text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:G0114
ATT&CK Technique Name:Chimera
Chimera has used netstat -ano | findstr EST to discover network connections.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Prevent administrator accounts from being enumerated when an application is elevating through UAC since it can lead to the disclosure of account names. The Registry key is located at HKLM\ SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\CredUI\Enum... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Applications and appliances that utilize default username and password should be changed immediately after the installation, and before deployment to a production environment.[66] When possible, applications that use SSH keys should be updated periodically and pro... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Use Recent OS Version
The HIDE_OVERLAY_WINDOWS permission was introduced in Android 12 allowing apps to hide overlay windows of type TYPE_APPLICATION_OVERLAY drawn by other apps with the SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW permission, preventing other applications from creating overlay windows on ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
Using the machine's local time, XCSSET waits 43200 seconds (12 hours) from the initial creation timestamp of a specific file, .report. After the elapsed time, XCSSET executes additional modules.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0504
ATT&CK Technique Name:Anchor
Anchor can determine the public IP and location of a compromised host.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0440
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Smith
Agent Smith exploits known OS vulnerabilities, including Janus, to replace legitimate applications with malicious versions.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has modified the Registry key HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest by setting the UseLogonCredential registry value to 1 in order to force credentials to be stored in clear text in memory.[180] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 My Ticks Don't Lie: New Timing Attacks for Hypervisor Detection
Hypervisor detection is a pillar of sandbox evasion techniques. While hardware-assisted virtualization solutions are indispensable for scalable dynamic malware analysis, compared to bare-metal machines they all introduce timing discrepa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI has registered itself as a service using its export function.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0463
ATT&CK Technique Name:INSOMNIA
INSOMNIA can retrieve SMS messages and iMessages.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0562
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNSPOT
SUNSPOT encrypted log entries it collected with the stream cipher RC4 using a hard-coded key. It also uses AES128-CBC encrypted blobs for SUNBURST source code and data extracted from the SolarWinds Orion <MsBuild.exe process.[318] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used Daniel Bohannon’s Invoke-Obfuscation framework and obfuscated PowerShell scripts.[55][12] The group has also used other obfuscation methods, including Base64 obfuscation of VBScripts and PowerShell commands.[55][56][57][58][59][60][61] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0141
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Windows
Winnti for Windows can add a service named wind0ws to the Registry to achieve persistence after reboot.[277] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0077
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leafminer
Leafminer has obtained and used tools such as LaZagne, Mimikatz, PsExec, and MailSniper.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUGARDUMP
Some SUGARDUMP variants required a user to enable a macro within a malicious .xls file for execution.[222] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can create a backdoor in KeePass using a malicious config file and in TortoiseSVN using a registry hook.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0226
ATT&CK Technique Name:Smoke Loader
Smoke Loader adds a Visual Basic script in the Startup folder to deploy the payload.[145] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0696
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flagpro
Flagpro has dropped an executable file to the startup directory.[97] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1213.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Confluence
Adversaries may leverage Confluence repositories to mine valuable information. Often found in development environments alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to store development-related documentation, however, in general may contain more diverse cate... | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-21 Hand in Your Pocket Without You Noticing: Current State of Mobile Wallet Security
Apple Pay, Google Pay, and Samsung Pay are the de-facto payment services for mobile users. Their growth and popularity during COVID-19 have given mobile users the option to pay with ease, often without the need to tou... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
FunnyDream can delete files including its dropper component.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0501
ATT&CK Technique Name:PipeMon
The PipeMon installer has modified the Registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Print\Environments\Windows x64\Print Processors to install PipeMon as a Print Processor.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0008
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbanak
Carbanak actors used legitimate credentials of banking employees to perform operations that sent them millions of dollars.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0625
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cuba
Cuba loaded the payload into memory using PowerShell.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1110.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Spraying
Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has used has used Metasploit’s named-pipe impersonation technique to escalate privileges.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0244
ATT&CK Technique Name:Comnie
Comnie achieves persistence by adding a shortcut of itself to the startup path in the Registry.[62] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Disinformation At Scale: Using GPT-3 Maliciously for Information Operations
Last year, OpenAI developed GPT-3—currently the largest and most powerful natural language model in the world. The select groups that were granted first access quickly demonstrated that it can write realistic text from almo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0141
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Windows
Winnti for Windows can check if the explorer.exe process is responsible for calling its install function.[273] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0142
ATT&CK Technique Name:StreamEx
StreamEx has the ability to modify the Registry.[151] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0871
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution through API
Adversaries may attempt to leverage Application Program Interfaces (APIs) used for communication between control software and the hardware. Specific functionality is often coded into APIs which can be called by software to engage specific functions on a device... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent can delete previously created tasks on a compromised host.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1059
ATT&CK Technique Name:metaMain
metaMain can recursively enumerate files in an operator-provided directory.[188][194] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0182
ATT&CK Technique Name:FinFisher
FinFisher checks its parent process for indications that it is running in a sandbox setup.[102][103] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has used DCSync attacks to gather credentials for privilege escalation routines.[11] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Over the Air Baseband Exploit: Gaining Remote Code Execution on 5G Smartphones
In recent years we saw the widespread adoption of 5G Cellular Networks, both for consumer devices, IoT, and critical infrastructure. The estimate of the number of devices connected to a 5G network varies, but statistics... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0348
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cardinal RAT
Cardinal RAT establishes Persistence by setting the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Load Registry key to point to its executable.[54] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Ghidra - Journey from Classified NSA Tool to Open Source
This year was a momentous one for the National Security Agency (NSA) as we released our game-changing software reverse engineering (SRE) framework to the open source community: Ghidra. This was a long and arduous process and we want to give B... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Whip the Whisperer: Simulating Side Channel Leakage
Cryptographic side channels are well-understood from a mathematical perspective, and many countermeasures exist that reduce leakage. Yet, there are many implementations in the field that leak. This is caused by a combination of lack of security exp... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0410
ATT&CK Technique Name:Fysbis
Fysbis has masqueraded as the rsyncd and dbus-inotifier services.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0354
ATT&CK Technique Name:Denis
Denis has used DNS tunneling for C2 communications.[21][22][23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0659
ATT&CK Technique Name:Diavol
Diavol can enumerate victims' local and external IPs when registering with C2.[70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0394
ATT&CK Technique Name:HiddenWasp
HiddenWasp installs reboot persistence by adding itself to /etc/rc.local.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can detect VMWare via its I/O port and Virtual PC via the vpcext instruction.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, attackers used a signed kernel rootkit to establish additional persistence.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1037.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Logon Script
Adversaries may use network logon scripts automatically executed at logon initialization to establish persistence. Network logon scripts can be assigned using Active Directory or Group Policy Objects. These logon scripts run with the privileges of the user ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0433
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rifdoor
Rifdoor has added four additional bytes of data upon launching, then saved the changed version as C:\ProgramData\Initech\Initech.exe.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0259
ATT&CK Technique Name:InnaputRAT
InnaputRAT uses the API call ShellExecuteW for execution.[100] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0488
ATT&CK Technique Name:CrackMapExec
CrackMapExec can set a scheduled task on the target system to execute commands remotely using at.[6] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 CastGuard: Mitigating Type Confusion in C++
Type confusion vulnerabilities offer incredibly powerful primitives to exploit writers. Many traditional types of memory safety issues (bounds violations, temporal safety) can be automatically detected and prevented in some manner, even if it comes at a p... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0136
ATT&CK Technique Name:IndigoZebra
IndigoZebra has compromised legitimate email accounts to use in their spearphishing operations.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0102
ATT&CK Technique Name:Wizard Spider
Wizard Spider has obtained and used publicly-available post-exploitation frameworks and tools like Metasploit, Empire, Mimikatz.[99] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 RollBack - A New Time-Agnostic Replay Attack Against the Automotive Remote Keyless Entry Systems
Automotive Remote Keyless Entry (RKE) systems implement disposable rolling codes, making every key fob button press unique, effectively preventing simple replay attacks. However, RollJam was proven to b... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
A Threat Group-3390 tool can spawn svchost.exe and inject the payload into that process.[37][38] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Disable or remove any unnecessary or unused shells or interpreters. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32 has collected the OS version and computer name from victims. One of the group's backdoors can also query the Windows Registry to gather system information, and another macOS backdoor performs a fingerprint of the machine on its first connection to the C&C server. APT32 ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM exploited a publicly-facing servers including Wildfly/JBoss servers to gain access to the network.[30][31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig utilized stolen credentials to gain access to victim machines.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson can use a HTTP GET request to download its final payload.[83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1015
ATT&CK Technique Name:Active Directory Configuration
Disable legacy authentication, which does not support MFA, and require the use of modern authentication protocols instead. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0291
ATT&CK Technique Name:PJApps
PJApps has the capability to collect and leak the victim's location.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has used Registry Run keys to establish persistence for its downloader tools known as HARDTACK and SHIPBREAD.[91] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has leveraged the legitimate email marketing service SMTP2Go for phishing campaigns.[11] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Siamese Neural Networks for Detecting Brand Impersonation
Brand impersonation is a key attack strategy in which a malicious user crafts content to look like a known brand to deceive a user into entering sensitive information, such as account passwords or credit card details. To address this issue, w... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0028
ATT&CK Technique Name:SHIPSHAPE
APT30 may have used the SHIPSHAPE malware to move onto air-gapped networks. SHIPSHAPE targets removable drives to spread to other systems by modifying the drive to use Autorun to execute or by hiding legitimate document files and copying an executable to the folder with t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1011
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Guidance
Inform users that device rooting or granting unnecessary access to the accessibility service presents security risks that could be taken advantage of without their knowledge. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke issued wget requests from infected systems to the C2.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0677
ATT&CK Technique Name:AADInternals
The AADInternals Set-AADIntUserMFA command can be used to disable MFA for a specified user. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has used string encoding with floating point calculations.[355] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used net localgroup and net localgroup Administrators to enumerate group information, including members of the local administrators group.[29] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0568
ATT&CK Technique Name:EVILNUM
EVILNUM can obtain the username from the victim's machine.[59] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0227
ATT&CK Technique Name:spwebmember
spwebmember is used to enumerate and dump information from Microsoft SharePoint.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbanak
Carbanak encodes the message body of HTTP traffic with Base64.[18][19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 leveraged PowerShell to deploy malware families in victims’ environments.[26][27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can collect clear text web credentials for Internet Explorer/Edge.[81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0124
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windigo
Windigo has used a script to check for the presence of files created by OpenSSH backdoors.[324] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0435
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLEAD
PLEAD has the ability to proxy network communications.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mustang Panda
Mustang Panda has executed PowerShell scripts via WMI.[87][88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0662
ATT&CK Technique Name:RCSession
RCSession can be installed via DLL side-loading.[56][17][53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0073
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT19
An APT19 Port 22 malware variant registers itself as a service.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1613
ATT&CK Technique Name:Container and Resource Discovery
Adversaries may attempt to discover containers and other resources that are available within a containers environment. Other resources may include images, deployments, pods, nodes, and other information such as the status of a cluster. | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-18 Eternal War in XNU Kernel Objects
Jailbreaking, in general, means breaking the device out of its "jail'." Apple devices (e.g., iPhone, iPad, Apple Watch) are the most famous "jail'' devices among the world. iOS, macOS, watchOS, and tvOS are operating systems developed by Apple Inc. and used in Apple... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team uses the MS-SQL server xp_cmdshell command, and PowerShell to execute commands. [4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 can detect EDR userland hooks.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0077
ATT&CK Technique Name:CallMe
CallMe exfiltrates data to its C2 server over the same protocol as C2 communications.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0385
ATT&CK Technique Name:njRAT
njRAT can browse file systems using a file manager module.[207] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0223
ATT&CK Technique Name:POWERSTATS
POWERSTATS can upload files from compromised hosts.[145] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0082
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT38
APT38 has used a custom MBR wiper named BOOTWRECK, which will initiate a system reboot after wiping the victim's MBR.[6] | secon |
title:botconf2022 Into The Silent Night
Since December 2019, Zloader had revived as “Silent Night”, and it has been used various attack campaigns. It has especially been used in two attack campaigns (PseudoGate and Malsmoke). These attack campaigns are aimed at users in Japan, Canada, or U.S. to obtain banking related ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0414
ATT&CK Technique Name:BabyShark
BabyShark has used scheduled tasks to maintain persistence.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT1
APT1 used a batch script to perform a series of discovery techniques and saves it to a text file.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0463
ATT&CK Technique Name:INSOMNIA
INSOMNIA can collect the device’s name, serial number, iOS version, total disk space, and free disk space.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink has maintained persistence by patching legitimate device firmware when it is downloaded, including that of WatchGuard devices.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used ipconfig, nbtstat, tracert, route print, and cat /etc/hosts commands.[166] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0456
ATT&CK Technique Name:Aria-body
Aria-body has the ability to duplicate a token from ntprint.exe.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0579
ATT&CK Technique Name:Waterbear
Waterbear can hook the ZwOpenProcess and GetExtendedTcpTable APIs called by the process of a security product to hide PIDs and TCP records from detection.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0593
ATT&CK Technique Name:ECCENTRICBANDWAGON
ECCENTRICBANDWAGON has encrypted strings with RC4.[109] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0574
ATT&CK Technique Name:BendyBear
BendyBear communicates to a C2 server over port 443 using modified RC4 and XOR-encrypted chunks.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1068
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackCat
BlackCat can utilize net use commands to discover the user name on a compromised host.[24] | secon |
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