text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:G0119
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider has used the win32_service WMI class to retrieve a list of services from the system.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has included contact list exfiltration in the malicious apps deployed as part of Operation BULL.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT can send collected files back over same C2 channel.[109] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1529
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Shutdown/Reboot
Adversaries may shutdown/reboot systems to interrupt access to, or aid in the destruction of, those systems. Operating systems may contain commands to initiate a shutdown/reboot of a machine or network device. In some cases, these commands may also be used to... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT can check for VMware-related files and DLLs related to sandboxes.[48][49][50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used a PowerShell backdoor to check for Skype connections on the target machine.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0585
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kerrdown
Kerrdown has the ability to determine if the compromised host is running a 32 or 64 bit OS architecture.[186] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0026
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT18
APT18 actors leverage legitimate credentials to log into external remote services.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0360
ATT&CK Technique Name:BONDUPDATER
BONDUPDATER uses -windowstyle hidden to conceal a PowerShell window that downloads a payload.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Partition Integrity
Android Verified Boot can detect unauthorized modifications made to the system partition, which could lead to execution flow hijacking.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS will perform UAC bypass either through fodhelper.exe or eventvwr.exe.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors executed commands through the installed web shell via Tor exit nodes.[18] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-23 One Drive, Double Agent: Clouded OneDrive Turns Sides
Over the last 10 years, ransomware attacks have become the main cybersecurity risk. More than 200 different ransomware families have been used in the wild. Most of them are fairly similar. EDRs can prevent most of them generically with decoy fil... | secon |
title:botconf2017 Thinking Outside of the (Sand)box
During my talk, I will outline the current state of apps that try to break the Android sandbox model, either by directly exploiting the Android device or by trying to circumvent the protections in place. In the past, there has been mentions of malware families that tr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0382
ATT&CK Technique Name:ServHelper
ServHelper will attempt to enumerate Windows version and system architecture.[327] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1056.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Keylogging
Adversaries may log user keystrokes to intercept credentials as the user types them. Keylogging is likely to be used to acquire credentials for new access opportunities when OS Credential Dumping efforts are not effective, and may require an adversary to intercept ke... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1593.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Search Engines
Adversaries may use search engines to collect information about victims that can be used during targeting. Search engine services typical crawl online sites to index context and may provide users with specialized syntax to search for specific keywords or specific... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has used legitimate applications to side-load malicious DLLs.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0398
ATT&CK Technique Name:HyperBro
HyperBro has the ability to start and stop a specified service.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0941
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Information which is sensitive to the operation and architecture of the process environment may be encrypted to ensure confidentiality and restrict access to only those who need to know. [4] [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 used its Cloudflare services C2 channels for data exfiltration.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0575
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conti
Conti can enumerate routine network connections from a compromised host.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0449
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maze
Maze has attempted to delete the shadow volumes of infected machines, once before and once after the encryption process.[37][38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0084
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mis-Type
Mis-Type has used cmd.exe to run commands on a compromised host.[221] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sowbug
Sowbug extracted Word documents from a file server on a victim network.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has used batch scripts to enumerate administrators and users in the domain.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT has used Base64 encoded strings and scripts.[359] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0463
ATT&CK Technique Name:INSOMNIA
INSOMNIA has utilized malicious JavaScript and iframes to exploit WebKit running on vulnerable iOS 12 devices.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1614
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Location Discovery
Adversaries may gather information in an attempt to calculate the geographical location of a victim host. Adversaries may use the information from System Location Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0945
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Allow for code signing of any project files stored at rest to prevent unauthorized tampering. Ensure the signing keys are not easily accessible on the same system. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEADEYE
DEADEYE can enumerate a victim computer's volume serial number and host name.[73] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 CSI:Rowhammer: Closing the Case of Half-Double and Beyond
Rowhammer is a severe security problem in DRAM, allowing an unprivileged adversary to gain kernel privileges by inducing electrical disturbance errors. Today, mitigations against Rowhammer, most notably Targeted Row Refresh (TRR), are widely... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 Shield with Hole: New Security Mitigation Helps Us Escape Chrome Sandbox to Exfiltrate User Privacy
More security mitigations always mean securer software and more exploit cost. Chrome browser keeps introducing all kinds of security mitigation measures such as multi-process architecture[1], sandbox ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can create a named pipe to listen for and send data to a named pipe-based C2 server.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0577
ATT&CK Technique Name:FrozenCell
FrozenCell has used an online cell tower geolocation service to track targets.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used JScript for logging and downloading additional tools.[45][46] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 Back to the Future. Cross-Protocol Attacks in the Era of 5G
The state of mobile technologies can be baffling. We are already seeing deployment of 5G networks with astounding bandwidth and minimal latency. Yet, standards reliant on SS7, a technology developed in the 1970s, still continue to dominat... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 An Unauthenticated Journey to Root: Pwning Your Company's Enterprise Software Servers
Often Fortune 1000 companies consist of a plethora of software, hardware, vendors, and solutions all operating to keep the business running and alive. With all this complexity, there is often a single vendor that's... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUGARDUMP
SUGARDUMP has encrypted collected data using AES CBC mode and encoded it using Base64.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil searches for all processes listed in the prc field within its configuration file and then terminates each process. [7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has used scheduled task raw XML with a backdated timestamp of June 2, 2016. The group has also set the creation time of the files dropped by the second stage of the exploit to match the creation time of kernel32.dll. Additionally, APT32 has used a random value to modify... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can identify whether it has been run previously on a host by checking for a specified folder.[240] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0652
ATT&CK Technique Name:MarkiRAT
MarkiRAT can capture all keystrokes on a compromised host.[109] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0223
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS can use WMI queries to retrieve data from compromised hosts.[102][84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0807
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Allowlists
Use host-based allowlists to prevent devices from accepting connections from unauthorized systems. For example, allowlists can be used to ensure devices can only connect with master stations or known management/engineering workstations. [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1486
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Encrypted for Impact
Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit the privileges of user accounts so that only authorized administrators can edit system environment variables. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:ComRAT
ComRAT has checked the victim system's date and time to perform tasks during business hours (9 to 5, Monday to Friday).[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Certain developer utilities should be blocked or restricted if not required. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0200
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dipsind
A Dipsind variant registers as a Winlogon Event Notify DLL to establish persistence.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1055
ATT&CK Technique Name:Do Not Mitigate
Execution Guardrails likely should not be mitigated with preventative controls because it may protect unintended targets from being compromised. If targeted, efforts should be focused on preventing adversary tools from running earlier in the chain of activity and on... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 hex-encoded PII data prior to exfiltration.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil has the capability to destroy files and folders.[26][27][28][28][29][30][31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0089
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackEnergy
BlackEnergy communicates with its C2 server over HTTP.[41] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Ghost in the Wireless, iwlwifi Edition
Wi-Fi replaced Ethernet and became the main network protocol on laptops for the last few years. Software implementations of the Wi-Fi protocol naturally became the targets of attackers, and vulnerabilities found in Wi-Fi drivers were exploited to gain control o... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 actors obtain legitimate credentials using a variety of methods and use them to further lateral movement on victim networks.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0145
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSOURCE
If the victim is using PowerShell 3.0 or later, POWERSOURCE writes its decoded payload to an alternate data stream (ADS) named kernel32.dll that is saved in %PROGRAMDATA%\Windows\.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has downloaded additional code and files from servers onto victims.[276][277][278][279] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0678
ATT&CK Technique Name:Torisma
Torisma can use WTSEnumerateSessionsW to monitor remote desktop connections.[87] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0340
ATT&CK Technique Name:Octopus
Octopus can collect information on the Windows directory and searches for compressed RAR files on the host.[211][212][213] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1211
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploitation for Defense Evasion
Adversaries may exploit a system or application vulnerability to bypass security features. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
BADNEWS encrypts C2 data with a ROR by 3 and an XOR by 0x23.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can leverage WMI debugging to remotely replace binaries like sethc.exe, Utilman.exe, and Magnify.exe with cmd.exe.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0520
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLINDINGCAN
BLINDINGCAN has downloaded files to a victim machine.[71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0810
ATT&CK Technique Name:Out-of-Band Communications Channel
Provide operators with redundant, out-of-band communication to support monitoring and control of the operational processes, especially when recovering from a network outage [9]. Out-of-band communication should utilize diverse systems and technol... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0120
ATT&CK Technique Name:Evilnum
Evilnum has used the malware variant, TerraTV, to load a malicious DLL placed in the TeamViewer directory, instead of the original Windows DLL located in a system folder.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has established persistence via the Registry key HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run and a shortcut within the startup folder.[278][279] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0100
ATT&CK Technique Name:Inception
Inception used a browser plugin to steal passwords and sessions from Internet Explorer, Chrome, Opera, Firefox, Torch, and Yandex.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete is written in Python and is used in conjunction with additional Python scripts.[25][26][27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0533
ATT&CK Technique Name:SLOTHFULMEDIA
SLOTHFULMEDIA can enumerate open ports on a victim machine.[81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0072
ATT&CK Technique Name:OwaAuth
OwaAuth uses the filename owaauth.dll, which is a legitimate file that normally resides in %ProgramFiles%\Microsoft\Exchange Server\ClientAccess\Owa\Auth\; the malicious file by the same name is saved in %ProgramFiles%\Microsoft\Exchange Server\ClientAccess\Owa\bin\.[118] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0074
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sakula
Sakula contains UAC bypass code for both 32- and 64-bit systems.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0348
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cardinal RAT
Cardinal RAT is downloaded using HTTP over port 443.[57] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 HTTP Desync Attacks: Request Smuggling Reborn
HTTP requests are traditionally viewed as isolated, standalone entities. In this session, I'll introduce techniques for remote, unauthenticated attackers to smash through this isolation and splice their requests into others, through which I was able to p... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0567
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dtrack
Dtrack has used a decryption routine that is part of an executable physical patch.[76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 replaces the Sticky Keys binary C:\Windows\System32\sethc.exe for persistence.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0606
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bad Rabbit
Bad Rabbit has been executed through user installation of an executable disguised as a flash installer.[33][34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has identified security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors installed on a compromised system.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tarrask
Tarrask leverages token theft to obtain lsass.exe security permissions.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Moses Staff
Moses Staff has used signed drivers from an open source tool called DiskCryptor to evade detection.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0549
ATT&CK Technique Name:SilkBean
SilkBean can install new applications which are obtained from the C2 server.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0517
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pillowmint
Pillowmint has used a malicious shim database to maintain persistence.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0134
ATT&CK Technique Name:Downdelph
Downdelph bypasses UAC to escalate privileges by using a custom "RedirectEXE" shim database.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0410
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fysbis
Fysbis has established persistence using a systemd service.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has relied on users to download and execute malicious Docker images.[3] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Wrangling with the Ghost: An Inside Story of Mitigating Speculative Execution Side Channel Vulnerabilities
2018 started off with a bang as the world was introduced to a new class of hardware vulnerability which became known as Meltdown and Spectre. New classes of vulnerabilities are exceedingly rar... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0135
ATT&CK Technique Name:BackdoorDiplomacy
BackdoorDiplomacy has exploited CVE-2020-5902, an F5 BIP-IP vulnerability, to drop a Linux backdoor. BackdoorDiplomacy has also exploited mis-configured Plesk servers.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession can capture screenshots from a compromised host.[135] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0596
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShadowPad
ShadowPad uses a DGA that is based on the day of the month for C2 servers.[25][26][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has abused the KernelCallbackTable to hijack process control flow and execute shellcode.[1][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
An APT3 downloader establishes SOCKS5 connections for its initial C2.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
AppleJeus has deleted the MSI file after installation.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0437
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kivars
Kivars has the ability to initiate keylogging on the infected host.[96] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-23 MoustachedBouncer: AitM-Powered Surveillance via Belarus ISPs
An APT group conducting long-term espionage against diplomats, leveraging email-based C&C protocols, C++ modular backdoors, and adversary-in-the-middle (AitM) attacks… Sounds like the infamous Turla? Think again! We will introduce Mousta... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Morning Break
Morning Coffee Break will be served in the following areas for Briefings pass holders.Bay View Court North Corridor (North Convention Center)Bay View Court South Corridor (North Convention Center)Breakers Registration Corridor, Lagoon Corridor (Level 2)South Seas Foyer North, Jasmine ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1627
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Guardrails
Adversaries may use execution guardrails to constrain execution or actions based on adversary supplied and environment specific conditions that are expected to be present on the target. Guardrails ensure that a payload only executes against an intended target a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher renames one of its .dll files to uxtheme.dll in an apparent attempt to masquerade as a legitimate file.[57][58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0150
ATT&CK Technique Name:POSHSPY
POSHSPY uses a DGA to derive command and control URLs from a word list.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has used AES for encryption of command and control traffic.[4] | secon |
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