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Wait repeat from the hammocks part,


<poi>
what do you care about more that Stella has a hammock and people are jealous at it, or there's like money in his bank account that He could spend helping people's lives right now, if you, like, wanted to and chose to do so,
</poi>


probably that he has billions on his bank account. But I don't know this is, this is like, this doesn't respond to stuff. Again, saying, right?
So if morality is inherent to human beings, we have to go and this is what both of them are saying we have to go through, go through social contracts to value morality. This means that all the constraints and negative personalities in modern societies of acquiring health are a product of that society as a media. This is what things talks about, as opposed to that. We can say that in any society, and this can be an unmonetized society. This can literally every been talking about money. This can literally be a society where you don't have money, or you require that different stuff that in any sort of this society, we are programmed to seek happiness. And that means, for example, that you go beyond, beyond your basic need in this aspect. So in a primitive society, this means picking apples and stalking them at the risk of someone else. Not being able to pick them up, because, you know, if you pick them up and stop them and you you can eat for maybe five more days, as opposed to filling out your basic need of eating today. In this regard, this is something that's important, but you're increasing your basic survival instinct, and this increases like the happiness to you. It's important that you cannot choose whether you're going to be happy or not, you have the urge to do this, and your basic necessities is something that constrains you in this in this regard. But what's also important to recognize here is that of like human nature dictates that we are not satisfied with what we have, which means that on their side of the house, if you take their mention, and that is doing your basic needs. These needs probably have to stay the same, because if these needs change with time, or they allow these things progressively go further and further and further, then they are susceptible to a lot of attacks. They attack us here, where people approve of the stuff like this, so on their sandal house. If this doesn't change, that means that progressively, your happiness is actually going down, right, because you're constantly having your basic needs met and stuff like this, but you feel more because you're becoming content with this. Like this is the basic analysis and like mechanisms they choose. Why it's immoral to have wealth, because people do more and more and more, and they're quitting really ingredient stuff like this. But if you flip this, if you talk about that, people are necessarily not happy with having the same amount of help over time, over time their basic needs, that means that under their hedging, the utility and happiness of all the people is gradually decreasing as long as they do not improve in life and stuff like this. This is something that's also connected to this.
So at the end of this debate, we showed that there's something more basic and primitive, like really biological, non physiological, that drives us to have more than the actually necessary at the very moment. But they also show you that in terms of like utility as after this, their world is a weapon. Everyone is equally unhappy, and that happiness decreases over time, meaning everyone is equally unhappy and unhappier as by progressing as after this. That's why we do very proud to oppose that.
</ow>
<pm>
when the White House is filled with people like John Bolton, the National Security advisor, who are very sure that we can win the war with Iran in a breeze and actually secure Trump's presidency and filling his mind with this horrible nonsense and stuff like that, this is the riskiest and possibly the most horrible time to do this. But also, we're going to take even a higher burden. Why? Overall, this is a stupid strategy that they encompassed and they got the most they could have wanted anyway.

So, let's talk about what you can get from nuclear energy and stuff like that from this deal. You can get nuclear power plants. This is what they're claiming that they want. They want to develop their country with energy. And notice that with the agreement that specifically allows... and it specifically allows enough enriched uranium to have nuclear power plants at the status quo. So, this means that nuclear power—nuclear power is out of the question. They're already receiving the benefit let for nuclear weapons. Couple of reasons why it will be very, very hard to develop nuclear weapons, especially in a timeframe that is reasonable. First of all, the scientists were already very sufficient to be targeted. You need a lot of people who have a lot of know-how that were very much blocked up until this point, which means that the process for Iran specifically is going to be lot higher not higher longer than the other things. Second of all, you need to import the resources and... import, how do you say, a lot of raw materials, which nobody at this current theater scope, when the tensions are coming up, has a very huge incentive to give you. Even the countries who are loosely connected to you and they're not really allies but loosely connected are Iran—no, sorry, China and Russia. They still don't have how do you say how do you say the reason to fund this because, first of all, they don't want you to have nuclear weapons. This is why they sign on to a treaty. Second of all, they don't want to be implicated in a thing that can also ruin their relationship with Trump, specifically when they have already differing opinions. So, nobody has really the incentive to give you, which means that this slows down the process even more.

Thirdly, for Israel, it was really sufficient in taking down stuff with hacking, with projects like Stocket, and taking you down even remotely. And fucking you’ll but notice lastly, even if they did have— even if I didn't say any of this, the current estimate of them making a nuclear weapon would be at least 5 years from now if they start enriching at this moment in time, which means that even if they break this—which they started to do—they will not have a nuclear weapon in the next 5 years. But notice the second thing: even if they have the nuclear weapon in the next 5 years, it will be one nuclear weapon because this is how you develop. You need to develop multiple of them in order to have a credible threat and stuff like that. So, still even in 5 years, there wouldn't be enough to protect themselves and stuff like that. So, this is something that is out of the debate by this metric.

So, what is in of the debate? So, let's say risk of escalation of tensions, how say ruining your relationship with people who are actually defending you at the status quo and actually safety. Why is it ruin? Let's say even the best-case scenario where all I said is not true, we still win this debate. A couple of things. First of all, pro Trump's presidency in Trump's cabinet is currently filled with people like... with very non-coherent messaging. Some people are for bombing Iran, which would be like ludicrous for any normal presidency to consider because that would lead to a lot of casualties. But apparently, Trump was like 10 seconds away from sending, how you say, US military drones to bomb Iran in this situation. The problem is the risk of escalation increases when the tensions increase. It's not that wars start because somebody says "I declare war on you" and now we go there. The issue is they usually start by incidents that happen in the times of tension. What is the time of this? This is similar to the Cuban Missile Crisis and stuff like that, where everything is perceived as a threat, where somebody flying a drone over your territory because they want to provoke you is conceived as a threat and stuff like that. You're giving these kinds of signals that leave Trump in a very horrible position because he wants to appear as a strong man. If you down his drone, why is it likely for you to also escalate the conflict here?

Notice that Iran has a lot of decentralized units that are operating and that are downing these drones and stuff like that. So, the Iranian military guard and CS are necessarily more decentralized. The central government doesn't have as much influence over them. Why? First of all, because they were needed to, how you say, do guerrilla warfare against states like Israel, funding Kasbulla and stuff like that. So, they were given a lot of leverage. to central government can disassociate with them if need be and stuff like that. So, they're operating more or less on a directional basis where you can tell them this is what you do, but they have discretionary power to do something. This is very similar in other militaries, but it's more emphasized in the military of Iran and the situation.

This means that these people are much more... this is why downing of drones happen and stuff like that, which is not necessarily something that Iran should have done. This risk of escalating tension becomes even more pronounced when Trump is now sending more ships and more, how you say, battle carriers in preparation for war in wanting to intimidate you, which means that you can't interpret any other attack or any normal passage as an attack and risk escalation of conflict. But notice that this goes two ways. They can say Trump will lose presidency. We will cover both of these. If Trump stays, it's horrible for you for all these reasons because you ruined the thing. But even if Trump goes, you have ruined your reputation as somebody who... drones are portraying as getting fucked over by Trump by stooping to the same level as Trump by doing something that they said you will never do, that they said you will own her until, how say, because it's Obama deal. Yes,

<poi>
but your analysis, decentralized stuff, actually proves that if he do the deal, some crazy guy who's a commander might actually shoot. He's...
</poi>

no, no, but you know why you know what's the difference in that case? That's not comparative. But what is comparative is more ships on the shores. It's more Trump getting ready to attack the overall idea of people being ready to attack. But even if that's not true, let's say about the EU. The EU is the one who has been honoring the agreement from the start onwards and stuff like that, specifically because you were honoring it too. As IR read in the situation, you're losing a valuable ally who managed to resist and push the International Community to also honor the deal based on the thing that they don't want you to get nuclear weapons and they think this is a good deal. The problem is if you disagree with them and stop that, it's much more likely for sanctions to be back.

Also, expediating... like slowing down the process that I told you before. But also, how you say, your businessmen, your politicians not meeting on relevant playing fields with other politicians where you can influence and bow for other people, not meeting in Dallas, not going to the Yen meetings because you're targeted by sanctions and stuff like that, which means you have less international sway, especially over your enemies like Israel and Saudi Arabia, who will be there to lobby against you no matter what. Which means that they have a seat at the table where they talk about their problems, where they talk about how you are bad, but you don't have a seat to defend yourself because people do not want to trade with you because they can't and understand.

So, safety lastly in the situation, let's say 5 years, but I said... but the last thing as well, even if you develop a nuclear weapon, there's triggers the nuclear race in the Middle East, where also Saudi Arabia gets nuclear weapons and all the other enemies go... go get nuclear weapons because they can. And what was preventing them? And what Saudi Arabia actually said, if they get it, we will get it too. And this is why it was urgent for people to make a deal. This makes it much less unsafe because it's much less unpredictable to deal with Saudi Arabia this way. You should definitely vote opening government. Thank you.
</pm>

<lo>
Chair, adjudicators, ladies and gentlemen. Countries gain power in the world either by being an economic and political powerhouse or by being a military powerhouse. The Iran deal asks Iran to sacrifice their military capabilities in order for them to be able to gain prominence through economic prosperity. Iran is now being denied their chance to gain economic prosperity through this deal, and yet they are still being expected to make the sacrifices with respect to their military. We think that that is unfair. It's not the terms that Iran signed up to, and the way in which Iran is able to establish itself is by starting to go back on the terms of that deal, increase their supplies to the enriched uranium, and exercise their power in that capacity.

We think that will be better at achieving the goals of the Iranian government which is to ensure sustainable economic and political power for Iran and its people. So, we think the reinstatement of sanctions on Iran has hurt their products, their oil exports, and their trading partners have been penalized. You've seen a capital flight from Iran. What is the best outcome for Iran in this situation? One, you take actions which put pressure on the US to rejoin this agreement. Two, you get the EU to lower tariffs on Iran to compensate for the fact that they have higher tariffs coming in from the US. Three, you get the EU to put pressure on the US to rejoin. I'm going to talk to you about why the actions of enriching—of increasing stock of enriched uranium are most likely to lead to those sorts of outcomes. But first, I'm going to respond to opening government because their main claim is that this is bad because the US increasing tensions means that the US is likely to attack. I'm going to talk through this a little bit more throughout my speech, but I think quite obvious response.

Firstly, the example they give you of how Trump was minutes away from ordering drone strikes on Iran and then was pulled back is evidence of the fact that there is a check and accountability mechanism on the things that Trump can do. So, when they say it's just him and John Bolton and they can do anything they want, an example that they use showed that that is not true because there are Joint Chiefs of Staff who rise on these sorts of issues. There are also political reasons why it's unlikely that they would do it in an election cycle, etc. But I just want to point out that it is not true that they have the sort of power or the likelihood to act in the way that they characterize them. Secondly, the US is not the only threat to Iran. So, if we're talking about the Iranian government minimizing threats around it, if you completely decimate your military powers, the threat of Saudi Arabia becomes much more real. So, they'll give us reasons why the Iranian government should prioritize this slight increase in threat from the US over having significantly weaker military capabilities with respect to an aggressor which is so close to us. We think that is something they should be considering as well.

Thirdly, the example of why an attack is likely to happen is that ships are now near Iran. I would point out that the US has military presence and naval presence all around the world. It is the way that they keep checks on people. They have ships outside of China. No one is saying that it is likely that they are going to attack there. I think they needed more analysis in order to get that. Why are we likely to get a bettering of the position of Iran by following through on this procedure? One, it puts pressure on the US. The US joined the Iran deal because Iran was a threat to the region and the regional stability which the US relies on because it gets oil from there, it trades with people there, and it doesn't have... it's not good for the US if the region is constantly in terror and constantly in turmoil.

So, the only way you get respect from these individuals is if you become a threat because otherwise it's incredibly easy for them to ignore you. The US is likely to respond. It's similar to how it responded before, which is to say engage with Iran rather than attack it for a number of reasons. First, it is an election cycle year at the moment. It would be an incredibly polarizing move for them to commit to war within with a country that has a potential nuclear power when there's little direct threat to the citizens of America for doing so. So, it's unlikely that any politician would actually do that. Secondly, it is a war-weary country, and there's little political will for going back towards a war with a country that is so far away. Thirdly, they don't have an incentive for having less regional stability from a place where they get oil, so they don't have an incentive to create another state that is in turmoil. Someone who they cannot rely on as a trading partner, no thank you. But also fourthly and final, because their allies, who they trade with, who their economy is reliant on allies like the EU, do not want the US to go to war with Iran because they are also allies with them. So, they are likely to face significant pushback from their allies if they were to go to war.

For this, that means that the response to this sort of action is overwhelmingly likely to be a stabilizing one by the US rather than one which just attacks them, which is kind of... I think unfounded by the proposition team. No, thank you. The second thing that it can do is it puts pressure on the EU to compensate. The EU wants the Iranian deal to be a success for a number of reasons. One, they don't want Iran to be seen as an aggressor in the region. They also get oil from Saudi Arabia, and it's bad for them if those oil prices are constantly fluctuating. But also, they have kind of humanitarian obligations to not allow someone who could play a role in the war in Yemen, and they don't want an increased aggressor there.

Two, they spend an awful lot of time on this deal, and it's a really good pure win for the European Union. Its success can be shown to be a success and a worthwhile mission as a unifying thing that the US uh that the EU can hold up together as a strong, unified union. I'll take closing in a second, but also because it's better for them to have a new trading partner in a situation where the EU is in turmoil, where they don't know what the future of who they're going to be trading with after losing the UK. It's beneficial for them to be establishing more links around the world. There are all reasons why the EU is likely to, in response to increased uranium by the Iranian government, to try and accommodate them and make the situation good for them. Before I go on closing...

<poi>
so how do you think that the Republican Party will react during those elections you mentioned in order to portray this strongly?
</poi>

I still think that it is too polarizing to do that, and there are so many other ways that it's easy for them to portray themselves as strong with respect to the economy, etc. I think that it would be very unlikely that this would be their first port of call. We're going to go to war with an enemy that doesn't really affect their life. They need to put in work and to say why that is likely to happen.

Thirdly and final point about why this would be bad for the Iranian government. South power, in order for Iran to promote itself in the world, we will have to sign more deals like this in the future to get more allies in different places. That means they will have to make some sacrifices in return for a benefit. They will be making deals with countries that are much more powerful than them. If the countries they are making deals with now see it as they can make a deal with Iran, make them make all these sacrifices, and then not follow through on that deal, Iran will still continue to make the cuts to their military, etc. Then it just leaves them open to being completely exploited in the future. Iran needs to either exert itself with economic power, which it currently does not have, or military power in order to gain respect. Taking steps like this do not likely escalate tensions to the extent the proposition would like to, but they are the only way that you can ensure economic prosperity and also the lasting power of Iranian soft power for their ability to join deals in the future. Please impose.
</lo>

<dpm>
This previous speech was a lot of analysis of why it is a bad idea for the United States to engage in armed conflict with Iran. That disregards the analysis in our first speech. We agree it's a bad idea; that still does not mean it will not happen. One of the key reasons why Donald Trump did not launch US air strikes against Iran was because Jack Keane, a Fox News anchor who was present at the discussion with John Bolton after the downing of the US drone in the Persian Gulf, advised that it is not a great idea to do so. The decision-making processes are far less transparent than these guys will all think. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are more consulted by and large. There is a great deal of executive power vested within the presidency in the United States. There is a need to react to escalations of conflict within a reasonably short period of time. This overall means that you will not have a large public-scale consultation which will lead to rational decision-making when it comes to an escalation.

What is more likely to happen is you will have a few people at the table making these sorts of decisions. We already provide analysis as to why these few people are very, very problematic. Some of the most influential people within the Trump Administration are John Bolton, a gross foreign policy hawk who has called for war with Iran since the George W. Bush Administration, and people like Michael Phelps, the chief of staff, who has been similarly very hawkish.

When Donald Trump, as he has already done so, consults with very few people when it comes to foreign policy decision-making. You have a far higher risk of conflict and escalation. We think that further, there is a large level of decentralization that exists within the decision-making within Iran. What closing ask in the POI there is, but why is this comparative? I mean, look, the level of decision-making that is provided by the Iranian regime is directional. What does this mean? This means that, by definition, you do not have a you do not control the chain of command within the puts forces or the Revolutionary Guard to a very detailed extent. You do not give out precise orders. Our direction, in terms of how aggressive you ought to be towards neighbors, is something that is provided by the regime.

So, if there is a call for escalation, if there are numerous, no thank you, if there are numerous public gatherings, you continue yelling "Death to America," etc. These guys, in a situation where there is further escalation from the United States, where they also have to make decisions reasonably quickly, are far more likely to engage in a sort of warfare. Now, on the possibility of of uh of Iranian nuclear weapons, we have a lot of analysis as to why this is incredibly unlikely to happen. No, your main supplier of technology, Libya, has a different regime right now than it did five years ago. Secondly, the U.S. and Israel have been successful in various means of slowing down your nuclear program—killing your nuclear scientists, etc. This means it's very difficult to get there.

But the further point on this is, I don't really understand how gaining nuclear weapons improves your international standing or makes you a bigger superpower. Look at North Korea; it has to improve the standard of life. The second thing I will point out is that yes, nuclear weapons may, to an extent, be a deterrent, but this is by and large true in democratic states and far less so in less democratic ones. I will point out that since developing nuclear weapons, India and Pakistan—both countries which are at best semi-democratic—have engaged in three different conflicts. Admittedly, they were regionalized, but this does not mean you have a strong deterrent, no thank you, towards your neighbors. Countries like Saudi Arabia, which is a fully autocratic state, countries like Israel, which is more democratic but still without a pure level of democratic accountability, especially with respect to its foreign policy, so you don't really achieve a kind of strong deterrence.

Now, the U.S. will not engage because it's an election cycle. A few responses here. The first one I will point out is that 2003, the year of the Iraq War, was also in an election cycle. It was one year before the 2004 election; that's exactly the equivalent of this year. The second thing I will point out here is that, by and large, foreign policy is dominated by the need to portray or portray power towards your enemies. I will point out that in a situation where there is a likelihood of a small strike, like the hoods downing another drone or attacking a tanker in the Gulf of Persia, there is a high need to react in order to maintain your power in the region.

So, yes, completely correct that a war is a terrible idea. The analysis we have provided over the last 12 minutes is why a series of small circumstances are far less likely to happen on our side of the house and lead to this grossly unfortunate turn of events. I will take Closing.

<poi>
If Iraq was invaded during an election cycle and with clear proof that no nuclear weapons existed, then how can the premise case be that the United States will be rational and de-escalate if we follow this agreement?
</poi>

I find so what the point of this is that U.S. foreign policy can be hawkish in situations, even in situations where there is real proof of nuclear weapons. What I would point out is there has been a massive de-escalation in the years after the Iran nuclear deal, albeit with some aggression from the Republicans. The second thing I will point out here is, I mean, look, debate is a comparative thing. What you get on our side of the house is a far higher likelihood of a conflict happening. Now, the line they want to go towards is yes, but when you get nuclear weapons, you have a far greater deterrent. Look at two minutes of analysis as to why this is a really long process to which you will not get to the end of in five or six years; you are far more likely to get that sort of ion, so not really competitive on their side of the house.

Finally, on the European Union, the responses we get there are that the EU will try to be prominent, but by and large, the EU is not a unified institution. The fact they haven't been able to elect the European government for two months after the election is one proof of this. The point is, though, that they have been supportive of the de-escalation of a conflict while forcing Iran to not develop nuclear weapons. Why is this the case? Because at any point at which they continue enriching uranium, the narrative that they are a radical and terrorist state becomes far stronger. At that point, it's far more difficult for you to garner the support that is necessary in order to push the United States towards de-escalating the Iranian conflict.

One other thing I will point out is it's not that simple to stop enriching uranium. They have decided on this. Again, that is why negotiations with the Islamic Republic lasted for a decade, again because the decision process is not fully centralized. The final thing, therefore, I do want to point out on the risk of against is that there are strong lobby groups within both inside the European Union and the United States that are heavily pushing towards escalating conflict with Iran. The AIPAC, for instance, in the United States, the strongest Israeli lobby group, is very much pushing towards this on both sides of the house, but all of these lobby groups are far stronger on ours than they are on theirs. And I'm very, very proud to oppose.
</dpm>

<dlo>
Two responses in terms of, and then I'm going to talk about U.S. response in this case. Talk about the state of the deal and what can happen in the future in terms of relationships. Let's first talk about responses. In terms of the first thing that they say in the specific case is nuclear weapons don't make you a superpower; that is correct. What we say, though, is that has nuclear capacity—its capacity to be a regional influence—is increased, that which is particularly important to Iran in the context of the proxy wars that it has at the moment with Saudi Arabia and the enemies it has in the region. But also, its capacity to develop its economy relies on things like trade and good relationships with, or strong relationships with, particular people in the region.

The second reason why nuclear weapons or nuclear capacity is important in this case is because it does give you a certain amount of power, even if it doesn't make you a superpower. That's why this deal was struck in the first place, because people recognized that Iran having weapons meant that a compromise had to be made, which meant that Iran had access to the trade that it needed in order to develop. But the third thing is that this is not about Iran needing nuclear weapons to become a superpower; this is Iran needing a deal and how it interacts with people in terms of when it enters international deals.

This is important in the context of trying to establish itself in general. When you approach international deals, when they go the way you don't want them to go, or someone falls back on their side, how you respond to that decides how people treat you in the future in relation to these fields. So, it is particularly important in this case that Iran doesn't let itself be walked all over but instead recognizes or responds in a way that suggests that if one person was to fall back on their side of the deal, they would be able to also take an action—not such that the deal would necessarily collapse, but just as a response of fairness, which doesn't put them at the back foot but rather gives them power in order to respond in the future.

The second thing, though, is that when they say it takes five years to make nuclear weapons, one of the criticisms of the Iran nuclear deal was that it was that Iran might be able to make nuclear weapons in as little as three weeks because while the deal stopped enrichment of uranium, it didn't necessarily stop people working in the background on particular nuclear weapons. In fact, the reason why the U.S. withdrew from the deal was because it believed Iran was enriching uranium in the first place, which it was particularly afraid of because it felt that Iran would be able to create nuclear weapons in quite a short space of time, not five years that the opening government talks about.

And therefore, their framing in terms of how these powers interact and whether people will take them seriously is actually categorically incorrect, both factually but also to how historically countries have responded to this particular deal on Iran's power, which is important in the context of how seriously countries take Iran in general. In response to this, let's talk about the U.S. response, because I am just so tired of this analysis that all the actors are irrational. So, you can't say the actors stay this way, but we can if the actors are irrational; they're irrational on both sides. So, they can't say we know how Trump's going to act; we know how John Bolton's going to act because they're so predictable, but also tell us they are irrational. That is not analysis; that's just an argument you can't rely on at all.

But let's actually talk about how irrational these actors are or rather where Trump might get his ideas and how they might be informed. Firstly, their response to the thing about the Joint Chiefs of Staff not mattering is factually untrue in so far as there are advisors to a government, and there are people who have the ear of the president. Insofar as those people have information, read the news like the rest of us. We think it is just the case that those people are likely to have information that is valuable; they can give to the president or give to people who work for the president. That means that they make rational decisions, i.e., not to go to war with Iran.

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