text stringlengths 100 9.93M | category stringclasses 11
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|---|---|
ATT&CK ID:S0681
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lizar
Lizar has a plugin to retrieve information about all active network sessions on the infected server.[46] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0930
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Segmentation
Segment operational network and systems to restrict access to critical system functions to predetermined management systems. [7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0534
ATT&CK Technique Name:Bazar
Bazar can collect the time on the compromised host.[12][13] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation Honeybee
During Operation Honeybee, the threat actors used batch files that modified registry keys.[108] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:TeamTNT
TeamTNT has developed custom malware such as Hildegard.[33] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-19 Finding Our Path: How We're Trying to Improve Active Directory Security
As the dominant directory service solution, Active Directory persists as the crucial backbone of identity, authentication, and security for organizations of all sizes. Over time, nearly every Active Directory environment be... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0497
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dacls
Dacls can encrypt its configuration file with AES CBC.[91] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0531
ATT&CK Technique Name:Grandoreiro
Grandoreiro has added BMP images to the resources section of its Portable Executable (PE) file increasing each binary to at least 300MB in size.[21] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0649
ATT&CK Technique Name:SMOKEDHAM
SMOKEDHAM has encrypted its C2 traffic with RC4.[123] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit has several modules that search the Windows Registry for stored credentials: Get-UnattendedInstallFile, Get-Webconfig, Get-ApplicationHost, Get-SiteListPassword, Get-CachedGPPPassword, and Get-RegistryAutoLogon.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0551
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldenEagle
GoldenEagle has modified or configured proxy information.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0012
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operation CuckooBees
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the net view and ping commands as part of their advanced reconnaissance.[66] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0367
ATT&CK Technique Name:Emotet
Emotet has maintained persistence through a scheduled task. [54] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0050
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT32
APT32's backdoor has used Windows services as a way to execute its malicious payload. [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0242
ATT&CK Technique Name:SynAck
SynAck abuses NTFS transactions to launch and conceal malicious processes.[8][9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0139
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerDuke
PowerDuke has a command to get text of the current foreground window.[26] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0006
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT1
APT1 has created email accounts for later use in social engineering, phishing, and when registering domains.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0493
ATT&CK Technique Name:GoldenSpy
GoldenSpy's setup file installs initial executables under the folder %WinDir%\System32\PluginManager.[64] | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Bypassing Windows Hello for Business and Pleasure
Windows Hello is the most popular password-less solution that includes authentication by either PIN code or biometric authentication. As a password-less technology, Windows Hello provides people with a more convenient authentication experience compar... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0683
ATT&CK Technique Name:Peirates
Peirates can use stolen service account tokens to perform its operations.[9] | secon |
title:blackhat:us-21 Your Software IS/NOT Vulnerable: CSAF, VEX, and the Future of Advisories
As more attention is paid to security and the underlying components used in developing software, more organizations will be sending out security advisories. As SBOMs become more widespread, many of these advisories will actual... | secon |
titleblackhat:us-20 Plundervolt: Flipping Bits from Software without Rowhammer
Fault attacks pose a substantial threat to the security of our modern systems, allowing to break cryptographic algorithms or to obtain root privileges on a system. Fortunately, fault attacks have always required local physical access to the ... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-20 Finding New Bluetooth Low Energy Exploits via Reverse Engineering Multiple Vendors' Firmwares
Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) has seen widespread product adoption and a renewed interest from a security community whose interest in Classic Bluetooth (BT) had waned. Protocols that run "above" the Host Cont... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0401
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exaramel for Linux
Exaramel for Linux has a command to download a file from and to a remote C2 server.[171][172] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1047
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mori
Mori can delete its DLL file and related files by Registry value.[153] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0373
ATT&CK Technique Name:Astaroth
Astaroth exfiltrates collected information from its r1.log file to the external C2 server. [8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Train users to be suspicious about certificate errors. Adversaries may use their own certificates in an attempt to intercept HTTPS traffic. Certificate errors may arise when the application’s certificate does not match the one expected by the host. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0356
ATT&CK Technique Name:KONNI
KONNI has stored collected information and discovered processes in a tmp file.[100] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0249
ATT&CK Technique Name:Gold Dragon
Gold Dragon lists the directories for Desktop, program files, and the user’s recently accessed files.[63] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0015
ATT&CK Technique Name:C0015
During C0015, the threat actors relied on users to enable macros within a malicious Microsoft Word document.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0425
ATT&CK Technique Name:Corona Updates
Corona Updates can collect the device’s call log.[5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:C0024
ATT&CK Technique Name:SolarWinds Compromise
During the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used fsutil to check available free space before executing actions that might create large files on disk.[340] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:HTTPBrowser
HTTPBrowser's code may be obfuscated through structured exception handling and return-oriented programming.[163] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0696
ATT&CK Technique Name:Flagpro
Flagpro can collect data from a compromised host, including Windows authentication information.[71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0063
ATT&CK Technique Name:SHOTPUT
SHOTPUT is obscured using XOR encoding and appended to a valid GIF file.[294][295] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0057
ATT&CK Technique Name:Tasklist
Tasklist can be used to discover services running on a system.[55] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0100
ATT&CK Technique Name:Inception
Inception has used decoy documents to load malicious remote payloads via HTTP.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0066
ATT&CK Technique Name:3PARA RAT
3PARA RAT has a command to retrieve metadata for files on disk as well as a command to list the current working directory.[3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0381
ATT&CK Technique Name:FlawedAmmyy
FlawedAmmyy may obfuscate portions of the initial C2 handshake.[1] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1203
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exploitation for Client Execution
Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in client applications to execute code. Vulnerabilities can exist in software due to unsecure coding practices that can lead to unanticipated behavior. Adversaries can take advantage of certain vulne... | secon |
title:blackhat:us-23 I Watched You Roll the Die: Unparalleled RDP Monitoring Reveal Attackers' Tradecraft
The Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) is a critical attack vector used by evil threat actors including in ransomware outbreaks. To study RDP attacks, we created PyRDP, an open-source RDP interception tool with unma... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0112
ATT&CK Technique Name:Windshift
Windshift has included SMS message exfiltration in the malicious apps deployed as part of Operation BULL and Operation ROCK.[51] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1497.003
ATT&CK Technique Name:Time Based Evasion
Adversaries may employ various time-based methods to detect and avoid virtualization and analysis environments. This may include enumerating time-based properties, such as uptime or the system clock, as well as the use of timers or other triggers to avoid a v... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0584
ATT&CK Technique Name:AppleJeus
AppleJeus has placed a plist file within the LaunchDaemons folder and launched it manually.[8][9] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 When Machines Can't Talk: Security and Privacy Issues of Machine-to-Machine Data Protocols
Two popular machine-to-machine (M2M) protocols—MQTT & CoAP—are slowly forming the backbone of many IoT infrastructures, including critical industry environments. They are used to provide data connectivity for... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0144
ATT&CK Technique Name:ChChes
ChChes collects the victim hostname, window resolution, and Microsoft Windows version.[86][87] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-18 A Measured Response to a Grain of Rice
Over time, our hardware has become smaller, faster, cheaper - and also incredibly more complicated. Just like with software, this complexity brings with it both increased attack surfaces and a more difficult detection problem.Unfortunately right now, when it c... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0106
ATT&CK Technique Name:Rocke
Rocke has compiled malware, delivered to victims as .c files, with the GNU Compiler Collection (GCC).[8] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0603
ATT&CK Technique Name:Stuxnet
Stuxnet was able to self-replicate by being spread through removable drives. A willing insider or unknown third party, such as a contractor, may have brought the removable media into the target environment. [12] The earliest version of Stuxnet relied on physical installatio... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0187
ATT&CK Technique Name:Daserf
Daserf hides collected data in password-protected .rar archives.[15] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-19 BluePill: Neutralizing Anti-Analysis Behavior in Malware Dissection
In the malware realm designing transparent sandboxes is only one part of the story. When analysts intervene to understand structure and functional capabilities of complex samples, a good deal of their time is wasted in disarming pil... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1041
ATT&CK Technique Name:Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over an existing command and control channel. Stolen data is encoded into the normal communications channel using the same protocol as command and control communications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:OutSteel
OutSteel has used cmd.exe to scan a compromised host for specific file extensions.[112] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0240
ATT&CK Technique Name:ROKRAT
ROKRAT can modify the HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\ registry key so it can bypass the VB object model (VBOM) on a compromised host.[138] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0070
ATT&CK Technique Name:Dark Caracal
Dark Caracal's version of Bandook adds a registry key to HKEY_USERS\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run for persistence.[69] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0113
ATT&CK Technique Name:Prikormka
Prikormka uses DLL search order hijacking for persistence by saving itself as ntshrui.dll to the Windows directory so it will load before the legitimate ntshrui.dll saved in the System32 subdirectory.[31] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0289
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pegasus for iOS
Pegasus for iOS update and sends the location of the phone.[28] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0121
ATT&CK Technique Name:Sidewinder
Sidewinder has sent e-mails with malicious links to credential harvesting websites.[22] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1630.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:File Deletion
Adversaries may wipe a device or delete individual files in order to manipulate external outcomes or hide activity. An application must have administrator access to fully wipe the device, while individual files may not require special permissions to delete dependi... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1042
ATT&CK Technique Name:Disable or Remove Feature or Program
Turn off or restrict access to unneeded VB components. | secon |
titleblackhat:us-21 Do You Speak My Language? Make Static Analysis Engines Understand Each Other
With the widespread usage of service-oriented architectures[1][2][3][4][5], detecting security issues becomes a harder task as vulnerabilities span multiple services, codebases, and programming languages.At Facebook, produc... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0379
ATT&CK Technique Name:Revenge RAT
Revenge RAT has a plugin for microphone interception.[33][34] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0813
ATT&CK Technique Name:Software Process and Device Authentication
Devices should authenticate all messages between master and outstation assets. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0941
ATT&CK Technique Name:Encrypt Sensitive Information
Information which is sensitive to the operation and architecture of the process environment may be encrypted to ensure confidentiality and restrict access to only those who need to know. [4] [5] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0630
ATT&CK Technique Name:Nebulae
Nebulae can list files and directories on a compromised host.[204] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0867
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lateral Tool Transfer
Adversaries may transfer tools or other files from one system to another to stage adversary tools or other files over the course of an operation. Copying of files may also be performed laterally between internal victim systems to support Lateral Movement with... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1016
ATT&CK Technique Name:MacMa
MacMa decrypts a downloaded file using AES-128-EBC with a custom delta.[140] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0266
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrickBot
TrickBot searches the system for all of the following file extensions: .avi, .mov, .mkv, .mpeg, .mpeg4, .mp4, .mp3, .wav, .ogg, .jpeg, .jpg, .png, .bmp, .gif, .tiff, .ico, .xlsx, and .zip. It can also obtain browsing history, cookies, and plug-in information.[303][304] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0032
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group replaced the background wallpaper of systems with a threatening image after rendering the system unbootable with a Disk Structure Wipe.[2] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1003.001
ATT&CK Technique Name:LSASS Memory
Adversaries may attempt to access credential material stored in the process memory of the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS). After a user logs on, the system generates and stores a variety of credential materials in LSASS process memory. These cred... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0801
ATT&CK Technique Name:Access Management
Access Management technologies can help enforce authentication on critical remote service, examples include, but are not limited to, device management services (e.g., telnet, SSH), data access servers (e.g., HTTP, Historians), and HMI sessions (e.g., RDP, VNC). | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0632
ATT&CK Technique Name:GrimAgent
GrimAgent can use Native API including GetProcAddress and ShellExecuteW.[86] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1038
ATT&CK Technique Name:Execution Prevention
Adversaries may use new payloads to execute this technique. Identify and block potentially malicious software executed through hijacking by using application control solutions also capable of blocking libraries loaded by legitimate software. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1063
ATT&CK Technique Name:Brute Ratel C4
Brute Ratel C4 can enumerate all processes and locate specific process IDs (PIDs).[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0623
ATT&CK Technique Name:Siloscape
Siloscape can send kubectl commands to victim clusters through an IRC channel and can run kubectl locally to spread once within a victim cluster.[10] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0685
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerPunch
PowerPunch can use the volume serial number from a target host to generate a unique XOR key for the next stage payload.[11] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0527
ATT&CK Technique Name:CSPY Downloader
CSPY Downloader can use the schtasks utility to bypass UAC.[48] | secon |
titleblackhat:eu-20 IAM Concerned: OAuth Token Hijacking in Google Cloud (GCP)
Imagine you've protected your production Google Cloud environment from compromised credentials, using MFA and a hardware security key. However, you find that your GCP environment has been breached through hijacking of OAuth session tokens ca... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0485
ATT&CK Technique Name:Mandrake
Mandrake uses foreground persistence to keep a service running. It shows the user a transparent notification to evade detection.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0682
ATT&CK Technique Name:TrailBlazer
TrailBlazer has used filenames that match the name of the compromised system in attempt to avoid detection.[42] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0453
ATT&CK Technique Name:Pony
Pony has delayed execution using a built-in function to avoid detection and analysis.[33] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0059
ATT&CK Technique Name:Magic Hound
Magic Hound enabled and used the default system managed account, DefaultAccount, via "powershell.exe" /c net user DefaultAccount /active:yes to connect to a targeted Exchange server over RDP.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1028
ATT&CK Technique Name:Operating System Configuration
Starting in Windows 11 22H2, the EnableMPRNotifications policy can be disabled through Group Policy or through a configuration service provider to prevent Winlogon from sending credentials to network providers.[6] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T1056.002
ATT&CK Technique Name:GUI Input Capture
Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for credentials with a seemingly legitimate prompt. When programs are executed that need additional privileges than are present in the current user context, it is common for the opera... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:T0823
ATT&CK Technique Name:Graphical User Interface
Adversaries may attempt to gain access to a machine via a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to enhance execution capabilities. Access to a GUI allows a user to interact with a computer in a more visual manner than a CLI. A GUI allows users to move a cursor and... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0194
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerSploit
PowerSploit contains a collection of Privesc-PowerUp modules that can discover and exploit unquoted path vulnerabilities.[6][7] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0532
ATT&CK Technique Name:Lucifer
Lucifer can use WMI to log into remote machines for propagation.[71] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S1068
ATT&CK Technique Name:BlackCat
BlackCat has the ability to encrypt Windows devices, Linux devices, and VMWare instances.[30] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0027
ATT&CK Technique Name:Threat Group-3390
Threat Group-3390 has performed DLL search order hijacking to execute their payload.[35] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M0807
ATT&CK Technique Name:Network Allowlists
Use host-based allowlists to prevent devices from accepting connections from unauthorized systems. For example, allowlists can be used to ensure devices can only connect with master stations or known management/engineering workstations. [9] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0692
ATT&CK Technique Name:SILENTTRINITY
SILENTTRINITY can transfer files from an infected host to the C2 server.[114] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:M1017
ATT&CK Technique Name:User Training
Applications may send push notifications to verify a login as a form of multi-factor authentication (MFA). Train users to only accept valid push notifications and to report suspicious push notifications. | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G1001
ATT&CK Technique Name:HEXANE
HEXANE has identified executives, HR, and IT staff at victim organizations for further targeting.[2][3] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0129
ATT&CK Technique Name:AutoIt backdoor
AutoIt backdoor attempts to escalate privileges by bypassing User Access Control.[12] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0331
ATT&CK Technique Name:Agent Tesla
Agent Tesla has the ability to decrypt strings encrypted with the Rijndael symmetric encryption algorithm.[6] | secon |
title:blackhat:eu-20 How Embedded TCP/IP Stacks Breed Critical Vulnerabilities
In the past few years, there's been a rise in critical vulnerabilities affecting embedded TCP/IP stacks which had remained undiscovered for over a decade. The direct, unauthenticated and sometimes cross-perimeter network exposure of these st... | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0657
ATT&CK Technique Name:BLUELIGHT
BLUELIGHT has exfiltrated data over its C2 channel.[17] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0441
ATT&CK Technique Name:PowerShower
PowerShower has the ability to deploy a reconnaissance module to retrieve a list of the active processes.[203] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:G0087
ATT&CK Technique Name:APT39
APT39 has created scheduled tasks for persistence.[18][19][20] | secon |
ATT&CK ID:S0661
ATT&CK Technique Name:FoggyWeb
FoggyWeb can masquerade the output of C2 commands as a fake, but legitimately formatted WebP file.[16] | secon |
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