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ATT&CK ID:T1422
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Network Configuration Discovery
Adversaries may look for details about the network configuration and settings, such as IP and/or MAC addresses, of operating systems they access or through information discovery of remote systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has the ability to discover the computer name and Windows product name/version.[210] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0931
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0470
ATT&CK Technique Name:BBK
BBK has the ability to inject shellcode into svchost.exe.[1] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 Office in Wonderland
In this talk we will explore a wide range of novel techniques that abuse Microsoft Office features for offensive purposes. We will disclose details on new Word and Excel vulnerabilities, release attack vectors that Microsoft deemed features and demonstrate the security impact ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1055
ATT&CK Technique Name:SharkBot
SharkBot can intercept notifications to send to the C2 server and take advantage of the Direct Reply feature.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
APT19 used an HTTP malware variant and a Port 22 malware variant to collect the MAC address and IP address from the victim’s machine.[15] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 The Ripple Effect: Building a Diverse Security Research Team
Achieving a diverse, inclusive team which is a dream to work in was not a short journey. It took time and was well worth the effort. While the industry numbers paint a gloomy picture for gender equality and representation, we successfully ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 actors use at to schedule tasks to run self-extracting RAR archives, which install HTTPBrowser or PlugX on other victims on a network.[8] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Perception Deception: Physical Adversarial Attack Challenges and Tactics for DNN-Based Object Detection
DNN has been successful for Object Detection, which is critical to the perceptions of Autonomous Driving, and it also has been found vulnerable to adversarial examples. There has been an ongoing ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0607
ATT&CK Technique Name:KillDisk
KillDisk terminates various processes to get the user to reboot the victim machine.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1002
ATT&CK Technique Name:BITTER
BITTER has used scheduled tasks for persistence and execution.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group obtained tools such as Wake-On-Lan, Responder, ChromePass, and dbxcli.[79][80] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0072
ATT&CK Technique Name:OwaAuth
OwaAuth has a command to timestop a file or directory.[41] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 The Mummy 2018 – Microsoft Accidentally Summons Back Ugly Attacks from the Past
In the early 2000s attackers could very easily leverage naïve mechanisms of IP fragmentation and reassembly to intercept packets, modify them, or cause denial of service. The same fundamental flaw brought up other techn... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors stroed payloads in Windows CLFS (Common Log File System) transactional logs.[14] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Alice in Kernel Land: Lessons Learned From the eBPF Rabbit Hole
Extended Berkeley Packet Filter (eBPF) is a technology that provides capabilities to programmers seeking to make use of kernel layer performance and functionality. Fundamentally, eBPF allows users to load programs into kernel space an... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0526
ATT&CK Technique Name:KGH_SPY
KGH_SPY can send a file containing victim system information to C2.[95] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has named malicious files rekeywiz.exe to match the name of a legitimate Windows executable.[149] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0401
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exaramel for Linux
Exaramel for Linux has a hardcoded location that it uses to achieve persistence if the startup system is Upstart or System V and it is running as root.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:PlugX
PlugX has a module to download and execute files on the compromised machine.[347][348] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has used the megacmd tool to upload stolen files from a victim network to MEGA.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Moses Staff
Moses Staff has used batch scripts that can disable the Windows firewall on specific remote machines.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has created self-signed digital certificates to enable mutual TLS authentication for malware.[1][2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used net group /domain, net group "domain admins" /domain, and net group "Exchange Trusted Subsystem" /domain to find domain group permission settings.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0499
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hancitor
Hancitor has deleted files using the VBA kill function.[96] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
Android 10 introduced changes that prevent normal applications from accessing sensitive device identifiers.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0556
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pay2Key
Pay2Key can stop the MS SQL service at the end of the encryption process to release files locked by the service.[30] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-20 Identifying Multi-Binary Vulnerabilities in Embedded Firmware at Scale
Low-power, single-purpose embedded devices (e.g., routers and IoT devices) have become ubiquitous. While they automate and simplify many aspects of our lives, recent large-scale attacks have shown that their sheer number poses ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:WinMM
WinMM uses NetUser-GetInfo to identify that it is running under an "Admin" account on the local system.[178] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
APT19 launched an HTTP malware variant and a Port 22 malware variant using a legitimate executable that loaded the malicious DLL.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Review changes to the cron schedule. cron execution can be reviewed within the /var/log directory. To validate the location of the cron log file, check the syslog config at /etc/rsyslog.conf or /etc/syslog.conf | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Configure the Increase Scheduling Priority option to only allow the Administrators group the rights to schedule a priority process. This can be can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0311
ATT&CK Technique Name:YiSpecter
YiSpecter has collected information about running processes.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can use WMI for execution on a compromised host.[125] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:ComRAT
ComRAT can use SSL/TLS encryption for its HTTP-based C2 channel. ComRAT has used public key cryptography with RSA and AES encrypted email attachments for its Gmail C2 channel.[11][12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Regularly check component software on critical services that adversaries may target for persistence to verify the integrity of the systems and identify if unexpected changes have been made. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has used icons mimicking MS Office files to mask malicious executables.[45] Windshift has also attempted to hide executables by changing the file extension to ".scr" to mimic Windows screensavers.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke's miner has created UPX-packed files in the Windows Start Menu Folder.[71][72][73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink has the ability to execute on device startup, using a modified RC script named S51armled.[8] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 100 Seconds of Solitude: Defeating Cisco Trust Anchor With FPGA Bitstream Shenanigans
First commercially introduced in 2013, Cisco Trust Anchor module(TAm) is a proprietary hardware security module that is used in a wide range of Cisco products, including enterprise routers, switches and firewalls.... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0161
ATT&CK Technique Name:XAgentOSX
XAgentOSX contains the getFirefoxPassword function to attempt to locate Firefox passwords.[95] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1045
ATT&CK Technique Name:INCONTROLLER
INCONTROLLER can brute force password-based authentication to Schneider PLCs over the CODESYS protocol (UDP port 1740).[4]INCONTROLLER can perform brute force guessing of passwords to OPC UA servers using a predefined list of passwords.[4][5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Configuration
Configure browsers or tasks to regularly delete persistent cookies. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Periodically check the integrity of the running configuration and system image to ensure they have not been modified. [2] [3] [4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0813
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Process and Device Authentication
Devices should authenticate all messages between master and outstation assets. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32's backdoor has used LZMA compression and RC4 encryption before exfiltration.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can check for artifacts of VirtualBox, Virtual PC and VMware environment, and terminate itself if they are detected.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0337
ATT&CK Technique Name:BadPatch
BadPatch captures screenshots in .jpg format and then exfiltrates them.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Woody RAT
Woody RAT can create a suspended notepad process and write shellcode to delete a file into the suspended process using NtWriteVirtualMemory.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can discover and exploit path interception opportunities in the PATH environment variable.[2][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0109
ATT&CK Technique Name:WEBC2
Variants of WEBC2 achieve persistence by using DLL search order hijacking, usually by copying the DLL file to %SYSTEMROOT% (C:\WINDOWS\ntshrui.dll).[38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Enforce the principle of least-privilege. Consider implementing access control mechanisms that include both authentication and authorization for code repositories. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Proactively reset accounts that are known to be part of breached credentials either immediately, or after detecting bruteforce attempts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0130
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ajax Security Team
Ajax Security Team has used CWoolger and MPK, custom-developed malware, which recorded all keystrokes on an infected system.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0239
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bankshot
Bankshot marks files to be deleted upon the next system reboot and uninstalls and removes itself from the system.[24] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-19 Mobile Network Hacking, IP Edition
Mobile networks have gone through a decade of security improvements ranging from better GSM encryption to stronger SIM card and SS7 configurations. These improvements were driven by research at this and other hacking conferences.
Meanwhile, the networks have also... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Can You Roll Your Own SIEM?
At Two Sigma, we had sunk over $1 million in licensing for a popular third-party SIEM product and were paying an additional $200,000 in annual maintenance. We were limited on what data sources we could leverage as our license was restricted to a low daily ingestion rate.... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0680
ATT&CK Technique Name:LitePower
LitePower can query the Registry for keys added to execute COM hijacking.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 used Kerberos ticket attacks for lateral movement.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Oldsmar Treatment Plant Intrusion
During the Oldsmar Treatment Plant Intrusion, the threat actors utilized an operator HMI to manipulate process control setpoint values far beyond normal operating levels.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1037.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Startup Items
Adversaries may use startup items automatically executed at boot initialization to establish persistence. Startup items execute during the final phase of the boot process and contain shell scripts or other executable files along with configuration information used... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has used PowerShell commands embedded inside batch scripts.[139] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has used valid accounts for initial access and privilege escalation.[10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0402
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX/Shlayer
OSX/Shlayer can masquerade as a Flash Player update.[116][117] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used scheduled tasks to execute malicious PowerShell code on remote systems.[127] | secon |
title:botconf2014 Semantic Exploration of Binaries
Attacks with malicious software are an imminent risk. Malware developers not only unveil constantly new artistries in response to current detection schemes but also manifest a tendency to re-code and modify existing malware versions with regard to their behaviour and f... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-23 Unsafe At Any Speed: CISA's Plan to Foster Tech Ecosystem Security
In 1965, Ralph Nader published "Unsafe at Any Speed", a survey of automobile safety from design, to delivery, to maintenance. The parallels to the safety of modern technology are startling. In this talk, we'll explore how products c... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Black Hat USA 2022
To close out Black Hat USA 2022, join Black Hat Founder Jeff Moss and Review Board members Sheila A. Berta, Chris Eng, Natalie Silvanovich and Matt Suiche for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec com... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0817
ATT&CK Technique Name:Supply Chain Management
A supply chain management program should include methods the assess the trustworthiness and technical maturity of a supplier, along with technical methods (e.g., code-signing, bill of materials) needed to validate the integrity of newly obtained devices and ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed has compressed collected data before exfiltration.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0044
ATT&CK Technique Name:JHUHUGIT
JHUHUGIT has used a Registry Run key to establish persistence by executing JavaScript code within the rundll32.exe process.[127] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 With Friends Like eBPF, Who Needs Enemies?
Since its first appearance in Kernel 3.18, eBPF (Extended Berkeley Packet Filter) has progressively become a key technology for observability in the Linux kernel. Initially dedicated to network monitoring, eBPF can now be used to monitor and trace any kind... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0251
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zebrocy
Zebrocy uses HTTP for C2.[376][377][378][379][380][381] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST collected the registry value HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\MachineGuid from compromised hosts.[89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Putter Panda
Droppers used by Putter Panda use RC4 or a 16-byte XOR key consisting of the bytes 0xA0 – 0xAF to obfuscate payloads.[261] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0351
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cannon
Cannon can collect the current time zone information from the victim’s machine.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0800
ATT&CK Technique Name:Authorization Enforcement
All field controllers should restrict program uploads to only certain users (e.g., engineers, field technician), preferably through implementing a role-based access mechanism. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0527
ATT&CK Technique Name:CSPY Downloader
CSPY Downloader can search loaded modules, PEB structure, file paths, Registry keys, and memory to determine if it is being debugged or running in a virtual environment.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has encoded strings in its malware with base64 as well as with a simple, single-byte XOR obfuscation using key 0x40.[207][208][209] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 Decisions and Revisions - The Ever Evolving Face of the Black Hat NOC
This session is your chance to get up close and personal with the Black Hat NOC. We'll walk you through the process of deciding what equipment and services we deploy on the Black Hat network, and our reasoning around those decis... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors uses zip to pack collected files before exfiltration.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0061
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN8
FIN8 has injected malicious code into a new svchost.exe process.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0414
ATT&CK Technique Name:BabyShark
BabyShark has used scheduled tasks to maintain persistence.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0226
ATT&CK Technique Name:Smoke Loader
Smoke Loader downloads a new version of itself once it has installed. It also downloads additional plugins.[417] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0083
ATT&CK Technique Name:SilverTerrier
SilverTerrier uses FTP for C2 communications.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif droppers have used COM objects to execute the malware's full executable payload.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0375
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remexi
Remexi utilizes scheduled tasks as a persistence mechanism.[148] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Software Attacks on Hardware Wallets
Almost all security research has a question often left unanswered: what would be the financial consequence, if a discovered vulnerability is maliciously exploited? The security community almost never knows, unless a real attack takes place and the damage becomes... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has used mshta.exe to execute malicious HTA files.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Spalax
For Operation Spalax, the threat actors obtained packers such as CyaX.[81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0806
ATT&CK Technique Name:Minimize Wireless Signal Propagation
Techniques can include (i) reducing transmission power on wireless signals, (ii) adjusting antenna gain to prevent extensions beyond organizational boundaries, and (iii) employing RF shielding techniques to block excessive signal propagation. [8... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0368
ATT&CK Technique Name:NotPetya
NotPetya can use wmic to help propagate itself across a network.[91][92] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0391
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAWKBALL
HAWKBALL has encrypted the payload with an XOR-based algorithm.[149] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Decade of the RATs – Custom Chinese Linux Rootkits for Everyone
While 2020 is the Year of the Rat for the Chinese, it's felt more like the Decade of the RATs. In this talk, I reveal a nearly decade-long, undetected, state-sponsored effort to strategically target the Linux servers that comprise the ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0408
ATT&CK Technique Name:FlexiSpy
FlexiSpy can retrieve a list of installed applications.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0430
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Linux
Winnti for Linux has used a custom TCP protocol with four-byte XOR for command and control (C2).[146] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0137
ATT&CK Technique Name:CORESHELL
CORESHELL has established persistence by creating autostart extensibility point (ASEP) Registry entries in the Run key and other Registry keys, as well as by creating shortcuts in the Internet Explorer Quick Start folder.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0802
ATT&CK Technique Name:Communication Authenticity
Protocols used for device management should authenticate all network messages to prevent unauthorized system changes. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has collected documents from the victim's SharePoint.[2] | secon |
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