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The second reason, though, is that if news anchors could inform Trump in one case, why can't they inform Trump in our case? Because there's no reason why newscasters wouldn't take our side in this particular situation where wars are costly, where a deal with Iran or some sort of peaceful agreement with Iran would be better in general for stability in the region, which the U.S. is involved in, see its involvement in Syria, but also its good relationships with Saudi Arabia and Israel. There's genuinely no reason why people wouldn't encourage the president—whether they were news anchors or chiefs of staff or whoever has the ear of Donald Trump—to not get involved in any sort of conflict with Iran.
But in general, we think there are three reasons why these people will advise Trump not to get involved in any sort of conflict that could uh that could put put at the region in any sort of term out in general. First of all, these people are generally pro-trade, and so far as Iran has any control over the Strait of Hormuz or any sort of trade routes that are important to global trade, it is likely they would advise against Trump creating a situation where that might be jeopardized. Second of all, in terms of military alliances, Saudi Arabia is a huge military ally for Iran, in so far as Saudi does not want Iran to have nuclear capability. It is likely that they would not engage in war with Iran, but rather try to negotiate a situation that would put that particular ally in a safe situation.
Third of all, the threat to Israel. A lot of people in power in the U.S. are Evangelical or have Evangelical Jewish connections such that they would want to protect Israel. In so far as Iran is an enemy to Israel and has threatened Israel in the past, them having any sort of military capability or being militaristic is not in the interest of the U.S. and its allies, and therefore they would advise the president against it. Third of all, there are checks in the presidency; spending bills have to be passed through Congress. There will be a huge amount of discussion about this, even if it's just by the Democrats in the news, in the newspapers, in the world to the election in general.
But also, there a 2003 War happened that was after 9/11. This is not the same as 9/11. They give you no specific reasons why this will necessarily be so much on the national conscience that people would be forced or compelled to be involved in conflict.
<poi>
Cool, the EU, Russia, and China said they will uphold the deal if Iran does it too. The problem with this, you think that if they break the deal, they will offer us carrots. The problem is they will offer us sticks because they can push us to this with riling sanctions.
</poi>
Yeah, so I'm going to go on to that now, but ultimately what we get here on the proposition case, just to be clear, is that they have achieved no link between Iran making this action and the U.S. response. We've explained to you why, even so far as the U.S. responses are rational, there is more likely to be influence, which involves it not involving itself in any conflict. Let's talk about the deal now, right? Because the opening government said the benefit of the deal continuing to exist is that you can meet with businesses and politicians, and you're still friends with the EU and Russia.
And here's the reality: one, EU, Russian, and Chinese businesses have left Iran because the sanctions mean they can't trade with people. Second, businesses using Iranian oil with the connection to the U.S. have been sanctioned and have therefore stopped doing that. The reality is this deal, because it's happened in such a short time, is a structured web that relies on U.S. business capital and trade. That means that any business that has based itself or its business model on some sort of relationship with U.S. trade capital can no longer operate in Iran or can no longer trade with Iran because they're being sanctioned. Ultimately, what that means is that the status quo is that the U.S. withdrawal from the deal has crippled any good the deal was providing for Iran because even its other partners are not able to negotiate with them properly.
The status quo is there is no renegotiation of the deal happening, but also essentially there's an international sanction on Iran because the people who came back into the country have structured themselves in such a way they can no longer actually beneficially trade with Iran. There are two options: one, we think the same; Iran becomes poor, there's unrest, they look vulnerable, they're more likely to be attacked in proxy wars, and Iran, at least in that case, enriched uranium could help them. The second option, though, is a renegotiation of the deal where they can achieve more trade, or the EU can encourage the U.S. to stop sanctioning, or Russia and China can encourage the U.S. to stop sanctioning its businesses when they engage with Iran.
That is the best-case scenario, but that doesn't happen in the status quo where Iran does absolutely nothing. Because the EU, Russia, and China have no incentive to create any difference in Iran's situation in the status quo, Iran does nothing; nothing happens. The reality is Iran is a vulnerable party in this particular situation. We have proven the link between Iran taking this action and the other parties to the deal reacting; they have proven no link between Iran taking this action and the U.S. reacting in a certain way. Please I pause.
</dlo>
<mg>
Who you said was right that Western countries would not react would react with hostility to this new nuclear program. What they means is that the most important impact in this debate is not the short-term military effect that this will happen; that sure is more likely there in the house. They oppose that in an government, and therefore that's a good impact, but that is still unlikely because a war is always unlikely; it's difficult to sell. Even if it happens, it's like really short-term and not going to be maintaining for a long year, but rather the most important impact is the long-term economic consequences that will happen to Iran that will extend for decades and that will restrain their economy for a long time and cause great problems to the regime.
First of all, two additional rebuttals to the opening opposition. Okay, already opening government, I see that say so a really effective rebuttal that U.S. reducing the pressure because of the electoral period. But I want to add two more. First of all, the mechanism that they say that you want to maintain stability because of the oil. I want to maintain stability; I think that is not true. Already, they are under the embargo of oil in in Iran, and that is happening, so they are not dependent at all. They and the resources of Iran, so I think that what happens within Iran is completely irrelevant to the United States and I know Saudi Arabia or the the own of the United States within the country is much more.
And secondly, I think that they do not take this into account in opening half is that these people, the people of Western countries, usually hate Iran very much. They think that they are like a terrorist, that they are like Islamic fighters, that they are really tied to terrorists. We think that this is extremely unlikely that you can sell to this population that a developing country like Iran, that they're far away and really poor, is going to change your policy with just an escalate of of of threat. No, thank you. I think that this is extremely unlikely that the voters of the United States, Europe, or Israel are going to be happy with their government surrendering to the pressure of a developing country, which they hate and think this is terrorist.
Now, going to our extension, we have two parts. First,where we think that it's extremely likely that the sanctions will happen not only from the U.S. now but also for the next administration of the U.S. and also for other countries, such as Israel and Europe, etc. First of all, as introduced, because it's a great sense of pride in these countries, and especially this fight against a country which they consider underdeveloped and a terrorist and a terrorist state. This happens differently in the United States, in which most vast majority of the population hates this country and thinks that they are like terrorists or Islamic radicals, etc., and happens in another way in the Arab countries, which are surrounded by Iran, which have historical hate between races and would have the little opportunity that they can to damage these people.
Secondly, for this reason, not yet, for this reason we think that for the voters, it's extremely popular to say that you are doing like an intermediary. You are not attacking this country because war in Europe is extremely unpopular, but you are able to put hard economic sanctions, which are not risky at all, but which are coherent with the idea that we cannot be supporting a terrorist regime which is threatening to put nuclear weapons, actually, in Europe. Many people think that if Iran is able to get nuclear weapons, they are going to attack Europe. It's not rational, but they think that this is possible because they are Islamists, they are radicals, and there's no more logic under that.
So, third, I also think that this works in the past; they think if for many years we put economic pressure over this country and they were forced to to to withdraw the nuclear program at the surrender,that then we have another time that we have another opportunity of doing the same—putting this country on its knees and without any risk, because we are not going to go to war, we are not losing soldiers there, and we are last maintaining the status quo. At the same time, we are putting a lot of pressure. We’re not saying that it’s completely impossible that they attack the country; what we are saying is that this is perhaps a 10%, a 15%, or a 20% chance.
But what we are sure of, at a 100% chance, is that the United States, Europe, and Israel is not going to respond in an economically friendly way to Iran, but rather with embargoes and sanctions, which will lead for decades of economic stagnation. Thirdly, we think that Iran, after these economic sanctions, are going to respond obviously. First, because they also have a really strong Persian pride, like the only Persian country in the world. Secondly, because of the pride of like the Islamic fighters against the imperialism of the United States and Europe. Thirdly, because they think that they have weapons; they can use Hezbollah, they can use Hamas in order to try to attack Israel and destabilize the region, and inflict some harm to Israel and to the prestige of the United States, which is not able to maintain safe their lives in the western countries.
And also because we think that due to the economic pressure, it will be very important for the Iranian government to maintain popularity within the country. While you are suffering from stagnation or an economic crisis, it’s really important to find a common enemy outside which is the to to blame for these economic problems and therefore to put that blame there. That’s an additional reason to European countries, Israel, and also the next administration of Trump to maintain the status quo or to higher that and so maintain the system in the the country of of Iran.
What we prove with this argument is that it’s extremely likely that this escalation, at least in economic war, and therefore that Iran is going to be maintained like in the corner of the trap for many years. So what’s the impact of this? We think that, as most of the; I not, sorry I have no time. The The impact of this is that as all the dictatorships in the world, they are the Iranian dictatorship is potentially unstable. That means that in the past general election, the former president have to face like two billion demonstrations in the streets just because they were unhappy with his policies. That’s potentially what happens every time.
That means that when you are going to face decades of economic stagnation because nobody is going to buy the oil—which is 20% or 25% of the economy—when all the countries in your region, which have been allied with you, are not going to trade with you, are going to block you, you are going to face a long-term economic crisis. This is going to be really damaging for the government of Iran, which cannot maintain popularity. But with confrontation with the United States, that means two things:
A. It’s much more likely that in the long term, because of this process of economic stagnation, and therefore retaliation from Iran with Hamas and Hezbollah in the long term a war can happen or attack can happen but secondly,
B. It leads to instability in the Iranian government, just because of this economic situation that will eventually lead to to some protest for it.
Closing government wants this debate because we are able to prove the most likely thing in this debate, which is not war—no United States invading Iran; that’s like a 10% chance. But what happens in the next decades when the economy of Iran is going to crash because of the economic sanctions? What happens not only for the United States now but for the United States in the future, and for Europe, Israel, and the rest? Thank you.
</mg>
<mo>
I've had it with people telling lies and getting away with it because they sound smart. Not happening this time around. Three things in closing opposition:
1. Why everything in government is sound comparative.
2. The benefits of a nuclear program far more than the open opposition.
3. The actual interests of the Iranian government—why this enables them to have legitimacy and power.
Everything is integrated now. Opening up’s response to the open government is: look, the U.S. is rational and will engage. We don’t care if the open side is right; let’s say that government is completely right. Let’s take their word that the U.S. is completely rational and therefore engages because of John B. feeling Trump’s head and so on and so forth.
Within their framework, it is incredibly unlikely that the United States will act rationally and de-escalate tensions if Iran complies with this deal for a number of reasons.
1. Stefan tells a explicit lie, or he has no conception of time. The reason why Iran started developing uranium again is because Trump imposed sanctions on Iran, even after Iran started complying with the deal because He construed the idea that Iran is not complying, and therefore Iran decided that since sanctions happen anyway, they are going to continue.
2. The second Iraq war happened during an election cycle. International inspections of the United Nations proved that there was no evidence of nuclear weapons, yet the United States still invaded, even after it ostensibly democratized. They still retained troops on the ground; they did the same thing in Afghanistan because they had geopolitical interests there because as pakish government claims.
3. Both OG and CG want to talk about the narrative of Iran as an evil country. Note that this George Bush Jr. defined them as the axis of evil back in 2001. But since Trump has already construed a narrative that they are breaking a deal—which they were not breaking—there’s fast dependency here. It’s incredibly unlikely that after several administrations have convinced the American people that Iran is a rogue country that cannot be trusted, even if inspections show that they can’t be because they are hiding nuclear weapons elsewhere.
It’s very unlikely that the future establishment will back down on that claim because it delegitimizes their foreign policy, and it loses the electoral power because this is what the United States people believe. Exactly this is what CG concedes in their speech. They say people hate Iran; they’re convinced it’s a rogue and terrorist country. People will accept sanctions as long as there’s no war. Exactly. This is precisely what the United States government is going to do; they will retain sanctions on Iran because people support the sanctions on Iran and because they have electoral interests to do so.
Iraq is again an example; when you convince people that Iraq has nuclear weapons, even when it’s proven that they didn’t, in order for you to retain legitimacy over your foreign policy and for people not to vote against you, you still have to pretend that they had nuclear weapons, and you still have to go down there, although it was proven that they did not.
So essentially, the government concedes our case. Now, Mil is with decentralization. Like, Mil using big words in this debate is not going to help you. Look, having a weaker chain of command means it’s probably more likely that someone is going to go rogue after we sign the deal.
Again, note also that for religious reasons, most rebels in Iraq and Syria who rebelled against the governments there did so on religious grounds. This government is betraying our vow to fight for our world; they are siding with the enemy who invaded our Muslim brethren. Therefore, we have to rebel against this government. Note also that the idea of someone taking down a drone can probably happen anyway, regardless of whether we have this deal or not.
Essentially, again, can see it. Again, just another point for CG. So if you want to talk about sanctions, sanctions probably happen anyway, as I explained with the U.S. They probably also happen with the EU under CG’s framework. If people hate Iran because there are secondary sanctions on companies, every European company that does business in America has to face secondary sanctions not to do business with Iran.
Also, if people really hate Iran, then no country in the EU will openly trade with them, right? Because you don’t want to be ostracized from the international law system if they are a sponsor of terrorism, and you trade with them. By extension, you can become a sponsor of terrorism, which means that in all negotiations within the EU, within NATO, other countries are more likely to be aggressive towards you, telling you, “You trade with a sponsor of terrorism; we’re going to give you a worse deal,” and so on and so forth.
Moving on to benefits now—developing nuclear weapons. First of all, I’d like to point to an example of North Korea, which is the most isolated country in the fucking world, and they still manage to develop a nuclear weapon. And Yes, it’s right that they did not improve their standard of life, but it also meant that although everybody fucking hates North Korea, and although it’s the most isolated country in the world, nobody invaded fucking North Korea.
But even if that’s not true, the belief that we have nuclear weapons is incredibly important. It’s a stronger measure Milo gives you because even if the government is completely right and everyone is hawkish, the belief that we have nuclear weapons is something that’s going to help us. Look, the entire Trump administration is based on convincing people that Iran has nuclear weapons and convincing its allies to act in a similar fashion.
Note that even if Trump knows that they do not, he still has to get approval from Congress under the War Powers Act of 1974 to send troops down to the ground. Most countries work this way. At the end, this means that if people believe that a country has nuclear weapons, even if it doesn’t, it’s probably not going to be attacked for that.
We need to keep reinforcing this deal and show the people that we indeed have nuclear weapons, which is something that the U.S. is not going to deny because they are credible threats to Iran. Under OG’s metric, the U.S. is a credible threat.
So, the U.S. promised Libya they wouldn’t be attacked, and it was attacked. Saudi Arabia shows intentions to attack; it attacked Yemen directly. It blocks Qatar, which is one of its main trading partners. Israel has religious reasons for a preemptive strike because it believes that under Shia Islam, Iran will want to become a major state and invade Iran.
Therefore, as long as there is no credible deterrent in the form of nuclear weapons, all countries surrounding Iran have shown a tendency to attack other countries when they believe that the calculus is in their fucking favor. Look, Israel is also an example for our side as well in terms of nuclear weapons. Before that, something to say:
<poi>
cool, yeah, there’s a comparison at the end of the debate is judged by the risk of escalation. The problem on your side then becomes that the path to nuclear weapons, which is not instant by Trump’s metric weeks...
</poi>
Okay, sure, the first part was answered by the first five minutes of my speech. The second will be answered now.
Is also an excellent example of nuclear deterrence; there were four Arab-Israeli wars, the last one happening in 1974. 1974 was the year Israel acquired nuclear weapons. The USSR, which was in the Cold War and on the edge of the Cuban Missile Crisis, never engaged in a full-scale war.
Siri, go India and Pakistan admit it; it’s regionalized. Yes, exactly the point. Not until 1945 did we have cycles of 30 to 40 years of countries going to full-scale wars when their territory would be invaded and their cities bombarded. Now we have a reduced explosiveness; Kashmir and proxy war. That’s probably comparative.