text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0208
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pasam
Pasam establishes by infecting the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) DLL to load a malicious DLL dropped to disk.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication. Where possible, also enable multi-factor authentication on externally facing services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574.008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Path Interception by Search Order Hijacking
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the search order used to load other programs. Because some programs do not call other programs using the full path, adversaries may place their own file in the director... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors used administrative utilities to deliver Trojan components to remote systems.[317] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Reverse Engineering WhatsApp Encryption for Chat Manipulation and More
As of early 2018, the Facebook-owned messaging application, WhatsApp, has over 1.5 billion users with over one billion groups and 65 billion messages sent every day. WhatsApp end-to-end encryption ensures only you and the person ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1066
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkTortilla
DarkTortilla has modified registry keys for persistence.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink can upload files from a compromised host.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1000
ATT&CK Technique Name:ALLANITE
ALLANITE utilized spear phishing to gain access into energy sector environments. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has included malware functionality capable of downloading new DEX files at runtime during Operation BULL.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream can send compressed and obfuscated packets to C2.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0262
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuasarRAT
QuasarRAT can launch a remote shell to execute commands on the victim’s machine.[272][273] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors used a script that ran WMI queries to check if a VM or sandbox was running, including VMWare and Virtualbox. The script would also call WMI to determine the number of cores allocated to the system; if less than two the script woul... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0152
ATT&CK Technique Name:EvilGrab
EvilGrab adds a Registry Run key for ctfmon.exe to establish persistence.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group deployed malware designed not to run on computers set to Korean, Japanese, or Chinese in Windows language preferences.[18] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Revisiting Stealthy Sensitive Information Collection from Android Apps
In recent years, most countries and territories have put in place strict regulations for user privacy protection. Checking and monitoring the privacy policy compliance of mobile applications thus has become essential for users,... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used tools such as the MailFetch mail crawler to collect victim emails (excluding spam) from online services via IMAP.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has gained access to a global administrator account in Azure AD.[5] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 How can Communities Move Forward After Incidents of Sexual Harassment or Assault?
When incidents of sexual harassment or sexual assault occur within communities, as we've recently seen in InfoSec, how can a community respond in ways that support survivors and also hold problematic members accountab... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet leverages the Admin$ share for lateral movement once the local admin password has been brute forced. [26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 can use legitimate websites for external C2 channels including Slack, Discord, and MS Teams.[5] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 From Workstation to Domain Admin: Why Secure Administration isn't Secure and How to Fix it
Organizations have been forced to adapt to the new reality: Anyone can be targeted and many can be compromised.This has been the catalyst for many to tighten up operations and revamp ancient security practices... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum loader only executes the payload after the left mouse button has been pressed at least three times, in order to avoid being executed within virtualized or emulated environments.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0098
ATT&CK Technique Name:T9000
T9000 uses the Skype API to record audio and video calls. It writes encrypted data to %APPDATA%\Intel\Skype.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Configure SNMPv3 to use the highest level of security (authPriv) available.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0377
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ebury
Ebury has encrypted C2 traffic using the client IP address, then encoded it as a hexadecimal string.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0671
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tomiris
Tomiris has connected to a signalization server that provides a URL and port, and then Tomiris sends a GET request to that URL to establish C2.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1034
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrifeWater
StrifeWater can enumerate files on a compromised host.[287] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0355
ATT&CK Technique Name:Final1stspy
Final1stspy uses Python code to deobfuscate base64-encoded strings.[87] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:AutoIt backdoor
AutoIt backdoor is capable of identifying documents on the victim with the following extensions: .doc; .pdf, .csv, .ppt, .docx, .pst, .xls, .xlsx, .pptx, and .jpeg.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0339
ATT&CK Technique Name:Micropsia
Micropsia takes screenshots every 90 seconds by calling the Gdi32.BitBlt API.[108] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0482
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bundlore
Bundlore creates a new key pair with ssh-keygen and drops the newly created user key in authorized_keys to enable remote login.[8] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 Circumventing the Guardians: How the Security Features in State-of-the-Art TLS Inspection Solutions can be Exploited for Covert Data Exfiltration
<span style="font-size: 10pt;" data-mce-style="font-size:
10pt;">In this talk, we will reveal a new stealthy method of data exfiltration that specifically... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0407
ATT&CK Technique Name:Monokle
Monokle uses XOR to obfuscate its second stage binary.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to prevent JavaScript scripts from executing potentially malicious downloaded content [68]. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0105
ATT&CK Technique Name:dsquery
dsquery has the ability to enumerate various information, such as the operating system and host name, for systems within a domain.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE has used a custom obfuscation algorithm to hide strings including Registry keys, APIs, and DLL names.[228] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0119
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider has collected credentials from infected systems, including domain accounts.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream can stage collected information including screen captures and logged keystrokes locally.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors used domain accounts to gain further access to victim systems.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory C: and system directories, such as C:\Windows\, to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0283
ATT&CK Technique Name:jRAT
jRAT collects information about the OS (version, build type, install date) as well as system up-time upon receiving a connection from a backdoor.[180] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Darkhotel
Darkhotel has collected the hostname, OS version, service pack version, and the processor architecture from the victim’s machine.[105][106] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1034
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrifeWater
StrifeWater has create a scheduled task named Mozilla\Firefox Default Browser Agent 409046Z0FF4A39CB for persistence.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER used spearphishing emails with malicious Microsoft Word attachments to infect victims.[48][49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0105
ATT&CK Technique Name:dsquery
dsquery can be used to gather information on permission groups within a domain.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0338
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobian RAT
Cobian RAT has a feature to perform screen capture.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dark Caracal
Dark Caracal leveraged a watering hole to serve up malicious code.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1067
ATT&CK Technique Name:FluBot
FluBot can add display overlays onto banking apps to capture credit card information.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0564
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackMould
BlackMould can send commands to C2 in the body of HTTP POST requests.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1134.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Make and Impersonate Token
Adversaries may make new tokens and impersonate users to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, if an adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system the adversary can then create a logon session ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Component Object Model Hijacking
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects. COM is a system within Windows to enable interaction between software components through the operating... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0664
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pandora
Pandora can identify if incoming HTTP traffic contains a token and if so it will intercept the traffic and process the received command.[10] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Fault-Injection Detection Circuits: Design, Calibration, Validation and Tuning
This session covers the tunable replica circuit (TRC), a fault-injection detection circuit that has been integrated into Intel® Converged Security and Management Engine (Intel® CSME) in the recent 12th Gen Intel® Core™ Pr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0508
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ngrok
Ngrok can provide DGA for C2 servers through the use of random URL strings that change every 12 hours.[23] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 A Hacker's Guide to Reducing Side-Channel Attack Surfaces Using Deep-Learning
In recent years, deep-learning based side-channel attacks have been proven to be very effective and opened the door to automated implementation techniques. Building on this line of work, this talk explores how to take the... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Mind Games: Using Data to Solve for the Human Element
The security industry's traditional approach to mitigating human risk is predicated on the assumption that individuals will make the right security decisions if they have enough training and fear of the consequences. Years of security research in... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0583
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pysa
Pysa has extracted credentials from the password database before encrypting the files.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0062
ATT&CK Technique Name:DustySky
DustySky searches for removable media and duplicates itself onto it.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has searched compromised systems for folders of interest including those related to HR, audit and expense, and meeting memos.[192] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet infected WinCC machines via a hardcoded database server password.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0605
ATT&CK Technique Name:EKANS
EKANS can determine the domain of a compromised host.[77] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Bypassing Anti-Cheats & Hacking Competitive Games
With the increasing popularity of games having a competitive element, cheats have become a common method for hackers to gain an advantage. These cheats could range from a sniper bullet that felt just a little too accurate to a player teleporting ac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors used cmd.exe to execute commands and run malicious binaries.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETEAGLE
If NETEAGLE does not detect a proxy configured on the infected machine, it will send beacons via UDP/6000. Also, after retrieving a C2 IP address and Port Number, NETEAGLE will initiate a TCP connection to this socket. The ensuing connection is a plaintext C2 channel in wh... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Rough and Ready: Frameworks to Measure Persistent Engagement and Deterrence
The US is in the midst of its most dramatic shift in policy, emphasizing forward defense and deterrence and to "intercept and halt" adversary cyber operations. Supporters believe these actions should significantly reduce att... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0077
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leafminer
Leafminer scanned network services to search for vulnerabilities in the victim system.[37] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Diving Into Spooler: Discovering LPE and RCE Vulnerabilities in Windows Printer
Ten years ago, an escalation of privilege bug in Windows Printer Spooler was used in Stuxnet, which is a notorious worm that destroyed the nuclear enrichment centrifuges of Iran and infected more than 45000 networks. In ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0407
ATT&CK Technique Name:Monokle
Monokle can record audio from the device's microphone and can record phone calls, specifying the output audio quality.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1034
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrifeWater
StrifeWater can use a variety of APIs for execution.[161] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Malware researchers can reverse engineer malware variants that use d... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Strings in Attor's components are encrypted with a XOR cipher, using a hardcoded key and the configuration data, log files and plugins are encrypted using a hybrid encryption scheme of Blowfish-OFB combined with RSA.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro has the ability to use HTTP in C2 communications.[145][146] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum has used a custom implementation of AES encryption to encrypt collected data.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1053
ATT&CK Technique Name:Scheduled Task/Job
Adversaries may abuse task scheduling functionality to facilitate initial or recurring execution of malicious code. Utilities exist within all major operating systems to schedule programs or scripts to be executed at a specified date and time. A task can also be ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI can gather the OS version, architecture information, connected drives, hostname, RAM size, and disk space information from the victim’s machine and has used cmd /c systeminfo command to get a snapshot of the current system state of the target machine.[197][198][199] | secon |
title:botconf2017 Hunting Down Gooligan
This talk provides a retrospective on how during 2017 Check Point and Google jointly hunted down Gooligan – one of the largest Android botnets at the time. Beside its scale what makes Gooligan a worthwhile case-study is its heavy reliance on stolen oauth tokens to attack Google P... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0337
ATT&CK Technique Name:BadPatch
BadPatch establishes a foothold by adding a link to the malware executable in the startup folder.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:Higaisa
Higaisa performed padding with null bytes before calculating its hash.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1023
ATT&CK Technique Name:CreepyDrive
CreepyDrive can use HTTPS for C2 using the Microsoft Graph API.[82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
Following data collection, FIN6 has compressed log files into a ZIP archive prior to staging and exfiltration.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has registered multiple domains to facilitate payload staging and C2.[28][29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0690
ATT&CK Technique Name:Green Lambert
Green Lambert can delete the original executable after initial installation in addition to unused functions.[89][90] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37 has used exploits for Flash Player (CVE-2016-4117, CVE-2018-4878), Word (CVE-2017-0199), Internet Explorer (CVE-2020-1380 and CVE-2020-26411), and Microsoft Edge (CVE-2021-26411) for execution.[18][19][20][21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon decrypts ciphertext using an XOR cipher and a base64-encoded string.[209] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp has used user mode rootkit techniques to remain hidden on the system.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Follow Office macro security best practices suitable for your environment. Disable Office VBA macros from executing.Disable Office add-ins. If they are required, follow best practices for securing them by requiring them to be signed and disablin... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used stolen credentials to access administrative accounts within the domain.[17][18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can use Winlogon Helper DLL to establish persistence.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has used valid accounts for initial access and privilege escalation.[10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors used company extranet servers as secondary C2 servers.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM has used tasklist to enumerate processes.[119] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 WebAuthn 101 - Demystifying WebAuthn
Five years later and we're finally at the finish line: Proposed recommendation for W3C WebAuthn. This talk will go into some detail on the use cases WebAuthn sets out solve, how we got here, what's ready for implementation today and what's coming. *Any* service ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0380
ATT&CK Technique Name:StoneDrill
StoneDrill has obfuscated its module with an alphabet-based table or XOR encryption.[311] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0487
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kessel
Kessel has exfiltrated information gathered from the infected system to the C2 server.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth uses ActiveX objects for file execution and manipulation. [8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0147
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pteranodon
Pteranodon can use a malicious VBS file for execution.[121] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1062
ATT&CK Technique Name:S.O.V.A.
S.O.V.A. can programmatically tap the screen or swipe.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0074
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sakula
Sakula encodes C2 traffic with single-byte XOR keys.[118] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Breaking the Isolation: Cross-Account AWS Vulnerabilities
Multiple AWS services were found to be vulnerable to a new cross-account vulnerability class. An attacker could manipulate various services in AWS and cause them to perform actions on other clients' resources due to unsafe identity policies u... | secon |
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