text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0425
ATT&CK Technique Name:Corona Updates
Corona Updates can collect voice notes, device accounts, and gallery images.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has obtained information on security software, including security logging information that may indicate whether their malware has been detected.[109] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has used a customized PlugX variant which could exfiltrate documents from air-gapped networks.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Enforce the principle of least privilege by limiting container dashboard access to only the necessary users. When using Kubernetes, avoid giving users wildcard permissions or adding users to the system:masters group, and use RoleBindings rather than ClusterR... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-23 Jailbreaking an Electric Vehicle in 2023 or What It Means to Hotwire Tesla's x86-Based Seat Heater
Tesla has been known for their advanced and well-integrated car computers, from serving mundane entertainment purposes to fully autonomous driving capabilities. More recently, Tesla has started usi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
For Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used a Visual Basic script embedded within a Word document to download an implant.[112] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot establishes persistence by creating an autostart service that allows it to run whenever the machine boots.[126] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0324
ATT&CK Technique Name:SpyDealer
SpyDealer can record video and take photos via front and rear cameras.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0142
ATT&CK Technique Name:Confucius
Confucius has used a file stealer that checks the Document, Downloads, Desktop, and Picture folders for documents and images with specific extensions.[81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0088
ATT&CK Technique Name:TEMP.Veles
TEMP.Veles used valid credentials when laterally moving through RDP jump boxes into the ICS environment. [7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1025
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Process Integrity
Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 R2, and later versions may make LSA run as a Protected Process Light (PPL) by setting the Registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\RunAsPPL, which requires all SSP DLLs to be signed by Microsoft. [1] [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY's amsiPatch.py module can disable Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) functions.[80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0134
ATT&CK Technique Name:Downdelph
Downdelph inserts pseudo-random characters between each original character during encoding of C2 network requests, making it difficult to write signatures on them.[3] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 DBREACH: Database Reconnaissance and Exfiltration via Adaptive Compression Heuristics
Databases often store sensitive data such as personally identifiable information. For this reason, databases often provide a data-at-rest encryption feature. Large databases may also attempt to compress data to sav... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has established persistence by being copied to the Startup directory or through the \Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run registry key.[232][233] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used attempted to lure victims into opening malicious e-mail attachments.[120][121][122][63][8][123] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0674
ATT&CK Technique Name:CharmPower
CharmPower can retrieve C2 domain information from actor-controlled S3 buckets.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remsec
Remsec schedules the execution one of its modules by creating a new scheduler task.[6] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 Pre-built JOP Chains with the JOP ROCKET: Bypassing DEP without ROP
ROP has become virtually synonymous with code-reuse attacks in exploit development, but the reality is there is another way: Jump-oriented Programming (JOP). Until recently, there were no dedicated tools to do JOP, unlike with RO... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emissary
Variants of Emissary have added Run Registry keys to establish persistence.[80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0254
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLAINTEE
PLAINTEE performs the tasklist command to list running processes.[196] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 modified Windows Services to ensure PowerShell scripts were loaded on the system. APT32 also creates a Windows service to establish persistence.[11][12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has made use of legitimate tools ConnectWise and Remote Utilities to gain access to target environment.[76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0801
ATT&CK Technique Name:Access Management
All devices or systems changes, including all administrative functions, should require authentication. Consider using access management technologies to enforce authorization on all management interface access attempts, especially when the device does not inherentl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN5
FIN5 scans processes on all victim systems in the environment and uses automated scripts to pull back the results.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST used the WMI query Select * From Win32_SystemDriver to retrieve a driver listing.[123] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire includes keylogging capabilities for Windows, Linux, and macOS systems.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has compromised social media accounts to conduct social engineering attacks.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0668
ATT&CK Technique Name:TinyTurla
TinyTurla has been installed using a .bat file.[332] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson contains a command to collect information about anti-virus software on the victim.[25][26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
On Windows 10, enable Attack Surface Reduction (ASR) rules to secure LSASS and prevent credential stealing. [88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0394
ATT&CK Technique Name:HiddenWasp
HiddenWasp downloads a tar compressed archive from a download server to the system.[213] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0385
ATT&CK Technique Name:njRAT
njRAT can be configured to spread via removable drives.[20][21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors uploaded stolen files to their C2 servers.[95] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0263
ATT&CK Technique Name:TYPEFRAME
TYPEFRAME can uninstall malware components using a batch script.[342] TYPEFRAME can execute commands using a shell.[342] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0153
ATT&CK Technique Name:RedLeaves
RedLeaves is capable of downloading a file from a specified URL.[376] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used exploit payloads that initiate download via ftp.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has harvested data from victim's e-mail including through execution of wmic /node: process call create "cmd /c copy c:\Users\\\backup.pst c:\windows\temp\backup.pst" copy "i:\\\My Documents\.pst"copy.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound enabled and used the default system managed account, DefaultAccount, via "powershell.exe" /c net user DefaultAccount /active:yes to connect to a targeted Exchange server over RDP.[6] | secon |
title:botconf2018 Everything Panda Banker
The Panda Banker malware was first spotted in the wild in early 2016. It has since seen consistent development, gained a significant threat actor user base, and has become one of the most advanced and persistent banking malwares in the current threat landscape. This presentatio... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0187
ATT&CK Technique Name:Daserf
Daserf can use steganography to hide malicious code downloaded to the victim.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0098
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackTech
BlackTech has used valid, stolen digital certificates for some of their malware and tools.[3] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Demigod: The Art of Emulating Kernel Rootkits
Kernel rootkit is considered the most dangerous malware that may infect computers. Operating at ring 0, the highest privilege level in the system, this super malware has unrestricted power to control the whole machine, thus can defeat all the defensive a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0486
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bonadan
Bonadan has maliciously altered the OpenSSH binary on targeted systems to create a backdoor.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1611
ATT&CK Technique Name:Escape to Host
Adversaries may break out of a container to gain access to the underlying host. This can allow an adversary access to other containerized resources from the host level or to the host itself. In principle, containerized resources should provide a clear separation of a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1505.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Terminal Services DLL
Adversaries may abuse components of Terminal Services to enable persistent access to systems. Microsoft Terminal Services, renamed to Remote Desktop Services in some Windows Server OSs as of 2022, enable remote terminal connections to hosts. Terminal Servi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0080
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Group
Cobalt Group obfuscated several scriptlets and code used on the victim’s machine, including through use of XOR and RC4.[23][24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0577
ATT&CK Technique Name:FrozenCell
FrozenCell has searched for pdf, doc, docx, ppt, pptx, xls, and xlsx file types for exfiltration.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0512
ATT&CK Technique Name:FatDuke
FatDuke can list running processes on the localhost.[99] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire has the ability to collect emails on a target system.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT can use a variety of API calls to execute shellcode.[147] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Word documents that prompted the victim to enable macros and run a Visual Basic script.[54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0607
ATT&CK Technique Name:KillDisk
KillDisk has called the Windows API to retrieve the hard disk handle and shut down the machine.[103] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used compromised service principals to make changes to the Office 365 environment.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has sent malicious URL links through email to victims. In some cases the URLs were shortened or linked to Word documents with malicious macros that executed PowerShells scripts to download Pupy.[69][70][71][72] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT can inject code into a targeted process by writing to the remote memory of an infected system and then create a remote thread.[70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0273
ATT&CK Technique Name:Socksbot
Socksbot creates a suspended svchost process and injects its DLL into it.[64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used file deletion to remove some modules and configurations from an infected host after use.[255] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0403
ATT&CK Technique Name:Riltok
Riltok communicates with the command and control server using HTTP requests.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0100
ATT&CK Technique Name:Inception
Inception has used a reconnaissance module to gather information about the operating system and hardware on the infected host.[171] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1027.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indicator Removal from Tools
Adversaries may remove indicators from tools if they believe their malicious tool was detected, quarantined, or otherwise curtailed. They can modify the tool by removing the indicator and using the updated version that is no longer detected by the t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0314
ATT&CK Technique Name:X-Agent for Android
X-Agent for Android was believed to have been used to obtain locational data of Ukrainian artillery forces.[39] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 Shield with Hole: New Security Mitigation Helps Us Escape Chrome Sandbox to Exfiltrate User Privacy
More security mitigations always mean securer software and more exploit cost. Chrome browser keeps introducing all kinds of security mitigation measures such as multi-process architecture[1], sandbox... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Operation Chimera - APT Operation Targets Semiconductor Vendors
This presentation provides an analysis of the advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks that have occurred during the past two years on the semiconductor industry. Our research shows that the majority of these attacks were concentrated o... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can spread itself by infecting other portable executable files on networks shared drives.[10] | secon |
title:botconf2022 ProxyChaos: a year-in-review of Microsoft Exchange exploitation
Hundreds of thousands of Microsoft Exchange servers are exposed to the internet, making this Microsoft’s on-premises email server solution the target of choice for attackers. Since the beginning of 2021, Exchange has been subject to sever... | secon |
title:botconf2022 Evolution of the Sysrv mining botnet
Sysrv-hello, or shortly Sysrv, is a botnet, which was first discovered in late December of 2020. The malware is written in Golang and targets both Linux and Windows endpoints. Based on its propagation style, it is a malicious worm, with one end-goal in mind: to spr... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0056
ATT&CK Technique Name:PROMETHIUM
PROMETHIUM has used a script that configures the knockd service and firewall to only accept C2 connections from systems that use a specified sequence of knock ports.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used scheduled tasks to invoke Cobalt Strike including through batch script schtasks /create /ru "SYSTEM" /tn "update" /tr "cmd /c c:\windows\temp\update.bat" /sc once /f /st and to maintain persistence.[38][39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0480
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cerberus
Cerberus can collect device information, such as the default SMS app and device locale.[9][10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0162
ATT&CK Technique Name:Komplex
The Komplex trojan creates a persistent launch agent called with $HOME/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.updates.plist with launchctl load -w ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.updates.plist.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0328
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Mango
Stealth Mango can record and take pictures using the front and back cameras.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0604
ATT&CK Technique Name:Industroyer
Industroyer's data wiper component removes the registry image path throughout the system and overwrites all files, rendering the system unusable. [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0623
ATT&CK Technique Name:Siloscape
Siloscape maps the host’s C drive to the container by creating a global symbolic link to the host through the calling of NtSetInformationSymbolicLink.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0513
ATT&CK Technique Name:LiteDuke
LiteDuke can wait 30 seconds before executing additional code if security software is detected.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN7
FIN7 has used mshta.exe to execute VBScript to execute malicious code on victim systems.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0396
ATT&CK Technique Name:EvilBunny
EvilBunny's dropper has checked the number of processes and the length and strings of its own file name to identify if the malware is in a sandbox environment.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling can store a file named mpsvc.dll, which opens a malicious mpsvc.mui file, in the same folder as the legitimate Microsoft executable MsMpEng.exe to gain execution.[17][18] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Repurposing Neural Networks to Generate Synthetic Media for Information Operations
Deep neural networks routinely achieve near human-level performances on a variety of tasks, but each new breakthrough demands massive volumes of quality data, access to expensive GPU clusters, and weeks or even month... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0511
ATT&CK Technique Name:RegDuke
RegDuke can hide data in images, including use of the Least Significant Bit (LSB).[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0652
ATT&CK Technique Name:MarkiRAT
MarkiRAT can capture all keystrokes on a compromised host.[109] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0149
ATT&CK Technique Name:MoonWind
MoonWind has a command to return a directory listing for a specified directory.[201] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hijack Execution Flow
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking the way operating systems run programs. Hijacking execution flow can be for the purposes of persistence, since this hijacked execution may reoccur over time. Adversaries may also use these mecha... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:Code Signing
Ensure all application component binaries are signed by the correct application developers. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has collected compromised credentials to use for targeting efforts.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0465
ATT&CK Technique Name:CARROTBALL
CARROTBALL has the ability to download and install a remote payload.[96] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Restrict write access to the /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins directory. | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Bring Your Own Token (BYOT) to Replace the Traditional Smartcards for Strong Authentication and Signing
Smartcards are a good way to enable strong authentication to enterprise network and applications as they provide identification, authentication, and ability to store cryptographic key information ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0343
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exaramel for Windows
The Exaramel for Windows dropper creates and starts a Windows service named wsmprovav with the description "Windows Check AV."[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0694
ATT&CK Technique Name:DRATzarus
DRATzarus can use IsDebuggerPresent to detect whether a debugger is present on a victim.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet calls LoadLibrary then executes exports from a DLL.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0449
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maze
Maze has used the "Wow64RevertWow64FsRedirection" function following attempts to delete the shadow volumes, in order to leave the system in the same state as it was prior to redirection.[12] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Everybody be Cool, This is a Robbery!
HSMs (Hardware Security Modules) bring cryptographic mechanisms to environments where the highest level of security is required. As an example, HSMs are widely used by cryptocurrency exchanges to secure crypto assets, by banks to protect cryptographic keys and ... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Forward Focus – The Impact of Artificial Intelligence
Artificial Intelligence (AI) has the potential to revolutionize cybersecurity by enhancing detection and response capabilities, automating routine tasks, and identifying threats that are invisible to humans. However, AI also poses significant ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hi-Zor
Hi-Zor creates a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[116] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETEAGLE
Adversaries can also use NETEAGLE to establish an RDP connection with a controller over TCP/7519. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Integrating multi-factor authentication (MFA) as part of organizational policy can greatly reduce the risk of an adversary gaining control of valid credentials that may be used for additional tactics such as initial access, lateral movement, and collecti... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0565
ATT&CK Technique Name:Raindrop
Raindrop was built to include a modified version of 7-Zip source code (including associated export names) and Far Manager source code.[29][30] | secon |
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