text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet has obfuscated macros within malicious documents to hide the URLs hosting the malware, CMD.exe arguments, and PowerShell scripts. [30][31][32][33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has used a batch script that adds a Registry Run key to establish malware persistence.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used one C2 to obtain enumeration scripts and monitor web logs, but a different C2 to send data back.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used Impacket's smbexec.py as well as accessing the C$ and IPC$ shares to move laterally.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has added paths to executables in the Registry to establish persistence.[241][242][243] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
An APT19 HTTP malware variant establishes persistence by setting the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Windows Debug Tools-%LOCALAPPDATA%\.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
File encryption should be enforced across email communications containing sensitive information that may be obtained through access to email services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0176
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wingbird
Wingbird drops a malicious file (sspisrv.dll) alongside a copy of lsass.exe, which is used to register a service that loads sspisrv.dll as a driver. The payload of the malicious driver (located in its entry-point function) is executed when loaded by lsass.exe before the sp... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has collected the hostname of a compromised machine.[161] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 Last Call for SATCOM Security
In 2014, we took to the stage and presented "A Wake-up Call for SATCOM Security," during which we described several theoretical scenarios that could result from the disturbingly weak security posture of multiple SATCOM products. Four years later, we are back at Black Ha... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT can use VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and then CreateRemoteThread to execute shellcode within the address space of Notepad.exe.[53] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Nakatomi Space: Lateral Movement as L1 Post-exploitation in OT
In OT networks, it is common knowledge that Purdue Reference Model Level 1 (L1) devices such as PLCs and RTUs are notoriously insecure. Regardless, L1 devices that sit at the intersection of multiple, mixed networks (Ethernet, Industr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0120
ATT&CK Technique Name:Evilnum
Evilnum has sent spearphishing emails designed to trick the recipient into opening malicious shortcut links which downloads a .LNK file.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can use known credentials to run commands and spawn processes as a domain user account.[5][6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT can use AES-CBC to encrypt data sent to its C2 server.[148] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
PlugX has the ability to use DLL search order hijacking for installation on targeted systems.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Several Ke3chang backdoors achieved persistence by adding a Run key.[131] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0105
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkVishnya
DarkVishnya used PowerShell to create shellcode loaders.[72] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0304
ATT&CK Technique Name:Android/Chuli.A
Android/Chuli.A gathered system information including phone number, OS version, phone model, and SDK version.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rootkit
Adversaries may use rootkits to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components. Rootkits are programs that hide the existence of malware by intercepting/hooking and modifying operating system API calls that supply s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson contains a module to steal credentials from Web browsers on the victim machine.[22][23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper can decompress and copy driver files using LZCopy.[107] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1029
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remote Data Storage
Automatically forward events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system. | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 FPs are Cheap. Show me the CVEs!
SAST tools are notoriously hard to evaluate and benchmark. The most important thing you want to know about a tool before spending time and money on it: does it give me relevant results? Does it really find the vulnerabilities it promises? Vendors are quick to tell yo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment operational network and systems to restrict access to critical system functions to predetermined management systems. [7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1070.007
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clear Network Connection History and Configurations
Adversaries may clear or remove evidence of malicious network connections in order to clean up traces of their operations. Configuration settings as well as various artifacts that highlight connection history may be created on... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has encrypted C2 commands with AES-256.[89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1002
ATT&CK Technique Name:BITTER
BITTER has used a RAR SFX dropper to deliver malware.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:IceApple
IceApple can harvest credentials from local and remote host registries.[5] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 A New Era of One-Click Attacks: How to Break Install-Less Apps
Apps are becoming larger, cumbersome, and resource-consuming. Vendors want to reduce the whole process for users to reach the target page of content and get the work done with just a few clicks. Install-Less apps are considered a new ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0588
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldMax
GoldMax has used scheduled tasks to maintain persistence.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1036.006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Space after Filename
Adversaries can hide a program's true filetype by changing the extension of a file. With certain file types (specifically this does not work with .app extensions), appending a space to the end of a filename will change how the file is processed by the opera... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Doors of Durin: The Veiled Gate to Siemens S7 Silicon
Siemens is a leading provider of industrial automation components for critical infrastructures, and their S7 PLC series is one of the most widely used PLCs in the industry. In recent years, Siemens integrated various security measures into their... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak can download a module to search for and build a report of harvested credential data.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has established domains that impersonate legitimate entities to use for targeting efforts. [43][44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0136
ATT&CK Technique Name:IndigoZebra
IndigoZebra created Dropbox accounts for their operations.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor's dispatcher can establish persistence by registering a new service.[18] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 Hermes Attack: Steal DNN Models In AI Privatization Deployment Scenarios
The AI privatization deployment is becoming a big market in China and the US. For example, company A has a private high-quality DNN model for live-face authentication, and it would like to sell this DNN model to other companie... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
Organizations may intentionally register similar domains to their own to deter adversaries from creating typosquatting domains. Other facets of this technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the ... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Stealth Mango and the Prevalence of Mobile Surveillanceware
In this talk, we will unveil the new in-house capabilities of a nation state actor who has been observed deploying both Android and iOS surveillance tooling, known as Stealth Mango and Tangelo. The actor behind these offensive capabilities... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0058
ATT&CK Technique Name:SslMM
SslMM contains a feature to manipulate process privileges and tokens.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0814
ATT&CK Technique Name:Static Network Configuration
Unauthorized connections can be prevented by statically defining the hosts and ports used for automation protocol connections. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0644
ATT&CK Technique Name:ObliqueRAT
ObliqueRAT can check for blocklisted usernames on infected endpoints.[131] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0144
ATT&CK Technique Name:ChChes
ChChes is capable of downloading files, including additional modules.[103][104][105] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has used a tool to capture screenshots.[27][28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:Blue Mockingbird
Blue Mockingbird has used frp, ssf, and Venom to establish SOCKS proxy connections.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0627
ATT&CK Technique Name:SodaMaster
SodaMaster has the ability to put itself to "sleep" for a specified time.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0446
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ryuk
Ryuk can remotely create a scheduled task to execute itself on a system.[153] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0657
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLUELIGHT
BLUELIGHT can collect IP information from the victim’s machine.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hi-Zor
Hi-Zor encrypts C2 traffic with a double XOR using two distinct single-byte keys.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group placed LNK files into the victims' startup folder for persistence.[187] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Exploiting Qualcomm WLAN and Modem Over The Air
In this talk, we will share our research in which we successfully exploit Qualcomm WLAN in FIRMWARE layer, break down the isolation between WLAN and Modem, and then fully control the Modem over the air.Setting up the real-time debugger is the key. With... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 clears Window Event logs and Sysmon logs from the system.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has accessed victim networks by using stolen credentials to access the corporate VPN infrastructure.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:JHUHUGIT
JHUHUGIT has registered a Windows shell script under the Registry key HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript to establish persistence.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0803
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Loss Prevention
Data loss prevention can restrict access to sensitive data and detect sensitive data that is unencrypted. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 has a number of modules that use WMI to execute tasks.[99] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has deleted the exfiltrated data on disk after transmission. Kimsuky has also used an instrumentor script to terminate browser processes running on an infected system and then delete the cookie files on disk.[122][123][124] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp has captured credentials when a user performs login through a SSL session.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0291
ATT&CK Technique Name:PJApps
PJApps has the capability to send messages to premium SMS messages.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1561.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disk Structure Wipe
Adversaries may corrupt or wipe the disk data structures on a hard drive necessary to boot a system; targeting specific critical systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rclone
Rclone can exfiltrate data over FTP or HTTP, including HTTP via WebDAV.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0339
ATT&CK Technique Name:Micropsia
Micropsia can perform a recursive directory listing for all volume drives available on the victim's machine and can also fetch specific files by their paths.[198] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxxZ
ZxxZ has collected the host name and operating system product name from a compromised machine.[416] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:CozyCar
One persistence mechanism used by CozyCar is to register itself as a scheduled task.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1426
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Information Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to get detailed information about a device’s operating system and hardware, including versions, patches, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0538
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crutch
Crutch can use Dropbox to receive commands and upload stolen data.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can copy a script to the user owned /usr/lib/systemd/system/ directory with a symlink mapped to a root owned directory, /etc/ystem/system, in the unit configuration file's ExecStart directive to establish persistence and elevate privileges.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0561
ATT&CK Technique Name:GuLoader
GuLoader can use HTTP to retrieve additional binaries.[149][150] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1556.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pluggable Authentication Modules
Adversaries may modify pluggable authentication modules (PAM) to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. PAM is a modular system of configuration files, libraries, and executable files which guide authenticati... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Integrating multi-factor authentication (MFA) as part of organizational policy can greatly reduce the risk of an adversary gaining control of valid credentials that may be used for additional tactics such as initial access, lateral movement, and collecti... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN4
FIN4 has used spearphishing emails (often sent from compromised accounts) containing malicious links.[50][51] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Leveraging Streaming-Based Outlier Detection and SliceLine to Stop Heavily Distributed Bot Attacks
In this presentation, we will discuss how to leverage streaming-based outlier detection and SliceLine to quickly and safely generate large volumes of rules/signatures that can be used to block malici... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Enterprise Policy
Enterprise policies should prevent enabling USB debugging on Android devices unless specifically needed (e.g., if the device is used for application development). | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Encrypt data stored at rest in cloud storage.[5][6] Managed encryption keys can be rotated by most providers. At a minimum, ensure an incident response plan to storage breach includes rotating the keys and test for impact on client applications.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has stored captured credential information in a file named pi.log.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0020
ATT&CK Technique Name:China Chopper
China Chopper's server component can perform brute force password guessing against authentication portals.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has conducted system locale checks to see if the compromised host is in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, or Moldova.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit service accounts to minimal required privileges, including membership in privileged groups such as Domain Administrators.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 has executed file /bin/pwd on exploited victims, perhaps to return architecture related information.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0670
ATT&CK Technique Name:WarzoneRAT
WarzoneRAT has the capability to install a live and offline keylogger, including through the use of the GetAsyncKeyState Windows API.[179][180] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1029
ATT&CK Technique Name:AuTo Stealer
AuTo Stealer can use TCP to communicate with command and control servers.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
An adversary must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0615
ATT&CK Technique Name:SombRAT
SombRAT can run upload to decrypt and upload files from storage.[64][91] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0301
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dendroid
Dendroid can open a dialog box to ask the user for passwords.[13] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 Using the JIT Vulnerability to Pwn Microsoft Edge
To speed up the javascript code, the modern browser introduces the Just-In-Time(JIT) compiler to javascript engine, which is also used by the Microsoft Edge javascript engine chakra. Because the javascript is a dynamic, untyped language before JIT... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1499.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Service Exhaustion Flood
Adversaries may target the different network services provided by systems to conduct a denial of service (DoS). Adversaries often target the availability of DNS and web services, however others have been targeted as well. Web server software can be atta... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Control
Turn off UAC's privilege elevation for standard users [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System] to automatically deny elevation requests, add: "ConsentPromptBehaviorUser"=dword:00000000. Consider enabling installer detection... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 The Evil Alt-Ego: (ab)using HTTP Alternative Services
The HTTP Alternative Services header (Alt-Svc, RFC 7838) was introduced in 2013 by seasoned developers with "good intentions" in a bid to streamline load balancing, protocol optimizations, and client segmentation. It has been subsequently impl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1073
ATT&CK Technique Name:Royal
Royal has been spread through the use of phishing campaigns including "call back phishing" where victims are lured into calling a number provided through email.[11][12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0387
ATT&CK Technique Name:KeyBoy
KeyBoy issues the command reg add "HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon" to achieve persistence.[7] [8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has used tools including BITSAdmin to test internet connectivity from compromised hosts.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used a WMI event filter to invoke a command-line event consumer at system boot time to launch a backdoor with rundll32.exe.[19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has used a batch script to gather folder and file names from victim hosts.[106][107][108] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used encryption (including salted 3DES via PowerSploit's Out-EncryptedScript.ps1), random variable names, and base64 encoding to obfuscate PowerShell commands and payloads.[85] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0171
ATT&CK Technique Name:Felismus
Some Felismus samples use a custom encryption method for C2 traffic that utilizes AES and multiple keys.[50] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 SDL at Scale: Growing Security Champions
If you're tasked with securing a portfolio of applications it's a practice in extremes. You've got a small team of security experts trying to help a multitude of developers, testers, and other engineers. You have to find a way to work with the team that's bee... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has created local accounts named help and DefaultAccount on compromised machines.[17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 actors look for and use VPN profiles during an operation to access the network using external VPN services.[42] Threat Group-3390 has also obtained OWA account credentials during intrusions that it subsequently used to attempt to regain access wh... | secon |
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