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<poi>
In both worlds, these two parts of the government work together. I don't see why you get that a drastic change or you get any additional synergy. They will still,
</poi>
if there is no drastic change, then we can just do this, because if there's no drastic change then why not?
And two, we have explained to you that there are a lot of situations where the incentive of government are basically short-term fixed patch a problem because they have short-term incentives. Their incentive is to the next ballot, the main people check. They want you to remember that I padded your wallet $200 every month. Please remember that when you check my name on the ballot box.
Politicians have inherently significantly more perverse incentives. Because of the short-termist nature of their election cycle. Whereas central banks, as opening opposition to some extent agrees with us, are significantly more technocratic in their approach. Meaning they have a significantly greater incentive to actually want to apply the best rates possible in order to get out of the economic recession, because when the blame is starting to be laid at them more explicitly for how things operate.
They also will want to properly justify themselves. Notably, however, because they have longer-term strategic incentives, they know that it's not worth trading off the benefit of right now to being criticized three years later when then your economy tanks because your currency has been devaluated to the point of being a fucking joke.
That is something that politicians generally speaking have less interest in. We see politicians like, thinking that printing more money is a genuine way out of recessions. We think it is therefore significantly better to stand on the side of technocracy. Proud to stand in opening government.
</dpm>
<dlo>
This debate is not about whether or not we come out of economic crisis. This debate is about how we choose to come out of economic crisis.
I first want to give you four structural reasons as to why that broad strokes claim that politicians are dumb and people are dumb and thus, they will never make good decisions for the economy is flawed. I'm going to give you four counter-structural reasons why politicians also have huge incentives to fix the economy. One, their popularity rating matters like Biden's popularity rating is at an all-time low because of inflation, which means that people actually do care about the fact that gas prices are incredibly high, goods prices are incredibly high.
Second, midterm elections. The Democrats are likely going to use the midterm election owned primarily because Biden hasn't handled the economic crisis properly and is getting flagged a shit for it. Third, coalition building. In a vast majority of cases, if you want Congress and Senate support from other parties, you are very likely to not get that if you're handling the economic conditions or the economic longevity of the country quite poorly.
Fourth and finally, lobby groups. Industry leaders from all around the world do not want, like, you're all around the states or any country, do not want your economy to continuously negotiate; they won't fund you in the next election if the economy keeps on going shit because they'll think that you are just a bad president who doesn't know how to grow the economy.
All of these four intra-structural reasons, I just think are more mechanistically robust than what they say. Because they say that all you care about is reelection and pleasing the people, so you will do stupid shit. I gave you four other reasons as to why you won't do stupid shit.


The reason why you ban are not only, is this more mechanistically robust but it's also just more sensible as to why, like, a politician won't just go batshit crazy. Second, they talk about populism because apparently populism is the angle that they want to win this debate upon. Look, one, voter authorization. If you make people go like, you don't understand long-term anything, you don't understand the economy, you're more likely to breed more populism, that is to say like more and more people are just going to get pissed off that the people that they're voting to power, don't essentially have the control over taxes.
Taxes hurt people, by the way. It takes away a massive part of your income. So, I think populous leaders like Putin or Donald Trump are going to point fingers at the central bank and go like the central bank is the reason why they are doing this. So, they're going to resolve themselves of all the blame. The reason why this matters panel is that you breed more populism under your world, period.
But I think, secondly, Sarm's argumentation, the second piece of argumentation that Sarm provided that I'm now going to rebuild, also tells you why populism gets worse under your world. I.E. populous governments, like, like, fuck with the Central Bank significantly more. The core trucks is that nepotism and like all these other things massively increase under their world, in which means that central banks cannot operate independently.
Look, when you make populous leaders desperate, they do desperate things. Simply, like, they lobby more. I mean, lobby more, they bribe more, they give personal threats, they create political gridlocks, or sometimes even shut down the government, or they demonize the high executives. These are like five, six different ways in which they can do desperate things.
What is the marginal impact? And I agree it's marginal because I just don't think this debate can happen in like, populous utopias. But here's the marginal impact. I agree that there's some nepotism right now. You know, the president elects the board, and the board gets verified by the Senate, right? But under their world, what happens is, after that nepotism, there's more nepotism because every time the central bank tries to do something, like, especially on the budget case, like, these populous leaders, like, do things like lobbying, do things like create gridlocks, do things like personally threaten them, do things like trying to like, you know, take them out of power.
Which means that in every set of the way, central banks' tools are now significantly politicized. The reason why that negates the power of central banks is because under our world, the central bank is again, to the best of its ability, like a quasi-public or just like a party that checks the government back. Insofar as it becomes more politicized because again, populous leaders have an incentive to do this.
I just don't think you get the material impacts of central banks' high executives in central banks being able to like, think freely and make technocratic decisions. Insofar as you make desperate leaders significantly more desperate under your panel. Please note that this is very important engagement because again, they try to coop with the benefit of not having a populous leader like Putin in the sphere.
But at the simultaneously, they just go like, oh, if you give it to the central bank, Putin will back off, right? Like, I mean, come on, that doesn’t add up. Um, the last thing I just want to review before going on to my argumentation is that they say that the reason why central banks are currently harmed is because there is no synergy between monetary and fiscal policy.


The reason why I want to refute this, I just don't think monetary and fiscal policy is supposed to be seen or just, or like whatever the fucking word is. Period. Because it's supposed to be flexible and it's supposed to be checked back. Because these are two sets of different tools. Which means that when the government says fiscal policy, the monetary policy is supposed to, like, you know, like go the opposite route.
If it is to, like, stop the extremities of the fiscal policy happening, it's supposed to be countered, it's not supposed to be synergistic. I just don't understand why it needs to because that's the entire point of the central bank being a separate body from the government. It's supposed to check back the economic decisions that the government makes.
Why then under our world are governments better? Just like they literally just try to refute the information incentive that gives you. That the governments are better because they have a tripod, say, than more information. Sam gives you three additional ones that they don't. Sam tells you A, they're very moderated. I.E. They have Senate and Congress to check back on them.
Second, Sarm told you they have a closer proximity to people. The reason why is just objectively is, because the government understands who is the most vulnerable and caters to them the most. But third, they have international institution collaboration. Why is this important? Because it negates why the government in the vast majority of cases, which are not populous countries, are likely to be moderate and likely to be conscientious of the economic decisions that they make.
Why will the lack of power prolong harm under their world? Simply panel, and this is where the trade-off happens. They are like, oh no, there is no trade-off. Like, they will always agree, no. Sometimes the government will want to give stimulus checks, but the central bank is going to go like increases debt, you cannot do this.
Sometimes the government is going to try to like, you know, like, like, help Ukraine, but like the government, the central banks going to go like, no.
But before I move on, CG.
<poi>
Yes, we're going to explain to you that regardless of whether these policies are identical, the fact that a more trusted body is making them means the economy will be more stable and recover faster.
</poi>
I already told you that A, there are no, like just because they are away from the public doesn't make them more trustworthy, but two, I've told you why these populous leaders that OG talks about will now pander to them significantly at a higher degree, which means that they won't have the independence that they have under the status quo.
Why is one priority more important than the other, panel, and this is the weighing, right? So, I agree that sometimes the government is going to give stimulus checks even though they shouldn't because it increases debt and that's bad for the economy. Three structural reasons why as to why the soft cushioning of the economic crisis on vulnerable people matter the most.
One, the lives of people are more important right now, which means that the belief in their government institutions decreases under their world. Second, they are more likely to have more instability and protest. Because economic crises are the time in which you require faith in the government. That goes down.


But third, economic growth only makes sense if it protects the most vulnerable. So, under your world, I believe central banks can reduce debt. I believe central banks can reduce inflation. But in the meantime, these measures are most likely to harm the more vulnerable people. The people that the government needs to protect because they understand them and they need to win their votes.
For all of these reasons, panel, please consider that the way, it's about the method to which you come out of an economic crisis, not just coming out of the economic crisis in general.
</dlo>
<mg>
Martha says she has more trust in the management of the central bank than in the government. She doesn't explain, analyze, or impact why she feels this way. I'm going to explain to you why Martha feels what she feels and why other people feel the way Marta does and why that is important, I.E. why, even if the government and central bank have the same policies or the same like, incentives or ability or whatever to have good policies. Um, or even if the government policies are better than the central banks' policies. Why the central banks involvement makes rebounding from crisis significantly more likely in less amount of time and due to additional buy-in from society and additional cooperation from the people within the state.
Why is this the case, right? Cuz why do people see the government as responsible? Cuz nobody, this, the government was in charge at the point of which you have an economic recession or economic crisis. Two, we think that each party has the incentive to slander the other party and blame the economic recession on the other party because they have the incentive to get elected in the next election cycle and they want to distance themselves from this economic crisis, and so they're going to spend extra time painting the exact situation and the exact harms that the citizens are currently experiencing and pushing that and saying this is a 100% to the people that you ought to be blaming.
And if you want to make changes, if you want to change society, you ought to remove them from government and the people in power are also going to be saying this against their opposition party, I.E. We are the only people who can change the situation, we are the only people and it's all because of the lack of ability to pass legislation that we ended up in this situation, which means that people within the government have the incentive to convince the voter race that the government as a whole is not competent.
They are not able to pass legislation that is effective in creating a positive economy or a good economy. Note that also, corporations and businesses also have the incentive to shift blame for rising prices and for changing policies and changing actions around the crisis onto the government because they do not want backlash and they do not want to take blame upon themselves.


And going to point out that hey, this is the government. This is not our fault. This is like, if you want someone to complain to, complain to them. And also note that each party at any given point in time has probably entered you into a crisis prior to this, even if it's not this specific crisis, so they have already shown that they are also inept, so they're not necessarily a better alternative than what you had in the status quo.
An opening opposition says, ah, but like, what if you would manage the crisis well or whatever? But even if you manage the crisis well, even if you do well in the past, or you're doing well now, or whatever policies happen now are good, you can always be better. So, no, let's say in the cold pandemic Israel, we had very little deaths in the beginning, but there were still significant backlash against the government and the government policies.
For both having extreme restrictions, and for relaxing the restrictions and for the economy. So there is no way that the government is seen as a competent body or a body that is doing what is in the interest of the people, etcetera.


Why do they not have these views on central banks? Firstly, and so far as a the central bank is often nominated. Not that we're not only talking about the US but people in the central bank are actively bipartisan, actively nominated by both parties by many people in the political system over time which means that we have people of different economic opinions within their things and people of different party affiliations.
So they're not seen as identified to a specific party and also the central bank actively distances themselves from partnership and from advocacy for political campaigning, etcetera as part of their thing and differentiation of powers, etcetera. But also note that the government has an incentive for a good relationship with the banks, so they're unlikely to schedule or put blame on the central bank for their actions in the future given that these are the same people who are going to be in the central bank or many of the people are going to be the same.
There are some different ones, they have the incentives to in the future have collaboration and have good interest rates or whatever and to be able to advance their policies. But also, companies have the incentive to also have good relationships. To have good ability to get loans. The individuals working in banks, etcetera, also have these incentives.
So like flee to slander and put this hate, put this backlash and criticism on the, this like not criticism but like, defaulting to the worst scenario or incompetence, so you are more likely to have more belief because you have less negative discourse about them from the get-go. Why is the lack of trust in policies important? Because if you think someone is a bad actor or you think they're going to be incompetent or you think they're going to compromise stupidly, you're going to prepare yourself for a situation where what they do doesn't work and you're going to expect what they do not to work;
And so you're going to have less buy-in because people are already preparing for the crisis to never end or for the policies to not work. Uh, before I continue into the impact, yeah, I'll take CO. CO, I want to know what you're going to run.
<poi>
Yeah, all the reasons of backlash you gave is the single biggest reason why governments are not going to be just playing stupid about their fiscal budgets. It's also just true that stimulus checks sometimes.
</poi>
Fine, the governments can be brilliant. They can make the best fiscal policies and the best budget policies.
The problem is that people don't believe that is what they are doing. Right? And when people believe that the government is incompetent or the government is making bad decisions, they protest against it because they have seen this incompetence and they do not want this incompetence to continue. They push for political change which means that even if the policy is good, it won't work because it's going to be changed by the next people in power before it actually gets the outcome it wants, right.
This means that people have less confidence in the economic rebounding which means they are less likely to like, they’re more likely to keep their money in savings, so they think they won’t get very much in the short term, on the next extended period, so they want to ensure they have money there, which means that they are less likely to spend it, and to invest it in the economy, which means they have less money within the economy. And that means that people who need money are less likely to get money because people aren't spending money. Um, and so it is not being circulated, right?
This also means companies are also preparing for the economic crisis to last a long time. Which means they do things like laying off workers, looking for other areas to make themselves more stable, and cutting costs. We think this also impacts the worse off minorities or that opening opposition talks about by extending the crisis and magnifying the impacts on everyone in society.
For all reasons, please propose a motion. Thank you very much for that speech. I'd like to call on the final speaker for the opposition.
</mg>
<mo>
So I don't really know a lot about the economy to be honest and I don't particularly like it, but even I know that people sit in central banks are usually incompetent and bad and really don't know what they're doing in most of the countries, right?
I mean the governor of Serbia is Jorgovanka Tabaković, and I assure you that she knows less economy than all of us in this room. So, top half so far is a wash really. The opening government tells you this is going to be done in a good manner, opening opposition says it's going to be done in a bad manner. We like opening government because they are friends, right?


But it's still unclear who wins on this clash because in some countries it's going to be like this, in other countries going to probably be like this. So you tell me panel who persuades to do more and who you trust more on this clash. We don't find it very important. We don't find it like anybody managed to persuade us more.
Prior to going on to inter-extension, one very important piece of trade. Notice, this debate probably doesn't have a big effect in developing countries. Why? Because here, even though in theory, you will, this would mean that like central control fiscal policy, right. It would still be under politicians, right. Notice like no central banks decide all of these things.
Literally no effect, right? Why? Because number one, there is corruption; ecause secondly, these people are chosen by the politicians because you have no institutions, because you usually have no civil society, no NGOs, and people are generally unaware of these problems. Meaning that no matter which of these you choose, they are probably still going to be run by politicians and politicians are probably still going to do most of the policy anyways, right?
Notice that then this debate takes place in different places where you have the institutions, you have the civil society such as the EU, the United States, and everything else. This framing is going to be important for my second argument. So, I'm going to let you know when this actually happens.


So, let's talk about number one, right. Notice that if you limit the budget of the politicians, and Marta said this is going to be reasonable, but you're still going to have to limit the budget of the politicians. There are a few reasons why this is true. Number one, notice that you don't necessarily know how long the crisis is going to last, meaning that you have to be restricted, right. But secondly, the mainstream economy and the old guys that usually sit in the central banks are usually for austerity. They don't like spending. They think spending is bad, etcetera, etcetera. Thirdly, notice that it is usually in their financial interest to have less spending, right? Because they themselves are usually rich, one plus tax and things like this.
So, notice that you necessarily do have to have a limit towards budgets even though it's usually going to be solidly reasonable. You still have to cut budgets. This is like the principle of this debate. So, why is this important? If you do this, notice that the politicians, what they end up doing is cut or give up on long-term projects which don't lead to good immediate effects, right.
Why is this true? Number one, because it's a crisis, right. So politicians want immediate effects. That makes them look like they do know what they're doing and they're doing a good job through the crisis. Secondly, it's very hard to survive the crisis as a politician. So you need fast votes and you need people to like you. Hence, you need immediate effects, right.
You want immediate past effects and long-term projects are usually something that requires time and not necessarily gives you these immediate effects. So, why are these projects in abstract good, right? Because notice that this is very important for the economy. These are usually infrastructure, energy, trade, and projects related to all of these things, right. Because in order to get out of crisis, like especially for poorer countries like Bulgaria or Greece, you need a lot of spending on all of these things. But notice also because it's the crisis, right? It's usually your companies that will go bankrupt if you spend on large projects; your local companies are usually the ones that work and they create roads and pay workers and everything else.
So, this is why these projects are usually bad, right? But what is the comparative? When you don't have the money as a politician, these are the first projects that you usually cut and the reason for this is, as I already mentioned, because they don't have an immediate effect, right?
Notice that when you have the unlimited amount, you're likely going to push for these projects anyways, even though they don't give you the immediate effect because you don't necessarily have to watch out what you're spending on, you don't have a limited budget.
The only comparative when you do, you cut on these projects which is very bad because this is something that slows down your exit from the crisis and that is very important. So, what is the impact of this? Notice that this means that politicians are more and more short-termist, right?
They don't think about the long-term projects which is bad because you're going to recover from the crisis slower. But also, notice the important thing, there is no accountability, right? So, every time there is a bad policy, politicians blame the central bank. They say, we don't have power over this. This is something that the central bank does, so you go talk to them.
Notice that they always blame and put the default on the central bank and this is bad, right? Because this is easier to push bad policy. There's no leverage; you can't call out all of these things. This is the important thing, right, because they have this puppet they use to always blame them for what's going on.
Let's talk about the EU second because I already told you at the beginning of my speech that this debate takes place in good places like the EU, not like Serbia or anything else, right? So, why is this important? Because notice that the countries can't make their own fiscal policy, right? It means that you can't decide for yourself how much money you want to spend on, like, how much money you have to spend for education, for work protection, and everything else.


Why is, like, why can't they decide on their own? Because notice that the European Central Bank will necessarily push for less money, right? We already told you why this necessarily happens. But also, it will be very unpopular to give more money to one country in the EU and then less money to the other country in the EU.


They necessarily have to give the same amount or pretty much the same amount and everything else. Notice that for this, is also like bad for small countries, right. Because small countries have less lobbying power to use, so they can push less agenda for getting more money and everything else.
So, what happens is you get less money to these countries in fiscal policy as a matter of getting out of crisis. Why is this bad? Because in order to get out of the crisis, you need to spend more money, right. This is especially true for small countries like Bulgaria or whatever, right.
Because you need to spend on infrastructure, you need to spend on energy, you need to spend on education, right? You notice it before all of these things, you need a lot of money. This is quite literally the only important thing, right.

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