text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0499
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hancitor
Hancitor has used CallWindowProc and EnumResourceTypesA to interpret and execute shellcode.[88] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0020
ATT&CK Technique Name:Maroochy Water Breach
In the Maroochy Water Breach, the adversary gained remote computer access to the system over radio.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0381
ATT&CK Technique Name:FlawedAmmyy
FlawedAmmyy has used PowerShell to execute commands.[101] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0037
ATT&CK Technique Name:FIN6
FIN6 has used malicious JavaScript to steal payment card data from e-commerce sites.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0433
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rifdoor
Rifdoor has encrypted strings with a single byte XOR algorithm.[162] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0385
ATT&CK Technique Name:njRAT
njRAT can identify remote hosts on connected networks.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0521
ATT&CK Technique Name:BloodHound
BloodHound can collect information about domain users, including identification of domain admin accounts.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0347
ATT&CK Technique Name:AuditCred
AuditCred is installed as a new service on the system.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0661
ATT&CK Technique Name:FoggyWeb
FoggyWeb's loader can call the load() function to load the FoggyWeb dll into an Application Domain on a compromised AD FS server.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0483
ATT&CK Technique Name:IcedID
IcedID has the ability to identify the computer name and OS version on a compromised host.[170] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Limit permissions so that users and user groups cannot create tokens. This setting should be defined for the local system account only. GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assig... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group has sent malicious links to victims via email.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Review privileged cloud account permission levels routinely to look for those that could allow an adversary to gain wide access, such as Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator in Azure AD.[14][15][16] These reviews should also check if ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors loaded DLLs via rundll32 using the svchost process.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0022
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Dream Job
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used tools that collected GetTickCount and GetSystemTimeAsFileTime data to detect sandbox or VMware services.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Limit Access to Resource Over Network
Use remote desktop gateways. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1078.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Default Accounts
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on W... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0483
ATT&CK Technique Name:IcedID
IcedID has the ability to identify Workgroup membership.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, the threat actors enabled Wdigest by changing the HKLM\SYSTEM\\ControlSet001\\Control\\SecurityProviders\\WDigest registry value from 0 (disabled) to 1 (enabled).[109] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has exploited CVE-2018-0798 in Equation Editor.[83] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM has used whoami to gather user information.[78] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0119
ATT&CK Technique Name:Indrik Spider
Indrik Spider has used Group Policy Objects to deploy batch scripts.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla has used wmi queries to gather information from the system.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 has used search order hijacking to execute malicious payloads, such as Winnti RAT.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has used a PowerShell-based keylogger named kl.ps1.[78][79] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
A Threat Group-3390 tool has created new Registry keys under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\ and HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services.[162][111] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1036
ATT&CK Technique Name:Account Use Policies
Use conditional access policies to block logins from non-compliant devices or from outside defined organization IP ranges.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0576
ATT&CK Technique Name:MegaCortex
MegaCortex has used .cmd scripts on the victim's system.[210] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0430
ATT&CK Technique Name:Winnti for Linux
Winnti for Linux has decoded XOR encoded strings holding its configuration upon execution.[257] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors used a malicious HTA file that contained a mix of encoded HTML and JavaScript/VBScript code.[18] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-19 Reverse Engineering Custom ASICs by Exploiting Potential Supply-Chain Leaks
Many industry specific solutions in the field of SCADA consist of unknown custom chips without public documentation. These Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) are often simple System on Chip (SoC) solutions wi... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 How Do Cyber Insurers View The World?
With the rise of data breaches there have been many discussions, presentations and articles written about cyber insurance, with many of them not being so flattered. Unfortunately there is a lot of misinformation and questions still remain. This session provide... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0198
ATT&CK Technique Name:NETWIRE
NETWIRE has used .NET packer tools to evade detection.[60] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0010
ATT&CK Technique Name:Turla
Turla surveys a system upon check-in to discover information in the Windows Registry with the reg query command.[37] Turla has also retrieved PowerShell payloads hidden in Registry keys as well as checking keys associated with null session named pipes .[96] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1633
ATT&CK Technique Name:Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Adversaries may employ various means to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include changing behaviors after checking for the presence of artifacts indicative of a virtual machine environment (VME) or sandbox. If the ad... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 In Search of CurveSwap: Measuring Elliptic Curve Implementations in the Wild
We survey elliptic curve implementations from several vantage points. We perform internet-wide scans for TLS on a large number of ports, as well as SSH and IPsec to measure elliptic curve support and implementation behavio... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0496
ATT&CK Technique Name:REvil
REvil can use the Windows command line to delete volume shadow copies and disable recovery.[282][283][284][285] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0673
ATT&CK Technique Name:DarkWatchman
DarkWatchman has used a DGA to generate a domain name for C2.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can discover and exploit DLL hijacking opportunities in services and processes.[29][30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1417
ATT&CK Technique Name:Input Capture
Adversaries may use methods of capturing user input to obtain credentials or collect information. During normal device usage, users often provide credentials to various locations, such as login pages/portals or system dialog boxes. Input capture mechanisms may be tran... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0397
ATT&CK Technique Name:LoJax
LoJax is a UEFI BIOS rootkit deployed to persist remote access software on some targeted systems.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0683
ATT&CK Technique Name:Peirates
Peirates can use stolen service account tokens to perform its operations. It also enables adversaries to switch between valid service accounts.[11] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Disinformation At Scale: Using GPT-3 Maliciously for Information Operations
Last year, OpenAI developed GPT-3—currently the largest and most powerful natural language model in the world. The select groups that were granted first access quickly demonstrated that it can write realistic text from almos... | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-22 Hunting and Exploiting Recursive MMIO Flaws in QEMU/KVM
When a hypervisor handles MMIO VM-exit to do DMA transfers, the same MMIO handler might be called later if the destination overlaps with its MMIO region. This kind of bug can damage the virtual device's state machine and even crash the hyper... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0551
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldenEagle
GoldenEagle can download new code to update itself.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0695
ATT&CK Technique Name:Donut
Donut can generate shellcode outputs that execute via Ruby.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot can make small changes to itself in order to change its checksum and hash value.[16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:MacMa
MacMa can collect the username from the compromised machine.[106] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:Higaisa
Higaisa used malicious e-mail attachments to lure victims into executing LNK files.[108][109] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0025
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT17
APT17 has created profile pages in Microsoft TechNet that were used as C2 infrastructure.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0411
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rotexy
Rotexy can automatically reply to SMS messages, and optionally delete them.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0482
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bundlore
Bundlore changes the permissions of a payload using the command chmod -R 755.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium can drop itself in C:\Windows\System32\spool\prtprocs\x64\winprint.dll to be loaded automatically by the spoolsv Windows service.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0004
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ke3chang
Ke3chang actors have been known to copy files to the network shares of other computers to move laterally.[30][31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1574.009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Path Interception by Unquoted Path
Adversaries may execute their own malicious payloads by hijacking vulnerable file path references. Adversaries can take advantage of paths that lack surrounding quotations by placing an executable in a higher level directory within the path, s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has used modified versions of PHProxy to examine web traffic between the victim and the accessed website.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0447
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lokibot
Lokibot has used process hollowing to inject itself into legitimate Windows process.[24][25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0627
ATT&CK Technique Name:SodaMaster
SodaMaster can enumerate the host name and OS version on a target system.[339] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0669
ATT&CK Technique Name:KOCTOPUS
KOCTOPUS can set the AutoRun Registry key with a PowerShell command.[136] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1044
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
The FunnyDream ScreenCap component can take screenshots on a compromised host.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment operational assets and their management devices based on their functional role within the process. Enabling more strict isolation to more critical control and operational information within the control environment. [5] [6] [4] [7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0244
ATT&CK Technique Name:Comnie
Comnie runs the command: net start >> %TEMP%\info.dat on a victim.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Multi-factor Authentication
Use multi-factor authentication for user and privileged accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0389
ATT&CK Technique Name:JCry
JCry has achieved execution by luring users to click on a file that appeared to be an Adobe Flash Player update installer. [118] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0554
ATT&CK Technique Name:Egregor
Egregor can encrypt all non-system files using a hybrid AES-RSA algorithm prior to displaying a ransom note.[6][43] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1050
ATT&CK Technique Name:PcShare
PcShare has been encrypted with XOR using different 32-long Base16 strings and compressed with LZW algorithm.[76] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0094
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kimsuky
Kimsuky has created email accounts for phishing operations.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0125
ATT&CK Technique Name:HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM has used the NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM account to create files on Exchange servers.[6] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-23 Trends and Top Takeaways from Black Hat Asia
Join Black Hat Founder Jeff Moss and Black Hat Asia Review Board members Sudhanshu Chauhan, Ty Miller and Asuka Nakajima for an insightful conversation on the most pressing issues facing the InfoSec community. This panel session will feature a candid d... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Calculating Risk in the Era of Obscurity: Reading Between the Lines of Security Advisories
Compliance with industry standards as well as various government regulations also requires a robust servicing and patching strategy. Beyond compliance, you must understand the risk to your resources from poor ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0859
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valid Accounts
Adversaries may steal the credentials of a specific user or service account using credential access techniques. In some cases, default credentials for control system devices may be publicly available. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls plac... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-18 Squeezing a Key through a Carry Bit
The Go implementation of the P-256 elliptic curve had a small bug due to a misplaced carry bit affecting less than 0.00000003% of field subtraction operations. We show how to build a full practical key recovery attack on top of it, capable of targeting JSON Web E... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Demystifying Modern Windows Rootkits
This talk will demystify the process of writing a rootkit, moving past theory and instead walking the audience through the process of going from a driver that says "Hello World" to a driver that abuses never-before-seen hooking methods to control the user-mode n... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0389
ATT&CK Technique Name:JCry
JCry has encrypted files and demanded Bitcoin to decrypt those files. [49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Heyoka Backdoor
Heyoka Backdoor has been spread through malicious document lures.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Application Developer Guidance
Applications very rarely require administrator permission. Developers should be cautioned against using this higher degree of access to avoid being flagged as a potentially malicious application. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0658
ATT&CK Technique Name:XCSSET
XCSSET uses the ssh launchdaemon to elevate privileges, bypass system controls, and enable remote access to the victim.[19] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0049
ATT&CK Technique Name:OilRig
OilRig has used PowerShell scripts for execution, including use of a macro to run a PowerShell command to decode file contents.[38][169][170] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Office Drama on macOS
In the world of Windows, macro-based Office attacks are well understood (and frankly are rather old news). However on macOS though such attacks are growing in popularity and are quite en vogue, they have received far less attention from the research and security community.In t... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has a function to hijack data from the clipboard by monitoring the contents of the clipboard and replacing the cryptocurrency wallet with the attacker's.[35][36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1034
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrifeWater
StrifeWater can send data and files from a compromised host to its C2 server.[123] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1034
ATT&CK Technique Name:StrifeWater
StrifeWater can collect the time zone from the victim's machine.[71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sykipot
Sykipot injects itself into running instances of outlook.exe, iexplore.exe, or firefox.exe.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0349
ATT&CK Technique Name:LaZagne
LaZagne can obtain credentials from web browsers such as Google Chrome, Internet Explorer, and Firefox.[44] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1602.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Device Configuration Dump
Adversaries may access network configuration files to collect sensitive data about the device and the network. The network configuration is a file containing parameters that determine the operation of the device. The device typically stores an ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0678
ATT&CK Technique Name:Torisma
Torisma can send victim data to an actor-controlled C2 server.[134] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used a compromised O365 administrator account to create a new Service Principal.[11] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Confidence in Chaos: Strategies for World-Class Security Operations
You've just found out the smart-lights in the cafeteria are connected to your corporate network and can be dimmed from anywhere in the world, the sales team has been spinning up unmanaged AWS accounts to do customer demos, and your... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0663
ATT&CK Technique Name:SysUpdate
SysUpdate can copy a script to the user owned /usr/lib/systemd/system/ directory with a symlink mapped to a root owned directory, /etc/ystem/system, in the unit configuration file's ExecStart directive to establish persistence and elevate privileges.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0455
ATT&CK Technique Name:Metamorfo
Metamorfo has a function to kill processes associated with defenses and can prevent certain processes from launching.[59][60] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-21 2021: A Titan M Odyssey
In the past years, most of the Android devices were relying on ARM Trustzone for critical security features.In 2018, with the release of the Pixel 3, Google introduced the Titan M chip, a hardware security module used to enhance the device security by reducing its attack sur... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Attacks From a New Front Door in 4G & 5G Mobile Networks
The inception of APIs in the telecom industry is destined to change the way mobile networks operated over the last 3 decades. The latest mobile networks now open their doors to enterprise customers, service providers, and application devel... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0064
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT33
APT33 has deployed a tool known as DarkComet to the Startup folder of a victim, and used Registry run keys to gain persistence.[22][23] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0666
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gelsemium
Gelsemium has the ability to perform timestomping of files on targeted systems.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0254
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLAINTEE
PLAINTEE uses the ipconfig /all command to gather the victim’s IP address.[175] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0468
ATT&CK Technique Name:Skidmap
Skidmap has the ability to set SELinux to permissive mode.[81] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0547
ATT&CK Technique Name:DropBook
DropBook has checked for the presence of Arabic language in the infected machine's settings.[116] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Users can be trained to identify social engineering techniques and phishing emails. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
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