text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has created scheduled tasks to launch executables after a designated number of minutes have passed.[68][69][70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0433
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rifdoor
Rifdoor has created a new registry entry at HKEY_CURRENT_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Graphics with a value of C:\ProgramData\Initech\Initech.exe /run.[224] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has used known administrator account credentials to execute the backdoor directly.[13] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Exploiting Windows Hello for Business
In Windows 10 and Windows Server 2016, Microsoft has introduced a new feature called Windows Hello for Business (WHfB), that allows password-less authentication in Active Directory-based environments and thus aims to reduce the risk of password theft. It is bui... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper can load drivers by creating a new service using the CreateServiceW API.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group malware has maintained persistence on a system by creating a LNK shortcut in the user’s Startup folder.[20] | secon |
title:botconf2017 Formatting for Justice: Crime Doesn’t Pay, Neither Does Rich Text
Due to it’s flexibility and capacity for embedding other objects, the rich text format (RTF) is a preferred file type used by both precision and quantity focused threat actors. This presentation will discuss the state of threats making ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0365
ATT&CK Technique Name:Olympic Destroyer
Olympic Destroyer uses the native Windows utilities vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit to delete and disable operating system recovery features such as the Windows backup catalog and Windows Automatic Repair.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mivast
Mivast creates the following Registry entry: HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Micromedia.[163] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT can use VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and then CreateRemoteThread to execute shellcode within the address space of Notepad.exe.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used Cobalt Strike to encapsulate C2 in DNS traffic.[12] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Why so Spurious? How a Highly Error-Prone x86/x64 CPU "Feature" can be Abused to Achieve Local Privilege Escalation on Many Operating Systems
There exists a "feature" in the x86 architecture that, due to improper programming by many operating system vendors, can be exploited to achieve local privil... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0638
ATT&CK Technique Name:Babuk
Babuk can use "WNetOpenEnumW" and "WNetEnumResourceW" to enumerate files in network resources for encryption.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:gh0st RAT
gh0st RAT has the capability to list processes.[115] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Consider disabling functions from web technologies such as PHP’s eval() that may be abused for web shells.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0610
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideTwist
SideTwist has the ability to upload files from a compromised host.[169] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0324
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpyDealer
SpyDealer harvests SMS and MMS messages from victims.[42] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 ReCertifying Active Directory Certificate Services
Microsoft's Active Directory Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) implementation, known as Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS), has unfortunately flown under the radar of the defensive industry. AD CS is widely deployed and provides attackers o... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8's malicious spearphishing payloads are executed as PowerShell. FIN8 has also used PowerShell for lateral movement and credential access.[98][99][100] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0537
ATT&CK Technique Name:HyperStack
HyperStack can add the name of its communication pipe to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\lanmanserver\parameters\NullSessionPipes.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:SeaDuke
SeaDuke compressed data with zlib prior to sending it over C2.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream has the ability to gather user information from the targeted system using whoami/upn&whoami/fqdn&whoami/logonid&whoami/all.[69] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 HTTP/2: The Sequel is Always Worse
HTTP/2 is easily mistaken for a transport-layer protocol that can be swapped in with zero security implications for the website behind it. Two years ago, I presented HTTP Desync Attacks and kicked off a wave of request smuggling, but HTTP/2 escaped serious analysi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used Putty Secure Copy Client (PSCP) to transfer data.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0368
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotPetya
NotPetya can use valid credentials with PsExec or wmic to spread itself to remote systems.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0131
ATT&CK Technique Name:TINYTYPHON
When a document is found matching one of the extensions in the configuration, TINYTYPHON uploads it to the C2 server.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1061
ATT&CK Technique Name:AbstractEmu
AbstractEmu can grant itself camera permissions.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can use PowerSploit's Invoke-TokenManipulation to manipulate access tokens.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:LuminousMoth
LuminousMoth has used malicious DLLs that setup persistence in the Registry Key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Current Version\Run.[147][148] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used and modified open-source tools like Impacket, Mimikatz, and pwdump.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete renamed payloads to masquerade as legitimate Google Chrome, Java, Dropbox, Adobe Reader and Python executables.[89][90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:BS2005
BS2005 uses Base64 encoding for communication in the message body of an HTTP request.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 copied the local SAM and SYSTEM Registry hives to a staging directory.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot can deobfuscate strings and files for execution.[203] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1497.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Activity Based Checks
Adversaries may employ various user activity checks to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors based on the results of checks for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environm... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Consider using Group Policy to configure and block additions/modifications to W32Time DLLs. [4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0461
ATT&CK Technique Name:SDBbot
SDBbot has sent collected data from a compromised host to its C2 servers.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0547
ATT&CK Technique Name:DropBook
DropBook can collect the names of all files and folders in the Program Files directories.[109][110] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can write or modify browser shortcuts to enable launching of malicious browser extensions.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Configuration
HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) is one method to mitigate potential Adversary-in-the-Middle situations where and adversary uses a mis-issued or fraudulent certificate to intercept encrypted communications by enforcing use of an expected certificate. [12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0473
ATT&CK Technique Name:Avenger
Avenger has the ability to identify installed anti-virus products on a compromised host.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1136
ATT&CK Technique Name:Create Account
Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0223
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS can use DCOM (targeting the 127.0.0.1 loopback address) to execute additional payloads on compromised hosts.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1626.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Device Administrator Permissions
Adversaries may abuse Android’s device administration API to obtain a higher degree of control over the device. By abusing the API, adversaries can perform several nefarious actions, such as resetting the device’s password for Endpoint Denial of... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper used pr and an openly available tool to scan for open ports on target systems.[65][66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1087
ATT&CK Technique Name:Account Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of valid accounts, usernames, or email addresses on a system or within a compromised environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist, which can aid in follow-on behavior such as brute-forci... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Behind the Speculative Curtain: The True Story of Fighting Meltdown and Spectre
It's January 2nd, 2018. Your phone buzzes. You've been working for more than 6 months to fight a new class of hardware vulnerabilities with a number of other companies. You *had* seven days until planned disclosure, but... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0516
ATT&CK Technique Name:SoreFang
SoreFang can gain persistence through use of scheduled tasks.[165] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has a tool that can list out currently running processes.[10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0529
ATT&CK Technique Name:CarbonSteal
CarbonSteal has performed rudimentary SSL certificate validation to verify C2 server authenticity before establishing a SSL connection.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1043
ATT&CK Technique Name:Credential Access Protection
With Windows 10, Microsoft implemented new protections called Credential Guard to protect the LSA secrets that can be used to obtain credentials through forms of credential dumping. It is not configured by default and has hardware and firmware system re... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0172
ATT&CK Technique Name:Reaver
Reaver deletes the original dropped file from the victim.[196] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman can track key presses with a keylogger module.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
In the Ukraine 2015 Incident, Sandworm Team developed and used malicious firmware to render communication devices inoperable. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Deep Panda
The Deep Panda group is known to utilize WMI for lateral movement.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0342
ATT&CK Technique Name:GreyEnergy
GreyEnergy chooses a service, drops a DLL file, and writes it to that serviceDLL Registry key.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0079
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkHydrus
DarkHydrus used an open-source tool, Phishery, to inject malicious remote template URLs into Microsoft Word documents and then sent them to victims to enable Forced Authentication.[13] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Qualcomm WiFi: Infinity War
Qualcomm is the chip manufacturer with the highest market share in smart phones. With hundreds of millions of devices using Qualcomm WiFi chips, any security issue can cause a big impact on users, among which, 0-click remote/adjacent attack surface is always the most conc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
Recent versions of Android modified how device administrator applications are uninstalled, making it easier for the user to remove them. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has encrypted C2 communications using AES in CBC mode during Operation BULL and Operation ROCK.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Enable AES Kerberos encryption (or another stronger encryption algorithm), rather than RC4, where possible.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication on cloud services whenever possible. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Responding to a Cyber Attack with Missiles
The lines between real and virtual worlds are blurring fast. Several governments have publicly stated that they reserve the right to respond to cyber attacks with kinetic force. Now we are seeing that happening for real. What are the rules of engagement in ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0545
ATT&CK Technique Name:TERRACOTTA
TERRACOTTA has used timer events in React Native to initiate the foreground service.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to find the public IP address of a compromised system.[82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0122
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silent Librarian
Silent Librarian has established e-mail accounts to receive e-mails forwarded from compromised accounts.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0509
ATT&CK Technique Name:FakeSpy
FakeSpy can hide its icon if it detects that it is being run on an emulator.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has used a utility called CLOSESHAVE that can securely delete a file from the system. They have also removed malware, tools, or other non-native files used during the intrusion to reduce their footprint or as part of the post-intrusion cleanup process.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0267
ATT&CK Technique Name:FELIXROOT
FELIXROOT uses HTTP and HTTPS to communicate with the C2 server.[122][123] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can maintain persistence by creating an auto-run Registry key.[211][212][213][214] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mivast
Mivast has the capability to download and execute .exe files.[296] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0683
ATT&CK Technique Name:Peirates
Peirates can use kubectl or the Kubernetes API to run commands.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has dropped an SSH-authorized key in the /root/.ssh folder in order to access a compromised server with SSH.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sykipot
Sykipot may gather a list of running processes by running tasklist /v.[245] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can query Registry keys for potential opportunities.[70][71] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Rough and Ready: Frameworks to Measure Persistent Engagement and Deterrence
The US is in the midst of its most dramatic shift in policy, emphasizing forward defense and deterrence and to "intercept and halt" adversary cyber operations. Supporters believe these actions should significantly reduce at... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0483
ATT&CK Technique Name:IcedID
IcedID has called ZwWriteVirtualMemory, ZwProtectVirtualMemory, ZwQueueApcThread, and NtResumeThread to inject itself into a remote process.[98] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0365
ATT&CK Technique Name:Olympic Destroyer
Olympic Destroyer uses API calls to enumerate the infected system's ARP table.[165] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can use VBA to perform execution.[33][34][35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Netsh Helper DLL
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by Netsh Helper DLLs. Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system. It contains functional... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Filter DLL
Adversaries may register malicious password filter dynamic link libraries (DLLs) into the authentication process to acquire user credentials as they are validated. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used a macOS Python implant to gather data as well as MailFetcher.py code to automatically collect email data.[23][24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0256
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mosquito
Mosquito can modify Registry keys under HKCU\Software\Microsoft[dllname] to store configuration values. Mosquito also modifies Registry keys under HKCR\CLSID...\InprocServer32 with a path to the launcher.[97] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used a custom decryption routine, which pulls key and salt values from other artifacts such as a WMI filter or PowerShell Profile, to decode encrypted PowerShell payloads.[240] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent an application from writing a signed vulnerable driver to the system.[5] On Windows 10 and 11, enable Microsoft Vulnerable Driver Blocklist to assist in hardening against third par... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0502
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drovorub
Drovorub has used a kernel module rootkit to hide processes, files, executables, and network artifacts from user space view.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 includes garbage code to mislead anti-malware software and researchers.[1][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8's malicious spearphishing payloads use WMI to launch malware and spawn cmd.exe execution. FIN8 has also used WMIC for lateral movement as well as during and post compromise cleanup activities.[46][47][48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0058
ATT&CK Technique Name:SslMM
SslMM contains a feature to manipulate process privileges and tokens.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0371
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERTON
POWERTON can install a Registry Run key for persistence.[203] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can use various APIs to allocate memory and facilitate code execution/injection.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0256
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mosquito
Mosquito's installer searches the Registry and system to see if specific antivirus tools are installed on the system.[68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0493
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldenSpy
GoldenSpy's installer has delayed installation of GoldenSpy for two hours after it reaches a victim system.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has lured targets to download a Cobalt Strike beacon by including a malicious link within spearphishing emails.[7][8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0152
ATT&CK Technique Name:EvilGrab
EvilGrab has the capability to capture screenshots.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
PlugX can modify the characteristics of folders to hide them from the compromised user.[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has developed its own unique malware for use in operations.[34] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 The Black Hat Asia NOC Report
Back with another year of soul-crushing statistics, the Black Hat NOC team will be sharing all of the data that keeps us equally puzzled, and entertained, year after year. We'll let you know all the tools and techniques we're using to set up, stabilize, and secure the... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 actors installed a credential logger on Microsoft Exchange servers. Threat Group-3390 also leveraged the reconnaissance framework, ScanBox, to capture keystrokes.[80][173][174] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1068
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackCat
BlackCat can determine if a user on a compromised host has domain admin privileges.[5] | secon |
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