text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0533
ATT&CK Technique Name:SLOTHFULMEDIA
SLOTHFULMEDIA has created a service on victim machines named "TaskFrame" to establish persistence.[112] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0124
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windigo
Windigo has used a script to gather credentials in files left on disk by OpenSSH backdoors.[196] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0023
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Ghost
For Operation Ghost, APT29 used new strains of malware including FatDuke, MiniDuke, RegDuke, and PolyglotDuke.[26] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Black Hat Europe 2021
Join Black Hat Europe Review Board members for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community. This Locknote will feature a candid discussion on the key takeaways coming out of the conference and ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remsec
Remsec is capable of using HTTP and HTTPS for C2.[277][278][279] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent can set persistence with a Registry run key.[111] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Consider disabling or restricting NTLM.[91] Consider disabling WDigest authentication.[92] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created scheduled tasks to set a periodic execution of a remote XSL script.[126] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used the ntdsutil.exe utility to export the Active Directory database for credential access.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0529
ATT&CK Technique Name:CarbonSteal
CarbonSteal has collected device network information, including 16-bit GSM Cell Identity, 16-bit Location Area Code, Mobile Country Code (MCC), and Mobile Network Code (MNC). CarbonSteal has also called netcfg to get stats.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors created services on remote systems for execution purposes.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0056
ATT&CK Technique Name:PROMETHIUM
PROMETHIUM has disguised malicious installer files by bundling them with legitimate software installers.[127][128] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skeleton Key
Skeleton Key is used to patch an enterprise domain controller authentication process with a backdoor password. It allows adversaries to bypass the standard authentication system to use a defined password for all accounts authenticating to that domain controller.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0119
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider has downloaded additional scripts, malware, and tools onto a compromised host.[224][225] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0577
ATT&CK Technique Name:FrozenCell
FrozenCell has retrieved device images for exfiltration.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0083
ATT&CK Technique Name:Misdat
Misdat has attempted to detect if a compromised host had a Japanese keyboard via the Windows API call GetKeyboardType.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:EXOTIC LILY
EXOTIC LILY has copied data from social media sites to impersonate targeted individuals.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole has undergone regular technical improvements in an attempt to evade detection.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0644
ATT&CK Technique Name:ObliqueRAT
ObliqueRAT can discover pluggable/removable drives to extract files from.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has exported emails from compromised Exchange servers including through use of the cmdlet New-MailboxExportRequest.[16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson can spread across systems by infecting removable media.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 modified legitimate Windows services to install malware backdoors.[15][16] APT41 created the StorSyncSvc service to provide persistence for Cobalt Strike.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37 has used an audio capturing utility known as SOUNDWAVE that captures microphone input.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:ComRAT
ComRAT has injected its orchestrator DLL into explorer.exe. ComRAT has also injected its communications module into the victim's default browser to make C2 connections appear less suspicious as all network connections will be initiated by the browser process.[15][16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Input Capture
Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal system usage, users often provide credentials to various different locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms m... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Certain signed scripts that can be used to execute other programs may not be necessary within a given environment. Use application control configured to block execution of these scripts if they are not required for a given system or network to prevent potential... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling can use cmd.exe for command execution.[72] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0471
ATT&CK Technique Name:build_downer
build_downer can extract malware from a downloaded JPEG.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAMMERTOSS
HAMMERTOSS is controlled via commands that are appended to image files.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group malware can use a common function to identify target files by their extension, and some also enumerate files and directories, including a Destover-like variant that lists files and gathers information for all drives.[174][175][176][177] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0681
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lizar
Lizar has a command to open the command-line on the infected system.[194][195] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0057
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tasklist
Tasklist can be used to enumerate security software currently running on a system by process name of known products.[103] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Back to the Future: A Radical Insecure Design of KVM on ARM
In ARM there are certain instructions that generates exception. Such instructions are typically executed to request a service from software that runs at a higher privilege level. From the OS kernel (EL1), software can call the Hypervisor (E... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 obtained a list of users and their roles from an Exchange server using Get-ManagementRoleAssignment.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY has several modules, such as ls.py, pwd.py, and recentFiles.py, to enumerate directories and files.[275] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0017
During C0017, APT41 used the following Windows scheduled tasks for DEADEYE dropper persistence on US state government networks: \Microsoft\Windows\PLA\Server Manager Performance Monitor, \Microsoft\Windows\Ras\ManagerMobility, \Microsoft\Windows\WDI\SrvSetupResults, and \Micr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0394
ATT&CK Technique Name:HiddenWasp
HiddenWasp adds itself as a shared object to the LD_PRELOAD environment variable.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has compromised Google Drive repositories.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee can inject code into multiple processes on infected endpoints.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0366
ATT&CK Technique Name:WannaCry
WannaCry attempts to copy itself to remote computers after gaining access via an SMB exploit.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0026
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT18
APT18 actors used the native at Windows task scheduler tool to use scheduled tasks for execution on a victim network.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest searches through the /Users/ folder looking for executable files. For each executable, ThiefQuest prepends a copy of itself to the beginning of the file. When the file is executed, the ThiefQuest code is executed first. ThiefQuest creates a hidden file, copies... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0440
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Smith
Agent Smith deletes infected applications’ update packages when they are detected on the system, preventing updates.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
Android 10 prevents applications from accessing clipboard data unless the application is on the foreground or is set as the device’s default input method editor (IME).[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has used brute force techniques to attempt account access when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are unavailable.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Active Directory Configuration
Clean up SID-History attributes after legitimate account migration is complete.Consider applying SID Filtering to interforest trusts, such as forest trusts and external trusts, to exclude SID-History from requests to access domain resources. SID Filte... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0280
ATT&CK Technique Name:MirageFox
MirageFox can collect CPU and architecture information from the victim’s machine.[231] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remsec
Remsec can exfiltrate data via a DNS tunnel or email, separately from its C2 channel.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1216.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:PubPrn
Adversaries may use PubPrn to proxy execution of malicious remote files. PubPrn.vbs is a Visual Basic script that publishes a printer to Active Directory Domain Services. The script may be signed by Microsoft and is commonly executed through the Windows Command Shell via... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aoqin Dragon
Aoqin Dragon has spread malware in target networks by copying modules to folders masquerading as removable devices.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN10
FIN10 has moved laterally using the Local Administrator account.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has used WMI to install malware on targeted systems.[45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0653
ATT&CK Technique Name:xCaon
xCaon has communicated with the C2 server by sending POST requests over HTTP.[374] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0466
ATT&CK Technique Name:WindTail
WindTail can identify and add files that possess specific file extensions to an array for archiving.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire contains modules that can discover and exploit unquoted path vulnerabilities.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT can collect the username from a compromised host.[161] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1049
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUGARUSH
SUGARUSH has used port 4585 for a TCP connection to its C2.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can identify installed security tools based on process names.[117] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT can make Ping GET HTTP requests to its C2 server at regular intervals for network connectivity checks.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0495
ATT&CK Technique Name:RDAT
RDAT has used AES ciphertext to encode C2 communications.[114] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shark
Shark can query HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography MachineGuid to retrieve the machine GUID.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla can log keystrokes on the victim’s machine.[5][6][7][8][9] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Lessons from Virginia - A Comparative Forensic Analysis of WinVote Voting Machines
The WinVote voting machine was used extensively in Virginia elections during 2004 and 2015. It has been dubbed the worst voting machine ever and that for good reasons. It runs Windows XP, service pack 0. It has by de... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-23 Jailbreaking an Electric Vehicle in 2023 or What It Means to Hotwire Tesla's x86-Based Seat Heater
Tesla has been known for their advanced and well-integrated car computers, from serving mundane entertainment purposes to fully autonomous driving capabilities. More recently, Tesla has started us... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth has used malicious files including VBS, LNK, and HTML for execution.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group has sent emails containing malicious attachments that require users to execute a file or macro to infect the victim machine.[60][61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Strider
Strider has registered its persistence module on domain controllers as a Windows LSA (Local System Authority) password filter to acquire credentials any time a domain, local user, or administrator logs in or changes a password.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession has the ability to modify a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[58][218] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used compromised domain accounts to gain access to the target environment.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet enumerates user accounts of the local host.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
For Operation Wocao, the threat actors obtained a variety of open source tools, including JexBoss, KeeThief, and BloodHound.[82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0062
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA459
TA459 has exploited Microsoft Word vulnerability CVE-2017-0199 for execution.[81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0368
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotPetya
NotPetya uses wevtutil to clear the Windows event logs.[24][25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0132
ATT&CK Technique Name:H1N1
H1N1 bypasses user access control by using a DLL hijacking vulnerability in the Windows Update Standalone Installer (wusa.exe).[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0113
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prikormka
A module in Prikormka collects information from the victim about installed anti-virus software.[80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1429
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audio Capture
Adversaries may capture audio to collect information by leveraging standard operating system APIs of a mobile device. Examples of audio information adversaries may target include user conversations, surroundings, phone calls, or other sensitive information. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0348
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cardinal RAT
Cardinal RAT checks its current working directory upon execution and also contains watchdog functionality that ensures its executable is located in the correct path (else it will rewrite the payload).[68] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:ComRAT
ComRAT has encrypted its virtual file system using AES-256 in XTS mode.[83][84] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0368
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotPetya
NotPetya drops PsExec with the filename dllhost.dat.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0168
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gazer
Gazer can establish persistence by creating a .lnk file in the Start menu.[101][102] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can attempt to overload sandbox analysis by sending 1550 calls to printf.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0471
ATT&CK Technique Name:build_downer
build_downer has the ability to detect if the infected host is running an anti-virus process.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 leverages valid accounts after gaining credentials for use within the victim domain.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1218.008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Odbcconf
Adversaries may abuse odbcconf.exe to proxy execution of malicious payloads. Odbcconf.exe is a Windows utility that allows you to configure Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) drivers and data source names. The Odbcconf.exe binary may be digitally signed by Microsoft. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0834
ATT&CK Technique Name:Native API
Adversaries may directly interact with the native OS application programming interface (API) to access system functions. Native APIs provide a controlled means of calling low-level OS services within the kernel, such as those involving hardware/devices, memory, and proce... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0515
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMail
WellMail can decompress scripts received from C2.[250] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Preemptively search for files containing passwords and take actions to reduce the exposure risk when found. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1036
ATT&CK Technique Name:Account Use Policies
Use conditional access policies to block logins from non-compliant devices or from outside defined organization IP ranges.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet attempts to contact command and control servers on port 80 to send basic information about the computer it has compromised. [1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0616
ATT&CK Technique Name:DEATHRANSOM
DEATHRANSOM has the ability to use WMI to delete volume shadow copies.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0570
ATT&CK Technique Name:BitPaymer
BitPaymer has set the run key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST had commands that allow an attacker to write or delete registry keys, and was observed stopping services by setting their HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\[service_name]\Start registry entries to value 4.[153][154] It also deleted previously-created Image Fi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1628.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Evasion
Adversaries may attempt to avoid detection by hiding malicious behavior from the user. By doing this, an adversary’s modifications would most likely remain installed on the device for longer, allowing the adversary to continue to operate on that device. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0072
ATT&CK Technique Name:OwaAuth
OwaAuth captures and DES-encrypts credentials before writing the username and password to a log file, C:\log.txt.[80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has used domain administrator accounts after dumping LSASS process memory.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT12
APT12 has used multiple variants of DNS Calculation including multiplying the first two octets of an IP address and adding the third octet to that value in order to get a resulting command and control port.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0916
ATT&CK Technique Name:Vulnerability Scanning
Regularly scan externally facing systems for vulnerabilities and establish procedures to rapidly patch systems when critical vulnerabilities are discovered through scanning and public disclosure. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0190
ATT&CK Technique Name:BITSAdmin
BITSAdmin can be used to create BITS Jobs to upload files from a compromised host.[7] | secon |
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