text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used a tool to query Active Directory using LDAP, discovering information about usernames listed in AD.[41] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group malware SierraCharlie uses RDP for propagation.[33][34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0488
ATT&CK Technique Name:CrackMapExec
CrackMapExec can gather the user accounts within domain groups.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0086
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZLib
The ZLib backdoor compresses communications using the standard Zlib compression library.[18] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 Video Killed the Text Star: OSINT Approach
In 1979 The Buggles launched the hit song "Video Killed the Radio Star." Nowadays The Buggles could write a new song titled "Video Killed the Text Star." Social networks are growing around video content. This means that if OSINT (Open Source INTelligence) w... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Ensure strong password length (ideally 25+ characters) and complexity for service accounts and that these passwords periodically expire.[7] Also consider using Group Managed Service Accounts or another third party product such as password vaulting.[7] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Command Injection in F5 iRules
BigIP F5 products are used by large corporations and governments all around the world. Its performance and load sharing capabilities has made it a preferred choice as reverse proxy to route web traffic in complex high performance projects. The F5 product contains a su... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0856
ATT&CK Technique Name:Spoof Reporting Message
Adversaries may spoof reporting messages in control system environments for evasion and to impair process control. In control systems, reporting messages contain telemetry data (e.g., I/O values) pertaining to the current state of equipment and the industria... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0682
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrailBlazer
TrailBlazer has used random identifier strings to obscure its C2 operations and result codes.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0554
ATT&CK Technique Name:Egregor
Egregor can collect any files found in the enumerated drivers before sending it to its C2 channel.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can create hidden system directories.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 obtained information about the configured Exchange virtual directory using Get-WebServicesVirtualDirectory.[281] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1471
ATT&CK Technique Name:Data Encrypted for Impact
An adversary may encrypt files stored on a mobile device to prevent the user from accessing them. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permane... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:Backdoor.Oldrea
Backdoor.Oldrea can use rundll32 for execution on compromised hosts.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0118
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nidiran
Nidiran can create a new service named msamger (Microsoft Security Accounts Manager).[82] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet executes malicious SQL commands in the WinCC database server to propagate to remote systems. The malicious SQL commands include xp_cmdshell, sp_dumpdbilog, and sp_addextendedproc. [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has used brute force attacks to compromise valid credentials.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can use spoof arguments in spawned processes that execute beacon commands.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0504
ATT&CK Technique Name:Anchor
Anchor has used cmd.exe to run its self deletion routine.[10] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Attacking iPhone XS Max
With the release of iPhone XS and XS Max, Apple's implementation of Pointer Authentication Code (PAC) on the A12 SoC comes more into play for exploit mitigations. While PAC effectively makes many of our own kernel vulnerabilities unexploitable on iPhone XS/XS Max, we were ab... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
Duqu is capable of loading executable code via process hollowing.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke installed a cron job that downloaded and executed files from the C2.[11][12][13] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 He Said, She Said – Poisoned RDP Offense and Defense
It's safe to assume that many people reading this text have heard of using the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) to connect to other machines. But has anyone ever considered that merely using RDP can compromise their own computer?
In this talk, we wil... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0360
ATT&CK Technique Name:BONDUPDATER
BONDUPDATER can use DNS and TXT records within its DNS tunneling protocol for command and control.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0462
ATT&CK Technique Name:CARROTBAT
CARROTBAT has the ability to execute command line arguments on a compromised host.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0095
ATT&CK Technique Name:ftp
ftp may be used to exfiltrate data separate from the main command and control protocol.[20][21] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 We Went to Iowa and All We Got were These Felony Arrest Records
In-depth discussion and review of the red team engagement of Iowa courthouses which resulted in an unprecedented outcome. Gary and Justin will take you through the engagement, arrest, and ensuing legal battle, and wrap up with lessons l... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0284
ATT&CK Technique Name:More_eggs
More_eggs has used basE91 encoding, along with encryption, for C2 communication.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0229
ATT&CK Technique Name:Orz
Some Orz versions have an embedded DLL known as MockDll that uses process hollowing and Regsvr32 to execute another payload.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0801
ATT&CK Technique Name:Access Management
All devices or systems changes, including all administrative functions, should require authentication. Consider using access management technologies to enforce authorization on all management interface access attempts, especially when the device does not inherentl... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1037.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Login Hook
Adversaries may use a Login Hook to establish persistence executed upon user logon. A login hook is a plist file that points to a specific script to execute with root privileges upon user logon. The plist file is located in the /Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwin... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0186
ATT&CK Technique Name:DownPaper
DownPaper uses PowerShell to add a Registry Run key in order to establish persistence.[75] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Active Directory Configuration
Disable legacy authentication, which does not support MFA, and require the use of modern authentication protocols instead. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can inject shellcode directly into Excel.exe or a specific process.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
A Patchwork payload has searched all fixed drives on the victim for files matching a specified list of extensions.[225][36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0697
ATT&CK Technique Name:HermeticWiper
HermeticWiper can determine the OS version, bitness, and enumerate physical drives on a targeted host.[157][158][159][160] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Duqu
Duqu examines running system processes for tokens that have specific system privileges. If it finds one, it will copy the token and store it for later use. Eventually it will start new processes with the stored token attached. It can also steal tokens to acquire administrative... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts. Most embedded network devices support TACACS+ and/or RADIUS. Follow vendor prescribed best practices for hardening access control. [2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0398
ATT&CK Technique Name:HyperBro
HyperBro can unpack and decrypt its payload prior to execution.[53][113] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium can set persistence with a Registry run key.[103] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0170
ATT&CK Technique Name:Helminth
Helminth establishes persistence by creating a shortcut.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0512
ATT&CK Technique Name:FatDuke
FatDuke can copy files and directories from a compromised host.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0387
ATT&CK Technique Name:KeyBoy
KeyBoy uses custom SSL libraries to impersonate SSL in C2 traffic.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0428
ATT&CK Technique Name:PoetRAT
PoetRAT has used a Python tool named klog.exe for keylogging.[134] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0365
ATT&CK Technique Name:Olympic Destroyer
Olympic Destroyer uses Windows Management Instrumentation to enumerate all systems in the network.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium can collect data from a compromised host.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0281
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dok
Dok installs a root certificate to aid in Adversary-in-the-Middle actions using the command add-trusted-cert -d -r trustRoot -k /Library/Keychains/System.keychain /tmp/filename.[7][8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1561
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disk Wipe
Adversaries may wipe or corrupt raw disk data on specific systems or in large numbers in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. With direct write access to a disk, adversaries may attempt to overwrite portions of disk data. Adversaries may op... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
If it is necessary that software must store credentials in the Registry, then ensure the associated accounts have limited permissions so they cannot be abused if obtained by an adversary. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Limit access to the Instance Metadata API. A properly configured Web Application Firewall (WAF) may help prevent external adversaries from exploiting Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks that allow access to the Cloud Instance Metadata API.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0394
ATT&CK Technique Name:HiddenWasp
HiddenWasp uses a cipher to implement a decoding function.[109] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0184
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWRUNER
POWRUNER can download or upload files from its C2 server.[324] | secon |
title:botconf2019 The Cereals Botnet
A new under-the-radar botnet targeting Network Access Storage (NAS) and Network Video Recorder (NVR) devices, has been discovered. The botnet originates back to 2013, uses a known vulnerability for infection, and is still active as of today. Our research shows that it is infecting a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 used GetPassword_x64 to harvest credentials.[4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1609
ATT&CK Technique Name:Container Administration Command
Adversaries may abuse a container administration service to execute commands within a container. A container administration service such as the Docker daemon, the Kubernetes API server, or the kubelet may allow remote management of containers within... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Axiom
Axiom has collected data from a compromised network.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dust Storm
For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors established domains as part of their operational infrastructure.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0539
ATT&CK Technique Name:Red Alert 2.0
Red Alert 2.0 can fetch a backup C2 domain from Twitter if the primary C2 is unresponsive.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS has deployed a modified version of Invoke-Ngrok to expose open local ports to the Internet.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0412
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxShell
ZxShell has a command called RunAs, which creates a new process as another user or process context.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has used SDelete to remove artifacts from victim networks.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0275
ATT&CK Technique Name:UPPERCUT
UPPERCUT has used HTTP for C2, including sending error codes in Cookie headers.[353] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0688
ATT&CK Technique Name:Meteor
Meteor can use bcdedit to delete different boot identifiers on a compromised host; it can also use vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet and C:\\Windows\\system32\\wbem\\wmic.exe shadowcopy delete.[40] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Grand Theft House: RF Lock Pick Tool to Unlock Smart Door Lock
Recently, many people have installed smart door locks in their homes and offices, as a way to maximize convenience and security. The wireless link provides a simple and convenient connection to the doorlock from anywhere in the IoT-co... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0117
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten has accessed Registry hives ntuser.dat and UserClass.dat.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement. They manipulated scheduled tasks by updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the sche... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has used multiple software exploits for common client software, like Microsoft Word, Exchange, and Adobe Reader, to gain code execution.[10][11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
Determine if certain social media sites, personal webmail services, or other service that can be used for spearphishing is necessary for business operations and consider blocking access if activity cannot be monitored well or if it poses a significant ris... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:Blue Mockingbird
Blue Mockingbird has used JuicyPotato to abuse the SeImpersonate token privilege to escalate from web application pool accounts to NT Authority\SYSTEM.[5] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 First Contact - Vulnerabilities in Contactless Payments
Introduced in 2007, contactless (NFC) payments have been used widely for a decade. Accounting for more than 40% of transactions globally, contactless payments are fast replacing cash and CHIP. Yet, contactless makes use of protocols much older ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0256
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mosquito
Mosquito stores configuration values under the Registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft[dllname].[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:Blue Mockingbird
Blue Mockingbird has used wmic.exe and Windows Registry modifications to set the COR_PROFILER environment variable to execute a malicious DLL whenever a process loads the .NET CLR.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet attempts to impersonate an anonymous token to enumerate bindings in the service control manager.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has used malware to collect information on network interfaces, including the MAC address.[211] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:TA505
TA505 has registered domains to impersonate services such as Dropbox to distribute malware.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metador
Metador has used the Windows command line to execute commands.[216] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0223
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS can disable Microsoft Office Protected View by changing Registry keys.[69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0699
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mythic
Mythic supports custom chunk sizes used to upload/download files.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that can identify traffic patterns indicative of AiTM activity can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
The NETWIRE payload has been injected into benign Microsoft executables via process hollowing.[27][28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling can establish persistence by adding a Registry run key.[58][59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0589
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sibot
Sibot has downloaded a DLL to the C:\windows\system32\drivers\ folder and renamed it with a .sys extension.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0444
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRat
ShimRat has installed a registry based start-up key HKCU\Software\microsoft\windows\CurrentVersion\Run to maintain persistence should other methods fail.[240] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Configuration
Consider disabling embedded files in Office programs, such as OneNote, that do not work with Protected View.[6][36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0349
ATT&CK Technique Name:LaZagne
LaZagne can obtain credentials from databases, mail, and WiFi across multiple platforms.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Window Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of open application windows. Window listings could convey information about how the system is used. For example, information about application windows could be used identify potential data to collect as well as i... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used custom DLLs for continuous retrieval of data from memory.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0457
ATT&CK Technique Name:Netwalker
Netwalker can add the following registry entry: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE{8 random characters}.[103] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound has used the command-line interface for code execution.[202][203][204] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0031
ATT&CK Technique Name:BACKSPACE
BACKSPACE may collect information about running processes.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used DLL side-loading to covertly load PoisonIvy into memory on the victim machine.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0623
ATT&CK Technique Name:Siloscape
Siloscape itself is obfuscated and uses obfuscated API calls.[299] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-23 The Most Dangerous Codec in the World: Finding and Exploiting Vulnerabilities in H.264 Decoders
Modern video encoding standards such as H.264 are a marvel of hidden complexity. But with hidden complexity comes hidden security risk. Decoding video today involves interacting with dedicated hardware ac... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Do not allow administrator accounts that have permissions to modify the Web content of organization login portals to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM used ipconfig /all to obtain information about the victim network configuration. The group also ran a modified version of NBTscan to identify available NetBIOS name servers.[91] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0802
ATT&CK Technique Name:Communication Authenticity
Protocols used for control functions should provide authenticity through MAC functions or digital signatures. If not, utilize bump-in-the-wire devices or VPNs to enforce communication authenticity between devices that are not capable of supporting this (e... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0394
ATT&CK Technique Name:HiddenWasp
HiddenWasp encrypts its configuration and payload.[157] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:GeminiDuke
GeminiDuke collects information on local user accounts from the victim.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0180
ATT&CK Technique Name:Volgmer
Volgmer can execute commands on the victim's machine.[345][346] | secon |
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