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[3762.56 --> 3768.40] really fascinating we will be very happy to have you again thanks a lot ivan well thank you very much |
[3768.40 --> 3773.36] for having me and uh yeah feel free to like call me up anytime i'll be happy to be back thanks |
[3773.36 --> 3781.52] ian for joining it was fun co-hosting together yeah thanks you guys this was great bye everyone |
[3783.76 --> 3789.92] if you enjoyed listening at the intersection of go and information security stay tuned for part three |
[3789.92 --> 3795.36] it's currently scheduled to record live on november 29th and of course go back and listen to part one |
[3795.36 --> 3802.00] while you're at it that was episode number 205 here's a sampler the stakes have been ratcheting up |
[3802.00 --> 3806.88] it's really easy to kind of look at it that way and we don't want to make it like too dark or too |
[3806.88 --> 3813.84] heady but now this is the playground of also a lot of nation states and a lot of criminals and you know |
[3813.84 --> 3819.12] if you're in this in the us it's kind of like the ransomware epidemic is sort of unavoidable right like |
[3819.12 --> 3824.08] you you have to talk about it every day and that's where things get less pretty right like if you're at |
[3824.08 --> 3829.76] a hospital that can't help folks because all their you know tragically outdated windows xp systems are |
[3829.76 --> 3834.80] in a flat network and all of them got popped at the same time that's where you go well yeah that code |
[3834.80 --> 3841.36] was fun i love the idea of just having these you know kind of hacking superpowers but there's a side |
[3841.36 --> 3846.40] to it that isn't quite so cute and i think we're kind of walking that line all the time right where you |
[3846.40 --> 3851.92] go oh this is fascinating and you just get wrapped up in the functionality and what someone has been able |
[3851.92 --> 3858.16] to accomplish and it's easy to forget like oh well there's this is actually a part of a much much |
[3858.16 --> 3865.68] heavier game listen in at gotime.fm slash 205 or search hacking with go in your podcast app of |
[3865.68 --> 3872.16] choice it should pop right up thanks once again to our partners at fastly and fly.io they help make |
[3872.16 --> 3878.00] go time possible into the mysterious brake master cylinder go times beats are dope because bmc makes |
[3878.00 --> 3884.96] dope beats it's as simple as that next time on go time angelica natalie and chris welcome tech lawyer |
[3884.96 --> 3891.28] lewis via to the show to answer the age-old question who owns our code stay tuned i think |
[3891.28 --> 3894.64] you're gonna dig it we'll have that episode ready for you next week |
[3906.64 --> 3906.72] you |
• The host discusses an APT case where a malware implant was written in Pascal |
• Sourcegraph is mentioned as a code intelligence platform and its features are discussed |
• Code Insights is introduced as a feature that allows users to turn their code base into a database through search queries |
• Joel Cortler explains how Code Insights works and its potential use cases |
• The host discusses the capabilities of Code Insights and its flexibility in allowing users to create custom searches |
• Ivan Kwiatkowski joins the show to discuss hacking with Go, specifically reverse engineering malware written in Go. |
• Improvements to IDA's support for Go programming language |
• Comparison of Go and Rust languages for security research and hacking |
• Challenges of reverse engineering code generated by Go and Rust languages |
• Tooling issues with disassembling Rust-generated code |
• Cross-compilation capabilities of the Go language |
• The speaker believes Go is not bringing anything new to the table in terms of multi-platform compatibility. |
• C++ and Java were also intended to be platform-agnostic, but did not always live up to this expectation. |
• Some architectures like Solaris, ARM, and MIPS are supported out of the box for Go. |
• However, some less common architectures like MIPS 64P32 and MIPS 64P32LE may require additional effort. |
• The speaker thinks that multi-platform compatibility is not a unique selling point for Go. |
• C already provides this feature, and other languages that do so are "good for them". |
• A major advantage of Go is the ability to distribute a single binary with all dependencies included. |
• This can be beneficial in situations where the developer has no control over the client's machine. |
• The concept of modules in Go, which tracks dependencies and version numbers, can prevent "dependency hell" and is generally a good thing. |
• Comparison of Go language to C/C++ in terms of file separation and functionality |
• Advantages of having multiple files for malware analysis and reverse engineering |
• Discussion of the benefits of using Go language, including memory safety and reduced vulnerabilities |
• Potential for improved security with Go code compared to unmanaged languages like C/C++ |
• Comparison of CVE numbers between Go and C/C++ projects as a metric for security |
• Introduction to FireHydrant and its incident management features |
• Brief discussion about the rarity or non-existence of malware in COBOL |
• COBOL programming language mentioned as being used in banks, but rarely seen in malware |
• Pascal programming language referenced due to a recent case involving APT malware written in it |
• Discussion of APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) hackers and their cyber espionage activities |
• Comparison between Go and Pascal languages, noting similarities despite different assembly representations |
• Explanation of compiler behavior and how it affects the assembly representation of code |
• Mention of decompiler tools like Ghidra and Ida Pro used to convert assembly back to C language |
• C++ and Go compilers add complex code under the hood, making it difficult for reverse engineers |
• Template instantiation and nested templates increase complexity |
• Reference counters and garbage collection are automatically added by compilers, but can be cluttering and unnecessary |
• Go compiler optimizes code with inlining and a unique calling convention |
• Threaded programs make debugging and understanding program flow more difficult |
• Threads as a concept are runtime objects and add significant complexity for reverse engineers to visualize and follow |
• Difficulty of reverse engineering due to multiple threads and simultaneous events |
• Stow Away program as an example of complex proxying operations |
• Challenges of tracking and understanding program behavior in real-time |
• Importance of having source code or open-source projects for reference |
• Visualization techniques for multi-threaded programs, including imagining source code instead of assembly code |
• Difficulty of interpreting variable names and function calls when they are unknown or misleading |
• Reverse engineering involves trying to understand code without comments or variable names |
• The goal of writing simple, readable code is often at odds with the ability of compilers to optimize it |
• Compilers can generate similar assembly code regardless of the complexity of the original code |
• Go's unique features, such as functions that can return multiple values, complicate translation to CPU code |
• Assembly languages have different conventions for handling function return values based on the programming language being used |
• Complexity of Go language compared to traditional languages |
• Differences in conventions between languages resulting in varying compiled code |
• Efficiency of Go's handling of multiple return values on the compiler level |
• Comparison of function calls and return values in Go versus assembly language |
• Error catching mechanisms in Go and its requirement for error checking |
• Malware developers follow best practices in error checking and handling when writing malware programs in the Go language. |
• The speaker has observed that even hackers use safety features and mechanisms intended by the language, rather than trying to circumvent them. |
• Error checking is often seen as providing valuable information for debugging purposes. |
• Most malware developers follow good coding practices, but there may be exceptions where code is intentionally written poorly. |
• The speaker notes that even malicious code can be well-written and follows best practices. |
• Representation of error values in assembly code |
• Difficulty understanding Go functions without documentation or clear function names |
• Using AI tools like Codex and Copilot to highlight and explain code |
• Personal aversion to using AI-powered coding assistance projects due to concerns about reliability and security. |
• Source code is uploaded to the cloud and analyzed to feed machine learning algorithms. |
• The speaker's source code ends up being open-source anyway, even when hosted on GitHub. |
• Machine learning projects can potentially help with reverse engineering programs, but none are known that specialize in this area. |
• AIs like mid-journey and Lex produce impressive results and have the potential to recognize and generate content. |
• Recognizing and generating functions will likely be generated by other computers eventually. |
• Specialized AIs may be needed for different programming languages. |
• Code generation and languages |
• Consistency of data sets in AI training |
• Impact of language strictness on AI understanding and code generation |
• Ambiguity of languages like Python, JavaScript, and PHP |
• Difficulty for AIs to understand dynamic typing and runtime determination |
• Advantages and challenges of working with assembly code for AIs. |
• The speaker believes that the new language being developed is the opposite of ambiguous and will be a good thing for AI. |
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