text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:M1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Obfuscate/encrypt event files locally and in transit to avoid giving feedback to an adversary. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0937
ATT&CK Technique Name:Filter Network Traffic
Perform inline allowlisting of automation protocol commands to prevent devices from sending unauthorized command or reporting messages. Allow/denylist techniques need to be designed with sufficient accuracy to prevent the unintended blocking of valid reporti... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1002
ATT&CK Technique Name:BITTER
BITTER has exploited Microsoft Office vulnerabilities CVE-2012-0158, CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0798, and CVE-2018-0802.[25][26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0247
ATT&CK Technique Name:NavRAT
NavRAT copies itself into a running Internet Explorer process to evade detection.[39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:System Partition Integrity
Ensure Verified Boot is enabled on devices with that capability. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Bypassing Windows Hello for Business and Pleasure
Windows Hello is the most popular password-less solution that includes authentication by either PIN code or biometric authentication. As a password-less technology, Windows Hello provides people with a more convenient authentication experience compa... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Restrict Registry Permissions
Restrict Registry permissions to disallow the modification of sensitive Registry keys such as HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\NetworkProvider\Order. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0559
ATT&CK Technique Name:SUNBURST
SUNBURST collected information from a compromised host.[177][178] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0098
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackTech
BlackTech has used right-to-left-override to obfuscate the filenames of malicious e-mail attachments.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Use application control configured to block execution of MMC if it is not required for a given system or network to prevent potential misuse by adversaries. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Do not allow administrator accounts that have permissions to add IIS components to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose these permissions to potential adversaries and/or other unprivileged systems. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0409
ATT&CK Technique Name:Machete
The different components of Machete are executed by Windows Task Scheduler.[98][99] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 DnD: Decompiling Deep Neural Network Compiled Binary
The usage of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) has steadily increased in recent years. Especially when used in edge devices and embedded systems, dedicated DNN compilers are used to compile DNNs into binaries for the best performance. Security applicat... | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-22 Real-World Detection Evasion Techniques in the Cloud
Recent cloud-focused malware campaigns have shown adversary groups possess an advanced knowledge of cloud technologies and their security mechanisms, with this knowledge being used to their advantage in a range of attacks. These attacks are no lo... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1505
ATT&CK Technique Name:Server Software Component
Adversaries may abuse legitimate extensible development features of servers to establish persistent access to systems. Enterprise server applications may include features that allow developers to write and install software or scripts to extend the function... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro can use MSI files to execute DLLs.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gamaredon Group
A Gamaredon Group file stealer has the capability to steal data from newly connected logical volumes on a system, including USB drives.[13][14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0057
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tasklist
Tasklist can be used to discover processes running on a system.[253] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. Efforts should focus on minimizing the amount and sensitivity of data available to external parties. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0267
ATT&CK Technique Name:FELIXROOT
FELIXROOT collects the username from the victim’s machine.[63][64] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0561
ATT&CK Technique Name:GuLoader
GuLoader has the ability to perform anti-debugging based on time checks, API calls, and CPUID.[27] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0354
ATT&CK Technique Name:Denis
Denis exploits a security vulnerability to load a fake DLL and execute its code.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0239
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bankshot
Bankshot generates a false TLS handshake using a public certificate to disguise C2 network communications.[2] | secon |
titleblackhat:asia-23 Behind the Scenes: How Criminal Enterprises Pre-infect Millions of Mobile Devices
Mobile phones may come pre-infected with malicious firmware before they are even delivered to the customers. This is a growing problem for regular users and enterprises. Many businesses produce mobile devices by outs... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0330
ATT&CK Technique Name:Zeus Panda
Zeus Panda encrypts strings with XOR. Zeus Panda also encrypts all configuration and settings in AES and RC4.[363][364] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0168
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gazer
Gazer uses custom encryption for C2 that uses 3DES.[54][55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0490
ATT&CK Technique Name:XLoader for iOS
XLoader for iOS can obtain the device’s UDID, version number, and product number.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used PowerShell on compromised systems.[172] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Audit
Routinely check user permissions to ensure only the expected users have the ability to list IAM identities or otherwise discover cloud accounts. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0093
ATT&CK Technique Name:GALLIUM
GALLIUM has used stolen certificates to sign its tools including those from Whizzimo LLC.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can be launched by using DLL search order hijacking in which the wrapper DLL is placed in the same folder as explorer.exe and loaded during startup into the Windows Explorer process instead of the legitimate library.[25] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0096
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT41
APT41 has used hashdump, Mimikatz, and the Windows Credential Editor to dump password hashes from memory and authenticate to other user accounts.[16][17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0260
ATT&CK Technique Name:InvisiMole
InvisiMole can replace legitimate software or documents in the compromised network with their trojanized versions, in an attempt to propagate itself within the network.[8] | secon |
title:blackhat:asia-21 The Motion Sensor Western: The Good (Automatic Functionality Support), the Bad (Security Risks to Devices), and the Ugly (Privacy Risks to Individuals)
In the last decade, motion sensors (accelerometers, gyroscopes) have become more and more ubiquitous in various IoT devices (e.g., smartphones, s... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1056
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pre-compromise
This technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on behaviors performed outside of the scope of enterprise defenses and controls. | secon |
title:blackhat:us-22 A Fully Trained Jedi, You Are Not
As software organizations try to bring security earlier in the development processes, what can or should regular software or operations engineers know about security? Taking as given that we want them to build secure systems, that demands a shared understanding of ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0341
ATT&CK Technique Name:Xbash
Xbash has maliciously encrypted victim's database systems and demanded a cryptocurrency ransom be paid.[93] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0363
ATT&CK Technique Name:Empire
Empire has a module for creating a new domain user if permissions allow.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0387
ATT&CK Technique Name:KeyBoy
KeyBoy installs a service pointing to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.[70] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
System settings can prevent applications from running that haven't been downloaded through the Apple Store (or other legitimate repositories) which can help mitigate some of these issues. Also enable application control solutions such as AppLocker and/or Device... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0241
ATT&CK Technique Name:RATANKBA
RATANKBA uses HTTP/HTTPS for command and control communication.[268][269] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
During AppleJeus's installation process, it uses postinstall scripts to extract a hidden plist from the application's /Resources folder and execute the plist file as a Launch Daemon with elevated permissions.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1054
ATT&CK Technique Name:Drinik
Drinik can use overlays to steal user banking credentials entered into legitimate sites.[14] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0384
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dridex
Dridex can use multiple layers of proxy servers to hide terminal nodes in its infrastructure.[9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cleaver
Cleaver has obtained and used open-source tools such as PsExec, Windows Credential Editor, and Mimikatz.[36] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0155
ATT&CK Technique Name:WINDSHIELD
WINDSHIELD C2 traffic can communicate via TCP raw sockets.[49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dyre
Dyre has the ability to achieve persistence by adding a new task in the task scheduler to run every minute.[53] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0572
ATT&CK Technique Name:Caterpillar WebShell
Caterpillar WebShell can obtain a list of local groups of users from a system.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0335
ATT&CK Technique Name:Carbon
Carbon decrypts task and configuration files for execution.[46][47] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0660
ATT&CK Technique Name:Clambling
Clambling can capture keystrokes on a compromised host.[38][39] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1064
ATT&CK Technique Name:SVCReady
SVCReady can create a scheduled task named RecoveryExTask to gain persistence.[169] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0874
ATT&CK Technique Name:Hooking
Adversaries may hook into application programming interface (API) functions used by processes to redirect calls for execution and privilege escalation means. Windows processes often leverage these API functions to perform tasks that require reusable system resources. Window... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0687
ATT&CK Technique Name:Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink can enumerate the process it is currently running under.[70] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 Hermes Attack: Steal DNN Models In AI Privatization Deployment Scenarios
The AI privatization deployment is becoming a big market in China and the US. For example, company A has a private high-quality DNN model for live-face authentication, and it would like to sell this DNN model to other companies... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dragonfly
Dragonfly has used various types of scripting to perform operations, including Python scripts. The group was observed installing Python 2.7 on a victim.[16] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0035
ATT&CK Technique Name:SPACESHIP
SPACESHIP identifies files with certain extensions and copies them to a directory in the user's profile.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Prevent the creation of new network adapters where possible.[1][2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32's macOS backdoor can receive a "delete" command.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0381
ATT&CK Technique Name:FlawedAmmyy
FlawedAmmyy has collected information and files from a compromised machine.[73] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0422
ATT&CK Technique Name:Anubis
Anubis can create overlays to capture user credentials for targeted applications.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0078
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gorgon Group
Gorgon Group attempted to get users to launch malicious Microsoft Office attachments delivered via spearphishing emails.[103] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0316
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pegasus for Android
Pegasus for Android accesses call logs.[15] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0007
ATT&CK Technique Name:FunnyDream
During FunnyDream, the threat actors used a Visual Basic script to run remote commands.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0622
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleSeed
AppleSeed can achieve execution through users running malicious file attachments distributed via email.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0001
ATT&CK Technique Name:Frankenstein
During Frankenstein, the threat actors used Empire to obtain a list of all running processes.[95] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0013
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Sharpshooter
During Operation Sharpshooter, the threat actors used a VBA macro to execute a simple downloader that installed Rising Sun.[113] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0084
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gallmaker
Gallmaker sent emails with malicious Microsoft Office documents attached.[103] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-23 A SSLippery Slope: Unraveling the Hidden Dangers of Certificate Misuse
Digital signatures are fundamental for verifying the authenticity and integrity of untrusted data in the digital world. They ensure that software, firmware, and other digital content are not tampered with during transmission or a... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0074
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sakula
Sakula uses DLL side-loading, typically using a digitally signed sample of Kaspersky Anti-Virus (AV) 6.0 for Windows Workstations or McAfee's Outlook Scan About Box to load malicious DLL files.[57] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1026
ATT&CK Technique Name:Privileged Account Management
Modify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\AppID\\{AppID_GUID} associated with the process-wide security of individual COM applications.[12]Modify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.ex... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1031
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Intrusion Prevention
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures may be able to prevent traffic to remote access services. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dark Caracal
Dark Caracal took screenshots using their Windows malware.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1009
ATT&CK Technique Name:Triton
Triton's imain.bin payload takes commands from the TsHi.ExplReadRam(Ex), TsHi.ExplWriteRam(Ex) and TsHi.ExplExec functions to perform operations on controller memory and registers using syscalls written in PowerPC shellcode. [4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0270
ATT&CK Technique Name:RogueRobin
RogueRobin has a command named $screenshot that may be responsible for taking screenshots of the victim machine.[143] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1030
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Deny direct remote access to internal systems through the use of network proxies, gateways, and firewalls. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1078
ATT&CK Technique Name:Valid Accounts
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within ... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0495
ATT&CK Technique Name:RDAT
RDAT can issue SOAP requests to delete already processed C2 emails. RDAT can also delete itself from the infected system.[194] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0014
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Wocao
During Operation Wocao, threat actors used valid VPN credentials to gain initial access.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1018
ATT&CK Technique Name:Saint Bot
Saint Bot has used different API calls, including GetProcAddress, VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, CreateProcessA, and SetThreadContext.[151][152] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0060
ATT&CK Technique Name:BRONZE BUTLER
BRONZE BUTLER's MSGET downloader uses a dead drop resolver to access malicious payloads.[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0472
ATT&CK Technique Name:down_new
down_new has the ability to list running processes on a compromised host.[17] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-22 Chasing Your Tail With a Raspberry Pi
For some people, trying to figure out if you're being followed is a matter of physical safety for themselves or others. In this talk, we'll discuss a methodology for using low cost, off the shelf parts and some adequate python code to help determine if you're be... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors executed an encoded VBScript file using wscript and wrote the decoded output to a text file.[108] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1004
ATT&CK Technique Name:LAPSUS$
LAPSUS$ has purchased credentials and session tokens from criminal underground forums.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0091
ATT&CK Technique Name:Silence
Silence has used RAdmin, a remote software tool used to remotely control workstations and ATMs.[4] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet used xp_cmdshell to store and execute SQL code.[7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0641
ATT&CK Technique Name:Kobalos
Kobalos is triggered by an incoming TCP connection to a legitimate service from a specific source port.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0071
ATT&CK Technique Name:hcdLoader
hcdLoader installs itself as a service for persistence.[61][62] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0481
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ragnar Locker
Ragnar Locker has been delivered as an unsigned MSI package that was executed with msiexec.exe.[20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1006
ATT&CK Technique Name:PLC-Blaster
PLC-Blaster scans the network to find other Siemens S7 PLC devices to infect. It locates these devices by checking for a service listening on TCP port 102. [7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0650
ATT&CK Technique Name:QakBot
QakBot has a module that can proxy C2 communications.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0688
ATT&CK Technique Name:Meteor
Meteor execution begins from a scheduled task named Microsoft\Windows\Power Efficiency Diagnostics\AnalyzeAll and it creates a separate scheduled task called mstask to run the wiper only once at 23:55:00.[108] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0019
ATT&CK Technique Name:Naikon
Naikon has used administrator credentials for lateral movement in compromised networks.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet has been observed creating new services to maintain persistence. [48][49] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1040
ATT&CK Technique Name:Behavior Prevention on Endpoint
Some endpoint security solutions can be configured to block some types of process injection based on common sequences of behavior that occur during the injection process. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1039
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bumblebee
Bumblebee has been spread through e-mail campaigns with malicious links.[28][29] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-19 Attacking and Defending the Microsoft Cloud (Office 365 & Azure AD)
The allure of the "Cloud" is indisputable. Organizations are moving into the cloud at a rapid pace. Even companies that have said no to the Cloud in the past have started migrating services and resources. The Cloud is a new paradig... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Ember Bear
Ember Bear has executed a batch script designed to disable Windows Defender on a compromised host.[34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0411
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rotexy
Rotexy can use phishing overlays to capture users' credit card information.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0126
ATT&CK Technique Name:ComRAT
ComRAT has embedded a XOR encrypted communications module inside the orchestrator module.[9][10] | secon |
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