text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0527
ATT&CK Technique Name:CSPY Downloader
CSPY Downloader can search loaded modules, PEB structure, file paths, Registry keys, and memory to determine if it is being debugged or running in a virtual environment.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0518
ATT&CK Technique Name:PolyglotDuke
PolyglotDuke can use LoadLibraryW and CreateProcess to load and execute code.[77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0554
ATT&CK Technique Name:Egregor
Egregor can perform a language check of the infected system and can query the CPU information (cupid).[121][122] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0482
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bundlore
Bundlore has attempted to get users to execute a malicious .app file that looks like a Flash Player update.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0488
ATT&CK Technique Name:CrackMapExec
CrackMapExec can create a registry key using wdigest.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0631
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chaes
Chaes has used the Puppeteer module to hook and monitor the Chrome web browser to collect user information from infected hosts.[8] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 Practical Side-Channel Attacks Against WPA-TKIP
Wireless networks and their security protocols keep evolving due to increased performance and reliability demands. For instance, recently the Wi-Fi Alliance released WPA3, which offers better security guarantees (e.g., longer keys). In light of this, o... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Set a browser extension allow or deny list as appropriate for your security policy. [17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can deobfuscate and re-assemble code strings for execution.[181][182][183] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1589.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Email Addresses
Adversaries may gather email addresses that can be used during targeting. Even if internal instances exist, organizations may have public-facing email infrastructure and addresses for employees. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0343
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exaramel for Windows
Exaramel for Windows automatically encrypts files before sending them to the C2 server.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0612
ATT&CK Technique Name:WastedLocker
WastedLocker has used cmd to execute commands on the system.[348] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0536
ATT&CK Technique Name:GPlayed
GPlayed can lock the user out of the device by showing a persistent overlay.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0405
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exodus
Exodus Two can take screenshots of any application in the foreground.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has shut down or uninstalled security applications on victim systems that might prevent ransomware from executing.[97][98][99] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0127
ATT&CK Technique Name:BBSRAT
BBSRAT uses a custom encryption algorithm on data sent back to the C2 server over HTTP.[13] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Burning Bridges - Stopping Lateral Movement via the RPC Firewall
In Windows based environments, RPC is the main underlying protocol required for remote administration and for Active Directory services. As such, it is often used by IT admins, but also by ransomware and advanced attackers to spread b... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 obtained PKI keys, certificate files, and the private encryption key from an Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) container to decrypt corresponding SAML signing certificates.[19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0595
ATT&CK Technique Name:ThiefQuest
ThiefQuest uses the kill_unwanted function to get a list of running processes, compares each process with an encrypted list of "unwanted" security related programs, and kills the processes for security related programs.[107] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-20 First Contact - Vulnerabilities in Contactless Payments
Introduced in 2007, contactless (NFC) payments have been used widely for a decade. Accounting for more than 40% of transactions globally, contactless payments are fast replacing cash and CHIP. Yet, contactless makes use of protocols much old... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream can use a Registry Run Key and the Startup folder to establish persistence.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors used the command nltest /domain_trusts /all_trusts to enumerate domain trusts.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0468
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skidmap
Skidmap has the ability to replace the pam_unix.so file on an infected machine with its own malicious version that accepts a specific backdoor password for all users.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1125
ATT&CK Technique Name:Video Capture
An adversary can leverage a computer's peripheral devices (e.g., integrated cameras or webcams) or applications (e.g., video call services) to capture video recordings for the purpose of gathering information. Images may also be captured from devices or applications, ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0241
ATT&CK Technique Name:RATANKBA
RATANKBA uses netstat -ano to search for specific IP address ranges.[72] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should be focused on initial access activities, such as drive by compromise where ad blocking... | secon |
title:botconf2015 Malware Instrumentation: Application to Regin Analysis
The complexity of the Regin malware underlines the importance of reverse engineering in modern incident response. The present study shows that such complexity can be overcome: substantial information about adversary tactics, techniques and procedu... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Administrators should perform an audit of all access lists and the permissions they have been granted to access web applications and services. This should be done extensively on all resources in order to establish a baseline, followed up on with periodic audits of new or upda... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 How I Used a JSON Deserialization 0day to Steal Your Money on the Blockchain
Fastjson is a widely used open source JSON parser with 23'100 stars on GitHub. As a basic module of countless java web services, it serves hundreds of millions of users. We managed to find a way to bypass many security che... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1055.008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ptrace System Calls
Adversaries may inject malicious code into processes via ptrace (process trace) system calls in order to evade process-based defenses as well as possibly elevate privileges. Ptrace system call injection is a method of executing arbitrary code in the address ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0352
ATT&CK Technique Name:OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D
OSX_OCEANLOTUS.D scrambles and encrypts data using AES256 before sending it to the C2 server.[28][29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0341
ATT&CK Technique Name:Xbash
Xbash can attempt to exploit known vulnerabilities in Hadoop, Redis, or ActiveMQ when it finds those services running in order to conduct further execution.[92][93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has compromised user credentials and used valid accounts for operations.[18][19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
Machete collects the MAC address of the target computer and other network configuration information.[134][135] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mafalda
Mafalda can manipulate the system registry on a compromised host.[88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1061
ATT&CK Technique Name:AbstractEmu
AbstractEmu has encoded files, such as exploit binaries, to potentially use during and after the rooting process.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0376
ATT&CK Technique Name:HOPLIGHT
HOPLIGHT has been observed loading several APIs associated with Pass the Hash.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Use auditing tools capable of detecting file system permissions abuse opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for service file system permissions weakne... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0184
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWRUNER
POWRUNER can capture a screenshot from a victim.[127] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN5
FIN5 scans processes on all victim systems in the environment and uses automated scripts to pull back the results.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT can use SetWindowsHookEx and GetKeyNameText to capture keystrokes.[157][158] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Enforce the principle of least-privilege by limiting dashboard visibility to only the resources required. This may limit the discovery value of the dashboard in the event of a compromised account. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 GPT-3 and Me: How Supercomputer-scale Neural Network Models Apply to Defensive Cybersecurity Problems
A key lesson of recent deep learning successes is that as we scale neural networks, they get better, and sometimes in game-changing ways.In this talk, we'll demonstrate and explain how supercompute... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot has attempted to get users to launch malicious documents to deliver its payload. [244][245] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0612
ATT&CK Technique Name:WastedLocker
WastedLocker has copied a random file from the Windows System32 folder to the %APPDATA% location under a different hidden filename.[52] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Ensure proper permissions are in place to help prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to install a bootkit. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak has the ability to base64 encode and XOR encrypt strings.[344][345][346] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team has used ROT13 encoding, AES encryption and compression with the zlib library for their Python-based backdoor.[76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0385
ATT&CK Technique Name:njRAT
njRAT will attempt to detect if the victim system has a camera during the initial infection. njRAT can also detect any removable drives connected to the system.[28][29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0234
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bandook
Bandook is capable of spawning a Windows command shell.[37][38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has searched for security products on infected machines.[104][105] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 The Cyber Safety Review Board: Studying Incidents to Drive Systemic Change
Join Rob Silvers (DHS Undersecretary for Policy and Chair of the Cyber Safety Review Board) and Heather Adkins (Deputy Chair and Vice President, Security Engineering, Google) for a discussion about the Cyber Safety Review Bo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0262
ATT&CK Technique Name:QuasarRAT
QuasarRAT can communicate over a reverse proxy using SOCKS5.[37][38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo can collect screenshots of the victim’s machine.[106][107] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0477
ATT&CK Technique Name:Goopy
Goopy has used a polymorphic decryptor to decrypt itself at runtime.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has staged archives of collected data on a target's Outlook Web Access (OWA) server.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and spearphishing attempts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0606
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bad Rabbit
Bad Rabbit has masqueraded as a Flash Player installer through the executable file install_flash_player.exe.[18][19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 utilized PowerShell scripts to establish command and control and install files for execution. [2] [3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0387
ATT&CK Technique Name:KeyBoy
KeyBoy has a download and upload functionality.[241][242] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0689
ATT&CK Technique Name:WhisperGate
WhisperGate can deobfuscate downloaded files stored in reverse byte order and decrypt embedded resources using multiple XOR operations.[254][255] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0267
ATT&CK Technique Name:FELIXROOT
FELIXROOT adds a shortcut file to the startup folder for persistence.[89] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used a valid account to maintain persistence via scheduled task.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM established persistence for PoisonIvy by created a scheduled task.[67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink can rename its running process to [kworker:0/1] to masquerade as a Linux kernel thread. Cyclops Blink has also named RC scripts used for persistence after WatchGuard artifacts.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0357
ATT&CK Technique Name:Impacket
Impacket can be used to sniff network traffic via an interface or raw socket.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0607
ATT&CK Technique Name:KillDisk
KillDisk looks for and terminates two non-standard processes, one of which is an ICS application. [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit contains a collection of Exfiltration modules that can harvest credentials using Mimikatz.[74][75] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 Apple Neural Engine Internal: From ML Algorithm to HW Registers
I am curious why the SEP (Secure Enclave Processor) firmware decryption key of the iPhone XR has been leaked for more than a year and no one has disclosed the machine learning model of FaceID. After I reverse engineered SEP, I found t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot is delivered via a malicious XLS attachment contained within a spearhpishing email.[137] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can find a process owned by a specific user and impersonate the associated token.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1547.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Authentication Package
Adversaries may abuse authentication packages to execute DLLs when the system boots. Windows authentication package DLLs are loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA) process at system start. They provide support for multiple logon processes and multip... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Spalax
For Operation Spalax, the threat actors used a variety of packers, including CyaX, to obfuscate malicious executables.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has used the icacls command to modify access control to backup servers, providing them with full control of all the system folders.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Regin
The Regin malware platform can use Windows admin shares to move laterally.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 used the Plink command-line utility to create SSH tunnels to C2 servers.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can search files on a compromised host.[296][297] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1043
ATT&CK Technique Name:ccf32
ccf32 can determine the local time on targeted machines.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN5
FIN5 scripts save memory dump data into a specific directory on hosts in the victim environment.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Network segmentation can be used to isolate infrastructure components that do not require broad network access. This may mitigate, or at least alleviate, the scope of AiTM activity. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0596
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShadowPad
ShadowPad has decrypted a binary blob to start execution.[208] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 used certutil to download additional files.[34][35][36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
Cobalt Strike can produce a sessions report from compromised hosts.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0372
ATT&CK Technique Name:LockerGoga
LockerGoga has been observed changing account passwords and logging off current users.[1][2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Ensure proper system isolation for critical network systems through use of firewalls. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 KeenLab iOS Jailbreak Internals: Userland Read-Only Memory can be Dangerous
Modern operating systems nowadays implement read-only memory mappings at their CPU architecture level, preventing common security attacks. By mapping memories as read-only, the memory owner process can usually trust the mem... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0154
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobalt Strike
The Cobalt Strike System Profiler can use JavaScript to perform reconnaissance actions.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0641
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kobalos
Kobalos can chain together multiple compromised machines as proxies to reach their final targets.[15][16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0075
ATT&CK Technique Name:Reg
Reg may be used to gather details from the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface.[77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1059.007
ATT&CK Technique Name:JavaScript
Adversaries may abuse various implementations of JavaScript for execution. JavaScript (JS) is a platform-independent scripting language (compiled just-in-time at runtime) commonly associated with scripts in webpages, though JS can be executed in runtime environments ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0350
ATT&CK Technique Name:zwShell
zwShell has been copied over network shares to move laterally.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy can obtain a list of SIDs and provide the option for selecting process tokens to impersonate.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used VBSscipt macros for execution on compromised hosts.[105] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0612
ATT&CK Technique Name:WastedLocker
WastedLocker can identify network adjacent and accessible drives.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shark
Shark has the ability to upload files from the compromised host over a DNS or HTTP C2 channel.[111] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0574
ATT&CK Technique Name:BendyBear
BendyBear has decrypted function blocks using a XOR key during runtime to evade detection.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 Veni, No Vidi, No Vici: Attacks on ETW Blind EDR Sensors
Event Tracing for Windows (ETW) is a built-in feature, originally designed to perform software diagnostics, and nowadays ETW is essential for Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR) solutions. ETW is deeply integrated into the Windows kernel and ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0081
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper has detected a target system’s OS version and system volume information.[376][377] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Use auditing tools capable of detecting hijacking opportunities on systems within an enterprise and correct them. Toolkits like the PowerSploit framework contain PowerUp modules that can be used to explore systems for hijacking weaknesses.[6]Use the program sxstrace.exe that ... | secon |
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