instruction stringclasses 1 value | input stringlengths 90 5.47k | output stringlengths 16 15.4k | __index_level_0__ int64 165k 175k |
|---|---|---|---|
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void gdImageWebpCtx (gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtx * outfile, int quantization)
{
uint8_t *argb;
int x, y;
uint8_t *p;
uint8_t *out;
size_t out_size;
if (im == NULL) {
return;
}
if (!gdImageTrueColor(im)) {
zend_error(E_ERROR, "Paletter image not supported by webp");
return;
}
if (quantization == -1) {
quantization = 80;
}
argb = (uint8_t *)gdMalloc(gdImageSX(im) * 4 * gdImageSY(im));
if (!argb) {
return;
}
p = argb;
for (y = 0; y < gdImageSY(im); y++) {
for (x = 0; x < gdImageSX(im); x++) {
register int c;
register char a;
c = im->tpixels[y][x];
a = gdTrueColorGetAlpha(c);
if (a == 127) {
a = 0;
} else {
a = 255 - ((a << 1) + (a >> 6));
}
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetRed(c);
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetGreen(c);
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetBlue(c);
*(p++) = a;
}
}
out_size = WebPEncodeRGBA(argb, gdImageSX(im), gdImageSY(im), gdImageSX(im) * 4, quantization, &out);
if (out_size == 0) {
zend_error(E_ERROR, "gd-webp encoding failed");
goto freeargb;
}
gdPutBuf(out, out_size, outfile);
free(out);
freeargb:
gdFree(argb);
}
Commit Message: Merge branch 'PHP-5.6' into PHP-7.0
CWE ID: CWE-190 | void gdImageWebpCtx (gdImagePtr im, gdIOCtx * outfile, int quantization)
{
uint8_t *argb;
int x, y;
uint8_t *p;
uint8_t *out;
size_t out_size;
if (im == NULL) {
return;
}
if (!gdImageTrueColor(im)) {
zend_error(E_ERROR, "Paletter image not supported by webp");
return;
}
if (quantization == -1) {
quantization = 80;
}
if (overflow2(gdImageSX(im), 4)) {
return;
}
if (overflow2(gdImageSX(im) * 4, gdImageSY(im))) {
return;
}
argb = (uint8_t *)gdMalloc(gdImageSX(im) * 4 * gdImageSY(im));
if (!argb) {
return;
}
p = argb;
for (y = 0; y < gdImageSY(im); y++) {
for (x = 0; x < gdImageSX(im); x++) {
register int c;
register char a;
c = im->tpixels[y][x];
a = gdTrueColorGetAlpha(c);
if (a == 127) {
a = 0;
} else {
a = 255 - ((a << 1) + (a >> 6));
}
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetRed(c);
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetGreen(c);
*(p++) = gdTrueColorGetBlue(c);
*(p++) = a;
}
}
out_size = WebPEncodeRGBA(argb, gdImageSX(im), gdImageSY(im), gdImageSX(im) * 4, quantization, &out);
if (out_size == 0) {
zend_error(E_ERROR, "gd-webp encoding failed");
goto freeargb;
}
gdPutBuf(out, out_size, outfile);
free(out);
freeargb:
gdFree(argb);
}
| 169,940 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PepperDeviceEnumerationHostHelperTest()
: ppapi_host_(&sink_, ppapi::PpapiPermissions()),
resource_host_(&ppapi_host_, 12345, 67890),
device_enumeration_(&resource_host_,
&delegate_,
PP_DEVICETYPE_DEV_AUDIOCAPTURE,
GURL("http://example.com")) {}
Commit Message: Pepper: Access PepperMediaDeviceManager through a WeakPtr
Its lifetime is scoped to the RenderFrame, and it might go away before the
hosts that refer to it.
BUG=423030
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/653243003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#299897}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | PepperDeviceEnumerationHostHelperTest()
: ppapi_host_(&sink_, ppapi::PpapiPermissions()),
resource_host_(&ppapi_host_, 12345, 67890),
device_enumeration_(&resource_host_,
delegate_.AsWeakPtr(),
PP_DEVICETYPE_DEV_AUDIOCAPTURE,
GURL("http://example.com")) {}
| 171,607 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_rec_arrays (MyObject *obj, GPtrArray *in, GPtrArray **ret, GError **error)
{
char **strs;
GArray *ints;
guint v_UINT;
if (in->len != 2)
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid array len");
return FALSE;
}
strs = g_ptr_array_index (in, 0);
if (!*strs || strcmp (*strs, "foo"))
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid string 0");
return FALSE;
}
strs++;
if (!*strs || strcmp (*strs, "bar"))
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid string 1");
return FALSE;
}
strs++;
if (*strs)
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid string array len in pos 0");
return FALSE;
}
strs = g_ptr_array_index (in, 1);
if (!*strs || strcmp (*strs, "baz"))
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid string 0");
return FALSE;
}
strs++;
if (!*strs || strcmp (*strs, "whee"))
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid string 1");
return FALSE;
}
strs++;
if (!*strs || strcmp (*strs, "moo"))
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid string 2");
return FALSE;
}
strs++;
if (*strs)
{
g_set_error (error,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"invalid string array len in pos 1");
return FALSE;
}
*ret = g_ptr_array_new ();
ints = g_array_new (TRUE, TRUE, sizeof (guint));
v_UINT = 10;
g_array_append_val (ints, v_UINT);
v_UINT = 42;
g_array_append_val (ints, v_UINT);
v_UINT = 27;
g_array_append_val (ints, v_UINT);
g_ptr_array_add (*ret, ints);
ints = g_array_new (TRUE, TRUE, sizeof (guint));
v_UINT = 30;
g_array_append_val (ints, v_UINT);
g_ptr_array_add (*ret, ints);
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_rec_arrays (MyObject *obj, GPtrArray *in, GPtrArray **ret, GError **error)
| 165,116 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnGetTransferBuffer(
int32 id,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
if (!channel_->renderer_process())
return;
if (command_buffer_.get()) {
base::SharedMemoryHandle transfer_buffer = base::SharedMemoryHandle();
uint32 size = 0;
gpu::Buffer buffer = command_buffer_->GetTransferBuffer(id);
if (buffer.shared_memory) {
buffer.shared_memory->ShareToProcess(channel_->renderer_process(),
&transfer_buffer);
size = buffer.size;
}
GpuCommandBufferMsg_GetTransferBuffer::WriteReplyParams(reply_message,
transfer_buffer,
size);
} else {
reply_message->set_reply_error();
}
Send(reply_message);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void GpuCommandBufferStub::OnGetTransferBuffer(
int32 id,
IPC::Message* reply_message) {
if (command_buffer_.get()) {
base::SharedMemoryHandle transfer_buffer = base::SharedMemoryHandle();
uint32 size = 0;
gpu::Buffer buffer = command_buffer_->GetTransferBuffer(id);
if (buffer.shared_memory) {
#if defined(OS_WIN)
transfer_buffer = NULL;
sandbox::BrokerDuplicateHandle(buffer.shared_memory->handle(),
channel_->renderer_pid(), &transfer_buffer, FILE_MAP_READ |
FILE_MAP_WRITE, 0);
CHECK(transfer_buffer != NULL);
#else
buffer.shared_memory->ShareToProcess(channel_->renderer_pid(),
&transfer_buffer);
#endif
size = buffer.size;
}
GpuCommandBufferMsg_GetTransferBuffer::WriteReplyParams(reply_message,
transfer_buffer,
size);
} else {
reply_message->set_reply_error();
}
Send(reply_message);
}
| 170,937 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: png_info_init_3(png_infopp ptr_ptr, png_size_t png_info_struct_size)
{
png_infop info_ptr = *ptr_ptr;
png_debug(1, "in png_info_init_3");
if (info_ptr == NULL)
return;
if (png_sizeof(png_info) > png_info_struct_size)
{
png_destroy_struct(info_ptr);
info_ptr = (png_infop)png_create_struct(PNG_STRUCT_INFO);
*ptr_ptr = info_ptr;
}
/* Set everything to 0 */
png_memset(info_ptr, 0, png_sizeof(png_info));
}
Commit Message: third_party/libpng: update to 1.2.54
TBR=darin@chromium.org
BUG=560291
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1467263003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#362298}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | png_info_init_3(png_infopp ptr_ptr, png_size_t png_info_struct_size)
{
png_infop info_ptr = *ptr_ptr;
png_debug(1, "in png_info_init_3");
if (info_ptr == NULL)
return;
if (png_sizeof(png_info) > png_info_struct_size)
{
png_destroy_struct(info_ptr);
info_ptr = (png_infop)png_create_struct(PNG_STRUCT_INFO);
*ptr_ptr = info_ptr;
if (info_ptr == NULL)
return;
}
/* Set everything to 0 */
png_memset(info_ptr, 0, png_sizeof(png_info));
}
| 172,163 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PasswordAutofillAgent::PasswordAutofillAgent(content::RenderFrame* render_frame)
: content::RenderFrameObserver(render_frame),
logging_state_active_(false),
was_username_autofilled_(false),
was_password_autofilled_(false),
weak_ptr_factory_(this) {
Send(new AutofillHostMsg_PasswordAutofillAgentConstructed(routing_id()));
}
Commit Message: Remove WeakPtrFactory from PasswordAutofillAgent
Unlike in AutofillAgent, the factory is no longer used in PAA.
R=dvadym@chromium.org
BUG=609010,609007,608100,608101,433486
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/1945723003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#391475}
CWE ID: | PasswordAutofillAgent::PasswordAutofillAgent(content::RenderFrame* render_frame)
: content::RenderFrameObserver(render_frame),
logging_state_active_(false),
was_username_autofilled_(false),
was_password_autofilled_(false) {
Send(new AutofillHostMsg_PasswordAutofillAgentConstructed(routing_id()));
}
| 173,334 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SampleTable::~SampleTable() {
delete[] mSampleToChunkEntries;
mSampleToChunkEntries = NULL;
delete[] mSyncSamples;
mSyncSamples = NULL;
delete mCompositionDeltaLookup;
mCompositionDeltaLookup = NULL;
delete[] mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries;
mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries = NULL;
delete[] mSampleTimeEntries;
mSampleTimeEntries = NULL;
delete[] mTimeToSample;
mTimeToSample = NULL;
delete mSampleIterator;
mSampleIterator = NULL;
}
Commit Message: Resolve merge conflict when cp'ing ag/931301 to mnc-mr1-release
Change-Id: I079d1db2d30d126f8aed348bd62451acf741037d
CWE ID: CWE-20 | SampleTable::~SampleTable() {
delete[] mSampleToChunkEntries;
mSampleToChunkEntries = NULL;
delete[] mSyncSamples;
mSyncSamples = NULL;
delete mCompositionDeltaLookup;
mCompositionDeltaLookup = NULL;
delete[] mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries;
mCompositionTimeDeltaEntries = NULL;
delete[] mSampleTimeEntries;
mSampleTimeEntries = NULL;
delete mSampleIterator;
mSampleIterator = NULL;
}
| 174,174 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void comps_objrtree_unite(COMPS_ObjRTree *rt1, COMPS_ObjRTree *rt2) {
COMPS_HSList *tmplist, *tmp_subnodes;
COMPS_HSListItem *it;
struct Pair {
COMPS_HSList * subnodes;
char * key;
char added;
} *pair, *parent_pair;
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = rt2->subnodes;
pair->key = NULL;
tmplist = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(tmplist, NULL, NULL, &free);
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
while (tmplist->first != NULL) {
it = tmplist->first;
comps_hslist_remove(tmplist, tmplist->first);
tmp_subnodes = ((struct Pair*)it->data)->subnodes;
parent_pair = (struct Pair*) it->data;
free(it);
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = ((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes;
if (parent_pair->key != NULL) {
pair->key = malloc(sizeof(char)
* (strlen(((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key)
+ strlen(parent_pair->key) + 1));
memcpy(pair->key, parent_pair->key,
sizeof(char) * strlen(parent_pair->key));
memcpy(pair->key + strlen(parent_pair->key),
((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
} else {
pair->key = malloc(sizeof(char)*
(strlen(((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key) +1));
memcpy(pair->key, ((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
}
/* current node has data */
if (((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->data != NULL) {
comps_objrtree_set(rt1, pair->key,
(((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->data));
}
if (((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes->first) {
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
} else {
free(pair->key);
free(pair);
}
}
free(parent_pair->key);
free(parent_pair);
}
comps_hslist_destroy(&tmplist);
}
Commit Message: Fix UAF in comps_objmrtree_unite function
The added field is not used at all in many places and it is probably the
left-over of some copy-paste.
CWE ID: CWE-416 | void comps_objrtree_unite(COMPS_ObjRTree *rt1, COMPS_ObjRTree *rt2) {
COMPS_HSList *tmplist, *tmp_subnodes;
COMPS_HSListItem *it;
struct Pair {
COMPS_HSList * subnodes;
char * key;
} *pair, *parent_pair;
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = rt2->subnodes;
pair->key = NULL;
tmplist = comps_hslist_create();
comps_hslist_init(tmplist, NULL, NULL, &free);
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
while (tmplist->first != NULL) {
it = tmplist->first;
comps_hslist_remove(tmplist, tmplist->first);
tmp_subnodes = ((struct Pair*)it->data)->subnodes;
parent_pair = (struct Pair*) it->data;
free(it);
pair = malloc(sizeof(struct Pair));
pair->subnodes = ((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes;
if (parent_pair->key != NULL) {
pair->key = malloc(sizeof(char)
* (strlen(((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key)
+ strlen(parent_pair->key) + 1));
memcpy(pair->key, parent_pair->key,
sizeof(char) * strlen(parent_pair->key));
memcpy(pair->key + strlen(parent_pair->key),
((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
} else {
pair->key = malloc(sizeof(char)*
(strlen(((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key) +1));
memcpy(pair->key, ((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key,
sizeof(char)*(strlen(((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->key)+1));
}
/* current node has data */
if (((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->data != NULL) {
comps_objrtree_set(rt1, pair->key,
(((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->data));
}
if (((COMPS_ObjRTreeData*)it->data)->subnodes->first) {
comps_hslist_append(tmplist, pair, 0);
} else {
free(pair->key);
free(pair);
}
}
free(parent_pair->key);
free(parent_pair);
}
comps_hslist_destroy(&tmplist);
}
| 169,752 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void SpdyWriteQueue::RemovePendingWritesForStream(
const base::WeakPtr<SpdyStream>& stream) {
CHECK(!removing_writes_);
removing_writes_ = true;
RequestPriority priority = stream->priority();
CHECK_GE(priority, MINIMUM_PRIORITY);
CHECK_LE(priority, MAXIMUM_PRIORITY);
DCHECK(stream.get());
#if DCHECK_IS_ON
for (int i = MINIMUM_PRIORITY; i <= MAXIMUM_PRIORITY; ++i) {
if (priority == i)
continue;
for (std::deque<PendingWrite>::const_iterator it = queue_[i].begin();
it != queue_[i].end(); ++it) {
DCHECK_NE(it->stream.get(), stream.get());
}
}
#endif
std::deque<PendingWrite>* queue = &queue_[priority];
std::deque<PendingWrite>::iterator out_it = queue->begin();
for (std::deque<PendingWrite>::const_iterator it = queue->begin();
it != queue->end(); ++it) {
if (it->stream.get() == stream.get()) {
delete it->frame_producer;
} else {
*out_it = *it;
++out_it;
}
}
queue->erase(out_it, queue->end());
removing_writes_ = false;
}
Commit Message: These can post callbacks which re-enter into SpdyWriteQueue.
BUG=369539
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/265933007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@268730 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void SpdyWriteQueue::RemovePendingWritesForStream(
const base::WeakPtr<SpdyStream>& stream) {
CHECK(!removing_writes_);
removing_writes_ = true;
RequestPriority priority = stream->priority();
CHECK_GE(priority, MINIMUM_PRIORITY);
CHECK_LE(priority, MAXIMUM_PRIORITY);
DCHECK(stream.get());
#if DCHECK_IS_ON
for (int i = MINIMUM_PRIORITY; i <= MAXIMUM_PRIORITY; ++i) {
if (priority == i)
continue;
for (std::deque<PendingWrite>::const_iterator it = queue_[i].begin();
it != queue_[i].end(); ++it) {
DCHECK_NE(it->stream.get(), stream.get());
}
}
#endif
// Defer deletion until queue iteration is complete, as
// SpdyBuffer::~SpdyBuffer() can result in callbacks into SpdyWriteQueue.
std::vector<SpdyBufferProducer*> erased_buffer_producers;
std::deque<PendingWrite>* queue = &queue_[priority];
std::deque<PendingWrite>::iterator out_it = queue->begin();
for (std::deque<PendingWrite>::const_iterator it = queue->begin();
it != queue->end(); ++it) {
if (it->stream.get() == stream.get()) {
erased_buffer_producers.push_back(it->frame_producer);
} else {
*out_it = *it;
++out_it;
}
}
queue->erase(out_it, queue->end());
removing_writes_ = false;
STLDeleteElements(&erased_buffer_producers); // Invokes callbacks.
}
| 171,674 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_get_iv_size)
{
char *cipher;
char *module;
int cipher_len, module_len;
char *cipher_dir_string;
char *module_dir_string;
MCRYPT td;
MCRYPT_GET_INI
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss",
&cipher, &cipher_len, &module, &module_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
td = mcrypt_module_open(cipher, cipher_dir_string, module, module_dir_string);
if (td != MCRYPT_FAILED) {
RETVAL_LONG(mcrypt_enc_get_iv_size(td));
mcrypt_module_close(td);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, MCRYPT_OPEN_MODULE_FAILED);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message: Fix bug #72455: Heap Overflow due to integer overflows
CWE ID: CWE-190 | PHP_FUNCTION(mcrypt_get_iv_size)
{
char *cipher;
char *module;
int cipher_len, module_len;
char *cipher_dir_string;
char *module_dir_string;
MCRYPT td;
MCRYPT_GET_INI
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "ss",
&cipher, &cipher_len, &module, &module_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
td = mcrypt_module_open(cipher, cipher_dir_string, module, module_dir_string);
if (td != MCRYPT_FAILED) {
RETVAL_LONG(mcrypt_enc_get_iv_size(td));
mcrypt_module_close(td);
} else {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, MCRYPT_OPEN_MODULE_FAILED);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
| 167,105 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: R_API void r_anal_bb_free(RAnalBlock *bb) {
if (!bb) {
return;
}
r_anal_cond_free (bb->cond);
R_FREE (bb->fingerprint);
r_anal_diff_free (bb->diff);
bb->diff = NULL;
R_FREE (bb->op_bytes);
r_anal_switch_op_free (bb->switch_op);
bb->switch_op = NULL;
bb->fingerprint = NULL;
bb->cond = NULL;
R_FREE (bb->label);
R_FREE (bb->op_pos);
R_FREE (bb->parent_reg_arena);
if (bb->prev) {
if (bb->prev->jumpbb == bb) {
bb->prev->jumpbb = NULL;
}
if (bb->prev->failbb == bb) {
bb->prev->failbb = NULL;
}
bb->prev = NULL;
}
if (bb->jumpbb) {
bb->jumpbb->prev = NULL;
bb->jumpbb = NULL;
}
if (bb->failbb) {
bb->failbb->prev = NULL;
bb->failbb = NULL;
}
R_FREE (bb);
}
Commit Message: Fix #10293 - Use-after-free in r_anal_bb_free()
CWE ID: CWE-416 | R_API void r_anal_bb_free(RAnalBlock *bb) {
if (!bb) {
return;
}
r_anal_cond_free (bb->cond);
R_FREE (bb->fingerprint);
r_anal_diff_free (bb->diff);
bb->diff = NULL;
R_FREE (bb->op_bytes);
r_anal_switch_op_free (bb->switch_op);
bb->switch_op = NULL;
bb->fingerprint = NULL;
bb->cond = NULL;
R_FREE (bb->label);
R_FREE (bb->op_pos);
R_FREE (bb->parent_reg_arena);
if (bb->prev) {
if (bb->prev->jumpbb == bb) {
bb->prev->jumpbb = NULL;
}
if (bb->prev->failbb == bb) {
bb->prev->failbb = NULL;
}
bb->prev = NULL;
}
if (bb->jumpbb) {
bb->jumpbb->prev = NULL;
bb->jumpbb = NULL;
}
if (bb->failbb) {
bb->failbb->prev = NULL;
bb->failbb = NULL;
}
if (bb->next) {
// avoid double free
bb->next->prev = NULL;
}
R_FREE (bb); // double free
}
| 169,199 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WM_SYMBOL midi *WildMidi_OpenBuffer(uint8_t *midibuffer, uint32_t size) {
uint8_t mus_hdr[] = { 'M', 'U', 'S', 0x1A };
uint8_t xmi_hdr[] = { 'F', 'O', 'R', 'M' };
midi * ret = NULL;
if (!WM_Initialized) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_INIT, NULL, 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (midibuffer == NULL) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_INVALID_ARG, "(NULL midi data buffer)", 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (size > WM_MAXFILESIZE) {
/* don't bother loading suspiciously long files */
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_LONGFIL, NULL, 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (memcmp(midibuffer,"HMIMIDIP", 8) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewHmp(midibuffer, size);
} else if (memcmp(midibuffer, "HMI-MIDISONG061595", 18) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewHmi(midibuffer, size);
} else if (memcmp(midibuffer, mus_hdr, 4) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewMus(midibuffer, size);
} else if (memcmp(midibuffer, xmi_hdr, 4) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewXmi(midibuffer, size);
} else {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewMidi(midibuffer, size);
}
if (ret) {
if (add_handle(ret) != 0) {
WildMidi_Close(ret);
ret = NULL;
}
}
return (ret);
}
Commit Message: wildmidi_lib.c (WildMidi_Open, WildMidi_OpenBuffer): refuse to proceed if less then 18 bytes of input
Fixes bug #178.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | WM_SYMBOL midi *WildMidi_OpenBuffer(uint8_t *midibuffer, uint32_t size) {
uint8_t mus_hdr[] = { 'M', 'U', 'S', 0x1A };
uint8_t xmi_hdr[] = { 'F', 'O', 'R', 'M' };
midi * ret = NULL;
if (!WM_Initialized) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_NOT_INIT, NULL, 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (midibuffer == NULL) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_INVALID_ARG, "(NULL midi data buffer)", 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (size > WM_MAXFILESIZE) {
/* don't bother loading suspiciously long files */
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_LONGFIL, NULL, 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (size < 18) {
_WM_GLOBAL_ERROR(__FUNCTION__, __LINE__, WM_ERR_CORUPT, "(too short)", 0);
return (NULL);
}
if (memcmp(midibuffer,"HMIMIDIP", 8) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewHmp(midibuffer, size);
} else if (memcmp(midibuffer, "HMI-MIDISONG061595", 18) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewHmi(midibuffer, size);
} else if (memcmp(midibuffer, mus_hdr, 4) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewMus(midibuffer, size);
} else if (memcmp(midibuffer, xmi_hdr, 4) == 0) {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewXmi(midibuffer, size);
} else {
ret = (void *) _WM_ParseNewMidi(midibuffer, size);
}
if (ret) {
if (add_handle(ret) != 0) {
WildMidi_Close(ret);
ret = NULL;
}
}
return (ret);
}
| 169,370 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static ssize_t stellaris_enet_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size)
{
stellaris_enet_state *s = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
int n;
uint8_t *p;
uint32_t crc;
if ((s->rctl & SE_RCTL_RXEN) == 0)
return -1;
if (s->np >= 31) {
return 0;
}
DPRINTF("Received packet len=%zu\n", size);
n = s->next_packet + s->np;
if (n >= 31)
n -= 31;
s->np++;
s->rx[n].len = size + 6;
p = s->rx[n].data;
*(p++) = (size + 6);
memset(p, 0, (6 - size) & 3);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static ssize_t stellaris_enet_receive(NetClientState *nc, const uint8_t *buf, size_t size)
{
stellaris_enet_state *s = qemu_get_nic_opaque(nc);
int n;
uint8_t *p;
uint32_t crc;
if ((s->rctl & SE_RCTL_RXEN) == 0)
return -1;
if (s->np >= 31) {
return 0;
}
DPRINTF("Received packet len=%zu\n", size);
n = s->next_packet + s->np;
if (n >= 31)
n -= 31;
if (size >= sizeof(s->rx[n].data) - 6) {
/* If the packet won't fit into the
* emulated 2K RAM, this is reported
* as a FIFO overrun error.
*/
s->ris |= SE_INT_FOV;
stellaris_enet_update(s);
return -1;
}
s->np++;
s->rx[n].len = size + 6;
p = s->rx[n].data;
*(p++) = (size + 6);
memset(p, 0, (6 - size) & 3);
}
| 165,078 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BOOL license_read_scope_list(wStream* s, SCOPE_LIST* scopeList)
{
UINT32 i;
UINT32 scopeCount;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 4)
return FALSE;
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, scopeCount); /* ScopeCount (4 bytes) */
scopeList->count = scopeCount;
scopeList->array = (LICENSE_BLOB*) malloc(sizeof(LICENSE_BLOB) * scopeCount);
/* ScopeArray */
for (i = 0; i < scopeCount; i++)
{
scopeList->array[i].type = BB_SCOPE_BLOB;
if (!license_read_binary_blob(s, &scopeList->array[i]))
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix possible integer overflow in license_read_scope_list()
CWE ID: CWE-189 | BOOL license_read_scope_list(wStream* s, SCOPE_LIST* scopeList)
{
UINT32 i;
UINT32 scopeCount;
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) < 4)
return FALSE;
Stream_Read_UINT32(s, scopeCount); /* ScopeCount (4 bytes) */
if (Stream_GetRemainingLength(s) / sizeof(LICENSE_BLOB) < scopeCount)
return FALSE; /* Avoid overflow in malloc */
scopeList->count = scopeCount;
scopeList->array = (LICENSE_BLOB*) malloc(sizeof(LICENSE_BLOB) * scopeCount);
/* ScopeArray */
for (i = 0; i < scopeCount; i++)
{
scopeList->array[i].type = BB_SCOPE_BLOB;
if (!license_read_binary_blob(s, &scopeList->array[i]))
return FALSE;
}
return TRUE;
}
| 166,440 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintPreviewMessageHandler::OnMetafileReadyForPrinting(
const PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewDocument_Params& params) {
StopWorker(params.document_cookie);
if (params.expected_pages_count <= 0) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
PrintPreviewUI* print_preview_ui = GetPrintPreviewUI();
if (!print_preview_ui)
return;
scoped_refptr<base::RefCountedBytes> data_bytes =
GetDataFromHandle(params.metafile_data_handle, params.data_size);
if (!data_bytes || !data_bytes->size())
return;
print_preview_ui->SetPrintPreviewDataForIndex(COMPLETE_PREVIEW_DOCUMENT_INDEX,
std::move(data_bytes));
print_preview_ui->OnPreviewDataIsAvailable(
params.expected_pages_count, params.preview_request_id);
}
Commit Message: Use pdf compositor service for printing when OOPIF is enabled
When OOPIF is enabled (by site-per-process flag or
top-document-isolation feature), use the pdf compositor service for
converting PaintRecord to PDF on renderers.
In the future, this will make compositing PDF from multiple renderers
possible.
TBR=jzfeng@chromium.org
BUG=455764
Change-Id: I3c28f03f4358e4228239fe1a33384f85e7716e8f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/699765
Commit-Queue: Wei Li <weili@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Cheng <dcheng@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#511616}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | void PrintPreviewMessageHandler::OnMetafileReadyForPrinting(
const PrintHostMsg_DidPreviewDocument_Params& params) {
StopWorker(params.document_cookie);
if (params.expected_pages_count <= 0) {
NOTREACHED();
return;
}
PrintPreviewUI* print_preview_ui = GetPrintPreviewUI();
if (!print_preview_ui)
return;
if (IsOopifEnabled() && print_preview_ui->source_is_modifiable()) {
auto* client = PrintCompositeClient::FromWebContents(web_contents());
DCHECK(client);
client->DoComposite(
params.metafile_data_handle, params.data_size,
base::BindOnce(&PrintPreviewMessageHandler::OnCompositePdfDocumentDone,
weak_ptr_factory_.GetWeakPtr(),
params.expected_pages_count, params.preview_request_id));
} else {
NotifyUIPreviewDocumentReady(
params.expected_pages_count, params.preview_request_id,
GetDataFromHandle(params.metafile_data_handle, params.data_size));
}
}
| 171,890 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetPowerLibrary(
PowerLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->power_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetPowerLibrary(
| 170,643 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: const char* SegmentInfo::GetTitleAsUTF8() const
{
return m_pTitleAsUTF8;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | const char* SegmentInfo::GetTitleAsUTF8() const
| 174,369 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void * CAPSTONE_API cs_winkernel_malloc(size_t size)
{
NT_ASSERT(size);
#pragma prefast(suppress : 30030) // Allocating executable POOL_TYPE memory
CS_WINKERNEL_MEMBLOCK *block = (CS_WINKERNEL_MEMBLOCK *)ExAllocatePoolWithTag(
NonPagedPool, size + sizeof(CS_WINKERNEL_MEMBLOCK), CS_WINKERNEL_POOL_TAG);
if (!block) {
return NULL;
}
block->size = size;
return block->data;
}
Commit Message: provide a validity check to prevent against Integer overflow conditions (#870)
* provide a validity check to prevent against Integer overflow conditions
* fix some style issues.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | void * CAPSTONE_API cs_winkernel_malloc(size_t size)
{
NT_ASSERT(size);
#pragma prefast(suppress : 30030) // Allocating executable POOL_TYPE memory
size_t number_of_bytes = 0;
CS_WINKERNEL_MEMBLOCK *block = NULL;
// A specially crafted size value can trigger the overflow.
// If the sum in a value that overflows or underflows the capacity of the type,
// the function returns NULL.
if (!NT_SUCCESS(RtlSizeTAdd(size, sizeof(CS_WINKERNEL_MEMBLOCK), &number_of_bytes))) {
return NULL;
}
block = (CS_WINKERNEL_MEMBLOCK *)ExAllocatePoolWithTag(
NonPagedPool, number_of_bytes, CS_WINKERNEL_POOL_TAG);
if (!block) {
return NULL;
}
block->size = size;
return block->data;
}
| 168,311 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ProcPanoramiXGetScreenSize(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReq);
WindowPtr pWin;
xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReply rep;
int rc;
if (stuff->screen >= PanoramiXNumScreens)
return BadMatch;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReq);
rc = dixLookupWindow(&pWin, stuff->window, client, DixGetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
rep = (xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReply) {
.type = X_Reply,
.sequenceNumber = client->sequence,
.length = 0,
/* screen dimensions */
.width = screenInfo.screens[stuff->screen]->width,
.height = screenInfo.screens[stuff->screen]->height,
.window = stuff->window,
.screen = stuff->screen
};
if (client->swapped) {
swaps(&rep.sequenceNumber);
swapl(&rep.length);
swapl(&rep.width);
swapl(&rep.height);
swapl(&rep.window);
swapl(&rep.screen);
}
WriteToClient(client, sizeof(xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReply), &rep);
return Success;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | ProcPanoramiXGetScreenSize(ClientPtr client)
{
REQUEST(xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReq);
WindowPtr pWin;
xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReply rep;
int rc;
REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReq);
if (stuff->screen >= PanoramiXNumScreens)
return BadMatch;
rc = dixLookupWindow(&pWin, stuff->window, client, DixGetAttrAccess);
if (rc != Success)
return rc;
rep = (xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReply) {
.type = X_Reply,
.sequenceNumber = client->sequence,
.length = 0,
/* screen dimensions */
.width = screenInfo.screens[stuff->screen]->width,
.height = screenInfo.screens[stuff->screen]->height,
.window = stuff->window,
.screen = stuff->screen
};
if (client->swapped) {
swaps(&rep.sequenceNumber);
swapl(&rep.length);
swapl(&rep.width);
swapl(&rep.height);
swapl(&rep.window);
swapl(&rep.screen);
}
WriteToClient(client, sizeof(xPanoramiXGetScreenSizeReply), &rep);
return Success;
}
| 165,432 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ExtensionTtsSpeakCompletedFunction::RunImpl() {
int request_id;
std::string error_message;
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetInteger(0, &request_id));
if (args_->GetSize() >= 2)
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(args_->GetString(1, &error_message));
ExtensionTtsController::GetInstance()->OnSpeechFinished(
request_id, error_message);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Extend TTS extension API to support richer events returned from the engine
to the client. Previously we just had a completed event; this adds start,
word boundary, sentence boundary, and marker boundary. In addition,
interrupted and canceled, which were previously errors, now become events.
Mac and Windows implementations extended to support as many of these events
as possible.
BUG=67713
BUG=70198
BUG=75106
BUG=83404
TEST=Updates all TTS API tests to be event-based, and adds new tests.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6792014
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@91665 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool ExtensionTtsSpeakCompletedFunction::RunImpl() {
bool ExtensionTtsGetVoicesFunction::RunImpl() {
result_.reset(ExtensionTtsController::GetInstance()->GetVoices(profile()));
return true;
}
| 170,385 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SimpleBlock::SimpleBlock(
Cluster* pCluster,
long idx,
long long start,
long long size) :
BlockEntry(pCluster, idx),
m_block(start, size, 0)
{
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | SimpleBlock::SimpleBlock(
| 174,444 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int spl_filesystem_file_read_csv(spl_filesystem_object *intern, char delimiter, char enclosure, char escape, zval *return_value TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
int ret = SUCCESS;
do {
ret = spl_filesystem_file_read(intern, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
} while (ret == SUCCESS && !intern->u.file.current_line_len && SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_SKIP_EMPTY));
if (ret == SUCCESS) {
size_t buf_len = intern->u.file.current_line_len;
char *buf = estrndup(intern->u.file.current_line, buf_len);
if (intern->u.file.current_zval) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&intern->u.file.current_zval);
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(intern->u.file.current_zval);
php_fgetcsv(intern->u.file.stream, delimiter, enclosure, escape, buf_len, buf, intern->u.file.current_zval TSRMLS_CC);
if (return_value) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(return_value) != IS_NULL) {
zval_dtor(return_value);
ZVAL_NULL(return_value);
}
ZVAL_ZVAL(return_value, intern->u.file.current_zval, 1, 0);
}
}
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
Commit Message: Fix bug #72262 - do not overflow int
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static int spl_filesystem_file_read_csv(spl_filesystem_object *intern, char delimiter, char enclosure, char escape, zval *return_value TSRMLS_DC) /* {{{ */
{
int ret = SUCCESS;
do {
ret = spl_filesystem_file_read(intern, 1 TSRMLS_CC);
} while (ret == SUCCESS && !intern->u.file.current_line_len && SPL_HAS_FLAG(intern->flags, SPL_FILE_OBJECT_SKIP_EMPTY));
if (ret == SUCCESS) {
size_t buf_len = intern->u.file.current_line_len;
char *buf = estrndup(intern->u.file.current_line, buf_len);
if (intern->u.file.current_zval) {
zval_ptr_dtor(&intern->u.file.current_zval);
}
ALLOC_INIT_ZVAL(intern->u.file.current_zval);
php_fgetcsv(intern->u.file.stream, delimiter, enclosure, escape, buf_len, buf, intern->u.file.current_zval TSRMLS_CC);
if (return_value) {
if (Z_TYPE_P(return_value) != IS_NULL) {
zval_dtor(return_value);
ZVAL_NULL(return_value);
}
ZVAL_ZVAL(return_value, intern->u.file.current_zval, 1, 0);
}
}
return ret;
}
/* }}} */
| 167,077 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::getConfig(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, void *params, size_t /* size */) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetConfig(mHandle, index, params);
OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE extIndex = (OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE)index;
if (err != OMX_ErrorNoMore) {
CLOG_IF_ERROR(getConfig, err, "%s(%#x)", asString(extIndex), index);
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | status_t OMXNodeInstance::getConfig(
OMX_INDEXTYPE index, void *params, size_t /* size */) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
if (isProhibitedIndex_l(index)) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "29422020");
return BAD_INDEX;
}
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_GetConfig(mHandle, index, params);
OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE extIndex = (OMX_INDEXEXTTYPE)index;
if (err != OMX_ErrorNoMore) {
CLOG_IF_ERROR(getConfig, err, "%s(%#x)", asString(extIndex), index);
}
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
| 174,134 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_get_hash (MyObject *obj, GHashTable **ret, GError **error)
{
GHashTable *table;
table = g_hash_table_new (g_str_hash, g_str_equal);
g_hash_table_insert (table, "foo", "bar");
g_hash_table_insert (table, "baz", "whee");
g_hash_table_insert (table, "cow", "crack");
*ret = table;
return TRUE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_get_hash (MyObject *obj, GHashTable **ret, GError **error)
| 165,100 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void TearDown() {
vpx_svc_release(&svc_);
delete(decoder_);
if (codec_initialized_) vpx_codec_destroy(&codec_);
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void TearDown() {
ReleaseEncoder();
delete(decoder_);
}
void InitializeEncoder() {
const vpx_codec_err_t res =
vpx_svc_init(&svc_, &codec_, vpx_codec_vp9_cx(), &codec_enc_);
EXPECT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
vpx_codec_control(&codec_, VP8E_SET_CPUUSED, 4); // Make the test faster
vpx_codec_control(&codec_, VP9E_SET_TILE_COLUMNS, tile_columns_);
vpx_codec_control(&codec_, VP9E_SET_TILE_ROWS, tile_rows_);
codec_initialized_ = true;
}
void ReleaseEncoder() {
vpx_svc_release(&svc_);
if (codec_initialized_) vpx_codec_destroy(&codec_);
codec_initialized_ = false;
}
void GetStatsData(std::string *const stats_buf) {
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *cx_pkt;
while ((cx_pkt = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(&codec_, &iter)) != NULL) {
if (cx_pkt->kind == VPX_CODEC_STATS_PKT) {
EXPECT_GT(cx_pkt->data.twopass_stats.sz, 0U);
ASSERT_TRUE(cx_pkt->data.twopass_stats.buf != NULL);
stats_buf->append(static_cast<char*>(cx_pkt->data.twopass_stats.buf),
cx_pkt->data.twopass_stats.sz);
}
}
}
void Pass1EncodeNFrames(const int n, const int layers,
std::string *const stats_buf) {
vpx_codec_err_t res;
ASSERT_GT(n, 0);
ASSERT_GT(layers, 0);
svc_.spatial_layers = layers;
codec_enc_.g_pass = VPX_RC_FIRST_PASS;
InitializeEncoder();
libvpx_test::I420VideoSource video(test_file_name_,
codec_enc_.g_w, codec_enc_.g_h,
codec_enc_.g_timebase.den,
codec_enc_.g_timebase.num, 0, 30);
video.Begin();
for (int i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
res = vpx_svc_encode(&svc_, &codec_, video.img(), video.pts(),
video.duration(), VPX_DL_GOOD_QUALITY);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
GetStatsData(stats_buf);
video.Next();
}
// Flush encoder and test EOS packet.
res = vpx_svc_encode(&svc_, &codec_, NULL, video.pts(),
video.duration(), VPX_DL_GOOD_QUALITY);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
GetStatsData(stats_buf);
ReleaseEncoder();
}
void StoreFrames(const size_t max_frame_received,
struct vpx_fixed_buf *const outputs,
size_t *const frame_received) {
vpx_codec_iter_t iter = NULL;
const vpx_codec_cx_pkt_t *cx_pkt;
while ((cx_pkt = vpx_codec_get_cx_data(&codec_, &iter)) != NULL) {
if (cx_pkt->kind == VPX_CODEC_CX_FRAME_PKT) {
const size_t frame_size = cx_pkt->data.frame.sz;
EXPECT_GT(frame_size, 0U);
ASSERT_TRUE(cx_pkt->data.frame.buf != NULL);
ASSERT_LT(*frame_received, max_frame_received);
if (*frame_received == 0)
EXPECT_EQ(1, !!(cx_pkt->data.frame.flags & VPX_FRAME_IS_KEY));
outputs[*frame_received].buf = malloc(frame_size + 16);
ASSERT_TRUE(outputs[*frame_received].buf != NULL);
memcpy(outputs[*frame_received].buf, cx_pkt->data.frame.buf,
frame_size);
outputs[*frame_received].sz = frame_size;
++(*frame_received);
}
}
}
void Pass2EncodeNFrames(std::string *const stats_buf,
const int n, const int layers,
struct vpx_fixed_buf *const outputs) {
vpx_codec_err_t res;
size_t frame_received = 0;
ASSERT_TRUE(outputs != NULL);
ASSERT_GT(n, 0);
ASSERT_GT(layers, 0);
svc_.spatial_layers = layers;
codec_enc_.rc_target_bitrate = 500;
if (codec_enc_.g_pass == VPX_RC_LAST_PASS) {
ASSERT_TRUE(stats_buf != NULL);
ASSERT_GT(stats_buf->size(), 0U);
codec_enc_.rc_twopass_stats_in.buf = &(*stats_buf)[0];
codec_enc_.rc_twopass_stats_in.sz = stats_buf->size();
}
InitializeEncoder();
libvpx_test::I420VideoSource video(test_file_name_,
codec_enc_.g_w, codec_enc_.g_h,
codec_enc_.g_timebase.den,
codec_enc_.g_timebase.num, 0, 30);
video.Begin();
for (int i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
res = vpx_svc_encode(&svc_, &codec_, video.img(), video.pts(),
video.duration(), VPX_DL_GOOD_QUALITY);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
StoreFrames(n, outputs, &frame_received);
video.Next();
}
// Flush encoder.
res = vpx_svc_encode(&svc_, &codec_, NULL, 0,
video.duration(), VPX_DL_GOOD_QUALITY);
EXPECT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
StoreFrames(n, outputs, &frame_received);
EXPECT_EQ(frame_received, static_cast<size_t>(n));
ReleaseEncoder();
}
void DecodeNFrames(const struct vpx_fixed_buf *const inputs, const int n) {
int decoded_frames = 0;
int received_frames = 0;
ASSERT_TRUE(inputs != NULL);
ASSERT_GT(n, 0);
for (int i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
ASSERT_TRUE(inputs[i].buf != NULL);
ASSERT_GT(inputs[i].sz, 0U);
const vpx_codec_err_t res_dec =
decoder_->DecodeFrame(static_cast<const uint8_t *>(inputs[i].buf),
inputs[i].sz);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res_dec) << decoder_->DecodeError();
++decoded_frames;
DxDataIterator dec_iter = decoder_->GetDxData();
while (dec_iter.Next() != NULL) {
++received_frames;
}
}
EXPECT_EQ(decoded_frames, n);
EXPECT_EQ(received_frames, n);
}
void DropEnhancementLayers(struct vpx_fixed_buf *const inputs,
const int num_super_frames,
const int remained_spatial_layers) {
ASSERT_TRUE(inputs != NULL);
ASSERT_GT(num_super_frames, 0);
ASSERT_GT(remained_spatial_layers, 0);
for (int i = 0; i < num_super_frames; ++i) {
uint32_t frame_sizes[8] = {0};
int frame_count = 0;
int frames_found = 0;
int frame;
ASSERT_TRUE(inputs[i].buf != NULL);
ASSERT_GT(inputs[i].sz, 0U);
vpx_codec_err_t res =
vp9_parse_superframe_index(static_cast<const uint8_t*>(inputs[i].buf),
inputs[i].sz, frame_sizes, &frame_count,
NULL, NULL);
ASSERT_EQ(VPX_CODEC_OK, res);
if (frame_count == 0) {
// There's no super frame but only a single frame.
ASSERT_EQ(1, remained_spatial_layers);
} else {
// Found a super frame.
uint8_t *frame_data = static_cast<uint8_t*>(inputs[i].buf);
uint8_t *frame_start = frame_data;
for (frame = 0; frame < frame_count; ++frame) {
// Looking for a visible frame.
if (frame_data[0] & 0x02) {
++frames_found;
if (frames_found == remained_spatial_layers)
break;
}
frame_data += frame_sizes[frame];
}
ASSERT_LT(frame, frame_count) << "Couldn't find a visible frame. "
<< "remained_spatial_layers: " << remained_spatial_layers
<< " super_frame: " << i;
if (frame == frame_count - 1)
continue;
frame_data += frame_sizes[frame];
// We need to add one more frame for multiple frame contexts.
uint8_t marker =
static_cast<const uint8_t*>(inputs[i].buf)[inputs[i].sz - 1];
const uint32_t mag = ((marker >> 3) & 0x3) + 1;
const size_t index_sz = 2 + mag * frame_count;
const size_t new_index_sz = 2 + mag * (frame + 1);
marker &= 0x0f8;
marker |= frame;
// Copy existing frame sizes.
memmove(frame_data + 1, frame_start + inputs[i].sz - index_sz + 1,
new_index_sz - 2);
// New marker.
frame_data[0] = marker;
frame_data += (mag * (frame + 1) + 1);
*frame_data++ = marker;
inputs[i].sz = frame_data - frame_start;
}
}
}
void FreeBitstreamBuffers(struct vpx_fixed_buf *const inputs, const int n) {
ASSERT_TRUE(inputs != NULL);
ASSERT_GT(n, 0);
for (int i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
free(inputs[i].buf);
inputs[i].buf = NULL;
inputs[i].sz = 0;
}
}
| 174,582 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: WebNavigationPolicy RenderViewImpl::decidePolicyForNavigation(
WebFrame* frame, const WebURLRequest& request, WebNavigationType type,
const WebNode&, WebNavigationPolicy default_policy, bool is_redirect) {
if (is_swapped_out_) {
if (request.url() != GURL("about:swappedout"))
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore;
return default_policy;
}
const GURL& url = request.url();
bool is_content_initiated =
DocumentState::FromDataSource(frame->provisionalDataSource())->
navigation_state()->is_content_initiated();
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableStrictSiteIsolation) &&
!frame->parent() && (is_content_initiated || is_redirect)) {
WebString origin_str = frame->document().securityOrigin().toString();
GURL frame_url(origin_str.utf8().data());
if (frame_url.GetOrigin() != url.GetOrigin()) {
Referrer referrer(
GURL(request.httpHeaderField(WebString::fromUTF8("Referer"))),
GetReferrerPolicyFromRequest(request));
OpenURL(frame, url, referrer, default_policy);
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore;
}
}
if (is_content_initiated) {
bool browser_handles_top_level_requests =
renderer_preferences_.browser_handles_top_level_requests &&
IsNonLocalTopLevelNavigation(url, frame, type);
if (browser_handles_top_level_requests ||
renderer_preferences_.browser_handles_all_requests) {
Referrer referrer(
GURL(request.httpHeaderField(WebString::fromUTF8("Referer"))),
GetReferrerPolicyFromRequest(request));
page_id_ = -1;
last_page_id_sent_to_browser_ = -1;
OpenURL(frame, url, referrer, default_policy);
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore; // Suppress the load here.
}
}
if (!frame->parent() && is_content_initiated &&
!url.SchemeIs(chrome::kAboutScheme)) {
bool send_referrer = false;
int cumulative_bindings =
RenderProcess::current()->GetEnabledBindings();
bool should_fork =
content::GetContentClient()->HasWebUIScheme(url) ||
(cumulative_bindings & content::BINDINGS_POLICY_WEB_UI) ||
url.SchemeIs(chrome::kViewSourceScheme) ||
frame->isViewSourceModeEnabled();
if (!should_fork) {
if (request.httpMethod() == "GET") {
bool is_initial_navigation = page_id_ == -1;
should_fork = content::GetContentClient()->renderer()->ShouldFork(
frame, url, is_initial_navigation, &send_referrer);
}
}
if (should_fork) {
Referrer referrer(
GURL(request.httpHeaderField(WebString::fromUTF8("Referer"))),
GetReferrerPolicyFromRequest(request));
OpenURL(
frame, url, send_referrer ? referrer : Referrer(), default_policy);
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore; // Suppress the load here.
}
}
GURL old_url(frame->dataSource()->request().url());
bool is_fork =
old_url == GURL(chrome::kAboutBlankURL) &&
historyBackListCount() < 1 &&
historyForwardListCount() < 1 &&
frame->opener() == NULL &&
frame->parent() == NULL &&
is_content_initiated &&
default_policy == WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyCurrentTab &&
type == WebKit::WebNavigationTypeOther;
if (is_fork) {
OpenURL(frame, url, Referrer(), default_policy);
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore;
}
return default_policy;
}
Commit Message: Use a new scheme for swapping out RenderViews.
BUG=118664
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9720004
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@127986 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | WebNavigationPolicy RenderViewImpl::decidePolicyForNavigation(
WebFrame* frame, const WebURLRequest& request, WebNavigationType type,
const WebNode&, WebNavigationPolicy default_policy, bool is_redirect) {
if (is_swapped_out_) {
if (request.url() != GURL(chrome::kSwappedOutURL))
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore;
// Allow chrome::kSwappedOutURL to complete.
return default_policy;
}
const GURL& url = request.url();
bool is_content_initiated =
DocumentState::FromDataSource(frame->provisionalDataSource())->
navigation_state()->is_content_initiated();
const CommandLine& command_line = *CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess();
if (command_line.HasSwitch(switches::kEnableStrictSiteIsolation) &&
!frame->parent() && (is_content_initiated || is_redirect)) {
WebString origin_str = frame->document().securityOrigin().toString();
GURL frame_url(origin_str.utf8().data());
if (frame_url.GetOrigin() != url.GetOrigin()) {
Referrer referrer(
GURL(request.httpHeaderField(WebString::fromUTF8("Referer"))),
GetReferrerPolicyFromRequest(request));
OpenURL(frame, url, referrer, default_policy);
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore;
}
}
if (is_content_initiated) {
bool browser_handles_top_level_requests =
renderer_preferences_.browser_handles_top_level_requests &&
IsNonLocalTopLevelNavigation(url, frame, type);
if (browser_handles_top_level_requests ||
renderer_preferences_.browser_handles_all_requests) {
Referrer referrer(
GURL(request.httpHeaderField(WebString::fromUTF8("Referer"))),
GetReferrerPolicyFromRequest(request));
page_id_ = -1;
last_page_id_sent_to_browser_ = -1;
OpenURL(frame, url, referrer, default_policy);
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore; // Suppress the load here.
}
}
if (!frame->parent() && is_content_initiated &&
!url.SchemeIs(chrome::kAboutScheme)) {
bool send_referrer = false;
int cumulative_bindings =
RenderProcess::current()->GetEnabledBindings();
bool should_fork =
content::GetContentClient()->HasWebUIScheme(url) ||
(cumulative_bindings & content::BINDINGS_POLICY_WEB_UI) ||
url.SchemeIs(chrome::kViewSourceScheme) ||
frame->isViewSourceModeEnabled();
if (!should_fork) {
if (request.httpMethod() == "GET") {
bool is_initial_navigation = page_id_ == -1;
should_fork = content::GetContentClient()->renderer()->ShouldFork(
frame, url, is_initial_navigation, &send_referrer);
}
}
if (should_fork) {
Referrer referrer(
GURL(request.httpHeaderField(WebString::fromUTF8("Referer"))),
GetReferrerPolicyFromRequest(request));
OpenURL(
frame, url, send_referrer ? referrer : Referrer(), default_policy);
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore; // Suppress the load here.
}
}
GURL old_url(frame->dataSource()->request().url());
bool is_fork =
old_url == GURL(chrome::kAboutBlankURL) &&
historyBackListCount() < 1 &&
historyForwardListCount() < 1 &&
frame->opener() == NULL &&
frame->parent() == NULL &&
is_content_initiated &&
default_policy == WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyCurrentTab &&
type == WebKit::WebNavigationTypeOther;
if (is_fork) {
OpenURL(frame, url, Referrer(), default_policy);
return WebKit::WebNavigationPolicyIgnore;
}
return default_policy;
}
| 171,032 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, offsetExists)
{
char *fname;
size_t fname_len;
phar_entry_info *entry;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "s", &fname, &fname_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (zend_hash_str_exists(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, fname, (uint) fname_len)) {
if (NULL != (entry = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, fname, (uint) fname_len))) {
if (entry->is_deleted) {
/* entry is deleted, but has not been flushed to disk yet */
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
if (fname_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
/* none of these are real files, so they don't exist */
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
if (zend_hash_str_exists(&phar_obj->archive->virtual_dirs, fname, (uint) fname_len)) {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | PHP_METHOD(Phar, offsetExists)
{
char *fname;
size_t fname_len;
phar_entry_info *entry;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS(), "p", &fname, &fname_len) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (zend_hash_str_exists(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, fname, (uint) fname_len)) {
if (NULL != (entry = zend_hash_str_find_ptr(&phar_obj->archive->manifest, fname, (uint) fname_len))) {
if (entry->is_deleted) {
/* entry is deleted, but has not been flushed to disk yet */
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
if (fname_len >= sizeof(".phar")-1 && !memcmp(fname, ".phar", sizeof(".phar")-1)) {
/* none of these are real files, so they don't exist */
RETURN_FALSE;
}
RETURN_TRUE;
} else {
if (zend_hash_str_exists(&phar_obj->archive->virtual_dirs, fname, (uint) fname_len)) {
RETURN_TRUE;
}
RETURN_FALSE;
}
}
| 165,065 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void write_version(
FILE *fp,
const char *fname,
const char *dirname,
xref_t *xref)
{
long start;
char *c, *new_fname, data;
FILE *new_fp;
start = ftell(fp);
/* Create file */
if ((c = strstr(fname, ".pdf")))
*c = '\0';
new_fname = malloc(strlen(fname) + strlen(dirname) + 16);
snprintf(new_fname, strlen(fname) + strlen(dirname) + 16,
"%s/%s-version-%d.pdf", dirname, fname, xref->version);
if (!(new_fp = fopen(new_fname, "w")))
{
ERR("Could not create file '%s'\n", new_fname);
fseek(fp, start, SEEK_SET);
free(new_fname);
return;
}
/* Copy original PDF */
fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
while (fread(&data, 1, 1, fp))
fwrite(&data, 1, 1, new_fp);
/* Emit an older startxref, refering to an older version. */
fprintf(new_fp, "\r\nstartxref\r\n%ld\r\n%%%%EOF", xref->start);
/* Clean */
fclose(new_fp);
free(new_fname);
fseek(fp, start, SEEK_SET);
}
Commit Message: Zero and sanity check all dynamic allocs.
This addresses the memory issues in Issue #6 expressed in
calloc_some.pdf and malloc_some.pdf
CWE ID: CWE-787 | static void write_version(
FILE *fp,
const char *fname,
const char *dirname,
xref_t *xref)
{
long start;
char *c, *new_fname, data;
FILE *new_fp;
start = ftell(fp);
/* Create file */
if ((c = strstr(fname, ".pdf")))
*c = '\0';
new_fname = safe_calloc(strlen(fname) + strlen(dirname) + 16);
snprintf(new_fname, strlen(fname) + strlen(dirname) + 16,
"%s/%s-version-%d.pdf", dirname, fname, xref->version);
if (!(new_fp = fopen(new_fname, "w")))
{
ERR("Could not create file '%s'\n", new_fname);
fseek(fp, start, SEEK_SET);
free(new_fname);
return;
}
/* Copy original PDF */
fseek(fp, 0, SEEK_SET);
while (fread(&data, 1, 1, fp))
fwrite(&data, 1, 1, new_fp);
/* Emit an older startxref, refering to an older version. */
fprintf(new_fp, "\r\nstartxref\r\n%ld\r\n%%%%EOF", xref->start);
/* Clean */
fclose(new_fp);
free(new_fname);
fseek(fp, start, SEEK_SET);
}
| 169,565 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: jp2_box_t *jp2_box_get(jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_box_t *box;
jp2_boxinfo_t *boxinfo;
jas_stream_t *tmpstream;
uint_fast32_t len;
uint_fast64_t extlen;
bool dataflag;
box = 0;
tmpstream = 0;
if (!(box = jas_malloc(sizeof(jp2_box_t)))) {
goto error;
}
box->ops = &jp2_boxinfo_unk.ops;
if (jp2_getuint32(in, &len) || jp2_getuint32(in, &box->type)) {
goto error;
}
boxinfo = jp2_boxinfolookup(box->type);
box->info = boxinfo;
box->ops = &boxinfo->ops;
box->len = len;
JAS_DBGLOG(10, (
"preliminary processing of JP2 box: type=%c%s%c (0x%08x); length=%d\n",
'"', boxinfo->name, '"', box->type, box->len
));
if (box->len == 1) {
if (jp2_getuint64(in, &extlen)) {
goto error;
}
if (extlen > 0xffffffffUL) {
jas_eprintf("warning: cannot handle large 64-bit box length\n");
extlen = 0xffffffffUL;
}
box->len = extlen;
box->datalen = extlen - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(true);
} else {
box->datalen = box->len - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(false);
}
if (box->len != 0 && box->len < 8) {
goto error;
}
dataflag = !(box->info->flags & (JP2_BOX_SUPER | JP2_BOX_NODATA));
if (dataflag) {
if (!(tmpstream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_stream_copy(tmpstream, in, box->datalen)) {
box->ops = &jp2_boxinfo_unk.ops;
jas_eprintf("cannot copy box data\n");
goto error;
}
jas_stream_rewind(tmpstream);
if (box->ops->getdata) {
if ((*box->ops->getdata)(box, tmpstream)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot parse box data\n");
goto error;
}
}
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 1) {
jp2_box_dump(box, stderr);
}
return box;
error:
if (box) {
jp2_box_destroy(box);
}
if (tmpstream) {
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed another problem with incorrect cleanup of JP2 box data upon error.
CWE ID: CWE-476 | jp2_box_t *jp2_box_get(jas_stream_t *in)
{
jp2_box_t *box;
jp2_boxinfo_t *boxinfo;
jas_stream_t *tmpstream;
uint_fast32_t len;
uint_fast64_t extlen;
bool dataflag;
box = 0;
tmpstream = 0;
if (!(box = jas_malloc(sizeof(jp2_box_t)))) {
goto error;
}
// Mark the box data as never having been constructed
// so that we will not errantly attempt to destroy it later.
box->ops = &jp2_boxinfo_unk.ops;
if (jp2_getuint32(in, &len) || jp2_getuint32(in, &box->type)) {
goto error;
}
boxinfo = jp2_boxinfolookup(box->type);
box->info = boxinfo;
box->len = len;
JAS_DBGLOG(10, (
"preliminary processing of JP2 box: type=%c%s%c (0x%08x); length=%d\n",
'"', boxinfo->name, '"', box->type, box->len
));
if (box->len == 1) {
if (jp2_getuint64(in, &extlen)) {
goto error;
}
if (extlen > 0xffffffffUL) {
jas_eprintf("warning: cannot handle large 64-bit box length\n");
extlen = 0xffffffffUL;
}
box->len = extlen;
box->datalen = extlen - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(true);
} else {
box->datalen = box->len - JP2_BOX_HDRLEN(false);
}
if (box->len != 0 && box->len < 8) {
goto error;
}
dataflag = !(box->info->flags & (JP2_BOX_SUPER | JP2_BOX_NODATA));
if (dataflag) {
if (!(tmpstream = jas_stream_memopen(0, 0))) {
goto error;
}
if (jas_stream_copy(tmpstream, in, box->datalen)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot copy box data\n");
goto error;
}
jas_stream_rewind(tmpstream);
// From here onwards, the box data will need to be destroyed.
// So, initialize the box operations.
box->ops = &boxinfo->ops;
if (box->ops->getdata) {
if ((*box->ops->getdata)(box, tmpstream)) {
jas_eprintf("cannot parse box data\n");
goto error;
}
}
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
if (jas_getdbglevel() >= 1) {
jp2_box_dump(box, stderr);
}
return box;
error:
if (box) {
jp2_box_destroy(box);
}
if (tmpstream) {
jas_stream_close(tmpstream);
}
return 0;
}
| 168,473 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int yr_object_array_set_item(
YR_OBJECT* object,
YR_OBJECT* item,
int index)
{
YR_OBJECT_ARRAY* array;
int i;
int count;
assert(index >= 0);
assert(object->type == OBJECT_TYPE_ARRAY);
array = object_as_array(object);
if (array->items == NULL)
{
count = yr_max(64, (index + 1) * 2);
array->items = (YR_ARRAY_ITEMS*) yr_malloc(
sizeof(YR_ARRAY_ITEMS) + count * sizeof(YR_OBJECT*));
if (array->items == NULL)
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
memset(array->items->objects, 0, count * sizeof(YR_OBJECT*));
array->items->count = count;
}
else if (index >= array->items->count)
{
count = array->items->count * 2;
array->items = (YR_ARRAY_ITEMS*) yr_realloc(
array->items,
sizeof(YR_ARRAY_ITEMS) + count * sizeof(YR_OBJECT*));
if (array->items == NULL)
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
for (i = array->items->count; i < count; i++)
array->items->objects[i] = NULL;
array->items->count = count;
}
item->parent = object;
array->items->objects[index] = item;
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
Commit Message: Fix heap overflow (reported by Jurriaan Bremer)
When setting a new array item with yr_object_array_set_item() the array size is doubled if the index for the new item is larger than the already allocated ones. No further checks were made to ensure that the index fits into the array after doubling its capacity. If the array capacity was for example 64, and a new object is assigned to an index larger than 128 the overflow occurs. As yr_object_array_set_item() is usually invoked with indexes that increase monotonically by one, this bug never triggered before. But the new "dotnet" module has the potential to allow the exploitation of this bug by scanning a specially crafted .NET binary.
CWE ID: CWE-119 | int yr_object_array_set_item(
YR_OBJECT* object,
YR_OBJECT* item,
int index)
{
YR_OBJECT_ARRAY* array;
int i;
int count;
assert(index >= 0);
assert(object->type == OBJECT_TYPE_ARRAY);
array = object_as_array(object);
if (array->items == NULL)
{
count = 64;
while (count <= index)
count *= 2;
array->items = (YR_ARRAY_ITEMS*) yr_malloc(
sizeof(YR_ARRAY_ITEMS) + count * sizeof(YR_OBJECT*));
if (array->items == NULL)
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
memset(array->items->objects, 0, count * sizeof(YR_OBJECT*));
array->items->count = count;
}
else if (index >= array->items->count)
{
count = array->items->count * 2;
while (count <= index)
count *= 2;
array->items = (YR_ARRAY_ITEMS*) yr_realloc(
array->items,
sizeof(YR_ARRAY_ITEMS) + count * sizeof(YR_OBJECT*));
if (array->items == NULL)
return ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY;
for (i = array->items->count; i < count; i++)
array->items->objects[i] = NULL;
array->items->count = count;
}
item->parent = object;
array->items->objects[index] = item;
return ERROR_SUCCESS;
}
| 168,045 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SYSCALL_DEFINE6(sendto, int, fd, void __user *, buff, size_t, len,
unsigned int, flags, struct sockaddr __user *, addr,
int, addr_len)
{
struct socket *sock;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
int err;
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
int fput_needed;
if (len > INT_MAX)
len = INT_MAX;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (!sock)
goto out;
iov.iov_base = buff;
iov.iov_len = len;
msg.msg_name = NULL;
iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, &iov, 1, len);
msg.msg_control = NULL;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_namelen = 0;
if (addr) {
err = move_addr_to_kernel(addr, addr_len, &address);
if (err < 0)
goto out_put;
msg.msg_name = (struct sockaddr *)&address;
msg.msg_namelen = addr_len;
}
if (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
msg.msg_flags = flags;
err = sock_sendmsg(sock, &msg, len);
out_put:
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
out:
return err;
}
Commit Message: net: validate the range we feed to iov_iter_init() in sys_sendto/sys_recvfrom
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v3.19
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-264 | SYSCALL_DEFINE6(sendto, int, fd, void __user *, buff, size_t, len,
unsigned int, flags, struct sockaddr __user *, addr,
int, addr_len)
{
struct socket *sock;
struct sockaddr_storage address;
int err;
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
int fput_needed;
if (len > INT_MAX)
len = INT_MAX;
if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buff, len)))
return -EFAULT;
sock = sockfd_lookup_light(fd, &err, &fput_needed);
if (!sock)
goto out;
iov.iov_base = buff;
iov.iov_len = len;
msg.msg_name = NULL;
iov_iter_init(&msg.msg_iter, WRITE, &iov, 1, len);
msg.msg_control = NULL;
msg.msg_controllen = 0;
msg.msg_namelen = 0;
if (addr) {
err = move_addr_to_kernel(addr, addr_len, &address);
if (err < 0)
goto out_put;
msg.msg_name = (struct sockaddr *)&address;
msg.msg_namelen = addr_len;
}
if (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK)
flags |= MSG_DONTWAIT;
msg.msg_flags = flags;
err = sock_sendmsg(sock, &msg, len);
out_put:
fput_light(sock->file, fput_needed);
out:
return err;
}
| 167,570 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GpuProcessHost::OnProcessLaunched() {
base::ProcessHandle child_handle = in_process_ ?
base::GetCurrentProcessHandle() : process_->GetData().handle;
#if defined(OS_WIN)
DuplicateHandle(base::GetCurrentProcessHandle(),
child_handle,
base::GetCurrentProcessHandle(),
&gpu_process_,
PROCESS_DUP_HANDLE,
FALSE,
0);
#else
gpu_process_ = child_handle;
#endif
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES("GPU.GPUProcessLaunchTime",
base::TimeTicks::Now() - init_start_time_);
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void GpuProcessHost::OnProcessLaunched() {
UMA_HISTOGRAM_TIMES("GPU.GPUProcessLaunchTime",
base::TimeTicks::Now() - init_start_time_);
}
| 170,923 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool extract_sockaddr(char *url, char **sockaddr_url, char **sockaddr_port)
{
char *url_begin, *url_end, *ipv6_begin, *ipv6_end, *port_start = NULL;
char url_address[256], port[6];
int url_len, port_len = 0;
*sockaddr_url = url;
url_begin = strstr(url, "//");
if (!url_begin)
url_begin = url;
else
url_begin += 2;
/* Look for numeric ipv6 entries */
ipv6_begin = strstr(url_begin, "[");
ipv6_end = strstr(url_begin, "]");
if (ipv6_begin && ipv6_end && ipv6_end > ipv6_begin)
url_end = strstr(ipv6_end, ":");
else
url_end = strstr(url_begin, ":");
if (url_end) {
url_len = url_end - url_begin;
port_len = strlen(url_begin) - url_len - 1;
if (port_len < 1)
return false;
port_start = url_end + 1;
} else
url_len = strlen(url_begin);
if (url_len < 1)
return false;
sprintf(url_address, "%.*s", url_len, url_begin);
if (port_len) {
char *slash;
snprintf(port, 6, "%.*s", port_len, port_start);
slash = strchr(port, '/');
if (slash)
*slash = '\0';
} else
strcpy(port, "80");
*sockaddr_port = strdup(port);
*sockaddr_url = strdup(url_address);
return true;
}
Commit Message: Stratum: extract_sockaddr: Truncate overlong addresses rather than stack overflow
Thanks to Mick Ayzenberg <mick@dejavusecurity.com> for finding this!
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool extract_sockaddr(char *url, char **sockaddr_url, char **sockaddr_port)
{
char *url_begin, *url_end, *ipv6_begin, *ipv6_end, *port_start = NULL;
char url_address[256], port[6];
int url_len, port_len = 0;
*sockaddr_url = url;
url_begin = strstr(url, "//");
if (!url_begin)
url_begin = url;
else
url_begin += 2;
/* Look for numeric ipv6 entries */
ipv6_begin = strstr(url_begin, "[");
ipv6_end = strstr(url_begin, "]");
if (ipv6_begin && ipv6_end && ipv6_end > ipv6_begin)
url_end = strstr(ipv6_end, ":");
else
url_end = strstr(url_begin, ":");
if (url_end) {
url_len = url_end - url_begin;
port_len = strlen(url_begin) - url_len - 1;
if (port_len < 1)
return false;
port_start = url_end + 1;
} else
url_len = strlen(url_begin);
if (url_len < 1)
return false;
if (url_len >= sizeof(url_address))
{
applog(LOG_WARNING, "%s: Truncating overflowed address '%.*s'",
__func__, url_len, url_begin);
url_len = sizeof(url_address) - 1;
}
sprintf(url_address, "%.*s", url_len, url_begin);
if (port_len) {
char *slash;
snprintf(port, 6, "%.*s", port_len, port_start);
slash = strchr(port, '/');
if (slash)
*slash = '\0';
} else
strcpy(port, "80");
*sockaddr_port = strdup(port);
*sockaddr_url = strdup(url_address);
return true;
}
| 166,308 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static inline int hpel_motion(MpegEncContext *s,
uint8_t *dest, uint8_t *src,
int src_x, int src_y,
op_pixels_func *pix_op,
int motion_x, int motion_y)
{
int dxy = 0;
int emu = 0;
src_x += motion_x >> 1;
src_y += motion_y >> 1;
/* WARNING: do no forget half pels */
src_x = av_clip(src_x, -16, s->width); // FIXME unneeded for emu?
if (src_x != s->width)
dxy |= motion_x & 1;
src_y = av_clip(src_y, -16, s->height);
if (src_y != s->height)
dxy |= (motion_y & 1) << 1;
src += src_y * s->linesize + src_x;
if (s->unrestricted_mv) {
if ((unsigned)src_x > FFMAX(s->h_edge_pos - (motion_x & 1) - 8, 0) ||
(unsigned)src_y > FFMAX(s->v_edge_pos - (motion_y & 1) - 8, 0)) {
s->vdsp.emulated_edge_mc(s->sc.edge_emu_buffer, src,
s->linesize, s->linesize,
9, 9,
src_x, src_y, s->h_edge_pos,
s->v_edge_pos);
src = s->sc.edge_emu_buffer;
emu = 1;
}
}
pix_op[dxy](dest, src, s->linesize, 8);
return emu;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static inline int hpel_motion(MpegEncContext *s,
uint8_t *dest, uint8_t *src,
int src_x, int src_y,
op_pixels_func *pix_op,
int motion_x, int motion_y)
{
int dxy = 0;
int emu = 0;
src_x += motion_x >> 1;
src_y += motion_y >> 1;
/* WARNING: do no forget half pels */
src_x = av_clip(src_x, -16, s->width); // FIXME unneeded for emu?
if (src_x != s->width)
dxy |= motion_x & 1;
src_y = av_clip(src_y, -16, s->height);
if (src_y != s->height)
dxy |= (motion_y & 1) << 1;
src += src_y * s->linesize + src_x;
if ((unsigned)src_x > FFMAX(s->h_edge_pos - (motion_x & 1) - 8, 0) ||
(unsigned)src_y > FFMAX(s->v_edge_pos - (motion_y & 1) - 8, 0)) {
s->vdsp.emulated_edge_mc(s->sc.edge_emu_buffer, src,
s->linesize, s->linesize,
9, 9, src_x, src_y,
s->h_edge_pos, s->v_edge_pos);
src = s->sc.edge_emu_buffer;
emu = 1;
}
pix_op[dxy](dest, src, s->linesize, 8);
return emu;
}
| 164,927 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int expandRegular(rpmfi fi, const char *dest, rpmpsm psm, int nodigest, int nocontent)
{
FD_t wfd = NULL;
int rc = 0;
/* Create the file with 0200 permissions (write by owner). */
{
mode_t old_umask = umask(0577);
wfd = Fopen(dest, "w.ufdio");
umask(old_umask);
}
if (Ferror(wfd)) {
rc = RPMERR_OPEN_FAILED;
goto exit;
}
if (!nocontent)
rc = rpmfiArchiveReadToFilePsm(fi, wfd, nodigest, psm);
exit:
if (wfd) {
int myerrno = errno;
Fclose(wfd);
errno = myerrno;
}
return rc;
}
Commit Message: Don't follow symlinks on file creation (CVE-2017-7501)
Open newly created files with O_EXCL to prevent symlink tricks.
When reopening hardlinks for writing the actual content, use append
mode instead. This is compatible with the write-only permissions but
is not destructive in case we got redirected to somebody elses file,
verify the target before actually writing anything.
As these are files with the temporary suffix, errors mean a local
user with sufficient privileges to break the installation of the package
anyway is trying to goof us on purpose, don't bother trying to mend it
(we couldn't fix the hardlink case anyhow) but just bail out.
Based on a patch by Florian Festi.
CWE ID: CWE-59 | static int expandRegular(rpmfi fi, const char *dest, rpmpsm psm, int nodigest, int nocontent)
static int expandRegular(rpmfi fi, const char *dest, rpmpsm psm, int exclusive, int nodigest, int nocontent)
{
FD_t wfd = NULL;
int rc = 0;
/* Create the file with 0200 permissions (write by owner). */
{
mode_t old_umask = umask(0577);
wfd = Fopen(dest, exclusive ? "wx.ufdio" : "a.ufdio");
umask(old_umask);
/* If reopening, make sure the file is what we expect */
if (!exclusive && wfd != NULL && !linkSane(wfd, dest)) {
rc = RPMERR_OPEN_FAILED;
goto exit;
}
}
if (Ferror(wfd)) {
rc = RPMERR_OPEN_FAILED;
goto exit;
}
if (!nocontent)
rc = rpmfiArchiveReadToFilePsm(fi, wfd, nodigest, psm);
exit:
if (wfd) {
int myerrno = errno;
Fclose(wfd);
errno = myerrno;
}
return rc;
}
| 168,267 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: de_dotdot( char* file )
{
char* cp;
char* cp2;
int l;
/* Collapse any multiple / sequences. */
while ( ( cp = strstr( file, "//") ) != (char*) 0 )
{
for ( cp2 = cp + 2; *cp2 == '/'; ++cp2 )
continue;
(void) strcpy( cp + 1, cp2 );
}
/* Remove leading ./ and any /./ sequences. */
while ( strncmp( file, "./", 2 ) == 0 )
(void) memmove( file, file + 2, strlen( file ) - 1 );
while ( ( cp = strstr( file, "/./") ) != (char*) 0 )
(void) memmove( cp, cp + 2, strlen( file ) - 1 );
/* Alternate between removing leading ../ and removing xxx/../ */
for (;;)
{
while ( strncmp( file, "../", 3 ) == 0 )
(void) memmove( file, file + 3, strlen( file ) - 2 );
cp = strstr( file, "/../" );
if ( cp == (char*) 0 )
break;
for ( cp2 = cp - 1; cp2 >= file && *cp2 != '/'; --cp2 )
continue;
(void) strcpy( cp2 + 1, cp + 4 );
}
/* Also elide any xxx/.. at the end. */
while ( ( l = strlen( file ) ) > 3 &&
strcmp( ( cp = file + l - 3 ), "/.." ) == 0 )
{
for ( cp2 = cp - 1; cp2 >= file && *cp2 != '/'; --cp2 )
continue;
if ( cp2 < file )
break;
*cp2 = '\0';
}
}
Commit Message: Fix heap buffer overflow in de_dotdot
CWE ID: CWE-119 | de_dotdot( char* file )
{
char* cp;
char* cp2;
int l;
/* Collapse any multiple / sequences. */
while ( ( cp = strstr( file, "//") ) != (char*) 0 )
{
for ( cp2 = cp + 2; *cp2 == '/'; ++cp2 )
continue;
(void) strcpy( cp + 1, cp2 );
}
/* Remove leading ./ and any /./ sequences. */
while ( strncmp( file, "./", 2 ) == 0 )
(void) memmove( file, file + 2, strlen( file ) - 1 );
while ( ( cp = strstr( file, "/./") ) != (char*) 0 )
(void) memmove( cp, cp + 2, strlen( cp ) - 1 );
/* Alternate between removing leading ../ and removing xxx/../ */
for (;;)
{
while ( strncmp( file, "../", 3 ) == 0 )
(void) memmove( file, file + 3, strlen( file ) - 2 );
cp = strstr( file, "/../" );
if ( cp == (char*) 0 )
break;
for ( cp2 = cp - 1; cp2 >= file && *cp2 != '/'; --cp2 )
continue;
(void) strcpy( cp2 + 1, cp + 4 );
}
/* Also elide any xxx/.. at the end. */
while ( ( l = strlen( file ) ) > 3 &&
strcmp( ( cp = file + l - 3 ), "/.." ) == 0 )
{
for ( cp2 = cp - 1; cp2 >= file && *cp2 != '/'; --cp2 )
continue;
if ( cp2 < file )
break;
*cp2 = '\0';
}
}
| 168,063 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ForeignSessionHelper::TriggerSessionSync(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& obj) {
browser_sync::ProfileSyncService* service =
ProfileSyncServiceFactory::GetInstance()->GetForProfile(profile_);
if (!service)
return;
const syncer::ModelTypeSet types(syncer::SESSIONS);
service->TriggerRefresh(types);
}
Commit Message: Prefer SyncService over ProfileSyncService in foreign_session_helper
SyncService is the interface, ProfileSyncService is the concrete
implementation. Generally no clients should need to use the conrete
implementation - for one, testing will be much easier once everyone
uses the interface only.
Bug: 924508
Change-Id: Ia210665f8f02512053d1a60d627dea0f22758387
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/1461119
Auto-Submit: Marc Treib <treib@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Yaron Friedman <yfriedman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Yaron Friedman <yfriedman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#630662}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | void ForeignSessionHelper::TriggerSessionSync(
JNIEnv* env,
const JavaParamRef<jobject>& obj) {
syncer::SyncService* service =
ProfileSyncServiceFactory::GetSyncServiceForProfile(profile_);
if (!service)
return;
service->TriggerRefresh({syncer::SESSIONS});
}
| 172,059 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ChromeContentClient::SandboxPlugin(CommandLine* command_line,
sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
std::wstring plugin_dll = command_line->
GetSwitchValueNative(switches::kPluginPath);
FilePath builtin_flash;
if (!PathService::Get(chrome::FILE_FLASH_PLUGIN, &builtin_flash))
return false;
FilePath plugin_path(plugin_dll);
if (plugin_path.BaseName() != builtin_flash.BaseName())
return false;
if (base::win::GetVersion() <= base::win::VERSION_XP ||
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableFlashSandbox)) {
return false;
}
if (policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.*") != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
if (LoadFlashBroker(plugin_path, command_line)) {
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0);
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_INTERACTIVE);
if (base::win::GetVersion() == base::win::VERSION_VISTA) {
::ChangeWindowMessageFilter(WM_MOUSEWHEEL, MSGFLT_ADD);
::ChangeWindowMessageFilter(WM_APPCOMMAND, MSGFLT_ADD);
}
policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
} else {
DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to start flash broker";
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0);
policy->SetTokenLevel(
sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED, sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED);
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | bool ChromeContentClient::SandboxPlugin(CommandLine* command_line,
sandbox::TargetPolicy* policy) {
std::wstring plugin_dll = command_line->
GetSwitchValueNative(switches::kPluginPath);
FilePath builtin_flash;
if (!PathService::Get(chrome::FILE_FLASH_PLUGIN, &builtin_flash))
return false;
FilePath plugin_path(plugin_dll);
if (plugin_path.BaseName() != builtin_flash.BaseName())
return false;
if (base::win::GetVersion() <= base::win::VERSION_XP ||
CommandLine::ForCurrentProcess()->HasSwitch(
switches::kDisableFlashSandbox)) {
return false;
}
// Add policy for the plugin proxy window pump event
// used by WebPluginDelegateProxy::HandleInputEvent().
if (policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_HANDLES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::HANDLES_DUP_ANY,
L"Event") != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
if (policy->AddRule(sandbox::TargetPolicy::SUBSYS_NAMED_PIPES,
sandbox::TargetPolicy::NAMEDPIPES_ALLOW_ANY,
L"\\\\.\\pipe\\chrome.*") != sandbox::SBOX_ALL_OK) {
NOTREACHED();
return false;
}
if (LoadFlashBroker(plugin_path, command_line)) {
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0);
policy->SetTokenLevel(sandbox::USER_RESTRICTED_SAME_ACCESS,
sandbox::USER_INTERACTIVE);
if (base::win::GetVersion() == base::win::VERSION_VISTA) {
::ChangeWindowMessageFilter(WM_MOUSEWHEEL, MSGFLT_ADD);
::ChangeWindowMessageFilter(WM_APPCOMMAND, MSGFLT_ADD);
}
policy->SetIntegrityLevel(sandbox::INTEGRITY_LEVEL_LOW);
} else {
DLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to start flash broker";
policy->SetJobLevel(sandbox::JOB_UNPROTECTED, 0);
policy->SetTokenLevel(
sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED, sandbox::USER_UNPROTECTED);
}
return true;
}
| 170,916 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool RenderViewHostManager::ShouldSwapProcessesForNavigation(
const NavigationEntry* curr_entry,
const NavigationEntryImpl* new_entry) const {
DCHECK(new_entry);
const GURL& current_url = (curr_entry) ? curr_entry->GetURL() :
render_view_host_->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL();
BrowserContext* browser_context =
delegate_->GetControllerForRenderManager().GetBrowserContext();
if (WebUIControllerFactoryRegistry::GetInstance()->UseWebUIForURL(
browser_context, current_url)) {
if (!WebUIControllerFactoryRegistry::GetInstance()->IsURLAcceptableForWebUI(
browser_context, new_entry->GetURL(), false)) {
return true;
}
} else {
if (WebUIControllerFactoryRegistry::GetInstance()->UseWebUIForURL(
browser_context, new_entry->GetURL())) {
return true;
}
}
if (GetContentClient()->browser()->ShouldSwapProcessesForNavigation(
curr_entry ? curr_entry->GetURL() : GURL(), new_entry->GetURL())) {
return true;
}
if (!curr_entry)
return false;
if (curr_entry->IsViewSourceMode() != new_entry->IsViewSourceMode())
return true;
return false;
}
Commit Message: Ensure extensions and the Chrome Web Store are loaded in new BrowsingInstances.
BUG=174943
TEST=Can't post message to CWS. See bug for repro steps.
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/12301013
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@184208 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-264 | bool RenderViewHostManager::ShouldSwapProcessesForNavigation(
const NavigationEntry* curr_entry,
const NavigationEntryImpl* new_entry) const {
DCHECK(new_entry);
const GURL& current_url = (curr_entry) ? curr_entry->GetURL() :
render_view_host_->GetSiteInstance()->GetSiteURL();
BrowserContext* browser_context =
delegate_->GetControllerForRenderManager().GetBrowserContext();
if (WebUIControllerFactoryRegistry::GetInstance()->UseWebUIForURL(
browser_context, current_url)) {
if (!WebUIControllerFactoryRegistry::GetInstance()->IsURLAcceptableForWebUI(
browser_context, new_entry->GetURL(), false)) {
return true;
}
} else {
if (WebUIControllerFactoryRegistry::GetInstance()->UseWebUIForURL(
browser_context, new_entry->GetURL())) {
return true;
}
}
if (GetContentClient()->browser()->ShouldSwapProcessesForNavigation(
render_view_host_->GetSiteInstance(),
curr_entry ? curr_entry->GetURL() : GURL(),
new_entry->GetURL())) {
return true;
}
if (!curr_entry)
return false;
if (curr_entry->IsViewSourceMode() != new_entry->IsViewSourceMode())
return true;
return false;
}
| 171,437 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: do_async_error (IncrementData *data)
{
GError *error;
error = g_error_new (MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"%s",
"this method always loses");
dbus_g_method_return_error (data->context, error);
g_free (data);
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | do_async_error (IncrementData *data)
| 165,082 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: HeadlessPrintManager::GetPrintParamsFromSettings(
const HeadlessPrintSettings& settings) {
printing::PrintSettings print_settings;
print_settings.set_dpi(printing::kPointsPerInch);
print_settings.set_should_print_backgrounds(
settings.should_print_backgrounds);
print_settings.set_scale_factor(settings.scale);
print_settings.SetOrientation(settings.landscape);
print_settings.set_display_header_footer(settings.display_header_footer);
if (print_settings.display_header_footer()) {
url::Replacements<char> url_sanitizer;
url_sanitizer.ClearUsername();
url_sanitizer.ClearPassword();
std::string url = printing_rfh_->GetLastCommittedURL()
.ReplaceComponents(url_sanitizer)
.spec();
print_settings.set_url(base::UTF8ToUTF16(url));
}
print_settings.set_margin_type(printing::CUSTOM_MARGINS);
print_settings.SetCustomMargins(settings.margins_in_points);
gfx::Rect printable_area_device_units(settings.paper_size_in_points);
print_settings.SetPrinterPrintableArea(settings.paper_size_in_points,
printable_area_device_units, true);
auto print_params = std::make_unique<PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params>();
printing::RenderParamsFromPrintSettings(print_settings,
&print_params->params);
print_params->params.document_cookie = printing::PrintSettings::NewCookie();
return print_params;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: allow styling the page number element when printing over the protocol.
Bug: none
Change-Id: I13e6afbd86a7c6bcdedbf0645183194b9de7cfb4
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/809759
Commit-Queue: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Lei Zhang <thestig@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Tom Sepez <tsepez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Jianzhou Feng <jzfeng@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#523966}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | HeadlessPrintManager::GetPrintParamsFromSettings(
const HeadlessPrintSettings& settings) {
printing::PrintSettings print_settings;
print_settings.set_dpi(printing::kPointsPerInch);
print_settings.set_should_print_backgrounds(
settings.should_print_backgrounds);
print_settings.set_scale_factor(settings.scale);
print_settings.SetOrientation(settings.landscape);
print_settings.set_display_header_footer(settings.display_header_footer);
if (print_settings.display_header_footer()) {
url::Replacements<char> url_sanitizer;
url_sanitizer.ClearUsername();
url_sanitizer.ClearPassword();
std::string url = printing_rfh_->GetLastCommittedURL()
.ReplaceComponents(url_sanitizer)
.spec();
print_settings.set_url(base::UTF8ToUTF16(url));
}
print_settings.set_margin_type(printing::CUSTOM_MARGINS);
print_settings.SetCustomMargins(settings.margins_in_points);
gfx::Rect printable_area_device_units(settings.paper_size_in_points);
print_settings.SetPrinterPrintableArea(settings.paper_size_in_points,
printable_area_device_units, true);
auto print_params = std::make_unique<PrintMsg_PrintPages_Params>();
printing::RenderParamsFromPrintSettings(print_settings,
&print_params->params);
print_params->params.document_cookie = printing::PrintSettings::NewCookie();
print_params->params.header_template =
base::UTF8ToUTF16(settings.header_template);
print_params->params.footer_template =
base::UTF8ToUTF16(settings.footer_template);
return print_params;
}
| 172,902 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: vips_foreign_load_start( VipsImage *out, void *a, void *b )
{
VipsForeignLoad *load = VIPS_FOREIGN_LOAD( b );
VipsForeignLoadClass *class = VIPS_FOREIGN_LOAD_GET_CLASS( load );
if( !load->real ) {
if( !(load->real = vips_foreign_load_temp( load )) )
return( NULL );
#ifdef DEBUG
printf( "vips_foreign_load_start: triggering ->load()\n" );
#endif /*DEBUG*/
/* Read the image in. This may involve a long computation and
* will finish with load->real holding the decompressed image.
*
* We want our caller to be able to see this computation on
* @out, so eval signals on ->real need to appear on ->out.
*/
load->real->progress_signal = load->out;
/* Note the load object on the image. Loaders can use
* this to signal invalidate if they hit a load error. See
* vips_foreign_load_invalidate() below.
*/
g_object_set_qdata( G_OBJECT( load->real ),
vips__foreign_load_operation, load );
if( class->load( load ) ||
vips_image_pio_input( load->real ) )
return( NULL );
/* ->header() read the header into @out, load has read the
* image into @real. They must match exactly in size, bands,
* format and coding for the copy to work.
*
* Some versions of ImageMagick give different results between
* Ping and Load for some formats, for example.
*/
if( !vips_foreign_load_iscompat( load->real, out ) )
return( NULL );
/* We have to tell vips that out depends on real. We've set
* the demand hint below, but not given an input there.
*/
vips_image_pipelinev( load->out, load->out->dhint,
load->real, NULL );
}
return( vips_region_new( load->real ) );
}
Commit Message: fix a crash with delayed load
If a delayed load failed, it could leave the pipeline only half-set up.
Sebsequent threads could then segv.
Set a load-has-failed flag and test before generate.
See https://github.com/jcupitt/libvips/issues/893
CWE ID: CWE-362 | vips_foreign_load_start( VipsImage *out, void *a, void *b )
{
VipsForeignLoad *load = VIPS_FOREIGN_LOAD( b );
VipsForeignLoadClass *class = VIPS_FOREIGN_LOAD_GET_CLASS( load );
/* If this start has failed before in another thread, we can fail now.
*/
if( load->error )
return( NULL );
if( !load->real ) {
if( !(load->real = vips_foreign_load_temp( load )) )
return( NULL );
#ifdef DEBUG
printf( "vips_foreign_load_start: triggering ->load()\n" );
#endif /*DEBUG*/
/* Read the image in. This may involve a long computation and
* will finish with load->real holding the decompressed image.
*
* We want our caller to be able to see this computation on
* @out, so eval signals on ->real need to appear on ->out.
*/
load->real->progress_signal = load->out;
/* Note the load object on the image. Loaders can use
* this to signal invalidate if they hit a load error. See
* vips_foreign_load_invalidate() below.
*/
g_object_set_qdata( G_OBJECT( load->real ),
vips__foreign_load_operation, load );
/* Load the image and check the result.
*
* ->header() read the header into @out, load has read the
* image into @real. They must match exactly in size, bands,
* format and coding for the copy to work.
*
* Some versions of ImageMagick give different results between
* Ping and Load for some formats, for example.
*
* If the load fails, we need to stop
*/
if( class->load( load ) ||
vips_image_pio_input( load->real ) ||
vips_foreign_load_iscompat( load->real, out ) ) {
vips_operation_invalidate( VIPS_OPERATION( load ) );
load->error = TRUE;
return( NULL );
}
/* We have to tell vips that out depends on real. We've set
* the demand hint below, but not given an input there.
*/
vips_image_pipelinev( load->out, load->out->dhint,
load->real, NULL );
}
return( vips_region_new( load->real ) );
}
| 169,304 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool AXNodeObject::canSetValueAttribute() const {
if (equalIgnoringCase(getAttribute(aria_readonlyAttr), "true"))
return false;
if (isProgressIndicator() || isSlider())
return true;
if (isTextControl() && !isNativeTextControl())
return true;
return !isReadOnly();
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | bool AXNodeObject::canSetValueAttribute() const {
if (equalIgnoringASCIICase(getAttribute(aria_readonlyAttr), "true"))
return false;
if (isProgressIndicator() || isSlider())
return true;
if (isTextControl() && !isNativeTextControl())
return true;
return !isReadOnly();
}
| 171,909 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int mem_read(jas_stream_obj_t *obj, char *buf, int cnt)
{
int n;
assert(cnt >= 0);
assert(buf);
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("mem_read(%p, %p, %d)\n", obj, buf, cnt));
jas_stream_memobj_t *m = (jas_stream_memobj_t *)obj;
n = m->len_ - m->pos_;
cnt = JAS_MIN(n, cnt);
memcpy(buf, &m->buf_[m->pos_], cnt);
m->pos_ += cnt;
return cnt;
}
Commit Message: Made some changes to the I/O stream library for memory streams.
There were a number of potential problems due to the possibility
of integer overflow.
Changed some integral types to the larger types size_t or ssize_t.
For example, the function mem_resize now takes the buffer size parameter
as a size_t.
Added a new function jas_stream_memopen2, which takes a
buffer size specified as a size_t instead of an int.
This can be used in jas_image_cmpt_create to avoid potential
overflow problems.
Added a new function jas_deprecated to warn about reliance on
deprecated library behavior.
CWE ID: CWE-190 | static int mem_read(jas_stream_obj_t *obj, char *buf, int cnt)
{
ssize_t n;
assert(cnt >= 0);
assert(buf);
JAS_DBGLOG(100, ("mem_read(%p, %p, %d)\n", obj, buf, cnt));
jas_stream_memobj_t *m = (jas_stream_memobj_t *)obj;
n = m->len_ - m->pos_;
cnt = JAS_MIN(n, cnt);
memcpy(buf, &m->buf_[m->pos_], cnt);
m->pos_ += cnt;
return cnt;
}
| 168,749 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static RList *r_bin_wasm_get_data_entries (RBinWasmObj *bin, RBinWasmSection *sec) {
RList *ret = NULL;
RBinWasmDataEntry *ptr = NULL;
if (!(ret = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free))) {
return NULL;
}
ut8* buf = bin->buf->buf + (ut32)sec->payload_data;
ut32 len = sec->payload_len;
ut32 count = sec->count;
ut32 i = 0, r = 0;
size_t n = 0;
while (i < len && r < count) {
if (!(ptr = R_NEW0 (RBinWasmDataEntry))) {
return ret;
}
if (!(consume_u32 (buf + i, buf + len, &ptr->index, &i))) {
free (ptr);
return ret;
}
if (!(n = consume_init_expr (buf + i, buf + len, R_BIN_WASM_END_OF_CODE, NULL, &i))) {
free (ptr);
return ret;
}
ptr->offset.len = n;
if (!(consume_u32 (buf + i, buf + len, &ptr->size, &i))) {
free (ptr);
return ret;
}
ptr->data = sec->payload_data + i;
r_list_append (ret, ptr);
r += 1;
}
return ret;
}
Commit Message: Fix crash in fuzzed wasm r2_hoobr_consume_init_expr
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static RList *r_bin_wasm_get_data_entries (RBinWasmObj *bin, RBinWasmSection *sec) {
RList *ret = NULL;
RBinWasmDataEntry *ptr = NULL;
ut32 len = sec->payload_len;
if (!(ret = r_list_newf ((RListFree)free))) {
return NULL;
}
ut8* buf = bin->buf->buf + (ut32)sec->payload_data;
int buflen = bin->buf->length - (ut32)sec->payload_data;
ut32 count = sec->count;
ut32 i = 0, r = 0;
size_t n = 0;
while (i < len && len < buflen && r < count) {
if (!(ptr = R_NEW0 (RBinWasmDataEntry))) {
return ret;
}
if (!(consume_u32 (buf + i, buf + len, &ptr->index, &i))) {
goto beach;
}
if (i + 4 >= buflen) {
goto beach;
}
if (!(n = consume_init_expr (buf + i, buf + len, R_BIN_WASM_END_OF_CODE, NULL, &i))) {
goto beach;
}
ptr->offset.len = n;
if (!(consume_u32 (buf + i, buf + len, &ptr->size, &i))) {
goto beach;
}
if (i + 4 >= buflen) {
goto beach;
}
ptr->data = sec->payload_data + i;
r_list_append (ret, ptr);
r += 1;
}
return ret;
beach:
free (ptr);
return ret;
}
| 168,251 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long Cluster::GetPosition() const
{
const long long pos = m_element_start - m_pSegment->m_start;
assert(pos >= 0);
return pos;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long long Cluster::GetPosition() const
long Cluster::GetIndex() const { return m_index; }
long long Cluster::GetPosition() const {
const long long pos = m_element_start - m_pSegment->m_start;
assert(pos >= 0);
return pos;
}
| 174,350 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: resp_get_length(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *bp, int len, const u_char **endp)
{
int result;
u_char c;
int saw_digit;
int neg;
int too_large;
if (len == 0)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
too_large = 0;
neg = 0;
if (*bp == '-') {
neg = 1;
bp++;
len--;
}
result = 0;
saw_digit = 0;
for (;;) {
if (len == 0)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
c = *bp;
if (!(c >= '0' && c <= '9')) {
if (!saw_digit)
goto invalid;
break;
}
c -= '0';
if (result > (INT_MAX / 10)) {
/* This will overflow an int when we multiply it by 10. */
too_large = 1;
} else {
result *= 10;
if (result == INT_MAX && c > (INT_MAX % 10)) {
/* This will overflow an int when we add c */
too_large = 1;
} else
result += c;
}
bp++;
len--;
saw_digit = 1;
}
if (!saw_digit)
goto invalid;
/*
* OK, the next thing should be \r\n.
*/
if (len == 0)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
if (*bp != '\r')
goto invalid;
bp++;
len--;
if (len == 0)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
if (*bp != '\n')
goto invalid;
bp++;
len--;
*endp = bp;
if (neg) {
/* -1 means "null", anything else is invalid */
if (too_large || result != 1)
return (-4);
result = -1;
}
return (too_large ? -3 : result);
trunc:
return (-2);
invalid:
return (-5);
}
Commit Message: CVE-2017-12989/RESP: Make sure resp_get_length() advances the pointer for invalid lengths.
Make sure that it always sends *endp before returning and that, for
invalid lengths where we don't like a character in the length string,
what it sets *endp to is past the character in question, so we don't
run the risk of infinitely looping (or doing something else random) if a
character in the length is invalid.
This fixes an infinite loop discovered by Forcepoint's security
researchers Otto Airamo & Antti Levomäki.
Add a test using the capture file supplied by the reporter(s).
CWE ID: CWE-835 | resp_get_length(netdissect_options *ndo, register const u_char *bp, int len, const u_char **endp)
{
int result;
u_char c;
int saw_digit;
int neg;
int too_large;
if (len == 0)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
too_large = 0;
neg = 0;
if (*bp == '-') {
neg = 1;
bp++;
len--;
}
result = 0;
saw_digit = 0;
for (;;) {
if (len == 0)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
c = *bp;
if (!(c >= '0' && c <= '9')) {
if (!saw_digit) {
bp++;
goto invalid;
}
break;
}
c -= '0';
if (result > (INT_MAX / 10)) {
/* This will overflow an int when we multiply it by 10. */
too_large = 1;
} else {
result *= 10;
if (result == INT_MAX && c > (INT_MAX % 10)) {
/* This will overflow an int when we add c */
too_large = 1;
} else
result += c;
}
bp++;
len--;
saw_digit = 1;
}
if (!saw_digit)
goto invalid;
/*
* OK, the next thing should be \r\n.
*/
if (len == 0)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
if (*bp != '\r') {
bp++;
goto invalid;
}
bp++;
len--;
if (len == 0)
goto trunc;
ND_TCHECK(*bp);
if (*bp != '\n') {
bp++;
goto invalid;
}
bp++;
len--;
*endp = bp;
if (neg) {
/* -1 means "null", anything else is invalid */
if (too_large || result != 1)
return (-4);
result = -1;
}
return (too_large ? -3 : result);
trunc:
*endp = bp;
return (-2);
invalid:
*endp = bp;
return (-5);
}
| 167,928 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: cJSON *cJSON_CreateInt( int64_t num )
{
cJSON *item = cJSON_New_Item();
if ( item ) {
item->type = cJSON_Number;
item->valuefloat = num;
item->valueint = num;
}
return item;
}
Commit Message: Fix a buffer overflow / heap corruption issue that could occur if a
malformed JSON string was passed on the control channel. This issue,
present in the cJSON library, was already fixed upstream, so was
addressed here in iperf3 by importing a newer version of cJSON (plus
local ESnet modifications).
Discovered and reported by Dave McDaniel, Cisco Talos.
Based on a patch by @dopheide-esnet, with input from @DaveGamble.
Cross-references: TALOS-CAN-0164, ESNET-SECADV-2016-0001,
CVE-2016-4303
(cherry picked from commit ed94082be27d971a5e1b08b666e2c217cf470a40)
Signed-off-by: Bruce A. Mah <bmah@es.net>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | cJSON *cJSON_CreateInt( int64_t num )
| 167,274 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool IDNToUnicodeOneComponent(const base::char16* comp,
size_t comp_len,
base::string16* out) {
DCHECK(out);
if (comp_len == 0)
return false;
static const base::char16 kIdnPrefix[] = {'x', 'n', '-', '-'};
if ((comp_len > arraysize(kIdnPrefix)) &&
!memcmp(comp, kIdnPrefix, sizeof(kIdnPrefix))) {
UIDNA* uidna = g_uidna.Get().value;
DCHECK(uidna != NULL);
size_t original_length = out->length();
int32_t output_length = 64;
UIDNAInfo info = UIDNA_INFO_INITIALIZER;
UErrorCode status;
do {
out->resize(original_length + output_length);
status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
output_length = uidna_labelToUnicode(
uidna, comp, static_cast<int32_t>(comp_len), &(*out)[original_length],
output_length, &info, &status);
} while ((status == U_BUFFER_OVERFLOW_ERROR && info.errors == 0));
if (U_SUCCESS(status) && info.errors == 0) {
out->resize(original_length + output_length);
if (IsIDNComponentSafe(
base::StringPiece16(out->data() + original_length,
base::checked_cast<size_t>(output_length))))
return true;
}
out->resize(original_length);
}
out->append(comp, comp_len);
return false;
}
Commit Message: Block domain labels made of Cyrillic letters that look alike Latin
Block a label made entirely of Latin-look-alike Cyrillic letters when the TLD is not an IDN (i.e. this check is ON only for TLDs like 'com', 'net', 'uk', but not applied for IDN TLDs like рф.
BUG=683314
TEST=components_unittests --gtest_filter=U*IDN*
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2683793010
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#459226}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | bool IDNToUnicodeOneComponent(const base::char16* comp,
size_t comp_len,
bool is_tld_ascii,
base::string16* out) {
DCHECK(out);
if (comp_len == 0)
return false;
static const base::char16 kIdnPrefix[] = {'x', 'n', '-', '-'};
if ((comp_len > arraysize(kIdnPrefix)) &&
!memcmp(comp, kIdnPrefix, sizeof(kIdnPrefix))) {
UIDNA* uidna = g_uidna.Get().value;
DCHECK(uidna != NULL);
size_t original_length = out->length();
int32_t output_length = 64;
UIDNAInfo info = UIDNA_INFO_INITIALIZER;
UErrorCode status;
do {
out->resize(original_length + output_length);
status = U_ZERO_ERROR;
output_length = uidna_labelToUnicode(
uidna, comp, static_cast<int32_t>(comp_len), &(*out)[original_length],
output_length, &info, &status);
} while ((status == U_BUFFER_OVERFLOW_ERROR && info.errors == 0));
if (U_SUCCESS(status) && info.errors == 0) {
out->resize(original_length + output_length);
if (IsIDNComponentSafe(
base::StringPiece16(out->data() + original_length,
base::checked_cast<size_t>(output_length)),
is_tld_ascii))
return true;
}
out->resize(original_length);
}
out->append(comp, comp_len);
return false;
}
| 172,390 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool write_hci_command(hci_packet_t type, const void *packet, size_t length) {
int sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
if (sock == INVALID_FD)
goto error;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(0x7F000001);
addr.sin_port = htons(8873);
if (connect(sock, (const struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == -1)
goto error;
if (send(sock, &type, 1, 0) != 1)
goto error;
if (send(sock, &length, 2, 0) != 2)
goto error;
if (send(sock, packet, length, 0) != (ssize_t)length)
goto error;
close(sock);
return true;
error:;
close(sock);
return false;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Fix potential DoS caused by delivering signal to BT process
Bug: 28885210
Change-Id: I63866d894bfca47464d6e42e3fb0357c4f94d360
Conflicts:
btif/co/bta_hh_co.c
btif/src/btif_core.c
Merge conflict resolution of ag/1161415 (referencing ag/1164670)
- Directly into mnc-mr2-release
CWE ID: CWE-284 | static bool write_hci_command(hci_packet_t type, const void *packet, size_t length) {
int sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_TCP);
if (sock == INVALID_FD)
goto error;
struct sockaddr_in addr;
addr.sin_family = AF_INET;
addr.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(0x7F000001);
addr.sin_port = htons(8873);
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(connect(sock, (const struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr))) == -1)
goto error;
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(sock, &type, 1, 0)) != 1)
goto error;
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(sock, &length, 2, 0)) != 2)
goto error;
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(send(sock, packet, length, 0)) != (ssize_t)length)
goto error;
close(sock);
return true;
error:;
close(sock);
return false;
}
| 173,492 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool asn1_write_LDAPString(struct asn1_data *data, const char *s)
{
asn1_write(data, s, strlen(s));
return !data->has_error;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-399 | bool asn1_write_LDAPString(struct asn1_data *data, const char *s)
{
return asn1_write(data, s, strlen(s));
}
| 164,590 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void set_banner(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
{
char *banner, *q;
const char *p;
if (!vpninfo->banner || !(banner = malloc(strlen(vpninfo->banner)))) {
unsetenv("CISCO_BANNER");
return;
}
p = vpninfo->banner;
q = banner;
while (*p) {
if (*p == '%' && isxdigit((int)(unsigned char)p[1]) &&
isxdigit((int)(unsigned char)p[2])) {
*(q++) = unhex(p + 1);
p += 3;
} else
*(q++) = *(p++);
}
*q = 0;
setenv("CISCO_BANNER", banner, 1);
free(banner);
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static void set_banner(struct openconnect_info *vpninfo)
{
char *banner, *q;
const char *p;
if (!vpninfo->banner || !(banner = malloc(strlen(vpninfo->banner)+1))) {
unsetenv("CISCO_BANNER");
return;
}
p = vpninfo->banner;
q = banner;
while (*p) {
if (*p == '%' && isxdigit((int)(unsigned char)p[1]) &&
isxdigit((int)(unsigned char)p[2])) {
*(q++) = unhex(p + 1);
p += 3;
} else
*(q++) = *(p++);
}
*q = 0;
setenv("CISCO_BANNER", banner, 1);
free(banner);
}
| 164,960 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool AXNodeObject::computeAccessibilityIsIgnored(
IgnoredReasons* ignoredReasons) const {
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
ASSERT(m_initialized);
#endif
if (isDescendantOfLeafNode()) {
if (ignoredReasons)
ignoredReasons->push_back(
IgnoredReason(AXAncestorIsLeafNode, leafNodeAncestor()));
return true;
}
AXObject* controlObject = correspondingControlForLabelElement();
if (controlObject && controlObject->isCheckboxOrRadio() &&
controlObject->nameFromLabelElement()) {
if (ignoredReasons) {
HTMLLabelElement* label = labelElementContainer();
if (label && label != getNode()) {
AXObject* labelAXObject = axObjectCache().getOrCreate(label);
ignoredReasons->push_back(
IgnoredReason(AXLabelContainer, labelAXObject));
}
ignoredReasons->push_back(IgnoredReason(AXLabelFor, controlObject));
}
return true;
}
Element* element = getNode()->isElementNode() ? toElement(getNode())
: getNode()->parentElement();
if (!getLayoutObject() && (!element || !element->isInCanvasSubtree()) &&
!equalIgnoringCase(getAttribute(aria_hiddenAttr), "false")) {
if (ignoredReasons)
ignoredReasons->push_back(IgnoredReason(AXNotRendered));
return true;
}
if (m_role == UnknownRole) {
if (ignoredReasons)
ignoredReasons->push_back(IgnoredReason(AXUninteresting));
return true;
}
return false;
}
Commit Message: Switch to equalIgnoringASCIICase throughout modules/accessibility
BUG=627682
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2793913007
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#461858}
CWE ID: CWE-254 | bool AXNodeObject::computeAccessibilityIsIgnored(
IgnoredReasons* ignoredReasons) const {
#if DCHECK_IS_ON()
ASSERT(m_initialized);
#endif
if (isDescendantOfLeafNode()) {
if (ignoredReasons)
ignoredReasons->push_back(
IgnoredReason(AXAncestorIsLeafNode, leafNodeAncestor()));
return true;
}
AXObject* controlObject = correspondingControlForLabelElement();
if (controlObject && controlObject->isCheckboxOrRadio() &&
controlObject->nameFromLabelElement()) {
if (ignoredReasons) {
HTMLLabelElement* label = labelElementContainer();
if (label && label != getNode()) {
AXObject* labelAXObject = axObjectCache().getOrCreate(label);
ignoredReasons->push_back(
IgnoredReason(AXLabelContainer, labelAXObject));
}
ignoredReasons->push_back(IgnoredReason(AXLabelFor, controlObject));
}
return true;
}
Element* element = getNode()->isElementNode() ? toElement(getNode())
: getNode()->parentElement();
if (!getLayoutObject() && (!element || !element->isInCanvasSubtree()) &&
!equalIgnoringASCIICase(getAttribute(aria_hiddenAttr), "false")) {
if (ignoredReasons)
ignoredReasons->push_back(IgnoredReason(AXNotRendered));
return true;
}
if (m_role == UnknownRole) {
if (ignoredReasons)
ignoredReasons->push_back(IgnoredReason(AXUninteresting));
return true;
}
return false;
}
| 171,911 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: SpeechSynthesisLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetSpeechSynthesisLibrary() {
return speech_synthesis_lib_.GetDefaultImpl(use_stub_impl_);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | SpeechSynthesisLibrary* CrosLibrary::GetSpeechSynthesisLibrary() {
| 170,630 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void PrintSettingsInitializerWin::InitPrintSettings(
HDC hdc,
const DEVMODE& dev_mode,
const PageRanges& new_ranges,
const std::wstring& new_device_name,
bool print_selection_only,
PrintSettings* print_settings) {
DCHECK(hdc);
DCHECK(print_settings);
print_settings->set_printer_name(dev_mode.dmDeviceName);
print_settings->set_device_name(new_device_name);
print_settings->ranges = new_ranges;
print_settings->set_landscape(dev_mode.dmOrientation == DMORIENT_LANDSCAPE);
print_settings->selection_only = print_selection_only;
int dpi = GetDeviceCaps(hdc, LOGPIXELSX);
print_settings->set_dpi(dpi);
const int kAlphaCaps = SB_CONST_ALPHA | SB_PIXEL_ALPHA;
print_settings->set_supports_alpha_blend(
(GetDeviceCaps(hdc, SHADEBLENDCAPS) & kAlphaCaps) == kAlphaCaps);
DCHECK_EQ(dpi, GetDeviceCaps(hdc, LOGPIXELSY));
DCHECK_EQ(GetDeviceCaps(hdc, SCALINGFACTORX), 0);
DCHECK_EQ(GetDeviceCaps(hdc, SCALINGFACTORY), 0);
gfx::Size physical_size_device_units(GetDeviceCaps(hdc, PHYSICALWIDTH),
GetDeviceCaps(hdc, PHYSICALHEIGHT));
gfx::Rect printable_area_device_units(GetDeviceCaps(hdc, PHYSICALOFFSETX),
GetDeviceCaps(hdc, PHYSICALOFFSETY),
GetDeviceCaps(hdc, HORZRES),
GetDeviceCaps(hdc, VERTRES));
print_settings->SetPrinterPrintableArea(physical_size_device_units,
printable_area_device_units,
dpi);
}
Commit Message: Fix print preview workflow to reflect settings of selected printer.
BUG=95110
TEST=none
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7831041
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@102242 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void PrintSettingsInitializerWin::InitPrintSettings(
HDC hdc,
const DEVMODE& dev_mode,
const PageRanges& new_ranges,
const std::wstring& new_device_name,
bool print_selection_only,
PrintSettings* print_settings) {
DCHECK(hdc);
DCHECK(print_settings);
print_settings->set_printer_name(dev_mode.dmDeviceName);
print_settings->set_device_name(new_device_name);
print_settings->ranges = const_cast<PageRanges&>(new_ranges);
print_settings->set_landscape(dev_mode.dmOrientation == DMORIENT_LANDSCAPE);
print_settings->selection_only = print_selection_only;
int dpi = GetDeviceCaps(hdc, LOGPIXELSX);
print_settings->set_dpi(dpi);
const int kAlphaCaps = SB_CONST_ALPHA | SB_PIXEL_ALPHA;
print_settings->set_supports_alpha_blend(
(GetDeviceCaps(hdc, SHADEBLENDCAPS) & kAlphaCaps) == kAlphaCaps);
DCHECK_EQ(dpi, GetDeviceCaps(hdc, LOGPIXELSY));
DCHECK_EQ(GetDeviceCaps(hdc, SCALINGFACTORX), 0);
DCHECK_EQ(GetDeviceCaps(hdc, SCALINGFACTORY), 0);
gfx::Size physical_size_device_units(GetDeviceCaps(hdc, PHYSICALWIDTH),
GetDeviceCaps(hdc, PHYSICALHEIGHT));
gfx::Rect printable_area_device_units(GetDeviceCaps(hdc, PHYSICALOFFSETX),
GetDeviceCaps(hdc, PHYSICALOFFSETY),
GetDeviceCaps(hdc, HORZRES),
GetDeviceCaps(hdc, VERTRES));
print_settings->SetPrinterPrintableArea(physical_size_device_units,
printable_area_device_units,
dpi);
}
| 170,265 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void* H264SwDecMalloc(u32 size)
{
return malloc(size);
}
Commit Message: h264dec: check for overflows when calculating allocation size.
Bug: 27855419
Change-Id: Idabedca52913ec31ea5cb6a6109ab94e3fb2badd
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void* H264SwDecMalloc(u32 size)
void* H264SwDecMalloc(u32 size, u32 num)
{
if (size > UINT32_MAX / num) {
return NULL;
}
return malloc(size * num);
}
| 173,872 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void ResourceFetcher::DidLoadResourceFromMemoryCache(
unsigned long identifier,
Resource* resource,
const ResourceRequest& original_resource_request) {
ResourceRequest resource_request(resource->Url());
resource_request.SetFrameType(original_resource_request.GetFrameType());
resource_request.SetRequestContext(
original_resource_request.GetRequestContext());
Context().DispatchDidLoadResourceFromMemoryCache(identifier, resource_request,
resource->GetResponse());
Context().DispatchWillSendRequest(identifier, resource_request,
ResourceResponse() /* redirects */,
resource->Options().initiator_info);
Context().DispatchDidReceiveResponse(
identifier, resource->GetResponse(), resource_request.GetFrameType(),
resource_request.GetRequestContext(), resource,
FetchContext::ResourceResponseType::kFromMemoryCache);
if (resource->EncodedSize() > 0)
Context().DispatchDidReceiveData(identifier, 0, resource->EncodedSize());
Context().DispatchDidFinishLoading(
identifier, 0, 0, resource->GetResponse().DecodedBodyLength());
}
Commit Message: DevTools: send proper resource type in Network.RequestWillBeSent
This patch plumbs resoure type into the DispatchWillSendRequest
instrumenation. This allows us to report accurate type in
Network.RequestWillBeSent event, instead of "Other", that we report
today.
BUG=765501
R=dgozman
Change-Id: I0134c08b841e8dd247fdc8ff208bfd51e462709c
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/667504
Reviewed-by: Pavel Feldman <pfeldman@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Andrey Lushnikov <lushnikov@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#507936}
CWE ID: CWE-119 | void ResourceFetcher::DidLoadResourceFromMemoryCache(
unsigned long identifier,
Resource* resource,
const ResourceRequest& original_resource_request) {
ResourceRequest resource_request(resource->Url());
resource_request.SetFrameType(original_resource_request.GetFrameType());
resource_request.SetRequestContext(
original_resource_request.GetRequestContext());
Context().DispatchDidLoadResourceFromMemoryCache(identifier, resource_request,
resource->GetResponse());
Context().DispatchWillSendRequest(
identifier, resource_request, ResourceResponse() /* redirects */,
resource->GetType(), resource->Options().initiator_info);
Context().DispatchDidReceiveResponse(
identifier, resource->GetResponse(), resource_request.GetFrameType(),
resource_request.GetRequestContext(), resource,
FetchContext::ResourceResponseType::kFromMemoryCache);
if (resource->EncodedSize() > 0)
Context().DispatchDidReceiveData(identifier, 0, resource->EncodedSize());
Context().DispatchDidFinishLoading(
identifier, 0, 0, resource->GetResponse().DecodedBodyLength());
}
| 172,478 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: BufferMeta(const sp<IMemory> &mem, OMX_U32 portIndex, bool is_backup = false)
: mMem(mem),
mIsBackup(is_backup),
mPortIndex(portIndex) {
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE: IOMX: work against metadata buffer spoofing
- Prohibit direct set/getParam/Settings for extensions meant for
OMXNodeInstance alone. This disallows enabling metadata mode
without the knowledge of OMXNodeInstance.
- Use a backup buffer for metadata mode buffers and do not directly
share with clients.
- Disallow setting up metadata mode/tunneling/input surface
after first sendCommand.
- Disallow store-meta for input cross process.
- Disallow emptyBuffer for surface input (via IOMX).
- Fix checking for input surface.
Bug: 29422020
Change-Id: I801c77b80e703903f62e42d76fd2e76a34e4bc8e
(cherry picked from commit 7c3c2fa3e233c656fc8c2fc2a6634b3ecf8a23e8)
CWE ID: CWE-200 | BufferMeta(const sp<IMemory> &mem, OMX_U32 portIndex, bool is_backup = false)
BufferMeta(
const sp<IMemory> &mem, OMX_U32 portIndex, bool copyToOmx,
bool copyFromOmx, OMX_U8 *backup)
: mMem(mem),
mCopyFromOmx(copyFromOmx),
mCopyToOmx(copyToOmx),
mPortIndex(portIndex),
mBackup(backup) {
}
| 174,124 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_METHOD(Phar, getStub)
{
size_t len;
char *buf;
php_stream *fp;
php_stream_filter *filter = NULL;
phar_entry_info *stub;
phar_entry_info *stub;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&(phar_obj->arc.archive->manifest), ".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1, (void **)&stub)) {
if (phar_obj->arc.archive->fp && !phar_obj->arc.archive->is_brandnew && !(stub->flags & PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSION_MASK)) {
fp = phar_obj->arc.archive->fp;
} else {
if (!(fp = php_stream_open_wrapper(phar_obj->arc.archive->fname, "rb", 0, NULL))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar error: unable to open phar \"%s\"", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
return;
}
if (stub->flags & PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSION_MASK) {
char *filter_name;
if ((filter_name = phar_decompress_filter(stub, 0)) != NULL) {
filter = php_stream_filter_create(filter_name, NULL, php_stream_is_persistent(fp) TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
filter = NULL;
}
if (!filter) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar error: unable to read stub of phar \"%s\" (cannot create %s filter)", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname, phar_decompress_filter(stub, 1));
return;
}
php_stream_filter_append(&fp->readfilters, filter);
}
}
if (!fp) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"Unable to read stub");
return;
}
php_stream_seek(fp, stub->offset_abs, SEEK_SET);
len = stub->uncompressed_filesize;
goto carry_on;
} else {
RETURN_STRINGL("", 0, 1);
}
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-20 | PHP_METHOD(Phar, getStub)
{
size_t len;
char *buf;
php_stream *fp;
php_stream_filter *filter = NULL;
phar_entry_info *stub;
phar_entry_info *stub;
PHAR_ARCHIVE_OBJECT();
if (zend_parse_parameters_none() == FAILURE) {
return;
}
if (SUCCESS == zend_hash_find(&(phar_obj->arc.archive->manifest), ".phar/stub.php", sizeof(".phar/stub.php")-1, (void **)&stub)) {
if (phar_obj->arc.archive->fp && !phar_obj->arc.archive->is_brandnew && !(stub->flags & PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSION_MASK)) {
fp = phar_obj->arc.archive->fp;
} else {
if (!(fp = php_stream_open_wrapper(phar_obj->arc.archive->fname, "rb", 0, NULL))) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar error: unable to open phar \"%s\"", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname);
return;
}
if (stub->flags & PHAR_ENT_COMPRESSION_MASK) {
char *filter_name;
if ((filter_name = phar_decompress_filter(stub, 0)) != NULL) {
filter = php_stream_filter_create(filter_name, NULL, php_stream_is_persistent(fp) TSRMLS_CC);
} else {
filter = NULL;
}
if (!filter) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_UnexpectedValueException, 0 TSRMLS_CC, "phar error: unable to read stub of phar \"%s\" (cannot create %s filter)", phar_obj->arc.archive->fname, phar_decompress_filter(stub, 1));
return;
}
php_stream_filter_append(&fp->readfilters, filter);
}
}
if (!fp) {
zend_throw_exception_ex(spl_ce_RuntimeException, 0 TSRMLS_CC,
"Unable to read stub");
return;
}
php_stream_seek(fp, stub->offset_abs, SEEK_SET);
len = stub->uncompressed_filesize;
goto carry_on;
} else {
RETURN_STRINGL("", 0, 1);
}
}
| 165,296 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void copy_asoundrc(void) {
char *src = RUN_ASOUNDRC_FILE ;
char *dest;
if (asprintf(&dest, "%s/.asoundrc", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
if (is_link(dest)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s is a symbolic link\n", dest);
exit(1);
}
pid_t child = fork();
if (child < 0)
errExit("fork");
if (child == 0) {
drop_privs(0);
int rv = copy_file(src, dest);
if (rv)
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: cannot transfer .asoundrc in private home directory\n");
else {
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
}
_exit(0);
}
waitpid(child, NULL, 0);
if (chown(dest, getuid(), getgid()) < 0)
errExit("chown");
if (chmod(dest, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) < 0)
errExit("chmod");
unlink(src);
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: CWE-269 | static void copy_asoundrc(void) {
char *src = RUN_ASOUNDRC_FILE ;
char *dest;
if (asprintf(&dest, "%s/.asoundrc", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
if (is_link(dest)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s is a symbolic link\n", dest);
exit(1);
}
copy_file_as_user(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); // regular user
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
unlink(src);
}
| 170,096 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: status_t OMXNodeInstance::allocateBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, size_t size, OMX::buffer_id *buffer,
void **buffer_data) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(size);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_AllocateBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta, size);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(allocateBuffer, err, BUFFER_FMT(portIndex, "%zu@", size));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
*buffer_data = header->pBuffer;
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(allocateBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(*buffer, portIndex, "%zu@%p", size, *buffer_data));
return OK;
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE omx: check buffer port before using
Bug: 28816827
Change-Id: I3d5bad4a1ef96dec544b05bb31cc6f7109aae0a5
CWE ID: CWE-119 | status_t OMXNodeInstance::allocateBuffer(
OMX_U32 portIndex, size_t size, OMX::buffer_id *buffer,
void **buffer_data) {
Mutex::Autolock autoLock(mLock);
BufferMeta *buffer_meta = new BufferMeta(size, portIndex);
OMX_BUFFERHEADERTYPE *header;
OMX_ERRORTYPE err = OMX_AllocateBuffer(
mHandle, &header, portIndex, buffer_meta, size);
if (err != OMX_ErrorNone) {
CLOG_ERROR(allocateBuffer, err, BUFFER_FMT(portIndex, "%zu@", size));
delete buffer_meta;
buffer_meta = NULL;
*buffer = 0;
return StatusFromOMXError(err);
}
CHECK_EQ(header->pAppPrivate, buffer_meta);
*buffer = makeBufferID(header);
*buffer_data = header->pBuffer;
addActiveBuffer(portIndex, *buffer);
sp<GraphicBufferSource> bufferSource(getGraphicBufferSource());
if (bufferSource != NULL && portIndex == kPortIndexInput) {
bufferSource->addCodecBuffer(header);
}
CLOG_BUFFER(allocateBuffer, NEW_BUFFER_FMT(*buffer, portIndex, "%zu@%p", size, *buffer_data));
return OK;
}
| 173,524 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void InitializeOriginStatFromOriginRequestSummary(
OriginStat* origin,
const OriginRequestSummary& summary) {
origin->set_origin(summary.origin.spec());
origin->set_number_of_hits(1);
origin->set_average_position(summary.first_occurrence + 1);
origin->set_always_access_network(summary.always_access_network);
origin->set_accessed_network(summary.accessed_network);
}
Commit Message: Origins should be represented as url::Origin (not as GURL).
As pointed out in //docs/security/origin-vs-url.md, origins should be
represented as url::Origin (not as GURL). This CL applies this
guideline to predictor-related code and changes the type of the
following fields from GURL to url::Origin:
- OriginRequestSummary::origin
- PreconnectedRequestStats::origin
- PreconnectRequest::origin
The old code did not depend on any non-origin parts of GURL
(like path and/or query). Therefore, this CL has no intended
behavior change.
Bug: 973885
Change-Id: Idd14590b4834cb9d50c74ed747b595fe1a4ba357
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1895167
Commit-Queue: Łukasz Anforowicz <lukasza@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Alex Ilin <alexilin@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#716311}
CWE ID: CWE-125 | void InitializeOriginStatFromOriginRequestSummary(
OriginStat* origin,
const OriginRequestSummary& summary) {
origin->set_origin(summary.origin.GetURL().spec());
origin->set_number_of_hits(1);
origin->set_average_position(summary.first_occurrence + 1);
origin->set_always_access_network(summary.always_access_network);
origin->set_accessed_network(summary.accessed_network);
}
| 172,379 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void net_tx_pkt_init(struct NetTxPkt **pkt, PCIDevice *pci_dev,
uint32_t max_frags, bool has_virt_hdr)
{
struct NetTxPkt *p = g_malloc0(sizeof *p);
p->pci_dev = pci_dev;
p->vec = g_malloc((sizeof *p->vec) *
(max_frags + NET_TX_PKT_PL_START_FRAG));
p->raw = g_malloc((sizeof *p->raw) * max_frags);
p->max_payload_frags = max_frags;
p->max_raw_frags = max_frags;
p->max_raw_frags = max_frags;
p->has_virt_hdr = has_virt_hdr;
p->vec[NET_TX_PKT_VHDR_FRAG].iov_base = &p->virt_hdr;
p->vec[NET_TX_PKT_VHDR_FRAG].iov_len =
p->has_virt_hdr ? sizeof p->virt_hdr : 0;
p->vec[NET_TX_PKT_L2HDR_FRAG].iov_base = &p->l2_hdr;
p->vec[NET_TX_PKT_L3HDR_FRAG].iov_base = &p->l3_hdr;
*pkt = p;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-190 | void net_tx_pkt_init(struct NetTxPkt **pkt, PCIDevice *pci_dev,
uint32_t max_frags, bool has_virt_hdr)
{
struct NetTxPkt *p = g_malloc0(sizeof *p);
p->pci_dev = pci_dev;
p->vec = g_new(struct iovec, max_frags + NET_TX_PKT_PL_START_FRAG);
p->raw = g_new(struct iovec, max_frags);
p->max_payload_frags = max_frags;
p->max_raw_frags = max_frags;
p->max_raw_frags = max_frags;
p->has_virt_hdr = has_virt_hdr;
p->vec[NET_TX_PKT_VHDR_FRAG].iov_base = &p->virt_hdr;
p->vec[NET_TX_PKT_VHDR_FRAG].iov_len =
p->has_virt_hdr ? sizeof p->virt_hdr : 0;
p->vec[NET_TX_PKT_L2HDR_FRAG].iov_base = &p->l2_hdr;
p->vec[NET_TX_PKT_L3HDR_FRAG].iov_base = &p->l3_hdr;
*pkt = p;
}
| 164,947 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
gss_buffer_set_t *data_set)
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
size_t i;
if (minor_status == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
*minor_status = 0;
if (desired_object == GSS_C_NO_OID)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ;
if (data_set == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
*data_set = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (!ctx->established)
return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops)/
sizeof(krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[0]); i++) {
if (g_OID_prefix_equal(desired_object, &krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[i].oid)) {
return (*krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[i].func)(minor_status,
context_handle,
desired_object,
data_set);
}
}
*minor_status = EINVAL;
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
}
Commit Message: Fix gss_process_context_token() [CVE-2014-5352]
[MITKRB5-SA-2015-001] The krb5 gss_process_context_token() should not
actually delete the context; that leaves the caller with a dangling
pointer and no way to know that it is invalid. Instead, mark the
context as terminated, and check for terminated contexts in the GSS
functions which expect established contexts. Also add checks in
export_sec_context and pseudo_random, and adjust t_prf.c for the
pseudo_random check.
ticket: 8055 (new)
target_version: 1.13.1
tags: pullup
CWE ID: | krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid (OM_uint32 *minor_status,
const gss_ctx_id_t context_handle,
const gss_OID desired_object,
gss_buffer_set_t *data_set)
{
krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *ctx;
size_t i;
if (minor_status == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
*minor_status = 0;
if (desired_object == GSS_C_NO_OID)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_READ;
if (data_set == NULL)
return GSS_S_CALL_INACCESSIBLE_WRITE;
*data_set = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
ctx = (krb5_gss_ctx_id_rec *) context_handle;
if (ctx->terminated || !ctx->established)
return GSS_S_NO_CONTEXT;
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops)/
sizeof(krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[0]); i++) {
if (g_OID_prefix_equal(desired_object, &krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[i].oid)) {
return (*krb5_gss_inquire_sec_context_by_oid_ops[i].func)(minor_status,
context_handle,
desired_object,
data_set);
}
}
*minor_status = EINVAL;
return GSS_S_UNAVAILABLE;
}
| 166,815 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static void QuitMessageLoop() {
base::RunLoop::QuitCurrentWhenIdleDeprecated();
}
Commit Message: Migrate ServiceProcessControl tests off of QuitCurrent*Deprecated().
Bug: 844016
Change-Id: I9403b850456c8ee06cd2539f7cec9599302e81a0
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1126576
Commit-Queue: Wez <wez@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Avi Drissman <avi@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#573131}
CWE ID: CWE-94 | static void QuitMessageLoop() {
base::Unretained(this), on_launched));
}
| 172,054 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: ExtensionFunction::ResponseAction UsbFindDevicesFunction::Run() {
scoped_ptr<extensions::core_api::usb::FindDevices::Params> parameters =
FindDevices::Params::Create(*args_);
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(parameters.get());
vendor_id_ = parameters->options.vendor_id;
product_id_ = parameters->options.product_id;
interface_id_ = parameters->options.interface_id.get()
? *parameters->options.interface_id.get()
: UsbDevicePermissionData::ANY_INTERFACE;
UsbDevicePermission::CheckParam param(vendor_id_, product_id_, interface_id_);
if (!extension()->permissions_data()->CheckAPIPermissionWithParam(
APIPermission::kUsbDevice, ¶m)) {
return RespondNow(Error(kErrorPermissionDenied));
}
UsbService* service = device::DeviceClient::Get()->GetUsbService();
if (!service) {
return RespondNow(Error(kErrorInitService));
}
service->GetDevices(
base::Bind(&UsbFindDevicesFunction::OnGetDevicesComplete, this));
return RespondLater();
}
Commit Message: Remove fallback when requesting a single USB interface.
This reverts commit 2d475d0ed37bf8f19385537ad31e361f1b21624b. The
permission broker now supports opening devices that are partially
claimed through the OpenPath method and RequestPathAccess will always
fail for these devices so the fallback path from RequestPathAccess to
OpenPath is always taken.
BUG=500057
Review URL: https://codereview.chromium.org/1227313003
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#338354}
CWE ID: CWE-399 | ExtensionFunction::ResponseAction UsbFindDevicesFunction::Run() {
scoped_ptr<extensions::core_api::usb::FindDevices::Params> parameters =
FindDevices::Params::Create(*args_);
EXTENSION_FUNCTION_VALIDATE(parameters.get());
vendor_id_ = parameters->options.vendor_id;
product_id_ = parameters->options.product_id;
int interface_id = parameters->options.interface_id.get()
? *parameters->options.interface_id.get()
: UsbDevicePermissionData::ANY_INTERFACE;
UsbDevicePermission::CheckParam param(vendor_id_, product_id_, interface_id);
if (!extension()->permissions_data()->CheckAPIPermissionWithParam(
APIPermission::kUsbDevice, ¶m)) {
return RespondNow(Error(kErrorPermissionDenied));
}
UsbService* service = device::DeviceClient::Get()->GetUsbService();
if (!service) {
return RespondNow(Error(kErrorInitService));
}
service->GetDevices(
base::Bind(&UsbFindDevicesFunction::OnGetDevicesComplete, this));
return RespondLater();
}
| 171,704 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetTouchpadLibrary(
TouchpadLibrary* library, bool own) {
library_->touchpad_lib_.SetImpl(library, own);
}
Commit Message: chromeos: Replace copy-and-pasted code with macros.
This replaces a bunch of duplicated-per-library cros
function definitions and comments.
BUG=none
TEST=built it
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/6086007
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@70070 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-189 | void CrosLibrary::TestApi::SetTouchpadLibrary(
| 170,648 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void FlushImeConfig() {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return;
bool active_input_methods_are_changed = false;
InputMethodConfigRequests::iterator iter =
pending_config_requests_.begin();
while (iter != pending_config_requests_.end()) {
const std::string& section = iter->first.first;
const std::string& config_name = iter->first.second;
ImeConfigValue& value = iter->second;
if (config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
!tentative_current_input_method_id_.empty()) {
std::vector<std::string>::iterator engine_iter = std::find(
value.string_list_value.begin(),
value.string_list_value.end(),
tentative_current_input_method_id_);
if (engine_iter != value.string_list_value.end()) {
std::rotate(value.string_list_value.begin(),
engine_iter, // this becomes the new first element
value.string_list_value.end());
} else {
LOG(WARNING) << tentative_current_input_method_id_
<< " is not in preload_engines: " << value.ToString();
}
tentative_current_input_method_id_.erase();
}
if (chromeos::SetImeConfig(input_method_status_connection_,
section.c_str(),
config_name.c_str(),
value)) {
if (config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName) {
active_input_methods_are_changed = true;
VLOG(1) << "Updated preload_engines: " << value.ToString();
}
pending_config_requests_.erase(iter++);
} else {
break;
}
}
if (active_input_methods_are_changed) {
const size_t num_active_input_methods = GetNumActiveInputMethods();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(Observer, observers_,
ActiveInputMethodsChanged(this,
current_input_method_,
num_active_input_methods));
}
}
Commit Message: Remove use of libcros from InputMethodLibrary.
BUG=chromium-os:16238
TEST==confirm that input methods work as before on the netbook. Also confirm that the chrome builds and works on the desktop as before.
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/7003086
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@89142 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-399 | void FlushImeConfig() {
if (!initialized_successfully_)
return;
bool active_input_methods_are_changed = false;
InputMethodConfigRequests::iterator iter =
pending_config_requests_.begin();
while (iter != pending_config_requests_.end()) {
const std::string& section = iter->first.first;
const std::string& config_name = iter->first.second;
input_method::ImeConfigValue& value = iter->second;
if (config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName &&
!tentative_current_input_method_id_.empty()) {
std::vector<std::string>::iterator engine_iter = std::find(
value.string_list_value.begin(),
value.string_list_value.end(),
tentative_current_input_method_id_);
if (engine_iter != value.string_list_value.end()) {
std::rotate(value.string_list_value.begin(),
engine_iter, // this becomes the new first element
value.string_list_value.end());
} else {
LOG(WARNING) << tentative_current_input_method_id_
<< " is not in preload_engines: " << value.ToString();
}
tentative_current_input_method_id_.erase();
}
if (ibus_controller_->SetImeConfig(section, config_name, value)) {
if (config_name == language_prefs::kPreloadEnginesConfigName) {
active_input_methods_are_changed = true;
VLOG(1) << "Updated preload_engines: " << value.ToString();
}
pending_config_requests_.erase(iter++);
} else {
break;
}
}
if (active_input_methods_are_changed) {
const size_t num_active_input_methods = GetNumActiveInputMethods();
FOR_EACH_OBSERVER(InputMethodLibrary::Observer, observers_,
ActiveInputMethodsChanged(this,
current_input_method_,
num_active_input_methods));
}
}
| 170,485 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void IOHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
process_host_ = process_host;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: speculative fix for crash in NetworkHandler::Disable
This keeps BrowserContext* and StoragePartition* instead of
RenderProcessHost* in an attemp to resolve UAF of RenderProcessHost
upon closure of DevTools front-end.
Bug: 801117, 783067, 780694
Change-Id: I6c2cca60cc0c29f0949d189cf918769059f80c1b
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/876657
Commit-Queue: Andrey Kosyakov <caseq@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry Gozman <dgozman@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#531157}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void IOHandler::SetRenderer(RenderProcessHost* process_host,
void IOHandler::SetRenderer(int process_host_id,
RenderFrameHostImpl* frame_host) {
RenderProcessHost* process_host = RenderProcessHost::FromID(process_host_id);
if (process_host) {
browser_context_ = process_host->GetBrowserContext();
storage_partition_ = process_host->GetStoragePartition();
} else {
browser_context_ = nullptr;
storage_partition_ = nullptr;
}
}
| 172,751 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long Chapters::Atom::GetTime(
const Chapters* pChapters,
long long timecode)
{
if (pChapters == NULL)
return -1;
Segment* const pSegment = pChapters->m_pSegment;
if (pSegment == NULL) // weird
return -1;
const SegmentInfo* const pInfo = pSegment->GetInfo();
if (pInfo == NULL)
return -1;
const long long timecode_scale = pInfo->GetTimeCodeScale();
if (timecode_scale < 1) // weird
return -1;
if (timecode < 0)
return -1;
const long long result = timecode_scale * timecode;
return result;
}
Commit Message: libwebm: Pull from upstream
Rolling mkvparser from upstream. Primarily for fixing a bug on parsing
failures with certain Opus WebM files.
Upstream commit hash of this pull: 574045edd4ecbeb802ee3f1d214b5510269852ae
The diff is so huge because there were some style clean ups upstream.
But it was ensured that there were no breaking changes when the style
clean ups was done upstream.
Change-Id: Ib6e907175484b4b0ae1b55ab39522ea3188ad039
CWE ID: CWE-119 | long long Chapters::Atom::GetTime(
| 174,361 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: std::string SanitizeEndpoint(const std::string& value) {
if (value.find('&') != std::string::npos
|| value.find('?') != std::string::npos)
return std::string();
return value;
}
Commit Message: DevTools: move front-end URL handling to DevToolsUIBindingds
BUG=662859
Review-Url: https://codereview.chromium.org/2607833002
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#440926}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | std::string SanitizeEndpoint(const std::string& value) {
| 172,457 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int ras_getdatastd(jas_stream_t *in, ras_hdr_t *hdr, ras_cmap_t *cmap,
jas_image_t *image)
{
int pad;
int nz;
int z;
int c;
int y;
int x;
int v;
int i;
jas_matrix_t *data[3];
/* Note: This function does not properly handle images with a colormap. */
/* Avoid compiler warnings about unused parameters. */
cmap = 0;
for (i = 0; i < jas_image_numcmpts(image); ++i) {
data[i] = jas_matrix_create(1, jas_image_width(image));
assert(data[i]);
}
pad = RAS_ROWSIZE(hdr) - (hdr->width * hdr->depth + 7) / 8;
for (y = 0; y < hdr->height; y++) {
nz = 0;
z = 0;
for (x = 0; x < hdr->width; x++) {
while (nz < hdr->depth) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
z = (z << 8) | c;
nz += 8;
}
v = (z >> (nz - hdr->depth)) & RAS_ONES(hdr->depth);
z &= RAS_ONES(nz - hdr->depth);
nz -= hdr->depth;
if (jas_image_numcmpts(image) == 3) {
jas_matrix_setv(data[0], x, (RAS_GETRED(v)));
jas_matrix_setv(data[1], x, (RAS_GETGREEN(v)));
jas_matrix_setv(data[2], x, (RAS_GETBLUE(v)));
} else {
jas_matrix_setv(data[0], x, (v));
}
}
if (pad) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF) {
return -1;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < jas_image_numcmpts(image); ++i) {
if (jas_image_writecmpt(image, i, 0, y, hdr->width, 1,
data[i])) {
return -1;
}
}
}
for (i = 0; i < jas_image_numcmpts(image); ++i) {
jas_matrix_destroy(data[i]);
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: Fixed a few bugs in the RAS encoder and decoder where errors were tested
with assertions instead of being gracefully handled.
CWE ID: | static int ras_getdatastd(jas_stream_t *in, ras_hdr_t *hdr, ras_cmap_t *cmap,
jas_image_t *image)
{
int pad;
int nz;
int z;
int c;
int y;
int x;
int v;
int i;
jas_matrix_t *data[3];
/* Note: This function does not properly handle images with a colormap. */
/* Avoid compiler warnings about unused parameters. */
cmap = 0;
assert(jas_image_numcmpts(image) <= 3);
for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
data[i] = 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < jas_image_numcmpts(image); ++i) {
if (!(data[i] = jas_matrix_create(1, jas_image_width(image)))) {
goto error;
}
}
pad = RAS_ROWSIZE(hdr) - (hdr->width * hdr->depth + 7) / 8;
for (y = 0; y < hdr->height; y++) {
nz = 0;
z = 0;
for (x = 0; x < hdr->width; x++) {
while (nz < hdr->depth) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF) {
goto error;
}
z = (z << 8) | c;
nz += 8;
}
v = (z >> (nz - hdr->depth)) & RAS_ONES(hdr->depth);
z &= RAS_ONES(nz - hdr->depth);
nz -= hdr->depth;
if (jas_image_numcmpts(image) == 3) {
jas_matrix_setv(data[0], x, (RAS_GETRED(v)));
jas_matrix_setv(data[1], x, (RAS_GETGREEN(v)));
jas_matrix_setv(data[2], x, (RAS_GETBLUE(v)));
} else {
jas_matrix_setv(data[0], x, (v));
}
}
if (pad) {
if ((c = jas_stream_getc(in)) == EOF) {
goto error;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < jas_image_numcmpts(image); ++i) {
if (jas_image_writecmpt(image, i, 0, y, hdr->width, 1,
data[i])) {
goto error;
}
}
}
for (i = 0; i < jas_image_numcmpts(image); ++i) {
jas_matrix_destroy(data[i]);
data[i] = 0;
}
return 0;
error:
for (i = 0; i < 3; ++i) {
if (data[i]) {
jas_matrix_destroy(data[i]);
}
}
return -1;
}
| 168,740 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int nfc_genl_deactivate_target(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct genl_info *info)
{
struct nfc_dev *dev;
u32 device_idx, target_idx;
int rc;
if (!info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX])
return -EINVAL;
device_idx = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX]);
dev = nfc_get_device(device_idx);
if (!dev)
return -ENODEV;
target_idx = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX]);
rc = nfc_deactivate_target(dev, target_idx, NFC_TARGET_MODE_SLEEP);
nfc_put_device(dev);
return rc;
}
Commit Message: nfc: Ensure presence of required attributes in the deactivate_target handler
Check that the NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX attributes (in addition to
NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX) are provided by the netlink client prior to
accessing them. This prevents potential unhandled NULL pointer dereference
exceptions which can be triggered by malicious user-mode programs,
if they omit one or both of these attributes.
Signed-off-by: Young Xiao <92siuyang@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-476 | static int nfc_genl_deactivate_target(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct genl_info *info)
{
struct nfc_dev *dev;
u32 device_idx, target_idx;
int rc;
if (!info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX] ||
!info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX])
return -EINVAL;
device_idx = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_DEVICE_INDEX]);
dev = nfc_get_device(device_idx);
if (!dev)
return -ENODEV;
target_idx = nla_get_u32(info->attrs[NFC_ATTR_TARGET_INDEX]);
rc = nfc_deactivate_target(dev, target_idx, NFC_TARGET_MODE_SLEEP);
nfc_put_device(dev);
return rc;
}
| 169,645 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: struct ipv6_txoptions *ipv6_update_options(struct sock *sk,
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt)
{
if (inet_sk(sk)->is_icsk) {
if (opt &&
!((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_LISTEN | TCPF_CLOSE)) &&
inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr != LOOPBACK4_IPV6) {
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen;
icsk->icsk_sync_mss(sk, icsk->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
}
}
opt = xchg(&inet6_sk(sk)->opt, opt);
sk_dst_reset(sk);
return opt;
}
Commit Message: ipv6: add complete rcu protection around np->opt
This patch addresses multiple problems :
UDP/RAW sendmsg() need to get a stable struct ipv6_txoptions
while socket is not locked : Other threads can change np->opt
concurrently. Dmitry posted a syzkaller
(http://github.com/google/syzkaller) program desmonstrating
use-after-free.
Starting with TCP/DCCP lockless listeners, tcp_v6_syn_recv_sock()
and dccp_v6_request_recv_sock() also need to use RCU protection
to dereference np->opt once (before calling ipv6_dup_options())
This patch adds full RCU protection to np->opt
Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
CWE ID: CWE-416 | struct ipv6_txoptions *ipv6_update_options(struct sock *sk,
struct ipv6_txoptions *opt)
{
if (inet_sk(sk)->is_icsk) {
if (opt &&
!((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_LISTEN | TCPF_CLOSE)) &&
inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr != LOOPBACK4_IPV6) {
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
icsk->icsk_ext_hdr_len = opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen;
icsk->icsk_sync_mss(sk, icsk->icsk_pmtu_cookie);
}
}
opt = xchg((__force struct ipv6_txoptions **)&inet6_sk(sk)->opt,
opt);
sk_dst_reset(sk);
return opt;
}
| 167,337 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: virtual void ResetModel() {
last_pts_ = 0;
bits_in_buffer_model_ = cfg_.rc_target_bitrate * cfg_.rc_buf_initial_sz;
frame_number_ = 0;
first_drop_ = 0;
bits_total_ = 0;
duration_ = 0.0;
}
Commit Message: Merge Conflict Fix CL to lmp-mr1-release for ag/849478
DO NOT MERGE - libvpx: Pull from upstream
Current HEAD: 7105df53d7dc13d5e575bc8df714ec8d1da36b06
BUG=23452792
Change-Id: Ic78176fc369e0bacc71d423e0e2e6075d004aaec
CWE ID: CWE-119 | virtual void ResetModel() {
last_pts_ = 0;
bits_in_buffer_model_ = cfg_.rc_target_bitrate * cfg_.rc_buf_initial_sz;
frame_number_ = 0;
first_drop_ = 0;
bits_total_ = 0;
duration_ = 0.0;
denoiser_offon_test_ = 0;
denoiser_offon_period_ = -1;
}
| 174,517 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: perform_transform_test(png_modifier *pm)
{
png_byte colour_type = 0;
png_byte bit_depth = 0;
unsigned int palette_number = 0;
while (next_format(&colour_type, &bit_depth, &palette_number, 0))
{
png_uint_32 counter = 0;
size_t base_pos;
char name[64];
base_pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, 0, "transform:");
for (;;)
{
size_t pos = base_pos;
PNG_CONST image_transform *list = 0;
/* 'max' is currently hardwired to '1'; this should be settable on the
* command line.
*/
counter = image_transform_add(&list, 1/*max*/, counter,
name, sizeof name, &pos, colour_type, bit_depth);
if (counter == 0)
break;
/* The command line can change this to checking interlaced images. */
do
{
pm->repeat = 0;
transform_test(pm, FILEID(colour_type, bit_depth, palette_number,
pm->interlace_type, 0, 0, 0), list, name);
if (fail(pm))
return;
}
while (pm->repeat);
}
}
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | perform_transform_test(png_modifier *pm)
{
png_byte colour_type = 0;
png_byte bit_depth = 0;
unsigned int palette_number = 0;
while (next_format(&colour_type, &bit_depth, &palette_number, pm->test_lbg,
pm->test_tRNS))
{
png_uint_32 counter = 0;
size_t base_pos;
char name[64];
base_pos = safecat(name, sizeof name, 0, "transform:");
for (;;)
{
size_t pos = base_pos;
const image_transform *list = 0;
/* 'max' is currently hardwired to '1'; this should be settable on the
* command line.
*/
counter = image_transform_add(&list, 1/*max*/, counter,
name, sizeof name, &pos, colour_type, bit_depth);
if (counter == 0)
break;
/* The command line can change this to checking interlaced images. */
do
{
pm->repeat = 0;
transform_test(pm, FILEID(colour_type, bit_depth, palette_number,
pm->interlace_type, 0, 0, 0), list, name);
if (fail(pm))
return;
}
while (pm->repeat);
}
}
}
| 173,684 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: struct addr_t* MACH0_(get_entrypoint)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
struct addr_t *entry;
int i;
if (!bin->entry && !bin->sects) {
return NULL;
}
if (!(entry = calloc (1, sizeof (struct addr_t)))) {
return NULL;
}
if (bin->entry) {
entry->addr = entry_to_vaddr (bin);
entry->offset = addr_to_offset (bin, entry->addr);
entry->haddr = sdb_num_get (bin->kv, "mach0.entry.offset", 0);
}
if (!bin->entry || entry->offset == 0) {
for (i = 0; i < bin->nsects; i++) {
if (!strncmp (bin->sects[i].sectname, "__text", 6)) {
entry->offset = (ut64)bin->sects[i].offset;
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, "mach0.entry", entry->offset, 0);
entry->addr = (ut64)bin->sects[i].addr;
if (!entry->addr) { // workaround for object files
entry->addr = entry->offset;
}
break;
}
}
bin->entry = entry->addr;
}
return entry;
}
Commit Message: Fix null deref and uaf in mach0 parser
CWE ID: CWE-416 | struct addr_t* MACH0_(get_entrypoint)(struct MACH0_(obj_t)* bin) {
struct addr_t *entry;
int i;
if (!bin->entry && !bin->sects) {
return NULL;
}
if (!(entry = calloc (1, sizeof (struct addr_t)))) {
return NULL;
}
if (bin->entry) {
entry->addr = entry_to_vaddr (bin);
entry->offset = addr_to_offset (bin, entry->addr);
entry->haddr = sdb_num_get (bin->kv, "mach0.entry.offset", 0);
}
if (!bin->entry || entry->offset == 0) {
for (i = 0; i < bin->nsects; i++) {
if (!strncmp (bin->sects[i].sectname, "__text", 6)) {
entry->offset = (ut64)bin->sects[i].offset;
sdb_num_set (bin->kv, "mach0.entry", entry->offset, 0);
entry->addr = (ut64)bin->sects[i].addr;
if (!entry->addr) { // workaround for object files
entry->addr = entry->offset;
}
break;
}
}
bin->entry = entry->addr;
}
return entry;
}
| 168,233 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GpuProcessHost::OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped_Params& params) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuProcessHost::OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped");
gfx::PluginWindowHandle handle =
GpuSurfaceTracker::Get()->GetSurfaceWindowHandle(params.surface_id);
if (handle != gfx::kNullPluginWindow) {
RouteOnUIThread(GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(params));
return;
}
base::ScopedClosureRunner scoped_completion_runner(
base::Bind(&AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwappedCompletedForGPU,
host_id_, params.route_id,
true /* alive */, false /* presented */));
int render_process_id = 0;
int render_widget_id = 0;
if (!GpuSurfaceTracker::Get()->GetRenderWidgetIDForSurface(
params.surface_id, &render_process_id, &render_widget_id)) {
return;
}
RenderWidgetHelper* helper =
RenderWidgetHelper::FromProcessHostID(render_process_id);
if (!helper)
return;
scoped_completion_runner.Release();
helper->DidReceiveBackingStoreMsg(ViewHostMsg_CompositorSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
render_widget_id,
params.surface_id,
params.surface_handle,
params.route_id,
params.size,
host_id_));
}
Commit Message: Implement TextureImageTransportSurface using texture mailbox
This has a couple of advantages:
- allow tearing down and recreating the UI parent context without
losing the renderer contexts
- do not require a context to be able to generate textures when
creating the GLSurfaceHandle
- clearer ownership semantics that potentially allows for more
robust and easier lost context handling/thumbnailing/etc., since a texture is at
any given time owned by either: UI parent, mailbox, or
TextureImageTransportSurface
- simplify frontbuffer protection logic;
the frontbuffer textures are now owned by RWHV where they are refcounted
The TextureImageTransportSurface informs RenderWidgetHostView of the
mailbox names for the front- and backbuffer textures by
associating them with a surface_handle (1 or 2) in the AcceleratedSurfaceNew message.
During SwapBuffers() or PostSubBuffer() cycles, it then uses
produceTextureCHROMIUM() and consumeTextureCHROMIUM()
to transfer ownership between renderer and browser compositor.
RWHV sends back the surface_handle of the buffer being returned with the Swap ACK
(or 0 if no buffer is being returned in which case TextureImageTransportSurface will
allocate a new texture - note that this could be used to
simply keep textures for thumbnailing).
BUG=154815,139616
TBR=sky@chromium.org
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/11194042
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@171569 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void GpuProcessHost::OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
const GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped_Params& params) {
TRACE_EVENT0("gpu", "GpuProcessHost::OnAcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped");
gfx::PluginWindowHandle handle =
GpuSurfaceTracker::Get()->GetSurfaceWindowHandle(params.surface_id);
if (handle != gfx::kNullPluginWindow) {
RouteOnUIThread(GpuHostMsg_AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwapped(params));
return;
}
base::ScopedClosureRunner scoped_completion_runner(
base::Bind(&AcceleratedSurfaceBuffersSwappedCompletedForGPU,
host_id_, params.route_id,
true /* alive */, params.surface_handle));
int render_process_id = 0;
int render_widget_id = 0;
if (!GpuSurfaceTracker::Get()->GetRenderWidgetIDForSurface(
params.surface_id, &render_process_id, &render_widget_id)) {
return;
}
RenderWidgetHelper* helper =
RenderWidgetHelper::FromProcessHostID(render_process_id);
if (!helper)
return;
scoped_completion_runner.Release();
helper->DidReceiveBackingStoreMsg(ViewHostMsg_CompositorSurfaceBuffersSwapped(
render_widget_id,
params.surface_id,
params.surface_handle,
params.route_id,
params.size,
host_id_));
}
| 171,355 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int decode_studio_vop_header(Mpeg4DecContext *ctx, GetBitContext *gb)
{
MpegEncContext *s = &ctx->m;
if (get_bits_left(gb) <= 32)
return 0;
s->partitioned_frame = 0;
s->decode_mb = mpeg4_decode_studio_mb;
decode_smpte_tc(ctx, gb);
skip_bits(gb, 10); /* temporal_reference */
skip_bits(gb, 2); /* vop_structure */
s->pict_type = get_bits(gb, 2) + AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I; /* vop_coding_type */
if (get_bits1(gb)) { /* vop_coded */
skip_bits1(gb); /* top_field_first */
skip_bits1(gb); /* repeat_first_field */
s->progressive_frame = get_bits1(gb) ^ 1; /* progressive_frame */
}
if (s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I) {
if (get_bits1(gb))
reset_studio_dc_predictors(s);
}
if (ctx->shape != BIN_ONLY_SHAPE) {
s->alternate_scan = get_bits1(gb);
s->frame_pred_frame_dct = get_bits1(gb);
s->dct_precision = get_bits(gb, 2);
s->intra_dc_precision = get_bits(gb, 2);
s->q_scale_type = get_bits1(gb);
}
if (s->alternate_scan) {
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->inter_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_h_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_v_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
} else {
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->inter_scantable, ff_zigzag_direct);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_scantable, ff_zigzag_direct);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_h_scantable, ff_alternate_horizontal_scan);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_v_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
}
mpeg4_load_default_matrices(s);
next_start_code_studio(gb);
extension_and_user_data(s, gb, 4);
return 0;
}
Commit Message: avcodec/mpeg4videodec: Clear interlaced_dct for studio profile
Fixes: Out of array access
Fixes: 13090/clusterfuzz-testcase-minimized-ffmpeg_AV_CODEC_ID_MPEG4_fuzzer-5408668986638336
Found-by: continuous fuzzing process https://github.com/google/oss-fuzz/tree/master/projects/ffmpeg
Reviewed-by: Kieran Kunhya <kierank@obe.tv>
Signed-off-by: Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
CWE ID: CWE-125 | static int decode_studio_vop_header(Mpeg4DecContext *ctx, GetBitContext *gb)
{
MpegEncContext *s = &ctx->m;
if (get_bits_left(gb) <= 32)
return 0;
s->partitioned_frame = 0;
s->interlaced_dct = 0;
s->decode_mb = mpeg4_decode_studio_mb;
decode_smpte_tc(ctx, gb);
skip_bits(gb, 10); /* temporal_reference */
skip_bits(gb, 2); /* vop_structure */
s->pict_type = get_bits(gb, 2) + AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I; /* vop_coding_type */
if (get_bits1(gb)) { /* vop_coded */
skip_bits1(gb); /* top_field_first */
skip_bits1(gb); /* repeat_first_field */
s->progressive_frame = get_bits1(gb) ^ 1; /* progressive_frame */
}
if (s->pict_type == AV_PICTURE_TYPE_I) {
if (get_bits1(gb))
reset_studio_dc_predictors(s);
}
if (ctx->shape != BIN_ONLY_SHAPE) {
s->alternate_scan = get_bits1(gb);
s->frame_pred_frame_dct = get_bits1(gb);
s->dct_precision = get_bits(gb, 2);
s->intra_dc_precision = get_bits(gb, 2);
s->q_scale_type = get_bits1(gb);
}
if (s->alternate_scan) {
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->inter_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_h_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_v_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
} else {
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->inter_scantable, ff_zigzag_direct);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_scantable, ff_zigzag_direct);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_h_scantable, ff_alternate_horizontal_scan);
ff_init_scantable(s->idsp.idct_permutation, &s->intra_v_scantable, ff_alternate_vertical_scan);
}
mpeg4_load_default_matrices(s);
next_start_code_studio(gb);
extension_and_user_data(s, gb, 4);
return 0;
}
| 170,232 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: PHP_FUNCTION(imagetruecolortopalette)
{
zval *IM;
zend_bool dither;
long ncolors;
gdImagePtr im;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rbl", &IM, &dither, &ncolors) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
if (ncolors <= 0) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Number of colors has to be greater than zero");
RETURN_FALSE;
}
gdImageTrueColorToPalette(im, dither, ncolors);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
Commit Message: Fix bug#72697 - select_colors write out-of-bounds
CWE ID: CWE-787 | PHP_FUNCTION(imagetruecolortopalette)
{
zval *IM;
zend_bool dither;
long ncolors;
gdImagePtr im;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARGS() TSRMLS_CC, "rbl", &IM, &dither, &ncolors) == FAILURE) {
return;
}
ZEND_FETCH_RESOURCE(im, gdImagePtr, &IM, -1, "Image", le_gd);
if (ncolors <= 0 || ncolors > INT_MAX) {
php_error_docref(NULL TSRMLS_CC, E_WARNING, "Number of colors has to be greater than zero and no more than %d", INT_MAX);
RETURN_FALSE;
}
gdImageTrueColorToPalette(im, dither, (int)ncolors);
RETURN_TRUE;
}
| 166,953 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::ProcessQueries(bool did_finish) {
while (!pending_queries_.empty()) {
const PendingQuery& query = pending_queries_.front();
GLuint result_available = GL_FALSE;
GLuint64 result = 0;
switch (query.target) {
case GL_COMMANDS_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM:
DCHECK(query.commands_completed_fence != nullptr);
result_available =
did_finish || query.commands_completed_fence->HasCompleted();
result = result_available;
break;
case GL_COMMANDS_ISSUED_CHROMIUM:
result_available = GL_TRUE;
result = GL_TRUE;
break;
case GL_LATENCY_QUERY_CHROMIUM:
result_available = GL_TRUE;
result = (base::TimeTicks::Now() - base::TimeTicks()).InMilliseconds();
break;
case GL_ASYNC_PIXEL_PACK_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM:
result_available = GL_TRUE;
result = GL_TRUE;
for (const PendingReadPixels& pending_read_pixels :
pending_read_pixels_) {
if (pending_read_pixels.waiting_async_pack_queries.count(
query.service_id) > 0) {
DCHECK(!did_finish);
result_available = GL_FALSE;
result = GL_FALSE;
break;
}
}
break;
case GL_READBACK_SHADOW_COPIES_UPDATED_CHROMIUM:
DCHECK(query.buffer_shadow_update_fence);
if (did_finish || query.buffer_shadow_update_fence->HasCompleted()) {
ReadBackBuffersIntoShadowCopies(query.buffer_shadow_updates);
result_available = GL_TRUE;
result = 0;
}
break;
case GL_GET_ERROR_QUERY_CHROMIUM:
result_available = GL_TRUE;
FlushErrors();
result = PopError();
break;
default:
DCHECK(!IsEmulatedQueryTarget(query.target));
if (did_finish) {
result_available = GL_TRUE;
} else {
api()->glGetQueryObjectuivFn(
query.service_id, GL_QUERY_RESULT_AVAILABLE, &result_available);
}
if (result_available == GL_TRUE) {
if (feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_disjoint_timer_query) {
api()->glGetQueryObjectui64vFn(query.service_id, GL_QUERY_RESULT,
&result);
} else {
GLuint temp_result = 0;
api()->glGetQueryObjectuivFn(query.service_id, GL_QUERY_RESULT,
&temp_result);
result = temp_result;
}
}
break;
}
if (!result_available) {
break;
}
query.sync->result = result;
base::subtle::Release_Store(&query.sync->process_count, query.submit_count);
pending_queries_.pop_front();
}
DCHECK(!did_finish || pending_queries_.empty());
return error::kNoError;
}
Commit Message: Add GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM
This makes the query of GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR to programs much
cheaper by minimizing the round-trip to the GPU thread.
Bug: 881152, 957001
Change-Id: Iadfa798af29225e752c710ca5c25f50b3dd3101a
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1586630
Commit-Queue: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kentaro Hara <haraken@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Geoff Lang <geofflang@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Kenneth Russell <kbr@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#657568}
CWE ID: CWE-416 | error::Error GLES2DecoderPassthroughImpl::ProcessQueries(bool did_finish) {
bool program_completion_query_deferred = false;
while (!pending_queries_.empty()) {
PendingQuery& query = pending_queries_.front();
GLuint result_available = GL_FALSE;
GLuint64 result = 0;
switch (query.target) {
case GL_COMMANDS_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM:
DCHECK(query.commands_completed_fence != nullptr);
result_available =
did_finish || query.commands_completed_fence->HasCompleted();
result = result_available;
break;
case GL_COMMANDS_ISSUED_CHROMIUM:
result_available = GL_TRUE;
result = GL_TRUE;
break;
case GL_LATENCY_QUERY_CHROMIUM:
result_available = GL_TRUE;
result = (base::TimeTicks::Now() - base::TimeTicks()).InMilliseconds();
break;
case GL_ASYNC_PIXEL_PACK_COMPLETED_CHROMIUM:
result_available = GL_TRUE;
result = GL_TRUE;
for (const PendingReadPixels& pending_read_pixels :
pending_read_pixels_) {
if (pending_read_pixels.waiting_async_pack_queries.count(
query.service_id) > 0) {
DCHECK(!did_finish);
result_available = GL_FALSE;
result = GL_FALSE;
break;
}
}
break;
case GL_READBACK_SHADOW_COPIES_UPDATED_CHROMIUM:
DCHECK(query.buffer_shadow_update_fence);
if (did_finish || query.buffer_shadow_update_fence->HasCompleted()) {
ReadBackBuffersIntoShadowCopies(query.buffer_shadow_updates);
result_available = GL_TRUE;
result = 0;
}
break;
case GL_GET_ERROR_QUERY_CHROMIUM:
result_available = GL_TRUE;
FlushErrors();
result = PopError();
break;
case GL_PROGRAM_COMPLETION_QUERY_CHROMIUM:
GLint status;
if (!api()->glIsProgramFn(query.program_service_id)) {
status = GL_TRUE;
} else {
api()->glGetProgramivFn(query.program_service_id,
GL_COMPLETION_STATUS_KHR, &status);
}
result_available = (status == GL_TRUE);
if (!result_available) {
// Move the query to the end of queue, so that other queries may have
// chance to be processed.
auto temp = std::move(query);
pending_queries_.pop_front();
pending_queries_.emplace_back(std::move(temp));
if (did_finish && !OnlyHasPendingProgramCompletionQueries()) {
continue;
} else {
program_completion_query_deferred = true;
}
}
result = 0;
break;
default:
DCHECK(!IsEmulatedQueryTarget(query.target));
if (did_finish) {
result_available = GL_TRUE;
} else {
api()->glGetQueryObjectuivFn(
query.service_id, GL_QUERY_RESULT_AVAILABLE, &result_available);
}
if (result_available == GL_TRUE) {
if (feature_info_->feature_flags().ext_disjoint_timer_query) {
api()->glGetQueryObjectui64vFn(query.service_id, GL_QUERY_RESULT,
&result);
} else {
GLuint temp_result = 0;
api()->glGetQueryObjectuivFn(query.service_id, GL_QUERY_RESULT,
&temp_result);
result = temp_result;
}
}
break;
}
if (!result_available) {
break;
}
query.sync->result = result;
base::subtle::Release_Store(&query.sync->process_count, query.submit_count);
pending_queries_.pop_front();
}
DCHECK(!did_finish || pending_queries_.empty() ||
program_completion_query_deferred);
return error::kNoError;
}
| 172,531 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool dump_fd_info(const char *dest_filename, char *source_filename, int source_base_ofs, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
FILE *fp = fopen(dest_filename, "w");
if (!fp)
return false;
unsigned fd = 0;
while (fd <= 99999) /* paranoia check */
{
sprintf(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "fd/%u", fd);
char *name = malloc_readlink(source_filename);
if (!name)
break;
fprintf(fp, "%u:%s\n", fd, name);
free(name);
sprintf(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "fdinfo/%u", fd);
fd++;
FILE *in = fopen(source_filename, "r");
if (!in)
continue;
char buf[128];
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf)-1, in))
{
/* in case the line is not terminated, terminate it */
char *eol = strchrnul(buf, '\n');
eol[0] = '\n';
eol[1] = '\0';
fputs(buf, fp);
}
fclose(in);
}
const int dest_fd = fileno(fp);
if (fchown(dest_fd, uid, gid) < 0)
{
perror_msg("Can't change '%s' ownership to %lu:%lu", dest_filename, (long)uid, (long)gid);
fclose(fp);
unlink(dest_filename);
return false;
}
fclose(fp);
return true;
}
Commit Message: ccpp: open file for dump_fd_info with O_EXCL
To avoid possible races.
Related: #1211835
Signed-off-by: Jakub Filak <jfilak@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-59 | static bool dump_fd_info(const char *dest_filename, char *source_filename, int source_base_ofs, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
{
FILE *fp = fopen(dest_filename, "wx");
if (!fp)
return false;
unsigned fd = 0;
while (fd <= 99999) /* paranoia check */
{
sprintf(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "fd/%u", fd);
char *name = malloc_readlink(source_filename);
if (!name)
break;
fprintf(fp, "%u:%s\n", fd, name);
free(name);
sprintf(source_filename + source_base_ofs, "fdinfo/%u", fd);
fd++;
FILE *in = fopen(source_filename, "r");
if (!in)
continue;
char buf[128];
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf)-1, in))
{
/* in case the line is not terminated, terminate it */
char *eol = strchrnul(buf, '\n');
eol[0] = '\n';
eol[1] = '\0';
fputs(buf, fp);
}
fclose(in);
}
const int dest_fd = fileno(fp);
if (fchown(dest_fd, uid, gid) < 0)
{
perror_msg("Can't change '%s' ownership to %lu:%lu", dest_filename, (long)uid, (long)gid);
fclose(fp);
unlink(dest_filename);
return false;
}
fclose(fp);
return true;
}
| 170,138 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: my_object_process_variant_of_array_of_ints123 (MyObject *obj, GValue *variant, GError **error)
{
GArray *array;
int i;
int j;
j = 0;
array = (GArray *)g_value_get_boxed (variant);
for (i = 0; i <= 2; i++)
{
j = g_array_index (array, int, i);
if (j != i + 1)
goto error;
}
return TRUE;
error:
*error = g_error_new (MY_OBJECT_ERROR,
MY_OBJECT_ERROR_FOO,
"Error decoding a variant of type ai (i + 1 = %i, j = %i)",
i, j + 1);
return FALSE;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-264 | my_object_process_variant_of_array_of_ints123 (MyObject *obj, GValue *variant, GError **error)
| 165,115 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: IW_IMPL(unsigned int) iw_get_ui32le(const iw_byte *b)
{
return b[0] | (b[1]<<8) | (b[2]<<16) | (b[3]<<24);
}
Commit Message: Trying to fix some invalid left shift operations
Fixes issue #16
CWE ID: CWE-682 | IW_IMPL(unsigned int) iw_get_ui32le(const iw_byte *b)
{
return (unsigned int)b[0] | ((unsigned int)b[1]<<8) |
((unsigned int)b[2]<<16) | ((unsigned int)b[3]<<24);
}
| 168,200 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: get_html_data (MAPI_Attr *a)
{
VarLenData **body = XCALLOC(VarLenData*, a->num_values + 1);
int j;
for (j = 0; j < a->num_values; j++)
{
body[j] = XMALLOC(VarLenData, 1);
body[j]->len = a->values[j].len;
body[j]->data = CHECKED_XCALLOC(unsigned char, a->values[j].len);
memmove (body[j]->data, a->values[j].data.buf, body[j]->len);
}
return body;
}
Commit Message: Check types to avoid invalid reads/writes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | get_html_data (MAPI_Attr *a)
{
VarLenData **body = XCALLOC(VarLenData*, a->num_values + 1);
int j;
for (j = 0; j < a->num_values; j++)
{
if (a->type == szMAPI_BINARY) {
body[j] = XMALLOC(VarLenData, 1);
body[j]->len = a->values[j].len;
body[j]->data = CHECKED_XCALLOC(unsigned char, a->values[j].len);
memmove (body[j]->data, a->values[j].data.buf, body[j]->len);
}
}
return body;
}
| 168,352 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: UserSelectionScreen::UpdateAndReturnUserListForMojo() {
std::vector<ash::mojom::LoginUserInfoPtr> user_info_list;
const AccountId owner = GetOwnerAccountId();
const bool is_signin_to_add = IsSigninToAdd();
users_to_send_ = PrepareUserListForSending(users_, owner, is_signin_to_add);
user_auth_type_map_.clear();
for (user_manager::UserList::const_iterator it = users_to_send_.begin();
it != users_to_send_.end(); ++it) {
const AccountId& account_id = (*it)->GetAccountId();
bool is_owner = owner == account_id;
const bool is_public_account =
((*it)->GetType() == user_manager::USER_TYPE_PUBLIC_ACCOUNT);
const proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType initial_auth_type =
is_public_account
? proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType::EXPAND_THEN_USER_CLICK
: (ShouldForceOnlineSignIn(*it)
? proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType::ONLINE_SIGN_IN
: proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType::OFFLINE_PASSWORD);
user_auth_type_map_[account_id] = initial_auth_type;
ash::mojom::LoginUserInfoPtr login_user_info =
ash::mojom::LoginUserInfo::New();
const std::vector<std::string>* public_session_recommended_locales =
public_session_recommended_locales_.find(account_id) ==
public_session_recommended_locales_.end()
? nullptr
: &public_session_recommended_locales_[account_id];
FillUserMojoStruct(*it, is_owner, is_signin_to_add, initial_auth_type,
public_session_recommended_locales,
login_user_info.get());
login_user_info->can_remove = CanRemoveUser(*it);
if (is_public_account && LoginScreenClient::HasInstance()) {
LoginScreenClient::Get()->RequestPublicSessionKeyboardLayouts(
account_id, login_user_info->public_account_info->default_locale);
}
user_info_list.push_back(std::move(login_user_info));
}
return user_info_list;
}
Commit Message: cros: Check initial auth type when showing views login.
Bug: 859611
Change-Id: I0298db9bbf4aed6bd40600aef2e1c5794e8cd058
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1123056
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyin Hu <xiaoyinh@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Jacob Dufault <jdufault@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#572224}
CWE ID: | UserSelectionScreen::UpdateAndReturnUserListForMojo() {
std::vector<ash::mojom::LoginUserInfoPtr> user_info_list;
const AccountId owner = GetOwnerAccountId();
const bool is_signin_to_add = IsSigninToAdd();
users_to_send_ = PrepareUserListForSending(users_, owner, is_signin_to_add);
user_auth_type_map_.clear();
for (const user_manager::User* user : users_to_send_) {
const AccountId& account_id = user->GetAccountId();
bool is_owner = owner == account_id;
const bool is_public_account =
user->GetType() == user_manager::USER_TYPE_PUBLIC_ACCOUNT;
const proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType initial_auth_type =
is_public_account
? proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType::EXPAND_THEN_USER_CLICK
: (ShouldForceOnlineSignIn(user)
? proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType::ONLINE_SIGN_IN
: proximity_auth::mojom::AuthType::OFFLINE_PASSWORD);
user_auth_type_map_[account_id] = initial_auth_type;
ash::mojom::LoginUserInfoPtr user_info = ash::mojom::LoginUserInfo::New();
user_info->basic_user_info = ash::mojom::UserInfo::New();
user_info->basic_user_info->type = user->GetType();
user_info->basic_user_info->account_id = user->GetAccountId();
user_info->basic_user_info->display_name =
base::UTF16ToUTF8(user->GetDisplayName());
user_info->basic_user_info->display_email = user->display_email();
user_info->basic_user_info->avatar = BuildMojoUserAvatarForUser(user);
user_info->auth_type = initial_auth_type;
user_info->is_signed_in = user->is_logged_in();
user_info->is_device_owner = is_owner;
user_info->can_remove = CanRemoveUser(user);
user_info->allow_fingerprint_unlock = AllowFingerprintForUser(user);
// Fill multi-profile data.
if (!is_signin_to_add) {
user_info->is_multiprofile_allowed = true;
} else {
GetMultiProfilePolicy(user, &user_info->is_multiprofile_allowed,
&user_info->multiprofile_policy);
}
// Fill public session data.
if (user->GetType() == user_manager::USER_TYPE_PUBLIC_ACCOUNT) {
user_info->public_account_info = ash::mojom::PublicAccountInfo::New();
std::string domain;
if (GetEnterpriseDomain(&domain))
user_info->public_account_info->enterprise_domain = domain;
const std::vector<std::string>* public_session_recommended_locales =
public_session_recommended_locales_.find(account_id) ==
public_session_recommended_locales_.end()
? nullptr
: &public_session_recommended_locales_[account_id];
std::string selected_locale;
bool has_multiple_locales;
std::unique_ptr<base::ListValue> available_locales =
GetPublicSessionLocales(public_session_recommended_locales,
&selected_locale, &has_multiple_locales);
DCHECK(available_locales);
user_info->public_account_info->available_locales =
lock_screen_utils::FromListValueToLocaleItem(
std::move(available_locales));
user_info->public_account_info->default_locale = selected_locale;
user_info->public_account_info->show_advanced_view = has_multiple_locales;
}
user_info->can_remove = CanRemoveUser(user);
if (is_public_account && LoginScreenClient::HasInstance()) {
LoginScreenClient::Get()->RequestPublicSessionKeyboardLayouts(
account_id, user_info->public_account_info->default_locale);
}
user_info_list.push_back(std::move(user_info));
}
return user_info_list;
}
| 172,204 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void HTMLMediaElement::ProgressEventTimerFired(TimerBase*) {
if (network_state_ != kNetworkLoading)
return;
double time = WTF::CurrentTime();
double timedelta = time - previous_progress_time_;
if (GetWebMediaPlayer() && GetWebMediaPlayer()->DidLoadingProgress()) {
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::progress);
previous_progress_time_ = time;
sent_stalled_event_ = false;
if (GetLayoutObject())
GetLayoutObject()->UpdateFromElement();
} else if (timedelta > 3.0 && !sent_stalled_event_) {
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::stalled);
sent_stalled_event_ = true;
SetShouldDelayLoadEvent(false);
}
}
Commit Message: defeat cors attacks on audio/video tags
Neutralize error messages and fire no progress events
until media metadata has been loaded for media loaded
from cross-origin locations.
Bug: 828265, 826187
Change-Id: Iaf15ef38676403687d6a913cbdc84f2d70a6f5c6
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/1015794
Reviewed-by: Mounir Lamouri <mlamouri@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Dale Curtis <dalecurtis@chromium.org>
Commit-Queue: Fredrik Hubinette <hubbe@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#557312}
CWE ID: CWE-200 | void HTMLMediaElement::ProgressEventTimerFired(TimerBase*) {
if (network_state_ != kNetworkLoading)
return;
// If this is an cross-origin request, and we haven't discovered whether
// the media is actually playable yet, don't fire any progress events as
// those may let the page know information about the resource that it's
// not supposed to know.
if (MediaShouldBeOpaque())
return;
double time = WTF::CurrentTime();
double timedelta = time - previous_progress_time_;
if (GetWebMediaPlayer() && GetWebMediaPlayer()->DidLoadingProgress()) {
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::progress);
previous_progress_time_ = time;
sent_stalled_event_ = false;
if (GetLayoutObject())
GetLayoutObject()->UpdateFromElement();
} else if (timedelta > 3.0 && !sent_stalled_event_) {
ScheduleEvent(EventTypeNames::stalled);
sent_stalled_event_ = true;
SetShouldDelayLoadEvent(false);
}
}
| 173,164 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: construct_mac_tlv(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *apdu_buf, size_t data_tlv_len, size_t le_tlv_len,
unsigned char *mac_tlv, size_t * mac_tlv_len, const unsigned char key_type)
{
size_t block_size = (KEY_TYPE_AES == key_type ? 16 : 8);
unsigned char mac[4096] = { 0 };
size_t mac_len;
unsigned char icv[16] = { 0 };
int i = (KEY_TYPE_AES == key_type ? 15 : 7);
epass2003_exdata *exdata = NULL;
if (!card->drv_data)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
exdata = (epass2003_exdata *)card->drv_data;
if (0 == data_tlv_len && 0 == le_tlv_len) {
mac_len = block_size;
}
else {
/* padding */
*(apdu_buf + block_size + data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len) = 0x80;
if ((data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1) % block_size)
mac_len = (((data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1) / block_size) +
1) * block_size + block_size;
else
mac_len = data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1 + block_size;
memset((apdu_buf + block_size + data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1),
0, (mac_len - (data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1)));
}
/* increase icv */
for (; i >= 0; i--) {
if (exdata->icv_mac[i] == 0xff) {
exdata->icv_mac[i] = 0;
}
else {
exdata->icv_mac[i]++;
break;
}
}
/* calculate MAC */
memset(icv, 0, sizeof(icv));
memcpy(icv, exdata->icv_mac, 16);
if (KEY_TYPE_AES == key_type) {
aes128_encrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_mac, 16, icv, apdu_buf, mac_len, mac);
memcpy(mac_tlv + 2, &mac[mac_len - 16], 8);
}
else {
unsigned char iv[8] = { 0 };
unsigned char tmp[8] = { 0 };
des_encrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_mac, 8, icv, apdu_buf, mac_len, mac);
des_decrypt_cbc(&exdata->sk_mac[8], 8, iv, &mac[mac_len - 8], 8, tmp);
memset(iv, 0x00, 8);
des_encrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_mac, 8, iv, tmp, 8, mac_tlv + 2);
}
*mac_tlv_len = 2 + 8;
return 0;
}
Commit Message: fixed out of bounds reads
Thanks to Eric Sesterhenn from X41 D-SEC GmbH
for reporting and suggesting security fixes.
CWE ID: CWE-125 | construct_mac_tlv(struct sc_card *card, unsigned char *apdu_buf, size_t data_tlv_len, size_t le_tlv_len,
unsigned char *mac_tlv, size_t * mac_tlv_len, const unsigned char key_type)
{
size_t block_size = (KEY_TYPE_AES == key_type ? 16 : 8);
unsigned char mac[4096] = { 0 };
size_t mac_len;
unsigned char icv[16] = { 0 };
int i = (KEY_TYPE_AES == key_type ? 15 : 7);
epass2003_exdata *exdata = NULL;
if (!card->drv_data)
return SC_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENTS;
exdata = (epass2003_exdata *)card->drv_data;
if (0 == data_tlv_len && 0 == le_tlv_len) {
mac_len = block_size;
}
else {
/* padding */
*(apdu_buf + block_size + data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len) = 0x80;
if ((data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1) % block_size)
mac_len = (((data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1) / block_size) +
1) * block_size + block_size;
else
mac_len = data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1 + block_size;
memset((apdu_buf + block_size + data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1),
0, (mac_len - (data_tlv_len + le_tlv_len + 1)));
}
/* increase icv */
for (; i >= 0; i--) {
if (exdata->icv_mac[i] == 0xff) {
exdata->icv_mac[i] = 0;
}
else {
exdata->icv_mac[i]++;
break;
}
}
/* calculate MAC */
memset(icv, 0, sizeof(icv));
memcpy(icv, exdata->icv_mac, 16);
if (KEY_TYPE_AES == key_type) {
aes128_encrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_mac, 16, icv, apdu_buf, mac_len, mac);
memcpy(mac_tlv + 2, &mac[mac_len - 16], 8);
}
else {
unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH] = { 0 };
unsigned char tmp[8] = { 0 };
des_encrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_mac, 8, icv, apdu_buf, mac_len, mac);
des_decrypt_cbc(&exdata->sk_mac[8], 8, iv, &mac[mac_len - 8], 8, tmp);
memset(iv, 0x00, sizeof iv);
des_encrypt_cbc(exdata->sk_mac, 8, iv, tmp, 8, mac_tlv + 2);
}
*mac_tlv_len = 2 + 8;
return 0;
}
| 169,053 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int zerocopy_sg_from_iovec(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct iovec *from,
int offset, size_t count)
{
int len = iov_length(from, count) - offset;
int copy = skb_headlen(skb);
int size, offset1 = 0;
int i = 0;
/* Skip over from offset */
while (count && (offset >= from->iov_len)) {
offset -= from->iov_len;
++from;
--count;
}
/* copy up to skb headlen */
while (count && (copy > 0)) {
size = min_t(unsigned int, copy, from->iov_len - offset);
if (copy_from_user(skb->data + offset1, from->iov_base + offset,
size))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy > size) {
++from;
--count;
offset = 0;
} else
offset += size;
copy -= size;
offset1 += size;
}
if (len == offset1)
return 0;
while (count--) {
struct page *page[MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
int num_pages;
unsigned long base;
unsigned long truesize;
len = from->iov_len - offset;
if (!len) {
offset = 0;
++from;
continue;
}
base = (unsigned long)from->iov_base + offset;
size = ((base & ~PAGE_MASK) + len + ~PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
num_pages = get_user_pages_fast(base, size, 0, &page[i]);
if ((num_pages != size) ||
(num_pages > MAX_SKB_FRAGS - skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags)) {
for (i = 0; i < num_pages; i++)
put_page(page[i]);
return -EFAULT;
}
truesize = size * PAGE_SIZE;
skb->data_len += len;
skb->len += len;
skb->truesize += truesize;
atomic_add(truesize, &skb->sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
while (len) {
int off = base & ~PAGE_MASK;
int size = min_t(int, len, PAGE_SIZE - off);
__skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, page[i], off, size);
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags++;
/* increase sk_wmem_alloc */
base += size;
len -= size;
i++;
}
offset = 0;
++from;
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: macvtap: zerocopy: validate vectors before building skb
There're several reasons that the vectors need to be validated:
- Return error when caller provides vectors whose num is greater than UIO_MAXIOV.
- Linearize part of skb when userspace provides vectors grater than MAX_SKB_FRAGS.
- Return error when userspace provides vectors whose total length may exceed
- MAX_SKB_FRAGS * PAGE_SIZE.
Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
CWE ID: CWE-119 | static int zerocopy_sg_from_iovec(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct iovec *from,
int offset, size_t count)
{
int len = iov_length(from, count) - offset;
int copy = skb_headlen(skb);
int size, offset1 = 0;
int i = 0;
/* Skip over from offset */
while (count && (offset >= from->iov_len)) {
offset -= from->iov_len;
++from;
--count;
}
/* copy up to skb headlen */
while (count && (copy > 0)) {
size = min_t(unsigned int, copy, from->iov_len - offset);
if (copy_from_user(skb->data + offset1, from->iov_base + offset,
size))
return -EFAULT;
if (copy > size) {
++from;
--count;
offset = 0;
} else
offset += size;
copy -= size;
offset1 += size;
}
if (len == offset1)
return 0;
while (count--) {
struct page *page[MAX_SKB_FRAGS];
int num_pages;
unsigned long base;
unsigned long truesize;
len = from->iov_len - offset;
if (!len) {
offset = 0;
++from;
continue;
}
base = (unsigned long)from->iov_base + offset;
size = ((base & ~PAGE_MASK) + len + ~PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
if (i + size > MAX_SKB_FRAGS)
return -EMSGSIZE;
num_pages = get_user_pages_fast(base, size, 0, &page[i]);
if (num_pages != size) {
for (i = 0; i < num_pages; i++)
put_page(page[i]);
return -EFAULT;
}
truesize = size * PAGE_SIZE;
skb->data_len += len;
skb->len += len;
skb->truesize += truesize;
atomic_add(truesize, &skb->sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
while (len) {
int off = base & ~PAGE_MASK;
int size = min_t(int, len, PAGE_SIZE - off);
__skb_fill_page_desc(skb, i, page[i], off, size);
skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags++;
/* increase sk_wmem_alloc */
base += size;
len -= size;
i++;
}
offset = 0;
++from;
}
return 0;
}
| 166,205 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: store_pool_error(png_store *ps, png_const_structp pp, PNG_CONST char *msg)
{
if (pp != NULL)
png_error(pp, msg);
/* Else we have to do it ourselves. png_error eventually calls store_log,
* above. store_log accepts a NULL png_structp - it just changes what gets
* output by store_message.
*/
store_log(ps, pp, msg, 1 /* error */);
}
Commit Message: DO NOT MERGE Update libpng to 1.6.20
BUG:23265085
Change-Id: I85199805636d771f3597b691b63bc0bf46084833
(cherry picked from commit bbe98b40cda082024b669fa508931042eed18f82)
CWE ID: | store_pool_error(png_store *ps, png_const_structp pp, PNG_CONST char *msg)
store_pool_error(png_store *ps, png_const_structp pp, const char *msg)
{
if (pp != NULL)
png_error(pp, msg);
/* Else we have to do it ourselves. png_error eventually calls store_log,
* above. store_log accepts a NULL png_structp - it just changes what gets
* output by store_message.
*/
store_log(ps, pp, msg, 1 /* error */);
}
| 173,708 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: bool ATSParser::PSISection::isCRCOkay() const {
if (!isComplete()) {
return false;
}
uint8_t* data = mBuffer->data();
if ((data[1] & 0x80) == 0) {
return true;
}
unsigned sectionLength = U16_AT(data + 1) & 0xfff;
ALOGV("sectionLength %u, skip %u", sectionLength, mSkipBytes);
sectionLength -= mSkipBytes;
uint32_t crc = 0xffffffff;
for(unsigned i = 0; i < sectionLength + 4 /* crc */; i++) {
uint8_t b = data[i];
int index = ((crc >> 24) ^ (b & 0xff)) & 0xff;
crc = CRC_TABLE[index] ^ (crc << 8);
}
ALOGV("crc: %08x\n", crc);
return (crc == 0);
}
Commit Message: Check section size when verifying CRC
Bug: 28333006
Change-Id: Ief7a2da848face78f0edde21e2f2009316076679
CWE ID: CWE-119 | bool ATSParser::PSISection::isCRCOkay() const {
if (!isComplete()) {
return false;
}
uint8_t* data = mBuffer->data();
if ((data[1] & 0x80) == 0) {
return true;
}
unsigned sectionLength = U16_AT(data + 1) & 0xfff;
ALOGV("sectionLength %u, skip %u", sectionLength, mSkipBytes);
if(sectionLength < mSkipBytes) {
ALOGE("b/28333006");
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "28333006");
return false;
}
sectionLength -= mSkipBytes;
uint32_t crc = 0xffffffff;
for(unsigned i = 0; i < sectionLength + 4 /* crc */; i++) {
uint8_t b = data[i];
int index = ((crc >> 24) ^ (b & 0xff)) & 0xff;
crc = CRC_TABLE[index] ^ (crc << 8);
}
ALOGV("crc: %08x\n", crc);
return (crc == 0);
}
| 173,769 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static int store_asoundrc(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_ASOUNDRC_FILE;
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0644);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.asoundrc", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid .asoundrc file\n");
exit(1);
}
pid_t child = fork();
if (child < 0)
errExit("fork");
if (child == 0) {
drop_privs(0);
int rv = copy_file(src, dest);
if (rv)
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: cannot transfer .asoundrc in private home directory\n");
else {
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
}
_exit(0);
}
waitpid(child, NULL, 0);
if (chown(dest, getuid(), getgid()) == -1)
errExit("fchown");
if (chmod(dest, 0644) == -1)
errExit("fchmod");
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
Commit Message: security fix
CWE ID: CWE-269 | static int store_asoundrc(void) {
fs_build_mnt_dir();
char *src;
char *dest = RUN_ASOUNDRC_FILE;
// create an empty file as root, and change ownership to user
FILE *fp = fopen(dest, "w");
if (fp) {
fprintf(fp, "\n");
SET_PERMS_STREAM(fp, getuid(), getgid(), 0644);
fclose(fp);
}
if (asprintf(&src, "%s/.asoundrc", cfg.homedir) == -1)
errExit("asprintf");
struct stat s;
if (stat(src, &s) == 0) {
if (is_link(src)) {
// make sure the real path of the file is inside the home directory
/* coverity[toctou] */
char* rp = realpath(src, NULL);
if (!rp) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: Cannot access %s\n", src);
exit(1);
}
if (strncmp(rp, cfg.homedir, strlen(cfg.homedir)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: .asoundrc is a symbolic link pointing to a file outside home directory\n");
exit(1);
}
free(rp);
}
copy_file_as_user(src, dest, getuid(), getgid(), 0644); // regular user
fs_logger2("clone", dest);
return 1; // file copied
}
return 0;
}
| 170,099 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GM2TabStyle::PaintBackgroundStroke(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
bool active,
SkColor stroke_color) const {
SkPath outer_path =
GetPath(TabStyle::PathType::kBorder, canvas->image_scale(), active);
gfx::ScopedCanvas scoped_canvas(canvas);
float scale = canvas->UndoDeviceScaleFactor();
cc::PaintFlags flags;
flags.setAntiAlias(true);
flags.setColor(stroke_color);
flags.setStyle(cc::PaintFlags::kStroke_Style);
flags.setStrokeWidth(GetStrokeThickness(active) * scale);
canvas->DrawPath(outer_path, flags);
}
Commit Message: Paint tab groups with the group color.
* The background of TabGroupHeader now uses the group color.
* The backgrounds of tabs in the group are tinted with the group color.
This treatment, along with the colors chosen, are intended to be
a placeholder.
Bug: 905491
Change-Id: Ic808548f8eba23064606e7fb8c9bba281d0d117f
Reviewed-on: https://chromium-review.googlesource.com/c/chromium/src/+/1610504
Commit-Queue: Bret Sepulveda <bsep@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Taylor Bergquist <tbergquist@chromium.org>
Cr-Commit-Position: refs/heads/master@{#660498}
CWE ID: CWE-20 | void GM2TabStyle::PaintBackgroundStroke(gfx::Canvas* canvas,
TabState active_state,
SkColor stroke_color) const {
SkPath outer_path =
GetPath(TabStyle::PathType::kBorder, canvas->image_scale(),
active_state == TAB_ACTIVE);
gfx::ScopedCanvas scoped_canvas(canvas);
float scale = canvas->UndoDeviceScaleFactor();
cc::PaintFlags flags;
flags.setAntiAlias(true);
flags.setColor(stroke_color);
flags.setStyle(cc::PaintFlags::kStroke_Style);
flags.setStrokeWidth(GetStrokeThickness(active_state == TAB_ACTIVE) * scale);
canvas->DrawPath(outer_path, flags);
}
| 172,522 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: _PUBLIC_ codepoint_t next_codepoint_handle_ext(
struct smb_iconv_handle *ic,
const char *str, size_t len,
charset_t src_charset,
size_t *bytes_consumed)
{
/* it cannot occupy more than 4 bytes in UTF16 format */
uint8_t buf[4];
smb_iconv_t descriptor;
size_t ilen_orig;
size_t ilen;
size_t olen;
char *outbuf;
if ((str[0] & 0x80) == 0) {
*bytes_consumed = 1;
return (codepoint_t)str[0];
}
* This is OK as we only support codepoints up to 1M (U+100000)
*/
ilen_orig = MIN(len, 5);
ilen = ilen_orig;
descriptor = get_conv_handle(ic, src_charset, CH_UTF16);
if (descriptor == (smb_iconv_t)-1) {
*bytes_consumed = 1;
return INVALID_CODEPOINT;
}
/*
* this looks a little strange, but it is needed to cope with
* codepoints above 64k (U+1000) which are encoded as per RFC2781.
*/
olen = 2;
outbuf = (char *)buf;
smb_iconv(descriptor, &str, &ilen, &outbuf, &olen);
if (olen == 2) {
olen = 4;
outbuf = (char *)buf;
smb_iconv(descriptor, &str, &ilen, &outbuf, &olen);
if (olen == 4) {
/* we didn't convert any bytes */
*bytes_consumed = 1;
return INVALID_CODEPOINT;
}
olen = 4 - olen;
} else {
olen = 2 - olen;
}
*bytes_consumed = ilen_orig - ilen;
if (olen == 2) {
return (codepoint_t)SVAL(buf, 0);
}
if (olen == 4) {
/* decode a 4 byte UTF16 character manually */
return (codepoint_t)0x10000 +
(buf[2] | ((buf[3] & 0x3)<<8) |
(buf[0]<<10) | ((buf[1] & 0x3)<<18));
}
/* no other length is valid */
return INVALID_CODEPOINT;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-200 | _PUBLIC_ codepoint_t next_codepoint_handle_ext(
struct smb_iconv_handle *ic,
const char *str, size_t len,
charset_t src_charset,
size_t *bytes_consumed)
{
/* it cannot occupy more than 4 bytes in UTF16 format */
uint8_t buf[4];
smb_iconv_t descriptor;
size_t ilen_orig;
size_t ilen;
size_t olen;
char *outbuf;
if (((str[0] & 0x80) == 0) && (src_charset == CH_DOS ||
src_charset == CH_UNIX ||
src_charset == CH_UTF8)) {
*bytes_consumed = 1;
return (codepoint_t)str[0];
}
* This is OK as we only support codepoints up to 1M (U+100000)
*/
ilen_orig = MIN(len, 5);
ilen = ilen_orig;
descriptor = get_conv_handle(ic, src_charset, CH_UTF16);
if (descriptor == (smb_iconv_t)-1) {
*bytes_consumed = 1;
return INVALID_CODEPOINT;
}
/*
* this looks a little strange, but it is needed to cope with
* codepoints above 64k (U+1000) which are encoded as per RFC2781.
*/
olen = 2;
outbuf = (char *)buf;
smb_iconv(descriptor, &str, &ilen, &outbuf, &olen);
if (olen == 2) {
olen = 4;
outbuf = (char *)buf;
smb_iconv(descriptor, &str, &ilen, &outbuf, &olen);
if (olen == 4) {
/* we didn't convert any bytes */
*bytes_consumed = 1;
return INVALID_CODEPOINT;
}
olen = 4 - olen;
} else {
olen = 2 - olen;
}
*bytes_consumed = ilen_orig - ilen;
if (olen == 2) {
return (codepoint_t)SVAL(buf, 0);
}
if (olen == 4) {
/* decode a 4 byte UTF16 character manually */
return (codepoint_t)0x10000 +
(buf[2] | ((buf[3] & 0x3)<<8) |
(buf[0]<<10) | ((buf[1] & 0x3)<<18));
}
/* no other length is valid */
return INVALID_CODEPOINT;
}
| 164,667 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: LogLuvClose(TIFF* tif)
{
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
/*
* For consistency, we always want to write out the same
* bitspersample and sampleformat for our TIFF file,
* regardless of the data format being used by the application.
* Since this routine is called after tags have been set but
* before they have been recorded in the file, we reset them here.
*/
td->td_samplesperpixel =
(td->td_photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL) ? 1 : 3;
td->td_bitspersample = 16;
td->td_sampleformat = SAMPLEFORMAT_INT;
}
Commit Message: * libtiff/tif_pixarlog.c, libtiff/tif_luv.c: fix heap-based buffer
overflow on generation of PixarLog / LUV compressed files, with
ColorMap, TransferFunction attached and nasty plays with bitspersample.
The fix for LUV has not been tested, but suffers from the same kind
of issue of PixarLog.
Reported by Agostino Sarubbo.
Fixes http://bugzilla.maptools.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2604
CWE ID: CWE-125 | LogLuvClose(TIFF* tif)
{
LogLuvState* sp = (LogLuvState*) tif->tif_data;
TIFFDirectory *td = &tif->tif_dir;
assert(sp != 0);
/*
* For consistency, we always want to write out the same
* bitspersample and sampleformat for our TIFF file,
* regardless of the data format being used by the application.
* Since this routine is called after tags have been set but
* before they have been recorded in the file, we reset them here.
* Note: this is really a nasty approach. See PixarLogClose
*/
if( sp->encoder_state )
{
/* See PixarLogClose. Might avoid issues with tags whose size depends
* on those below, but not completely sure this is enough. */
td->td_samplesperpixel =
(td->td_photometric == PHOTOMETRIC_LOGL) ? 1 : 3;
td->td_bitspersample = 16;
td->td_sampleformat = SAMPLEFORMAT_INT;
}
}
| 168,464 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: int virtio_load(VirtIODevice *vdev, QEMUFile *f)
{
int i, ret;
uint32_t num;
uint32_t features;
uint32_t supported_features;
BusState *qbus = qdev_get_parent_bus(DEVICE(vdev));
VirtioBusClass *k = VIRTIO_BUS_GET_CLASS(qbus);
if (k->load_config) {
ret = k->load_config(qbus->parent, f);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
qemu_get_8s(f, &vdev->status);
qemu_get_8s(f, &vdev->isr);
qemu_get_be16s(f, &vdev->queue_sel);
qemu_get_be32s(f, &features);
if (virtio_set_features(vdev, features) < 0) {
return -1;
}
vdev->config_len = qemu_get_be32(f);
qemu_get_buffer(f, vdev->config, vdev->config_len);
num = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (num > VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX) {
error_report("Invalid number of PCI queues: 0x%x", num);
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
vdev->vq[i].vring.num = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (k->has_variable_vring_alignment) {
vdev->vq[i].vring.align = qemu_get_be32(f);
}
vdev->vq[i].pa = qemu_get_be64(f);
qemu_get_be16s(f, &vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx);
vdev->vq[i].signalled_used_valid = false;
vdev->vq[i].notification = true;
if (vdev->vq[i].pa) {
uint16_t nheads;
virtqueue_init(&vdev->vq[i]);
nheads = vring_avail_idx(&vdev->vq[i]) - vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx;
/* Check it isn't doing very strange things with descriptor numbers. */
if (nheads > vdev->vq[i].vring.num) {
error_report("VQ %d size 0x%x Guest index 0x%x "
"inconsistent with Host index 0x%x: delta 0x%x",
i, vdev->vq[i].vring.num,
vring_avail_idx(&vdev->vq[i]),
vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx, nheads);
return -1;
}
} else if (vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx) {
error_report("VQ %d address 0x0 "
"inconsistent with Host index 0x%x",
i, vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx);
return -1;
}
if (k->load_queue) {
ret = k->load_queue(qbus->parent, i, f);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
}
virtio_notify_vector(vdev, VIRTIO_NO_VECTOR);
return 0;
}
Commit Message:
CWE ID: CWE-94 | int virtio_load(VirtIODevice *vdev, QEMUFile *f)
{
int i, ret;
uint32_t num;
uint32_t features;
uint32_t supported_features;
BusState *qbus = qdev_get_parent_bus(DEVICE(vdev));
VirtioBusClass *k = VIRTIO_BUS_GET_CLASS(qbus);
if (k->load_config) {
ret = k->load_config(qbus->parent, f);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
qemu_get_8s(f, &vdev->status);
qemu_get_8s(f, &vdev->isr);
qemu_get_be16s(f, &vdev->queue_sel);
if (vdev->queue_sel >= VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX) {
return -1;
}
qemu_get_be32s(f, &features);
if (virtio_set_features(vdev, features) < 0) {
return -1;
}
vdev->config_len = qemu_get_be32(f);
qemu_get_buffer(f, vdev->config, vdev->config_len);
num = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (num > VIRTIO_PCI_QUEUE_MAX) {
error_report("Invalid number of PCI queues: 0x%x", num);
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
vdev->vq[i].vring.num = qemu_get_be32(f);
if (k->has_variable_vring_alignment) {
vdev->vq[i].vring.align = qemu_get_be32(f);
}
vdev->vq[i].pa = qemu_get_be64(f);
qemu_get_be16s(f, &vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx);
vdev->vq[i].signalled_used_valid = false;
vdev->vq[i].notification = true;
if (vdev->vq[i].pa) {
uint16_t nheads;
virtqueue_init(&vdev->vq[i]);
nheads = vring_avail_idx(&vdev->vq[i]) - vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx;
/* Check it isn't doing very strange things with descriptor numbers. */
if (nheads > vdev->vq[i].vring.num) {
error_report("VQ %d size 0x%x Guest index 0x%x "
"inconsistent with Host index 0x%x: delta 0x%x",
i, vdev->vq[i].vring.num,
vring_avail_idx(&vdev->vq[i]),
vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx, nheads);
return -1;
}
} else if (vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx) {
error_report("VQ %d address 0x0 "
"inconsistent with Host index 0x%x",
i, vdev->vq[i].last_avail_idx);
return -1;
}
if (k->load_queue) {
ret = k->load_queue(qbus->parent, i, f);
if (ret)
return ret;
}
}
virtio_notify_vector(vdev, VIRTIO_NO_VECTOR);
return 0;
}
| 165,336 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: long long mkvparser::ReadUInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long& len) {
assert(pReader);
assert(pos >= 0);
int status;
len = 1;
unsigned char b;
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0) // error or underflow
return status;
if (status > 0) // interpreted as "underflow"
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if (b == 0) // we can't handle u-int values larger than 8 bytes
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
unsigned char m = 0x80;
while (!(b & m)) {
m >>= 1;
++len;
}
long long result = b & (~m);
++pos;
for (int i = 1; i < len; ++i) {
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0) {
len = 1;
return status;
}
if (status > 0) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
return result;
}
Commit Message: external/libvpx/libwebm: Update snapshot
Update libwebm snapshot. This update contains security fixes from upstream.
Upstream git hash: 229f49347d19b0ca0941e072b199a242ef6c5f2b
BUG=23167726
Change-Id: Id3e140e7b31ae11294724b1ecfe2e9c83b4d4207
(cherry picked from commit d0281a15b3c6bd91756e453cc9398c5ef412d99a)
CWE ID: CWE-20 | long long mkvparser::ReadUInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long& len) {
long long ReadUInt(IMkvReader* pReader, long long pos, long& len) {
if (!pReader || pos < 0)
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
len = 1;
unsigned char b;
int status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0) // error or underflow
return status;
if (status > 0) // interpreted as "underflow"
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
if (b == 0) // we can't handle u-int values larger than 8 bytes
return E_FILE_FORMAT_INVALID;
unsigned char m = 0x80;
while (!(b & m)) {
m >>= 1;
++len;
}
long long result = b & (~m);
++pos;
for (int i = 1; i < len; ++i) {
status = pReader->Read(pos, 1, &b);
if (status < 0) {
len = 1;
return status;
}
if (status > 0) {
len = 1;
return E_BUFFER_NOT_FULL;
}
result <<= 8;
result |= b;
++pos;
}
return result;
}
| 173,862 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: void GpuVideoDecodeAccelerator::Initialize(
const media::VideoCodecProfile profile,
IPC::Message* init_done_msg,
base::ProcessHandle renderer_process) {
DCHECK(!video_decode_accelerator_.get());
DCHECK(!init_done_msg_);
DCHECK(init_done_msg);
init_done_msg_ = init_done_msg;
#if (defined(OS_CHROMEOS) && defined(ARCH_CPU_ARMEL)) || defined(OS_WIN)
DCHECK(stub_ && stub_->decoder());
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_WIN7) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED() << "HW video decode acceleration not available.";
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
return;
}
DLOG(INFO) << "Initializing DXVA HW decoder for windows.";
DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator* video_decoder =
new DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator(this, renderer_process);
#else // OS_WIN
OmxVideoDecodeAccelerator* video_decoder =
new OmxVideoDecodeAccelerator(this);
video_decoder->SetEglState(
gfx::GLSurfaceEGL::GetHardwareDisplay(),
stub_->decoder()->GetGLContext()->GetHandle());
#endif // OS_WIN
video_decode_accelerator_ = video_decoder;
if (!video_decode_accelerator_->Initialize(profile))
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
#else // Update RenderViewImpl::createMediaPlayer when adding clauses.
NOTIMPLEMENTED() << "HW video decode acceleration not available.";
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS) && defined(ARCH_CPU_ARMEL)
}
Commit Message: Convert plugin and GPU process to brokered handle duplication.
BUG=119250
Review URL: https://chromiumcodereview.appspot.com/9958034
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@132303 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: | void GpuVideoDecodeAccelerator::Initialize(
const media::VideoCodecProfile profile,
IPC::Message* init_done_msg) {
DCHECK(!video_decode_accelerator_.get());
DCHECK(!init_done_msg_);
DCHECK(init_done_msg);
init_done_msg_ = init_done_msg;
#if (defined(OS_CHROMEOS) && defined(ARCH_CPU_ARMEL)) || defined(OS_WIN)
DCHECK(stub_ && stub_->decoder());
#if defined(OS_WIN)
if (base::win::GetVersion() < base::win::VERSION_WIN7) {
NOTIMPLEMENTED() << "HW video decode acceleration not available.";
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
return;
}
DLOG(INFO) << "Initializing DXVA HW decoder for windows.";
DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator* video_decoder =
new DXVAVideoDecodeAccelerator(this);
#else // OS_WIN
OmxVideoDecodeAccelerator* video_decoder =
new OmxVideoDecodeAccelerator(this);
video_decoder->SetEglState(
gfx::GLSurfaceEGL::GetHardwareDisplay(),
stub_->decoder()->GetGLContext()->GetHandle());
#endif // OS_WIN
video_decode_accelerator_ = video_decoder;
if (!video_decode_accelerator_->Initialize(profile))
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
#else // Update RenderViewImpl::createMediaPlayer when adding clauses.
NOTIMPLEMENTED() << "HW video decode acceleration not available.";
NotifyError(media::VideoDecodeAccelerator::PLATFORM_FAILURE);
#endif // defined(OS_CHROMEOS) && defined(ARCH_CPU_ARMEL)
}
| 170,942 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: InstalledBubbleContent(Browser* browser,
const Extension* extension,
ExtensionInstalledBubble::BubbleType type,
SkBitmap* icon,
ExtensionInstalledBubble* bubble)
: browser_(browser),
extension_id_(extension->id()),
bubble_(bubble),
type_(type),
info_(NULL) {
ResourceBundle& rb = ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
const gfx::Font& font = rb.GetFont(ResourceBundle::BaseFont);
gfx::Size size(icon->width(), icon->height());
if (size.width() > kIconSize || size.height() > kIconSize)
size = gfx::Size(kIconSize, kIconSize);
icon_ = new views::ImageView();
icon_->SetImageSize(size);
icon_->SetImage(*icon);
AddChildView(icon_);
string16 extension_name = UTF8ToUTF16(extension->name());
base::i18n::AdjustStringForLocaleDirection(&extension_name);
heading_ = new views::Label(l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING,
extension_name,
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_SHORT_PRODUCT_NAME)));
heading_->SetFont(rb.GetFont(ResourceBundle::MediumFont));
heading_->SetMultiLine(true);
heading_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
AddChildView(heading_);
switch (type_) {
case ExtensionInstalledBubble::PAGE_ACTION: {
info_ = new views::Label(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_PAGE_ACTION_INFO));
info_->SetFont(font);
info_->SetMultiLine(true);
info_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
AddChildView(info_);
break;
}
case ExtensionInstalledBubble::OMNIBOX_KEYWORD: {
info_ = new views::Label(l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_OMNIBOX_KEYWORD_INFO,
UTF8ToUTF16(extension->omnibox_keyword())));
info_->SetFont(font);
info_->SetMultiLine(true);
info_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
AddChildView(info_);
break;
}
case ExtensionInstalledBubble::APP: {
views::Link* link = new views::Link(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_APP_INFO));
link->set_listener(this);
manage_ = link;
manage_->SetFont(font);
manage_->SetMultiLine(true);
manage_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
AddChildView(manage_);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (type_ != ExtensionInstalledBubble::APP) {
manage_ = new views::Label(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_MANAGE_INFO));
manage_->SetFont(font);
manage_->SetMultiLine(true);
manage_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
AddChildView(manage_);
}
close_button_ = new views::ImageButton(this);
close_button_->SetImage(views::CustomButton::BS_NORMAL,
rb.GetBitmapNamed(IDR_CLOSE_BAR));
close_button_->SetImage(views::CustomButton::BS_HOT,
rb.GetBitmapNamed(IDR_CLOSE_BAR_H));
close_button_->SetImage(views::CustomButton::BS_PUSHED,
rb.GetBitmapNamed(IDR_CLOSE_BAR_P));
AddChildView(close_button_);
}
Commit Message: [i18n-fixlet] Make strings branding specific in extension code.
IDS_EXTENSIONS_UNINSTALL
IDS_EXTENSIONS_INCOGNITO_WARNING
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING
IDS_EXTENSION_ALERT_ITEM_EXTERNAL And fix a $1 $1 bug.
IDS_EXTENSION_INLINE_INSTALL_PROMPT_TITLE
BUG=NONE
TEST=NONE
Review URL: http://codereview.chromium.org/9107061
git-svn-id: svn://svn.chromium.org/chrome/trunk/src@118018 0039d316-1c4b-4281-b951-d872f2087c98
CWE ID: CWE-119 | InstalledBubbleContent(Browser* browser,
const Extension* extension,
ExtensionInstalledBubble::BubbleType type,
SkBitmap* icon,
ExtensionInstalledBubble* bubble)
: browser_(browser),
extension_id_(extension->id()),
bubble_(bubble),
type_(type),
info_(NULL) {
ResourceBundle& rb = ResourceBundle::GetSharedInstance();
const gfx::Font& font = rb.GetFont(ResourceBundle::BaseFont);
gfx::Size size(icon->width(), icon->height());
if (size.width() > kIconSize || size.height() > kIconSize)
size = gfx::Size(kIconSize, kIconSize);
icon_ = new views::ImageView();
icon_->SetImageSize(size);
icon_->SetImage(*icon);
AddChildView(icon_);
string16 extension_name = UTF8ToUTF16(extension->name());
base::i18n::AdjustStringForLocaleDirection(&extension_name);
heading_ = new views::Label(l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_HEADING, extension_name));
heading_->SetFont(rb.GetFont(ResourceBundle::MediumFont));
heading_->SetMultiLine(true);
heading_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
AddChildView(heading_);
switch (type_) {
case ExtensionInstalledBubble::PAGE_ACTION: {
info_ = new views::Label(l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_PAGE_ACTION_INFO));
info_->SetFont(font);
info_->SetMultiLine(true);
info_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
AddChildView(info_);
break;
}
case ExtensionInstalledBubble::OMNIBOX_KEYWORD: {
info_ = new views::Label(l10n_util::GetStringFUTF16(
IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_OMNIBOX_KEYWORD_INFO,
UTF8ToUTF16(extension->omnibox_keyword())));
info_->SetFont(font);
info_->SetMultiLine(true);
info_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
AddChildView(info_);
break;
}
case ExtensionInstalledBubble::APP: {
views::Link* link = new views::Link(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_APP_INFO));
link->set_listener(this);
manage_ = link;
manage_->SetFont(font);
manage_->SetMultiLine(true);
manage_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
AddChildView(manage_);
break;
}
default:
break;
}
if (type_ != ExtensionInstalledBubble::APP) {
manage_ = new views::Label(
l10n_util::GetStringUTF16(IDS_EXTENSION_INSTALLED_MANAGE_INFO));
manage_->SetFont(font);
manage_->SetMultiLine(true);
manage_->SetHorizontalAlignment(views::Label::ALIGN_LEFT);
AddChildView(manage_);
}
close_button_ = new views::ImageButton(this);
close_button_->SetImage(views::CustomButton::BS_NORMAL,
rb.GetBitmapNamed(IDR_CLOSE_BAR));
close_button_->SetImage(views::CustomButton::BS_HOT,
rb.GetBitmapNamed(IDR_CLOSE_BAR_H));
close_button_->SetImage(views::CustomButton::BS_PUSHED,
rb.GetBitmapNamed(IDR_CLOSE_BAR_P));
AddChildView(close_button_);
}
| 170,984 |
Analyze the following vulnerable code snippet, the commit message, and the CWE ID. Determine the impact category of this vulnerability. Respond with the corrected function only. Remember, I want response with just the fixed code only, No explanation. | Code: static bool getCoverageFormat12(vector<uint32_t>& coverage, const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
const size_t kNGroupsOffset = 12;
const size_t kFirstGroupOffset = 16;
const size_t kGroupSize = 12;
const size_t kStartCharCodeOffset = 0;
const size_t kEndCharCodeOffset = 4;
const size_t kMaxNGroups = 0xfffffff0 / kGroupSize; // protection against overflow
if (kFirstGroupOffset > size) {
return false;
}
uint32_t nGroups = readU32(data, kNGroupsOffset);
if (nGroups >= kMaxNGroups || kFirstGroupOffset + nGroups * kGroupSize > size) {
return false;
}
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < nGroups; i++) {
uint32_t groupOffset = kFirstGroupOffset + i * kGroupSize;
uint32_t start = readU32(data, groupOffset + kStartCharCodeOffset);
uint32_t end = readU32(data, groupOffset + kEndCharCodeOffset);
if (end < start) {
return false;
}
addRange(coverage, start, end + 1); // file is inclusive, vector is exclusive
}
return true;
}
Commit Message: Add error logging on invalid cmap - DO NOT MERGE
This patch logs instances of fonts with invalid cmap tables.
Bug: 25645298
Bug: 26413177
Change-Id: I183985e9784a97a2b4307a22e036382b1fc90e5e
CWE ID: CWE-20 | static bool getCoverageFormat12(vector<uint32_t>& coverage, const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
const size_t kNGroupsOffset = 12;
const size_t kFirstGroupOffset = 16;
const size_t kGroupSize = 12;
const size_t kStartCharCodeOffset = 0;
const size_t kEndCharCodeOffset = 4;
const size_t kMaxNGroups = 0xfffffff0 / kGroupSize; // protection against overflow
if (kFirstGroupOffset > size) {
return false;
}
uint32_t nGroups = readU32(data, kNGroupsOffset);
if (nGroups >= kMaxNGroups || kFirstGroupOffset + nGroups * kGroupSize > size) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "25645298");
return false;
}
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < nGroups; i++) {
uint32_t groupOffset = kFirstGroupOffset + i * kGroupSize;
uint32_t start = readU32(data, groupOffset + kStartCharCodeOffset);
uint32_t end = readU32(data, groupOffset + kEndCharCodeOffset);
if (end < start) {
android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "26413177");
return false;
}
addRange(coverage, start, end + 1); // file is inclusive, vector is exclusive
}
return true;
}
| 173,895 |
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