utkarsh2105/DebateBench · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 9.69k

But lastly, let’s talk about the interests of the actual Iranian government, as CG said—that to stay in power and avoid escalation. No, the entire theocratic system of Iran, of Ayatollahs since Khomeini, is based on the idea that Iran represents a third way which will spread Shia Islam and be neither capitalist nor communist.

The entire system of Ayatollahs and the Council of Guardians of the Revolution is based on the idea that we are going to do this; we’re going to be a strong country for our Muslim brothers. Given economic pressures, this will happen anyway. The only way to retain peace is to convince the people that we’re doing something for the future, that we are sacrificing now in order to keep fighting our hated enemies. If that doesn’t happen, people lose trust in their government.

That’s why opposition we finally win this fucking debate.
</mo>

<gw>
The reason why we are going to win this debate is very simple: it’s called possibility. So OG tells you that there’s a big impact if they invade.

OO points out look but it’s not that likely that they invade. Both things are probably right; they are likely to be small escalations, and they are also likely true. But no one is going to invade Iran.

Then CG tells you something weird about people invading Iran—“or probably to invade.” We are the only ones to tell you something that you can actually believe after this debate, which is that it is likely that countries react with sanctions, and that possibility will make strong economic pressure, which is back to Iran.

First, our case framing and rebuilding, and then CO and OO.

So first, our case: look, OG told you there is a lot of risks in this situation due to the possibility of retaliation. What we tell you is that the reaction is massive pressure to Iran’s economy. We told you a number of reasons, but it’s really important to remember two of them.

First, they believe that they did it once, and it was useful. So they believe there is a useful tool to bend the knee on Iran. They did it, and they believe that is true; they can make it this way.

Second, they believe this is a way to do it without the tensions, without the invasions. So the most likely thing to happen is that they believe if they have a tool to do it without getting the setbacks, without getting the possibility of those bad things happening to Israel, I don’t know, it is much more likely that they do that because they think it is efficient with no cost.

Compare here the possibility to sanction someone when you know it’s efficient because you have proof that it is towards the probability of invade them—it's ridiculous. So we think it is much more likely that they sanction them.

The second thing that we tell you is this is not only true; it is also true that this provokes an irreversible trend to Iran. So Once they go into breaking the deal, it’s really difficult to go back to the deal. Iran's pride is the necessity to justify strength towards the people because it’s the source of legitimacy of the Iran government.

They are in a weakened position in the Middle East; they do this, so they bent the knee once, and they were fucked up when the knee was bent and then they went down. And Now again, it’s impossible for them—or at least not very possible that Iran accepts again to go to a deal in future negotiations that they claim.

If they do it in 10 years when they’ve been so fucked up by those sanctions, whereas if they do it now, that doesn’t happen because they are still complying with the EU. The EU is already maintaining the deal because they say there's a Trump idiot thing to do.

That is the comparative; it is likely that today they can do it. It is not in 10 years when they get to a situation where they were pressured and they continued everything.

How I told you, why the sanctions are really bad was not contested and all conceded in the debate: the sanctions are really bad.

No, what is the likely thing that happens? So what is the implicit comparative that CG told you in his speech? The implicit comparative is, A. the European Union and many others don’t sanction you because they promise you to comply with the agreement if you comply with the agreement.

Hence, okay, maybe the U.S. will somehow sanction, but firstly, the European Union and many others won’t. But Secondly, this is a response to CO’s direct response when they say that this will happen anyhow and it’s not comparative.

It is probably not true for at least six reasons.

First, because there won’t be any plausible justification after Trump. Trump’s justification is that they’re not complying. Whenever Trump goes out, if they are complying, there’s no possible justification to keep this trend.

Second, because many others will want you to do it, so they will press on the U.S. government in the UN and the European Union.

Thirdly, because the Democrats can actually win. Okay, this is a likely scenario in which Democrats win. Probably they won’t keep their path. Even if the Republicans win, they will want to appear more moderate than Trump because Trump was doing that probably for not justifiable reasons.

But fifthly, and most importantly, due to the fact that Iran and Iraq, and Afghanistan, are good examples of how not to do things, it’s much more likely that the U.S. electorate can buy into a narrative where we’re doing something about a fatality in Afghanistan or Iraq rather than going into Iran because it’s really harmful to their people and to their army.

So we think the most likely scenario is that in 10 years, the EU and other countries won’t have sanctioned you. You won’t have stress with the sanctions, but most likely also the U.S. will have lifted the sanctions. That is by far the thing which is more likely in the debate.

And this is why we win.

Let’s go to CO, basically; they say one thing, which is you secure when you have nuclear weapons because you have more deterrent power. This is false for at least four reasons.

First, because you already have massive deterrent power even if you don’t have nuclear weapons; you have a big army. So if Saudi Arabia gets crazy and goes rogue, you have a massive army to respond.

Secondly, because you have Russia; you have Russia as a hedge to back you up. They already have nuclear weapons in the first place; they already have massive armies in the first place.

Thirdly, it is untrue that nuclear weapons somehow deter; they do not prevent offenses in your context because it's like an offensive attack weapon, not a defensive weapon.

So even if you have it, you can still attack them. But precisely for all those reasons, we think that all the deterrence you can get, you’ve already got. Precisely if it’s true what they say, that you can get them in five weeks—okay, so if you can get them in five weeks, you already have the deterrent power because you can always get them in five weeks.

So if that’s true, there’s no deterrence at all. So we think CO has nothing in the debate.
Must run about non-comparatives at all.

<poi>
it’s unlikely that sanctions are worse than the status quo where no one is trading with Iran. But if the EU always responds to a threat with sanctions, why do they sign this deal in the first place?
</poi>

So first, it is not true that it’s not the status quo. Iran’s economy during the past 10 years was stagnant, and in the past years due to those precise sanctions, Iran could empower. Does that mean it could grow at 10%? No, but when they target your base, most economists say when they target your expectations, the likelihood that you can develop is much less.

Lastly, on OO, they say, look, this improves your situation to negotiate towards Europe. Most of their battles were won in my speech when I told you that you already have the leverage in negotiations. You already believe that you have a way out.

But not two more reasons:

First, it is that the European Union probably won’t think it is a better position to negotiate because if you react harshly, they would also have to react harshly in order to prevent third parties from doing the same.

There are other countries with not perfect similarities to Iran, but if the European Union seems to concede when others break the deal, that will probably happen Again, but bear in mind when you adjudicate a class with that we gave you a reason why this couldn't happen at all because Iran wouldn't be able to go into the deal in the first place. They could have committed to this PR thing at the end of the debate. We are the only ones to prove something that is absolutely possible, which is that the economy has been struggling for years. Pride on both sides—we think that’s it. We think we win.
</gw>

<ow>
All right, what’s important is that perception oftentimes overlooks reality in international relations, which is why we don’t have to prove that Iran needs to have or develop nuclear weapons for us to act as if they did. From the United States' point of view, this is the status quo. I don’t care if they don’t follow rules and stuff like this. You can Google this Liberation stuff. It was the United States which unilaterally imposed sanctions on Iran under the threat or under the idea that Iran was violating sanctions, even though this was completely internationally disputed. This is similar to what happened in the Iraq War; this is their policy continuously, which then resulted in a lot of different European countries as well imposing sanctions and halting investments and trade with Iran being stopped because there’s a threat that relations are going to deteriorate and stuff like this.

Which is why closing arms is critical because they ignore our analysis on the idea that it’s the perception of having nuclear weapons that is important. They can’t simultaneously claim that European governments and democracies have the incentive to be moderate towards Iran with the analysis they gave in the member speech, which is why they like to demonize them and why they have a completely different approach towards Iran.

On the legitimacy point, look, this is directly responding to closing government. The idea to regain stability from the perspective of the regime is to prioritize stuff. We would rather have, or as the government, prioritize military power, which is developing your nuclear weapons, than prioritizing economic gains. This is for the reason that we, as a religious autocracy, as pointed out in his speech, are more likely to sell this as a stability mechanism when we are saying that we are fighting against our eternal enemy, the United States, and that we are not backing down to their demands.

The comparative is that Iranians have come to terms with living with sanctions, which yes, do have a huge impact on the Iranian economy. But that means that because they’ve been able to survive and are still a perceived threat to the United States throughout the past ten years, means that they have a huge internal economy that they are trading with alternative partners and stuff like this, that they are finding glucose somewhere. So it's unclear on their side of the house why this time the sanctions would be so detrimental to deal with GL stability comparatively to our side.

It’s huge pressure on the Iranian regime not to back down and not to get anything when they talk about Krot, blah blah blah. What they have to stand for in this debate is that Iran, unilaterally—and this is important—after it started enriching uranium as a response to the UN warranted imposing sanctions by the United States, now reverses its position and still maintains legitimacy in international relations or with its own people because it didn’t get anything. Because Trump is unlikely to, like, de-impose sanctions and stuff like this, right?

So the burden of government here is to show that sanctions don’t exist on their side, and they cannot do so even with the European Union. We talk about why there are secondary sanctions and stuff like this. This is partly because of their analysis towards Iran, but also because—and this is the analysis they respond to in our case—it is not important if Iran develops nuclear weapons as long as countries believe that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. This is something from the perception to which they react.

Also, we think that it’s very likely as a response to what comes in the previous speech that Russia is going to stay on board for a couple of reasons, meaning that the geopolitics of the region means that they’re more likely to actually still trade with us, still cooperate with us, because we are the most important ally. But also because of the history of, like, deal-breaking they have, they are likely to accept that we also broke a deal and stuff like this.

But also that the idea that the U.S. will fight over this—no. So Trump, also when they talk about Trump, is not a problem. It’s a Republican Senate. There’s been this whole narrative in United States politics that this was Obama’s fault and stuff like this. So it’s not that one L is leaving this fight; it’s very likely that whoever comes in his place is either going to face huge Republican opposition if they want to reimpose and stuff like this because the whole deal was perceived by United States politics as broken to start it.

But also, if that’s not true, if a Republican comes, it’s very likely that it’s going to continue the same policy because this is going to support the status quo. Why is opening government completely uncooperative in this debate?

But lastly, let’s talk about the interests of the actual Iranian government, as CG said—that to stay in power and avoid escalation. No, the entire theocratic system of Iran, of Ayatollahs since Khomeini, is based on the idea that Iran represents a third way which will spread Shia Islam and be neither capitalist nor communist.

The entire system of Ayatollahs and the Council of Guardians of the Revolution is based on the idea that we are going to do this; we’re going to be a strong country for our Muslim brothers. Given economic pressures, this will happen anyway. The only way to retain peace is to convince the people that we’re doing something for the future, that we are sacrificing now in order to keep fighting our hated enemies. If that doesn’t happen, people lose trust in their government.

That’s why opposition we finally win this fucking debate.

</mo>

<gw>

The reason why we are going to win this debate is very simple: it’s called possibility. So OG tells you that there’s a big impact if they invade.

OO points out look but it’s not that likely that they invade. Both things are probably right; they are likely to be small escalations, and they are also likely true. But no one is going to invade Iran.

Then CG tells you something weird about people invading Iran—“or probably to invade.” We are the only ones to tell you something that you can actually believe after this debate, which is that it is likely that countries react with sanctions, and that possibility will make strong economic pressure, which is back to Iran.

First, our case framing and rebuilding, and then CO and OO.

So first, our case: look, OG told you there is a lot of risks in this situation due to the possibility of retaliation. What we tell you is that the reaction is massive pressure to Iran’s economy. We told you a number of reasons, but it’s really important to remember two of them.

First, they believe that they did it once, and it was useful. So they believe there is a useful tool to bend the knee on Iran. They did it, and they believe that is true; they can make it this way.

Second, they believe this is a way to do it without the tensions, without the invasions. So the most likely thing to happen is that they believe if they have a tool to do it without getting the setbacks, without getting the possibility of those bad things happening to Israel, I don’t know, it is much more likely that they do that because they think it is efficient with no cost.

Compare here the possibility to sanction someone when you know it’s efficient because you have proof that it is towards the probability of invade them—it's ridiculous. So we think it is much more likely that they sanction them.

The second thing that we tell you is this is not only true; it is also true that this provokes an irreversible trend to Iran. So Once they go into breaking the deal, it’s really difficult to go back to the deal. Iran's pride is the necessity to justify strength towards the people because it’s the source of legitimacy of the Iran government.

They are in a weakened position in the Middle East; they do this, so they bent the knee once, and they were fucked up when the knee was bent and then they went down. And Now again, it’s impossible for them—or at least not very possible that Iran accepts again to go to a deal in future negotiations that they claim.

If they do it in 10 years when they’ve been so fucked up by those sanctions, whereas if they do it now, that doesn’t happen because they are still complying with the EU. The EU is already maintaining the deal because they say there's a Trump idiot thing to do.

That is the comparative; it is likely that today they can do it. It is not in 10 years when they get to a situation where they were pressured and they continued everything.

How I told you, why the sanctions are really bad was not contested and all conceded in the debate: the sanctions are really bad.

No, what is the likely thing that happens? So what is the implicit comparative that CG told you in his speech? The implicit comparative is, A. the European Union and many others don’t sanction you because they promise you to comply with the agreement if you comply with the agreement.

Hence, okay, maybe the U.S. will somehow sanction, but firstly, the European Union and many others won’t. But Secondly, this is a response to CO’s direct response when they say that this will happen anyhow and it’s not comparative.

It is probably not true for at least six reasons.

First, because there won’t be any plausible justification after Trump. Trump’s justification is that they’re not complying. Whenever Trump goes out, if they are complying, there’s no possible justification to keep this trend.

Second, because many others will want you to do it, so they will press on the U.S. government in the UN and the European Union.

Thirdly, because the Democrats can actually win. Okay, this is a likely scenario in which Democrats win. Probably they won’t keep their path. Even if the Republicans win, they will want to appear more moderate than Trump because Trump was doing that probably for not justifiable reasons.

But fifthly, and most importantly, due to the fact that Iran and Iraq, and Afghanistan, are good examples of how not to do things, it’s much more likely that the U.S. electorate can buy into a narrative where we’re doing something about a fatality in Afghanistan or Iraq rather than going into Iran because it’s really harmful to their people and to their army.

So we think the most likely scenario is that in 10 years, the EU and other countries won’t have sanctioned you. You won’t have stress with the sanctions, but most likely also the U.S. will have lifted the sanctions. That is by far the thing which is more likely in the debate.

And this is why we win.

Let’s go to CO, basically; they say one thing, which is you secure when you have nuclear weapons because you have more deterrent power. This is false for at least four reasons.

First, because you already have massive deterrent power even if you don’t have nuclear weapons; you have a big army. So if Saudi Arabia gets crazy and goes rogue, you have a massive army to respond.

Secondly, because you have Russia; you have Russia as a hedge to back you up. They already have nuclear weapons in the first place; they already have massive armies in the first place.

Thirdly, it is untrue that nuclear weapons somehow deter; they do not prevent offenses in your context because it's like an offensive attack weapon, not a defensive weapon.

So even if you have it, you can still attack them. But precisely for all those reasons, we think that all the deterrence you can get, you’ve already got. Precisely if it’s true what they say, that you can get them in five weeks—okay, so if you can get them in five weeks, you already have the deterrent power because you can always get them in five weeks.

So if that’s true, there’s no deterrence at all. So we think CO has nothing in the debate.

Must run about non-comparatives at all.

<poi>

it’s unlikely that sanctions are worse than the status quo where no one is trading with Iran. But if the EU always responds to a threat with sanctions, why do they sign this deal in the first place?

</poi>

So first, it is not true that it’s not the status quo. Iran’s economy during the past 10 years was stagnant, and in the past years due to those precise sanctions, Iran could empower. Does that mean it could grow at 10%? No, but when they target your base, most economists say when they target your expectations, the likelihood that you can develop is much less.

Lastly, on OO, they say, look, this improves your situation to negotiate towards Europe. Most of their battles were won in my speech when I told you that you already have the leverage in negotiations. You already believe that you have a way out.

But not two more reasons:

First, it is that the European Union probably won’t think it is a better position to negotiate because if you react harshly, they would also have to react harshly in order to prevent third parties from doing the same.

There are other countries with not perfect similarities to Iran, but if the European Union seems to concede when others break the deal, that will probably happen Again, but bear in mind when you adjudicate a class with that we gave you a reason why this couldn't happen at all because Iran wouldn't be able to go into the deal in the first place. They could have committed to this PR thing at the end of the debate. We are the only ones to prove something that is absolutely possible, which is that the economy has been struggling for years. Pride on both sides—we think that’s it. We think we win.

</gw>

<ow>

All right, what’s important is that perception oftentimes overlooks reality in international relations, which is why we don’t have to prove that Iran needs to have or develop nuclear weapons for us to act as if they did. From the United States' point of view, this is the status quo. I don’t care if they don’t follow rules and stuff like this. You can Google this Liberation stuff. It was the United States which unilaterally imposed sanctions on Iran under the threat or under the idea that Iran was violating sanctions, even though this was completely internationally disputed. This is similar to what happened in the Iraq War; this is their policy continuously, which then resulted in a lot of different European countries as well imposing sanctions and halting investments and trade with Iran being stopped because there’s a threat that relations are going to deteriorate and stuff like this.

Which is why closing arms is critical because they ignore our analysis on the idea that it’s the perception of having nuclear weapons that is important. They can’t simultaneously claim that European governments and democracies have the incentive to be moderate towards Iran with the analysis they gave in the member speech, which is why they like to demonize them and why they have a completely different approach towards Iran.

On the legitimacy point, look, this is directly responding to closing government. The idea to regain stability from the perspective of the regime is to prioritize stuff. We would rather have, or as the government, prioritize military power, which is developing your nuclear weapons, than prioritizing economic gains. This is for the reason that we, as a religious autocracy, as pointed out in his speech, are more likely to sell this as a stability mechanism when we are saying that we are fighting against our eternal enemy, the United States, and that we are not backing down to their demands.

The comparative is that Iranians have come to terms with living with sanctions, which yes, do have a huge impact on the Iranian economy. But that means that because they’ve been able to survive and are still a perceived threat to the United States throughout the past ten years, means that they have a huge internal economy that they are trading with alternative partners and stuff like this, that they are finding glucose somewhere. So it's unclear on their side of the house why this time the sanctions would be so detrimental to deal with GL stability comparatively to our side.

It’s huge pressure on the Iranian regime not to back down and not to get anything when they talk about Krot, blah blah blah. What they have to stand for in this debate is that Iran, unilaterally—and this is important—after it started enriching uranium as a response to the UN warranted imposing sanctions by the United States, now reverses its position and still maintains legitimacy in international relations or with its own people because it didn’t get anything. Because Trump is unlikely to, like, de-impose sanctions and stuff like this, right?

So the burden of government here is to show that sanctions don’t exist on their side, and they cannot do so even with the European Union. We talk about why there are secondary sanctions and stuff like this. This is partly because of their analysis towards Iran, but also because—and this is the analysis they respond to in our case—it is not important if Iran develops nuclear weapons as long as countries believe that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. This is something from the perception to which they react.

Also, we think that it’s very likely as a response to what comes in the previous speech that Russia is going to stay on board for a couple of reasons, meaning that the geopolitics of the region means that they’re more likely to actually still trade with us, still cooperate with us, because we are the most important ally. But also because of the history of, like, deal-breaking they have, they are likely to accept that we also broke a deal and stuff like this.

But also that the idea that the U.S. will fight over this—no. So Trump, also when they talk about Trump, is not a problem. It’s a Republican Senate. There’s been this whole narrative in United States politics that this was Obama’s fault and stuff like this. So it’s not that one L is leaving this fight; it’s very likely that whoever comes in his place is either going to face huge Republican opposition if they want to reimpose and stuff like this because the whole deal was perceived by United States politics as broken to start it.

But also, if that’s not true, if a Republican comes, it’s very likely that it’s going to continue the same policy because this is going to support the status quo. Why is opening government completely uncooperative in this debate?