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In that case, even in the long term, this might get better. They don't prove it gets better if it initially doesn't work. I don't know why it will work in the long run. But secondly, about parents, not those they give the example of football, right? That you integrate with them. But this happens because the footballers talk to each other 40 hours a week. You see your neighbors for five minutes in the store. Why does this lead to integration? Why does this mean understanding their stories? Why does it mean you're now changing your water preferences to advocate for them? No analysis here.

Now, on OG, I wasn't positive. They think, "Ah, our arguments are completely not changed on the integration," but that is bullshit, as it's pointed out by other teams in the case, meaning are the you having access to good schools depends on teachers not being racist to you, and it depends on people actively being able to help you and advocate for you. They say, "Ah, but you get more food stamps." This depends on people actively being okay with their taxes being redistributed to you, which they don't prove.

Now, what is the problem with their case? Generally, they say that in the best case you get some skills because you go to a good school. Why won't those schools and services be good for you? One, teachers will just not pay attention to you. I wouldn't—the worst case where there are racists and they don't think you deserve this attention. But secondly, in the best case, they physically cannot pay attention to you because the discrepancy between the levels of preparedness within students is very different. Some kids have been in prep school their entire life, and then you get some black kids who have had bad teachers beforehand. That's why you won't be able to pay attention to them.

But lastly, parents lobby for the white kids to get the attention of the teachers; otherwise, they pull out their donations or their funding. Comparatively, teachers do a lot of things like donating to charitable charity things when they go to poor regions to feel like they're bringing value. This is the solvency. OG.

<poi>
Gentrification actually happens in non-diverse neighborhoods. Now, when it gets diverse, no one wants violence because their own house value would decrease if it's in a dangerous neighborhood.
</poi>

No, If you wanted to respond to all arguments about violence, sure, we do not argue violence. We just explained that people will not accept you and won't give you the opportunities, not to talk about. I'm not sure why this is so hard to understand.

Now, comparing with all, I want to weigh out a few things. Why is money and having the ability to pay for yourself the most important thing? One, it gives you sovereignty, but you can't go to protest because you have to work two jobs as opposed to one to keep up with the high expenses of rent you have in your area. You can't, for example, donate and save up money because now all of your money goes to just getting your groceries every week. Even if nothing's insignificant at first, it piles up to the point that it's so expensive that you can't do those things.

Secondly, you have to cut costs; you can't eat less food. you can't concentrate because you less productive because you can't fucking afford it. why it is more important than all one none of their arguments are unproved to the point at which they don't prove why ethnic tensions happens. Their principle is based on practical, but the most important thing is money really determines self-expression, which they defend because when you have the money, you can donate, you can go to church, you can build it up. I'm very happy to fucking oppose.
</ow>
<pm>
When crisis hit, I have far more trust in Christine Lagarde or Janet Yellen or fucking even Alan than I have in Trump, or Evan, right? Before I go into training, five different reasons but just like what central banks are going to be incredibly better at this. I want to give three points of framing. Firstly, how would this look like, right? I think it's very, very intuitive. Every central bank all around the world has huge incentives to put up a reasonable spending cap and I do believe this not to be out of generally what the general public wants or for example also what the other experts in the field want.
Why is this likely to be quite reasonable? First of all, I don't think they want to disturb the economy by setting a limit which is very, very much under what the market expects or very much over what the market expects, right? Very often they don't want to create incompetence in the economy. So I think they will actually think twice and the limit that I said is actually going to be quite decent. Second of all, I do believe banking people who work in central banks are very immune to criticism from other economists, from their other professionals and they do have huge incentives to not pump this up. But really, notice a bunch of times central banks are not just very prudish, right? Very often, sometimes, they think expansionary policy is okay. Sometimes they think that being like, monetary, like, respective is just fine.


Meaning, to some extent, there is no clear reason why they don't always set the limit very high or very low. I do believe they have huge incentives to do it properly and to do it on a case-by-case basis, right? Secondly, like where does debate actually matter, right? And because like not in the CDM is actually not to me. I don't think the debatable matter a bunch of times, right? I think in the majority of cases, if the country is kind of decent, right? People who are running the central banks and people who are like, running like the treasury are kind of going to come to an agreement, right?


In a bunch of cases, they do coordinate their income policy, they do it in the impactful cases. This will just not be that important, right? However, we think that the debate creates and where this debate matters is where there's a huge disagreement between both the officials and politicians and what the central bank thinks and knows is the best. And I do believe these are the set of cases where these will matter the most. Third thing in framing, I just want to deal with the principle because most likely they will try to run this, right? Oh, but now you're taking the principle right away for people to kind of determine taxes, right?
I think firstly, you know, to some extent this is fine. But you already are doing this. In the moment, central banks are already given the full mandate to do whatever they fucking want in monetary policy, right? And I do believe both oppositions have the burden to explain why the additional things that they cannot do is something which is meaningfully principally different, right?
And second of all, I do miss to some extent a bunch of voters actually just care about the effective economic policy because this is something that they can feel on their own skin versus some arbitrary notion of maybe their agency to determine a part of their income policies taken away from them. I just don't think this will matter that much.


Okay. Let's then dive into five reasons why generally central banks are going to be quite decent when they set those limits and why politicians are going to be specifically in terms of economic crisis. First and kind of obvious incentives. Central banks don't care about getting re-elected. People who are in power. do care.
What kind of incentive does this give them, right? This gives them the incentive to pander to what the average voter thinks is actually a good economic policy. However, the issue is that very often the average voter just does not know anything about economics or at least has some very dear notion.
What very often happens, is that people just assume that is good, right. Specifically in times of crisis, right. So to some extent, this is kind of the incentives that politicians offer do pander to, right? That's how for example, in the US, we ended up with a huge amount of government spending even though every economist basically said that this is bullshit, right?
Exactly because Biden and the Democrats know that their constituency thinks that spending is actually good, right. On a comparative, right. We actually give the power to people which are not elected by, they don't have the incentive. They don't need anyone to vote for them in three years, right?
That's why they basically have been sending to decide, what is the best economic policy at the time, what will actually be better for the long term, right. So, this is why to some extent, they're far better in deciding this. Second of all, they have a long-term incentive, right?
In central banks, like Corinthian, they're often elected for a very long period of time. They refuse to spend for 10 to 15 years, right? And they care shit ton about their reputation, right. They very often care about what is the legacy which they live in a specific institution, right.
So, to some extent, exactly because they don't need to be re-elected every two to three years, this gives them the incentive to actually not pander but think long-term, right. To think what's going to happen in 10 to 15 years because they're still going to be there.
On a comparative, right? Notice how short-term election cycles actually are. This is basically like four to three years, but often when an economic crisis comes, very often like cycles are even shorter because they're often economic crises being inherent political instability.
Very often elections are quite like, common, meaning politicians have a very short-term incentive, right. And they actually, even if maybe they want to look at the long run, they just don't have the ability to do it, right. Exactly because they know, that they will potentially not be there in five years, right?
And then they have the election which is going to happen the next time, right? This gives them the incentive to think short-term and actually fuck up economic policy much, much, much more. Before I go on, I would love to take CO. If CO, then OO.
<poi>
So, the Federal Reserve Board is elected, is nominated by the President and approved by the US Senate. If that is true, why doesn't that mean there are much more increases under your vote?
</poi>
Uh, I don't think pandering increases much on our side because I do believe a bunch of these people actually have to be quite professional.


Even if maybe they are, like, they're basically 10 to 15 years quite often, which is far longer than any politician so far. Good reason why this is generally going to give better policies is, central banks are actually able to make synergy fiscal and monetary. You know, this is at the moment. They're basically able to control only monetary policy.
Which is fine. It actually gets fucked up when people in power decide to take different and there is an opposite policy. Now this is very often, right. ECB is very like, actually like the monetary supply. However, what actually does happen is, the government spends a bunch of money, right.
Meaning to select is that easy is pushed in a corner and has to adopt their policy. This is why very often you push countries even more into crisis. Exactly because there is no synergy between monetary and fiscal policy, right? So, to some extent, that gets far better when like central banks are able to basically command both branches of monetary supply.
Fourthly, right. I don't think the ECB has the need to make partisan compromises. Notice what happens very often when like, when an economic crisis happens. Very often this comes with political crisis happening as well. Very often parties in order to stay in power in these specific cases need to make like awful compromises.
Very often compromises are either A, we're not going to spend at all or B, we're going to overspend because we want to pay for every project every party wants because we still want them to vote us in and to keep us in power, right? This very often creates like incredibly harmful economic conditions, right.
Either you're overspending or underspending, right. On a comparative, ECB has no incentive to make this type of partisan compromises, right? They very often have the incentive to look at what's going to be the best and basically be very independent in doing this. And this is why I do believe just like giving Christine Lagarde the right to decide is far better than fucking Erdona deciding. Very proud to propose.
</pm>
<lo>
Two bits of framing off the get-go. The first is to say that crises are somewhat unpredictable but also inevitable, I.E. One, economies generally tend to be older, business bust, and business booms. Things go up and down, but secondarily, exhaust and shocks are kind of hard to predict and kind of hard to prevent, I.E. you don't know when the next war is going to happen, you don't know when the next supply shock is going to happen in an increasingly interconnected world. Those are inevitable.
The ability to cushion and protect the greater society from the impact of rising prices, inflation, or recession is what's supremely important in this debate. Is, at the end of the day, the reason why even central banks want to maintain is, the side that wins this round. The essential claim from team opening opposition is going to be that governments need the freedom to control the size of the budget to do things in the short to medium term that they deem to be important for people's livelihood.
Cuz that otherwise people protest, people turn to instability and that's largely a far worse outcome than like, bad prices in the short term. The second thing I want to do is just characterize economic crisis for you because OG does not do this surprisingly. Firstly, I think economic crisis generally formed through exogenous shocks, things like sanctions causing cost for inflation. Secondly, through poor regulation of industries, since the finance industry in 2008, or thirdly through uncertainty, which causes a loss in investor’s confidence.
I think the outcomes you want to achieve therefore want to implement things like better regulation to prevent and increase stability. Secondly, to stimulate consumer confidence. Why then do we think government incentives are better? This is the first argument from opening opposition. Firstly, I think governments are just more holistic, I.E. They are made up of various departments that engage in inter-departmental discourse, I.E. The tripartite state format allows, but also just different departments within local and federal between, ah, between like healthcare and education.
All engage in discourse that allows for a number of outcomes. Firstly, you have greater information. That is to say, you have more information coming from various departments, things like census and demographic control that allow you to make better decisions and provide a more holistic approach. This looks like multi-faceted infrastructure bills that generate both employment but also decrease things like environmental costs and things like spending loss.
This I think mitigates a lot of OG's framing that short-term incentives are necessarily bad because I think you have more information to make better decisions in the short term and that's increasing. Secondly, proximity to people. This is to say that governments are more accountable to their voter base. They have to engage in things like surveys, in terms of census and data collection, but also the reelection incentive means you have to listen to people in ways that central banks don't.
I think that it's unlike the pandering to voters who know nothing is a silly argument for two reasons. Firstly, I think generally we know that authority has failed, look at Greece for example, but secondarily, people know what they need. In the short term, if people don't get what they need, like things like stimulus checks, people can't afford things like healthcare or food. They revolt and turn against you. That generates further instability in the long term. It's probably worse. Third, the third incentive is checking balances, I.E. There are just weird means of checking balances internally between sectors that fight over parts of the budget, but also externally from the public that is watching what you do with their money. Fourthly, is a connection to outside actors. This is to say that governments have negotiating power with international institutions that can call on things like expertise, but also things like bonuses and better funding from things like the IMF or the World Bank.
But even if that's not the case, there's also other governments you can turn to like allies for better in funding. The Central Bank lacks the ability to coordinate these sorts of strategies and therefore, lacks capacity but also lacks decision-making for like justification authority. Why does the lack of control over the budget hurt the government? Firstly, a lower budget means you lose out on things like decision-making power, I.E. you can't give aid to people such as stimulus checks when they're facing large amounts of poverty or unemployment.
This is super bad, one, because people can't afford a decent quality of life and turn against you. But secondly, because people just get hurt on mass and usually get hurt means that people turn against each other which generally causes further instability in the long term and decreases investor confidence. But secondly, the level of ability you have to control shocks also decreases, I.E. engaging in more aid to say Ukraine is still somewhat better.


If America can do that because at least you can help to decrease the long-term impacts of war. If you can give more aid or controlled budget towards outside actors, you can probably decrease the level of instability in those actors and that I think is something that can help provide some amount of alleviation from economic crisis as well.
The point therefore is capacity, If the government can't take on debt, it can't be effective. That is the level of poverty increases unpredictably. The ability to have a flexible budget allows them to adapt and account for that. The central bank's long-term incentives don't meet those short-term needs. This is the comparative proof to you now. Why central banks are comparatively worse? First, they're technocratic, which means that they aren't as linked to the people who are accountable to them.
Which means that any decisions they make are not decisions that are taken necessarily in people's, in the common person's desires, but more in terms of investor or price confidence. Secondly, they're immune to critique. Right? This is to say that even if they make a bad decision, it's unlikely to hear it in time to reverse a decision. But thirdly, their priorities are simply different from what people need. Things like, reducing debt and increasing reserves or maintaining price stability, don't always come at the cost of the common person's quality of life.


I think that's necessarily bad because it flips all of OG's characterization of central banks being good actors and they say that, they have just a higher chance of being bad actors too. All of these needs are a priority. People need stimulus, people need subsidies, people need spending, and the government needs to be able to be flexible and adapt to those crises. Because crises always involve unique situations every time. They don't often follow the same patterns in 2008 that they do in 2012.
Before I go on, CG.
<poi>
Since, central banks anyway command full monetary policy, they presumably have also the access to all data that you can say, and it’s unclear why they can also not coordinate with other government agencies.
</poi>
Because the central bank is just one branch. The government is the entire collective of those branches. The ability to coordinate that information but also to weigh that against your own priorities is different, right? I.E. If I'm a bunch of technocrats making decisions, I have different priorities and a different level of proximity than different state departments do.
Second argument, this hurts central banks' decision-making. That is to say that the central bank is more likely to become politicized. Why? Because they're given more power. I.E. it opens them up to political actors who not only entrench themselves into the central bank's ability to make decisions. I.E. If I know the central bank has control over my budget, I as a senator, I as a party, am more likely to want to politicize that branch of government so that I have some level of influence over the central bank decision-making.
I think in this quo, government having autonomy over the budget means it has no incentive to entrench itself and interfere with central bank decision-making. I think that's necessary better, because in that world, the central bank can make autonomous decisions and that aren't interfered by government, which means that you kind of meet OG's burden as well but more importantly, it keeps the government autonomous and therefore, that's made it soon that they need to do.
I think why this is bad is because it mitigates the central bank's own responsibilities on things like price stability and debt alleviation. For all those reasons, proud to oppose.
</lo>
<dpm>
Panel, the underlying premise on opening opposition's case, is that inherently central banks will always reduce the rate of money that exists in the market, will reduce the amount of budget governments have, and will always, no matter the context, act against the interests of the people, against the interests of the economy, whatever.
This is just factually incorrect, because central banks actually have every incentive to get the country out of economic crisis. Why? And if their primary incentive is to regulate the money supply, the money supply is also significantly impacted by the way the economy performs. Note, for example, that if the general wealth of the country goes down significantly, corporations start going down, and people start going bankrupt.
There's no one who has the ability to spend. The value of the currency also decreases. Meaning that the central bank has a structural incentive to keep currencies relatively stable and that incentive exists symmetrically in terms of wanting to ensure that the country gets out of the economic crisis. What central banks don't have an incentive to do is to act in a populist manner.
This is the critical distinction because opening opposition tells us stimulus packages are inherently necessary. Probably I agree. Probably the United States government could have, even with a smaller budget, budget hit for stimulus packages by, you know, shuffling their budget and not spending a trillion dollars or close to a trillion dollars on the military-industrial complex, right.
The fact that that, you know, you don't, it is why the size of the budget makes it necessary, you know, for the stimulus package but note that if the stimulus package comes at the expense of the dollar suddenly inflating in price to the effect that today when people are paid the minimum wage, they can no longer make rent, they can no longer feed their families, they can no longer pay for petrol, they can't make their jobs, they cannot afford anything.
At that point, it is not entirely clear to me why that is significantly better to have turned on the money print go and fuck everyone across the world, because when the dollar collapsed, that fucked all of us. Notice that the central bank on the comparative probably doesn't have that kind of incentive because, you know, they want to keep the currency stable.
Their incentive is to long-term ensure the stability of the economy and to flatten the amount of both how hot an economy runs and how cold an economy runs because they have an emphasis on stability. Even if stability would mean the comparative that we get out of the economic crisis slightly slower as the leader of opposition has explicitly conceded, no one can predict the flow of a bear market or a bull market.
No one can predict when an economy crashes or when it recovers, etcetera. Meaning that it to some extent, if that is kind of going to happen anyways, then presumably long-term stability in ensuring that, you know, we don't just do what is currently the most popular towards the voters who don't necessarily understand the long-term implications of what they have voted in is, you know, probably somewhat unimportant.


Not secondarily, however, that it is unclear to us why voting is necessarily the premier mechanism for ensuring the best monetary policy or even the monetary policy that best reflects the will of the people. Because it is unclear to us that the primary mechanism which people as right, the primary motivation that people have when electing governments is the economy. Presumably, people also vote for all kinds of other reasons such as traditional relations.
They probably vote on healthcare advice, etcetera. Notice then that, it is ultimately unclear to us why the ECB or the American Central Bank or any central bank has an incentive to set the budget lower than where a government could realistically operate. Now we do get a mechanism here for why they are likely to fuck up from opening opposition and I want to be fair to them, because what they tell us effectively is, ah, the central bank isn't as integrated into government institutions as they could be as they should be and the government therefore has better oversight of where spending needs to go. Couple of things here. One, that's an odd problem. I have no idea why if this were the alternative, the ECB wouldn't be much more integrated with government spending.
Two, presumably as Martha has pointed out, there's already significant interactions between the treasury and the central bank. So, presumably, they can just pick up the phone and talk to the government and come to some kind of compromise, explaining to the government where they need to take their budget, where they need to adjust tax rates, etcetera, in order to get the economy out of the ball.
At that point, I'm just not clear where opening opposition's specific problem lies in terms of the political will, because ultimately, that just seems, you know, spending problem like, not money intake problem because I think, most economies where the government has a significant incentive to overspend vastly above what the ECB, what the Central Bank would want to spend on.
Presumably, they have more of an issue of not allocating their current funds properly or just want to continue spending as they have and not recognizing that they're currently in a crisis. Not similarly, when the country is in a crisis and a government overcorrects, as in makes their fiscal policy low, the ECB, the central bank is likely to also want to, for similar incentives, push up the budget because the government is also making poor economic decisions.
Even if their intentions are good and wanting to get the government, the country out of recession, the central banks have the incentive. Note where the problem, then the final problem we hear from opening opposition is this idea that, ah, but the central banks will become politicized; their decisions will become bad. They will just make the decisions that politicians want anyways. If that's true, then I'm unclear on what the delta is.
If they are just going to basically become so politicized and just act on the will of the people, then presumably their impacts are also not happening. Then it's symmetrically true on both sides of the debate that presumably just nothing changes. If they're just another political body or, you know, to that effect, then it doesn't have the impact that opening opposition claims.
Before I continue, I would like to engage with closing.

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