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Often that means that people's livelihoods are destroyed, and you lose faith in democracy, which ends up being irreversible on their side. The military holds very powerful positions in Bangladesh for reasons. They've always been given huge levels of control of the Bangladeshi economy since the Cold War.

They are politically influential because of connections to political parties. The problem is that when the military backs the incumbent government, they have a vested interest in the leaders of protest movements. Why? They do not want the leaders of protest movements involved because the leaders specifically are people in unions and figureheads of the anti-military movement.

Then, when student organizers begin running for office, you view democracy as a threat to the military's grasping power, and this is a perception issue on their side. The counteract by no means is perfect on our side, but student protesters are more able to portray democracy as good for the military.

You can better ally with the military or at least not go directly against it. Even if it's not a clear path on our side, they will undermine elections, and there's more violence against protesters. That's all on that, far worse. Very proud to propose.
</pm>

<lo>
So, we're going to explain two simple things in opening opposition: first, why leadership is better; secondly, why the world in which these student leaders engage outside the democratic system is far worse.

I'm going to prove how you get instability that OG thinks is so important, as well as better policies. So, firstly, why do we just get better leadership within the system? We agree with the premise of opening government that these student leaders are likely to win because they're often uniquely inspiring people. Many people supported the movement in the first place to overthrow the dictatorship, indicating a large commitment of support.

The current leader of the provisional government is likely to back these individuals as well. They are just generally relatable to you and uniquely inspiring because they represent the movement that gave them democracy and was pushing to give them democracy. It represented the end of the dictatorship that oppressed so many individuals.

Why is this so good? I have a couple of reasons why the people make better leaders and are uniquely able to represent the youth.

And make their voices important in the political sphere in the first place, and the premise directly challenges what we get out of opening government that says there will be incentives to represent the youth on either side of the house if we prove that youth otherwise would be politically disengaged. This means there's less political incentive to cater to them because they don't see them as viable voters in the first place. Why is this the case? Firstly, youth deeply distrust the establishment, not only due to decades of oppression under a dictatorship, or the sudo dictatorship, and a legacy of corruption associated with other parties like the BNP as well, but also just generally associate the state itself as a source of repression.

Additionally, youth have incentives to engage in rational ignorance where they believe that their vote doesn't matter, and they have less incentive, therefore, to be politically engaged. It's not worth it to put in the effort to, you know, vote and to try and learn about political parties if you don't think your vote is going to matter in the first place. Even when you do consume media, it often feeds you negative narratives about, for example, why democracy is a shame. Horrible things in your country are happening, and it's not worth voting because media often sensationalizes the worst things that happen because it's the most eye-catching.

This means that youth, who often disproportionately appeal to these things, have no incentives to want to engage politically otherwise. So, it is uniquely only the leaders that represented the transition to democracy that youth are willing to fight for the past that would make them engage in the political system and have some degree of trust to want to vote in the first place. On their side, they have no leverage.

The second reason why youth are going to be disproportionately not represented is that they are economically weak as well. This is likely because, you know, being quite young, you have less time to accumulate wealth in the long term, which gives you political and economic leverage. Additionally, Bangladesh is currently going through an economic transition, moving from a relatively poor to a more middle and upper-income country, which has resulted in large amounts of unemployment in the short term. As you know, when your country becomes richer and wages rise, it means that as the economy begins to transition, many people are left behind and left unemployed.

This disproportionately harms the youth because their lack of experience and time means they're not likely to be, for example, the highest middle management type people, and more likely to be workers, which has left many of them economically in the dust. This means that they have less lobbying power, but also less economic power to be engaged in the system as well, take time off to vote, and to do things like attend protests and rallies, especially in the context of a post-revolution society where a lot of their will to engage and their will to protest has been exhausted.

This means that in the absence of these individuals, they get no representation for the youth. Furthermore, I want to explain why youth leaders themselves are incredibly good. This is because there's likely to be a selection effect where the youth leaders are likely to be people that have strong liberal democratic values, to the extent that they were willing to fight and potentially be incarcerated or die for these values in an oppressive regime in the first place. This suggests a deep ideological attachment to things like democracy and the liberalization of society.

What is the impact of all of this? I think it's first just good that we have good democratic liberal values, or things against corruption and pro things like meritocracy. But also, on a political policy level, it's good that we have demands to cater to people that have long-term interests, that is, the youth who are going to live for much longer than people who are not the youth. This is important because these demands, for example, have transitioned away from textiles and other forms of low-skill industry, which is bad in the long term even if it is desirable for politicians in the short term.

Why are these things bad in the long term? For example, textiles or other forms of manufacturing are often unsustainable as Bangladesh becomes more economically wealthy. As incomes rise, exports become less competitive because you have higher costs of inputs, and this is bad because it hinders other industries. Additionally, automation would otherwise force countries like Bangladesh to industrialize as well.

So, why is it the case that alternatives are bad and are going to care about these short-termist interests? First, let's begin by characterizing who these alternatives are. For example, the BNP is an old establishment party, which has the resources and the legitimacy to succeed by being an opposition party to the Awami League. This is a problem because they have a long history of corruption and institutionalized corruption, which is likely to continue.

Often, you as a leader of a party that is engaged in corruption become passively adapted to having large amounts of wealth and resources, but they are also likely to be politically short-termist as well. They are likely to have connections because, as an old establishment party, you have large connections with industry, for example, manufacturing or textiles, which is often tipping point of view catering to the their interests. Not only do they have personal connections, but because there are also competing alternative incentives.

For example, many workers in society are somewhat short-termist; they want to keep their jobs in the short term, even if it's bad for the country in the long term. Thus, these two factors incentivize alternative parties like the BNP to overvalue short-term interests and prioritize things like textiles rather than adapting and investing in better long-term economic plans. Secondly, I think another alternative is likely to be Islamist parties as well because Bangladesh has a large Muslim population, which is likely to be incredibly oppressive towards Hindu minorities.

This is likely to be the case because Islamist parties use this as a primary means of differentiation as a political party against other parties, which leads to a more extremist type of rhetoric and policy stance. Secondly, I want to explain why it is worse for these leaders to engage outside the political system. Before that closing.

<poi>
UNSS has been a powerful democratizing and anti-corruption force even just since August, and overthrowing the Hasina was the cause of momentum that can be channeled to strengthen existing political institutions. Which Young people now, not in the past, have the desire to work.
</poi>

But but the problem is it's associated with these student leaders alongside the government as they front for the pro-democracy movement. When they don't run, they also look to do things like be critical of the otherwise democratic system. In the counterfactual, which we are going to explain now, in the short run, we think in a world where these people do not run, it leads to more instability. For example, these student leaders are more likely to do things that start protests because they believe these other alternative parties are bad and anti-democratic, which they are also likely to be, as we proved in our previous point.

So, they do things like protest in the streets, even if it's not all youth; it's likely the leaders and their close followers who now are not choosing to run but still have the original passion and desire to be engaged. This is a problem because these types of protests firstly lead to things like democratic backsliding and distrust of the government, which OG think is so harmful, but also creates instability itself, which leads to things like investor flight.

Finally, I think the overwhelming dominance of the student party that would run on our side is good in terms of avoiding the gridlock that occurs more when you have a plurality of parties on their side of the house. That are to have overwhelming majorities, and gridlock itself is often inherently bad when, for example, parties have incentives to sabotage the main party in a coalition because they want them to succeed less so they can win in the next electoral cycle. This is really powerful because you don't pass basic infrastructural bills that Bangladesh needs in a post-conflict society. Proud to oppose.
</lo>

<dpm>
If this was WEDC 1980 and motion was about Zimbabwe and ZANU PF and Robert Mugabe, all of opening opposition's arguments could be made to the very same extent that the people we need to care the most about are the young revolutionaries involved in the protest movements who need to be represented by their lovely figure, Mugabe. We all know how that story ends—hint: not well. The thesis of opening government is straightforward: power corrupts. The student protesters did a good thing by opposing by toppling Hasina's regime.

The best thing, they can now do is to stay on the outside to criticize, yes, to protest, as opposed to become corrupted by the political establishment. Three points in this speech: first on youth voting, second the counterfactual, finally democratic consolidation.

First on youth establishment. This is opening opposition's main point. I have four lines of response. Response number one: the premise of opening opposition's claim is that the youth are otherwise unlikely to engage in politics. That's unlikely because student organizers don't disappear on our side of the house. They still exist, they still have charisma, they still have a sense of personality, and strong incentives to encourage youth voters to turn out and vote.

The reason why this is probably a message that will be received well by young individuals is for all the reasons that opening opposition themselves name. For example, the fact that these leaders have unique power over student protesters, the fact that these people have charisma, the fact that these individuals are seen as having accomplished a revolutionary movement. This means that even if there is a marginal reduction in the youth vote, it's not 60%; rather, we probably get a high level of youth turnout on either side of the house, mitigating opening opposition's claim.

Response number two: political parties, most obviously the BNP, have strong structural incentives under our side of the house to appeal to our youth voters. This is for three reasons. Reason number one: the August protest movement energized youth votes in a way that was not true historically. So, opening opposition is right; historically, young voters in Bangladesh did not participate in democratic politics. But the fact that they have now been energized and mobilized by the most powerful moment in post-independence Bangladeshi history means that youth voters probably feel empowered to participate in democratic politics, even if their leaders do not run.

Reason number two: political parties have strong incentives to appeal to youth voters to deter any potential violence. Hint: what did student protesters do this August when political parties did not represent them? They turned to the streets; they rioted. Foreign investment plummeted, which means even if the BNP, excuse me, is corrupt and selfish, its corrupt and selfish interests align with appealing to youth voters to ensure there is not a second July Revolution.

Reason number three: on our side of the house, we have durable fiat to assume these leaders do not solely form a political party. But if you're in the BNP in the next 5, 10, or 15 years, you're always concerned that if you do not appeal sufficiently well to youth voters, these guys might come out of retirement and actually run against you. This means the theoretical potential that these organizers could potentially run in elections is a powerful preemptive deterrent against neglecting or ignoring the youth's vote.

Response number three to opening opposition: we'll flip their claim. Youth distrust will be worse on their side of the house. This is an argument that applies to the longer-term prospect, not the immediate term. Both teams agree in the short term the people who participated in the protests vote overwhelmingly for these figures. But what happens in the long term? Student protesters are likely to feel enormously disillusioned with Bangladeshi politics. Why is that? Because when these people become political operators, when they run parties, when they're in government, they have to make decisions and trade-offs that protesters feel violate the principles they pushed for.

These people have to accept campaign contributions from corporations; they have to engage in political horse-trading to overcome the gridlock opening opposition describes. Here's the problem: when the person that you saw leading the revolution is now engaging in the very same kinds of political shenanigans that you opposed and fought against, that is when you are much more likely, on their side of the house, to feel personally attacked.

Now to be clear, on both sides of the house, some political party has to engage in horse-trading, campaign contributions, etc. It's better when that's a mainstream political party like the BNP, as opposed to these figureheads of the movement violating their trust, which flips their claim on engagement long-term and also increases the probability of protests on the streets. This comprehensively flips opening opposition's claim and mitigates it to the point they cannot win on this argument.

Point number two: what is the counterfactual? Opening opposition says that the likely counterfactual is the Bangladesh Nationalist Party. We agree. Here are three reasons: first, this party has existing infrastructure. They've been in power or been the main opposition movement since the rise to power in 2009. They've been the main secondary party in Bangladesh since the 80s.

Reason number two: the AL is overwhelmingly unlikely to win votes in the upcoming election. Why is that? They've been enormously discredited; their leader literally fled to, I think, India. The point is that the AL is at an all-time low, which means the BNP has enormous capacity to win the election because they have existing infrastructure.

Reason number three: just empirically, polling shows that the BNP is probably going to be the largest party in whatever the next election happens to be. Now, opening opposition's claim here is twofold. First, they say that radical Islamist parties gain power. Second, they say that the BNP is bad.

Let's work through both. Their first plan on radical Islamist parties doesn't work for three reasons. Reason number one: there's a huge problem with this argument, which is they are right; Islamist parties will get some power. But the groups that are voting for Islamist parties would never be the student protesters on our side of the house. The reason why is that the vast majority of people involved in the student protest movement were liberal, democratic, or university students. They are overwhelmingly secular or not highly religious, which means if the organizers of the protests don't run for office, then the people who would have voted for them are not suddenly turning to radical Islamist parties because they believe that as a legitimate conception of democracy.

Therefore, the logical alternative is they move towards secular parties like, for example, the BNP. Response number two: it's unlikely that Islamist parties gain substantial power because there's a game-theoretic disincentive to vote for these parties. The reason why is that you know that the percentage of votes that goes to any individual Islamist party is low, especially because there are multiple of them and they split the vote. So you, as a voter, have a game-theoretic incentive to vote for a secular party that's likely to get a greater share of votes because that's more likely to affect the outcome of the election.
CO.

<poi>
Why you distinguish between why are you saying that the BNP is the secular party? They're clearly the non...
</poi>

no, no, no. So just to be clear, the claim I'm making here is that the radical, fundamentalist Islamist parties are not likely to be in power. Our claim is that the BNP is preferable.

This deals nicely with opening opposition's second plan. They say the BNP is short-termist and corrupt. A lot of problems here. Response number one: the BNP can be held accountable on our side of the house for the specific advocacy, criticism, and protesting of powerful organized movements. The BNP has incentives to listen to these people, even if they're not involved in politics, to ensure there is not another wave of revolution.

Secondarily, the BNP understands that it has to earn the support of these voters because these voters, for all the reasons opening opposition identifies, are distrustful of mainstream parties—and legitimately so. So the BNP, unlike student organizers, cannot take these votes for granted, which means the BNP has strong incentives to rebrand itself, to internally purge corrupt members through its party.

But thirdly, and this is critical, we are fine with gridlock. Here's why: because the biggest problem facing Bangladesh is not that you don't pass policy. The biggest problem facing Bangladesh is that an authoritarian movement gains power, does not have checks on its capacity to legislate, and turns Bangladesh into a secondary authoritarian movement. Gridlock is good because it moderates policy, even if Islamist parties are counterbalanced by secular parties.
All of which means that it is good to have gridlock. On their side of the house, it can increase the probability of backsliding and military violence. We propose.
</dpm>

<dlo>

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