text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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ATT&CK ID:S0441
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerShower
PowerShower has sent HTTP GET and POST requests to C2 servers to send information and receive instructions.[165] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:PcShare
PcShare can collect files and information from a compromised host.[37] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0476
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valak
Valak has the ability to enumerate local admin accounts.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0338
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cobian RAT
Cobian RAT creates an autostart Registry key to ensure persistence.[61] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-21 Lessons From 11 Billion Breached Records
Security flaws, hackers and data breaches are the new normal. It’s not just those of us in the industry facing these foes every single day, it’s everyone. Whether you’re online or offline, you simply cannot exist today without your personal information bein... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Firmware Cartography: Charting the Course for Modern Server Compromise
The modern server is the Matryoshka doll of computers, computers inside computers, a giant, undocumented mess. Undocumented devices have made homes at undocumented addresses, on buses, and in protocols most server owners don't kn... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0075
ATT&CK Technique Name:Reg
Reg may be used to find credentials in the Windows Registry.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky can gather a list of all processes running on a victim's machine.[146] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1037
ATT&CK Technique Name:Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts
Adversaries may use scripts automatically executed at boot or logon initialization to establish persistence. Initialization scripts can be used to perform administrative functions, which may often execute other programs or send information to an... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Election Security: Securing America's Future
The United States Government is intensely focused on election security and is working together with election partners better than ever before. The Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is leading the fe... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Action RAT
Action RAT can use cmd.exe to execute commands on an infected host.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used dynamic DNS resolution to construct and resolve to randomly-generated subdomains for C2.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0046
ATT&CK Technique Name:CozyCar
CozyCar's main method of communicating with its C2 servers is using HTTP or HTTPS.[81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0512
ATT&CK Technique Name:FatDuke
FatDuke can enumerate directories on target machines.[123] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Use file system access controls to protect folders such as C:\Windows\System32. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1562
ATT&CK Technique Name:Impair Defenses
Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0053
ATT&CK Technique Name:SeaDuke
SeaDuke is capable of persisting via the Registry Run key or a .lnk file stored in the Startup directory.[237] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:gh0st RAT
gh0st RAT has gathered system architecture, processor, OS configuration, and installed hardware information.[146] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Enforce the principle of least privilege by limiting privileges of user accounts so only authorized accounts can modify the web directory.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Axiom
Axiom has used previously compromised administrative accounts to escalate privileges.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 has used DGAs to change their C2 servers monthly.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1029
ATT&CK Technique Name:Remote Data Storage
Automatically forward events to a log server or data repository to prevent conditions in which the adversary can locate and manipulate data on the local system. When possible, minimize time delay on event reporting to avoid prolonged storage on the local system. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Account Management
Limit privileges of user accounts and groups so that only authorized administrators can interact with service changes and service binary target path locations. Deny execution from user directories such as file download directories and temp directories where ... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 A Hole in the Tube: Uncovering Vulnerabilities in Critical Infrastructure of Healthcare Facilities
A hidden infrastructure that transports critical care items within all modern hospitals, lies in plain sight - the pneumatic tube system (PTS). This critical infrastructure is responsible for deliveri... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke has used Pastebin to check the version of beaconing malware and redirect to another Pastebin hosting updated malware.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0233
ATT&CK Technique Name:MURKYTOP
MURKYTOP has the capability to delete local files.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0536
ATT&CK Technique Name:GPlayed
GPlayed can collect the device’s IMEI, phone number, and country.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0652
ATT&CK Technique Name:MarkiRAT
MarkiRAT can modify the shortcut that launches Telegram by replacing its path with the malicious payload to launch with the legitimate executable.[23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0264
ATT&CK Technique Name:OopsIE
OopsIE can download files from its C2 server to the victim's machine.[326][327] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has used JavaScript to drop and execute malware loaders.[59][60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet attempts to access network resources with a domain account’s credentials.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1622
ATT&CK Technique Name:Debugger Evasion
Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid debuggers. Debuggers are typically used by defenders to trace and/or analyze the execution of potential malware payloads. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used the VPS infrastructure of compromised Iranian threat actors.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
There are multiple methods of preventing a user's command history from being flushed to their .bash_history file, including use of the following commands:set +o history and set -o history to start logging again;unset HISTFILE being added to a user's .... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling has the ability to enumerate network shares.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1002
ATT&CK Technique Name:BITTER
BITTER has registered a variety of domains to host malicious payloads and for C2.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0051
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN10
FIN10 has used Meterpreter to enumerate users on remote systems.[65] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0045
ATT&CK Technique Name:menuPass
menuPass has compressed files before exfiltration using TAR and RAR.[44][45][46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0439
ATT&CK Technique Name:Okrum
Okrum can establish persistence by creating a .lnk shortcut to itself in the Startup folder.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0445
ATT&CK Technique Name:ShimRatReporter
ShimRatReporter listed all non-privileged and privileged accounts available on the machine.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0084
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gallmaker
Gallmaker sent victims a lure document with a warning that asked victims to "enable content" for execution.[95] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0069
ATT&CK Technique Name:MuddyWater
MuddyWater has used a Word Template, Normal.dotm, for persistence.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0421
ATT&CK Technique Name:GolfSpy
GolfSpy can collect local accounts on the device, pictures, bookmarks/histories of the default browser, and files stored on the SD card. GolfSpy can list image, audio, video, and other files stored on the device. GolfSpy can copy arbitrary files from the device.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0207
ATT&CK Technique Name:Vasport
Vasport creates a backdoor by making a connection using a HTTP POST.[358] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER has used legitimate applications to side-load malicious DLLs.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET uses the chmod +x command to grant executable permissions to the malicious file.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors used Conti ransomware to encrypt a compromised network.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Night Dragon
During Night Dragon, threat actors uploaded commonly available hacker tools to compromised web servers.[17] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-18 The Problems and Promise of WebAssembly
WebAssembly is a new standard that allows assembly-like code to run in browsers at near-native speed. But how does WebAssembly work, and how does it execute code while maintaining the security guarantees of a browser? This presentation gives an overview of the... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke has used Pastebin, Gitee, and GitLab for Command and Control.[29][30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0473
ATT&CK Technique Name:Avenger
Avenger has the ability to identify the host volume ID and the OS architecture on a compromised host.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0065
ATT&CK Technique Name:Leviathan
Leviathan has obtained valid accounts to gain initial access.[41][42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate some obfuscation activity at the network level. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda can launch an interface where it can execute several commands on the victim’s PC.[357] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent can sleep for 195 - 205 seconds after payload execution and before deleting its task.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0301
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dendroid
Dendroid can open a dialog box to ask the user for passwords.[13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has used NBTscan and custom tools to discover remote systems.[11][12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used different compromised credentials for remote access and to move laterally.[58][59][60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Action RAT
Action RAT can use Base64 to decode actor-controlled C2 server communications.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0514
ATT&CK Technique Name:WellMess
WellMess can use junk data in the Base64 string for additional obfuscation.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0170
ATT&CK Technique Name:Helminth
Helminth has used a scheduled task for persistence.[77] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Sharpshooter
During Operation Sharpshooter, threat actors sent malicious Word OLE documents to victims.[24] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire includes various modules for finding files of interest on hosts and network shares.[119] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium can drop itself in C:\Windows\System32\spool\prtprocs\x64\winprint.dll as an alternative Print Processor to be loaded automatically when the spoolsv Windows service starts.[56] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0203
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hydraq
Hydraq creates a backdoor through which remote attackers can retrieve information such as computer name, OS version, processor speed, memory size, and CPU speed.[168] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Attack on Titan M, Reloaded: Vulnerability Research on a Modern Security Chip
The Titan M chip was introduced by Google in their Pixel 3 devices, and in a previous study, we analyzed this chip and presented its internals and protections. Based on this acquired background, in this new talk we will fo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Partition Integrity
System partition integrity mechanisms, such as Verified Boot, can detect the unauthorized modification of system files. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0915
ATT&CK Technique Name:Active Directory Configuration
Consider configuration and use of a network-wide authentication service such as Active Directory, LDAP, or RADIUS capabilities which can be found in ICS devices. [8] [9] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 To Flexibly Tame Kernel Execution With Onsite Analysis
Existing kernel analysis tools either instrument the subject kernel to report data from the inside or use QEMU to gain information from the translated execution. Instrumentation based tools are not applicable to binary-only operating systems suc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict File and Directory Permissions
Making PowerShell profiles immutable and only changeable by certain administrators will limit the ability for adversaries to easily create user level persistence. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Dragonblood: Attacking the Dragonfly Handshake of WPA3
One of its main advantages of WPA3 is that it provides forward secrecy and prevents offline dictionary attacks. However, the WPA3 certification program was created behind closed doors, meaning researchers could not critique it. This is problemat... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:GOLD SOUTHFIELD
GOLD SOUTHFIELD has used publicly-accessible RDP and remote management and monitoring (RMM) servers to gain access to victim machines.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla has used WMI event filters and consumers to establish persistence.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0606
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bad Rabbit
Bad Rabbit has used Mimikatz to harvest credentials from the victim's machine.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1546.004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Unix Shell Configuration Modification
Adversaries may establish persistence through executing malicious commands triggered by a user’s shell. User Unix Shells execute several configuration scripts at different points throughout the session based on events. For example, when a u... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1414
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clipboard Data
Adversaries may abuse clipboard manager APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard. For example, passwords being copied and pasted from a password manager application could be captured by a malicious application installed on the device. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has created scheduled tasks for persistence.[18][19][20] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 Automated REST API Endpoint Identification for Security Testing at Scale: How Machine Learning Accelerates Security Testing
Unlike traditional web applications where a web crawler is used to discover various urls, REST API endpoints can be exposed in various formats and many REST services do not p... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0530
ATT&CK Technique Name:Melcoz
Melcoz can use VBS scripts to execute malicious DLLs.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0582
ATT&CK Technique Name:LookBack
LookBack sets up a Registry Run key to establish a persistence mechanism.[145] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0405
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exodus
Exodus Two can extract information on pictures from the Gallery, Chrome and SBrowser bookmarks, and the connected WiFi network's password.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0141
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Windows
Winnti for Windows can check for the presence of specific files prior to moving to the next phase of execution.[328] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot has the ability to check running processes.[210] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1021
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Web-Based Content
Update corporate policies to restrict what types of third-party applications may be added to any online service or tool that is linked to the company's information, accounts or network (e.g., Google, Microsoft, Dropbox, Basecamp, GitHub). However, rather ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has included phone call and audio recording capabilities in the malicious apps deployed as part of Operation BULL and Operation ROCK.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0394
ATT&CK Technique Name:HiddenWasp
HiddenWasp adds itself as a shared object to the LD_PRELOAD environment variable.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot has the ability to enumerate windows on a compromised host.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0115
ATT&CK Technique Name:Crimson
Crimson can use a module to perform keylogging on compromised hosts.[45][46][47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Applications and appliances that utilize default username and password should be changed immediately after the installation, and before deployment to a production environment.[66] When possible, applications that use SSH keys should be updated periodically and pro... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Password Policies
Verify that account credentials that may be used to access deployment systems are unique and not used throughout the enterprise network. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naikon
Naikon has used DLL side-loading to load malicious DLL's into legitimate executables.[47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0253
ATT&CK Technique Name:RunningRAT
RunningRAT contains code to open and copy data from the clipboard.[43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0340
ATT&CK Technique Name:Octopus
Octopus has been disguised as legitimate programs, such as Java and Telegram Messenger.[109][110] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0805
ATT&CK Technique Name:Block Serial COM
Adversaries may block access to serial COM to prevent instructions or configurations from reaching target devices. Serial Communication ports (COM) allow communication with control system devices. Devices can receive command and configuration messages over such ser... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Whispers Among the Stars: A Practical Look at Perpetrating (and Preventing) Satellite Eavesdropping Attacks
Space is changing. The number of satellites in orbit will increase from approximately 2,000 today to more than 15,000 by 2030. "New Space" brings promises of ubiquitous broadband and unpreced... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Deep Panda
Deep Panda has used the sticky-keys technique to bypass the RDP login screen on remote systems during intrusions.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0140
ATT&CK Technique Name:Shamoon
Shamoon can download an executable to run on the victim.[404] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0034
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team have used previously acquired legitimate credentials prior to attacks.[54] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 ELF Section Docking: Revisiting Stageless Payload Delivery
When it comes to generating and delivering malware on Linux, offensive operators have choices. Some objectives call for a dynamic payload bootstrap off the wire, others require stageless implants. Often, malware deployed with bundled payload... | secon |
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