text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0678
ATT&CK Technique Name:Torisma
Torisma can use HTTP and HTTPS for C2 communications.[341] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon attempts to disable UAC remote restrictions by modifying the Registry.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Suckfly
Several tools used by Suckfly have been command-line driven.[319] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can detect VMWare via its I/O port and Virtual PC via the vpcext instruction.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang is known to use 7Zip and RAR with passwords to encrypt data prior to exfiltration.[38][39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Block .scr files from being executed from non-standard locations. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mimikatz
Mimikatz's CRYPTO::Extract module can extract keys by interacting with Windows cryptographic application programming interface (API) functions.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1052
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Control
Turn off UAC's privilege elevation for standard users [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System]to automatically deny elevation requests, add: "ConsentPromptBehaviorUser"=dword:00000000. Consider enabling installer detection ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0244
ATT&CK Technique Name:Comnie
Comnie uses ipconfig /all and route PRINT to identify network adapter and interface information.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0265
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kazuar
Kazuar stages command output and collected data in files before exfiltration.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1207
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rogue Domain Controller
Adversaries may register a rogue Domain Controller to enable manipulation of Active Directory data. DCShadow may be used to create a rogue Domain Controller (DC). DCShadow is a method of manipulating Active Directory (AD) data, including objects and schemas,... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can create a WMI Event to execute a payload for persistence.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0499
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hancitor
Hancitor has decoded Base64 encoded URLs to insert a recipient’s name into the filename of the Word document. Hancitor has also extracted executables from ZIP files.[105][106] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:GOLD SOUTHFIELD
GOLD SOUTHFIELD has conducted malicious spam (malspam) campaigns to gain access to victim's machines.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used different compromised credentials for remote access and to move laterally.[58][59][60] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 The Windows Notification Facility: Peeling the Onion of the Most Undocumented Kernel Attack Surface Yet
All Windows researchers know about RPC and ALPC, and the attack surface provided through the kernel's system call layer. As they know about shared memory, the object manager, the registry, and co... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group malware has collected Microsoft Office documents from mapped network drives.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher has used the KernelCallbackTable to hijack the execution flow of a process by replacing the __fnDWORD function with the address of a created Asynchronous Procedure Call stub routine.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0017
ATT&CK Technique Name:BISCUIT
BISCUIT has a command to periodically take screenshots of the system.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0587
ATT&CK Technique Name:Penquin
The Penquin C2 mechanism is based on TCP and UDP packets.[47][48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 compromised an online billing/payment service using VPN access between a third-party service provider and the targeted payment service.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hikit
Hikit uses certmgr.exe -add GlobalSign.cer -c -s -r localMachine Root and certmgr.exe -add GlobalSign.cer -c -s -r localMachineTrustedPublisher to install a self-generated certificate to the local trust store as a root CA and Trusted Publisher.[9] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 Lessons From 11 Billion Breached Records
Security flaws, hackers and data breaches are the new normal. It’s not just those of us in the industry facing these foes every single day, it’s everyone. Whether you’re online or offline, you simply cannot exist today without your personal information bei... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0651
ATT&CK Technique Name:BoxCaon
BoxCaon uploads files and data from a compromised host over the existing C2 channel.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0922
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Protect files stored locally with proper permissions to limit opportunities for adversaries to interact and collect information from databases. [8] [9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream can connect to HTTP proxies via TCP to create a tunnel to C2.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:SeaDuke
SeaDuke C2 traffic has been encrypted with RC4 and AES.[119][120] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0241
ATT&CK Technique Name:RATANKBA
RATANKBA uses the command reg query "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\InternetSettings".[75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0342
ATT&CK Technique Name:GreyEnergy
GreyEnergy uses HTTP and HTTPS for C2 communications.[123] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Configuration
Cloud service providers may allow customers to deactivate unused regions.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure that cloud accounts, particularly privileged accounts, have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Passwords and access keys should be rotated regularly. This limits the amount of time credentials can be used to access resources if a c... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1046
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowGoop
PowGoop has used a DLL named Goopdate.dll to impersonate a legitimate Google update file.[126] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed can take screenshots on a compromised host by calling a series of APIs.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0247
ATT&CK Technique Name:NavRAT
NavRAT uses tasklist /v to check running processes.[179] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0438
ATT&CK Technique Name:Attor
Attor's installer plugin can schedule a new task that loads the dispatcher on boot/logon.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0608
ATT&CK Technique Name:Conficker
Conficker variants used the Windows AUTORUN feature to spread through USB propagation.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0424
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triada
Triada injects code into the Zygote process to effectively include itself in all forked processes. Additionally, code is injected into the Android Play Store App, web browser applications, and the system UI application.[5][6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0430
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Linux
Winnti for Linux has used HTTP in outbound communications.[368] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0196
ATT&CK Technique Name:PUNCHBUGGY
PUNCHBUGGY has used PowerShell to decode base64-encoded assembly.[179] | secon |
title:botconf2018 WASM Security Analysis Reverse Engineering
WebAssembly(WASM) is a new technology designed for browers. It aims to define a portable, size- and load-time-efficient binary format to serve as a compilation target which can be compiled to execute at native speed by taking advantage of common hardware capa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1064
ATT&CK Technique Name:SVCReady
SVCReady can enter a sleep stage for 30 minutes to evade detection.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1485
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Destruction
Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwrit... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dust Storm
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors deployed a file called DeployJava.js to fingerprint installed software on a victim system prior to exploit delivery.[21] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Hacked on National Television
In 2021, Swedish national television (SVT) aired a six-part TV series called "Hacked" where 4 professional hackers set out to hack into the private assets of normal people, celebrities, and companies. They had all agreed to participate in a cyber security experiment ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors obtained the password for the victim's password manager via a custom keylogger.[132] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0473
ATT&CK Technique Name:Avenger
Avenger has the ability to XOR encrypt files to be sent to C2.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used a AMSI bypass, which patches the in-memory amsi.dll, in PowerShell scripts to bypass Windows antimalware products.[91] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 CANCELLED: Too Soft[ware Defined] Networks: SD-WAN VulnerabilityAssessment
The software defined wide-area network is technology based on SDN approach applied to branch office connections in Enterprises. According to Gartner's predictions, more than 50% of routers will be replaced with SD-WAN Solutio... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 used the command prompt to launch commands on the victim’s machine.[124][125] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 No More Secret Sauce!: How We Can Power Real Security Machine Learning Progress Through Open Algorithms and Benchmarks
While we've recently seen game-changing machine learning breakthroughs in the domains of language, vision, and robotics, it's no secret that security ML progress remains fettered by... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0378
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoshC2
PoshC2 contains a module for taking packet captures on compromised hosts.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot leverages a custom packer to obfuscate its functionality.[86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLACKCOFFEE
BLACKCOFFEE uses Microsoft’s TechNet Web portal to obtain a dead drop resolver containing an encoded tag with the IP address of a command and control server.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 downloads and executes PowerShell scripts and performs PowerShell commands.[10][11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0922
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Protect files stored locally with proper permissions to limit opportunities for adversaries to interact and collect information from the local system. [4] [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0295
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSAndroid
RCSAndroid can capture photos using the front and back cameras.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
In the Ukraine 2015 incident, Sandworm Team sent spearphishing attachments to three energy distribution companies containing malware to gain access to victim systems. [11] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Morning Beverage Break (Briefings)
Open to Briefings Passholders. Please wear your badge. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0362
ATT&CK Technique Name:Linux Rabbit
Linux Rabbit acquires valid SSH accounts through brute force. [43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0134
ATT&CK Technique Name:Transparent Tribe
Transparent Tribe has directed users to open URLs hosting malicious content.[66][67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Heyoka Backdoor
Heyoka Backdoor can inject a DLL into rundll32.exe for execution.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used their own web shells, as well as those previously placed on target systems by other threat actors, for reconnaissance and lateral movement.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0623
ATT&CK Technique Name:Siloscape
Siloscape checks for Kubernetes node permissions.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:Higaisa
Higaisa’s JavaScript file used a legitimate Microsoft Office 2007 package to side-load the OINFO12.OCX dynamic link library.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Microsoft released an optional patch update - KB3045645 - that will remove the "auto-elevate" flag within the sdbinst.exe. This will prevent use of application shimming to bypass UAC. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has incorporated code into several tools that attempts to terminate anti-virus processes.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT can detect Avast Software, Doctor Web, Kaspersky, AVG, ESET, and Sophos antivirus programs.[117] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group placed LNK files into the victims' startup folder for persistence.[187] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0396
ATT&CK Technique Name:EvilBunny
EvilBunny's dropper has checked the number of processes and the length and strings of its own file name to identify if the malware is in a sandbox environment.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:DnsSystem
DnsSystem can write itself to the Startup folder to gain persistence.[74] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
There are multiple methods of preventing a user's command history from being flushed to their .bash_history file, including use of the following commands:set +o history and set -o history to start logging again;unset HISTFILE being added to a user's .... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0341
ATT&CK Technique Name:Xbash
Xbash can perform port scanning of TCP and UDP ports.[67] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-23 From Dead Data to Digestion: Extracting Windows Fibers for Your Digital Forensics Diet
Windows Fibers are a lesser known optional component of Windows. They are being adopted by attackers as a non-traditional way to execute code and sidestep EDR telemetry sources. Not only this but Fibers are being... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has used cmd.exe /c to execute files.[217] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Consider encrypting important information to reduce an adversary’s ability to perform tailored data modifications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, the threat actors renamed some tools and executables to appear as legitimate programs.[115] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can track key presses with a keylogger module.[40][41][42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0329
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tangelo
Tangelo contains functionality to gather cellular IDs.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0270
ATT&CK Technique Name:RogueRobin
RogueRobin establishes persistence by creating a shortcut (.LNK file) in the Windows startup folder to run a script each time the user logs in.[29][30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0615
ATT&CK Technique Name:SombRAT
SombRAT can use a legitimate process name to hide itself.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors exfiltrated files and directories of interest from the targeted system.[131] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0342
ATT&CK Technique Name:GreyEnergy
GreyEnergy has a module to inject a PE binary into a remote process.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0505
ATT&CK Technique Name:Desert Scorpion
Desert Scorpion can list files stored on external storage.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0366
ATT&CK Technique Name:WannaCry
WannaCry scans its local network segment for remote systems to try to exploit and copy itself to.[90] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Decisions and Revisions - The Ever Evolving Face of the Black Hat NOC
This session is your chance to get up close and personal with the Black Hat NOC. We'll walk you through the process of deciding what equipment and services we deploy on the Black Hat network, and our reasoning around those decisi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has attempted to use WMI event subscriptions to establish persistence on compromised hosts.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0067
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT37
APT37's has added persistence via the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\CurrentVersion\Run\.[24][25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE can persist via startup options for Login items.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0074
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sakula
Sakula calls cmd.exe to run various DLL files via rundll32.[87] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1051
ATT&CK Technique Name:Update Software
Ensure operating systems and browsers are using the most current version. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Axiom
Axiom actors have been known to use the Sticky Keys replacement within RDP sessions to obtain persistence.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0657
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLUELIGHT
BLUELIGHT can use different cloud providers for its C2.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0538
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crutch
Crutch can automatically monitor removable drives in a loop and copy interesting files.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles targeted several ICS vendors and manufacturers. [4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:JHUHUGIT
A JHUHUGIT variant accesses a screenshot saved in the clipboard and converts it to a JPG image.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0265
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kazuar
Kazuar gathers information about local groups and members.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0512
ATT&CK Technique Name:FatDuke
FatDuke has been regularly repacked by its operators to create large binaries and evade detection.[40] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lock Bootloader
Users should ensure bootloaders are locked to prevent arbitrary operating system code from being flashed onto the device. | secon |
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