNOWN_QOP; /* XXX */
break;
}
if (code) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
if (conf_state)
*conf_state = conf_req_flag;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | kg_seal(minor_status, context_handle, conf_req_flag, qop_req,
input_message_buffer, conf_state, output_message_buffer, toktype)
OM_uint32 *minor_status;
gss_ctx_id_t context_handle;
int conf_req_flag;
gss_qop_t qop_req;
gss_buffer_t input_message_buffer;
int *conf_state;
gss_buffer_t output_message_buffer;
int toktype;
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
krb5_error_code code;
krb5_context context;
output_message_buffer->length = 0;
output_message_buffer->value = NULL;
/* Only default qop or matching established cryptosystem is allowed.
There are NO EXTENSIONS to this set for AES and friends! The
new spec says "just use 0". The old spec plus extensions would
actually allow for certain non-zero values. Fix this to handle
them later. */
if (qop_req != 0) {
*minor_status = (OM_uint32) G_UNKNOWN_QOP;
return GSS_S_FAILURE;
}
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (ctx->terminated || !ctx->established) {
*minor_status = KG_CTX_INCOMPLETE;
return(GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT);
}
context = ctx->k5_context;
switch (ctx->proto)
{
case 0:
code = make_seal_token_v1(context, ctx->enc, ctx->seq,
&ctx->seq_send, ctx->initiate,
input_message_buffer, output_message_buffer,
ctx->signalg, ctx->cksum_size, ctx->sealalg,
conf_req_flag, toktype, ctx->mech_used);
break;
case 1:
code = gss_krb5int_make_seal_token_v3(context, ctx,
input_message_buffer,
output_message_buffer,
conf_req_flag, toktype);
break;
default:
code = G_UNKNOWN_QOP; /* XXX */
break;
}
if (code) {
*minor_status = code;
save_error_info(*minor_status, context);
return(GSS_S_FAILURE);
}
if (conf_state)
*conf_state = conf_req_flag;
*minor_status = 0;
return(GSS_S_COMPLETE);
}
| 166,817 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void MaybeStopInputMethodDaemon(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const ImeConfigValue& value) {
if (section == language_prefs::kGeneralSectionName &&
config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
ContainOnlyOneKeyboardLayout(value) &&
enable_auto_ime_shutdown_) {
StopInputMethodDaemon();
}
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void MaybeStopInputMethodDaemon(const std::string& section,
const std::string& config_name,
const input_method::ImeConfigValue& value) {
if (section == language_prefs::kGeneralSectionName &&
config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
ContainOnlyOneKeyboardLayout(value) &&
enable_auto_ime_shutdown_) {
StopInputMethodDaemon();
}
}
| 170,500 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void comps_mrtree_unite(COMPS_MRTree *rt1, COMPS_MRTree *rt2) {
COMPS_HSList *tmplist, *tmp_subnodes;
COMPS_HSListItem *it, *it2;
struct Pair {
COMPS_HSList * subnodes;
char * key;
char added;
} *pair, *parent_pair;
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = rt2->subnodes;
pair->key = NULL;
tmplist = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(tmplist, NULL, NULL, &free);
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
while (tmplist->first != NULL) {
it = tmplist->first;
comps_hslist_remove(tmplist, tmplist->first);
tmp_subnodes = ((struct Pair*)it->data)->subnodes;
parent_pair = (struct Pair*) it->data;
free(it);
pair->added = 0;
for (it = tmp_subnodes->first; it != NULL; it=it->next) {
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = ((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes;
if (parent_pair->key != NULL) {
pair->key =
malloc(sizeof(char)
* (strlen(((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->key)
+ strlen(parent_pair->key) + 1));
memcpy(pair->key, parent_pair->key,
sizeof(char) * strlen(parent_pair->key));
memcpy(pair->key+strlen(parent_pair->key),
((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
} else {
pair->key = malloc(sizeof(char)*
(strlen(((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->key) +
1));
memcpy(pair->key, ((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
}
/* current node has data */
if (((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->data->first != NULL) {
for (it2 = ((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->data->first;
it2 != NULL; it2 = it2->next) {
comps_mrtree_set(rt1, pair->key, it2->data);
}
if (((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes->first) {
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
} else {
free(pair->key);
free(pair);
}
/* current node hasn't data */
} else {
if (((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes->first) {
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
} else {
free(pair->key);
free(pair);
}
}
}
free(parent_pair->key);
free(parent_pair);
}
comps_hslist_destroy(&tmplist);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void comps_mrtree_unite(COMPS_MRTree *rt1, COMPS_MRTree *rt2) {
COMPS_HSList *tmplist, *tmp_subnodes;
COMPS_HSListItem *it, *it2;
struct Pair {
COMPS_HSList * subnodes;
char * key;
} *pair, *parent_pair;
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = rt2->subnodes;
pair->key = NULL;
tmplist = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(tmplist, NULL, NULL, &free);
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
while (tmplist->first != NULL) {
it = tmplist->first;
comps_hslist_remove(tmplist, tmplist->first);
tmp_subnodes = ((struct Pair*)it->data)->subnodes;
parent_pair = (struct Pair*) it->data;
free(it);
for (it = tmp_subnodes->first; it != NULL; it=it->next) {
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = ((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes;
if (parent_pair->key != NULL) {
pair->key =
malloc(sizeof(char)
* (strlen(((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->key)
+ strlen(parent_pair->key) + 1));
memcpy(pair->key, parent_pair->key,
sizeof(char) * strlen(parent_pair->key));
memcpy(pair->key+strlen(parent_pair->key),
((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
} else {
pair->key = malloc(sizeof(char)*
(strlen(((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->key) +
1));
memcpy(pair->key, ((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
}
/* current node has data */
if (((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->data->first != NULL) {
for (it2 = ((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->data->first;
it2 != NULL; it2 = it2->next) {
comps_mrtree_set(rt1, pair->key, it2->data);
}
if (((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes->first) {
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
} else {
free(pair->key);
free(pair);
}
/* current node hasn't data */
} else {
if (((COMPS_MRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes->first) {
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
} else {
free(pair->key);
free(pair);
}
}
}
free(parent_pair->key);
free(parent_pair);
}
comps_hslist_destroy(&tmplist);
}
| 169,750 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ProcSendEvent(ClientPtr client)
{
WindowPtr pWin;
WindowPtr effectiveFocus = NullWindow; /* only set if dest==InputFocus */
DeviceIntPtr dev = PickPointer(client);
DeviceIntPtr keybd = GetMaster(dev, MASTER_KEYBOARD);
SpritePtr pSprite = dev->spriteInfo->sprite;
REQUEST(xSendEventReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xSendEventReq);
/* libXext and other extension libraries may set the bit indicating
* that this event came from a SendEvent request so remove it
* since otherwise the event type may fail the range checks
* and cause an invalid BadValue error to be returned.
*
* This is safe to do since we later add the SendEvent bit (0x80)
* back in once we send the event to the client */
stuff->event.u.u.type &= ~(SEND_EVENT_BIT);
/* The client's event type must be a core event type or one defined by an
extension. */
if (!((stuff->event.u.u.type > X_Reply &&
stuff->event.u.u.type < LASTEvent) ||
(stuff->event.u.u.type >= EXTENSION_EVENT_BASE &&
stuff->event.u.u.type < (unsigned) lastEvent))) {
client->errorValue = stuff->event.u.u.type;
return BadValue;
}
if (stuff->event.u.u.type == ClientMessage &&
stuff->event.u.u.detail != 8 &&
stuff->event.u.u.detail != 16 && stuff->event.u.u.detail != 32) {
}
if (stuff->destination == PointerWindow)
pWin = pSprite->win;
else if (stuff->destination == InputFocus) {
WindowPtr inputFocus = (keybd) ? keybd->focus->win : NoneWin;
if (inputFocus == NoneWin)
return Success;
/* If the input focus is PointerRootWin, send the event to where
the pointer is if possible, then perhaps propogate up to root. */
if (inputFocus == PointerRootWin)
inputFocus = GetCurrentRootWindow(dev);
if (IsParent(inputFocus, pSprite->win)) {
effectiveFocus = inputFocus;
pWin = pSprite->win;
}
else
effectiveFocus = pWin = inputFocus;
}
else
dixLookupWindow(&pWin, stuff->destination, client, DixSendAccess);
if (!pWin)
return BadWindow;
if ((stuff->propagate != xFalse) && (stuff->propagate != xTrue)) {
client->errorValue = stuff->propagate;
return BadValue;
}
stuff->event.u.u.type |= SEND_EVENT_BIT;
if (stuff->propagate) {
for (; pWin; pWin = pWin->parent) {
if (XaceHook(XACE_SEND_ACCESS, client, NULL, pWin,
&stuff->event, 1))
return Success;
if (DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, pWin,
&stuff->event, 1, stuff->eventMask,
NullGrab))
return Success;
if (pWin == effectiveFocus)
return Success;
stuff->eventMask &= ~wDontPropagateMask(pWin);
if (!stuff->eventMask)
break;
}
}
else if (!XaceHook(XACE_SEND_ACCESS, client, NULL, pWin, &stuff->event, 1))
DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, pWin, &stuff->event,
1, stuff->eventMask, NullGrab);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | ProcSendEvent(ClientPtr client)
{
WindowPtr pWin;
WindowPtr effectiveFocus = NullWindow; /* only set if dest==InputFocus */
DeviceIntPtr dev = PickPointer(client);
DeviceIntPtr keybd = GetMaster(dev, MASTER_KEYBOARD);
SpritePtr pSprite = dev->spriteInfo->sprite;
REQUEST(xSendEventReq);
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xSendEventReq);
/* libXext and other extension libraries may set the bit indicating
* that this event came from a SendEvent request so remove it
* since otherwise the event type may fail the range checks
* and cause an invalid BadValue error to be returned.
*
* This is safe to do since we later add the SendEvent bit (0x80)
* back in once we send the event to the client */
stuff->event.u.u.type &= ~(SEND_EVENT_BIT);
/* The client's event type must be a core event type or one defined by an
extension. */
if (!((stuff->event.u.u.type > X_Reply &&
stuff->event.u.u.type < LASTEvent) ||
(stuff->event.u.u.type >= EXTENSION_EVENT_BASE &&
stuff->event.u.u.type < (unsigned) lastEvent))) {
client->errorValue = stuff->event.u.u.type;
return BadValue;
}
/* Generic events can have variable size, but SendEvent request holds
exactly 32B of event data. */
if (stuff->event.u.u.type == GenericEvent) {
client->errorValue = stuff->event.u.u.type;
return BadValue;
}
if (stuff->event.u.u.type == ClientMessage &&
stuff->event.u.u.detail != 8 &&
stuff->event.u.u.detail != 16 && stuff->event.u.u.detail != 32) {
}
if (stuff->destination == PointerWindow)
pWin = pSprite->win;
else if (stuff->destination == InputFocus) {
WindowPtr inputFocus = (keybd) ? keybd->focus->win : NoneWin;
if (inputFocus == NoneWin)
return Success;
/* If the input focus is PointerRootWin, send the event to where
the pointer is if possible, then perhaps propogate up to root. */
if (inputFocus == PointerRootWin)
inputFocus = GetCurrentRootWindow(dev);
if (IsParent(inputFocus, pSprite->win)) {
effectiveFocus = inputFocus;
pWin = pSprite->win;
}
else
effectiveFocus = pWin = inputFocus;
}
else
dixLookupWindow(&pWin, stuff->destination, client, DixSendAccess);
if (!pWin)
return BadWindow;
if ((stuff->propagate != xFalse) && (stuff->propagate != xTrue)) {
client->errorValue = stuff->propagate;
return BadValue;
}
stuff->event.u.u.type |= SEND_EVENT_BIT;
if (stuff->propagate) {
for (; pWin; pWin = pWin->parent) {
if (XaceHook(XACE_SEND_ACCESS, client, NULL, pWin,
&stuff->event, 1))
return Success;
if (DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, pWin,
&stuff->event, 1, stuff->eventMask,
NullGrab))
return Success;
if (pWin == effectiveFocus)
return Success;
stuff->eventMask &= ~wDontPropagateMask(pWin);
if (!stuff->eventMask)
break;
}
}
else if (!XaceHook(XACE_SEND_ACCESS, client, NULL, pWin, &stuff->event, 1))
DeliverEventsToWindow(dev, pWin, &stuff->event,
1, stuff->eventMask, NullGrab);
return Success;
}
| 164,764 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DidStartNavigationToPendingEntry(const GURL& url,
content::ReloadType reload_type) {
devtools_bindings_->frontend_host_.reset(
content::DevToolsFrontendHost::Create(
web_contents()->GetMainFrame(),
base::Bind(&DevToolsUIBindings::HandleMessageFromDevToolsFrontend,
base::Unretained(devtools_bindings_))));
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | DidStartNavigationToPendingEntry(const GURL& url,
content::ReloadType reload_type) {
devtools_bindings_->UpdateFrontendHost();
}
| 172,453 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ssi_sd_load(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque, int version_id)
{
SSISlave *ss = SSI_SLAVE(opaque);
ssi_sd_state *s = (ssi_sd_state *)opaque;
int i;
if (version_id != 1)
return -EINVAL;
s->mode = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->cmd = qemu_get_be32(f);
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
s->cmdarg[i] = qemu_get_be32(f);
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++)
s->response[i] = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->arglen = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->response_pos = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->stopping = qemu_get_be32(f);
ss->cs = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->mode = SSI_SD_CMD;
dinfo = drive_get_next(IF_SD);
s->sd = sd_init(dinfo ? dinfo->bdrv : NULL, true);
if (s->sd == NULL) {
return -1;
}
register_savevm(dev, "ssi_sd", -1, 1, ssi_sd_save, ssi_sd_load, s);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-94 | static int ssi_sd_load(QEMUFile *f, void *opaque, int version_id)
{
SSISlave *ss = SSI_SLAVE(opaque);
ssi_sd_state *s = (ssi_sd_state *)opaque;
int i;
if (version_id != 1)
return -EINVAL;
s->mode = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->cmd = qemu_get_be32(f);
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
s->cmdarg[i] = qemu_get_be32(f);
for (i = 0; i < 5; i++)
s->response[i] = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->arglen = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (s->mode == SSI_SD_CMDARG &&
(s->arglen < 0 || s->arglen >= ARRAY_SIZE(s->cmdarg))) {
return -EINVAL;
}
s->response_pos = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->stopping = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (s->mode == SSI_SD_RESPONSE &&
(s->response_pos < 0 || s->response_pos >= ARRAY_SIZE(s->response) ||
(!s->stopping && s->arglen > ARRAY_SIZE(s->response)))) {
return -EINVAL;
}
ss->cs = qemu_get_be32(f);
s->mode = SSI_SD_CMD;
dinfo = drive_get_next(IF_SD);
s->sd = sd_init(dinfo ? dinfo->bdrv : NULL, true);
if (s->sd == NULL) {
return -1;
}
register_savevm(dev, "ssi_sd", -1, 1, ssi_sd_save, ssi_sd_load, s);
return 0;
}
| 165,358 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: EntrySync* EntrySync::copyTo(DirectoryEntrySync* parent, const String& name, ExceptionState& exceptionState) const
{
RefPtr<EntrySyncCallbackHelper> helper = EntrySyncCallbackHelper::create();
m_fileSystem->copy(this, parent, name, helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), DOMFileSystemBase::Synchronous);
return helper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
Commit Message: Oilpan: Ship Oilpan for SyncCallbackHelper, CreateFileResult and CallbackWrapper in filesystem/
These are leftovers when we shipped Oilpan for filesystem/ once.
BUG=340522
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/501263003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180909 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-119 | EntrySync* EntrySync::copyTo(DirectoryEntrySync* parent, const String& name, ExceptionState& exceptionState) const
{
EntrySyncCallbackHelper* helper = EntrySyncCallbackHelper::create();
m_fileSystem->copy(this, parent, name, helper->successCallback(), helper->errorCallback(), DOMFileSystemBase::Synchronous);
return helper->getResult(exceptionState);
}
| 171,420 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void TearDown() {
delete[] src_;
delete[] ref_;
libvpx_test::ClearSystemState();
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void TearDown() {
if (!use_high_bit_depth_) {
vpx_free(src_);
delete[] ref_;
#if CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
} else {
vpx_free(CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(src_));
delete[] CONVERT_TO_SHORTPTR(ref_);
#endif // CONFIG_VP9_HIGHBITDEPTH
}
libvpx_test::ClearSystemState();
}
| 174,591 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int http_read_header(URLContext *h, int *new_location)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
char line[MAX_URL_SIZE];
int err = 0;
s->chunksize = -1;
for (;;) {
if ((err = http_get_line(s, line, sizeof(line))) < 0)
return err;
av_log(h, AV_LOG_TRACE, "header='%s'\n", line);
err = process_line(h, line, s->line_count, new_location);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (err == 0)
break;
s->line_count++;
}
if (s->seekable == -1 && s->is_mediagateway && s->filesize == 2000000000)
h->is_streamed = 1; /* we can in fact _not_ seek */
cookie_string(s->cookie_dict, &s->cookies);
av_dict_free(&s->cookie_dict);
return err;
}
Commit Message: http: make length/offset-related variables unsigned.
Fixes #5992, reported and found by Paul Cher <paulcher@icloud.com>.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int http_read_header(URLContext *h, int *new_location)
{
HTTPContext *s = h->priv_data;
char line[MAX_URL_SIZE];
int err = 0;
s->chunksize = UINT64_MAX;
for (;;) {
if ((err = http_get_line(s, line, sizeof(line))) < 0)
return err;
av_log(h, AV_LOG_TRACE, "header='%s'\n", line);
err = process_line(h, line, s->line_count, new_location);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (err == 0)
break;
s->line_count++;
}
if (s->seekable == -1 && s->is_mediagateway && s->filesize == 2000000000)
h->is_streamed = 1; /* we can in fact _not_ seek */
cookie_string(s->cookie_dict, &s->cookies);
av_dict_free(&s->cookie_dict);
return err;
}
| 168,500 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageCreate (int sx, int sy)
{
int i;
gdImagePtr im;
if (overflow2(sx, sy)) {
return NULL;
}
if (overflow2(sizeof (unsigned char *), sy)) {
return NULL;
}
if (overflow2(sizeof (unsigned char), sx)) {
return NULL;
}
im = (gdImage *) gdCalloc(1, sizeof(gdImage));
if (!im) {
return NULL;
}
/* Row-major ever since gd 1.3 */
im->pixels = (unsigned char **) gdMalloc (sizeof (unsigned char *) * sy);
if (!im->pixels) {
gdFree(im);
return NULL;
}
im->polyInts = 0;
im->polyAllocated = 0;
im->brush = 0;
im->tile = 0;
im->style = 0;
for (i = 0; (i < sy); i++) {
/* Row-major ever since gd 1.3 */
im->pixels[i] = (unsigned char *) gdCalloc (sx, sizeof (unsigned char));
if (!im->pixels[i]) {
for (--i ; i >= 0; i--) {
gdFree(im->pixels[i]);
}
gdFree(im->pixels);
gdFree(im);
return NULL;
}
}
im->sx = sx;
im->sy = sy;
im->colorsTotal = 0;
im->transparent = (-1);
im->interlace = 0;
im->thick = 1;
im->AA = 0;
for (i = 0; (i < gdMaxColors); i++) {
im->open[i] = 1;
};
im->trueColor = 0;
im->tpixels = 0;
im->cx1 = 0;
im->cy1 = 0;
im->cx2 = im->sx - 1;
im->cy2 = im->sy - 1;
im->res_x = GD_RESOLUTION;
im->res_y = GD_RESOLUTION;
im->interpolation = NULL;
im->interpolation_id = GD_BILINEAR_FIXED;
return im;
}
Commit Message: Fix #340: System frozen
gdImageCreate() doesn't check for oversized images and as such is prone
to DoS vulnerabilities. We fix that by applying the same overflow check
that is already in place for gdImageCreateTrueColor().
CVE-2016-9317
CWE ID: CWE-20 | BGD_DECLARE(gdImagePtr) gdImageCreate (int sx, int sy)
{
int i;
gdImagePtr im;
if (overflow2(sx, sy)) {
return NULL;
}
if (overflow2(sizeof (unsigned char *), sy)) {
return NULL;
}
if (overflow2(sizeof (unsigned char), sx)) {
return NULL;
}
im = (gdImage *) gdCalloc(1, sizeof(gdImage));
if (!im) {
return NULL;
}
/* Row-major ever since gd 1.3 */
im->pixels = (unsigned char **) gdMalloc (sizeof (unsigned char *) * sy);
if (!im->pixels) {
gdFree(im);
return NULL;
}
im->polyInts = 0;
im->polyAllocated = 0;
im->brush = 0;
im->tile = 0;
im->style = 0;
for (i = 0; (i < sy); i++) {
/* Row-major ever since gd 1.3 */
im->pixels[i] = (unsigned char *) gdCalloc (sx, sizeof (unsigned char));
if (!im->pixels[i]) {
for (--i ; i >= 0; i--) {
gdFree(im->pixels[i]);
}
gdFree(im->pixels);
gdFree(im);
return NULL;
}
}
im->sx = sx;
im->sy = sy;
im->colorsTotal = 0;
im->transparent = (-1);
im->interlace = 0;
im->thick = 1;
im->AA = 0;
for (i = 0; (i < gdMaxColors); i++) {
im->open[i] = 1;
};
im->trueColor = 0;
im->tpixels = 0;
im->cx1 = 0;
im->cy1 = 0;
im->cx2 = im->sx - 1;
im->cy2 = im->sy - 1;
im->res_x = GD_RESOLUTION;
im->res_y = GD_RESOLUTION;
im->interpolation = NULL;
im->interpolation_id = GD_BILINEAR_FIXED;
return im;
}
| 168,743 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void StopInputMethodDaemon() {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return;
should_launch_ime_ = false;
if (ibus_daemon_process_handle_ != base::kNullProcessHandle) {
const base::ProcessId pid = base::GetProcId(ibus_daemon_process_handle_);
if (!chromeos::StopInputMethodProcess(input_method_status_connection_)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "StopInputMethodProcess IPC failed. Sending SIGTERM to "
<< "PID " << pid;
base::KillProcess(ibus_daemon_process_handle_, -1, false /* wait */);
}
VLOG(1) << "ibus-daemon (PID=" << pid << ") is terminated";
ibus_daemon_process_handle_ = base::kNullProcessHandle;
}
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void StopInputMethodDaemon() {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return;
should_launch_ime_ = false;
if (ibus_daemon_process_handle_ != base::kNullProcessHandle) {
const base::ProcessId pid = base::GetProcId(ibus_daemon_process_handle_);
if (!ibus_controller_->StopInputMethodProcess()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "StopInputMethodProcess IPC failed. Sending SIGTERM to "
<< "PID " << pid;
base::KillProcess(ibus_daemon_process_handle_, -1, false /* wait */);
}
VLOG(1) << "ibus-daemon (PID=" << pid << ") is terminated";
ibus_daemon_process_handle_ = base::kNullProcessHandle;
}
}
| 170,508 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int adev_open_output_stream(struct audio_hw_device *dev,
audio_io_handle_t handle,
audio_devices_t devices,
audio_output_flags_t flags,
struct audio_config *config,
struct audio_stream_out **stream_out,
const char *address)
{
struct a2dp_audio_device *a2dp_dev = (struct a2dp_audio_device *)dev;
struct a2dp_stream_out *out;
int ret = 0;
int i;
UNUSED(address);
UNUSED(handle);
UNUSED(devices);
UNUSED(flags);
INFO("opening output");
out = (struct a2dp_stream_out *)calloc(1, sizeof(struct a2dp_stream_out));
if (!out)
return -ENOMEM;
out->stream.common.get_sample_rate = out_get_sample_rate;
out->stream.common.set_sample_rate = out_set_sample_rate;
out->stream.common.get_buffer_size = out_get_buffer_size;
out->stream.common.get_channels = out_get_channels;
out->stream.common.get_format = out_get_format;
out->stream.common.set_format = out_set_format;
out->stream.common.standby = out_standby;
out->stream.common.dump = out_dump;
out->stream.common.set_parameters = out_set_parameters;
out->stream.common.get_parameters = out_get_parameters;
out->stream.common.add_audio_effect = out_add_audio_effect;
out->stream.common.remove_audio_effect = out_remove_audio_effect;
out->stream.get_latency = out_get_latency;
out->stream.set_volume = out_set_volume;
out->stream.write = out_write;
out->stream.get_render_position = out_get_render_position;
out->stream.get_presentation_position = out_get_presentation_position;
/* initialize a2dp specifics */
a2dp_stream_common_init(&out->common);
out->common.cfg.channel_flags = AUDIO_STREAM_DEFAULT_CHANNEL_FLAG;
out->common.cfg.format = AUDIO_STREAM_DEFAULT_FORMAT;
out->common.cfg.rate = AUDIO_STREAM_DEFAULT_RATE;
/* set output config values */
if (config)
{
config->format = out_get_format((const struct audio_stream *)&out->stream);
config->sample_rate = out_get_sample_rate((const struct audio_stream *)&out->stream);
config->channel_mask = out_get_channels((const struct audio_stream *)&out->stream);
}
*stream_out = &out->stream;
a2dp_dev->output = out;
a2dp_open_ctrl_path(&out->common);
if (out->common.ctrl_fd == AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED)
{
ERROR("ctrl socket failed to connect (%s)", strerror(errno));
ret = -1;
goto err_open;
}
DEBUG("success");
/* Delay to ensure Headset is in proper state when START is initiated
from DUT immediately after the connection due to ongoing music playback. */
usleep(250000);
return 0;
err_open:
free(out);
*stream_out = NULL;
a2dp_dev->output = NULL;
ERROR("failed");
return ret;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static int adev_open_output_stream(struct audio_hw_device *dev,
audio_io_handle_t handle,
audio_devices_t devices,
audio_output_flags_t flags,
struct audio_config *config,
struct audio_stream_out **stream_out,
const char *address)
{
struct a2dp_audio_device *a2dp_dev = (struct a2dp_audio_device *)dev;
struct a2dp_stream_out *out;
int ret = 0;
int i;
UNUSED(address);
UNUSED(handle);
UNUSED(devices);
UNUSED(flags);
INFO("opening output");
out = (struct a2dp_stream_out *)calloc(1, sizeof(struct a2dp_stream_out));
if (!out)
return -ENOMEM;
out->stream.common.get_sample_rate = out_get_sample_rate;
out->stream.common.set_sample_rate = out_set_sample_rate;
out->stream.common.get_buffer_size = out_get_buffer_size;
out->stream.common.get_channels = out_get_channels;
out->stream.common.get_format = out_get_format;
out->stream.common.set_format = out_set_format;
out->stream.common.standby = out_standby;
out->stream.common.dump = out_dump;
out->stream.common.set_parameters = out_set_parameters;
out->stream.common.get_parameters = out_get_parameters;
out->stream.common.add_audio_effect = out_add_audio_effect;
out->stream.common.remove_audio_effect = out_remove_audio_effect;
out->stream.get_latency = out_get_latency;
out->stream.set_volume = out_set_volume;
out->stream.write = out_write;
out->stream.get_render_position = out_get_render_position;
out->stream.get_presentation_position = out_get_presentation_position;
/* initialize a2dp specifics */
a2dp_stream_common_init(&out->common);
out->common.cfg.channel_flags = AUDIO_STREAM_DEFAULT_CHANNEL_FLAG;
out->common.cfg.format = AUDIO_STREAM_DEFAULT_FORMAT;
out->common.cfg.rate = AUDIO_STREAM_DEFAULT_RATE;
/* set output config values */
if (config)
{
config->format = out_get_format((const struct audio_stream *)&out->stream);
config->sample_rate = out_get_sample_rate((const struct audio_stream *)&out->stream);
config->channel_mask = out_get_channels((const struct audio_stream *)&out->stream);
}
*stream_out = &out->stream;
a2dp_dev->output = out;
a2dp_open_ctrl_path(&out->common);
if (out->common.ctrl_fd == AUDIO_SKT_DISCONNECTED)
{
ERROR("ctrl socket failed to connect (%s)", strerror(errno));
ret = -1;
goto err_open;
}
DEBUG("success");
/* Delay to ensure Headset is in proper state when START is initiated
from DUT immediately after the connection due to ongoing music playback. */
TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(usleep(250000));
return 0;
err_open:
free(out);
*stream_out = NULL;
a2dp_dev->output = NULL;
ERROR("failed");
return ret;
}
| 173,425 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void array_cleanup( char* arr[] , int arr_size)
{
int i=0;
for( i=0; i< arr_size; i++ ){
if( arr[i*2] ){
efree( arr[i*2]);
}
}
efree(arr);
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72241: get_icu_value_internal out-of-bounds read
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static void array_cleanup( char* arr[] , int arr_size)
{
int i=0;
for( i=0; i< arr_size; i++ ){
if( arr[i*2] ){
efree( arr[i*2]);
}
}
efree(arr);
}
| 167,200 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void comps_objmrtree_unite(COMPS_ObjMRTree *rt1, COMPS_ObjMRTree *rt2) {
COMPS_HSList *tmplist, *tmp_subnodes;
COMPS_HSListItem *it;
COMPS_ObjListIt *it2;
struct Pair {
COMPS_HSList * subnodes;
char * key;
char added;
} *pair, *parent_pair;
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = rt2->subnodes;
pair->key = NULL;
tmplist = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(tmplist, NULL, NULL, &free);
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
while (tmplist->first != NULL) {
it = tmplist->first;
comps_hslist_remove(tmplist, tmplist->first);
tmp_subnodes = ((struct Pair*)it->data)->subnodes;
parent_pair = (struct Pair*) it->data;
free(it);
pair->added = 0;
for (it = tmp_subnodes->first; it != NULL; it=it->next) {
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = ((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes;
if (parent_pair->key != NULL) {
pair->key =
malloc(sizeof(char)
* (strlen(((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->key)
+ strlen(parent_pair->key) + 1));
memcpy(pair->key, parent_pair->key,
sizeof(char) * strlen(parent_pair->key));
memcpy(pair->key+strlen(parent_pair->key),
((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
} else {
pair->key = malloc(sizeof(char)*
(strlen(((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->key) +
1));
memcpy(pair->key, ((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
}
/* current node has data */
if (((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->data->first != NULL) {
for (it2 = ((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->data->first;
it2 != NULL; it2 = it2->next) {
comps_objmrtree_set(rt1, pair->key, it2->comps_obj);
}
if (((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes->first) {
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
} else {
free(pair->key);
free(pair);
}
/* current node hasn't data */
} else {
if (((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes->first) {
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
} else {
free(pair->key);
free(pair);
}
}
}
free(parent_pair->key);
free(parent_pair);
}
comps_hslist_destroy(&tmplist);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void comps_objmrtree_unite(COMPS_ObjMRTree *rt1, COMPS_ObjMRTree *rt2) {
COMPS_HSList *tmplist, *tmp_subnodes;
COMPS_HSListItem *it;
COMPS_ObjListIt *it2;
struct Pair {
COMPS_HSList * subnodes;
char * key;
} *pair, *parent_pair;
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = rt2->subnodes;
pair->key = NULL;
tmplist = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(tmplist, NULL, NULL, &free);
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
while (tmplist->first != NULL) {
it = tmplist->first;
comps_hslist_remove(tmplist, tmplist->first);
tmp_subnodes = ((struct Pair*)it->data)->subnodes;
parent_pair = (struct Pair*) it->data;
free(it);
for (it = tmp_subnodes->first; it != NULL; it=it->next) {
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = ((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes;
if (parent_pair->key != NULL) {
pair->key =
malloc(sizeof(char)
* (strlen(((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->key)
+ strlen(parent_pair->key) + 1));
memcpy(pair->key, parent_pair->key,
sizeof(char) * strlen(parent_pair->key));
memcpy(pair->key+strlen(parent_pair->key),
((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
} else {
pair->key = malloc(sizeof(char)*
(strlen(((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->key) +
1));
memcpy(pair->key, ((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
}
/* current node has data */
if (((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->data->first != NULL) {
for (it2 = ((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->data->first;
it2 != NULL; it2 = it2->next) {
comps_objmrtree_set(rt1, pair->key, it2->comps_obj);
}
if (((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes->first) {
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
} else {
free(pair->key);
free(pair);
}
/* current node hasn't data */
} else {
if (((COMPS_ObjMRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes->first) {
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
} else {
free(pair->key);
free(pair);
}
}
}
free(parent_pair->key);
free(parent_pair);
}
comps_hslist_destroy(&tmplist);
}
| 169,751 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: mp_capable_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *opt, u_int opt_len, u_char flags)
{
const struct mp_capable *mpc = (const struct mp_capable *) opt;
if (!(opt_len == 12 && flags & TH_SYN) &&
!(opt_len == 20 && (flags & (TH_SYN | TH_ACK)) == TH_ACK))
return 0;
if (MP_CAPABLE_OPT_VERSION(mpc->sub_ver) != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " Unknown Version (%d)", MP_CAPABLE_OPT_VERSION(mpc->sub_ver)));
return 1;
}
if (mpc->flags & MP_CAPABLE_C)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " csum"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " {0x%" PRIx64, EXTRACT_64BITS(mpc->sender_key)));
if (opt_len == 20) /* ACK */
ND_PRINT((ndo, ",0x%" PRIx64, EXTRACT_64BITS(mpc->receiver_key)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "}"));
return 1;
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-13040/MPTCP: Clean up printing DSS suboption.
Do the length checking inline; that means we print stuff up to the point
at which we run out of option data.
First check to make sure we have at least 4 bytes of option, so we have
flags to check.
This fixes a buffer over-read discovered by Kim Gwan Yeong.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-125 | mp_capable_print(netdissect_options *ndo,
const u_char *opt, u_int opt_len, u_char flags)
{
const struct mp_capable *mpc = (const struct mp_capable *) opt;
if (!(opt_len == 12 && (flags & TH_SYN)) &&
!(opt_len == 20 && (flags & (TH_SYN | TH_ACK)) == TH_ACK))
return 0;
if (MP_CAPABLE_OPT_VERSION(mpc->sub_ver) != 0) {
ND_PRINT((ndo, " Unknown Version (%d)", MP_CAPABLE_OPT_VERSION(mpc->sub_ver)));
return 1;
}
if (mpc->flags & MP_CAPABLE_C)
ND_PRINT((ndo, " csum"));
ND_PRINT((ndo, " {0x%" PRIx64, EXTRACT_64BITS(mpc->sender_key)));
if (opt_len == 20) /* ACK */
ND_PRINT((ndo, ",0x%" PRIx64, EXTRACT_64BITS(mpc->receiver_key)));
ND_PRINT((ndo, "}"));
return 1;
}
| 167,835 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FrameView::updateLayoutAndStyleForPainting()
{
RefPtr<FrameView> protector(this);
updateLayoutAndStyleIfNeededRecursive();
if (RenderView* view = renderView()) {
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT1(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("devtools.timeline"), "UpdateLayerTree", "frame", m_frame.get());
InspectorInstrumentation::willUpdateLayerTree(m_frame.get());
view->compositor()->updateIfNeededRecursive();
if (view->compositor()->inCompositingMode() && m_frame->isLocalRoot())
m_frame->page()->scrollingCoordinator()->updateAfterCompositingChangeIfNeeded();
updateCompositedSelectionBoundsIfNeeded();
InspectorInstrumentation::didUpdateLayerTree(m_frame.get());
invalidateTreeIfNeededRecursive();
}
scrollContentsIfNeededRecursive();
ASSERT(lifecycle().state() == DocumentLifecycle::PaintInvalidationClean);
}
Commit Message: Defer call to updateWidgetPositions() outside of RenderLayerScrollableArea.
updateWidgetPositions() can destroy the render tree, so it should never
be called from inside RenderLayerScrollableArea. Leaving it there allows
for the potential of use-after-free bugs.
BUG=402407
R=vollick@chromium.org
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/490473003
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/blink/trunk@180681 bbb929c8-8fbe-4397-9dbb-9b2b20218538
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void FrameView::updateLayoutAndStyleForPainting()
{
RefPtr<FrameView> protector(this);
updateLayoutAndStyleIfNeededRecursive();
updateWidgetPositionsIfNeeded();
if (RenderView* view = renderView()) {
TRACE_EVENT_INSTANT1(TRACE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT("devtools.timeline"), "UpdateLayerTree", "frame", m_frame.get());
InspectorInstrumentation::willUpdateLayerTree(m_frame.get());
view->compositor()->updateIfNeededRecursive();
if (view->compositor()->inCompositingMode() && m_frame->isLocalRoot())
m_frame->page()->scrollingCoordinator()->updateAfterCompositingChangeIfNeeded();
updateCompositedSelectionBoundsIfNeeded();
InspectorInstrumentation::didUpdateLayerTree(m_frame.get());
invalidateTreeIfNeededRecursive();
}
scrollContentsIfNeededRecursive();
ASSERT(lifecycle().state() == DocumentLifecycle::PaintInvalidationClean);
}
| 171,636 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void BluetoothOptionsHandler::GenerateFakePairing(
const std::string& name,
const std::string& address,
const std::string& icon,
const std::string& pairing) {
DictionaryValue device;
device.SetString("name", name);
device.SetString("address", address);
device.SetString("icon", icon);
device.SetBoolean("paired", false);
device.SetBoolean("connected", false);
DictionaryValue op;
op.SetString("pairing", pairing);
if (pairing.compare("bluetoothEnterPasskey") != 0)
op.SetInteger("passkey", 12345);
if (pairing.compare("bluetoothRemotePasskey") == 0)
op.SetInteger("entered", 2);
web_ui_->CallJavascriptFunction(
"options.SystemOptions.connectBluetoothDevice", device, op);
}
Commit Message: Implement methods for pairing of bluetooth devices.
BUG=chromium:100392,chromium:102139
TEST=
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/8495018
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@109094 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void BluetoothOptionsHandler::GenerateFakePairing(
bool connected,
const std::string& pairing) {
DictionaryValue properties;
properties.SetString(bluetooth_device::kNameProperty, name);
properties.SetString(bluetooth_device::kAddressProperty, address);
properties.SetString(bluetooth_device::kIconProperty, icon);
properties.SetBoolean(bluetooth_device::kPairedProperty, paired);
properties.SetBoolean(bluetooth_device::kConnectedProperty, connected);
properties.SetInteger(bluetooth_device::kClassProperty, 0);
chromeos::BluetoothDevice* device =
chromeos::BluetoothDevice::Create(properties);
DeviceFound("FakeAdapter", device);
if (pairing.compare("bluetoothRemotePasskey") == 0) {
DisplayPasskey(device, 12345, 2);
} else if (pairing.compare("bluetoothConfirmPasskey") == 0) {
RequestConfirmation(device, 12345);
} else if (pairing.compare("bluetoothEnterPasskey") == 0) {
RequestPasskey(device);
}
delete device;
}
| 170,970 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: modifier_total_encodings(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm)
{
return 1 + /* (1) nothing */
pm->ngammas + /* (2) gamma values to test */
pm->nencodings + /* (3) total number of encodings */
/* The following test only works after the first time through the
* png_modifier code because 'bit_depth' is set when the IHDR is read.
* modifier_reset, below, preserves the setting until after it has called
* the iterate function (also below.)
*
* For this reason do not rely on this function outside a call to
* modifier_reset.
*/
((pm->bit_depth == 16 || pm->assume_16_bit_calculations) ?
pm->nencodings : 0); /* (4) encodings with gamma == 1.0 */
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | modifier_total_encodings(PNG_CONST png_modifier *pm)
modifier_total_encodings(const png_modifier *pm)
{
return 1 + /* (1) nothing */
pm->ngammas + /* (2) gamma values to test */
pm->nencodings + /* (3) total number of encodings */
/* The following test only works after the first time through the
* png_modifier code because 'bit_depth' is set when the IHDR is read.
* modifier_reset, below, preserves the setting until after it has called
* the iterate function (also below.)
*
* For this reason do not rely on this function outside a call to
* modifier_reset.
*/
((pm->bit_depth == 16 || pm->assume_16_bit_calculations) ?
pm->nencodings : 0); /* (4) encodings with gamma == 1.0 */
}
| 173,671 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: DocumentInit& DocumentInit::WithPreviousDocumentCSP(
const ContentSecurityPolicy* previous_csp) {
DCHECK(!previous_csp_);
previous_csp_ = previous_csp;
return *this;
}
Commit Message: Inherit the navigation initiator when navigating instead of the parent/opener
Spec PR: https://github.com/w3c/webappsec-csp/pull/358
Bug: 905301, 894228, 836148
Change-Id: I43ada2266d42d1cd56dbe3c6dd89d115e878a83a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1314633
Commit-Queue: Andy Paicu <andypaicu@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Mike West <mkwst@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#610850}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | DocumentInit& DocumentInit::WithPreviousDocumentCSP(
| 173,054 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageWebpCtx (gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtx * outfile, int quality)
{
uint8_t *argb;
int x, y;
uint8_t *p;
uint8_t *out;
size_t out_size;
if (im == NULL) {
return;
}
if (!gdImageTrueColor(im)) {
gd_error("Paletter image not supported by webp");
return;
}
if (quality == -1) {
quality = 80;
}
if (overflow2(gdImageSX(im), 4)) {
return;
}
if (overflow2(gdImageSX(im) * 4, gdImageSY(im))) {
return;
}
argb = (uint8_t *)gdMalloc(gdImageSX(im) * 4 * gdImageSY(im));
if (!argb) {
return;
}
p = argb;
for (y = 0; y < gdImageSY(im); y++) {
for (x = 0; x < gdImageSX(im); x++) {
register int c;
register char a;
c = im->tpixels[y][x];
a = gdTrueColorGetAlpha(c);
if (a == 127) {
a = 0;
} else {
a = 255 - ((a << 1) + (a >> 6));
}
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetRed(c);
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetGreen(c);
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetBlue(c);
*(p++) = a;
}
}
out_size = WebPEncodeRGBA(argb, gdImageSX(im), gdImageSY(im), gdImageSX(im) * 4, quality, &out);
if (out_size == 0) {
gd_error("gd-webp encoding failed");
goto freeargb;
}
gdPutBuf(out, out_size, outfile);
free(out);
freeargb:
gdFree(argb);
}
Commit Message: Fix double-free in gdImageWebPtr()
The issue is that gdImageWebpCtx() (which is called by gdImageWebpPtr() and
the other WebP output functions to do the real work) does not return whether
it succeeded or failed, so this is not checked in gdImageWebpPtr() and the
function wrongly assumes everything is okay, which is not, in this case,
because there is a size limitation for WebP, namely that the width and
height must by less than 16383.
We can't change the signature of gdImageWebpCtx() for API compatibility
reasons, so we introduce the static helper _gdImageWebpCtx() which returns
success respective failure, so gdImageWebpPtr() and gdImageWebpPtrEx() can
check the return value. We leave it solely to libwebp for now to report
warnings regarding the failing write.
This issue had been reported by Ibrahim El-Sayed to security@libgd.org.
CVE-2016-6912
CWE ID: CWE-415 | BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageWebpCtx (gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtx * outfile, int quality)
/* returns 0 on success, 1 on failure */
static int _gdImageWebpCtx (gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtx * outfile, int quality)
{
uint8_t *argb;
int x, y;
uint8_t *p;
uint8_t *out;
size_t out_size;
int ret = 0;
if (im == NULL) {
return 1;
}
if (!gdImageTrueColor(im)) {
gd_error("Palette image not supported by webp");
return 1;
}
if (quality == -1) {
quality = 80;
}
if (overflow2(gdImageSX(im), 4)) {
return 1;
}
if (overflow2(gdImageSX(im) * 4, gdImageSY(im))) {
return 1;
}
argb = (uint8_t *)gdMalloc(gdImageSX(im) * 4 * gdImageSY(im));
if (!argb) {
return 1;
}
p = argb;
for (y = 0; y < gdImageSY(im); y++) {
for (x = 0; x < gdImageSX(im); x++) {
register int c;
register char a;
c = im->tpixels[y][x];
a = gdTrueColorGetAlpha(c);
if (a == 127) {
a = 0;
} else {
a = 255 - ((a << 1) + (a >> 6));
}
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetRed(c);
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetGreen(c);
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetBlue(c);
*(p++) = a;
}
}
out_size = WebPEncodeRGBA(argb, gdImageSX(im), gdImageSY(im), gdImageSX(im) * 4, quality, &out);
if (out_size == 0) {
gd_error("gd-webp encoding failed");
ret = 1;
goto freeargb;
}
gdPutBuf(out, out_size, outfile);
free(out);
freeargb:
gdFree(argb);
return ret;
}
/*
Function: gdImageWebpCtx
Write the image as WebP data via a <gdIOCtx>. See <gdImageWebpEx>
for more details.
Parameters:
im - The image to write.
outfile - The output sink.
quality - Image quality.
Returns:
Nothing.
*/
BGD_DECLARE(void) gdImageWebpCtx (gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtx * outfile, int quality)
{
_gdImageWebpCtx(im, outfile, quality);
}
| 168,817 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, offsetGet)
{
char *fname, *error;
size_t fname_len;
zval zfname;
phar_entry_info *entry;
zend_string *sfname;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s", &fname, &fname_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
/* security is 0 here so that we can get a better error message than "entry doesn't exist" */
if (!(entry = phar_get_entry_info_dir(phar_obj->archive, fname, fname_len, 1, &error, 0))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Entry %s does not exist%s%s", fname, error?", ":"", error?error:"");
} else {
if (fname_len == sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot get stub \".phar/stub.php\" directly in phar \"%s\", use getStub", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (fname_len == sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar/alias.txt", sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot get alias \".phar/alias.txt\" directly in phar \"%s\", use getAlias", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (fname_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot directly get any files or directories in magic \".phar\" directory", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (entry->is_temp_dir) {
efree(entry->filename);
efree(entry);
}
sfname = strpprintf(0, "phar://%s/%s", phar_obj->archive->fname, fname);
ZVAL_NEW_STR(&zfname, sfname);
spl_instantiate_arg_ex1(phar_obj->spl.info_class, return_value, &zfname);
zval_ptr_dtor(&zfname);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | PHP_METHOD(Phar, offsetGet)
{
char *fname, *error;
size_t fname_len;
zval zfname;
phar_entry_info *entry;
zend_string *sfname;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "p", &fname, &fname_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
/* security is 0 here so that we can get a better error message than "entry doesn't exist" */
if (!(entry = phar_get_entry_info_dir(phar_obj->archive, fname, fname_len, 1, &error, 0))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Entry %s does not exist%s%s", fname, error?", ":"", error?error:"");
} else {
if (fname_len == sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot get stub \".phar/stub.php\" directly in phar \"%s\", use getStub", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (fname_len == sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar/alias.txt", sizeof(".phar/alias.txt")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot get alias \".phar/alias.txt\" directly in phar \"%s\", use getAlias", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (fname_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_BadMethodCallException, 0, "Cannot directly get any files or directories in magic \".phar\" directory", phar_obj->archive->fname);
return;
}
if (entry->is_temp_dir) {
efree(entry->filename);
efree(entry);
}
sfname = strpprintf(0, "phar://%s/%s", phar_obj->archive->fname, fname);
ZVAL_NEW_STR(&zfname, sfname);
spl_instantiate_arg_ex1(phar_obj->spl.info_class, return_value, &zfname);
zval_ptr_dtor(&zfname);
}
}
| 165,066 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: image_pixel_setf(image_pixel *this, unsigned int max)
{
this->redf = this->red / (double)max;
this->greenf = this->green / (double)max;
this->bluef = this->blue / (double)max;
this->alphaf = this->alpha / (double)max;
if (this->red < max)
this->rede = this->redf * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->rede = 0;
if (this->green < max)
this->greene = this->greenf * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->greene = 0;
if (this->blue < max)
this->bluee = this->bluef * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->bluee = 0;
if (this->alpha < max)
this->alphae = this->alphaf * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->alphae = 0;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | image_pixel_setf(image_pixel *this, unsigned int max)
image_pixel_setf(image_pixel *this, unsigned int rMax, unsigned int gMax,
unsigned int bMax, unsigned int aMax)
{
this->redf = this->red / (double)rMax;
this->greenf = this->green / (double)gMax;
this->bluef = this->blue / (double)bMax;
this->alphaf = this->alpha / (double)aMax;
if (this->red < rMax)
this->rede = this->redf * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->rede = 0;
if (this->green < gMax)
this->greene = this->greenf * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->greene = 0;
if (this->blue < bMax)
this->bluee = this->bluef * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->bluee = 0;
if (this->alpha < aMax)
this->alphae = this->alphaf * DBL_EPSILON;
else
this->alphae = 0;
}
| 173,618 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: pdf_dict_put(fz_context *ctx, pdf_obj *obj, pdf_obj *key, pdf_obj *val)
{
int i;
RESOLVE(obj);
if (!OBJ_IS_DICT(obj))
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "not a dict (%s)", pdf_objkindstr(obj));
if (!val)
val = PDF_OBJ_NULL;
if (DICT(obj)->len > 100 && !(obj->flags & PDF_FLAGS_SORTED))
pdf_sort_dict(ctx, obj);
if (key < PDF_OBJ_NAME__LIMIT)
i = pdf_dict_find(ctx, obj, key);
else
i = pdf_dict_finds(ctx, obj, pdf_to_name(ctx, key));
prepare_object_for_alteration(ctx, obj, val);
if (i >= 0 && i < DICT(obj)->len)
{
if (DICT(obj)->items[i].v != val)
{
pdf_obj *d = DICT(obj)->items[i].v;
DICT(obj)->items[i].v = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, val);
{
pdf_obj *d = DICT(obj)->items[i].v;
DICT(obj)->items[i].v = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, val);
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, d);
}
}
else
memmove(&DICT(obj)->items[i + 1],
&DICT(obj)->items[i],
(DICT(obj)->len - i) * sizeof(struct keyval));
DICT(obj)->items[i].k = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, key);
DICT(obj)->items[i].v = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, val);
DICT(obj)->len ++;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-416 | pdf_dict_put(fz_context *ctx, pdf_obj *obj, pdf_obj *key, pdf_obj *val)
static void
pdf_dict_get_put(fz_context *ctx, pdf_obj *obj, pdf_obj *key, pdf_obj *val, pdf_obj **old_val)
{
int i;
if (old_val)
*old_val = NULL;
RESOLVE(obj);
if (!OBJ_IS_DICT(obj))
fz_throw(ctx, FZ_ERROR_GENERIC, "not a dict (%s)", pdf_objkindstr(obj));
if (!val)
val = PDF_OBJ_NULL;
if (DICT(obj)->len > 100 && !(obj->flags & PDF_FLAGS_SORTED))
pdf_sort_dict(ctx, obj);
if (key < PDF_OBJ_NAME__LIMIT)
i = pdf_dict_find(ctx, obj, key);
else
i = pdf_dict_finds(ctx, obj, pdf_to_name(ctx, key));
prepare_object_for_alteration(ctx, obj, val);
if (i >= 0 && i < DICT(obj)->len)
{
if (DICT(obj)->items[i].v != val)
{
pdf_obj *d = DICT(obj)->items[i].v;
DICT(obj)->items[i].v = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, val);
{
pdf_obj *d = DICT(obj)->items[i].v;
DICT(obj)->items[i].v = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, val);
if (old_val)
*old_val = d;
else
pdf_drop_obj(ctx, d);
}
}
else
memmove(&DICT(obj)->items[i + 1],
&DICT(obj)->items[i],
(DICT(obj)->len - i) * sizeof(struct keyval));
DICT(obj)->items[i].k = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, key);
DICT(obj)->items[i].v = pdf_keep_obj(ctx, val);
DICT(obj)->len ++;
}
}
| 165,260 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SelectionEditor::NodeChildrenWillBeRemoved(ContainerNode& container) {
if (selection_.IsNone())
return;
const Position old_base = selection_.base_;
const Position old_extent = selection_.extent_;
const Position& new_base =
ComputePositionForChildrenRemoval(old_base, container);
const Position& new_extent =
ComputePositionForChildrenRemoval(old_extent, container);
if (new_base == old_base && new_extent == old_extent)
return;
selection_ = SelectionInDOMTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(new_base, new_extent)
.SetIsHandleVisible(selection_.IsHandleVisible())
.Build();
MarkCacheDirty();
}
Commit Message: Move SelectionTemplate::is_handle_visible_ to FrameSelection
This patch moves |is_handle_visible_| to |FrameSelection| from |SelectionTemplate|
since handle visibility is used only for setting |FrameSelection|, hence it is
a redundant member variable of |SelectionTemplate|.
Bug: 742093
Change-Id: I3add4da3844fb40be34dcb4d4b46b5fa6fed1d7e
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/595389
Commit-Queue: Yoshifumi Inoue <yosin@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Xiaocheng Hu <xiaochengh@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kent Tamura <tkent@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#491660}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void SelectionEditor::NodeChildrenWillBeRemoved(ContainerNode& container) {
if (selection_.IsNone())
return;
const Position old_base = selection_.base_;
const Position old_extent = selection_.extent_;
const Position& new_base =
ComputePositionForChildrenRemoval(old_base, container);
const Position& new_extent =
ComputePositionForChildrenRemoval(old_extent, container);
if (new_base == old_base && new_extent == old_extent)
return;
selection_ = SelectionInDOMTree::Builder()
.SetBaseAndExtent(new_base, new_extent)
.Build();
MarkCacheDirty();
}
| 171,764 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: StorageHandler::StorageHandler()
: DevToolsDomainHandler(Storage::Metainfo::domainName),
process_(nullptr),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | StorageHandler::StorageHandler()
: DevToolsDomainHandler(Storage::Metainfo::domainName),
storage_partition_(nullptr),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {}
| 172,775 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GpuDataManager::UpdateGpuInfo(const GPUInfo& gpu_info) {
{
base::AutoLock auto_lock(gpu_info_lock_);
if (!gpu_info_.Merge(gpu_info))
return;
RunGpuInfoUpdateCallbacks();
content::GetContentClient()->SetGpuInfo(gpu_info_);
}
UpdateGpuFeatureFlags();
}
Commit Message: Fix a lock re-entry bug in GpuDataManager::UpdateGpuInfo.
The issue is that the registered callbacks could request GPUInfo, so they could re-enter the lock. Therefore, we should release the lock before we run through callbacks.
BUG=84805
TEST=the issue in 84805 is gone.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7054063
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@87898 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void GpuDataManager::UpdateGpuInfo(const GPUInfo& gpu_info) {
{
base::AutoLock auto_lock(gpu_info_lock_);
if (!gpu_info_.Merge(gpu_info))
return;
}
RunGpuInfoUpdateCallbacks();
{
base::AutoLock auto_lock(gpu_info_lock_);
content::GetContentClient()->SetGpuInfo(gpu_info_);
}
UpdateGpuFeatureFlags();
}
| 170,410 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: fbPictureInit (ScreenPtr pScreen, PictFormatPtr formats, int nformats)
{
srcRepeat = FALSE;
if (maskTransform)
maskRepeat = FALSE;
if (!miComputeCompositeRegion (®ion, pSrc, pMask, pDst, xSrc, ySrc,
xMask, yMask, xDst, yDst, width, height))
return;
n = REGION_NUM_RECTS (®ion);
pbox = REGION_RECTS (®ion);
while (n--)
{
h = pbox->y2 - pbox->y1;
y_src = pbox->y1 - yDst + ySrc;
y_msk = pbox->y1 - yDst + yMask;
y_dst = pbox->y1;
while (h)
{
h_this = h;
w = pbox->x2 - pbox->x1;
x_src = pbox->x1 - xDst + xSrc;
x_msk = pbox->x1 - xDst + xMask;
x_dst = pbox->x1;
if (maskRepeat)
{
y_msk = mod (y_msk - pMask->pDrawable->y, pMask->pDrawable->height);
if (h_this > pMask->pDrawable->height - y_msk)
h_this = pMask->pDrawable->height - y_msk;
y_msk += pMask->pDrawable->y;
}
if (srcRepeat)
{
y_src = mod (y_src - pSrc->pDrawable->y, pSrc->pDrawable->height);
if (h_this > pSrc->pDrawable->height - y_src)
h_this = pSrc->pDrawable->height - y_src;
y_src += pSrc->pDrawable->y;
}
while (w)
{
w_this = w;
if (maskRepeat)
{
x_msk = mod (x_msk - pMask->pDrawable->x, pMask->pDrawable->width);
if (w_this > pMask->pDrawable->width - x_msk)
w_this = pMask->pDrawable->width - x_msk;
x_msk += pMask->pDrawable->x;
}
if (srcRepeat)
{
x_src = mod (x_src - pSrc->pDrawable->x, pSrc->pDrawable->width);
if (w_this > pSrc->pDrawable->width - x_src)
w_this = pSrc->pDrawable->width - x_src;
x_src += pSrc->pDrawable->x;
}
(*func) (op, pSrc, pMask, pDst,
x_src, y_src, x_msk, y_msk, x_dst, y_dst,
w_this, h_this);
w -= w_this;
x_src += w_this;
x_msk += w_this;
x_dst += w_this;
}
h -= h_this;
y_src += h_this;
y_msk += h_this;
y_dst += h_this;
}
pbox++;
}
REGION_UNINIT (pDst->pDrawable->pScreen, ®ion);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-189 | fbPictureInit (ScreenPtr pScreen, PictFormatPtr formats, int nformats)
{
srcRepeat = FALSE;
if (maskTransform)
maskRepeat = FALSE;
fbWalkCompositeRegion (op, pSrc, pMask, pDst, xSrc, ySrc,
xMask, yMask, xDst, yDst, width, height,
srcRepeat, maskRepeat, func);
}
| 165,130 |
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