text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drinik
Drinik has used custom encryption to hide strings, potentially to evade antivirus products.[12] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 RCE-as-a-Service: Lessons Learned from 5 Years of Real-World CI/CD Pipeline Compromise
In the past 5 years, we've demonstrated countless supply chain attacks in production CI/CD pipelines for virtually every company we've tested, with several dozen successful compromises of targets ranging from smal... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0237
ATT&CK Technique Name:GravityRAT
GravityRAT collects the volumes mapped on the system, and also steals files with the following extensions: .docx, .doc, .pptx, .ppt, .xlsx, .xls, .rtf, and .pdf.[138] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium has the ability to use various Windows API functions to perform tasks.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1073
ATT&CK Technique Name:Royal
Royal can use RmShutDown to kill applications and services using the resources that are targeted for encryption.[37] | secon |
title:botconf2017 Stantinko: a Massive Adware Campaign Operating Covertly since 2012
Stantinko is a botnet that we estimate infects around half a million machines mainly located in the Russian Federation and Ukraine. In addition to its prevalence, Stantinko stands out because of its use of advanced anti-analysis techni... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0386
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ursnif
Ursnif has deleted data staged in tmp files after exfiltration.[245] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1049
ATT&CK Technique Name:Antivirus/Antimalware
Anti-virus can be used to automatically quarantine suspicious files. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has used WinRM to enable remote execution.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Adversaries can install new AppInit DLLs binaries to execute this technique. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed through AppInit DLLs functionality by using application control [8] tools, like Windows Defender Application Control[9], AppL... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZIRCONIUM
ZIRCONIUM has purchased domains for use in targeted campaigns.[71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0395
ATT&CK Technique Name:LightNeuron
LightNeuron has used filenames associated with Exchange and Outlook for binary and configuration files, such as winmail.dat.[86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0497
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dacls
Dacls can establish persistence via a LaunchAgent.[14][15] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-23 I Watched You Roll the Die: Unparalleled RDP Monitoring Reveal Attackers' Tradecraft
The Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) is a critical attack vector used by evil threat actors including in ransomware outbreaks. To study RDP attacks, we created PyRDP, an open-source RDP interception tool with unmat... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors injected code into a selected process, which in turn launches a command as a child process of the original.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1124
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Time Discovery
An adversary may gather the system time and/or time zone from a local or remote system. The system time is set and stored by the Windows Time Service within a domain to maintain time synchronization between systems and services in an enterprise network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Since StartupItems are deprecated, preventing all users from writing to the /Library/StartupItems directory would prevent any startup items from getting registered. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dyre
Dyre has the ability to create files in a TEMP folder to act as a database to store information.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0950
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploit Protection
Security applications that look for behavior used during exploitation such as Windows Defender Exploit Guard (WDEG) and the Enhanced Mitigation Experience Toolkit (EMET) can be used to mitigate some exploitation behavior. [5] Control flow integrity checking is an... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain can establish an indirect and raw TCP socket-based connection to the C2 server.[35][36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sys10
Sys10 collects the local IP address of the victim and sends it to the C2.[151] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has used the Fodhelper UAC bypass technique to gain elevated privileges.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0003
ATT&CK Technique Name:RIPTIDE
APT12 has used RIPTIDE, a RAT that uses HTTP to communicate.[286] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0340
ATT&CK Technique Name:Octopus
Octopus has been delivered via spearsphishing emails.[165] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has abused the Outlook Home Page feature for persistence. OilRig has also used CVE-2017-11774 to roll back the initial patch designed to protect against Home Page abuse.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used stolen credentials to compromise Outlook Web Access (OWA).[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass stages data prior to exfiltration in multi-part archives, often saved in the Recycle Bin.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Earth Lusca
Earth Lusca has used ProcDump to obtain the hashes of credentials by dumping the memory of the LSASS process.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0652
ATT&CK Technique Name:MarkiRAT
MarkiRAT can drop its payload into the Startup directory to ensure it automatically runs when the compromised system is started.[154] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:CozyCar
One persistence mechanism used by CozyCar is to register itself as a scheduled task.[46] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-23 HARry Parser and the Cursed Tracker: Breaking the Spell of Online Data Collection
Embark on a thrilling journey to uncover the hidden secrets of online tracking and data collection by advertisers, data brokers, and tech giants. Welcome to the dark and creepy world of online tracking! Advertisers an... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0327
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skygofree
Skygofree has the capability to exploit several known vulnerabilities and escalate privileges.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0668
ATT&CK Technique Name:TinyTurla
TinyTurla can set its configuration parameters in the Registry.[164] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0533
ATT&CK Technique Name:SLOTHFULMEDIA
SLOTHFULMEDIA has named a service it establishes on victim machines as "TaskFrame" to hide its malicious purpose.[67] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 Start Arbitrary Activity App Components as the System User Vulnerability Affecting Samsung Android Devices
Samsung Android devices running Android versions 9, 10, 11, and 12 contain a vulnerability that allows any local app on the device (including third-party apps with zero permissions) to provi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, the threat actors consistently removed traces of their activity by first overwriting a file using /c cd /d c:\windows\temp\ & copy \\<IP ADDRESS>\c$\windows\system32\devmgr.dll \\<IP ADDRESS>\c$\windows\temp\LMAKSW.ps1 /y and then deleting th... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication. Where possible, also enable multi-factor authentication on externally facing services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1568
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dynamic Resolution
Adversaries may dynamically establish connections to command and control infrastructure to evade common detections and remediations. This may be achieved by using malware that shares a common algorithm with the infrastructure the adversary uses to receive the mal... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0254
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLAINTEE
An older variant of PLAINTEE performs UAC bypass.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Ensure least privilege principles are applied to important information resources to reduce exposure to data manipulation risk. | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 Like Lightning From the Cloud: Finding RCEs in an Embedded TLS Library and Toasting a Popular Cloud-connected UPS
Modern Cloud-connected devices are based upon a single TLS connection to the Cloud, through which they can be controlled. Interaction with the local network is limited to a bare minim... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0354
ATT&CK Technique Name:Denis
Denis exploits a security vulnerability to load a fake DLL and execute its code.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0342
ATT&CK Technique Name:GreyEnergy
GreyEnergy encrypts its configuration files with AES-256 and also encrypts its strings.[122] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0297
ATT&CK Technique Name:XcodeGhost
XcodeGhost can prompt a fake alert dialog to phish user credentials.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has queried the AWS instance metadata service for credentials.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 malware has injected a Cobalt Strike beacon into Rundll32.exe.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has used spearphishing with a link to trick victims into clicking on a link to a zip file containing malicious files.[11][12][13] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-23 Mirage: Cyber Deception Against Autonomous Cyber Attacks
It was once thought to be impossible or simply decades away. But, in 2016, enhancements in search and neural network classifiers, as well as computing advancements, led to the creation of the AlphaGo system, which is capable of outperforming t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0018
During C0018, the threat actors used PDQ Deploy to move AvosLocker and tools across the network.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has used process hollowing in iexplore.exe to load the RedLeaves implant.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0456
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aria-body
Aria-body has established persistence via the Startup folder or Run Registry key.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Identify critical business and system processes that may be targeted by adversaries and work to isolate and secure those systems against unauthorized access and tampering. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot injects into the svchost.exe process.[39][40][41][42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit access to the root account and prevent users from modifying PAM components through proper privilege separation (ex SELinux, grsecurity, AppArmor, etc.) and limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can use HTTP and HTTPS over ports 80 and 443 in C2 communications.[33][34][35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0362
ATT&CK Technique Name:Linux Rabbit
Linux Rabbit acquires valid SSH accounts through brute force. [43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has collected stolen files in a temporary folder in preparation for exfiltration.[87] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has used WMI event subscriptions for persistence.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stealth Falcon
Stealth Falcon malware gathers the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) table from the victim.[219] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1134.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Token Impersonation/Theft
Adversaries may duplicate then impersonate another user's existing token to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, an adversary can duplicate an existing token using DuplicateToken or DuplicateTokenEx. The token can then be used w... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0011
ATT&CK Technique Name:Taidoor
Taidoor has modified the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run key for persistence.[255] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:CozyCar
The main CozyCar dropper checks whether the victim has an anti-virus product installed. If the installed product is on a predetermined list, the dropper will exit.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0484
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carberp
Carberp has queried the infected system's registry searching for specific registry keys associated with antivirus products.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0134
ATT&CK Technique Name:Transparent Tribe
Transparent Tribe has dropped encoded executables on compromised hosts.[334] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Azure AD Administrators apply limitations upon the ability for users to grant consent to unfamiliar or unverified third-party applications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:MacMa
MacMa has used TLS encryption to initialize a custom protocol for C2 communications.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0589
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sibot
Sibot will delete itself if a certain server response is received.[216] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain can support an HKCMD sideloading start method.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:ADVSTORESHELL
ADVSTORESHELL achieves persistence by adding itself to the HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run Registry key.[5][6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0108
ATT&CK Technique Name:Blue Mockingbird
Blue Mockingbird has used Windows Registry modifications to specify a DLL payload.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0085
ATT&CK Technique Name:S-Type
S-Type primarily uses port 80 for C2, but falls back to ports 443 or 8080 if initial communication fails.[32] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0128
ATT&CK Technique Name:BADNEWS
When it first starts, BADNEWS crawls the victim's local drives and collects documents with the following extensions: .doc, .docx, .pdf, .ppt, .pptx, and .txt.[20][21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:ZxxZ
ZxxZ has used scheduled tasks for persistence and execution.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0016
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT29
APT29 has used a compromised account to access an organization's VPN infrastructure.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
APT28 has used the WindowStyle parameter to conceal PowerShell windows.[5] [6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has used cron to create pre-scheduled and periodic background jobs on a Linux system.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can use winapiexec tool for indirect execution of ShellExecuteW and CreateProcessA.[101] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0493
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldenSpy
GoldenSpy has been packaged with a legitimate tax preparation software.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Ensure that proper permissions and directory access control are set to deny users the ability to write files to the top-level directory C: and system directories, such as C:\Windows\, to reduce places where malicious files could be placed for... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1048
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Isolation and Sandboxing
Make it difficult for adversaries to advance their operation through exploitation of undiscovered or unpatched vulnerabilities by using sandboxing. Other types of virtualization and application microsegmentation may also mitigate the impact of s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0036
ATT&CK Technique Name:FLASHFLOOD
FLASHFLOOD employs the same encoding scheme as SPACESHIP for data it stages. Data is compressed with zlib, and bytes are rotated four times before being XOR'ed with 0x23.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0448
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rising Sun
Rising Sun can clear a memory blog in the process by overwriting it with junk bytes.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Patchwork
Patchwork dumped the login data database from \AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default\Login Data.[67] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0192
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pupy
Pupy can access a connected webcam and capture pictures.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0577
ATT&CK Technique Name:FrozenCell
FrozenCell has used an online cell tower geolocation service to track targets.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors used compromised VPN accounts to gain access to victim systems.[48] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0693
ATT&CK Technique Name:CaddyWiper
CaddyWiper has the ability to destroy information about a physical drive's partitions including the MBR, GPT, and partition entries.[10][11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0149
ATT&CK Technique Name:MoonWind
MoonWind obtains the number of removable drives from the victim.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kevin
Kevin can send data from the victim host through a DNS C2 channel.[65] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Lessons and Lulz: The 5th Annual Black Hat USA NOC Report
Back with another year of soul crushing statistics, the Black Hat NOC team will be sharing all of the data that keeps us equally puzzled, and entertained, year after year. We'll let you know all the tools and techniques we're using to set up... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT28
An APT28 backdoor may collect the entire contents of an inserted USB device.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1628.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Suppress Application Icon
A malicious application could suppress its icon from being displayed to the user in the application launcher. This hides the fact that it is installed, and can make it more difficult for the user to uninstall the application. Hiding the application's i... | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 Make Redirection Evil Again - URL Parser Issues in OAuth
Since 2012, OAuth 2.0 has been widely deployed by online service providers worldwide. Security-related headlines related to OAuth showed up from time to time, and most problems were caused by incorrect implementations of the protocol/service... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1584.005
ATT&CK Technique Name:Botnet
Adversaries may compromise numerous third-party systems to form a botnet that can be used during targeting. A botnet is a network of compromised systems that can be instructed to perform coordinated tasks. Instead of purchasing/renting a botnet from a booter/stresser ser... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:TA0003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Persistence
The adversary is trying to maintain their foothold. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has used kill.bat script to disable security tools.[123] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Scan public code repositories for exposed credentials or other sensitive information before making commits. Ensure that any leaked credentials are removed from the commit history, not just the current latest version of the code. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Darkhotel
Darkhotel used a virus that propagates by infecting executables stored on shared drives.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0505
ATT&CK Technique Name:Desert Scorpion
Desert Scorpion can track the device’s location.[17] | secon |
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