text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
values |
|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0375
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remexi
Remexi utilizes scheduled tasks as a persistence mechanism.[148] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Ensure proper Registry permissions are in place to prevent adversaries from disabling or modifying firewall settings. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0522
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exobot
Exobot can obtain a list of installed applications and can detect if an antivirus application is running, and close it if it is.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0605
ATT&CK Technique Name:EKANS
EKANS uses standard encryption library functions to encrypt files.[44][45] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0092
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent.btz
Agent.btz creates a file named thumb.dd on all USB flash drives connected to the victim. This file contains information about the infected system and activity logs.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has injected code into target processes via thread local storage callbacks.[2][3][4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1090.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Internal Proxy
Adversaries may use an internal proxy to direct command and control traffic between two or more systems in a compromised environment. Many tools exist that enable traffic redirection through proxies or port redirection, including HTRAN, ZXProxy, and ZXPortMap. A... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0026
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT18
APT18 can list files information for specific directories.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1218.010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Regsvr32
Adversaries may abuse Regsvr32.exe to proxy execution of malicious code. Regsvr32.exe is a command-line program used to register and unregister object linking and embedding controls, including dynamic link libraries (DLLs), on Windows systems. The Regsvr32.exe binary m... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Sleight of ARM: Demystifying Intel Houdini
ARM is taking over the computer industry. In recent years, we have seen some of the major players in the industry switch from x86-based processors to ARM processors. Most notable is Apple, which has supported the transition to ARM from x86 with a binary tra... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0143
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aquatic Panda
Aquatic Panda has used DLL search-order hijacking to load exe, dll, and dat files into memory.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete logs keystrokes from the victim’s machine.[101][102][103][104] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang has dumped credentials, including by using Mimikatz.[40][41][42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0435
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLEAD
PLEAD has been executed via malicious links in e-mails.[18] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT3
APT3 has been known to side load DLLs with a valid version of Chrome with one of their tools.[3][4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emissary
The C2 server response to a beacon sent by a variant of Emissary contains a 36-character GUID value that is used as an encryption key for subsequent network communications. Some variants of Emissary use various XOR operations to encrypt C2 data.[44] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 Domain Borrowing: Catch My C2 Traffic if You Can
For red teams, CDN is a good redirector and protector for their C2 traffic, especially with domain fronting. However, if there are HTTPS decryption devices in the network, domain fronting can be easily detected by comparing SNI and HOST.This talk wi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1049
ATT&CK Technique Name:Antivirus/Antimalware
Common tools for detecting Linux rootkits include: rkhunter [16], chrootkit [17], although rootkits may be designed to evade certain detection tools. | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 ChaosDB: How We Hacked Databases of Thousands of Azure Customers
In August 2021, the Wiz Research Team uncovered ChaosDB - a critical cross-tenant vulnerability in Azure Cosmos DB, Azure's flagship managed database solution which is used by countless organizations. This vulnerability is every compa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has used compromised credentials to log on to other systems and escalate privileges.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0340
ATT&CK Technique Name:Octopus
Octopus has uploaded stolen files and data from a victim's machine over its C2 channel.[91] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Prototype Pollution Leads to RCE: Gadgets Everywhere
Many have heard about Prototype Pollution vulnerabilities in JavaScript applications. This kind of vulnerability allows an attacker to inject properties into an object's root prototype that may lead to flow control alteration and unexpected pro... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:CosmicDuke
CosmicDuke contains a custom version of the RC4 algorithm that includes a programming error.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Review authentication logs to ensure that mechanisms such as enforcement of MFA are functioning as intended.Periodically review the hybrid identity solution in use for any discrepancies. For example, review all Pass Through Authentication (PTA) agents in the Azure Management ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0665
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThreatNeedle
ThreatNeedle can decrypt its payload using RC4, AES, or one-byte XORing.[231] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 Level Up Your Security Mindset
We live in a world of constant change, so why is it the people who obsess about the latest and greatest are often the most resistant to change? Is security incompatible with modern environments in which it serves? On the other hand, just sprinkle some "quantum machine... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 can call and dynamically resolve hashed APIs.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has downloaded additional malware and tools onto a compromised host.[190][191][192][193] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0259
ATT&CK Technique Name:InnaputRAT
Some InnaputRAT variants establish persistence by modifying the Registry key HKU\\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run:%appdata%\NeutralApp\NeutralApp.exe.[123] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Heyoka Backdoor
Heyoka Backdoor can enumerate drives on a compromised host.[162] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:OutSteel
OutSteel has been distributed through malicious links contained within spearphishing emails.[39] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-19 Locknote: Conclusions and Key Takeaways from Black Hat Asia 2019
At the close of this year's conference, join Black Hat Founder Jeff Moss and members of the esteemed Black Hat Review Board for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community. This Locknote will ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire can use built-in modules to abuse trusted utilities like MSBuild.exe.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hi-Zor
Hi-Zor deletes its RAT installer file as it executes its DLL payload file.[101] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has installed TrickBot as a service named ControlServiceA in order to establish persistence.[140] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet has sent Microsoft Word documents with embedded macros that will invoke scripts to download additional payloads. [41][42][43][44][45] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Meltdown: Basics, Details, Consequences
The security of computer systems fundamentally relies on the principle of confidentiality. Confidentiality is typically provided through memory isolation, e.g., kernel address ranges are marked as non-accessible and are protected from user access.In this talk... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0079
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkHydrus
DarkHydrus has used -WindowStyle Hidden to conceal PowerShell windows. [15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0221
ATT&CK Technique Name:Umbreon
Umbreon creates valid local users to provide access to the system.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0805
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mechanical Protection Layers
Protection devices should have minimal digital components to prevent exposure to related adversarial techniques. Examples include interlocks, rupture disks, release valves, etc. [2] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 CANCELLED: Too Soft[ware Defined] Networks: SD-WAN VulnerabilityAssessment
The software defined wide-area network is technology based on SDN approach applied to branch office connections in Enterprises. According to Gartner's predictions, more than 50% of routers will be replaced with SD-WAN Soluti... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0587
ATT&CK Technique Name:Penquin
Penquin has encrypted strings in the binary for obfuscation.[248] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0163
ATT&CK Technique Name:Janicab
Janicab captured screenshots and sent them out to a C2 server.[78][79] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0550
ATT&CK Technique Name:DoubleAgent
DoubleAgent has accessed the list of installed apps.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay can take screenshots every 30 seconds as well as when an external removable storage device is connected.[134] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0250
ATT&CK Technique Name:Koadic
Koadic performs most of its operations using Windows Script Host (VBScript) and runs arbitrary shellcode .[77] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Bug Hunters Dump User Data. Can They Keep it? Well They're Keeping it Anyway.
A security researcher used a modern bug bounty platform to disclose an accidental dump of personal data of ~50,000 FAANG company's users from that company's servers. The data passes through several 3rd party systems no... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0610
ATT&CK Technique Name:SideTwist
SideTwist has the ability to collect the domain name on a compromised host.[210] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0661
ATT&CK Technique Name:FoggyWeb
FoggyWeb has the ability to communicate with C2 servers over HTTP GET/POST requests.[130] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0614
ATT&CK Technique Name:CostaBricks
CostaBricks has used a number of API calls, including VirtualAlloc, VirtualFree, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress, and ExitProcess.[62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0458
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ramsay
Ramsay has PE data embedded within JPEG files contained within Word documents.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0441
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerShower
PowerShower has collected system information on the infected host.[283] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbanak
Carbanak has copied legitimate service names to use for malicious services.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1562.010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Downgrade Attack
Adversaries may downgrade or use a version of system features that may be outdated, vulnerable, and/or does not support updated security controls such as logging. For example, PowerShell versions 5+ includes Script Block Logging (SBL) which can record executed ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1525
ATT&CK Technique Name:Implant Internal Image
Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malicious code to establish persistence after gaining access to an environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee can achieve persistence by copying its DLL to a subdirectory of %APPDATA% and creating a Visual Basic Script that will load the DLL via a scheduled task.[33][34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0366
ATT&CK Technique Name:WannaCry
WannaCry creates the service "mssecsvc2.0" with the display name "Microsoft Security Center (2.0) Service."[133][134] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0033
ATT&CK Technique Name:NetTraveler
NetTraveler reports window names along with keylogger information to provide application context.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mongall
Mongall has the ability to upload files from victim's machines.[123] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0048
ATT&CK Technique Name:RTM
RTM has used search order hijacking to force TeamViewer to load a malicious DLL.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sys10
Sys10 uses an XOR 0x1 loop to encrypt its C2 domain.[131] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0130
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ajax Security Team
Ajax Security Team has used personalized spearphishing attachments.[3] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 A Survivor-Centric, Trauma-Informed Approach to Stalkerware
Stalkerware is a type of spyware that is often used to surveil intimate partners or ex-partners. While it has been around for many years, its use has seen an uptick in recent years, with some studies suggesting a particular increase during... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1049
ATT&CK Technique Name:Antivirus/Antimalware
Consider utilizing the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) on Windows 10+ to analyze commands after being processed/interpreted. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 ClickOnce and You're in - When Appref-ms Abuse is Operating as Intended
As tried-and-true methods of code execution via phishing are getting phased out, new research was required to maintain that avenue of gaining initial access. Sifting through different file types and how they operate led to ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0587
ATT&CK Technique Name:Penquin
Penquin can execute remote commands using bash scripts.[36] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Morning Refreshment Break (Briefings)
Open to Briefings passholders. Please wear your badge. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0681
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lizar
Lizar can execute PE files in the address space of the specified process.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has used tools to enumerate processes on target hosts including Process Explorer.[110][111] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang has used compromised credentials to sign into victims’ Microsoft 365 accounts.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Grant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0472
ATT&CK Technique Name:down_new
down_new has the ability to gather information on installed applications.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0269
ATT&CK Technique Name:QUADAGENT
QUADAGENT gathers the current domain the victim system belongs to.[190] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 No Such Thing as a Stupid Question: Why Knowledge Shaming is Making Us Less Secure
One only needs to hop on social media in the aftermath of any breach to see the 'hot takes' that abound. It seems many people forget we're all one step away from being in their shoes! So it's little wonder that there ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0412
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxShell
ZxShell can disable the firewall by modifying the registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1098.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:SSH Authorized Keys
Adversaries may modify the SSH authorized_keys file to maintain persistence on a victim host. Linux distributions and macOS commonly use key-based authentication to secure the authentication process of SSH sessions for remote management. The authorized_keys ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1578.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Delete Cloud Instance
An adversary may delete a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in an attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. Deleting an instance or virtual machine can remove valuable forensic artifacts and other eviden... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0052
ATT&CK Technique Name:CopyKittens
CopyKittens has used Metasploit, Empire, and AirVPN for post-exploitation activities.[38][39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0450
ATT&CK Technique Name:SHARPSTATS
SHARPSTATS has the ability to identify the domain of the compromised host.[180] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors used software packing in its tools.[61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Trojan.Karagany
Trojan.Karagany can inject a suspended thread of its own process into a new process and initiate via the ResumeThread API.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee can use backup C2 servers if the primary server fails.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kevin
Kevin has renamed an image of cmd.exe with a random name followed by a .tmpl extension.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet can create registry keys to load driver files.[152] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can determine if the user on an infected machine is in the admin or domain admin group.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0677
ATT&CK Technique Name:AADInternals
AADInternals is written and executed via PowerShell.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:ASPXSpy
ASPXSpy is a Web shell. The ASPXTool version used by Threat Group-3390 has been deployed to accessible servers running Internet Information Services (IIS).[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0526
ATT&CK Technique Name:KGH_SPY
KGH_SPY has the ability to steal data from the Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Thunderbird, and Opera browsers.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Falcon
Stealth Falcon malware creates a scheduled task entitled "IE Web Cache" to execute a malicious file hourly.[166] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0104
ATT&CK Technique Name:netstat
netstat can be used to enumerate local network connections, including active TCP connections and other network statistics.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0234
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bandook
Bandook has a command built in to use a raw TCP socket.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0443
ATT&CK Technique Name:MESSAGETAP
MESSAGETAP checks for the existence of two configuration files (keyword_parm.txt and parm.txt) and attempts to read the files every 30 seconds.[193] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink can encrypt C2 messages with AES-256-CBC sent underneath TLS. OpenSSL library functions are also used to encrypt each message using a randomly generated key and IV, which are then encrypted using a hard-coded RSA public key.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0018
During C0018, the threat actors exploited VMWare Horizon Unified Access Gateways that were vulnerable to several Log4Shell vulnerabilities, including CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2021-45046, CVE-2021-45105, and CVE-2021-44832.[22] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 A Broken Chain: Discovering OPC UA Attack Surface and Exploiting the Supply Chain
OPC Unified Architecture (OPC-UA) is emerging as one of the most important architectures for industrial communication and industry 4.0 transformation. It is platform-independent and trusted for connecting Industrial en... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0631
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaes
Chaes has a module to perform any API hooking it desires.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0530
ATT&CK Technique Name:Melcoz
Melcoz has been distributed through an AutoIt loader script.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
Gamaredon Group has delivered macros which can tamper with Microsoft Office security settings.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0031
ATT&CK Technique Name:BACKSPACE
The "ZR" variant of BACKSPACE will check to see if known host-based firewalls are installed on the infected systems. BACKSPACE will attempt to establish a C2 channel, then will examine open windows to identify a pop-up from the firewall software and will simulate a mouse-... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet has been observed to hook network APIs to monitor network traffic. [13] | secon |
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