text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0241
ATT&CK Technique Name:RATANKBA
RATANKBA runs the whoami and query user commands.[152] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0347
ATT&CK Technique Name:AuditCred
AuditCred can open a reverse shell on the system to execute commands.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0148
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM has resolved Pony C2 server IP addresses by either converting Bitcoin blockchain transaction data to specific octets, or accessing IP addresses directly within the Namecoin blockchain.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mongall
Mongall can identify removable media attached to compromised hosts.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0402
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX/Shlayer
OSX/Shlayer can use bash scripts to check the macOS version, download payloads, and extract bytes from files. OSX/Shlayer uses the command sh -c tail -c +1381... to extract bytes at an offset from a specified file. OSX/Shlayer uses the curl -fsL "$url" >$tmp_path comman... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used credential dumping tools such as LaZagne to steal credentials to accounts logged into the compromised system and to Outlook Web Access.[62][63][64][65] OilRig has also used tool named PICKPOCKET to dump passwords from web browsers.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0316
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pegasus for Android
Pegasus for Android accesses contact list information.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
Dtrack has used a dropper that embeds an encrypted payload as extra data.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0540
ATT&CK Technique Name:Asacub
Asacub can send SMS messages from compromised devices.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0642
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADFLICK
BADFLICK has uploaded files from victims' machines.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has attempted to get users to enable macros and launch malicious Microsoft Word documents delivered via spearphishing emails.[150][151][152][153][154][155][156][157][158][159] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 The Rise of Potatoes: Privilege Escalations in Windows Services
Privilege escalation is a required step for an attacker in order to get full control of a system starting from a lower privileged access.In Windows there are many ways to reach this goal. This talk will be focused on showing all the ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0801
ATT&CK Technique Name:Access Management
All devices or systems changes, including all administrative functions, should require authentication. Consider using access management technologies to enforce authorization on all management interface access attempts, especially when the device does not inherentl... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 EtherOops: Exploring Practical Methods to Exploit Ethernet Packet-in-Packet Attacks
The concept of physical layer conditions in which a packet is re-evaluated in transit leading to a packet-in-packet attack has been shown in multiple protocols in the past. However, applying this logic to the Etherne... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
Black Basta had added data prior to the Portable Executable (PE) header to prevent automatic scanners from identifying the payload.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0335
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbon
Carbon has a command to inject code into a process.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0180
ATT&CK Technique Name:Volgmer
Volgmer installs a copy of itself in a randomly selected service, then overwrites the ServiceDLL entry in the service's Registry entry. Some Volgmer variants also install .dll files as services with names generated by a list of hard-coded strings.[130][131][132] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Reverse Engineering the Tesla Battery Management System to increase Power Available
Tesla released the dual motor performance Model S in late 2014. At that time the vehicle came with "insane mode" acceleration and an advertised 0-60 time of 3.2 seconds. Later, in July of 2015, Tesla announced "Ludic... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0657
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLUELIGHT
BLUELIGHT can collect the username on a compromised host.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0492
ATT&CK Technique Name:CookieMiner
CookieMiner has looked for files in the user's home directory with "wallet" in their name using find.[83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling has the ability to communicate over HTTP.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:P2P ZeuS
P2P ZeuS added junk data to outgoing UDP packets to peer implants.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used WinRM via PowerShell to execute commands and payloads on remote hosts.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0335
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbon
Carbon creates several tasks for later execution to continue persistence on the victim’s machine.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:INCONTROLLER
INCONTROLLER can remotely send commands to a malicious agent uploaded on Omron PLCs over HTTP or HTTPS.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman can execute PowerShell commands and has used PowerShell to execute a keylogger.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:ADVSTORESHELL
A variant of ADVSTORESHELL encrypts some C2 with RSA.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
The discovery modules used with Duqu can collect information on open windows.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used shellcode to download Meterpreter after compromising a victim.[452] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1547.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winlogon Helper DLL
Adversaries may abuse features of Winlogon to execute DLLs and/or executables when a user logs in. Winlogon.exe is a Windows component responsible for actions at logon/logoff as well as the secure attention sequence (SAS) triggered by Ctrl-Alt-Delete. Regist... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has used a malicious framework designed to impersonate the lsass.exe/vmtoolsd.exe token.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0113
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prikormka
A module in Prikormka collects information on available printers and disk drives.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has sent emails containing malicious links that require users to execute a file or macro to infect the victim machine.[23][24][25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0201
ATT&CK Technique Name:JPIN
JPIN can inject content into lsass.exe to load a module.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:PingPull
PingPull can decrypt received data from its C2 server by using AES.[170] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Morning Break
Morning Coffee Break will be served in the following areas for Briefings pass holders.Bay View Court North Corridor (North Convention Center)Bay View Court South Corridor (North Convention Center)Breakers Registration Corridor, Lagoon Corridor (Level 2)South Seas Foyer North, Jasmine F... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0528
ATT&CK Technique Name:Javali
Javali can use DLL side-loading to load malicious DLLs into legitimate executables.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0941
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
The encryption of firmware should be considered to prevent adversaries from identifying possible vulnerabilities within the firmware. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Another Flip in the Row
The Rowhammer bug is an issue in most DRAM modules which allows software to cause bit flips in DRAM cells, consequently manipulating data. Although only considered a reliability issue by DRAM vendors, research has showed that a single bit flip can subvert the security of an ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has exploited Adobe Flash vulnerability CVE-2018-4878 for execution.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0304
ATT&CK Technique Name:Android/Chuli.A
Android/Chuli.A used HTTP uploads to a URL as a command and control mechanism.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0170
ATT&CK Technique Name:Helminth
For C2 over HTTP, Helminth encodes data with base64 and sends it via the "Cookie" field of HTTP requests. For C2 over DNS, Helminth converts ASCII characters into their hexadecimal values and sends the data in cleartext.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0863
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Execution
Adversaries may rely on a targeted organizations user interaction for the execution of malicious code. User interaction may consist of installing applications, opening email attachments, or granting higher permissions to documents. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0502
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drovorub
Drovorub can exfiltrate files over C2 infrastructure.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil can inject itself into running processes on a compromised host.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0414
ATT&CK Technique Name:BabyShark
BabyShark has used mshta.exe to download and execute applications from a remote server.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has created new domain accounts on an ICS access server.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0220
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaos
Chaos provides a reverse shell is triggered upon receipt of a packet with a special string, sent to any port.[7] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 TRITON: How it Disrupted Safety Systems and Changed the Threat Landscape of Industrial Control Systems, Forever
In 2017, a sophisticated threat actor deployed the TRITON attack framework engineered to manipulate industrial safety systems at a critical infrastructure facility. This talk offers new in... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0572
ATT&CK Technique Name:Caterpillar WebShell
Caterpillar WebShell can obtain a list of user accounts from a victim's machine.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has searched a victim's network for organization collaboration channels like MS Teams or Slack to discover further high-privilege account credentials.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors generated a web shell within a vulnerable Enterprise Resource Planning Web Application Server as a persistence mechanism.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0283
ATT&CK Technique Name:jRAT
jRAT has the capability to log keystrokes from the victim’s machine, both offline and online.[84][85] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Meltdown: Basics, Details, Consequences
The security of computer systems fundamentally relies on the principle of confidentiality. Confidentiality is typically provided through memory isolation, e.g., kernel address ranges are marked as non-accessible and are protected from user access.In this talk,... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 used secure shell (SSH) to move laterally among their targets.[1] | secon |
title:botconf2015 Powered by JavaScript
Current capabilities of JavaScript turns the browser into the perfect host for a botnet agent. It can be compromised through different vectors, offers a wide range of functionalities, provides persistence and storage, communicates freely with many C&C channels, and behaves like a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor’s plugin deletes the collected files and log files after exfiltration.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0543
ATT&CK Technique Name:Spark
Spark has been packed with Enigma Protector to obfuscate its contents.[78] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 DroidGuard: A Deep Dive into SafetyNet
SafetyNet is the Android component developed by Google to verify the devices' integrity. These checksare used by the developers to prevent running applications on devices that would not meet security requirements but it is also used by Google to prevent bots,... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Infiltrating Corporate Intranet Like NSA - Pre-auth RCE on Leading SSL VPNs
SSL VPNs protect corporate assets from Internet exposure, but what if SSL VPNs themselves are vulnerable? They're exposed to the Internet, trusted to reliably guard the only way to intranet. However, we found pre-auth RCEs ... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Custom Processing Unit: Tracing and Patching Intel Atom Microcode
The ability to debug or simply observe the microarchitecture of closed-source CPUs has always been an exclusive privilege of the product vendors. For Intel CPUs, even the details of the high-level workings of CPU microcode were only a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0615
ATT&CK Technique Name:SombRAT
SombRAT has uploaded collected data and files from a compromised host to its C2 server.[118] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has targeted executives, human resources staff, and IT personnel for spearphishing.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has conducted brute force password spray attacks.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Ensure that Driver Signature Enforcement is enabled to restrict unsigned drivers from being installed. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire has a dylib hijacker module that generates a malicious dylib given the path to a legitimate dylib of a vulnerable application.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has targeted victims with e-mails containing malicious attachments.[93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0153
ATT&CK Technique Name:RedLeaves
RedLeaves can communicate to its C2 over HTTP and HTTPS if directed.[273][274] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0640
ATT&CK Technique Name:Avaddon
Avaddon looks for and attempts to stop database processes.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0228
ATT&CK Technique Name:NanHaiShu
NanHaiShu can change Internet Explorer settings to reduce warnings about malware activity.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0372
ATT&CK Technique Name:LockerGoga
Some of Norsk Hydro's production systems were impacted by a LockerGoga infection. This resulted in a loss of control which forced the company to switch to manual operations. [6] [7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0241
ATT&CK Technique Name:RATANKBA
RATANKBA uses WMI to perform process monitoring.[107][108] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0389
ATT&CK Technique Name:JCry
JCry has been observed deleting shadow copies to ensure that data cannot be restored easily.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT can collect .NET, PowerShell, and Python information from an infected host.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 can enumerate local and domain user account information.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can add a SID-History to a user if on a domain controller.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0262
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuasarRAT
QuasarRAT uses AES with a hardcoded pre-shared key to encrypt network communication.[111][112][113] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0664
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pandora
Pandora has the ability to install itself as a Windows service.[45] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Blue to Red: Traversing the Spectrum
The rising demand for talent to fill thousands of open roles in the security industry has resulted in one significant consequence: overspecialization. This can hinder someone from thinking about the larger picture of security challenges they face and can sometime... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN5
FIN5 has used legitimate VPN, RDP, Citrix, or VNC credentials to maintain access to a victim environment.[26][27][28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 can use HTTPS and HTTPS for C2 communication.[47][48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0631
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaes
Chaes has used a script that extracts the web session cookie and sends it to the C2 server.[7] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Snooping on Cellular Gateways and Their Critical Role in ICS
To keep up with the growing demand of always-on and available-anywhere connectivity, the use of cellular, in comparison to its wireless mobile connectivity counterpart in the electromagnetic spectrum, is rapidly expanding. My research in t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerDuke
PowerDuke has a command to get the victim's domain and NetBIOS name.[177] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Ensure all application component binaries are signed by the correct application developers. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has used known administrator account credentials to execute the backdoor directly.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0062
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA459
TA459 has attempted to get victims to open malicious Microsoft Word attachment sent via spearphishing.[225] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0379
ATT&CK Technique Name:Revenge RAT
Revenge RAT uses mshta.exe to run malicious scripts on the system.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0345
ATT&CK Technique Name:Seasalt
Seasalt is capable of installing itself as a service.[107] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0244
ATT&CK Technique Name:Comnie
Comnie collects the hostname of the victim machine.[93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI has relied on a victim to enable malicious macros within an attachment delivered via email.[125] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dust Storm
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors sent spearphishing emails that contained a malicious Microsoft Word document.[172] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0086
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZLib
ZLib has sent data and files from a compromised host to its C2 servers.[87] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:CURIUM
CURIUM has exfiltrated data from a compromised machine.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM has used Taiwan-based servers that appear to be exclusive to GALLIUM.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Deep Panda
Deep Panda has used the sticky-keys technique to bypass the RDP login screen on remote systems during intrusions.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke used scripts which detected and uninstalled antivirus software.[77][78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has used a script that checks /proc/*/environ for environment variables related to AWS.[301] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1061
ATT&CK Technique Name:AbstractEmu
AbstractEmu can use HTTP to communicate with the C2 server.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0448
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rising Sun
Rising Sun has executed commands using cmd.exe /c "<command> > <%temp%>\AM<random>. tmp" 2>&1.[287] | secon |
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