text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
titleblackhat:us-18 New Trends in Browser Exploitation: Attacking Client-Side JIT Compilers
As finding reliably exploitable vulnerabilities in web browser engines becomes gradually harder, attackers turn to previously less explored areas of the code. One of these seems especially interesting: just-in-time (JIT) compile... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 Non-Intrusive Vulnerability Localization and Hotpatching for Industrial Control Systems
Over the years, Industrial Control Systems (ICS) manufacturers have started embracing extensive system library support provided by control logic development software, easing the development process. Furthermor... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can execute a payload on a remote host with PowerShell. This technique does not write any data to disk.[56][57] Cobalt Strike can also use PowerSploit and other scripting frameworks to perform execution.[58][59][60][61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0696
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flagpro
Flagpro has relied on users clicking a malicious attachment delivered through spearphishing.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0467
ATT&CK Technique Name:TajMahal
TajMahal has the ability to send collected files over its C2.[130] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0262
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuasarRAT
QuasarRAT can gather system information from the victim’s machine including the OS type.[293] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:JHUHUGIT
A JHUHUGIT variant gathers network interface card information.[112] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0401
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exaramel for Linux
Exaramel for Linux can decrypt its configuration file.[84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST collected a list of process names that were hashed using a FNV-1a + XOR algorithm to check against similarly-hashed hardcoded blocklists.[242] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit's Invoke-Kerberoast module can request service tickets and return crackable ticket hashes.[13][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum's loader can check the amount of physical memory and terminates itself if the host has less than 1.5 Gigabytes of physical memory in total.[35] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 A Broken Chain: Discovering OPC UA Attack Surface and Exploiting the Supply Chain
OPC Unified Architecture (OPC-UA) is emerging as one of the most important architectures for industrial communication and industry 4.0 transformation. It is platform-independent and trusted for connecting Industrial en... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:CreepySnail
CreepySnail can use stolen credentials to authenticate on target networks.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang has performed local network configuration discovery using ipconfig.[116][117][118] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1059.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Visual Basic
Adversaries may abuse Visual Basic (VB) for execution. VB is a programming language created by Microsoft with interoperability with many Windows technologies such as Component Object Model and the Native API through the Windows API. Although tagged as legacy with n... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0945
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Devices should verify that firmware has been properly signed by the vendor before allowing installation. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:DanBot
DanBot has been distributed within a malicious Excel attachment via spearphishing emails.[67] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 Manufacturing Hardware Implants from Idea to Mass Production: A Hacker's Journey
This presentation wants to be a motivational talk for all those hackers out there that always wanted to share some cool hacking devices with the community but didn't know how to deal with R&D, Quality Assurance, an... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can utilize built-in modules to modify service binaries and restore them to their original state.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0615
ATT&CK Technique Name:SombRAT
SombRAT can execute loadfromfile, loadfromstorage, and loadfrommem to inject a DLL from disk, storage, or memory respectively.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aoqin Dragon
Aoqin Dragon has used custom malware, including Mongall and Heyoka Backdoor, in their operations.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0698
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWizard
HermeticWizard can use cmd.exe for execution on compromised hosts.[152] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0664
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pandora
Pandora can start and inject code into a new svchost process.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0387
ATT&CK Technique Name:KeyBoy
KeyBoy installs a keylogger for intercepting credentials and keystrokes.[89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0593
ATT&CK Technique Name:ECCENTRICBANDWAGON
ECCENTRICBANDWAGON can delete log files generated from the malware stored at C:\windows\temp\tmp0207.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0800
ATT&CK Technique Name:Authorization Enforcement
All APIs used to perform execution, especially those hosted on embedded controllers (e.g., PLCs), should provide adequate authorization enforcement of user access. Minimize user's access to only required API calls. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0942
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Ensure that unnecessary ports and services are closed to prevent risk of discovery and potential exploitation. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cleaver
Cleaver has created customized tools and payloads for functions including ARP poisoning, encryption, credential dumping, ASP.NET shells, web backdoors, process enumeration, WMI querying, HTTP and SMB communications, network interface sniffing, and keystroke logging.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can deobfuscate shellcode using a rolling XOR and decrypt metadata from Beacon sessions.[56][57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0513
ATT&CK Technique Name:LiteDuke
LiteDuke has been packed with multiple layers of encryption.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0432
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bread
Bread uses various tricks to obfuscate its strings including standard and custom encryption, programmatically building strings at runtime, and splitting unencrypted strings with repeated delimiters to break up keywords. Bread has also abused Java and JavaScript features to ob... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI used PowerShell to download and execute a specific 64-bit version of the malware.[131][132] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:Blue Mockingbird
Blue Mockingbird has executed custom-compiled XMRIG miner DLLs using rundll32.exe.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0332
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remcos
Remcos can add itself to the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[221] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Breaking the IIoT: Hacking industrial Control Gateways
Industrial control gateways connect most of the critical infrastructure surrounding us to the centralized management systems: From power grids (transformer stations, solar fields), city infrastructure (traffic lights, tunnel control systems) to... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0413
ATT&CK Technique Name:MailSniper
MailSniper can be used for searching through email in Exchange and Office 365 environments.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0698
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWizard
HermeticWizard has the ability to use wevtutil cl system to clear event logs.[17] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Microsoft Defender for Office 365 Evasion - The Story of Confirmed Vulnerability
Microsoft Defender for Office 365 safeguards your organization against malicious threats posed by email messages, links (URLs), and collaboration tools. Safe Attachments routes all messages and attachments that do not ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used credential dumping tool named VALUEVAULT to steal credentials from the Windows Credential Manager.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST used DNS for C2 traffic designed to mimic normal SolarWinds API communications.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can acquire local and domain user account information.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0526
ATT&CK Technique Name:KGH_SPY
KGH_SPY can execute PowerShell commands on the victim's machine.[125] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0576
ATT&CK Technique Name:MegaCortex
After escalating privileges, MegaCortex calls TerminateProcess(), CreateRemoteThread, and other Win32 APIs.[118] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has used Registry Run keys for persistence. The group has also set a Startup path to launch the PowerShell shell command and download Cobalt Strike.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0293
ATT&CK Technique Name:BrainTest
BrainTest provided capabilities that allowed developers to use compromised devices to post positive reviews on their own malicious applications as well as download other malicious applications they had submitted to the Play Store.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0262
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuasarRAT
QuasarRAT can hide process windows and make web requests invisible to the compromised user. Requests marked as invisible have been sent with user-agent string Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_9_3) AppleWebKit/537.75.14 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/7.0.3 Safari/704... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling can identify the username on a compromised host.[38][39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0540
ATT&CK Technique Name:Asacub
Asacub has stored encrypted strings in the APK file.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can use New-GPOImmediateTask to modify a GPO that will install and execute a malicious Scheduled Task/Job.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rclone
Rclone can list files and directories with the ls, lsd, and lsl commands.[245] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0223
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS uses character replacement, PowerShell environment variables, and XOR encoding to obfuscate code. POWERSTATS's backdoor code is a multi-layer obfuscated, encoded, and compressed blob. [56][70] POWERSTATS has used PowerShell code with custom string obfuscation ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0271
ATT&CK Technique Name:KEYMARBLE
KEYMARBLE uses a customized XOR algorithm to encrypt C2 communications.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0564
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackMould
BlackMould has the ability to download files to the victim's machine.[70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0443
ATT&CK Technique Name:MESSAGETAP
Once loaded into memory, MESSAGETAP deletes the keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt configuration files from disk. [144] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Reversible Encryption
An adversary may abuse Active Directory authentication encryption properties to gain access to credentials on Windows systems. The AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption property specifies whether reversible password encryption for an account is enabled or disa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:INCONTROLLER
INCONTROLLER can establish a remote HTTP connection to change the operating mode of Omron PLCs.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0816
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mitigation Limited or Not Effective
Once an adversary has access to a remote GUI they can abuse system features, such as required HMI functions. | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Network Defender Archeology: An NSM Case Study in Lateral Movement with DCOM
Adversaries love leveraging legitimate functionality that lays dormant inside of Microsoft Windows for malicious purposes and often disguise their activity under the smoke screen of "normal administrator behavior." Over th... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0283
ATT&CK Technique Name:jRAT
jRAT can be configured to reconnect at certain intervals.[8] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Go With the Flow: Enforcing Program Behavior Through Syscall Sequences and Origins
Over the years, applications increased in size and complexity, and with that also the number of vulnerabilities. Both industry and academia have proposed countermeasures to harden applications against potential attack... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0236
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kwampirs
Kwampirs collects a list of active and listening connections by using the command netstat -nao as well as a list of available network mappings with net use.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has password-protected malicious Word documents.[323] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:gh0st RAT
gh0st RAT can create a new service to establish persistence.[57][58] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0329
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tangelo
Tangelo contains functionality to gather GPS coordinates.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0654
ATT&CK Technique Name:ProLock
ProLock can remove files containing its payload after they are executed.[184] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has used command-line interfaces for execution.[69][331] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has created Windows tasks to establish persistence.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0395
ATT&CK Technique Name:LightNeuron
LightNeuron has used a malicious Microsoft Exchange transport agent for persistence.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0083
ATT&CK Technique Name:Misdat
Misdat has used Windows APIs, including ExitWindowsEx and GetKeyboardType.[124] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has used Windows command scripts.[336] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trap
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by an interrupt signal. The trap command allows programs and shells to specify commands that will be executed upon receiving interrupt signals. A common situation is a script allowing for gracef... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLC-Blaster
PLC-Blaster may manipulate any outputs of the PLC. Using the POU POKE any value within the process image may be modified. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:Higaisa
Higaisa’s JavaScript file used a legitimate Microsoft Office 2007 package to side-load the OINFO12.OCX dynamic link library.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0201
ATT&CK Technique Name:JPIN
A JPIN uses a encrypted and compressed payload that is disguised as a bitmap within the resource section of the installer.[174] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 Alarm.DISARM - Remotely Exploiting and Disarming Popular Physical Security System from Public Internet
You probably know this movie scene where the hacker of the group remotely disables the alarm before the other guys break in to execute a perfectly planned heist? Great, so this presentation is a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0677
ATT&CK Technique Name:AADInternals
AADInternals can gather encryption keys from Azure AD services such as ADSync and Active Directory Federated Services servers.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:BISCUIT
BISCUIT has a command to launch a command shell on the system.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil can obtain the token from the user that launched the explorer.exe process to avoid affecting the desktop of the SYSTEM user.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used Twitter to monitor potential victims and to prepare targeted phishing e-mails.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0655
ATT&CK Technique Name:BusyGasper
BusyGasper can collect data from messaging applications, including WhatsApp, Viber, and Facebook.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys related to SIP and trust provider components. Components may still be able to be hijacked to suitable functions already present on disk if malicious modifications... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0801
ATT&CK Technique Name:Access Management
Ensure embedded controls and network devices are protected through access management, as these devices often have unknown hardcoded accounts which could be used to gain unauthorized access. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1542.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:TFTP Boot
Adversaries may abuse netbooting to load an unauthorized network device operating system from a Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) server. TFTP boot (netbooting) is commonly used by network administrators to load configuration-controlled network device images from ... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 ERROR: BadAlloc! - Broken Memory Allocators Led to Millions of Vulnerable IoT and Embedded Devices
"BadAlloc" is our code name for a class of integer-overflow related security issues found in popular memory allocators' core functions such as malloc and calloc. BadAlloc vulnerabilities affect 17 dif... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
A Turla JavaScript backdoor has used Google Apps Script as its C2 server.[48][49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0066
ATT&CK Technique Name:3PARA RAT
3PARA RAT has a command to set certain attributes such as creation/modification timestamps on files.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0262
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuasarRAT
QuasarRAT has a command to edit the Registry on the victim’s machine.[128][129] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has placed scripts in the startup folder for persistence and modified the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce Registry key.[132][36][133][134][135] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
BADNEWS identifies files with certain extensions from USB devices, then copies them to a predefined directory.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Ensure proper permissions are set for Registry hives to prevent users from modifying keys for system components that may lead to privilege escalation. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1189
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drive-by Compromise
Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websites for non-exploitati... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0346
ATT&CK Technique Name:OceanSalt
OceanSalt can collect the name and ID for every process running on the system.[184] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0281
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dok
Dok uses AppleScript to install a login Item by sending Apple events to the System Events process.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has used SMS and email messages with links designed to steal credentials or track victims.[13][14][15][16][17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot creates a scheduled task on the system that provides persistence.[172][173][174] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used macros to verify if a mouse is connected to a compromised machine.[34] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Practical Attacks Against Attribute-based Encryption
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) implements fine-grained access control on data where the ability to decrypt a ciphertext is determined by the attributes owned by a user of the system. Hence, data can be stored by an entity that is not necessaril... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT can use SetWindowsHookEx and GetKeyNameText to capture keystrokes.[157][158] | secon |
Subsets and Splits
No community queries yet
The top public SQL queries from the community will appear here once available.