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[2038.72 --> 2044.32] whatever reason and we would just move on. So for us it doesn't really change that much although |
[2044.32 --> 2049.68] knowing about those guarantees kind of allows us to make more informed guesses about what is going |
[2049.68 --> 2054.64] on in the program. Like for instance when I do see a function that returns multiple return values |
[2054.64 --> 2060.56] then I am not a Go developer but still I am always going to assume that the last value returned is going |
[2060.56 --> 2065.52] to be the object or the first one I don't recall but I will have to check but I know that since this is |
[2065.52 --> 2069.60] the normal way that people are supposed to write Go code and since I know that the compiler is going |
[2069.60 --> 2075.52] to force people to do it even if they don't want to that probably I can base my hypothesis on those |
[2075.52 --> 2081.44] conventions which is actually pretty helpful in that regard. So would you say that Go is a good language |
[2081.44 --> 2089.12] to pick up for hacker or for researcher in security? Well I'm not really in the business of helping attackers |
[2089.12 --> 2094.24] you know being more efficient at writing offensive tools but if I were to then I would guess that |
[2094.24 --> 2100.96] Go is probably a good language to pick up. Basically anything that is away from the traditional |
[2100.96 --> 2105.92] languages is going to be more annoying for us because we are less used to it. I think Rust is going to be |
[2105.92 --> 2110.00] a good choice as well. I haven't looked at Rust too much myself I have a co-worker that did and |
[2110.00 --> 2117.04] also released some videos and from what he's saying it's like C++ but harder which is a kind of a high |
[2117.04 --> 2125.44] standard to beat. So yeah just Go and Rust would be my advice there although it's not advice please don't. |
[2125.44 --> 2131.28] So if those are the kind of the new school ones right Go and Rust what are like historically what |
[2131.28 --> 2137.04] languages has everyone used on the hacking side and on the research side? Well historically everything |
[2137.04 --> 2142.16] has been used you know Murphy's law which says that if there is a way to misuse something that is going |
[2142.16 --> 2148.64] to be misused right and programming languages have proven time and again that law. The thing is we are |
[2149.20 --> 2153.76] recipients of whatever the hackers are doing right. We do not get to choose what we are going to work |
[2153.76 --> 2157.92] on like hackers are going to write their their tools and they're going to choose whatever language |
[2157.92 --> 2163.20] is familiar for them or whatever language feels comfortable or whatever and this is why we end up |
[2163.20 --> 2169.04] sometimes facing the most ridiculous stuff like malware written in auto IT. I don't know if you know about |
[2169.04 --> 2176.48] this it's like a it's some weird scripting language that is used for UI testing and basically allows |
[2176.48 --> 2182.48] you to simulate keystrokes and mouse clicks. Well it turns out people write malware with this as well. |
[2182.48 --> 2187.92] Anything that has ever been available as a programming language has been one way or the other eventually |
[2187.92 --> 2194.32] been used for malware. So the thing is this is our bane as reverse engineers which is that we do receive |
[2194.32 --> 2198.96] malware and whatever it is we have to work on it because at the end of the day our job is to |
[2198.96 --> 2204.16] figure out what was going on in that specific incident. And so whether it's C or C++ or it's |
[2204.16 --> 2210.64] Go or Delphi or Pascal or whatever we just have Erlang maybe no Erlang I'm pretty sure there's an Erlang |
[2210.64 --> 2217.20] malware whatever we receive we have to work on and so we cannot really afford to be picky about what |
[2217.20 --> 2223.36] languages we get interested in. We just have to be able to adapt to whatever comes because everything |
[2223.36 --> 2228.56] will come eventually. So you just mentioned right there like you get your research is on whatever like |
[2228.56 --> 2233.36] hackers leave behind let that be malware or whatever what other things do people leave behind is it just |
[2233.36 --> 2240.64] the actual binaries or like are you digging into logs and other things? Yeah so in a typical incident |
[2240.64 --> 2246.96] scenario then you would have people that go into what we call forensics mode they will collect all the |
[2246.96 --> 2252.24] logs they will collect all the hard drives and try to figure out exactly what happened inside the network |
[2252.24 --> 2257.76] they will collect not just machine logs but you know DNS logs they will collect whatever event was |
[2257.76 --> 2263.44] generated by the windows machines they will collect you know whatever was saved by the HTTP proxy and so |
[2263.44 --> 2268.00] on all the net flow if it's available usually it's not usually not that much information is actually |
[2268.00 --> 2271.52] available in case of an incident but you know that's someone else's problem I'm not an incident |
[2271.52 --> 2279.52] responder and I have enough stuff to worry about but what I focus on is the actual malware we do have |
[2279.52 --> 2285.68] information through the antivirus from Kaspersky that gives us information about the execution context so we can |
[2285.68 --> 2291.12] see that okay this process launched this process etc so we have this type of information but in a bigger |
[2291.12 --> 2296.56] incident context then you would get a much clearer picture about everything that went on on the in the |
[2296.56 --> 2301.92] victim's network and this this whole trove of information would allow you to reconstruct the whole |
[2301.92 --> 2306.00] timeline of the incident so you would see that you know at this time you had some suspicious |
[2306.00 --> 2311.36] request on you know some web front end and then you would see that there is a file created at a later date on the |
[2311.36 --> 2316.80] same web server and then you would maybe see some weird suspicious request to the active directory server |
[2316.80 --> 2322.80] with some golden ticket with a mimicat or something well those kinds of lateral movement methods etc and at the end of the |
[2322.80 --> 2330.80] day somewhere some attacker would have to drop some binaries to help them either persist on the victim machine or get |
[2330.80 --> 2337.36] further into the network or deeper because they will try to do whatever they can without deploying anything some very careful |
[2337.36 --> 2343.52] attackers will not deploy anything on disk and they will just deploy whatever program that they need inside |
[2343.52 --> 2348.08] the memory which is very stealthy but also the machine happens to reboot then you know everything |
[2348.08 --> 2352.80] that was in the memory just goes away and so if you have no way of coming back onto the victim machine then |
[2352.80 --> 2357.28] you know all the access that you have deployed is lost some very stealthy attackers will decide that they |
[2357.28 --> 2365.12] would rather lose access and leave forensic traces on hard drive most of them like 90 99 of them will feel like they would |
[2365.12 --> 2371.60] rather leave some kind of trace knowing that most people don't look anyway and then leave stuff for |
[2371.60 --> 2377.60] us to analyze later if we figure out that there was an incident and you know someone goes there collects |
[2377.60 --> 2382.24] everything and just sends the binaries back to us you said the incident response teams are the ones that |
[2382.24 --> 2388.16] collect all that data and all of that yeah exactly so we do have such teams at Kaspersky but most |
[2388.16 --> 2393.28] cyber security companies will have either their internal instance responders or swoop in you know a |
[2393.28 --> 2399.76] contractor that they know of and that can be called at any hour of the day or the night and that will come and you know |
[2399.76 --> 2406.80] just exactly swoop in with the big guns if something weird took place now it doesn't mean that we do not work in |
[2406.80 --> 2411.76] direct interaction with those teams it means that you know this is their job and then you know we get we are more back |
[2411.76 --> 2419.28] office guys where you know we get escalated some stuff and then we look into it but most of the intelligence that we create |
[2419.28 --> 2424.32] doesn't actually come from incident response cases i think it would be a good idea if we were able to |
[2424.96 --> 2430.40] gain more information from that source as well i think it's a very valuable one but we work mostly |
[2430.40 --> 2435.60] on the telemetry collected by our antivirus you know all the samples that are suspicious or that are |
[2435.60 --> 2441.68] uploaded to the cloud for analysis and then we can also swoop in but you know very much more quietly |
[2441.68 --> 2446.80] and look at all this data and see okay this looks interesting because you know we've never seen this before |
[2446.80 --> 2451.20] or it looks like some malware that we saw 10 years ago and we haven't seen since and you have some |
[2451.20 --> 2456.40] modifications and then we are interested in what happened since then right but it's not really our |
[2456.40 --> 2461.76] work tends to be a bit disconnected from the actual incidents and really more focused on looking at the |
[2462.40 --> 2467.68] big data lake that we have and try to understand what is relevant inside of it that's cool thanks for |
[2467.68 --> 2475.36] that that insight from the other side of this equation what are some tips you can give for writing a secure |
[2475.36 --> 2481.76] software for people who do go or in general if it's not specific to go it's also useful yeah i think |
[2481.76 --> 2487.44] one of the main appeals of go is that you don't really need to think about security as much as with |
[2487.44 --> 2493.44] other languages go is a memory safe language unless i'm mistaken and the compiler is never going to let |
[2493.44 --> 2498.56] you do stupid stuff like create an array that is too small and then you know write stuff that goes out |
[2498.56 --> 2505.04] of it like it's not just not possible so it eliminates a whole lot of bug classes which we call memory |
[2505.04 --> 2509.44] corruptions it's just not going to happen you cannot do this to yourself and go and it means |
[2509.44 --> 2516.16] that all the old school buffer overflows that plagued all the c and c++ programs for dozens of years by |
[2516.16 --> 2522.48] now just are not going to ever happen in the go language it doesn't mean that the program is going to be |
[2522.48 --> 2528.48] like perfectly safe from any security issues but the issues are not going to be related to oh i made a |
[2528.48 --> 2533.36] programming mistake and uh there is a bug in my program it's going to be exploited it's going to be |
[2533.36 --> 2539.92] more related to design issues like the memory safe language does not help you implement a secure |
[2539.92 --> 2546.08] authentication scheme for instance it doesn't help you write a well thought out network protocol i saw |
[2546.08 --> 2550.96] that go really helps you with cryptography i noticed that it's very difficult to choose algorithms that are |
[2550.96 --> 2556.96] not safe like by default you can only i don't think you can choose the algorithms and go by like i know you |
[2556.96 --> 2562.88] can do aes for instance but like the cypher mode or the those kind of stuff tends to be unless i'm |
[2562.88 --> 2567.04] mistaken you know selected by default for you and the defaults are good so you're not going to be |
[2567.04 --> 2574.32] making those mistakes but oh yeah the iv something i was working on some code in go that was uh relying |
[2574.32 --> 2579.52] on aes i was looking at trying to figure out exactly how the iv was generated and so on i was looking |
[2579.52 --> 2585.20] saying that nowhere in the developer code and doing some research i noticed that it was actually go that |
[2585.20 --> 2591.76] would by itself generate an iv for the encryption this initialization vector and then it would append |
[2591.76 --> 2597.92] it to the uh somewhere in the final encrypted buffer and so usually in other languages this is something you |
[2597.92 --> 2603.60] would have to do on your own and this is a like a big avenue for making mistakes like if you choose a |
[2603.60 --> 2608.00] stupid iv like just zeros or if you do not select one at all then you're going to have encryption |
[2608.00 --> 2613.28] problems go would not let you do this so it's very obvious to me that go was created with |
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