text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif droppers have used VBA macros to download and execute the malware's full executable payload.[162] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1048
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Isolation and Sandboxing
Browser sandboxes can be used to mitigate some of the impact of exploitation, but sandbox escapes may still exist.[58][59]Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of client-side exploitation. T... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Adversaries may use new DLLs to execute this technique. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed through search order hijacking by using application control solutions capable of blocking DLLs loaded by legitimate software. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0528
ATT&CK Technique Name:Javali
Javali can capture login credentials from open browsers including Firefox, Chrome, Internet Explorer, and Edge.[34] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-22 Keynote: Fireside Chat with U.S. National Cyber Director Chris Inglis
Join the inaugural United State National Cyber Director Chris Inglis and Jeff Moss for a conversation about the evolution of the relationship between governments and the private sector. Director Inglis will discuss his positive ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0187
ATT&CK Technique Name:Daserf
Analysis of Daserf has shown that it regularly undergoes technical improvements to evade anti-virus detection.[4] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 So I became a Domain Controller
"They told me I could be anything I wanted, so I became a Domain Controller."
While SAMBA did implement Active Directory replication protocol for years, it was not easy to abuse it, especially on the Windows OS. The lsadump::DCSync feature in mimikatz was a first brea... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Refer to NIST guidelines when creating password policies. [22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0482
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bundlore
Bundlore has leveraged /bin/sh and /bin/bash to execute commands on the victim machine.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can use net localgroup to enable discovery of local groups.[24][25] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 Breakfast
Breakfast will be served in Shoreline (South Convention Center, Level 2) at 9:00 AM - 10:00 AM. Please wear your badge. Open to Briefings pass holders. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has downloaded additional malware to execute on victim systems.[433][401][434] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 So I became a Domain Controller
"They told me I could be anything I wanted, so I became a Domain Controller."
While SAMBA did implement Active Directory replication protocol for years, it was not easy to abuse it, especially on the Windows OS. The lsadump::DCSync feature in mimikatz was a first bre... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of behaviors related to process injection/memory tampering based on common sequences of indicators (ex: execution of specific API functions). | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0486
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bonadan
Bonadan can download an additional module which has a cryptocurrency mining extension.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0530
ATT&CK Technique Name:Melcoz
Melcoz can use DLL hijacking to bypass security controls.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has used a command-line tunneler, NACHOCHEESE, to give them shell access to a victim’s machine.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0599
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kinsing
Kinsing has used chmod to modify permissions on key files for use.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT can send collected data to cloud storage services such as PCloud.[24][25] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Stress and Hacking: Understanding Cognitive Stress in Tactical Cyber Ops
Hacking is a high-risk, high-reward, with a high-cost to human capital. In this session, we will talk about the effects of human factors in cyber operations and why you should care about them. Specifically, we will focus on re... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has injected malicious macros into all Word and Excel documents on mapped network drives.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
Duqu downloads additional modules for the collection of data in information repositories, including the Infostealer 2 module that can access data from Windows Shares.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 contains modules for local privilege escalation exploits such as CVE-2016-9192 and CVE-2016-0099.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0161
ATT&CK Technique Name:XAgentOSX
XAgentOSX contains keylogging functionality that will monitor for active application windows and write them to the log, it can handle special characters, and it will buffer by default 50 characters before sending them out over the C2 infrastructure.[181] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 leveraged spearphishing emails with malicious attachments to initially compromise victims.[36][37][38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0488
ATT&CK Technique Name:CrackMapExec
CrackMapExec can dump hashed passwords from LSA secrets for the targeted system.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0387
ATT&CK Technique Name:KeyBoy
KeyBoy time-stomped its DLL in order to evade detection.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has resized and added data to the certificate table to enable the signing of modified files with legitimate signatures.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0264
ATT&CK Technique Name:OopsIE
OopsIE compresses collected files with GZipStream before sending them to its C2 server.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Configure access controls and firewalls to limit access to critical systems and domain controllers. Most cloud environments support separate virtual private cloud (VPC) instances that enable further segmentation of cloud systems. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 All You Ever Wanted to Know about the AMD Platform Security Processor and were Afraid to Emulate - Inside a Deeply Embedded Security Processor
AMDs Zen (and later) CPUs contain the "(Platform) Secure Processor" (PSP) which is an embedded ARM core inside your x86 CPU responsible for initial system bo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit permissions so that users and user groups cannot create tokens. This setting should be defined for the local system account only. GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assig... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
An adversary must already have administrator level access on the local system to make full use of this technique; be sure to restrict users and accounts to the least privileges they require. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Modify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\AppID\\{AppID_GUID} associated with the process-wide security of individual COM applications.[21]Modify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.ex... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0527
ATT&CK Technique Name:CSPY Downloader
CSPY Downloader can use GET requests to download additional payloads from C2.[85] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 New Wine in an Old Bottle: Attacking Chrome WebSQL
Nowadays, multiple mitigation mechanisms have gradually been added to Google Chrome in order to reduce the traditional RCE attack surfaces (e.g., V8 and Blink), which greatly increases the attack difficulty. Besides these well-known attack surface... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:JHUHUGIT
JHUHUGIT has registered itself as a scheduled task to run each time the current user logs in.[87][88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0268
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bisonal
Bisonal has renamed malicious code to msacm32.dll to hide within a legitimate library; earlier versions were disguised as winhelp.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0583
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pysa
Pysa has the capability to stop antivirus services and disable Windows Defender.[72] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Ensure proper process and file permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or interfering with security/logging services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used a keylogger called GEARSHIFT on a target system.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Black Basta
Black Basta can make a random number of calls to the kernel32.beep function to hinder log analysis.[6] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 iOS Dual Booting Demystified
In this talk, we will investigate and present on the ways in which to boot a custom firmware image on an iOS device. In order to show this, we will detail how the secure iOS boot process functions, including many of the details of how the low level component verificat... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has used various forms of spearphishing in attempts to get users to open malicious attachments.[74] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Malware Classification With Machine Learning Enhanced by Windows Kernel Emulation
This session will present a hybrid machine learning architecture that simultaneously utilizes static and dynamic malware analysis methodologies. We employ the Windows kernel emulator published by Mandiant for dynamic a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0569
ATT&CK Technique Name:Explosive
Explosive has a function to download a file to the infected system.[173] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:INCONTROLLER
INCONTROLLER can use the CODESYS protocol to remotely connect to Schneider PLCs and perform maintenance functions on the device.[6]INCONTROLLER can use Telnet to upload payloads and execute commands on Omron PLCs. [7][8] The malware can also use HTTP-based CGI script... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remsec
Remsec can obtain information about the current user.[156] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has acquired and used a variety of malware, including Cobalt Strike.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Configure settings for scheduled tasks to force tasks to run under the context of the authenticated account instead of allowing them to run as SYSTEM. The associated Registry key is located at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\SubmitControl. T... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used different compromised credentials for remote access and to move laterally.[58][59][60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0287
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZergHelper
ZergHelper attempts to extend its capabilities via dynamic updating of its code.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0220
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaos
After initial compromise, Chaos will download a second stage to establish a more permanent presence on the affected system.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:ComRAT
ComRAT has used encryption and base64 to obfuscate its orchestrator code in the Registry. ComRAT has also used encoded PowerShell scripts.[25][26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar has the ability to use an alternative C2 server if the primary server fails.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0451
ATT&CK Technique Name:LoudMiner
LoudMiner can automatically launch a Linux virtual machine as a service at startup if the AutoStart option is enabled in the VBoxVmService configuration file.[77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has modified the permissions on binaries with chattr.[14][15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0454
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cadelspy
Cadelspy has the ability to log keystrokes on the compromised host.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0464
ATT&CK Technique Name:SYSCON
SYSCON has the ability to use FTP in C2 communications.[16][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0625
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cuba
Cuba has used cmd.exe /c and batch files for execution.[92] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0261
ATT&CK Technique Name:Catchamas
Catchamas gathers the Mac address, IP address, and the network adapter information from the victim’s machine.[50] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth has used malicious VBS e-mail attachments for execution.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0631
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaes
Chaes has used Python scripts for execution and the installation of additional files.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Ensure that all wired and/or wireless traffic is encrypted appropriately. Use best practices for authentication protocols, such as Kerberos, and ensure web traffic that may contain credentials is protected by SSL/TLS. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used valid VPN credentials to gain initial access.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1212
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploitation for Credential Access
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to collect credentials. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0856
ATT&CK Technique Name:Spoof Reporting Message
Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control system environments for evasion and to impair process control. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industria... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Heyoka Backdoor
Heyoka Backdoor can establish persistence with the auto start function including using the value EverNoteTrayUService.[115] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:TianySpy
TianySpy can install malicious configurations on iPhones to allow malware to be installed via Ad Hoc distribution.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
One variant of Zebrocy uses WMI queries to gather information.[137] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0090
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rover
Rover automatically searches for files on local drives based on a predefined list of file extensions.[263] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0435
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLEAD
PLEAD has the ability to steal saved passwords from Microsoft Outlook.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee has named component DLLs "RapportGP.dll" to match those used by the security company Trusteer.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has used a peer-to-peer (P2P) network for C2.[48][49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0807
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Allowlists
Utilize network allowlists to restrict unnecessary connections to network devices (e.g., comm servers, serial to ethernet converters) and services, especially in cases when devices have limits on the number of simultaneous sessions they support. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0098
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackTech
BlackTech has obtained and used tools such as Putty, SNScan, and PsExec for its operations.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has downloaded additional malware with scheduled tasks.[90] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Smashing the ML Stack for Fun and Lawsuits
Adversarial machine learning research is booming. ML researchers are increasingly targeting commercial ML systems such as those used by Facebook, Tesla, Microsoft, IBM, or Google to demonstrate vulnerabilities. But what legal risks are researchers running?... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Prevent users from installing their own launch agents or launch daemons. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 EdTech- The Ultimate APT
This talk will show the audience that edtech is being implemented in schools without due regard for privacy or harm reduction. In doing this talk, it would be hoped that attention could be drawn to these serious issues and possibly, some action might be taken.Currently, only... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 contains an implementation of Mimikatz to gather credentials from memory.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Access to Resource Over Network
Limit communications with the container service to local Unix sockets or remote access via SSH. Require secure port access to communicate with the APIs over TLS by disabling unauthenticated access to the Docker API on port 2375. Instead, commun... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 PPLdump Is Dead. Long Live PPLdump!
The Windows Protected Process Light (PPL) mechanism hardens anti-malware and critical Windows services against tampering, even by administrators. This special status is guarded by the Windows Code Integrity (CI) subsystem which ensures that PPL processes will o... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:cmd
cmd is used to execute programs and other actions at the command-line interface.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0229
ATT&CK Technique Name:Orz
Orz can execute shell commands.[253] Orz can execute commands with JavaScript.[253] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0136
ATT&CK Technique Name:USBStealer
USBStealer exfiltrates collected files via removable media from air-gapped victims.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0607
ATT&CK Technique Name:KillDisk
KillDisk retrieves the hard disk name by calling the CreateFileA to \.\PHYSICALDRIVE0 API.[191] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 has modules for keystroke logging and capturing credentials from spoofed Outlook authentication messages.[137] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, update Windows Defender Application Control policies to include rules that block the older, vulnerable versions of PubPrn.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper has used the name postgressql.exe to mask a malicious payload.[71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1590.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Trust Dependencies
Adversaries may gather information about the victim's network trust dependencies that can be used during targeting. Information about network trusts may include a variety of details, including second or third-party organizations/domains (ex: managed s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1550.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pass the Hash
Adversaries may "pass the hash" using stolen password hashes to move laterally within an environment, bypassing normal system access controls. Pass the hash (PtH) is a method of authenticating as a user without having access to the user's cleartext password. This ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has abused misconfigured AD CS certificate templates to impersonate admin users and create additional authentication certificates.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Control
Turn off UAC's privilege elevation for standard users [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System] to automatically deny elevation requests, add: "ConsentPromptBehaviorUser"=dword:00000000. Consider enabling installer detection... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over known protocols like FTP can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures ar... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1578.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Create Cloud Instance
An adversary may create a new instance or virtual machine (VM) within the compute service of a cloud account to evade defenses. Creating a new instance may allow an adversary to bypass firewall rules and permissions that exist on instances currently residi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0562
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNSPOT
SUNSPOT decrypts SUNBURST, which was stored in AES128-CBC encrypted blobs.[224] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0334
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkComet
DarkComet can collect the computer name, RAM used, and operating system version from the victim’s machine.[103][104] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team conducted technical reconnaissance of the Parliament of Georgia's official internet domain prior to its 2019 attack.[8] | secon |
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