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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Help:Cheatsheet] | [TOKENS: 394]
Help:Cheatsheet Wikitext cheatsheet Works anywhere in the text ''italics'', '''bold''', and '''''both''''' italics, bold, and both [[copy edit]] [[copy edit]]ors copy edit copy editors "Pipe" a link to change the link's text [[Android (operating system)|Android]] Android Link to a section [[Frog#Locomotion]] [[Frog#Locomotion|locomotion in frogs]] {{slink|Frog#Locomotion}} Frog#Locomotion locomotion in frogs Frog ยง Locomotion [[Red link example]] Red link example https://www.wikipedia.org https://www.wikipedia.org [https://www.wikipedia.org] [https://www.wikipedia.org Wikipedia] Wikipedia Hello World! Hello again! This statement is true.{{cn}} This statement is true.[citation needed] ~~~~ Username (talk) 13:28, 21 February 2026 (UTC) [[User:Example]] or {{u|Example}} User:Example or Example <s>This topic isn't [[WP:N|notable]].</s> This topic isn't notable. <u>This topic is notable</u> This topic is notable <!-- This had consensus, discuss at talk page --> [[File:Wiki.png|thumb|Caption]] #REDIRECT [[Target page]] Target page #REDIRECT [[Target page#anchorName]] Target page#anchorName == Level 2 == === Level 3 === ==== Level 4 ==== ===== Level 5 ===== ====== Level 6 ====== do not use = Level 1 = as it is for page titles Level 2 * One * Two ** Two point one * Three # One # Two ## Two point one # Three no indent (normal) : first indent :: second indent ::: third indent :::: fourth indent {{Outdent|4}} return to left margin no indent (normal) See also
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Glossary] | [TOKENS: 77]
Contents Wikipedia:Glossary This is a glossary of terms commonly used on Wikipedia. !$@ 0โ€“9 A B A standard message which can be added to an article using a template. For example, {{stub}} is expanded to the following: C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W XYZ See also Notes
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/ืžืกืžืš_ืฉื˜ืื•ื‘ืจ] | [TOKENS: 828]
ืชื•ื›ืŸ ืขื ื™ื™ื ื™ื ืžืกืžืš ืฉื˜ืื•ื‘ืจ ืžืกืžืš ืฉื˜ืื•ื‘ืจ ื”ื•ื ื ื™ื™ืจ ืžื˜ื” ืฉื”ื›ื™ืŸ ืจืืฉ ื”ื—ื˜ื™ื‘ื” ื”ืืกื˜ืจื˜ื’ื™ืช ื‘ืื’ืฃ ื”ืชื›ื ื•ืŸ ื‘ืฆื”"ืœ, ืชื"ืœ ืฆื‘ื™ ืฉื˜ืื•ื‘ืจ, ื‘ืขื‘ื•ืจ ื”ืจืžื˜ื›"ืœ, ืจื‘-ืืœื•ืฃ ืืžื ื•ืŸ ืœื™ืคืงื™ืŸ-ืฉื—ืง, ื›ื”ื›ื ื” ืœืคื’ื™ืฉื” ื‘ื™ื ื• ื•ื‘ื™ืŸ ืžืงื‘ื™ืœื• ื”ืกื•ืจื™ ื—ื™ื›ืžืช ืฉื™ื”ืื‘ื™ ื‘ื™ื•ื ื™ 1995. ืกื‘ื‘ ื”ืฉื™ื—ื•ืช ื‘ื™ืŸ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื•ืกื•ืจื™ื” ื”ืกืชื™ื™ื ื‘ื™ื ื•ืืจ 1996 ืžืกืคืจ ื—ื•ื“ืฉื™ื ืœืื—ืจ ืจืฆื— ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ืจื‘ื™ืŸ. ื™ื•"ืจ ื”ืื•ืคื•ื–ื™ืฆื™ื” ื‘ืื•ืชื” ื”ืขืช, ื‘ื ื™ืžื™ืŸ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•, ื ืชืŸ ื‘ืžื” ืคื•ืžื‘ื™ืช ืœืชื•ื›ืŸ ื”ืžืกืžืš ืžืขืœ ื‘ื™ืžืช ื”ื›ื ืกืช, ื—ืจืฃ ืกื™ื•ื•ื’ื•. ื‘ืžืกื’ืจืช ื—ืงื™ืจืช ื”ื”ื“ืœืคื”, ื—ืงืจื” ืžืฉื˜ืจืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ 90 ื—ื™ื™ืœื™ื ื•ืขื•ื“ ืžืกืคืจ ืขื•ื‘ื“ื™ ืžืฉืจื“ ื”ื‘ื™ื˜ื—ื•ืŸ, ืืš ืœื ืื™ืชืจื” ืืช ื”ืžื“ืœื™ืฃ. ื—ื‘ืจ ื”ื›ื ืกืช ืจืŸ ื›ื”ืŸ ืคื ื” ืœื™ื•ืขืฅ ื”ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ ืœืžืžืฉืœื” ืžื™ื›ืืœ ื‘ืŸ-ื™ืื™ืจ ื•ื‘ื™ืงืฉ ืžืžื ื• ืœื”ื’ื™ืฉ ื‘ืงืฉื” ืœื”ืกืจืช ื—ืกื™ื ื•ืชื• ืฉืœ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื‘ืฉืœ ืขื‘ื™ืจื” ืขืœ ื—ื•ืง ื”ืขื•ื ืฉื™ืŸ, ืืš ื‘ืŸ-ื™ืื™ืจ ืกื™ืจื‘ ื•ืขื ื” ืฉืœื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืขื•ืžื“ืช ื”ื—ืกื™ื ื•ืช ื”ืžื”ื•ืชื™ืช. ื›ื”ืŸ ืขืชืจ ืœื‘ื’"ืฅ ืืฉืจ ืคืกืง ืฉืื›ืŸ ืขื•ืžื“ืช ืœื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื—ืกื™ื ื•ืชื• ืฉื›ืŸ ื”ื”ื“ืœืคื” ื”ื™ื™ืชื” ื‘ืžืกื’ืจืช ืžื™ืœื•ื™ ืชืคืงื™ื“ื• ื•ื“ื—ื” ืืช ื”ืขืชื™ืจื”. ืชื•ื›ื ื™ ื”ืžืกืžืš ืœืงืจื™ืื” ื ื•ืกืคืช ืงื™ืฉื•ืจื™ื ื—ื™ืฆื•ื ื™ื™ื ื”ืขืจื•ืช ืฉื•ืœื™ื™ื
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/ื”ืžื—ืื”_ื ื’ื“_ื‘ื ื™ืžื™ืŸ_ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•] | [TOKENS: 23349]
ืชื•ื›ืŸ ืขื ื™ื™ื ื™ื ื”ืžื—ืื” ื ื’ื“ ืจืืฉ ืžืžืฉืœืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื‘ื ื™ืžื™ืŸ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื‘ึพ2020: ื”ื—ืœ ืžึพ2023: ื”ืžื—ืื” ื ื’ื“ ื‘ื ื™ืžื™ืŸ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•, ื”ืžื•ื›ืจืช ื’ื ื›ืžื—ืืช ื‘ืœืคื•ืจ ื•ื›ืžื—ืืช ื”ื“ื’ืœื™ื ื”ืฉื—ื•ืจื™ื, ื”ื™ื™ืชื” ืกื“ืจื” ืฉืœ ืžื—ืื•ืช ืฆื™ื‘ื•ืจื™ื•ืช ืžืชืžืฉื›ื•ืช, ืฉื”ืชืขื•ืจืจื• ื‘ืžืกืคืจ ืจื‘ ืฉืœ ืžื•ืงื“ื™ื ื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื‘ืขืงื‘ื•ืช ื”ื’ืฉืช ื›ืชื‘ ื”ืื™ืฉื•ื ื ื’ื“ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื‘ื ื™ืžื™ืŸ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•. ื”ืžื—ืื•ืช ื”ืชืจื—ืฉื• ื”ื—ืœ ืžืžืื™ 2020, ืฉืื– ื”ื•ื’ืฉ ื›ืชื‘ ื”ืื™ืฉื•ื - ื•ืขื“ ืžืื™ 2021, ืžืขื˜ ืœืคื ื™ ื”ืฉื‘ืขืช ืžืžืฉืœืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื”ืฉืœื•ืฉื™ื ื•ืฉืฉ, ื•ื”ืŸ ื”ืชืžืงื“ื• ื‘ื“ืจื™ืฉื” ืœื”ืชืคื˜ืจื•ืชื• ืฉืœ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืžืชืคืงื™ื“ื•. ื”ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ืžื—ื• ื ื’ื“ ื”ืžืฉืš ื›ื”ื•ื ืชื• ืฉืœ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื‘ืขืช ืฉืžืฉืคื˜ ืคืœื™ืœื™ ืžืชื ื”ืœ ื ื’ื“ื•, ื‘ื™ืŸ ื”ื™ืชืจ ื‘ืฉืœ ื”ื˜ืขื ื” ื›ื™ ื”ื•ื ืžืขื“ื™ืฃ ืืช ื˜ื•ื‘ืชื• ื”ืื™ืฉื™ืช ื•ื”ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ืช ืขืœ ืคื ื™ ื˜ื•ื‘ืชื” ืฉืœ ื”ืžื“ื™ื ื”, ื•ื“ืจืฉื• ืœื—ืงื•ืจ ืืช ืคืจืฉืช ื”ืฆื•ืœืœื•ืช. ื‘ื”ืžืฉืš ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื”ืชื ื”ืœื• ื’ื ื›ื ื’ื“ ื”ืคืขืœืช ืกื’ืจื™ื ื•ื”ื’ื‘ืœืช ื—ื•ืคืฉ ื”ืชื ื•ืขื” ื›ื—ืœืง ืžื”ืžืื‘ืง ื ื’ื“ ื”ืชืคืฉื˜ื•ืช ื ื’ื™ืฃ ื”ืงื•ืจื•ื ื”. ืื—ื“ ืžืžื•ืงื“ื™ ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื”ืžื–ื•ื”ื™ื ื‘ื™ื•ืชืจ ืขื ื”ืžื—ืื•ืช ื”ื™ื” ื”ืžืชื—ื ื”ืกืžื•ืš ืœืžืขื•ืŸ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื”, ื‘ืจื—ื•ื‘ ื‘ืœืคื•ืจ ื‘ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื, ืฉืืฃ ื”ืขื ื™ืง ืœืžื—ืื” ืืช ื”ื›ื™ื ื•ื™ "ืžื—ืืช ื‘ืœืคื•ืจ". ืจืงืข ื‘ืงื™ืฅ 2016, ืœืื—ืจ ืฉืคื•ืจืกื ื›ื™ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื ื—ืงืจ ื‘ืžืฉื˜ืจื” ื‘ื—ืฉื“ื•ืช ืœืขื‘ื™ืจื•ืช ืžืชื—ื•ื ื˜ื•ื”ืจ ื”ืžื™ื“ื•ืช, ื”ื—ืœื” ืžื—ืื” ืฉืœ ืงื‘ื•ืฆื” ืงื˜ื ื” ืฉืœ ืื–ืจื—ื™ื ื ื’ื“ ื”ืžืฉืš ืฉืœื˜ื•ื ื• ืฉืœ ื‘ื ื™ืžื™ืŸ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•. ื”ืžื—ืื” ื–ื›ืชื” ื‘ื”ืžืฉืš ืœื›ื™ื ื•ื™ "ืžื—ืืช ื”ื™ื—ื™ื“ื™ื". ื“ื•ื“ ืคืœื“ืฉื˜ื™ื™ืŸ ื˜ืขืŸ ื›ื™ ื”ื•ื ื”ื™ื” ื”ืžื•ื—ื” ื”ืจืืฉื•ืŸ. ื–ืžืŸ ืงืฆืจ ืœืื—ืจ ืžื›ืŸ, ื”ืฆื˜ืจืคื• ืœืžื—ืืชื• ืื—ืจื™ื ื•ื‘ื”ื ืชืช-ืืœื•ืฃ ื‘ืžื™ืœื•ืื™ื ืืžื™ืจ ื”ืฉื›ืœ. ื”ื ืขืžื“ื• ื™ื—ื™ื“ื™ื ืื• ื‘ืงื‘ื•ืฆื•ืช ืงื˜ื ื•ืช ื‘ืฆืžืชื™ื ื‘ืจื—ื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื•ื ืฉืื• ืฉืœื˜ื™ื ืฉื”ืžืกืจ ืฉืœื”ื ื”ื™ื”: "ืื•ื”ื‘ื™ื ืืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื ืคืจื“ื™ื ืžื ืชื ื™ื”ื•". ื‘ืžืงื‘ื™ืœ, ืคืชื—ื• ื—ื•ืฉืฃ ื”ืฉื—ื™ืชื•ืช ืจืคื™ ืจื•ืชื ื•ืื™ื™ื‘ื™ ื‘ื ื™ืžื™ืŸ ื‘ื”ืคื’ื ื” ืžื•ืœ ื‘ื™ืชื• ืฉืœ ืื‘ื™ื—ื™ ืžื ื“ืœื‘ืœื™ื˜, ืฉืžื•ื ื” ื‘ืื•ืชื” ืขืชื” ืœื™ื•ืขืฅ ื”ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ ืœืžืžืฉืœื”. ื”ืฉื ื™ื™ื ื”ืชื ื’ื“ื• ืœืžื™ื ื•ื™ื• ืฉืœ ืžื ื“ืœื‘ืœื™ื˜ ืœืชืคืงื™ื“, ืžืื—ืจ ืฉื”ื™ื” ืœืคื ื™ ื›ืŸ ืžื–ื›ื™ืจ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ืฉืœ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•, ื•ื˜ืขื ื• ืฉืžื™ ืฉื ื•ืฉื ื‘ืชืคืงื™ื“ ื”ื™ื•ืขืฅ ื—ื™ื™ื‘ ืœื”ื™ื•ืช ื—ืฃ ืžื”ื™ื›ืจื•ืช ืงืจื•ื‘ื” ืขื ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื”. ื”ืžื•ื—ื™ื ื”ืคื’ื™ื ื• ืžื“ื™ ืฉื‘ื•ืข ืžื•ืœ ื‘ื™ืชื• ืฉืœ ืžื ื“ืœื‘ืœื™ื˜ ื‘ืคืชื— ืชืงื•ื•ื”. ื‘ื ื•ื‘ืžื‘ืจ 2016 ื”ืฆื˜ืจืฃ ืœืžื—ืืชื ืžื ื™ ื ืคืชืœื™, ืœืฉืขื‘ืจ ืื‘ ื”ื‘ื™ืช ื‘ืžืขื•ืŸ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื”, ืฉื”ื‘ื™ื ืœื—ืฉื™ืคืช ืคืจืฉืช ื”ืžืขื•ื ื•ืช ืฉื‘ื” ื”ื•ืจืฉืขื” ืฉืจื” ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•, ื•ืคืจืฉืช ื”ืžืชื ื•ืช ืฉื‘ืขืงื‘ื•ืชื™ื” ื”ื•ื’ืฉ ื ื’ื“ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื›ืชื‘ ืื™ืฉื•ื ื‘ืชื™ืง 1000. ืžืงื™ืฅ 2018 ื”ื—ืœื™ืคื” ืืช ืžื ื™ ื ืคืชืœื™ ืขื•ืจื›ืช ื”ื“ื™ืŸ ืกื™ื’ืœื™ืช ืงืกืœืจ, ืฉืขืจื›ื” ืชื—ืงื™ืจ ืขืœ ืคืจืฉืช ื”ืฆื•ืœืœื•ืช ื•ื”ืฆื™ืคื” ืื•ืชื”. ื”ืžื—ืื•ืช ืžื•ืœ ื‘ื™ืชื• ืฉืœ ื”ื™ื•ืขืฅ ื”ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ ืœืžืžืฉืœื” ื”ืชืงื™ื™ืžื• ื‘ื›ืœ ืžื•ืฆืื™ ืฉื‘ืช, ื•ืื ืฉื™ื ื ื•ืกืคื™ื ื”ืฆื˜ืจืคื• ืืœื™ื”ืŸ. ืขื ืจื™ื‘ื•ื™ ื”ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ื”ื•ืขืชืงื” ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื” ื‘ื”ื•ืจืืช ื”ืžืฉื˜ืจื” ืœื›ื™ื›ืจ ื’ื•ืจืŸ, ื›-500 ืžื˜ืจ ืžื‘ื™ืชื• ืฉืœ ืžื ื“ืœื‘ืœื™ื˜. ื‘ืคืขื™ืœื•ืช ืžื—ืื” ื‘ืฉื ืช 2017 ื›ื ื’ื“ ื”ื™ื•ืขืฅ ื”ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ ืœืžืžืฉืœื” ืื‘ื™ื—ื™ ืžื ื“ืœื“ื‘ืœื™ื˜ ื”ื“ืžื•ืช ื”ื‘ื•ืœื˜ืช ื”ื™ื” ื™ืฉื™ ื”ื“ืก. ื”ืžื—ืื” ื”ืชืžืงื“ื” ื‘ื“ืจื™ืฉื” ืœื”ืขืžื™ื“ ืœื“ื™ืŸ ืืช ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื‘ื ื™ืžื™ืŸ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•, ื•ื”ืชืงื™ื™ืžื” ืกืžื•ืš ืœื‘ื™ืชื• ืฉืœ ืžื ื“ืœื‘ืœื™ื˜ ื‘ืžืฉืš ื—ื•ื“ืฉื™ื ืจื‘ื™ื. . ื”ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ื˜ืขื ื• ืฉืžื ื“ืœื‘ืœื™ื˜ ืคื•ืขืœ ืชื—ืช ืœื—ืฆื™ื ืคื•ืœื™ื˜ื™ื™ื ื•ืœื ืžืžืœื ืืช ืชืคืงื™ื“ื• ื‘ืื•ืคืŸ ืขืฆืžืื™. ื”ืžื—ืื” ืขื•ืจืจื” ื“ื™ื•ืŸ ืฆื™ื‘ื•ืจื™ ืจื—ื‘ ืขืœ ื’ื‘ื•ืœื•ืช ื—ื•ืคืฉ ื”ื‘ื™ื˜ื•ื™ ื•ื”ื–ื›ื•ืช ืœื”ืคื’ื™ืŸ ืžื•ืœ ื‘ืชื™ื ืคืจื˜ื™ื™ื ืฉืœ ืื ืฉื™ ืฆื™ื‘ื•ืจ. ืžื ื“ืœื‘ืœื™ื˜ ืขืฆืžื• ื”ืชืœื•ื ืŸ ืขืœ ืคื’ื™ืขื” ื‘ืคืจื˜ื™ื•ืชื•, ื”ืžืฉื˜ืจื” ื”ืจื—ื™ืงื” ืืช ื”ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ื•ืืฃ ืขืฆืจื” ืืช ื™ืฉื™ ื”ื“ืก. ืœืจืืฉื•ื ื” ื‘ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื”ืžื—ืื”. ื‘ื“ืฆืžื‘ืจ 2017 ื™ื–ืžื• ื”ืžื•ื—ื™ื ื”ืคื’ื ื” ื‘ืชืœ ืื‘ื™ื‘ ื•ืžืฆืขื“ ื‘ืฉื“ืจื•ืช ืจื•ื˜ืฉื™ืœื“, ื ื’ื“ ื—ื•ืง ื”ื”ืžืœืฆื•ืช ื•"ื”ื—ื•ืง ื”ืฆืจืคืชื™" ืฉื ื•ืขื“ื• ืœืกื›ืœ ืืคืฉืจื•ืช ืฉืœ ื”ื’ืฉืช ื›ืชื‘ื™ ืื™ืฉื•ื ื ื’ื“ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•. ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื” ื ืงืจืื” "ืžืฆืขื“ ื”ื‘ื•ืฉื”" ื•ืœืงื—ื• ื‘ื” ื—ืœืง ืขืฉืจื•ืช ืืœืคื™ ืื ืฉื™ื ื•ื‘ื”ื ืื‘ื™ื” ืืœืฃ, ื—ื ื” ืงื™ื, ืขื•ื–ื™ ืืจื“ ื•ื™ืจื•ืŸ ื–ืœื™ื›ื”. ื‘ืืžืฆืข 2017 ื”ืชืคืฆืœื” ื”ืงื‘ื•ืฆื” ื”ื’ืจืขื™ื ื™ืช ืฉืœ ื”ืžื—ืื”, ื—ืœืง ื•ื‘ื”ื ืžื ื™ ื ืคืชืœื™ ื”ืžืฉื™ื›ื• ืœื”ืคื’ื™ืŸ ื‘ื›ื™ื›ืจ ื’ื•ืจืŸ ื‘ืคืชื— ืชืงื•ื•ื”, ื•ืื™ืœื• ืื—ืจื™ื ื‘ื”ื•ื‘ืœืช ื™ืฉื™ ื”ื“ืก, ืืœื“ื“ ื™ื ื™ื‘, ื—ื™ื™ื ืฉื“ืžื™, ื•ืขื•ืจืš ื”ื“ื™ืŸ ื’ื•ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื™ืฆื—ืง ื”ืคื’ื™ื ื• ื‘ื›ื™ื›ืจ ื”ื‘ื™ืžื” ืชื—ืช ื”ืžื•ืชื’ Crime Minister ืฉื ืฉื™ื–ื ื™ืฉื™ ื”ื“ืก. ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื”ืžืฉื™ื›ื• ืžื“ื™ ืฉื‘ื•ืข ื‘ืžื•ืฆืื™ ืฉื‘ืช ื‘ื›ื™ื›ืจ ื’ื•ืจืŸ, ื‘ื›ื™ื›ืจ ื”ื‘ื™ืžื”, ื•ื‘-20 ืืชืจื™ื ื ื•ืกืคื™ื. ื‘ื”ื ื ื”ืจื™ื”, ืขื›ื•, ื—ื™ืคื”, ืขืคื•ืœื”, ืจื—ื•ื‘ื•ืช, ื ืก ืฆื™ื•ื ื”, ื›ื™ื›ืจ ืคืจื™ื– ื‘ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื, ืฆืžื—, ื›ืคืจ ืกื‘ื ื•ืจืขื ื ื”. ืœืื—ืจ ื”ืจื™ื’ืชื• ืฉืœ ืกืœื•ืžื•ืŸ ื˜ืงื” ื”ืชืขื•ืจืจ ื’ืœ ืžื—ืื” ืกื•ืขืจ ื ื’ื“ ื”ืืœื™ืžื•ืช ื”ืžืฉื˜ืจืชื™ืช, ื•ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื ืคื’ืฉื• ืžื•ืœ ื‘ื™ืชื• ืฉืœ ื”ื™ื•ืขืฅ ื”ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ ืœืžืžืฉืœื”, ื‘ื›ื™ื›ืจ ื’ื•ืจืŸ, ื•ืกืžื•ืš ืœื‘ืชื™ื”ื ืฉืœ ืฉืจ ื”ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื, ื”ืฉืจ ืœื‘ื™ื˜ื—ื•ืŸ ืคื ื™ื ื•ืจืืฉืช ื”ืžื—ืœืงื” ืœื—ืงื™ืจืช ืฉื•ื˜ืจื™ื. ื”ืžื—ืื” ื‘ื›ื™ื›ืจ ื’ื•ืจืŸ ื”ืกืชื™ื™ืžื” ื‘ืกื•ืฃ 2019 ืขื ื”ื’ืฉืช ื›ืชื‘ื™ ื”ืื™ืฉื•ื ื‘ืชื™ืงื™ื 1000, 2000 ื•-4000. ื‘ืžืจืฅ 2020, ืœืื—ืจ ื”ื‘ื—ื™ืจื•ืช ืœื›ื ืกืช ื”-23 ื”ื—ืœื” "ืžื—ืืช ื”ื“ื’ืœื™ื ื”ืฉื—ื•ืจื™ื" ืขืœ ืจืงืข ื”ื˜ืœืช ื”ืจื›ื‘ืช ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ืขืœ ื™ื•"ืจ ื›ื—ื•ืœ ืœื‘ืŸ ื‘ื ื™ ื’ื ืฅ, ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ื ืฉื™ื ื”ืžื“ื™ื ื” ืจืื•ื‘ืŸ ืจื™ื‘ืœื™ืŸ. ื™ื•ืฉื‘ ืจืืฉ ื”ื›ื ืกืช ื”ื™ื•ืฆืืช ื™ื•ืœื™ ืื“ืœืฉื˜ื™ื™ืŸ ืกื™ืจื‘ ืœืคื ื•ืช ืืช ืžืงื•ืžื• ืœื™ื•"ืจ ื—ื“ืฉ, ื‘ืžื˜ืจื” ืœืžื ื•ืข ื”ืงืžืช ื•ืขื“ื” ืœื“ื™ื•ืŸ ื‘ื”ืกืจืช ื”ื—ืกื™ื ื•ืช ืฉืœ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•. ืฉืงืžื” ืฉื•ื•ืจืฆืžืŸ ื‘ืจืกืœืจ ื•ืื—ื™ื” ืื™ื™ืœ ื•ื™ืจื“ืŸ ืฉื•ื•ืจืฆืžืŸ ื™ื–ืžื• ืฉื™ื™ืจื•ืช ืžื—ืื” ืœื›ื ืกืช ื•ื›ืŸ ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ืกืžื•ืš ืœื‘ืชื™ ื—ื‘ืจื™ ื”ื›ื ืกืช ืžืžืคืœื’ืช ื—ื•ืกืŸ ืœื™ืฉืจืืœ. ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ืœืฉืขื‘ืจ ืื”ื•ื“ ื‘ืจืง ื ืจืชื ื•ืงืจื ื‘ืจืฉืชื•ืช ื”ื—ื‘ืจืชื™ื•ืช ืœื”ื ื™ืฃ ื“ื’ืœื™ื ืฉื—ื•ืจื™ื ืžื”ืžืจืคืกื•ืช ื•ื”ื—ืœื•ื ื•ืช. ืžื—ืื” ื–ื• ื”ืชืจื—ื‘ื” ื•ื”ื•ื‘ื™ืœื” ื”ื—ืœ ืžื™ื•ืœื™ 2020 ืœืžื—ืืช ื”ื’ืฉืจื™ื ื•ื”ืฆืžืชื™ื ื‘ืจื—ื‘ื™ ื”ืืจืฅ (ืจืื• ืคื™ืจื•ื˜ ื‘ื”ืžืฉืš ื”ืขืจืš). ืชื ื•ืขืช "ื”ื“ื’ืœื™ื ื”ืฉื—ื•ืจื™ื" ื•ืชื ื•ืขื•ืช ื ื•ืกืคื•ืช, ื”ื•ื“ื™ืขื• ืขืœ ืคื™ืจื•ืงื” ืฉืœ ื”ืžื—ืื” ืœืื—ืจ ื”ืฉื‘ืขืช ืžืžืฉืœืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื”ืฉืœื•ืฉื™ื ื•ืฉืฉ ื‘-24 ื‘ื™ื•ื ื™ 2021. ืžืžืื”ืœ ื‘ืœืคื•ืจ ืขื“ ื”ื‘ื™ื‘ื™ืกื˜ื™ืœื™ื” ื‘ื“ืฆืžื‘ืจ 2019 ื”ื—ืœื” ืื•ืจื™ ื ื—ืžืŸ, ื—ื‘ืจืช ืžืจื›ื– ืœื™ื›ื•ื“, ืžื—ืื” ื‘ืจื—ื•ื‘ ื‘ืœืคื•ืจ, ืœื™ื“ ืžืขื•ืŸ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื‘ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื (ื‘ื™ืช ืื’ื™ื•ืŸ), ืฉื ืกื‘ืจื” ืฉื”ืฉืคืขืช ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ืชื’ื‘ืจ. ื‘-11 ื‘ื™ื•ื ื™ ื—ื‘ืจ ืืœื™ื” ืืžื™ืจ ื”ืฉื›ืœ, ื•ืคืจืกื ื‘ืจืฉืชื•ืช ื”ื—ื‘ืจืชื™ื•ืช ืขืœ ืคืชื™ื—ืช ืฉื‘ื™ืชืช ืฉื‘ืช ื‘ื‘ืœืคื•ืจ. ืขื ื”ืฉื›ืœ ื”ื’ื™ืขื• ืื ืฉื™ "ืžื—ืืช ื”ื™ื—ื™ื“ื™ื" ื•ื”ืžืื”ืœ ื”ืชืžืœื. ื‘ืžืชื—ื ืฉื”ื• ื‘ื™ืŸ 10โ€“50 ืื™ืฉ, ื—ืœืงื ื ืฉืืจื• ืœื™ืฉื•ืŸ ื‘ืฉืงื™ ืฉื™ื ื” ืขืœ ื”ืžื“ืจื›ื” ื•ืœืขื™ืชื™ื ืืฆืœ ืฉื›ื ื™ื ื‘ืกื‘ื™ื‘ื” ืฉืคืชื—ื• ืœืคื ื™ ื”ืžื•ื—ื™ื ืืช ื‘ืชื™ื”ื.[ื“ืจื•ืฉ ืžืงื•ืจ] ื‘ืžื”ืœืš ืžื—ืื” ื–ื•, ื”ื’ื™ืขื• ืื–ืจื—ื™ื ืืœ ื”ืžืชื—ื ื›ื“ื™ ืœื”ื‘ื™ืข ืชืžื™ื›ื” ื‘ืžื•ื—ื™ื. ื‘ืžื”ืœืš ื”ืžื—ืื”, ื”ืชืงื™ื™ืžื• ืงื‘ืœื•ืช ืฉื‘ืช ืฉืžืฉื›ื• ืืœื™ื”ืŸ ืงื”ืœ. ื‘ื ื•ืกืฃ ื”ืชืงื™ื™ืžื• ืคืขื™ืœื•ื™ื•ืช ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ื”ืจืฆืื•ืช, ืงื•ื ืฆืจื˜ื™ื, ื”ื•ืคืขื•ืช, ืžื“ื™ื˜ืฆื™ื” ื•ืฉื™ืจื” ื‘ืฆื™ื‘ื•ืจ. ืจื•ื‘ ืฉื•ื›ื ื™ ื”ืžืื”ืœ ื”ืชืคื–ืจื• ืœืื—ืจ ืชืฉืขื” ื—ื•ื“ืฉื™ื, ืžืฉื”ื•ื’ืฉืžื” ืžื˜ืจืช ื”ืžื—ืื”, ืขืจื‘ ื”ื‘ื—ื™ืจื•ืช ืœื›ื ืกืช ื”ืขืฉืจื™ื ื•ืืจื‘ืข. ื›ืžื” ืขืฉืจื•ืช ืคืขื™ืœื™ื ืื™ื™ืฉื• ืืช ื ืงื•ื“ืช ื”ืžืื”ืœ ื‘ืžื”ืœืš ื”ื™ื•ื ืขื“ ืœื”ืฉื‘ืขืช ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื‘ื™ื•ื ื™ 2021. ื‘-26 ื‘ื™ื•ื ื™ ืคื™ื–ืจื” ื”ืžืฉื˜ืจื” ืืช ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื” ื”ืฉื‘ื•ืขื™ืช ื‘ืžืชื›ื•ื ืช "ืงื‘ืœืช ืฉื‘ืช" ื•ืขืฆืจื” ืืช ื”ืฉื›ืœ ืฉื ืฉื ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ืœืคื ื™ ื›ืžื” ืขืฉืจื•ืช ืื ืฉื™ื ื‘ื˜ืขื ื” ืฉื”ื•ื ื—ืกื ืืช ื”ื›ื‘ื™ืฉ ื›ืฉืขืชื™ื™ื. ื”ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ืžื ื’ื“ ื˜ืขื ื• ื›ื™ ื”ืžืขืฆืจ ื‘ื•ืฆืข ืœืœื ืกื™ื‘ื”. ื™ื—ื“ ืขื ื”ืฉื›ืœ ื ืขืฆืจื• ืฉื‘ืขื” ืคืขื™ืœื™ื ื‘ื”ื ืกื“ื™ ื‘ืŸ ืฉื˜ืจื™ืช ื•ื’ื™ืœ ื”ืžืจืฉืœื’. ืœืฉืœื•ืฉื” ื”ื•ืฆืข ืœื”ืฉืชื—ืจืจ ื‘ืชืžื•ืจื” ืœื”ืชื—ื™ื™ื‘ื•ืช ืœื ืœื”ื’ื™ืข ืœื‘ืœืคื•ืจ, ืืš ื”ื ืกื™ืจื‘ื• ื•ื”ื•ืขื‘ืจื• ืœื‘ื™ืช ื”ืžืขืฆืจ ื”ื“ืจื™ื. ืžืขืฆืจื• ืฉืœ ื”ืฉื›ืœ ืขื•ืจืจ ื”ื“ื™ื ื‘ืจืฉืชื•ืช ื”ื—ื‘ืจืชื™ื•ืช, ื•ืœืจืืฉื•ื ื”[ื“ืจื•ืฉ ืžืงื•ืจ] ื“ื™ื•ื•ื—ื” ื”ืชืงืฉื•ืจืช ื”ืžืžื•ืกื“ืช ืขืœ ืžื—ืืช ื”ื™ื—ื™ื“ื™ื. ืœืžื—ืจืช ื”ืžืขืฆืจ ืฆืขื“ื• ืžืื•ืช ืืœ ืžื’ืจืฉ ื”ืจื•ืกื™ื ื•ืฆื‘ืื• ืขืœ ื‘ื™ืช ืžืฉืคื˜ ื”ืฉืœื•ื, ืฉื ื”ื™ื• ื”ืขืฆื•ืจื™ื.[ื“ืจื•ืฉ ืžืงื•ืจ] ืœืžืงื•ื ื”ื’ื™ืขื• ื’ื ืื™ืฉื™ ืฆื™ื‘ื•ืจ ืžื”ืื•ืคื•ื–ื™ืฆื™ื” ื•ื‘ื”ื ื‘ื•ื’ื™ ื™ืขืœื•ืŸ, ื•ื—ื‘ืจื™ ื›ื ืกืช ื ื•ืกืคื™ื. ื‘ื™ื•ื ืจืืฉื•ืŸ ืœืคื ื•ืช ื‘ื•ืงืจ ืฉื•ื—ืจืจื• ื”ืขืฆื•ืจื™ื ืœืœื ืชื ืื™ื. ื‘ืขืงื‘ื•ืช ื”ืื™ืจื•ืข ืขื‘ืจื• ื›ืœ ืงื‘ื•ืฆื•ืช ื”ืžื—ืื” ื”ืžืคื•ื–ืจื•ืช ื‘ืืจืฅ ืœื‘ืœืคื•ืจ.[ื“ืจื•ืฉ ืžืงื•ืจ] ื‘ืื•ืชื• ื™ื•ื ืขืฆืจื” ื”ืžืฉื˜ืจื” ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ื ื•ืกืคื™ื ื•ื‘ื™ื ื™ื”ื ืœื•ื˜ื ืคื ืกืงื™ ืขืœ ืฉื”ืฉืœื™ืš ืžื˜ื‘ืขื•ืช ืฉืœ ืขืฉืจ ืื’ื•ืจื•ืช ืœื›ื™ื•ื•ืŸ ื”ื›ื ื™ืกื” ืœืžืขื•ืŸ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื”. ื”ืืงื˜ ื ื•ืขื“ ืœื“ื‘ืจื™ ืคื ืกืงื™ ืœืœื’ืœื’ ืขืœ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•, ื›ืื™ืœื• ื”ื•ื ื•ืžืฉืคื—ืชื• ื ื–ืงืง ืœืกื™ื•ืข ื›ืœื›ืœื™.[ื] ืžืฉื˜ืจืช ืžื—ื•ื– ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื ื‘ื™ืงืฉื” ืžื”ืคืจืงืœื™ื˜ื•ืช ืœื”ื’ื™ืฉ ื ื’ื“ื• ื›ืชื‘ ืื™ืฉื•ื. ื—ืฆื™ ืฉื ื” ืœืื—ืจ ืžื›ืŸ, ื‘ื“ืฆืžื‘ืจ 2020, ื”ื•ื“ื™ืขื” ืคืจืงืœื™ื˜ื•ืช ื”ืžื“ื™ื ื” ืฉื‘ื›ื•ื•ื ืชื” ืœื”ื’ื™ืฉ ื›ืชื‘ ืื™ืฉื•ื ื ื’ื“ ืคื ืกืงื™ ื‘ื’ื™ืŸ ื”ืฉืœื›ืช ื”ืžื˜ื‘ืขื•ืช. ืžืฉื‘ืจ ื”ืงื•ืจื•ื ื” ื•ืื•ืคืŸ ื ื™ื”ื•ืœื• ื”ื’ื‘ื™ืจื• ืืช ื”ืชืกื™ืกื” ื‘ืฆื™ื‘ื•ืจ. ืœื”ืคื’ื ื” ืฉื ืขืจื›ื” ื‘-14 ื‘ื™ื•ืœื™, ื™ื•ื ืฉืœื™ืฉื™, ืžื•ืœ ืžืขื•ืŸ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื•ื‘ื›ื™ื›ืจ ืฆืจืคืช ื”ืกืžื•ื›ื” ("ื›ื™ื›ืจ ืคืจื™ื–") ื”ื’ื™ืขื• ืื ืฉื™ื ืจื‘ื™ื, ื•ืœืจืืฉื•ื ื” ื”ื™ื• ื‘ื™ื ื™ื”ื ื’ื ืฆืขื™ืจื™ื ืจื‘ื™ื. ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื” ื›ื•ื ืชื” ื‘ืคื™ ืชื•ืžื›ื™ื” "ื”ื‘ื™ื‘ื™ืกื˜ื™ืœื™ื”" ื‘ื’ืœืœ ื”ืชืืจื™ืš ื”ื”ื™ืกื˜ื•ืจื™, ื™ื•ื ื”ื‘ืกื˜ื™ืœื™ื” ื”ืฆืจืคืชื™. ื”ื’ื™ืขื• ืงื‘ื•ืฆืช "ื”ื‘ืขืœื‘ืชื™ื" ืขื ื‘ื ื“ื ื•ืช ื•ืจื•ื“ื•ืช ื•ืจืงื“ื ื™ื•ืช ืžืงื‘ื•ืฆืช "ืื™ืจื•ื‘ื™ ืžื”ืคื›ื”"[ื“ืจื•ืฉื” ื”ื‘ื”ืจื”]. ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื” ืกื™ืžื ื” ืฉื™ื ื•ื™ ืžื’ืžื”, ืžืžื—ืื” ืฉืงื˜ื” ื›ืžืขื˜ ืœืœื ืื–ื›ื•ืจ ื‘ืชืงืฉื•ืจืช ื”ืžืžื•ืกื“ืช, ื”ื™ื ื”ืคื›ื” ืœื”ืคื’ื ืช ื”ืžื•ื ื™ื ืจื•ืขืฉืช, ืขื ืกื’ื ื•ื ื•ืช ืžื—ืื” ืื™ื ื“ื™ื‘ื™ื“ื•ืืœื™ืกื˜ื™ื™ื, ืชื—ืคื•ืฉื•ืช ื•ืžื™ืฆื’ื™ื. ื‘ื”ืคื’ื ื” ืœืงื—ื• ื—ืœืง ืขืฉืจื•ืช ืืœืคื™ ืื™ืฉ, ื•ื”ื™ื ื”ื™ื™ืชื” ืœืื—ืช ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื”ื’ื“ื•ืœื•ืช ืžืื– ืชื—ื™ืœืช ื”ืžื—ืื”. ื”ืžืฉื˜ืจื” ื ืขืจื›ื” ืœื”ืคื’ื ื” ืขื ื›ื•ื— ื’ื“ื•ืœ ืฉืœ ืฉื•ื˜ืจื™ ื™ืก"ืž, ืžืฉืžืจ ื”ื’ื‘ื•ืœ, ืฉื•ื˜ืจื™ื ืกืžื•ื™ื™ื. ื‘ืžื”ืœืš ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื”, ื”ื•ืชืงืคื• ืขื™ืชื•ื ืื™ื ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ื”ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื, ื•ื”ืชืงื™ืžื• ืขื™ืžื•ืชื™ื ืืœื™ืžื™ื ื‘ื™ืŸ ื”ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ืœืฉื•ื˜ืจื™ื. ืžืืจื’ื ื™ ื”ืžื—ืื” ื’ื™ื ื• ืื™ืจื•ืขื™ื ืืœื” ื•ื˜ืขื ื• ื›ื™ ื‘ืžืงื•ื "ื”ื™ื• ืฉืชื•ืœื™ื ืžื˜ืขื ืฉืขืฉื• ืคืจื•ื‘ื•ืงืฆื™ื•ืช" ื›ื“ื™ ืœื—ื‘ืœ ื‘ืžื—ืื”. ืžืื•ื—ืจ ื™ื•ืชืจ ื™ืฆืื• ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ื‘ืžืฆืขื“ ื‘ืจื—ื•ื‘ื•ืช ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื. ื‘ืžื”ืœืš ื”ืฆืขื“ื” ื ืขืฆืจื• ืขืฉืจื•ืช ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ื•ื”ื™ื ืคื•ื–ืจื” ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ื”ืžืฉื˜ืจื” ื‘ืขื–ืจืช ืคืจืฉื™ื ื•ืžื›ืช"ื–ื™ื•ืช.[ื“ืจื•ืฉ ืžืงื•ืจ] ื”ืžืฉืš ื”ืžื—ืื” ื”ืžื—ืื” ื”ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ืœื”ืชื ื”ืœ ืœืœื ืžื ื”ื™ื’ื™ื, ืืš ื”ื™ื• ื‘ื” ืžืกืคืจ ืงื‘ื•ืฆื•ืช ืžืจื›ื–ื™ื•ืช ื•ืคืขื™ืœื™ื ืžืจื›ื–ื™ื™ื ืฉืฉื™ืชืคื• ื‘ื™ื ื™ื”ื ืคืขื•ืœื”: ืืžื™ืจ ื”ืฉื›ืœ ืžืžื—ืืช ื”ื™ื—ื™ื“ื™ื ืฉืฉื™ื ืชื” ืืช ืฉืžื” ืœ"ืื™ืŸ ืžืฆื‘"; ื™ืฉื™ ื”ื“ืก ืžืงื‘ื•ืฆืช Crime Minister; ืื•ืจื™ ื ื—ืžืŸ ืฉืคืชื—ื” ืืช "ื”ืžืฆื•ืจ ืขืœ ื‘ืœืคื•ืจ" ืขื•ื“ ืœืคื ื™ ื’ืœ ื”ืžื—ืื•ืช; ืฉืงืžื” ืฉื•ื•ืจืฆืžืŸ ืžืงื‘ื•ืฆืช "ื”ื“ื’ืœื™ื ื”ืฉื—ื•ืจื™ื" ืฉืืจื’ื ื• ื‘ื™ืŸ ื”ื™ืชืจ ืืช ืžื—ืืช ื”ื’ืฉืจื™ื; ืขื•ืจืš ื“ื™ืŸ ื’ื•ื ืŸ ื‘ืŸ ื™ืฆื—ืง ืฉืžืขื ื™ืง ื™ื™ืขื•ืฅ ืžืฉืคื˜ื™, ืจื•ืขื™ ืคืœื’ ืžืžื•ื‘ื™ืœื™ ืžื—ืืช ื”ืฆื•ืœืœื•ืช ื•ื›ืœื™ ื”ืฉื™ื˜; ื™ื ื™ื‘ ืกื’ืœ ื•ื›ืœื ื™ืช ืฉืจื•ืŸ ืฉื™ื–ืžื• ืืช ื”ืงื‘ื•ืฆื•ืช ื”"ื‘ืขืœื‘ืชื™ื" ื•ื”ื—ื–ื™ืช ื”ื•ื•ืจื•ื“ื” - ืงื‘ื•ืฆื” ืฉืœ ืฉื—ืงื ื™ื ื•ืืžื ื™ื ืฆืขื™ืจื™ื ืฉืกืžืœื ื”ื•ื ื”ืฆื‘ืข ื”ื•ื•ืจื•ื“, ื ืงืจืื™ื ื’ื "ื”ื‘ื ื“ื ื•ืช ื”ื•ื•ืจื•ื“ื•ืช", ื•ื”ื ืงื™ื™ืžื• ืžื™ืฆื’ื™ื ืืžื ื•ืชื™ื™ื ื•ื—ื™ืœืงื• ืคืจื—ื™ื ื•ื“ื’ืœื™ื ื•ืจื•ื“ื™ื; ืชื ื•ืขืช "ื”ื“ืžื•ืงืจื˜ื™ื" ื‘ืจืืฉื•ืชื” ืฉืœ ืœื™ืžื•ืจ ืžื•ื™ืืœ ื ืชื ื” ืœืžื—ืื” ืจื•ื— ื’ื‘ื™ืช ื‘ืชื—ื•ื ื”ืจืฉืชื•ืช ื”ื—ื‘ืจืชื™ื•ืช, ืงื‘ื•ืฆืช 555 ืคื˜ืจื™ื•ื˜ื™ื ืฉืœ ืœื•ื—ืžื™ ืฆื•ื•ืช ืื•ื•ื™ืจ ื‘ืžื™ืœื•ืื™ื ื•ื‘ื“ื™ืžื•ืก, ื•ื”ืขื™ืชื•ื ืื™ืช ื”ืขืฆืžืื™ืช ืื•ืจ-ืœื™ ื‘ืจืœื‘ ืฉืกื™ืงืจื” ืืช ื”ืžื—ืื” ื•ื”ืขื‘ื™ืจื” ืฉื™ื“ื•ืจื™ื ื—ื™ื™ื ื‘ืจืฉืชื•ืช ื”ื—ื‘ืจืชื™ื•ืช. ื”ืฉืจ ืœื‘ื™ื˜ื—ื•ืŸ ืคื ื™ื ืืžื™ืจ ืื•ื—ื ื” ืคื ื” ืืœ ืื•ืจ-ืœื™ ื‘ืจืœื‘ ื‘ื”ื–ืžื ื” ืœืคื’ื™ืฉื” ืขื ื ืฆื™ื’ื™ ื”ืžื—ืื”, ืืš ื”ื™ื ื“ื—ืชื” ืืช ื”ื”ื–ืžื ื” ื‘ื ื™ืžื•ืง ืฉ"ื–ื•ื”ื™ ืžื—ืื” ืขืžืžื™ืช ื•ืื™ืŸ ืœื” ื ืฆื™ื’ื™ื ืฉื™ื“ื‘ืจื• ื‘ืฉื ื”ืขื". ื‘ืชื—ื™ืœื” ืืคื™ื™ื ื• ืืช ื”ืžื—ืื•ืช ื“ื’ืœื™ื ืฉื—ื•ืจื™ื ืฉื”ื•ื ืคื• ื™ื—ื“ ืขื ื“ื’ืœื™ ื™ืฉืจืืœ, ื‘ื”ืžืฉืš ื”ืชื•ื•ืกืฃ ื”ืฆื‘ืข ื”ื•ื•ืจื•ื“ ืฉื”ื›ื ื™ืกื” ืœืžื—ืื” ืงื‘ื•ืฆืช ื”ื‘ืขืœื‘ืชื™ื ื•ืงื‘ื•ืฆื•ืช "ืงื•ืžื™ ื™ืฉืจืืœ" ื•"ื”ื—ื–ื™ืช ื”ื•ื•ืจื•ื“ื”" ืฉืื™ืžืฆื• ืืช ื”ืฆื‘ืข ื”ื•ื•ืจื•ื“ ื‘ื›ืจื–ื•ืช ืฉืœื”ื. ื‘ื™ื•ื ื—ืžื™ืฉื™ ืฉืœืื—ืจ ื”"ื‘ื™ื‘ื™ืกื˜ื™ืœื™ื”" ื”ืชืงื™ื™ืžื” ืฉื•ื‘ ื”ืคื’ื ื” ื’ื“ื•ืœื”. ื”ืžืฉื˜ืจื” ืคื™ื–ืจื” ืืช ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื” ื‘ื›ื•ื— ืจื‘ ื•ืขื ืฉื™ืžื•ืฉ ื ืจื—ื‘ ื‘ืžื›ืชื–ื™ื•ืช. ืชืžื•ื ืช ืžืคื’ื™ืŸ ื›ื•ืจืข ื›ืฉื™ื“ื• ืžื ื™ืคื” ืืช ื“ื’ืœ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื•ื”ื•ื ืžื ืกื” ืœื”ืชื’ื•ื ืŸ ืžืคื ื™ ืกื™ืœื•ืŸ ื”ืžื™ื ื”ืชืคืจืกืžื” ื‘ืขื•ืœื ื•ื”ืคื›ื” ืœืื™ื™ืงื•ืŸ ืฉืœ ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื”. ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื”ืžืฉื™ื›ื• ื‘ื™ืžื™ ืฉืœื™ืฉื™, ื—ืžื™ืฉื™, ื•ื”ืคื’ื ื” ื’ื“ื•ืœื” ื‘ืฉื‘ืช ืฉืืœื™ื” ื”ื’ื™ืขื• ื™ื•ืชืจ ื•ื™ื•ืชืจ ืื ืฉื™ื. ื ืขืจื›ื• ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื’ื ื‘ืชืœ ืื‘ื™ื‘ ื•ื‘ืงื™ืกืจื™ื”, ื•ืžื—ืืช ื”ื’ืฉืจื™ื ื”ืชืงื™ื™ืžื” ื‘ืžืงื‘ื™ืœ ื‘ืจื—ื‘ื™ ื”ืืจืฅ ื›ืœ ืžื•ืฆืื™ ืฉื‘ืช. ื‘-1 ื‘ืื•ื’ื•ืกื˜ ื ืขืจื›ื” ื‘ื‘ืœืคื•ืจ ื”ืคื’ื ื” ื’ื“ื•ืœื” ื•ื”ืฉืชืชืคื• ื‘ื” ืœืžืขืœื” ืž-10,000 ืื™ืฉ.[ื“ืจื•ืฉ ืžืงื•ืจ] ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืœื’ืœื’ ืขืœ ื”ื ื•ื›ื—ื•ืช ื”ื“ืœื™ืœื” ื•ื”ืขืœื” ื‘ื“ืฃ ื”ืคื™ื™ืกื‘ื•ืง ืฉืœื• ืชืžื•ื ื” ืฉืœ ืžืชื—ื ื”ืคื’ื ื” ื‘ืชืœ ืื‘ื™ื‘ ื›ืžืขื˜ ืจื™ืง ืœืคื ื™ ืชื—ื™ืœืช ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื”. ื‘ืชื’ื•ื‘ื” ื”ืชื—ื™ืœื• ืžืืจื’ื ื™ ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ืœื—ืœืง ืฆืžื™ื“ื™ื ืžืžื•ืกืคืจื™ื ื›ื“ื™ ืœื“ืขืช ื‘ืžื“ื•ื™ืง ืžื” ืžืกืคืจ ื”ืื ืฉื™ื.[ื“ืจื•ืฉ ืžืงื•ืจ] ื‘-29 ื‘ืื•ื’ื•ืกื˜ ื”ืชืงื™ื™ืžื” ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื” ื”ื’ื“ื•ืœื” ื‘ื™ื•ืชืจ ืขื“ ืื–.[ื“ืจื•ืฉ ืžืงื•ืจ] ืœื˜ืขื ืช ื”ืžืืจื’ื ื™ื ื—ื•ืœืงื• ื‘ื›ื ื™ืกื•ืช 36,000 ืฆืžื™ื“ื™ื ื•ืžืกืคืจ ื”ืžืฉืชืชืคื™ื ื‘ืคื•ืขืœ ื”ื™ื” ืืฃ ื’ื“ื•ืœ ืžื›ืš.[ื“ืจื•ืฉ ืžืงื•ืจ][ืžืคื ื™ ืฉ...] ืงื‘ื•ืฆืช '555 ืคื˜ืจื™ื•ื˜ื™ื' ื ื•ืกื“ื” ืขืจื‘ ื”ื‘ื—ื™ืจื•ืช ืœื›ื ืกืช ื”ืขืฉืจื™ื ื•ืฉืœื•ืฉ ืฉื ืขืจื›ื• ื‘ึพ2 ื‘ืžืจืฅ 2020, ื‘ื”ืžืฉืš ืœื™ื•ื–ืžืชื ืฉืœ ืืœ"ื (ืžื™ืœ') ื–ืื‘ ืจื– ื•ืกืจืŸ (ืžื™ืœ') ื’ื™ื ืคื•ืจืŸ, ืœืคืจืกื ืขืฆื•ืžื” ืฉืœ ืœื•ื—ืžื™ ืฆื•ื•ืช ืื•ื•ื™ืจ, ื”ืงื•ืจืืช ืœื—ื‘ืจื™ ื”ื›ื ืกืช ื•ืœื ืฉื™ื ื”ืžื“ื™ื ื” "ืœื ืœืืคืฉืจ ืœื ืืฉื ื‘ืขื‘ื™ืจื•ืช ื—ืžื•ืจื•ืช ืฉืœ ืฉื—ื™ืชื•ืช ืฉืœื˜ื•ื ื™ืช ืœืงื‘ืœ ืžื ื“ื˜ ืœื”ืจื›ื™ื‘ ืžืžืฉืœื”". ื”ืžื˜ืจื” ื”ื™ื™ืชื” ืœื’ื™ื™ืก 120 ื—ื•ืชืžื™ื ื‘ื“ื•ืžื” ืœืžื›ืชื‘ื™ื ื“ื•ืžื™ื ืฉื”ืชืคืจืกืžื• ื–ืžืŸ ืงืฆืจ ืงื•ื“ื ืœื›ืŸ. ื‘ืคื•ืขืœ, ื›ืฉืžื ื™ื™ืŸ ื”ื—ื•ืชืžื™ื ื”ื’ื™ืข ืœึพ540 ื ืฉืœื—ื• ื”ืžื›ืชื‘ื™ื ืœื—ื‘ืจื™ ื”ื›ื ืกืช ื•ืœื ืฉื™ื ื”ืžื“ื™ื ื” ืจืื•ื‘ืŸ ืจื™ื‘ืœื™ืŸ. ื ื˜ืขืŸ ืฉืขืฉื• ื–ืืช "ืžืชื•ืš ืื—ืจื™ื•ืช ืขืจื›ื™ืช ื•ืืžื•ื ื” ืฉื”ื ื”ื’ื” ื ืงื™ื™ืช ื›ืคื™ื™ื ื•ืืžื™ื ื” ื”ื™ื ืชื ืื™ ื‘ืกื™ืกื™ ืœื”ืžืฉืš ืงื™ื•ืžื• ืฉืœ ื”ืžืฉื˜ืจ ื”ื“ืžื•ืงืจื˜ื™ ื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ". ื ื’ื“ ื”ืงื‘ื•ืฆื” ื”ื•ืขืœืชื” ื‘ื™ืงื•ืจืช ืžืคื™ ืขืžื™ืช ืกื’ืœ ืขืœ ืžื” ืฉื ืชืคืก ื‘ืขื™ื ื™ื• ื›ื”ืชื ืฉืื•ืช ื‘ื›ืš ืฉ"ืžืื—ื•ืจื™ ื”ืขืฆื•ืžื” ืขื•ืžื“ืช ื”ื”ื ื—ื” ื”ืžื’ื•ื ื” ืฉื˜ื™ื™ืก ืฉื•ื•ื” ื™ื•ืชืจ ืžืกืชื ืœื•ื—ื ื‘ื’ื•ืœื ื™ ืื• ื’ื‘ืขืชื™", ื•ื’ื ื”ื•ืขืœื• ื˜ืขื ื•ืช ืฉื”ืžื ื™ืขื™ื ืฉืœ ื”ืงื‘ื•ืฆื” ื”ื ืœืžืขืฉื” ืคื•ืœื™ื˜ื™ื™ื. ืขืจื‘ ื”ื‘ื—ื™ืจื•ืช, ื‘ึพ28 ื‘ืคื‘ืจื•ืืจ 2020, ืคืจืกืžื” ื”ืงื‘ื•ืฆื” ืžื•ื“ืขื•ืช ื‘ืขื™ืชื•ื ื™ื "ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื”ื™ื•ื" ื•"ื™ื“ื™ืขื•ืช ืื—ืจื•ื ื•ืช", ืฉื›ืœืœื• ื ื•ืกื— ืžืงื•ืฆืจ ืฉืœ ื”ืžื›ืชื‘ ื•ืืช ืฉืžื•ืช ื”ื—ื•ืชืžื™ื, ื›ื•ืœืœ 15 ื—ืชื™ืžื•ืช ืฉื”ืชื•ื•ืกืคื•, ื›ืš ืฉืกืš ื”ื—ื•ืชืžื™ื ืขืœ ื”ืžื•ื“ืขื•ืช ื”ื™ื” 555, ื•ืžื›ืืŸ ื ื’ื–ืจ ืฉืžื” ืฉืœ ื”ืงื‘ื•ืฆื”. ืžื—ืืช ื”ื’ืฉืจื™ื ื”ื™ื ื™ื•ื–ืžื” ืฉืœ ืงื‘ื•ืฆืช ื”ื“ื’ืœื™ื ื”ืฉื—ื•ืจื™ื ื”ืžื‘ื•ืกืกืช ืขืœ ื™ื•ื–ืžื•ืช ืžืงื•ืžื™ื•ืช. ืžื—ืื” ื–ื• ื”ื—ืœื” ืœืื—ืจ ืžืขืฆืจื• ืฉืœ ืืžื™ืจ ื”ืฉื›ืœ ื‘ืžืื”ืœ ืœื™ื“ ืžืขื•ืŸ ื‘ื™ืช ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื‘ื‘ืœืคื•ืจ, ื•ื”ื™ื ื ืžืฉื›ื” ื‘ืจืฆื™ืคื•ืช ืžืื– 1 ื‘ื™ื•ืœื™ 2020. ืžืขืœ 315 ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื”ืชืงื™ื™ืžื• ืžื“ื™ ืžื•ืฆืื™ ืฉื‘ืช ื‘ืžืกืคืจ ืจื‘ ืฉืœ ื’ืฉืจื™ื ื•ืฆืžืชื™ื ื‘ืจื—ื‘ื™ ื”ืžื“ื™ื ื” ื‘ืžืงื‘ื™ืœ ืœื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื‘ืžืจื›ื–ื™ ื”ืขืจื™ื. ื”ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ื”ื ื™ืคื• ื“ื’ืœื™ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื•ื“ื’ืœื™ ืžื—ืื” ื•ืจื•ื“ื™ื ื•ืฉื—ื•ืจื™ื, ื•ื ื”ื’ื™ื ื—ื•ืœืคื™ื ืฆืคืจื• ืœื”ื ืœืื•ืช ื”ื–ื“ื”ื•ืช. ืฆืคื™ืจื•ืช ื”ื”ื–ื“ื”ื•ืช ื”ืคื›ื• ืœืื—ื“ ืžืกืžืžื ื™ ื”ืžื—ืื”. ื”ืกื’ืจ ื”ืฉื ื™ ื•ื”ืชืคืฉื˜ื•ืช ื”ืžื—ืื” ื‘ืจื—ื‘ื™ ื”ืืจืฅ ืœืื—ืจ ื”ื”ืกืจื” ื”ื”ื“ืจื’ืชื™ืช ืฉืœ ื”ืกื’ืจ ื”ืจืืฉื•ืŸ ื”ืœื›ื” ื•ื”ืชืคืฉื˜ื” ืฉื•ื‘ ืžื’ืคืช ื”ืงื•ืจื•ื ื”, ื”ื—ืœื™ื˜ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•, ื‘ื ื™ื’ื•ื“ ืœืขืžื“ืช ื”ืคืจื•ื™ืงื˜ื•ืจ ื’ืžื–ื•, ืœื”ื˜ื™ืœ ืกื’ืจ ืฉื ื™ ืขืœ ื”ืžื“ื™ื ื” ื›ื•ืœื”. ืฉืจื™ ื›ื—ื•ืœ ืœื‘ืŸ ื”ืชื ื’ื“ื• ืœืกื’ืจ ื›ืœืœื™, ืฉืจ ื”ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื ืื‘ื™ ื ื™ืกื ืงื•ืจืŸ ื•ืฉืจ ื”ื—ื•ืฅ ื’ื‘ื™ ืืฉื›ื ื–ื™ ืืžืจื• ืฉื ืชื ื™ื”ื• "ืจืง ืจื•ืฆื” ืœืžื ื•ืข ืืช ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื ื’ื“ื• ื‘ื‘ืœืคื•ืจ". ื‘-25 ื‘ืกืคื˜ืžื‘ืจ ืื™ืฉืจื” ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ืกื’ืจ ื›ืœืœื™, ื‘ืžืกื’ืจืชื• ื ื™ืชืŸ ื™ื”ื™ื” ืœื”ืชืจื—ืง ืžื”ื‘ื™ืช ืขื“ ืงื™ืœื•ืžื˜ืจ ืื—ื“. ื‘ืชื’ื•ื‘ื” ื ื•ืฆืจื• ื‘ืื•ืคืŸ ืกืคื•ื ื˜ื ื™ ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื‘ื™ื™ืฉื•ื‘ื™ื ื”ืฉื•ื ื™ื ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ืชื•ืฉื‘ื™ ื”ืžืงื•ื, ื•ื›ืžื•ืช ื”ืžื•ื—ื™ื ืขืœืชื” ืคื™ ื—ืžื™ืฉื” ื•ืฉืฉื” ื•ืœื”ืขืจื›ืช ืืจื’ื•ืŸ ื”ื“ื’ืœื™ื ื”ืฉื—ื•ืจื™ื ื”ืฉืชืชืคื• ื‘ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ืžืขืœ 250,000 ืื™ืฉ. ื”ืžืืจื’ื ื™ื ื”ืžืงื•ืžื™ื™ื ืคืจืกืžื• ืืช ืžื™ืงื•ืžื™ ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื‘ืจืฉืชื•ืช ื”ื—ื‘ืจืชื™ื•ืช. ื”ื ื“ื™ื•ื•ื—ื• ืขืœ ืžืกืคืจ ื”ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ื•ื”ืขื‘ื™ืจื• ืชืขื•ื“ ื•ืชืžื•ื ื•ืช ืฉืจื•ื›ื–ื• ืœื“ืฃ ื”ืคื™ื™ืกื‘ื•ืง ืฉืœ "ื”ื“ื’ืœื™ื ื”ืฉื—ื•ืจื™ื" ื•ืœื“ืฃ ื”ืคื™ื™ืกื‘ื•ืง "ืงื™ืœื•ืžื˜ืจ ืื™ื˜ ืื™ื–!" ื”ืคื’ื ื” ื‘ื›ืœ ืฉื›ื•ื ื” ืฉืœ ื”ื‘ืขืœื‘ืชื™ื. ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื”ืžืงื•ืžื™ื•ืช ื”ืชืงื™ื™ืžื• ืื—ืจ ื”ืฆื”ืจื™ื™ื ื‘ื™ืžื™ื ืฉืœื™ืฉื™, ื—ืžื™ืฉื™ ื•ืฉื‘ืช. ืœืื—ืจ ื‘ื™ื˜ื•ืœ ืžื’ื‘ืœืช ื”ืงื™ืœื•ืžื˜ืจ, ืื•ื—ื“ื• ื—ืœืง ืžื”ืงื‘ื•ืฆื•ืช ื”ืžืงื•ืžื™ื•ืช ืขื ืงื‘ื•ืฆื•ืช ื‘ืžืงื•ืžื•ืช ืžืจื›ื–ื™ื™ื ื™ื•ืชืจ. ื”ืžื—ืื•ืช ื”ืžืงื•ืžื™ื•ืช ื ืžืฉื›ื• ืžืกืคื˜ืžื‘ืจ 2020, ืขื ืžืกืคืจ ืžื•ื—ื™ื ืžืฉืชื ื”. ื‘ื™ื•ื ืฉื‘ืช 26 ื‘ืกืคื˜ืžื‘ืจ, ืœืžื—ืจืช ื”ื”ื›ืจื–ื” ืขืœ ื”ืกื’ืจ ื”ืฉื ื™ ืขืœ ื”ืืจืฅ ืืš ื‘ื˜ืจื ื ื›ื ืกื• ืชืงื ื•ืช ื”ืžืจื—ืง ืœืชื•ืงืคืŸ, ื”ืชืืจื’ื ื” ืžื—ืืช ืื ืฉื™ื ื‘ื›ืœื™ ืจื›ื‘, ื•ื”ื™ื ื›ื•ื ืชื” "ืฉื™ื™ืจืช ื”ืชืงื•ื•ื”" - ื˜ื•ืจ ืฉืœ ืืœืคื™ ื›ืœื™ ืจื›ื‘ ื–ืจื ื‘ื›ื‘ื™ืฉื™ื ื”ืจื™ืงื™ื ื‘ื’ืœืœ ื”ืกื’ืจ ื”ืžื•ื‘ื™ืœื™ื ืœื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื. ื–ื” ื”ื™ื” ืื™ืจื•ืข ื‘ืงื ื” ืžื™ื“ื” ื’ื“ื•ืœ ืฉื›ืœืœ ืœืจืืฉื•ื ื” ื’ื ืื ืฉื™ื ื‘ื’ื™ืœืื™ื ืฉื•ื ื™ื ืฉืœื ื”ืฉืชืชืคื• ืขื“ ืื– ื‘ืžื—ืื•ืช. ืฉื•ื˜ืจื™ื ื”ืฆื™ื‘ื• ืžื—ืกื•ืžื™ื ื•ืขื™ื›ื‘ื• ืืช ื”ืฉื™ื™ืจื•ืช ื•ืื•ืจืš ื˜ื•ืจ ื”ืžื›ื•ื ื™ื•ืช ืฉื‘ื“ืจืš ื”ืชืžืฉืš ืขืœ ืคื ื™ ืขืฉืจื•ืช ืงื™ืœื•ืžื˜ืจื™ื. ื—ืœืง ืžื”ืžื•ื—ื™ื ื”ื’ื™ืขื• ืœื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื ื•ื—ื–ืจื• ืขืœ ืขืงื‘ื•ืชื™ื”ื, ื•ื—ืœืง ื”ืžืฉื™ื›ื• ืœื‘ืœืคื•ืจ ื•ืฉื ื”ืชืงื™ื™ืžื” ืžื—ืื” ืขื ื›-12 ืืœืฃ ืื™ืฉ. ืžื—ืืช ื”ืฆื•ืœืœื•ืช ื”ืชื—ื™ืœื” ื‘-19 ื‘ื™ื•ืœื™ 2020 ื›ืžื™ืฆื’ ืฉืœ ืงืฆื™ื ื™ื ื•ืœื•ื—ืžื™ื ื‘ืžื™ืœื•ืื™ื ื‘ืฆื”"ืœ ื‘ื™ื•ื–ืžืช ืจื•ืขื™ ืคืœื’ ืœื•ื—ื ื•ืงืฆื™ืŸ ืœืฉืขื‘ืจ ื‘ื™ื—ื™ื“ืช 669, ื•ืขื˜ืจ ืฉื™ื™ื ืคืœื“, ืฉืชื•ื‘ืขื™ื ืžื”ื™ื•ืขืฅ ื”ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ ืœืžืžืฉืœื” ืœืคืชื•ื— ื‘ื—ืงื™ืจื” ืฉืœ ืคืจืฉืช ื”ืฆื•ืœืœื•ืช. ื”ื ืœื‘ืฉื• ืžื“ื™ื ืฉืœ ื”ืฆื‘ื ื”ืžืฆืจื™ ื›ื‘ื™ื›ื•ืœ, ื•ื ืกืขื• ื‘ืืจืฅ ื‘ืฉื™ื™ืจื” ืฉืœ ื›ืœื™ ืจื›ื‘ ืžืขื•ื˜ืจื™ื ื‘ื“ื’ืœื™ ืžืฆืจื™ื™ื, ื›ืฉื”ื ื’ื•ืจืจื™ื ืืจื‘ืข ืฆื•ืœืœื•ืช. ืขืœ ื”ืฆื•ืœืœื•ืช ื›ืชื•ื‘ "ืื—"ื™ ืฉื—ื™ืชื•ืช", "ืื—"ื™ ืฉื•ื—ื“" "ืชื•ื“ื” ื‘ื™ื‘ื™" ื‘ืขืจื‘ื™ืช ื•-"Milikowsky" (ืื™ืฉ ื”ืขืกืงื™ื ื ืชืŸ ืžื™ืœื™ืงื•ื‘ืกืงื™, ื‘ืŸ ื“ื•ื“ื• ืฉืœ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•). ื™ืขื“ ื”ืฉื™ื™ืจื” ื”ื™ื” ืžืขื•ืŸ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื‘ืจื—ื•ื‘ ื‘ืœืคื•ืจ ื‘ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื, ืฉื ื”ืชืงื™ื™ื ื˜ืงืก ืžืกื™ืจืช ื”ืฆื•ืœืœื•ืช ืœืฆื‘ื ื”ืžืฆืจื™. ื‘ืจืืฉื™ืช ืื•ืงื˜ื•ื‘ืจ 2020 ื ื•ื“ืข ืฉื”ื™ื•ืขืฅ ื”ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ ืœืžืžืฉืœื” ืื‘ื™ื—ื™ ืžื ื“ืœื‘ืœื™ื˜ ื”ื—ืœื™ื˜ ืœืกื’ื•ืจ ืืช ื”ื‘ื“ื™ืงื” ื‘ืคืจืฉืช ื”ืฆื•ืœืœื•ืช ื ื’ื“ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•. ื‘ืชื’ื•ื‘ื” ืืจื’ื ื” ืงื‘ื•ืฆืช "ื—ืงื™ืจื” ืขื›ืฉื™ื•" ืฉื™ื™ืจืช ืžื—ืื” ื’ื“ื•ืœื”, ื•ื‘-14 ื‘ืื•ืงื˜ื•ื‘ืจ 2020 ื™ืฆืื• ืฉืœื•ืฉ ืฉื™ื™ืจื•ืช ืžืงืฆื•ืช ื”ืืจืฅ ืœื›ื™ื•ื•ืŸ ื‘ืœืคื•ืจ, ื”ื ื•ืฉืื•ืช ื›ื—ืžื™ืฉื™ื ื“ื’ืžื™ ืฆื•ืœืœื•ืช ืฉืขืœื™ื”ื ื›ื™ืชื•ื‘ื™ื ื›ื’ื•ืŸ ืื—"ื™ ืžื•ืฉื—ืช ื•ืื—"ื™ ืฉื•ื—ื“. ื‘ืงื™ืกืจื™ื” ืขืฆืจื” ื”ืฉื™ื™ืจื” ืœืขืฆืจืช ื’ื“ื•ืœื” ืฉื‘ื” ืฉืจื” ืื—ื™ื ื•ืขื ื ื™ื ื™, ื‘ืฉืžื™ื™ื ื—ื’ื• ื˜ืจืงื˜ื•ืจื•ื ื™ื ืžืขื•ืคืคื™ื, ื•ืžื˜ืก ื”ืฆื“ืขื” ืฉืœ ืื•ื•ื™ืจื•ื ื™ ืื•ืœื˜ืจื” ืœื™ื™ื˜ ื—ืœืฃ ื‘ืชืฆื•ืจืช ื—ืฅ ืžืขืœ ื”ืขืฆืจืช. ื”ืฉื™ื™ืจื” ื•ื‘ื” ื›ืžืื” ืฆื•ืœืœื•ืช ื”ืžืฉื™ื›ื” ืœื›ื™ื•ื•ืŸ ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื ื‘ืœื™ื•ื•ื™ ืื•ืคื ื•ืขื ื™ื ื•ืืœืคื™ ื›ืœื™ ืจื›ื‘. ื‘ืฆื“ื™ ื”ื“ืจื›ื™ื ื•ื‘ืฆืžืชื™ื ื•ืขืœ ื”ื’ืฉืจื™ื ืงื™ื‘ืœื• ืื ืฉื™ื ืืช ืคื ื™ ื”ืฉื™ื™ืจื” ื‘ื”ื ืคืช ื“ื’ืœื™ื. ืขื ืขืจื‘ ื”ื’ื™ืขื” ื”ืฉื™ื™ืจื” ืœื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื, ื•ื”ืชืงื™ื™ืžื” ืฉื ืขืฆืจืช ื‘ืจื•ื‘ ืขื. ืฉื•ื ืขืจื•ืฅ ืชืงืฉื•ืจืช ืžืžื•ืกื“ ืœื ืกื™ืงืจ ืืช ื”ืื™ืจื•ืข. ื‘ืžื”ืœืš ื ื•ื‘ืžื‘ืจ 2020 ื”ืชืจื‘ื• ืžืคื’ื ื™ ืฆื•ืœืœื•ืช ืขืฆืžืื™ื™ื ื‘ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื‘ืงื™ืกืจื™ื”, ื‘ื‘ืœืคื•ืจ, ืœื™ื“ ื”ืงืจื™ื” ื‘ืชืœ ืื‘ื™ื‘, ื•ื‘ื›ื‘ื™ืฉื™ ื”ืžื“ื™ื ื”. ื ื›ื•ืŸ ืœื™ื ื•ืืจ 2021, ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื”ืชืจื›ื–ื• ื‘ืฉืœื•ืฉื” ืžื•ืงื“ื™ื ืžื“ื™ ืฉื‘ืช ื‘ืขืจื‘: ื‘ืœืคื•ืจ (ื›ื™ื›ืจ ืคืจื™ื–), ืงื™ืกืจื™ื” ื•ื›ื™ื›ืจ ื”ื‘ื™ืžื”. ื”ื›ื ืกืช ืื™ืฉืจื” ื‘-29 ื‘ืกืคื˜ืžื‘ืจ 2020 ืชื™ืงื•ื ื™ื "ืœื—ื•ืง ื”ืงื•ืจื•ื ื” ื”ื’ื“ื•ืœ", ื•ื‘ื”ื ื”ื’ื‘ืœื•ืช ืœืงื™ื•ื ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื‘ืžืจื—ื‘ ื”ืฆื™ื‘ื•ืจื™ ื‘ื–ืžืŸ ืกื’ืจ ื›ืœืœื™. ื”ื—ื•ืง ืฉืขื‘ืจ ืืกืจ ืขืœ ืงื™ื•ื ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื‘ื–ืžืŸ ืฉืœ ืกื’ืจ ื›ืœืœื™ ืืœื ื‘ืงื‘ื•ืฆื•ืช ืฉืœ 20 ืื™ืฉ ื‘ืœื‘ื“ ื•ื‘ืžืจื—ืง ืฉืœ ืขื“ ืงื™ืœื•ืžื˜ืจ ืžืžืงื•ื ื”ืžื’ื•ืจื™ื. ื‘ืชื’ื•ื‘ื”, ื”ื’ื™ืฉื• ืžืกืคืจ ืืจื’ื•ื ื™ื ืื–ืจื—ื™ื™ื ื•ืžื•ื‘ื™ืœื™ื ืฉืœ ืชื ื•ืขื•ืช ื”ืžื—ืื” ืขืชื™ืจื” ืœื‘ื’"ืฅ, ื‘ื” ื˜ืขื ื• ืฉืžืขื•ืจื‘ื•ืชื• ื”ืื™ืฉื™ืช ืฉืœ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื‘ืงื™ื“ื•ื ื”ื—ื•ืง ื•ื‘ื”ื˜ืœืช ืกื’ืจื™ื ืฉื™ื’ื‘ื™ืœื• ืืช ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ืคืกื•ืœื” ืžื›ื™ื•ื•ืŸ ืฉื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ืžื›ื•ื•ื ื•ืช ื‘ืื•ืคืŸ ืื™ืฉื™ ื ื’ื“ื•. ื›ืžื• ื›ืŸ ื”ืขืชื™ืจื•ืช ื˜ืขื ื• ืฉื”ื”ื’ื‘ืœื•ืช ื’ื•ืจืžื•ืช ืœืคื’ื™ืขื” ื‘ืœืชื™ ืžื™ื“ืชื™ืช ื‘ื—ื•ืคืฉ ื”ื‘ื™ื˜ื•ื™ ื•ื‘ื—ื•ืคืฉ ืœื”ืคื’ื™ืŸ - ื•ืœืคื™ื›ืš ืื™ื ืŸ ื—ื•ืงื™ื•ืช. ื‘ื’"ืฅ ื“ืŸ ื‘ืขืชื™ืจื•ืช ื‘ื”ืจื›ื‘ ืžื•ืจื—ื‘ ืฉืœ ืชืฉืขื” ืฉื•ืคื˜ื™ื, ื•ื‘ืคืกืง ื”ื“ื™ืŸ ืฉืคื•ืจืกื ื‘-4 ื‘ืืคืจื™ืœ 2021 ื”ืขืชื™ืจื•ืช ื”ืชืงื‘ืœื• ื‘ืื•ืคืŸ ืžืœื. ืฉืžื•ื ื” ืฉื•ืคื˜ื™ ื‘ื’"ืฅ ืงื‘ืขื• ื‘ื“ืขืช ืจื•ื‘ ื›ื™ ื”ืื™ืกื•ืจ ืขืœ ื”ืฉืชืชืคื•ืช ื‘ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื‘ืžืจื—ืง ื”ืขื•ืœื” ืขืœ 1,000 ืžื˜ืจื™ื ืžืžืงื•ื ืžื’ื•ืจื™ื• ืฉืœ ืื“ื, ืฉืขืžื“ื” ื‘ืชื•ืงืฃ ื‘-1 ืขื“ 13 ื‘ืื•ืงื˜ื•ื‘ืจ ื‘ืื•ืชื” ืฉื ื”, ืื™ื ื” ื—ื•ืงื™ืช ื•ืœื ืขื•ื‘ืจืช ืืช ืžื‘ื—ื ื™ ื”ื—ื•ืงืชื™ื•ืช ืœื ื•ื›ื— ื”ืคื’ื™ืขื” ื”ื—ืžื•ืจื” ื‘ื—ื™ืจื•ืช ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื” ื•ื‘ื—ื•ืคืฉ ื”ื‘ื™ื˜ื•ื™. ื”ืฉื•ืคื˜ ืžื ื™ ืžื–ื•ื– ืฆื™ื™ืŸ ื›ื™ ื”ื™ื” ืขืœ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื‘ื ื™ืžื™ืŸ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืœื”ื™ืžื ืข ืžืœื™ื˜ื•ืœ ื—ืœืง ื‘ื”ื—ืœื˜ื” ืขืœ ืื™ืฉื•ืจ ื”ืชืงื ื•ืช, ืืฉืจ ื ื•ืขื“ื• ื‘ืขื™ืงืจ ืœื”ื’ื‘ืœืช ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ืฉื›ื•ื•ื ื• ื ื’ื“ื• ืื™ืฉื™ืช. ื ืงื‘ืข ื›ื™ "ืžืงื•ื ืงื™ื•ื ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื” ืžื”ื•ื•ื” ื—ืœืง ืžื”ื•ืชื™ ืžืŸ ื”ืžืกืจ ืฉืœ ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื”, ื‘ืžื™ื•ื—ื“ ื›ืืฉืจ ืžื“ื•ื‘ืจ ื‘ืžืขื•ื ื• ื”ืจืฉืžื™ ืฉืœ ื ื‘ื—ืจ ืฆื™ื‘ื•ืจ, ื•ื›ืŸ ืœื ื•ื›ื— ื”ื—ืฉื™ื‘ื•ืช ื”ื™ืชืจื” ืฉื™ืฉ ืœื™ื™ื—ืก ืœืžืชืŸ ืืคืฉืจื•ืช ืœื‘ืงืจ ืืช ื”ืฉืœื˜ื•ืŸ ื‘ืขื™ืชื•ืช ื—ื™ืจื•ื". ื‘ื ื•ืกืฃ, ื ืงื‘ืข ื›ื™ ื›ืœ ื”ืงื ืกื•ืช ืฉื”ื•ื˜ืœื• ืžื›ื•ื— ื”ืชืงื ื” ื”ืžื’ื‘ื™ืœื” ืืช ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื‘ื˜ืœื™ื, ื•ื›ื™ ืื ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ืœื ื™ื›ื•ืœื” ืœื”ืฉื™ื‘ ืืช ื”ืงื ืกื•ืช ืฉื”ื•ื˜ืœื• ื‘ืชืงื•ืคื” ื–ื• ื‘ื’ื™ืŸ ื”ืฉืชืชืคื•ืช ื‘ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื‘ืžืจื—ืง ื”ืขื•ืœื” ืขืœ 1,000 ืžื˜ืจ, ื™ื‘ื•ื˜ืœื• ื›ืœืœ ื”ืงื ืกื•ืช ืฉื”ื•ื˜ืœื• ื‘ืชืงื•ืคื” ื‘ื’ื™ืŸ ื”ืคืจืช ื”ื’ื‘ืœืช ืžืจื—ืง ื”ื™ืฆื™ืื” ืžื”ื‘ื™ืช, ื•ื”ื›ืกืคื™ื ืฉืฉื•ืœืžื• ื‘ื’ื™ืŸ ืงื ืกื•ืช ืืœื” ื™ื•ืฉื‘ื• ืœืžืฉืœืžื™ื. ื—ื™ื“ื•ืฉ ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ืœืื—ืจ ืคืจื•ืฅ ืžืœื—ืžืช ื—ืจื‘ื•ืช ื‘ืจื–ืœ ืœืื—ืจ ื˜ื‘ื— ืฉื‘ืขื” ื‘ืื•ืงื˜ื•ื‘ืจ ืฉื›ื›ื” ื”ืžื—ืื” ื ื’ื“ ื”ืจืคื•ืจืžื” ื”ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ืช ื•ื–ืืช ื‘ืžืงื‘ื™ืœ ืœืขืฆื™ืจืช ื”ืœื™ื›ื™ ื”ื—ืงื™ืงื” ื‘ื›ื ืกืช. ืืจื’ื•ื ื™ื ืฉืœืงื—ื• ื—ืœืง ืžืจื›ื–ื™ ื‘ืžื—ืื”, ื›ืžื• ืื—ื™ื ืœื ืฉืง ืฉื™ื ื• ืืช ืžืจื›ื– ื”ื›ื•ื‘ื“ ืฉืœ ืคืขื™ืœื•ืชื ืœืกื™ื•ืข ืื–ืจื—ื™ ืœืžืคื•ื ื™ื ื•ืœื—ื™ื™ืœื™ื. ื–ืžืŸ ืงืฆืจ ืœืื—ืจ ืชื—ื™ืœืช ื”ืžืœื—ืžื” ื”ื—ืœื” ืžื—ืืช ืžืฉืคื—ืช ื”ื—ื˜ื•ืคื™ื ืฉื”ืชืจื›ื–ื” ื‘ืขื™ืงืจ ื‘ืงืจื‘ืช ืฉืขืจื™ ื”ืงืจื™ื”. ืžื—ืื” ื–ื• ื”ืชืžืงื“ื” ื‘ืงืจื™ืื” ืœื”ื—ื–ืจืช ื”ื—ื˜ื•ืคื™ื. ื‘ื™ื ื•ืืจ 2024, ื”ืชื—ื“ืฉื• ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื ื’ื“ ืžืžืฉืœืช ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื‘ืชืœ ืื‘ื™ื‘, ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื ื•ืงื™ืกืจื™ื” ื›ืฉื”ืžืกืจ ื”ืขื™ืงืจื™ ืฉืœื”ืŸ ื”ื™ื” ื”ืงื“ืžืช ื”ื‘ื—ื™ืจื•ืช. ืงืจื™ืื” ื–ื• ื”ืชื‘ืกืกื” ื‘ื™ืŸ ื”ืฉืืจ ืขืœ ืกืงืจื™ื ืฉื”ืจืื• ืฉืจื•ื‘ ื’ื“ื•ืœ ื‘ืฆื™ื‘ื•ืจ ืชื•ืžืš ื‘ืžื”ืœืš ื›ื–ื”. ืขืœ ืืฃ ืจื•ื‘ ื–ื” ื‘ืกืงืจื™ื ืœื ื”ืฆืœื™ื—ื• ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื•ืช (ืฉื ืขืจื›ื• ื‘ืฉื“ืจื•ืช ืจื•ื˜ืฉื™ืœื“ ื•ื‘ื›ื™ื›ืจ ื”ื‘ื™ืžื”) ืœืกื—ื•ืฃ ืืช ื”ืฆื™ื‘ื•ืจ ื”ืจื—ื‘ ื•ืจืง ืืœืคื™ื ื‘ื•ื“ื“ื™ื ื”ืชื™ื™ืฆื‘ื• ื‘ื”ืŸ. ืžืกืคืจ ื—ื•ืงืจื™ื ื ื™ืกื• ืœื ืชื— ืคืขืจ ื–ื” ื•ืœื”ืกื‘ื™ืจ ืžื“ื•ืข ื”ื™ืงืฃ ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื ืฉืืจ ื ืžื•ืš. ืขื ื”ื–ืžืŸ ื”ืฆื˜ืจืคื• ืœืžื—ืื” ืขื•ื“ ืืจื’ื•ื ื™ื ืื–ืจื—ื™ื™ื ื•ื‘ื”ืชืื ืžืกืคืจ ื”ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ื’ื“ืœ. ื‘ืžื”ืœืš ืžืจืฅ 2024 ื™ืฆื ืืจื’ื•ืŸ "ืขืžื•ืชืช ืœื•ื—ืžื™ ื›ื™ืคื•ืจ 73'" ื‘ืงืžืคื™ื™ืŸ ื—ื“ืฉ "ืืชื” ื”ืจืืฉ, ืืชื” ืืฉื" ื•ืœื”ืคืฆืช ื”ืžืกืจื™ื ื’ื™ื™ืกื• ื›ืกืคื™ื ื‘ืคืœื˜ืคื•ืจืžืช ื’ื™ื•ืก ื”ืžื•ื ื™ื. ื‘ื™ืŸ ื”ืืจื’ื•ื ื™ื ืฉื”ืฉืชืœื‘ื• ื‘ืžื—ืื” ื”ื™ื• ืืจื’ื•ื ื™ื ื›ืžื• ืื—ื™ื ืœื ืฉืง, ื‘ื•ื ื•ืช ืืœื˜ืจื ื˜ื™ื‘ื”, "ื”ื“ื’ืœื™ื ื”ืฉื—ื•ืจื™ื", "ืœื•ื‘ื™ 99", "ื”ื™ื•ื ืฉืื—ืจื™", "ืคื•ืจื•ื 555", "ื—ื•ืคืฉื™ ื‘ืืจืฆื ื•", "ื”ื—ื–ื™ืช ื”ื•ื•ืจื•ื“ื”", "ืžืฉื ื™ื ื›ื™ื•ื•ืŸ", "ื“ื•ืจ ืฉื™ื ื•ื™" ื•ืžืฉืคื—ื•ืช ืžืžื˜ื” ื”ืžืฉืคื—ื•ืช ืœื”ื—ื–ืจืช ื”ื—ื˜ื•ืคื™ื ื•ื”ื ืขื“ืจื™ื. ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื”ืชืจื—ื‘ื• ืœืžืงื•ืžื•ืช ื ื•ืกืคื™ื ื‘ืจื—ื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืจืืœ, ื’ืฉืจื™ื ื•ื‘ืชื™ ืฉืจื™ื. ืœื˜ืขื ืช ื—ืœืง ืžื”ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ื”ืžืฉื˜ืจื” ืžื•ื‘ื™ืœื” ืงื• ืื’ืจืกื™ื‘ื™ ื ื’ื“ ื”ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื. ื‘-31 ื‘ืžืจืฅ 2024 ื”ืชืงื™ื™ืžื” ื‘ืงืจื‘ืช ืžืฉื›ืŸ ื”ื›ื ืกืช ื‘ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื ื”ืคื’ื ื” ืฉืœ ืžืกืคืจ ืืจื’ื•ื ื™ ืžื—ืื” ื‘ื” ื”ืฉืชืชืคื• ื›-100,000. ื—ืœืง ืžื”ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ื ืฉืืจื• ืœื™ืฉื•ืŸ ื‘ืžืงื•ื ื•ื”ืžืฉื™ื›ื• ืœื”ืคื’ื™ืŸ ืžื•ืœ ื”ื›ื ืกืช ืขื•ื“ ืฉืœื•ืฉื” ื™ืžื™ื. ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ืฉื”ืชืงื™ื™ืžื• ื‘ื›ื™ื›ืจ ื”ื‘ื™ืžื” ืขื‘ืจื• ืœืื–ื•ืจ ืฉืจื•ื ื” ื‘ืงืคืœืŸ ื•ื‘-6 ื‘ืืคืจื™ืœ ื—ื–ืจื• ืœื”ืชืงื™ื™ื ื‘ื›ื™ื›ืจ ื”ื“ืžื•ืงืจื˜ื™ื”. ื‘ืื•ืชื” ื”ืคื’ื ื” ื ื“ืจืกื• ื—ืžื™ืฉื” ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ืจื›ื‘ ืฉื ื—ืกื ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ื”ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื. ื‘ืžืงื‘ื™ืœ ืœื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื‘ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื ื•ืชืœ ืื‘ื™ื‘ ืžืชืงื™ื™ืžื•ืช ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ืฉื‘ื•ืขื™ื•ืช ื‘ืงืจื‘ืช ื‘ื™ืชื• ืฉืœ ื‘ื ื™ืžื™ืŸ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื‘ืงื™ืกืจื™ื”. ื”ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ื‘ืงื™ืกืจื™ื” ื˜ืขื ื• ืœื™ื—ืก ืืœื™ื ืžืฆื“ ื”ืžืฉื˜ืจื”. ืชื’ื•ื‘ื•ืช ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืœื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ืœืžืŸ ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื”ืจืืฉื•ื ื•ืช ื ื’ื“ื• ื‘ื™ื•ืœื™ 2020, ื˜ืขืŸ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื›ื™ ื”ื”ืชืงื”ืœื•ื™ื•ืช ื”ื”ืžื•ื ื™ื•ืช ื‘ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื’ื•ืจืžื•ืช ืœื”ืคืฆืช ืžื’ืคืช ื”ืงื•ืจื•ื ื”, ื•ืืฃ ื›ื™ื ื” ืืช ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช "ืžื“ื’ืจืช ืงื•ืจื•ื ื”". ื˜ืขื ื” ื–ื• ื”ื™ื™ืชื” ื•ืขื•ื“ื ื” ืฉื ื•ื™ื” ื‘ืžื—ืœื•ืงืช - ืžื—ืงืจื™ื ืžื“ืขื™ื™ื ืฉื•ื ื™ื ื”ื’ื™ืขื• ืœืžืžืฆืื™ื ืกื•ืชืจื™ื ื‘ื›ืœ ื”ืงืฉื•ืจ ืœื”ืฉืคืขืช ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื‘ืื•ื•ื™ืจ ื”ืคืชื•ื— ืขืœ ื”ืขืœื™ื™ื” ื‘ืชื—ืœื•ืื”. ื‘ืจื, ื—ืœืง ืžื’ื•ืจืžื™ ื”ืžืงืฆื•ืข ื”ืจืคื•ืื™ื™ื ื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื˜ืขื ื• ืืฃ ื”ื, ื›ื™ ื™ืฉ ืœื”ื™ืžื ืข ืžืงื™ื•ื ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื”ืžื•ื ื™ื•ืช, ืœืคื—ื•ืช ื‘ืชืงื•ืคื•ืช ื‘ื”ืŸ ื”ืชื—ืœื•ืื” ืžืžื’ืคืช ื”ืงื•ืจื•ื ื” ื”ื’ื™ืขื” ืœืฉื™ื. ืœืื—ืจ ื”ื”ื—ืœื˜ื•ืช ืขืœ ื”ื˜ืœืช ืกื’ืจื™ื, ื•ื‘ืžื™ื•ื—ื“ ืœืื—ืจ ื”ื”ื—ืœื˜ื” ืœื”ื˜ื™ืœ ืืช ื”ืกื’ืจ ื”ืฉื ื™ ื‘ื—ื•ื“ืฉ ืกืคื˜ืžื‘ืจ 2020, ื”ื•ืืฉื ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ื’ื•ืจืžื™ื ืฉื•ื ื™ื, ื•ื‘ื”ื ืคื•ืœื™ื˜ื™ืงืื™ื ืžืžื—ื ื” ื”ืžืจื›ื–-ืฉืžืืœ ื•ืื ืฉื™ ืชืงืฉื•ืจืช, ื›ื™ ื”ื˜ืœืช ื”ืกื’ืจื™ื ืœื ื ืขืฉืชื” ืžืกื™ื‘ื•ืช ื‘ืจื™ืื•ืชื™ื•ืช, ืืœื ืžืกื™ื‘ื•ืช ืคื•ืœื™ื˜ื™ื•ืช - ืขืฆื™ืจืช ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื ื’ื“ื•. ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื”ื’ื™ื‘ ืœื”ืืฉืžื•ืช ืืœื• ื‘ืื•ืžืจื• ื›ื™ ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ืื™ื ืŸ ืคื•ื’ืขื•ืช ื‘ื• ืคื•ืœื™ื˜ื™ืช, ื•ื”ื”ื—ืœื˜ื” ืœื”ื’ื‘ื™ืœืŸ ื”ืชืงื‘ืœื” ืžื›ื™ื•ื•ืŸ ืฉื”ืŸ ืคื•ื’ืขื•ืช ื‘ืžืืžืฆื™ื ืœืžื’ืจ ืืช ืžื—ืœืช ื”ืงื•ืจื•ื ื”, ืžืฉื•ื ืฉื”ืŸ ืžืืคืฉืจื•ืช ืœื›ืœ ืื–ืจื— ืœืฉื‘ื•ืจ ืืช ื”ืกื’ืจ ื‘ื˜ืขื ื” ืฉื”ื•ื "ื‘ื“ืจืš ืœื”ืคื’ื ื”". ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื˜ืขืŸ ืฉื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื ื’ื“ื• ื”ืŸ "ืื ืจื›ื™ืกื˜ื™ื•ืช ื•ื”ื–ื•ื™ื•ืช". ืืžื™ืจื•ืช ืืœื” ื’ืจืจื• ื‘ื™ืงื•ืจืช ื ื’ื“ื• ืžืฆื“ ื—ื‘ืจื™ ื›ื ืกืช ืžื”ืงื•ืืœื™ืฆื™ื” ื•ืžื”ืื•ืคื•ื–ื™ืฆื™ื”. ื›ืžื• ื›ืŸ, ื˜ืขืŸ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืฉื‘ืžืกื’ืจืช ื”ืžื—ืื” ืžืชืงื™ื™ืžืช ื”ืกืชื” ืœืืœื™ืžื•ืช ื›ื ื’ื“ื•, ืœืจื‘ื•ืช ืงืจื™ืื•ืช ืœืจืฆื—ื•. ื‘ื™ื•ื ื”ื–ื™ื›ืจื•ืŸ ื”-25 ืœื™ืฆื—ืง ืจื‘ื™ืŸ, ื˜ืขืŸ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืฉ-โ€ื™ืฉ ื”ืกืชื” ืžืคื•ืจืฉืช ืœืจืฆื— ื›ืœืคื™ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื•ื‘ื ื™ ื‘ื™ืชื• ื—ื“ืฉื•ืช ืœื‘ืงืจื™ื ื•ืื™ืฉ ื›ืžืขื˜ ืื™ื ื• ืคื•ืฆื” ืคื”. ืื ืชืจืฆื• ืืชืŸ ืฆื™ื˜ื•ื˜ื™ื ืื‘ืœ ื–ื” ืžืขืœ ื•ืžืขื‘ืจโ€. ื˜ืขื ื” ื–ื• ื”ืกืชืžื›ื” ืขืœ ืคืจืกื•ืžื™ื, ืฉื”ื•ืคื™ืขื• ื‘ืจืฉืชื•ืช ื”ื—ื‘ืจืชื™ื•ืช, ื•ื›ืœืœื•, ื‘ื™ืŸ ื”ืฉืืจ, ืงืจื™ืื•ืช ืœืจืฆื•ื— ืื•ืชื• ื•ื›ืŸ ืืช ื‘ื ื™ื• ื•ืืฉืชื•, ื‘ื’ื™ื ื ื”ื•ื’ืฉื• ืžืกืคืจ ื›ืชื‘ื™ ืื™ืฉื•ื ื‘ืžื”ืœืš ื”ืฉื ื” ื”ื—ื•ืœืคืช. ื›ื ื’ื“ ื›ืœื™ ื”ืชืงืฉื•ืจืช ื˜ืขืŸ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•, ื‘ืžื™ื•ื—ื“ ื‘ืจืืฉื™ืช ื”ืžื—ืื”, ื›ื™ ื”ืŸ ืžืขื ื™ืงื•ืช ื›ื™ืกื•ื™ ื ืจื—ื‘ ื•ื‘ืœืชื™ ืคืจื•ืคืจืฆื™ื•ื ื™ ืœื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื ื’ื“ื•. ื›ืš ืœืžืฉืœ, ื‘-25 ื‘ื™ื•ืœื™ ื›ืชื‘ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื‘ืขืžื•ื“ ื”ืคื™ื™ืกื‘ื•ืง ืฉืœื• ื›ื™ ืขืจื•ืฅ 12 โ€ื”ืคืš ืœื–ืจื•ืข ืชืขืžื•ืœื” ื—ืกืจืช ื‘ื•ืฉื” ืฉืœ ื”ืฉืžืืœ ื”ืื ืจื›ื™ืกื˜ื™ ืœื”ืคื™ืœ ืืช ืžืžืฉืœืช ื”ื™ืžื™ืŸ ื•ื”ืขื•ืžื“ ื‘ืจืืฉื”โ€, ื•ื˜ืขืŸ ื›ื™ ื”ื ืžื“ื•ื•ื—ื™ื ืขืœ โ€ืžืกืคืจื™ื ืžื ื•ืคื—ื™ื ืฉืœ ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ืโ€. ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื˜ืขืŸ ื’ื ื›ื™ ื›ืžืขื˜ ื›ืœ ื”ืชื•ื›ื ื™ื•ืช "ืžื’ื•ื™ืกื•ืช ืœืชืขืžื•ืœื” ื‘ื•ืœืฉื‘ื™ืงื™ืช ื ื’ื“ื•", ื•ื›ื™ ื”ื โ€ืœื ืื•ืžืจื™ื ืžื™ืœื” ืื—ืช ืขืœ ื”ืื™ื•ืžื™ื ื”ืžืคื•ืจืฉื™ื ืœืจืฆื•ื— ืืช ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื•ืžืฉืคื—ืชื•.โ€ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืฆื™ืจืฃ ืœื”ื•ื“ืขืชื• ืชืžื•ื ืช ืกื˜ื™ืœืก ืžืฉื™ื“ื•ืจื™ ืขืจื•ืฅ 12 ื‘ื” ื ืจืื” ืคืืจืง ืฆ'ืืจืœืก ืงืœื•ืจ, ื›ืฉืขืœ ื”ื“ืฉื ืื ืฉื™ื ื‘ื•ื“ื“ื™ื, ื›ืฉื”ื›ื™ืชื•ื‘ ืฉืฆื•ืจืฃ ืœืชืžื•ื ื” ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ื”ืขืจื•ืฅ ื”ื•ื "ื’ืœ ืฉืœ ืžื—ืื”". ื—ืœืง ืžื”ืขื™ืชื•ื ืื™ื ื”ืขื‘ื™ืจื• ื’ื ื”ื ื‘ื™ืงื•ืจืช ืขืœ ื›ืœ ื”ืชืงืฉื•ืจืช ื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ, ื•ื‘ื”ื ืฉืžืขื•ืŸ ืจื™ืงืœื™ืŸ, ืื™ืฉ ืชืงืฉื•ืจืช ื”ืžื–ื•ื”ื” ืขื ื”ื™ืžื™ืŸ ืฉืืžืจ ื›ื™: โ€ืงื•ืžืฅ ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ื–ื•ื›ื” ืœืกื™ืงื•ืจ ื‘ืœืชื™-ืคื•ืกืง, ื‘ืžืงื•ื ืœื“ื•ื•ื— ืขืœ ื”ืื™ืจื•ืขื™ื ืื ืฉื™ ืชืงืฉื•ืจืช ื”ืคื›ื• ืœืฉื—ืงื ื™ื ื”ืจืืฉื™ื™ืโ€. ืžื ื’ื“, ืืชืจ ื”ืขื™ืŸ ื”ืฉื‘ื™ืขื™ืช ื”ืžื’ื“ื™ืจ ืขืฆืžื• ื›ืขื•ืกืง ื‘ืกืงื™ืจื” ื•ื‘ื™ืงื•ืจืช ืฉืœ ื”ืชืงืฉื•ืจืช, ืคืจืกื ื‘ืชื’ื•ื‘ื” ืœื˜ืขื ื•ืช ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื›ื™ ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื–ื›ื• ืœืกื™ืงื•ืจ ื’ื ื‘ื›ืœื™ ืชืงืฉื•ืจืช ื‘ื•ืœื˜ื™ื ื‘ืขื•ืœื. ื‘ืžื”ืœืš ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช, ื”ื•ืืฉื ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื‘ื”ืคืฆืช ื™ื“ื™ืขื•ืช ื›ื•ื–ื‘ื•ืช, ืžื˜ืขื•ืช ืื• ืžื•ื’ื–ืžื•ืช, ื‘ืขื™ืงืจ ื“ืจืš ื”ืจืฉืชื•ืช ื”ื—ื‘ืจืชื™ื•ืช. ืžื ื’ื ื•ืŸ ืชืขืžื•ืœื” ื–ื” ื›ื•ื ื” "ืžื›ื•ื ืช ื”ืจืขืœ". ื‘ืžืงืจื” ืื—ื“ ื”ืขืœื” ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืคื•ืกื˜ ื‘-"ื˜ื•ื•ื™ื˜ืจ" ืฉืœ ืื“ื ื‘ื›ื™ื ื•ื™ "ื“ื ื” ืจื•ืŸ" ื•ื‘ื• ืงืจื™ืื” ืœื™ืจื•ืช ื‘ื• "ื›ื“ื•ืจ ื‘ืจืืฉ". ื‘ืžืงืจื” ืื—ืจ ืืžืจ ืฉื”ืžืฉื˜ืจื” ืขืฆืจื” "ืœื™ื“ ืžืฉืจื“ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ืื“ื ืฉืื™ื™ื ืœืจืฆื•ื— ืื•ืชื™ ื•ื‘ื›ืœื™ื• ื ืžืฆืื• ืกื›ื™ื ื™ื". ืžืื•ื—ืจ ื™ื•ืชืจ ื”ืชื‘ืจืจ ืฉื”ืคืจื•ืคื™ืœ "ื“ื ื” ืจื•ืŸ" ืžื–ื•ื™ืฃ ื•ืœื ื‘ืจื•ืจ ืžื™ ืขื•ืžื“ ืžืื—ื•ืจื™ื•, ื•ื”ืื™ืฉ ืฉื ืขืฆืจ ืœื™ื“ ืžืฉืจื“ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื”ื•ื ื“ืจ ืจื—ื•ื‘. ื‘ืžืงืจื” ืื—ืจ, ื”ื•ืคืฆื” ืชืžื•ื ื” ื‘ืจืฉืชื•ืช ื”ื—ื‘ืจืชื™ื•ืช ื‘ื” ื ื˜ืขืŸ ื›ื™ ืจื•ืื™ื ืืช ืื—ื“ ื”ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ืขื•ืฉื” ืืช ืฆืจื›ื™ื• ืขืœ ืžื›ื•ื ื™ืช. ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื”ื–ื›ื™ืจ ืืช ื”ืชืžื•ื ื”, ื‘ืขืงื™ืคื™ืŸ, ื‘ืื—ื“ ืžื ืื•ืžื™ื• ื›ืืฉืจ ืงืจื ืœื ืœื’ืจื•ืจ ืืช ื”ืžื“ื™ื ื” "ืœื”ืคืฆืช ืžื—ืœื•ืช ื‘ืืžืฆืขื•ืช ืชื ืื™ื ืกื ื™ื˜ืจื™ื™ื ืื™ื•ืžื™ื ืฉืœ ืขืฉื™ื™ืช ืฆืจื›ื™ื ื‘ืจื—ื•ื‘ื•ืช ื•ื‘ื—ืฆืจื•ืช". ื‘ืคื•ืขืœ, ื”ืชื‘ืจืจ ื›ื™ ืžื“ื•ื‘ืจ ื‘ืชืžื•ื ื” ืฉืฆื•ืœืžื” ื‘ืืจืฆื•ืช ื”ื‘ืจื™ืช ื•ืœื ื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ. ื‘ืจืืฉื™ืช ื ื•ื‘ืžื‘ืจ 2020 ืคืจืกืžื” ืคื™ื™ืกื‘ื•ืง ื›ื™ ื—ืฉืคื” ืจืฉืช ืื™ืจืื ื™ืช ืฉืœ 12 ื—ืฉื‘ื•ื ื•ืช ืžื–ื•ื™ืคื™ื ืฉื›ื•ื•ื ื• ื‘ืขื™ืงืจ ื›ืœืคื™ ื™ืฉืจืืœ, ื›ืืฉืจ ื—ืœืง ืžื”ื”ื—ืฉื‘ื•ื ื•ืช ื”ืชื—ื–ื• ืœื™ืฉืจืืœื™ื. ื“ืจืš ื”ื—ืฉื‘ื•ื ื•ืช "ื”ื™ืฉืจืืœื™ื" ืคืจืกืžื• ื”ืื™ืจืื ื™ื ื”ื•ื“ืขื•ืช ื‘ืขื‘ืจื™ืช ื”ืžื‘ื™ืขื•ืช ืชืžื™ื›ื” ื‘ืžื—ืื” ื ื’ื“ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•, ื•ื›ืŸ ื‘ื™ืงื•ืจืช ืขืœ ืžื“ื™ื ื™ื•ืชื• ื•ืขืœ ืชื’ื•ื‘ืชื• ืฉืœ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืœืžืฉื‘ืจ ืงื•ืจื•ื ื”.ื‘ืชื’ื•ื‘ื” ืฉื™ืชืฃ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืคื•ืกื˜ ืžื˜ืขื ืชื ื•ืขืช ื”ืœื™ื›ื•ื“ ื‘ื• ื ื›ืชื‘ ืฉืื™ืจืืŸ ื”ืฉืชืžืฉื” ื‘ืจืฉืชื•ืช ื”ื—ื‘ืจืชื™ื•ืช ื›ื“ื™ ืœืชื“ืœืง ืืช ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื ื’ื“ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื‘ื ื™ืกื™ื•ืŸ ืœื”ืคื™ืœื•, ื•ื›ื™ ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื ืชืžื›ื•ืช ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ โ€ืื—ื“ ื”ืžืฉื˜ืจื™ื ื”ื—ืฉื•ื›ื™ื ื‘ืขื•ืœื ื•ืœืฉื ื™ื”ื ืžื˜ืจื” ืžืฉื•ืชืคืช: ืœื”ืคื™ืœ ืืช ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•โ€. ืงืจืŸ ื‘ืจืœ ื›ืฆื ืœืกื•ืŸ, ืžื•ืกื“ ื”ืžื’ื“ื™ืจ ืขืฆืžื• ื›-"ืคื•ืขืœ ืœื”ืชื—ื“ืฉื•ืช ื”ืฉืžืืœ ื”ืฆื™ื•ื ื™ ื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ", ืคืจืกื ื“ื•ื— ืžื˜ืขืžื• ืฉื‘ื• ื ื˜ืขืŸ ื›ื™ ื ืžืฆื ืงืฉืจ ื‘ื™ืŸ ื”ืชื‘ื˜ืื•ื™ื•ืชื™ื• ืฉืœ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื”, ื‘ื ื• ื•ื‘ื›ื™ืจื™ื ื ื•ืกืคื™ื ื‘ืžื”ืœืš ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช, ืœื‘ื™ืŸ ืขืœื™ื™ื” ื‘ื›ื™ื ื•ื™ื™ ื’ื ืื™ ื•ืฉื ืื” ื›ืœืคื™ ื”ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื. ื‘-20 ื‘ืื•ื’ื•ืกื˜ 2020 ื”ืชืงื™ื™ืžื” ื‘ื›ื™ื›ืจ ืคืจื™ื– ื”ืคื’ื ืช ืชืžื™ื›ื” ื‘ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื‘ื”ืฉืชืชืคื•ืชื ืฉืœ ื›-300 ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื. ื‘ืžืงื‘ื™ืœ, ื‘ื›ื™ื›ืจ ืฆืจืคืช ื•ื‘ืจื—ื•ื‘ ื‘ืŸ ืžื™ืžื•ืŸ ื ืขืจื›ื” ื”ืคื’ื ื” ื‘ืกื“ืจ ื’ื•ื“ืœ ื“ื•ืžื” ื ื’ื“ ื”ืฉื—ื™ืชื•ืช. ื›ื“ื™ ืœืงื™ื™ื ืืช ืžืคื’ืŸ ื”ืชืžื™ื›ื” ื‘ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื”, ืคื™ื ืชื” ื”ืžืฉื˜ืจื” ืืช ืžืื”ืœ ื”ืžื—ืื” ืžื•ืœ ืžืขื•ืŸ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื‘ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื; ื‘ืžื”ืœืš ื”ืคื™ื ื•ื™ ื ืคืฆืข ื›ืจืžื™ ื’ื™ืœื•ืŸ ืฉืื–ืง ืืช ืขืฆืžื• ืœืžืื”ืœ ื”ืžื—ืื”. ื”ืชื ื’ืฉื•ื™ื•ืช ืืœื™ืžื•ืช ืื™ืจืขื• ื’ื ืžืกืคืจ ื”ืชืงืคื•ืช ืืœื™ืžื•ืช ื ื’ื“ ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื. ื”ืžืฉื˜ืจื” ืขืฆืจื” ื‘ืชืœ ืื‘ื™ื‘ ื—ืฉื•ื“ ื‘ื ื™ืกื™ื•ืŸ ื“ืจื™ืกืช ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื, ื•ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ืงื‘ืœื• ื›ื ื’ื“ ื ื™ืกื™ื•ื ื•ืช ื“ืจื™ืกื” ื ื•ืกืคื™ื. ื•ื‘ื›ืžื” ืžื•ืงื“ื™ื ืจื™ืกืกื• ืื–ืจื—ื™ื ื’ื– ืคืœืคืœ ืœืขื‘ืจ ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื. ื‘ืฉืขืจ ื”ื ื’ื‘ ื ื“ืงืจ ืžืคื’ื™ืŸ ื‘ืฆื•ื•ืืจื• ื‘ืืžืฆืขื•ืช ืžื‘ืจื’. ื”ื™ื• ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ืฉืชืžื›ื• ื‘ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื”ืฉืชืžืฉื• ื‘ืกื™ืกืžื” "ืฉืžืืœื ื™ื ื‘ื•ื’ื“ื™ื" ื•ืงื™ืœืœื•. ื—ื‘ืจื™ ืงื‘ื•ืฆื•ืช ืื•ื”ื“ื™ ื”ื›ื“ื•ืจื’ืœ "ืคื ืื˜ื™ืงืก" ื•"ืœื” ืคืžื™ืœื™ื”" ืชืงืคื• ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ื‘ืžืกืคืจ ืื™ืจื•ืขื™ื ืฉื•ื ื™ื. ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ื ืคืฆืขื• ื‘ื”ืชื ื’ืฉื™ื•ืช ืขื ืฉื•ื˜ืจื™ื. ื‘ื—ืœืง ืžื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ืื™ืจืขื• ื”ืชื ื’ืฉื•ื™ื•ืช ืืœื™ืžื•ืช. ื—ืœืง ืžื”ืฆืขื“ื•ืช ื‘ืชืœ ืื‘ื™ื‘ ื•ื‘ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื ืœื ืงื™ื‘ืœื• ืื™ืฉื•ืจ ื›ื—ื•ืง, ื ืคืจืฆื• ืžื—ืกื•ืžื™ื ืžืฉื˜ืจืชื™ื™ื ื•ื ื—ืกืžื• ื›ื‘ื™ืฉื™ื ืžืจื›ื–ื™ื™ื. ื”ื™ื• ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ืฉืื™ื™ืžื• ื•ืงื™ืœืœื•. ืืžื™ืจ ื”ืฉื›ืœ ื”ืฉื•ื•ื” ืชื”ืœื™ื›ื™ื ื‘ืฉืœื˜ื•ืŸ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืœื”ืชืคื•ืจืจื•ืช ื”ื“ืžื•ืงืจื˜ื™ื” ื‘ืจืคื•ื‘ืœื™ืงืช ื•ื™ื™ืžืืจ, ื•ื”ืžืคื’ื™ืŸ ืกื“ื™ ื‘ืŸ ืฉื˜ืจื™ืช ื”ืฉื•ื•ื” ืืช ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืœื”ื™ื˜ืœืจ. ื”ืฉื•ื•ืื” ื–ื• ืกืคื’ื” ื’ื™ื ื•ื™ ืžืฆื“ ืชื ื•ืขื•ืช ื”ืžื•ื‘ื™ืœื•ืช ืืช ื”ืžื—ืื”. ื‘ืžื”ืœืš ื”ืžื—ืื” ื”ื™ื• ืžืขืฆืจื™ื ืฉืœ ืžืื•ืช ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื, ื—ืœืงื ืขื•ื›ื‘ื• ืœื—ืงื™ืจื” ื•ืืฃ ื”ื•ื‘ืื• ืœื”ืืจื›ืช ืžืขืฆืจ. ื‘ืฉื ื™ ืื™ืจื•ืขื™ื, ืฉื•ื˜ืจื™ื ืจื•ืกืกื• ื‘ื’ื– ืคืœืคืœ ื•ื”ื•ืฉืœื›ื• ืœืขื‘ืจื ื—ืคืฆื™ื. ื‘-23 ื‘ื™ื•ื ื™ 2022, ืกื "ืฆ ื ื™ืกื• ื’ื•ืื˜ื” ื”ื•ืจืฉืข ื‘ืชืงื™ืคืช ืฆืœื ื•ืžืคื’ื™ืŸ ื‘ืžื—ืื•ืช. ื”ืชื ื”ืœื•ืช ื”ืžืฉื˜ืจื” ื”ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ื”ืคื ื• ื‘ื™ืงื•ืจืช ืจื‘ื” ื›ื ื’ื“ ื”ืชื ื”ืœื•ืช ื”ืžืฉื˜ืจื”. ื”ื ื˜ืขื ื• ื›ื™ ื”ื™ื•ืช ืฉืœื ืžื•ื ื” ืžืคื›"ืœ ืœืžืฉื˜ืจื” ืžืฉื ืช 2018, ืืœื ืจืง ืžืžืœื ืžืงื•ื, ื”ืžืฉื˜ืจื” ื”ืคื›ื” ื›ืœื™ ืคื•ืœื™ื˜ื™ ื‘ื™ื“ื™ ื”ืฉืจ ืœื‘ื™ื˜ื—ื•ืŸ ืคื ื™ื ืืžื™ืจ ืื•ื—ื ื”. ืขื•ื“ ื”ื ื˜ืขื ื• ื›ื™ ื”ื ื™ืฆื‘ื™ื, ื•ื‘ื›ืœืœื ื“ื•ืจื•ืŸ ื™ื“ื™ื“ ืžืคืงื“ ืžื—ื•ื– ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื (ืื™ืชื• ื”ืฉืจ ื ืคื’ืฉ ืคืขืžื™ื™ื ืœืคื™ ื™ื•ืžื ื•) ื ื•ืงื˜ื™ื ื‘ื™ื“ ืงืฉื” ื›ื ื’ื“ ื”ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ื›ื“ื™ ืœืจืฆื•ืช ืื•ืชื• ื•ื‘ื›ืš ืœื”ืจื•ื•ื™ื— "ืงืจื“ื™ื˜" ืืฆืœื• ื‘ืžืจื•ืฅ ืœืžืคื›"ืœื•ืช. ื‘ื™ืงื•ืจืช ื–ื• ื–ื›ืชื” ืœื’ื™ื‘ื•ื™ ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ื‘ื›ื™ืจื™ื ื‘ืžืฉื˜ืจืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืœืฉืขื‘ืจ, ื‘ื”ื ื”ืžืคื›"ืœ ืœืฉืขื‘ืจ ืžืฉื” ืงืจืื“ื™ ื•ื ื™ืฆื‘ ื‘ื“ื™ืžื•ืก ืืœื™ืง ืจื•ืŸ. ื‘ืฉื™ื—ื” ืขื ื™ื“ื™ื“, ืื•ื—ื ื” ื‘ื™ืงืฉ ืœืืกื•ืจ ื›ืœื™ืœ ืขืœ ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ืœื™ื“ ืžืขื•ืŸ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื”, ื‘ื ื™ื’ื•ื“ ืœืคืกื™ืงืช ื‘ื’"ืฅ ื•ื›ืŸ ื›ื™ ื‘ืจืฆื•ื ื• "ืœืืชื’ืจ ืืช ื‘ื’"ืฅ" ื‘ื˜ืขื ื” ืฉื”ื•ื ืœื ื™ื•ื“ืข ืœื”ืกื‘ื™ืจ ืœืฆื™ื‘ื•ืจ ืžื“ื•ืข ื—ืœ ืื™ืกื•ืจ ืขืœ ืชืคื™ืœื” ื•ืžื•ืคืขื™ ืชืจื‘ื•ืช, ืืš ืœื ืขืœ ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช. ื‘ืชื’ื•ื‘ื” ืœืื™ืจื•ืข, ื”ื™ื•ืขืฅ ื”ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ ืœืžืžืฉืœื”, ืื‘ื™ื—ื™ ืžื ื“ืœื‘ืœื™ื˜, ืฉืœื— ืžื›ืชื‘ ืœืžืžืœื ืžืงื•ื ืžืคื›"ืœ ื”ืžืฉื˜ืจื”, ืžื•ื˜ื™ ื›ื”ืŸ, ื•ื”ื–ื”ื™ืจื• ืฉืขืœ ื”ืžืฉื˜ืจื” ืœืงื‘ืœ ื”ื—ืœื˜ื•ืช ื‘ืฆื•ืจื” ืขืฆืžืื™ืช ื•ืœืœื ืฉื™ืงื•ืœื™ื ื–ืจื™ื. ื‘-22 ื‘ืื•ื’ื•ืกื˜, ื‘ืขืช ืฆืขื“ื” ืฉื”ืชืงื™ื™ืžื” ืœืœื ืจื™ืฉื™ื•ืŸ ืฉืœ ืงื‘ื•ืฆืช ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ืžื’ืฉืจ ื”ืžื™ืชืจื™ื ืœื›ื™ื•ื•ืŸ ื›ื™ื›ืจ ืคืจื™ื–, ืชื•ืขื“ ืกื’ืŸ ื ื™ืฆื‘ ื ื™ืกื• ื’ื•ืื˜ื” ื“ื•ื—ืฃ ื‘ื—ื•ื–ืงื” ืฉื ื™ ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ื•ื‘ื ื•ืกืฃ ืžื›ื” ื‘ืื—ื“ ืžื”ื ื‘ืคื ื™ื•. ื‘ืฉืœ ื›ืš ื”ื•ื’ืฉ ื ื’ื“ ื’ื•ืื˜ื” ื›ืชื‘ ืื™ืฉื•ื, ืฉืœื•ืฉื” ื—ื•ื“ืฉื™ื ืœืื—ืจ ื”ืžืงืจื”. ื”ืืžืŸ ื–ืื‘ ืื ื’ืœืžืื™ืจ, ื”ืžื•ืคื™ืข ื‘ื“ืžื•ืช ื”ืงื•ืžื™ืงืก "ืฉื•ืฉืง'ื”", ื ืขืฆืจ ื‘ื”ืคื’ื ื” ื‘ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื ื‘ื—ืฉื“ ืœ"ื”ื˜ืจื“ื” ืžื™ื ื™ืช ืฉืœ ื”ืฆื™ื‘ื•ืจ", ืขื‘ื™ืจื” ืฉืœื ืงื™ื™ืžืช ื‘ื—ื•ืง ื”ืขื•ื ืฉื™ืŸ. ื‘ืื—ืช ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ืฉื”ืชืจื—ืฉื” ื‘-15 ื‘ื™ื•ืœื™ ื‘ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื ื”ืชืจื—ืฉื• ืขื™ืžื•ืชื™ื ืงืฉื™ื ื‘ื™ืŸ ื”ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ืœืฉื•ื˜ืจื™ื. ืœืื—ืจ ืฉื”ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ื—ืกืžื• ืืช ื ืชื™ื‘ ื”ืจื›ื‘ืช ื”ืงืœื”, ื”ืฉืœื™ื›ื• ื—ืคืฆื™ื ืœืขื‘ืจ ืฉื•ื˜ืจื™ื, ืชืงืคื• ืขื™ืชื•ื ืื™ื ื•ื”ืฆื™ืชื• ืคื—ื™ื, ื”ื’ื™ื‘ื• ื”ืฉื•ื˜ืจื™ื ื‘ืฉื™ืžื•ืฉ ื‘ื–ืจื ื•ืงื™ ืžื™ื ื›ื ื’ื“ ื”ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ื•ื‘ืžืขืฆืจ ืฉืœ 50 ืžื”ื. ื‘-10 ื‘ืื•ืงื˜ื•ื‘ืจ ื”ืชืจืื™ื™ืŸ ื‘ืขืจื•ืฅ 13 ืกื "ืฆ ื–ื™ื• ืฉื’ื™ื‘, ื•ื”ืฆื™ื’ ืžื™ื“ืข ื›ื‘ื™ื›ื•ืœ ืžืชื•ืš ืคื•ืกื˜ ืฉืœ ืื ืฉื™ "ืงืจื™ื™ื ืžื™ื ื™ืกื˜ืจ" ื‘ื”ื ื ื›ืชื‘ ื›ื™ ื”ื ื›ืžืชื›ื ื ื™ื ืœืคื’ื•ืข ื‘ืฉื•ื˜ืจื™ื ื‘ืขื–ืจืช ื’ื– ืžื“ืžื™ืข ื•ืฉื•ืงืจื™ื. ื–ืžืŸ ืงืฆืจ ืžืื•ื—ืจ ื™ื•ืชืจ, ืœืื—ืจ ืฉื”ืชื‘ืจืจ ื›ื™ ื”ืคื•ืกื˜ ืžื–ื•ื™ืฃ ื•ืœื ื ื›ืชื‘ ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ืื ืฉื™ "ืงืจื™ื™ื ืžื™ื ืกื˜ืจ", ื—ื–ืจ ื‘ื• ืฉื’ื™ื‘ ืžื“ื‘ืจื™ื•. ื‘ืžื”ืœืš ื—ื•ื“ืฉื™ ื”ืงื™ืฅ ืฉืœ ืฉื ืช 2020, ื”ืชืืจื’ื ื” ืงื‘ื•ืฆืช "ืื™ืžื”ื•ืช ืฉื•ืžืจื•ืช", ืฉื”ื—ืœื” ื‘ืื•ืชื” ืขืช ืœื”ืฆื˜ืจืฃ ืœื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื›ืฉื”ืŸ ืœื‘ื•ืฉื•ืช ื‘ืืคื•ื“ ื–ื•ื”ืจ, ื›ืฉืžื˜ืจืŸ ื”ื™ื™ืชื” ืœื”ื’ืŸ ืขืœ ื”ืฆืขื™ืจื™ื, ืžืžื” ืฉื”ืŸ ืจืื• ื›ืืœื™ืžื•ืช ืžืฆื“ ื”ืžืฉื˜ืจื”. ืžื™ืงื•ื ื”ืžื™ืงื•ื ืขื™ืงืจื™ ืฉืœ ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช ื”ื™ื” ื‘ืกืžื•ืš ืœืžืขื•ืŸ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื‘ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื (ื‘ื™ืช ืื’ื™ื•ืŸ). 61 ืžืชื•ืฉื‘ื™ ื”ืฉื›ื•ื ื•ืช ืจื—ื‘ื™ื” ื•ื˜ืœื‘ื™ื”, ืฉื‘ื”ืŸ ืžืชืงื™ื™ืžื•ืช ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื•ืช, ืขืชืจื• ืœื‘ื’"ืฅ ืขืœ ืžื ืช ืฉื™ื•ืจื” ืœื”ืขืชื™ืงืŸ ืœืžืงื•ื ืื—ืจ, ืื• ืœื”ื’ื‘ื™ืœืŸ ื‘ื“ืจืš ืื—ืจืช ื‘ืžืงื•ื, ื‘ื–ืžืŸ ื•ื‘ื›ืžื•ืช ื”ืžืฉืชืชืคื™ื. ื”ืขืชื™ืจื” ื ื“ื—ืชื”. ื‘ืคืกืง ื”ื“ื™ืŸ ืฆื™ื™ืŸ ื”ืฉื•ืคื˜ ืขื•ื–ื™ ืคื•ื’ืœืžืŸ ื›ื™ "ืžืขื•ื ื• ื”ืจืฉืžื™ ืฉืœ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื”ื•ื ืกืžืœ ืฉืœื˜ื•ื ื™ ื•ื”ื•ื ื ื‘ื—ืจ ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ื”ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ืœื ื‘ื›ื“ื™, ืœืฆื•ืจืš ื”ืขื‘ืจืช ืžืกืจื™ื”ื [...] ื‘ื—ื™ืจืช ืžื™ืงื•ืžื” ืฉืœ ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื” ื ื•ืฉืืช ืืžื™ืจื” ื‘ืขืœืช ื—ืฉื™ื‘ื•ืช ืขืฆืžืื™ืช ื•ื ืคืจื“ืช ืขื‘ื•ืจ ื”ืžืคื’ื™ื ื™ื ื•ืืฃ ื”ื™ื ื—ื•ืกื” ืชื—ืช ื”ื”ื’ื ื” ืฉืœ ื—ื™ืจื•ืช ื”ื”ืคื’ื ื” ื•ื”ื‘ื™ื˜ื•ื™" ื’ืœืจื™ื™ืช ืชืžื•ื ื•ืช ืกืžืœื™ืœื™ื ืฉืœ ืืจื’ื•ื ื™ื ื”ืžืฉืชืชืคื™ื ื‘ืžื—ืื” ืงื™ืฉื•ืจื™ื ื—ื™ืฆื•ื ื™ื™ื ื‘ื™ืื•ืจื™ื ื”ืขืจื•ืช ืฉื•ืœื™ื™ื
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Shortcut_index] | [TOKENS: 343]
Contents Wikipedia:Shortcut index Page version status This is an accepted version of this page This is an index of abbreviated redirects and the pages they lead to (mainly in the Wikipedia namespace). For a list of community related shortcuts such as for WikiProjects and Portals, see WP:WPR and WP:PORTCUT, respectively. For a list of shortcuts to Wikipedia talk pages, see WT:WT. For a table of all one-, two-, and three-letter shortcuts, see WP:SCT. For other useful directories and indexes, see Wikipedia:Directories and indexes. How to create a shortcut Shortcuts exist as redirects pointing from the title of the shortcut (for example, Wikipedia:START) to its target (in this case, Wikipedia:Contents). Notice that project shortcuts are usually listed with the prefix "WP" and not "Wikipedia"; this is because when "WP" or "Wp" appears before a colon in a page name, MediaWiki automatically expands it to "Wikipedia". Therefore, there is no need to create shortcuts literally starting with "WP:" as opposed to "Wikipedia:". Prefixes similar to "WP" can be found at Wikipedia:Shortcut#List of prefixes. Shortcut redirects should be tagged with Template:R from shortcut(edit talk links history) so they will auto-categorize in Category:Redirects from shortcuts. Browsing the encyclopedia Portal shortcuts This is an incomplete list of shortcuts. Project shortcuts General information, help, and tutorials Collaboration and community Procedures, policies, and guidelines Miscellany Shortcuts to talk pages Shortcut alphabet Two- and three-character shortcuts See Wikipedia:Shortcut table for a list of all of these in both upper and lower case. See also
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Contents Wikipedia:Editor's index to Wikipedia This index for editors is intended to help find anything not in the encyclopedia itself, including administration pages such as guidelines, policies, essays, informative, discussion and process pages. See about this index for tips on how to use this, and for instructions on maintaining consistency when editing it. See also Reader's index to Wikipedia and Editor's index to Commons. For a smaller listing of "help" and "how to" pages, see the Help directory. For other useful directories and indexes, see Wikipedia:Directories and indexes. A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tatmadaw] | [TOKENS: 10227]
Contents Tatmadaw The Tatmadaw,[b] also known as the Sit-Tat,[c] is the armed forces of Myanmar (formerly Burma). It is administered by the Ministry of Defence and composed of the Myanmar Army, the Myanmar Navy and the Myanmar Air Force. Auxiliary services include the Myanmar Police Force, the Border Guard Forces, the Myanmar Coast Guard, and the People's Militia Units. Since independence in 1948, the Tatmadaw has faced significant ethnic insurgencies, especially in Chin, Kachin, Kayin, Kayah, and Shan states. General Ne Win took control of the country in a 1962 coup d'รฉtat, attempting to build an autarkic society called the Burmese Way to Socialism. Following the violent repression of nationwide protests in 1988, the military agreed to free elections in 1990, but ignored the resulting victory of the National League for Democracy and imprisoned its leader Aung San Suu Kyi. The 1990s also saw the escalation of the conflict involving Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine State due to RSO attacks on the Tatmadaw forces, which saw the Rohingya minority facing oppression and, starting in 2017, genocide. In 2008, the Tatmadaw again rewrote Myanmar's constitution, installing the pro-junta Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in the 2010 elections, which were boycotted by most opposition groups. Political reforms over the next half-decade culminated in a sweeping NLD victory in the 2015 election; after the USDP lost another election in 2020, the Tatmadaw annulled the election and deposed the civilian government. The Tatmadaw has been widely accused by international organizations of human rights violation and crimes against humanity; including ethnic cleansing, political repression, torture, sexual assault, war crimes, extrajudicial punishments (including summary executions) and massacre of civilians involved in peaceful political demonstrations. The Tatmadaw has long operated as a state within a state. According to the Constitution of Myanmar, the Tatmadaw is led by the commander-in-chief of Defence Services. Some actions of the Tatmadaw require the approval of the National Defence and Security Council, an eleven-member national security council responsible for security and defence affairs in Myanmar. The president of Myanmar has no command role over the Tatmadaw, though he may work with the NDSC in authorizing military action. Name The name "Tatmadaw" literally means "Royal Armed Forces" in the Burmese language. Since Burma has not been a monarchy since the era prior to British colonial rule, the word "royal" in this usage is understood to mean "glorious". This name has become controversial in Myanmar, especially since 2021, as many people in Myanmar have opposed the military during the country's renewed civil war and object to the usage of the complimentary term "royal" to describe it. As a result, many Burmese people have taken to using an alternative name "Sit-Tat", which simply means "military" with no positive or negative connotations. History The Royal Armed Forces was the armed forces of the Burmese monarchy from the 9th to 19th centuries. It refers to the military forces of the Pagan dynasty, the Ava Kingdom, the Toungoo dynasty and the Konbaung dynasty in chronological order. The army was one of the major armed forces of Southeast Asia until it was defeated by the British over a six-decade span in the 19th century. The army was organised into a small standing army of a few thousands, which defended the capital and the palace, and a much larger conscription-based wartime army. Conscription was based on the ahmudan system, which required local chiefs to supply their predetermined quota of men from their jurisdiction on the basis of population in times of war. The wartime army also consisted of elephantry, cavalry, artillery and naval units. Firearms, first introduced from China in the late 14th century, became integrated into strategy only gradually over many centuries. The first special musket and artillery units, equipped with Portuguese matchlocks and cannon, were formed in the 16th century. Outside the special firearm units, there was no formal training program for the regular conscripts, who were expected to have a basic knowledge of self-defence, and how to operate the musket on their own. As the technological gap between European powers widened in the 18th century, the army was dependent on Europeans' willingness to sell more sophisticated weaponry. While the army had held its own against the armies of the kingdom's neighbours, its performance against more technologically advanced European armies deteriorated over time. While it defeated the Portuguese and French intrusions in the 17th and 18th centuries respectively, the army proved unable to match the military strength of the British Empire in the 19th century, losing the First, Second and Third Anglo-Burmese Wars. On 1 January 1886, the Royal Burmese Army was formally disbanded by the British government. Under British rule, the colonial government in Burma abstained from recruiting Burmese soldiers into the East India Company forces (and later the British Indian Army), instead relying on pre-existing Indian sepoys and Nepalese Gurkhas to garrison the nascent colony. Due to mistrust of the Burmese population, the colonial government maintained this ban for decades, instead looking to the indigenous Karens, Kachins and Chins to form new military units in the colony. In 1937, the colonial government overturned the ban, and Burmese troops started to enlist in small numbers in the British Indian Army. At the beginning of World War I, the only Burmese military regiment in the British Indian Army, the 70th Burma Rifles, consisted of three battalions, made up of Karens, Kachins and Chins. During the conflict, the demands of war led to the colonial government relaxing the ban, raising a Burmese battalion in the 70th Burma Rifles, a Burmese company in the 85th Burma Rifles, and seven Burmese Mechanical Transport companies. In addition, three companies (combat units) of Burma Sappers and Miners, made up of mostly Burmese, and a company of Labour Corps, made up of Chins and Burmese, were also raised. All these units began their overseas assignment in 1917. The 70th Burma Rifles served in Egypt for garrison duties while the Burmese Labour Corps served in France. One company of Burma Sappers and Miners distinguished themselves in Mesopotamia at the crossing the Tigris. After World War I, the colonial government stopped recruiting Burmese soldiers, and discharged all but one Burmese companies, which had been abolished by 1925. The last Burmese company of Burma Sappers and Miners too was disbanded in 1929. Instead, Indian soldiers and other ethnic minorities were used as the primary colonial force in Burma, which was used to suppress ethnic Burmese rebellions such as the one led by Saya San from 1930 to 1931. On 1 April 1937, Burma was made a separate colony, and Burmese were now eligible to join the army. But few Burmese bothered to join. Before World War II began, the British Burma Army consisted of Karen (27.8%), Chin (22.6%), Kachin (22.9%), and Burmese 12.3%, without counting their British officer corps. Compton Mackenzie wrote in Eastern Epic that after the separation of India and Burma: These military forces were expanded between 1939 and the end of 1941, but the additional strength was impaired by defects inherent in the organisation as it stood before separation. The small and independent military command now set up had been carved out of the experienced Indian organisation with its comparatively large resources; adequate though this may have been for peacetime conditions it was quite inadequate to deal with the expansion im- posed by a great war. The officers were drawn from the British service and the Indian Army with little hope of reinforcement in time of war except for the untrained resources of Burma. Before the outbreak of war with Japan and for some time afterwards Burma Army Headquarters was simultaneously a War Office, a G.H.Q,., a Corps H.Q. and an [Lines of Communication] Area H.Q. Matters of detail could have been worked out more quickly and efficiently by G.H.Q,. in India if the Army in Burma had been placed for command and general administration under [it]. As it was, up to November 1940 Burma was directly under the War Office at home; it was then placed under Far Eastern Command at Singapore. Neither arrangement even bordered upon common sense, but although three times in 1940 and 1941 successive commanders-in-chief urged the authorities in the United Kingdom to place Burma [under India], it was not done until December 15th by which time it was too late." In December 1941, a group of Burmese independence activists founded the Burma Independence Army (BIA) with Japanese help. The Burma Independence Army led by Aung San (the father of Aung San Suu Kyi) fought in the Burma Campaign on the side of the Imperial Japanese Army. Thousands of young men joined its ranksโ€”reliable estimates range from 15,000 to 23,000. The great majority of the recruits were Burmese, with little ethnic minority representation. Many of the fresh recruits lacked discipline. At Myaungmya in the Irrawaddy Delta, an ethnic war broke out between Burmese BIA men and Karens, with both sides responsible for massacres. The Burma Independence Army was soon replaced with the Burma Defence Army, founded on 26 August 1942 with three thousand BIA veterans. The army became the Burma National Army with General Ne Win as its commander on 1 August 1943 when Burma achieved nominal independence. In late 1944, it had a strength of approximately 15,000. Disillusioned by the Japanese occupation, the Burma National Army switched sides and joined the allied forces on 27 March 1945. At the time of Myanmar's independence in 1948, the Tatmadaw was weak, small and disunited. Cracks appeared along the lines of ethnic background, political affiliation, organisational origin and different services. The most serious problem was the tension between Karen Officers, coming from the British Burma Army and Burmese officers, coming from the Patriotic Burmese Force (PBF). In accordance with the agreement reached at the Kandy Conference in September 1945, the Tatmadaw was reorganised by incorporating the British Burma Army and the Patriotic Burmese Force. The officer corps shared by ex-PBF officers and officers from the British Burma Army and Army of Burma Reserve Organisation (ABRO). The colonial government also decided to form what were known as "Class Battalions" based on ethnicity. There were a total of 15 rifle battalions at the time of independence and four of them were made up of former members of PBF. None of the influential positions within the War Office and commands were manned with former PBF Officers. All services including military engineers, supply and transport, ordnance and medical services, Navy and Air Force were commanded by former Officers from ABRO. The War Office was officially opened on 8 May 1948 under the Ministry of Defence and managed by a War Office Council chaired by the Minister of Defence. At the head of War Office was Chief of Staff, Vice Chief of Staff, Chief of Naval Staff, Chief of Air Staff, Adjutant General and Quartermaster General. Vice Chief of Staff, who was also Chief of Army Staff and the head of General Staff Office. VCS oversee General Staff matters and there were three branch offices: GS-1 Operation and Training, GS-2 Staff Duty and Planning; GS-3 Intelligence. Signal Corps and Field Engineering Corps are also under the command of General Staff Office. According to the war establishment adopted on 14 April 1948, Chief of Staff was under the War Office with the rank of major general. It was subsequently upgraded to a lieutenant general. Vice Chief of Staff was a brigadier general. The Chief of Staff was staffed with GSO-I with the rank of lieutenant colonel, three GSO-II with the rank of major, four GSO-III with the rank of captain for operation, training, planning and intelligence, and one Intelligence Officer (IO). The Chief of Staff office also had one GSO-II and one GSO-III for field engineering, and the Chief Signal Officer and a GSO-II for signal. Directorate of Signal and Directorate Field Engineering are also under General Staff Office. Under Adjutant General Office were Judge Advocate General, Military Secretary, and Vice Adjutant General. The Adjutant General (AG) was a brigadier general whereas the Judge Advocate General (JAG), Military Secretary (MS) and Vice Adjutant General (VAG) were colonels. VAG handles adjutant staff matters and there were also three branch offices; AG-1 planning, recruitment and transfer; AG-2 discipline, moral, welfare, and education; AG-3 salary, pension, and other financial matters. The Medical Corps and the Provost Marshal Office were under the Adjutant General Office. The Quarter Master General office also had three branch offices: QG-1 planning, procurement, and budget; QG-2 maintenance, construction, and cantonment; and QG-3 transportation. Under the QMG office were Garrison Engineering Corps, Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Corps, Military Ordnance Corps, and the Supply and Transport Corps. Both AG and QMG office similar structure to the General Staff Office, but they only had three ASO-III and three QSO-III respectively. The Navy and Air Force were separate services under the War office but under the chief of staff. As per War Office order No. (9) 1955 on 28 September 1955, the Chief of Staff became the Commander in Chief, the Chief of Army Staff became the Vice Chief of Staff (Army), the Chief of Naval Staff become Vice Chief of Staff (Navy) and the Chief of Air Staff became the Vice Chief of Staff (Air). On 1 January 1956, the War Office was officially renamed as the Ministry of Defence. General Ne Win became the first Chief of Staff of the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces) to command all three services โ€“ Army, Navy and Air Force โ€“ under a single unified command for the first time. Brigadier General Aung Gyi was given the post of Vice Chief of Staff (Army). Brigadier General D. A Blake became commander of South Burma Subdistrict Command (SBSD) and Brigadier General Kyaw Zaw, a member of the Thirty Comrades, became Commander of North Burma Subdistrict Command (NBSD). Due to deteroriating political situations in 1957, the then Prime Minister of Burma, U Nu invited General Ne Win to form a "Caretaker Government" and handed over power on 28 October 1958. Under the stewardship of the Military Caretaker Government, parliamentary elections were held in February 1960. Several high-ranking and senior officers were dismissed due to their involvement and supporting various political parties. The elections of 1960 had put U Nu back as the Prime Minister and Pyidaungsu Party (Union Party) led civilian government resume control of the country. On 2 March 1962, the then Chief of Staff of Armed Forces, General Ne Win staged a coup d'รฉtat and formed the "Union Revolutionary Council". Around midnight the troops began to move into Yangon to take up strategic position. Prime Minister U Nu and his cabinet ministers were taken into protective custody. At 8:50 am, General Ne Win announced the coup over the radio. He said "I have to inform you, citizens of the Union that Armed Forces have taken over the responsibility and the task of keeping the country's safety, owing to the greatly deteriorating conditions of the Union." The country would be ruled by the military for the next 12 years. The Burma Socialist Programme Party became the sole political party and the majority of its full members were military. Government servants underwent military training and the Military Intelligence Service functioned as the secret police of the state. At the height of the Four Eights Uprising against the socialist government, Former General Ne Win, who at the time was chairman of the ruling Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), issued a warning against potential protestors during a televised speech. He stated that if the "disturbances" continued the "Army would have to be called and I would like to make it clear that if the Army shoots, it has no tradition of shooting into the Air, it would shoot straight to hit". Subsequently, the 22 Light Infantry Division, 33 Light Infantry Division and the 44 Light Infantry Division were redeployed to Yangon from front line fighting against ethnic insurgents in the Karen states. Battalions from three Light Infantry Divisions, augmented by infantry battalions under Yangon Regional Military Command and supporting units from Directorate of Artillery and Armour Corps were deployed during the suppression of protests in and around the then capital city of Yangon. Initially, these troops were deployed in support of the then People's Police Force (now known as Myanmar Police Force) security battalions and to patrol the streets of the capital and to guard government offices and building. However, at midnight of 8 August 1988 troops from 22 Light Infantry Division guarding Yangon City Hall opened fire on unarmed protesters as the crackdown against the protests began. The armed forces under General Saw Maung formed a State Law and Order Restoration Council, repealed the constitution and declared martial law on 18 September 1988. By late September the military had complete control of the country. In 2008, the current constitution was released by the military government for a public referendum. The SPDC claimed that the referendum was a success, with an approval rate of 93.82%; however, there has been widespread criticism of the veracity of these claims, partially because Cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar a few days before the referendum, and the government did not allow postponement of the referendum. Under the 2008 Constitution, the Tatmadaw is guaranteed 25% of the seats in the parliament, making it difficult to pass meaningful reforms that the Tatmadaw does not approve of. In 2010, conscription legislation was passed that compelled able-bodied men and women between 18โ€“45 and 18โ€“35 respectively to serve up to three years in the military, or face significant jail sentences. Following Myanmar's political reforms, Myanmar has made substantial shifts in its relations with major powers China, Russia and the United States. In 2014, Lieutenant-General Anthony Crutchfield, the deputy commander of the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), was invited to address his counterparts at the Myanmar National Defence College in Naypyidaw, which trains colonels and other high-ranking military officers. In May 2016, Myanmar's Union Parliament approved a military cooperation agreement with Russia following a proposal by Deputy Minister of Defence. In June 2016, Myanmar and Russia signed a defence cooperation agreement. The agreement will envisage exchanging information on international security issues, including the fight against terrorism, cooperation in the cultural sphere and leisure of servicemen and their families, along with exchanging experience in peacekeeping activities. Moreover, in response to Naypyidaw's post-2011 political and economic reforms, Australia re-established a โ€˜normalโ€™ bilateral relationship with Myanmar to support democratisation and reform. In June 2016, the Australian Federal Police signed a new Memorandum of Understanding with its Myanmar counterparts aimed at enhancing transnational crime cooperation and intelligence sharing. In December 2017, the US imposed sanctions on General Maung Maung Soe, a general of Western Myanmar Command who oversaw the military's crackdown in Rakhine State. The Tatmadaw had sentenced seven soldiers to 10-year prison terms for killing 10 Rohingya men in Rakhine in September 2017. A 2019 UN report revealed the degree to which the country's military uses its own businesses, foreign companies and arms deals to support, away from the public eye, a โ€œbrutal operationsโ€ against ethnic groups that constitute โ€œserious crimes under international lawโ€, bypassing civilian oversight and evading accountability. In June 2020, the Tatmadaw accused China for arming rebel groups in the country's frontier areas. In February 2021, the Tatmadaw detained Aung San Suu Kyi and other high-ranking politicians after a contested election with disputed results. A state of emergency had been declared for one year. The State Administration Council was established by Min Aung Hlaing on 2 February 2021 as the current government in power. On 1 August 2021, the State Administration Council was re-formed as a caretaker government, which appointed Min Aung Hlaing as Prime Minister. The same day, Min Aung Hlaing announced that the country's state of emergency had been extended by an additional two years. As the Myanmar Civil War has progressed, the Tatmadaw has become more reliant on military aid from Russia and China. As of 2023, analysts suggested that the Tatmadaw has sustained significant losses due to both combat against the pro-democracy insurgents as well as desertions within the rank and file soldiers. The United States Institute for Peace estimates that the Tatamadaw has sustained at least 13,000 combat losses and 8,000 losses due to desertion. The Tatmadaw itself has acknowledged that it does not have control over 132 of Myanmarโ€™s 330 townships, or 42 percent of the country's towns. On 10 February 2024, the State Administration Council activated conscription under the 2010 SPDC People's Military Service Law in response to anti-junta ethnic militias and pro-democracy rebels capturing massive swathes of territory. Min Aung Hlaing stated to officials and cadets in Pyin Oo Lwin that, "[The Tatmadaw will] continue to play a leading role in politics until ethnic armed groups no longer exist." Budget According to an analysis of budgetary data between FY 2011โ€“12 and 2018โ€“19, approximately 13% to 14% of the national budget is devoted to the Burmese military. However, the military budget remains opaque and subject to limited civilian scrutiny, and a 2011 Special Funds Law has enabled the Burmese military to circumvent parliamentary oversight to access supplemental funding. Defence budgets were publicly shared for the first time in 2015, and in recent years, parliamentary lawmakers have demanded greater transparency in military spending. The military also generates substantial revenue through 2 conglomerates, the Myanma Economic Holdings Limited (MEHL) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC). Revenues generated from these business interests have strengthened the Burmese military's autonomy from civilian oversight, and have contributed to the military's financial operations in "a wide array of international human rights and humanitarian law violations." Revenues from MEHL and MEC are kept "off-book," enabling the military to autonomously finance military affairs with limited civilian oversight. Between 1990 and 2020, Myanmar's military officers received US$18 billion in dividends from MEHL, whose entire board is made up of senior military officials. In the FY 2019โ€“20 national budget, the military was allocated 3,385 billion kyats (approximately US$2.4 billion). In May 2020, the Burmese parliament reduced the military's supplementary budgetary request by $7.55 million. On 28 October 2014, the Minister for Defence Wai Lwin revealed at a Parliament session that 46.2% of the budget is spent on personnel cost, 32.89% on operation and procurement, 14.49% on construction related projects and 2.76% on health and education. Doctrine The initial development of Burmese military doctrine post-independence was developed in the early 1950s to cope with external threats from more powerful enemies with a strategy of Strategic Denial under conventional warfare. The perception of threats to state security was more external than internal threats. The internal threat to state security was managed through the use of a mixture of force and political persuasion. Lieutenant Colonel Maung Maung drew up defence doctrine based on conventional warfare concepts, with large infantry divisions, armoured brigades, tanks and motorised war with mass mobilisation for the war effort being the important element of the doctrine. The objective was to contain the offensive of the invading forces at the border for at least three months, while waiting for the arrival of international forces, similar to the police action by international intervention forces under the directive of United Nations during the war on Korean peninsula. However, the conventional strategy under the concept of total war was undermined by the lack of appropriate command and control system, proper logistical support structure, sound economic bases and efficient civil defence organisations. At the beginning of the 1950s, while the Tatmadaw was able to reassert its control over most part of the country, Kuomintang (KMT) troops under General Li Mi, with support from the United States, invaded Burma and used the country's frontier as a springboard for attack against China, which in turn became the external threat to state security and sovereignty of Burma. The first phase of the doctrine was tested for the first time in Operation "Naga Naing" in February 1953 against invading KMT forces. The doctrine did not take into account logistic and political support for KMT from the United States and as a result it failed to deliver its objectives and ended in a humiliating defeat for the Tatmadaw. The Tatmadaw leadership then argued that the excessive media coverage was partly to blame for the failure of Operation "Naga Naing". For example, Brigadier General Maung Maung pointed out that newspapers, such as the "Nation", carried reports detailing the training and troops positioning, even went as far to the name and social background of the commanders who are leading the operation thus losing the element of surprise. Colonel Saw Myint, who was second in command for the operation, also complained about the long lines of communications and the excessive pressure imposed upon the units for public relations activities to prove that the support of the people was behind the operation. Despite failure, the Tatmadaw continued to rely on this doctrine until the mid-1960s. The doctrine was under constant review and modifications throughout KMT invasion and gained success in anti-KMT operations in the mid and late 1950s. However, this strategy became increasingly irrelevant and unsuitable in the late 1950s as the insurgents and KMT changed their positional warfare strategy to hit and run guerrilla warfare. At the 1958 the Tatmadaw's annual Commanding Officers (COs) conference, Colonel Kyi Win submitted a report outlining the requirement for new military doctrine and strategy. He stated that the 'Tatmadaw did not have a clear strategy to cope with insurgents', even though most of Tatmadaw's commanders were guerrilla fighters during the anti-British and anti-Japanese campaigns during the Second World War, they had very little knowledge of anti-guerrilla or counterinsurgency warfare. Based upon Colonel Kyi Win's report, the Tatmadaw began developing an appropriate military doctrine and strategy to meet the requirements of counterinsurgency warfare. This second phase of the doctrine was to suppress insurgency with people's war and the perception of threats to state security was more of internal threats. During this phase, external linkage of internal problems and direct external threats were minimised by the foreign policy based on isolation. It was common view of the commanders that unless insurgency was suppressed, foreign interference would be highly probable, therefore counterinsurgency became the core of the new military doctrine and strategy. Beginning in 1961, the Directorate of Military Training took charge the research for national defence planning, military doctrine and strategy for both internal and external threats. This included reviews of international and domestic political situations, studies of the potential sources of conflicts, collection of information for strategic planning and defining the possible routes of foreign invasion. In 1962, as part of new military doctrine planning, principles of anti-guerrilla warfare were outlined and counterinsurgency-training courses were delivered at the training schools. The new doctrine laid out three potential enemies and they are internal insurgents, historical enemies with roughly an equal strength (i.e. Thailand), and enemies with greater strength. It states that in suppressing insurgencies, the Tatmadaw must be trained to conduct long-range penetration with a tactic of continuous search and destroy. Reconnaissance, Ambush and all weather day and night offensive and attack capabilities along with winning the hearts and minds of people are important parts of anti-guerrilla warfare. For countering an historical enemy with equal strength, the Tatmadaw should fight a conventional warfare under total war strategy, without giving up an inch of its territory to the enemy. For powerful enemy and foreign invaders, the Tatmadaw should engage in total people's war, with a special focus on guerrilla strategy. To prepare for the transition to the new doctrine, Brigadier General San Yu, the then Vice Chief of Staff (Army), sent a delegation led by Lieutenant Colonel Thura Tun Tin was sent to Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and East Germany in July 1964 to study organisation structure, armaments, training, territorial organisation and strategy of people's militias. A research team was also formed at General Staff Office within the War Office to study defence capabilities and militia formations of neighbouring countries. The new doctrine of total people's war, and the strategy of anti-guerrilla warfare for counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare for foreign invasion, were designed to be appropriate for Burma. The doctrine flowed from the country's independent and active foreign policy, total people's defence policy, the nature of perceived threats, its geography and the regional environment, the size of its population in comparison with those of its neighbours, the relatively underdeveloped nature of its economy and its historical and political experiences. The doctrine was based upon 'three totalities': population, time and space (du-thone-du) and 'four strengths': manpower, material, time and morale (Panama-lay-yat). The doctrine did not develop concepts of strategic denial or counter-offensive capabilities. It relied almost totally on irregular low-intensity warfare, such as its guerrilla strategy to counter any form of foreign invasion. The overall counterinsurgency strategy included not only elimination of insurgents and their support bases with the 'four cuts' strategy, but also the building and designation of 'white area' and 'black area' as well. In April 1968, the Tatmadaw introduced special warfare training programmes at "Command Training Centres" at various regional commands. Anti-Guerrilla warfare tactics were taught at combat forces schools and other training establishments with special emphasis on ambush and counter-ambush, counterinsurgency weapons and tactics, individual battle initiative for tactical independence, commando tactics, and reconnaissance. Battalion size operations were also practised in the Southwest Regional Military Command area. The new military doctrine was formally endorsed and adopted at the first party congress of the BSPP in 1971. BSPP laid down directives for "complete annihilation of the insurgents as one of the tasks for national defence and state security" and called for "liquidation of insurgents through the strength of the working people as the immediate objective". This doctrine ensures the role of Tatmadaw at the heart of national policy making. Throughout the BSPP era, the total people's war doctrine was solely applied in counterinsurgency operations, since Burma did not face any direct foreign invasion throughout the period. In 1985, the then Lieutenant General Saw Maung, Vice-Chief of Staff of Tatmadaw reminded his commanders during his speech at the Command and General Staff College: In Myanmar, out of nearly 35 million people, the combined armed forces (army, navy and air force) are about two hundred thousand. In terms of percentage, that is about 0.01%. It is simply impossible to defend a country the size of ours with only this handful of troops... therefore, what we have to do in the case of foreign invasion is to mobilise people in accordance with the "total people's war" doctrine. To defend our country from aggressors, the entire population must be involved in the war effort as the support of people dictate the outcome of the war. The third phase of doctrinal development of the Myanmar Armed Forces came after the military take over and formation of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in September 1988 as part of the armed forces modernisation programme. The development was the reflection of sensitivity towards direct foreign invasion or invasion by proxy state during the turbulent years of the late 1980s and early 1990s, for example: the unauthorised presence of a US aircraft carrier Battle Group in Myanmar's territorial waters during the 1988 political uprising as evidence of an infringement of Myanmar's sovereignty. Also, the Tatmadaw leadership was concerned that foreign powers might arm the insurgents on the border to exploit the political situation and tensions in the country. This new threat perception, previously insignificant under the nation's isolationist foreign policy, led Tatmadaw leaders to review the defence capability and doctrine of the Tatmadaw. The third phase was to face the lower level external threats with a strategy of strategic denial under total people's defence concept. Current military leadership has successfully dealt with 17 major insurgent groups, whose 'return to legal fold' in the past decade has remarkably decreased the internal threats to state security, at least for the short and medium terms, even though threat perception of the possibility of external linkage to internal problems, perceived as being motivated by the continuing human rights violations, religious suppression and ethnic cleansing, remains high. Within the policy, the role of the Tatmadaw was defined as a `modern, strong and highly capable fighting force'. Since the day of independence, the Tatmadaw has been involved in restoring and maintaining internal security and suppressing insurgency. It was with this background that the Tatmadaw's "multifaceted" defence policy was formulated and its military doctrine and strategy could be interpreted as defence-in-depth. It was influenced by a number of factors such as history, geography, culture, economy and sense of threats. The Tatmadaw has developed an 'active defence' strategy based on guerrilla warfare with limited conventional military capabilities, designed to cope with low intensity conflicts from external and internal foes, which threatens the security of the state. This strategy, revealed in joint services exercises, is built on a system of total people's defence, where the armed forces provide the first line of defence and the training and leadership of the nation in the matter of national defence. It is designed to deter potential aggressors by the knowledge that defeat of the Tatmadaw's regular forces in conventional warfare would be followed by persistent guerrilla warfare in the occupied areas by people militias and dispersed regular troops which would eventually wear down the invading forces, both physically and psychologically, and leave it vulnerable to a counter-offensive. If the conventional strategy of strategic denial fails, then the Tatmadaw and its auxiliary forces will follow Mao's strategic concepts of 'strategic defensive', 'strategic stalemate' and 'strategic offensive'. Over the past decade, through a series of modernisation programs, the Tatmadaw has developed and invested in better Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence system; real-time intelligence; formidable air defence system; and early warning systems for its 'strategic denial' and 'total people's defence' doctrine. Organisational, command and control structure Overall command of the Tatmadaw (armed forces) rested with the country's highest-ranking military officer, a general, who acted concurrently as Defence Minister and Chief of Staff of Defence Services. He thus exercised supreme operational control over all three services, under the direction of the President, State Council and Council of Ministers. There was also a National Security Council which acted in advisory capacity. The Defence Minister cum Chief-of-Staff of Defence Services exercised day-to-day control of the armed forces and assisted by three Vice-Chiefs of Staff, one each for the army, navy and air force. These officers also acted as Deputy Ministers of Defence and commanders of their respective Services. They were all based at Ministry of Defence (Kakweyay Wungyi Htana) in Rangoon/Yangon. It served as a government ministry as well as joint military operations headquarters. The Joint Staff within the Ministry of Defence consisted of three major branches, one each for Army, Navy and Air Force, along with a number of independent departments. The Army Office had three major departments; the General (G) Staff to oversee operations, the Adjutant General's (A) Staff administration and the Quartermaster General's (Q) Staff to handle logistics. The General Staff consisted two Bureaus of Special Operations (BSO), which were created in April 1978 and June 1979 respectively. These BSO are similar to "Army Groups" in Western armies, high level staff units formed to manage different theatres of military operations. They were responsible for the overall direction and co-ordination of the Regional Military Commands (RMC) with BSO-1 covering Northern Command (NC), North Eastern Command (NEC), North Western Command (NWC), Western Command (WC) and Eastern Command (EC). BSO-2 responsible for South Eastern Command (SEC), South Western Command (SWC), Western Command (WC) and Central Command (CC). The Army's elite mobile Light Infantry Divisions (LID) were managed separately under a staff colonel. Under G Staff, there were also a number of directorates which corresponded to the Army's functional corps, such as Intelligence, Signals, Training, Armour and Artillery. The A Staff was responsible for the Adjutant General, Directorate of Medical Services and the Provost Marshal's Office. The Q Staff included the Directorates of Supply and Transport, Ordnance Services, Electrical and Mechanical Engineering, and Military Engineers. The Navy and Air Force Offices within the Ministry were headed by the Vice Chiefs of Staff for those Services. Each was supported by a staff officer at full colonel level. All these officers were responsible for the overall management of the various naval and air bases around the country, and the broader administrative functions such as recruitment and training. Operational Command in the field was exercised through a framework of Regional Military Commands (RMC), the boundaries of which corresponded with the country's Seven States and Seven Divisions. The Regional Military Commanders, all senior army officers, usually of Brigadier General rank, were responsible for the conduct of military operations in their respective RMC areas. Depending on the size of RMC and its operational requirements, Regional Military Commanders have at their disposal 10 or more infantry battalions (Kha La Ya). The Tatmadaw's organisational and command structure dramatically changed after the military coup in 1988. In 1990, the country's most senior army officer become a Senior general (equivalent to Field marshal rank in Western armies) and held the positions of chairman of State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), Prime Minister and Defence Minister, as well as being appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Services. He thus exercised both political and operational control over the entire country and armed forces. From 1989, each service has had its own Commander-in-Chief and Chief of Staff. The Army Commander in Chief is now elevated to full general (Bo gyoke Kyii) rank and also acted as deputy commander in Chief of the Defence Services. The C-in-C of the Air Force and Navy hold the equivalent of lieutenant general rank, while all three Service Chiefs of Staff were raised to major general level. Chiefs of Bureau of Special Operations (BSO), the heads of Q and A Staffs and the Director of Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI) were also elevated to lieutenant general rank. The reorganisation of the armed forces after 1988 resulted in the upgrading by two ranks of most of the senior positions. A new command structure was introduced at the Ministry of Defence level in 2002. The most important position created is the Joint Chief of Staff (Army, Navy, Air Force) that commands commanders-in-chief of the Navy and the Air Force. The Office of Strategic Studies (OSS, or Sit Maha Byuha Leilaryay Htana) was formed around 1994 and charged with formulating defence policies, and planning and doctrine of the Tatmadaw. The OSS was commanded by Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, who is also the Director of Defence Service Intelligence (DDSI). Regional Military Commands (RMC) and Light Infantry Divisions (LID) were also reorganised, and LIDs are now directly answerable to Commander in Chief of the Army. A number of new subordinate command headquarters were formed in response to the growth and reorganisation of the Army. These include Regional Operation Commands (ROC, or Da Ka Sa), which are subordinate to RMCs, and Military Operations Commands (MOC, or Sa Ka Kha), which are equivalent to Western infantry divisions. The Chief of Staff (Army) retained control of the Directorates of Signals, Directorate of Armour Corps, Directorate of Artillery Corps, Defence Industries, Security Printing, Public Relations and Psychological Warfare, and Military Engineering (field section), People's Militias and Border Troops, Directorate of Defence Services Computers (DDSC), the Defence Services Museum and Historical Research Institute. Under the Adjutant General Office, there are three directorates: Medical Services, Resettlement, and Provost Martial. Under the Quartermaster General Office are the directorates of Military Engineering (garrison section), Supply and Transport, Ordnance Services, and Electricaland Mechanical Engineering. Other independent department within the Ministry of Defence are Judge Advocate General, Inspector General, Military Appointment General, Directorate of Procurement, Record Office, Central Military Accounting, and Camp Commandant. All RMC Commander positions were raised to the level of major general and also serve as appointed chairmen of the state- and division-level Law and Order Restoration Committees. They were formally responsible for both military and civil administrative functions for their command areas. Also, three additional regional military commands were created. In early 1990, a new RMC was formed in Burma's north west, facing India. In 1996, the Eastern Command in Shan State was split into two RMCs, and South Eastern Command was divided to create a new RMC in country's far south coastal regions. In 1997, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) was abolished and the military government created the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The council includes all senior military officers and commanders of the RMCs. A new Ministry of Military Affairs was established and headed by a lieutenant general. This new ministry was abolished after its minister Lieutenant General Tin Hla was sacked in 2001. On 18 October 2004, the OSS and DDSI were abolished during the purge of General Khin Nyunt and military intelligence units. OSS ordered 4 regiment to raid in DDSI Headquarter in Yangon. At the same time, all of the MIU in the whole country were raided and arrested by OSS corps. Nearly two thirds of MIU officers were detained for years. A new military intelligence unit called Military Affairs Security (MAS) was formed to take over the functions of the DDSI, but MAS units were much fewer than DDSI's and MAS was under control by local Division commander. In early 2006, a new Regional Military Command (RMC) was created at the newly formed administrative capital, Naypyidaw. Service branches The Myanmar Army has always been by far the largest service and has always received the lion's share of Burma's defence budget. It has played the most prominent part in Burma's struggle against the 40 or more insurgent groups since 1948 and acquired a reputation as a tough and resourceful military force. In 1981, it was described as "probably the best army in Southeast Asia, apart from Vietnam's". This judgment was echoed in 1983, when another observer noted that "Myanmar's infantry is generally rated as one of the toughest, most combat seasoned in Southeast Asia". Personnel: 23,000 The Myanmar Air Force was formed on 16 January 1947, while Myanmar (also known as Burma) was under British colonial rule. By 1948, the new air force fleet included 40 Airspeed Oxfords, 16 de Havilland Tiger Moths, 4 Austers and 3 Supermarine Spitfires transferred from Royal Air Force with a few hundred personnel. The primary mission of Myanmar Air Force since its inception has been to provide transport, logistical, and close air support to Myanmar Army in counter-insurgency operations. The Myanmar Navy is the naval branch of the armed forces of Burma with estimated 19,000 men and women. The Myanmar Navy was formed in 1940 and, although very small, played an active part in Allied operations against the Japanese during the Second World War. The Myanmar Navy currently operates more than 122 vessels. Before 1988, the Myanmar Navy was small and its role in the many counterinsurgency operations was much less conspicuous than those of the army and air force. Yet the navy has always been, and remains, an important factor in Burma's security and it was dramatically expanded in recent years to a provide blue water capability and external threat defence role in Burma's territorial waters. Its personnel number 19,000 (including two naval infantry battalions). The Myanmar Police Force, formally known as The People's Police Force (Burmese: แ€•แ€ผแ€Šแ€บแ€žแ€ฐแ€ทแ€›แ€ฒแ€แ€•แ€บแ€–แ€ฝแ€ฒแ€ท, MLCTS: Pyi Thu Yae Tup Pwe), was established in 1964 as independent department under the Ministry of Home Affairs. It was reorganised on 1 October 1995 and informally become part of the Tatmadaw. Current director general of Myanmar Police Force is Brigadier General Kyaw Kyaw Tun with its headquarters at Naypyidaw. Its command structure is based on established civil jurisdictions. Each of Burma's seven states and seven divisions has their own Police Forces with headquarters in the respective capital cities. Israel and Australia often provide specialists to enhance the training of Burma's police. Personnel: 72,000 (including 4,500 Combat/SWAT Police) Rank structure Air Defence The Myanmar Air Defense Forces (แ€œแ€ฑแ€€แ€ผแ€ฑแ€ฌแ€„แ€บแ€ธแ€›แ€”แ€บแ€€แ€ฌแ€€แ€ฝแ€šแ€บแ€›แ€ฑแ€ธแ€แ€•แ€บแ€–แ€ฝแ€ฒแ€ท) is one of the major branches of the Tatmadaw. It was established as the Air Defence Command in 1997 but was not fully operational until late 1999. It was renamed the Bureau of Air Defence in the early 2000s. In early 2000s, the Tatmadaw established the Myanmar Integrated Air Defence System (MIADS) (แ€™แ€ผแ€”แ€บแ€™แ€ฌแ€ทแ€กแ€œแ€ฝแ€พแ€ฌแ€…แ€ฏแ€ถแ€•แ€ฑแ€ซแ€„แ€บแ€ธแ€…แ€•แ€บแ€œแ€ฑแ€€แ€ผแ€ฑแ€ฌแ€„แ€บแ€ธแ€›แ€”แ€บแ€€แ€ฌแ€€แ€ฝแ€šแ€บแ€›แ€ฑแ€ธแ€…แ€”แ€…แ€บ) with help from Russia, Ukraine and China. It is a tri-service bureau with units from all three branches of the armed forces. All air defence assets except anti-aircraft artillery are integrated into MIADS. Military intelligence The Office of the Chief of Military Security Affairs (OCMSA), commonly referred to by its Burmese acronym Sa Ya Pha (แ€…แ€›แ€–), is a branch of the Myanmar's Armed Forces tasked with intelligence gathering. It was created to replace the Directorate of Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI), which was disbanded in 2004. Defence industries The Myanmar Directorate of Defence Industries (DI) consists of 25 major factories throughout the country that produce approximately 70 major products for Army, Navy and Air Force. The main products include automatic rifles, machine guns, sub-machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, complete range of mortar and artillery ammunition, aircraft and anti-aircraft ammunition, tank and anti-tank ammunition, bombs, grenades, anti-tank mines, anti-personnel mines such as the M14 pyrotechnics, commercial explosives and commercial products, and rockets and so forth. DI have produced new assault rifles and light machine-guns for the infantry. The MA series of weapons were designed to replace the old German-designed but locally manufactured Heckler & Koch G3s and G4s that equipped Burma's army since the 1960s. Political representation in Myanmar's legislature 25% of the seats in both houses of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, Myanmar's legislature, are reserved for military appointees. See also Notes References External links
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Tips] | [TOKENS: 442]
Contents Wikipedia:Tips Wikipedia's tips library Welcome! Here you can digest how to use Wikipedia, in bite-sized morsels. The tips listed below were created for the Tip of the day project, or the Styletips project, but are listed here by title and organized by subject area for your convenience. See also the Tip of the day talk page where most of the tips are written. Feel free to join in! Writing an autobiography on Wikipedia is an example of conflict of interest editing and is strongly discouraged. In addition, there are special requirements for articles that are a biography of a living person. The Biographies of living persons noticeboard is a forum for impartial contributors to help resolve differences. The "<First Name> <Last Name>" article title format applies to the majority of biographical articles on Wikipedia. These should follow the article-naming conventions for people. Tips about Wikipedia as a whole Tips on accessing Wikipedia pages Getting help Tips for contributors on getting started Tips on working with articles From Wikipedia:Styletips: Tips on working with specific types of pages Other ways to contribute Communicating with other editors Watchdogging (monitoring) Wikipedia Configuring and customizing your account Tips on working faster Shortcuts Navigation MetaTips These need sorting into the above categories Be sure to check for duplication - do not include them if they are already there! Note: this section is currently empty. There are two main ways to use templates on articles: Transclusion will include the content of Template Name on the fly whenever the article is loaded, while the latter will permanently insert the content of the template into the article. With substitution, even if the template content is modified at a later date, the article's content will not change. Substitution is the preferred method for long-term, permanent notices because it is less confusing, and it even helps to lighten the load on the database. Substitution has the further advantage in that a template's content may be de-linked from any associated category or slightly modified to suit the circumstances, such as when the template is used on a talk page. Transclusion is preferred for displaying material that is normally updated, that way, all the places it appears are updated in a single operation. See also
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myanmar_civil_war_(2021%E2%80%93present)] | [TOKENS: 27529]
Contents Myanmar civil war (2021โ€“present) Legend: Massacre and killing Myanmar portal The Myanmar civil war[p] began in 2021 following the military coup on 1 February 2021. The coup, led by Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services, ousted the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD), citing alleged election fraud in the November 2020 general election. The seizure of power triggered mass anti-coup demonstrations and a violent crackdown by the Tatmadaw (Myanmar armed forces), which significantly escalated the country's longstanding insurgencies. In response to the coup, the exiled National Unity Government (NUG) and major ethnic armed organisations repudiated the 2008 Constitution and called instead for a democratic federal state. Besides engaging this alliance, the ruling government of the military junta, the State Administration Council (SAC), led by Min Aung Hlaing, also contends with other anti-SAC forces in areas under its control. The insurgents are apportioned into hundreds of armed groups scattered across the country. As of March 2023 the United Nations estimated that since the coup, 17.6 million people in Myanmar required humanitarian assistance, 1.6 million were internally displaced, and over 55,000 civilian buildings had been destroyed. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported over 40,000 people had fled to neighboring countries such as Bangladesh, India, and Thailand. As of October 2023, the Tatmadaw controlled under 40% of the country, though it maintained that it controlled around two-thirds of the country's 330 townships. In the second half of 2023, Chinland Defense Forces in Chin State had captured a majority of the state, with a few holdouts in urban areas and along the Indiaโ€“Myanmar border remaining. In October 2023, the Tatmadaw began facing manpower issues, with desertions and low morale being extremely common. This coincided with a major offensive by the People's Defense Force (PDF) and Three Brotherhood Alliance in the west of the country, which took 80 bases, 220 SAC positions, and several towns by 28 November 2023. October and November 2023 saw a series of concurrent anti-SAC offensives, including Operation 1111 besieging the state capital of Loikaw and renewed conflict by anti-SAC forces in northern Rakhine and Chin states. In Operation 1027, anti-SAC forces seized Laukkai, the capital of Kokang Self-Administered Zone, in January 2024. Northern Shan State fighting stopped with the Haigeng ceasefire after the fall of Laukkai. But the Rakhine offensive continued in northern Rakhine state with Mrauk U, among others, falling to the Arakan Army in February 2024. As of February 2024, thousands of the SAC's soldiers had surrendered without a fight, including six Tatmadaw generals. The SAC has used terror tactics against the population, including burnings, beheadings, mutilations, war rape, torching villages, and a massive aerial bombing campaign that has displaced nearly three million people. The Myanmar Air Force has dropped more bombs per capita than have been dropped in the Russo-Ukrainian war. A group of observers wrote that the SAC's forces remain "formidable and well-equipped", with "external allies and economic resources". In March 2024, anti-SAC forces in southeastern Myanmar captured Demoso and Papun, bringing the number of district-level towns captured by anti-SAC forces to eight. The ninth district-level town, Matupi, was captured by Chin resistance in June 2024. In late June 2024, the Three Brotherhood Alliance restarted Operation 1027 after claiming that Tatmadaw forces had broken the ceasefire, capturing the tenth district-level town, Kyaukme, by the end of the month. On 17 July, two more district-level towns were captured by the Brotherhood Alliance, Thandwe and Mongmit, bringing the number to 12. On 3 August, as part of a wider effort by the Three Brotherhood Alliance and other resistance groups, the MNDAA captured Lashio, the largest town in northern Shan State, as well as the headquarters of the SAC's Northeastern Command. On 20 December 2024, the Arakan Army claimed to have captured the Tatmadaw's Western Command headquarters in Ann, Rakhine State, marking the second regional command to fall to ethnic rebels in five months. After the deadly 2025 Myanmar earthquake, the NUG declared a two-week pause on offensives, and the SAC announced a ceasefire from 2 April to 22 April, despite continuing airstrikes on rebel groups. On 31 July, the SAC announced its dissolution and power was formally transferred to the National Defence and Security Council under the chairmanship of Min Aung Hlaing. Continued junta counteroffensives saw success in northern Shan state, retaking the district capital of Kyaukme on 2 October 2025. Background Insurgencies have been ongoing in Myanmar since 1948 and have largely been ethnic-based. Communists and the Karen National Union were the primary opposition actors to the central government. During the 20th century, several prominent ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) rose and fell in influence and control. Larger rebel factions such as the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) formed in response to the 1962 coup d'รฉtat, led by General Ne Win, and its increased political repression. The 8888 Uprising, in response to Ne Win's one-party rule, resulted in some of the first modern Bamar militias forming from protesters heading to areas under ethnic rebel control. In the aftermath of the 8888 Uprising the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), later known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), formed a Tatmadaw-led council. The Tatmadaw severely weakened ethnic insurgent groups, destroying most of their bases and strongholds through the 1990s. By the time of the 2011โ€“2015 Myanmar political reforms, the Tatmadaw had regained control of many longtime rebel strongholds, including Kokang and Karen State. The 2008 Constitution created self-administered zones with increased autonomy as part of its reforms. In 2015, the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was signed between eight EAOs and the central government. But by 2018 the NCA began to fall apart, due to alleged violations of the agreement by Tatmadaw soldiers entering EAO territories to build roads. Many non-signatories continued the conflict. In late 2016, four non-signatories of the NCA, including the KIA and Arakan Army, formed the Northern Alliance and engaged in war with the central government and other EAOs. On the morning of 1 February 2021, the Tatmadaw successfully deposed the elected Myanmar government in a coup d'รฉtat, forming a State Administration Council. Former president Win Myint, state chancellor Aung San Suu Kyi, and several other members of the National League for Democracy (NLD) were detained during the early morning of 1 February. Min Aung Hlaing was installed as the Commander-in-Chief of Defence Services and de facto ruler of the country. The coup's motives are unclear. In the leadup to the coup, the Tatmadaw claimed that the 2020 general elections had 8.6 million voter irregularities, but presented no evidence. The coup may have been a way to reestablish the military's long-reigning power over the country, which had ended ten years earlier. The bloody repression of anti-coup demonstrations led to the creation of armed groups to fight the SAC. Gathered under the name of the People's Defense Force (PDF) and the orders of the National Unity Government (NUG), formed by parliamentarians in office before the coup d'รฉtat, the PDF and the NUG declared a "defensive war" against SAC rule in September 2021. The ACLED estimated that as of 29 July 2022, around 23,521 people had been killed in violence after the 2021 coup. In the months after the coup, the opposition began to coalesce around the NUG, which launched an offensive against the SAC. By 2022, the opposition controlled substantial, though sparsely populated, territory. In many villages and towns, the SAC's attacks drove out tens of thousands of people. On the second anniversary of the coup, in February 2023, Min Aung Hlaing admitted to losing stable control over "more than a third" of townships. Independent observers note the real number is likely far higher, with as few as 72 out of 330 townships remaining under the control of the Tatmadaw, the military forces aligned with the junta. But the townships under SAC control included all major population centres. Prelude By late March 2021, dozens of protesters per day had been travelling to Myanmar's border areas to enlist in and train under one of the country's many insurgent groups, elevating the risk of a countrywide civil war. The Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH) also proposed the formation of a "Federal Armed Force" to combat the military, and in late March the Arakan Army (AA) threatened to end its ceasefire with the military should the latter "persist in massacring civilians". In late March, protesters increasingly began arming themselves with homemade weapons in an attempt to defend themselves against attacks by the military. Clashes with soldiers and IED attacks against administrative buildings and police stations became more common and protesters slowly became armed resistance. After about 30 years of dormancy, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the armed wing of the Communist Party of Burma (CPB), became active again on 15 March 2021 when communist fighters crossed from China into Kachin State, where the Kachin Independence Army gave them weapons. By August 2021, the CPB had established a new armed wing to fight the SAC. Over the next two years, the PLA presence grew in Tanintharyi Region, where they fought alongside the PDF, claiming to have 1,000 active troops in December 2023. The unrest across the nation and increased need for SAC troops in previously peaceful urban areas strengthened EAOs. The Kachin Independence Army had already been on the offensive since February and seized the military's base of Alaw Bum near the town of Laiza on 25 March 2021. The next day, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) attacked a military base, killing 10 SAC soldiers and taking others hostage in their first attack since the protests began. The next day saw the 2021 Kalay clashes, where protesters first openly used homemade weapons against soldiers, targeting security forces attacking a protest camp. SAC declared that it would cease all military operations on 29 March 2021 and hold bilateral negotiations with ethnic armed groups. But the Kachin Independence Army continued its offensives, saying the Myanmar Army had not in fact ceased operations. Seven insurgent groups who were signatories to the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement aligned themselves with the National Unity Government (NUG), including the All Burma Student Democratic Front (ABSDF) and the Karen National Union (KNU). The Northern Alliance, comprising the Arakan Army, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, attacked a police station in Naungmon, Shan State, killing at least 10 police officers and indicating their disregard of the SAC's call for a ceasefire. In response, on 11 April 2021, the military junta launched a counterattack to recapture the Alaw Bum base using airstrikes and ground troops, but had to retreat amidst heavy casualties. On 26 April, the Battle of Mindat became one of the first large-scale conflicts arising from the 2021 coup. The Chinland Defense Force (CDF) began armed resistance in Mindat, Chin State and the SAC declared martial law. After a soldier allegedly fired at protesters, fighting between the two sides erupted. The battle lasted four days, killing 30 SAC soldiers and leaving Mindat abandoned as more than 10,000 people fled the area. Timeline On 16 April 2021, pro-democracy politician Min Ko Naing announced the formation of the National Unity Government, with members of ethnic minority groups in senior roles. As part of the announcement he said that ousted leaders Aung San Suu Kyi and Win Myint would retain their positions and asked the international community to recognize their government over the SAC. Throughout April, informal clashes with protesters intensified, such as in Taze when protesters fought back against soldiers with hunting rifles and firebombs on 8 April. The National Unity Government declared the formation of an armed wing, the People's Defence Force (PDF), on 5 May 2021, a date often cited as the start of the civil war. The PDF was formed to protect its supporters from SAC attacks and as a first step towards a Federal Union Army. The PDF clashed with the Tatmadaw in the town of Muse on 23 May, killing at least 13 members of Myanmar's security forces. In early June, fighting erupted in Myawaddy District where the military and Karen Border Guard Forces battled against a combined Karen and PDF force, leaving dozens of SAC troops killed. Members of the Karenni PDF in Kayah State also captured and destroyed several Tatmadaw outposts near the state capital, Loikaw. Towards the end of May, the Tatmadaw used artillery and helicopters to strike PDF positions in Loikaw and Demoso. On 30 May, the KIA joined the PDF in a battle against SAC troops in Katha Township, killing eight SAC soldiers. Fighting also sprouted up in other Kachin State townships, including Putao, Hpakant and Momauk. While there were fewer conflict deaths between May and September, there were still many armed clashes and a spike in early June. Two dozen local officials appointed by the military were assassinated throughout the month of June with hundreds of bombings at police stations, banks and government offices. On 22 June, SAC forces using armoured vehicles raided a safehouse of the PDF in Mandalay, detaining several fighters. Myanmar security forces killed at least 25 people in another raid in Tabayin. These attacks occurred in Central Myanmar, also known as Anya, an area that had rarely seen armed violence in recent times. On 2 July, troops assaulted several villages in Sagaing Region and reportedly killed 41 civilians. The Washington Post described how Myanmar was sliding toward "bloody anarchy". On 7 September 2021, the NUG declared a state of emergency across the nation and launched what they called the "people's defensive war" against the SAC. The declaration of war increased the number of skirmishes and clashes between PDF militias, EAOs and the SAC across the country. According to the NUG in September 2021, over 1,700 SAC soldiers had been killed and 630 wounded in fighting during the preceding three months. Several major clashes took place from September to October in Chin State, Sagaing Region, Magwe Region, Kayah State and Shan State. On 18 September, the Pa-O National Army, a pro-SAC militia active in the Pa-O Self-Administered Zone, aided the SAC in capturing a resistance base near Aungban. By late September 2021, 8,000 residents of Thantlang town, Chin state, fled to Mizoram, India after their houses were set ablaze by the SAC army. Ambushes by anti-SAC forces in Shan State also killed at least 20 soldiers. On 16 November 2021, SAC forces overran and captured the base camp of Kalay PDF in southwestern Sagaing Region, killing 2 fighters and capturing 9 Kalay PDF medics. In October, SAC-controlled media reported that at least 406 junta informants had been killed and 285 wounded since 1 February in targeted attacks by resistance forces. According to analyst Matthew Arnold, the civil war's momentum had passed a critical threshold by the end of the 2022 dry season where the revolutionary sentiment had grown into a broader social and armed resistance that the SAC could no longer suppress. Towards the end of 2021, direct armed clashes gave way to more bombings, explosive devices and landmines. The PDF, with strong ground support from local communities, attacked soft government targets like police stations, outposts and military-owned businesses. Through these, the resistance became more organised as they seized weapons, underwent training and communicated between units through the help of the NUG and allied EAOs. According to the Karen National Union, roughly 2,200 SAC soldiers and militiamen were killed in the first half of 2022. On 17 November 2021, dozens of SAC soldiers ambushed an outpost of the Moebye PDF in Pekon Township, Shan State, forcing the outnumbered PDF soldiers to retreat. At least four SAC soldiers were killed during a four-day clash in Hpruso Township with the KNDF and Karenni Army. On 14 December, around 200 Tatmadaw troops searched the Karen National Union (KNU)-controlled town of Lay Kay Kaw Myothit near the Thai border, arresting people suspected to be activists or members of the PDF. On 20 December, SAC forces burned down nineteen houses in Kunnar, Loikaw Township after taking it from the KNDF the week before. On 24 December, more than 35 people were massacred when they were ambushed by SAC troops outside the village of Mo So in Kayah State. Two staff members of the aid group Save the Children were among those killed. The United Nations Security Council condemned the attack and called for a "thorough and transparent investigation" into the incident. Throughout February and March 2022, the SAC carried out repeated air strikes against civilian targets in villages in Shan, Kayin and Kayah States. On 17 February alone, around 20 SAC soldiers and 20 resistance fighters were killed in clashes in Mobye, southern Shan State. Witnesses described soldiers systematically looting jewelry, cash, vehicles, and other valuables. Amnesty International reported these actions as collective punishment against the country's ethnic minorities. Fighting broke out in parts of Loikaw on 14 April. The number of refugees on the Thai border increased after increased combat in Kayin State. On 15 April, SAC soldiers suffered at least 30 casualties after being pushed back by the KNLA at the battle for Lay Kay Kaw. The Dry Zone historical heartland of Myanmar had rarely seen armed violence in the modern conflict in Myanmar since 1948 as a predominantly Buddhist and Bamar farming region. The fighting in the Anya theater of Central Myanmar starting in 2021 changed this trajectory. Without the presence of EAOs, the Bamar PDF groups are characterized as local cells acting autonomously towards simple and directed towards the 2021 coup. In the 2021โ€“2022 dry season, the PDFs began to work more closely together and coordinate towards larger goals. In early 2022, resistance forces were fighting in Monywa, the capital of Sagaing Region. Resistance attacks on the SAC saw the SAC retaliate on civilians Targeted personnel attacks increased, killing various SAC personnel and destroying equipment. The PDF also suffered losses, with 12 fighters killed in a battle in Khin-U Township. Many cities saw violent clashes during 2022's Union Day. Mandalay also saw fighting, with casualties on both sides. Throughout the 2021โ€“2022 dry season, various groups in Northern Myanmar carried out ambushes against military outposts and convoys. The Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and the PDF attacked convoys in Mohnyin and Hpakant townships. In October, they also partially shut down gold mining operations run by SAC allies. After an ambush near Shwegu, the Tatmadaw responded with airstrikes and ground attacks against KIA bases in Hpakant and Mohnyin Townships. In early February, the KIA assaulted several military bases in Kachin and Shan States, reportedly burning one in Hpakant Township down. The SAC responded by increasing airstrikes and sending reinforcements to the area. The Chinland Defense Force (CDF) and the Chin National Army (CNA) raided and ambushed outposts and convoys in Matupi and Mindat Townships. In December, the Tatmadaw recaptured the town of Thantlang from the CDF in an offensive that destroyed over a quarter of the town's buildings. On 14 January 2022, units of the CNA moved into Senam village, south of Tamu, in neighboring Sagaing Region to attack a base run by the Indian-based People's Liberation Army of Manipur. After several hours of fighting, between 10 and 20 Manipuri rebels and 1 CNA fighter were killed. During this time, there were several cases of guerilla warfare across Myanmar using homemade explosives, including several accidents killing resistance fighters. On 17 June 2021, an army vehicle exploded in Tamwe Township, Yangon, allegedly killing several military personnel. On 14 December, Tatmadaw troops captured 12 suspected resistance fighters after several bombs accidentally exploded in Hlaing Thar Yar Township, Yangon. Urban warfare became less practical, so resistance forces began targeting SAC-aligned officials. According to SAC-aligned sources, 367 SAC-appointed officials were assassinated in targeted attacks between February 2021 and February 2022. Resistance forces also began targeting the homes of SAC pilots in Yangon in response to airstrikes on civilians. Fighting also occurred in other Bamar-majority regions. On 31 January 2022, at least 36 SAC soldiers were reportedly killed in ambushes over three days in Magwe, Sagaing and Tanintharyi regions and Chin, Shan and Kayah states. The intensity of fighting decreased during the monsoon season. Resistance forces were advantaged by the rainfall as the SAC could not carry out air strikes as easily. In June, resistance groups achieved control of 40โ€“50% of the country. Arakan Army claimed to administer most of Rakhine State with an independent government. Chin National Front and CDF made plans to establish a new government. The KIA and the Wa State, a neutral de-facto independent region of Myanmar, consolidated expanded territories. However, the Myanmar Army retained tight control of almost every city in Myanmar and most of the country's natural resources, including important jade mines. During this time, the PDF were also unable to move beyond rural guerilla tactics. Duwa Lashi La, acting president of the NUG, cited the lack of weaponry and international support as reasons for the prolonged conflict. On 31 May 2022, a bombing killed one person and injured nine others near the Sule Pagoda in Yangon, the largest city in Myanmar. State media accused the People's Defence Force of being responsible for the attack, which the PDF denied. A July clash in Pekon Township, Shan State also killed around 40 SAC soldiers and 11 PDF fighters. The military deployed its time-tested counterinsurgency methods in what has been called a "hammer approach" of bombing and burning villages and massacring civilians to flush out rebel groups. However, the approach was ineffective because they were unable to consolidate power or deter resistance. Myanmar military forces executed at least 37 villagers in the Mon Taing Pin massacre in May 2022 after shelling the village of Mondaingbin, Sagaing Region with heavy artillery. The SAC forces entered the local Buddhist monastery, conscripted young male villagers briefly before executing them and other captives by a stupa. On 23 July 2022, the State Administration Council announced that it had executed four political prisoners, including Zayar Thaw and Kyaw Min Yu, which was the first use of capital punishment in Myanmar since the late 1980s. The men had been accused of helping the resistance movement. The event was widely seen as a provocation to escalate the ongoing conflict by the Tatmadaw. The international community, including United Nations Secretary-General, the G7 nations and the European Union strongly condemned the executions. According to a special report from Radio Free Asia, SAC soldiers following a raid in Kachin state's Se Zin village in August 2022, set fire to more than 400 homes with at least 15 people killed on the spot, detained some 400 people in and around Se Zin, and about 100 of them have been killed (including extrajudicial massacre) by security forces between August 2022 and January 2023 while others died due to horrific prison conditions. On 16 September 2022, the Burmese military killed 11 children and wounded another 17 in the Let Yet Kone massacre, as part of an airborne strike conducted against a school in Let Yet Kone, Sagaing Region. The military claimed that the village was harbouring resistance fighters from the KIA and PDF. The attack was widely condemned by the international community, including the United Nations and European Union. Later in September 2022, retired Brigadier General Ohn Thwin, mentor to State Administration Council vice-chairman Senior General Soe Win, was assassinated by anti-SAC guerilla groups in Yangon. This assassination caused an increase in security on high-ranking SAC personnel. In early 2022, the Arakan Army and the junta clashed again in northern Rakhine State. On 8 February, Arakan Army and junta forces clashed on at least two occasions in Maungdaw in Rakhine State. Fighting broke out on 4 February when junta troops carried out a sneak attack on an AA outpost near the Letpan Mountains northeast of Mee Taik Village, killing an AA sentry, according to AA spokesman Khaing Thukha. Three hours of clashes were also reported on 6 February. The clashes raised fears of a breakdown of the informal ceasefire between the AA and the military which had been in place since November 2020. Further clashes in northern Maungdaw on the night of 7 February killed two civilians. Several junta troops, including a major, were also killed in the attack. Between June and August 2022, the informal ceasefire reached in late 2020 between the Arakan Army (AA) and the junta broke down. The AA had consolidated control during this period, avoided the initial violence of the war, and introduced many public services and local administrators in northern Rakhine state. With the military's attention diverted to increasing resistance elsewhere and increasing popular support for an alliance with the NUG, the AA sought to expand its influence into southern Rakhine. Rhetoric from AA leader Twan Mrat Naing in June grew more provocative with military spokespeople stating that the AA was inviting conflict. Armed clashes resumed in July after the junta launched an airstrike against an AA base in Kayin State, killing 6 AA soldiers. AA retaliated in Maungdaw Township and western Chin State in late July and early August. By late August, land travel to northern Rakhine required passing a series of checkpoints and all public transport ships had ceased operation due to river and land blockades. On 16 August 2022, two mortar shells fired by the Myanmar Army landed in a Rohingya refugee camp in Bangladesh, killing one man and injuring five others. Myanmar Army helicopters allegedly entered Bangladeshi air space to attack the Arakan Army and fired a shell within Bangladeshi air space. Two days later, Bangladesh summoned Myanmar ambassador Aung Kyaw Moe to strongly protest the land and airspace violations. In October 2022, Bangladeshi Foreign Minister AK Abdul Momen made a statement that border bombings by Myanmar had stopped after he met with the Chinese ambassador to Bangladesh, Li Jiming. In mid-October 2022, NUG issued a statement calling for the victory of the Spring Revolution by the end of 2023. This call to action was followed by increased fighting by the resistance forces in urban areas and in Southeastern Myanmar. This development took place in the wake of the junta torching at least 20 villages in the Sagaing and Magway Regions as part of a "four cuts" strategy of attacking civilians to weaken anti-regime movements. According to Sagaing-based resistance spokespeople, many victims of arson then joined the resistance. The urgency of the resistance was likely prompted by the looming elections planned by the State Administration Council. The fragmented nature of the grassroots elements of the PDF became more organized in 2022 through the command of the NUG and from cooperation with various EAOs- especially the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). The Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) claimed in January 2023 that 1,692 regime troops and 211 resistance fighters were killed since the 2021 coup, 293 civilians had been killed by the regime, and 126 displaced civilians died while fleeing their homes in Kayah and Shan states in 2022. The Karen National Liberation Army stepped up fighting, besieging the major town of Kawkareik on the Thai border in 21 October 2022 Battle of Kawkareik. The battle began with surprise attacks on the Asia Highway and at government offices within the town. Resistance forces looked poised to take the town, but ultimately withdrew two days later after facing junta air strikes and strategically drawing junta troops away from nearby positions. Four days later, undeterred KNLA-led forces seized a junta Light Infantry Battalion base in Kyain Seikgyi Township. In Shan State, clashes between PDF forces near Inle Lake and the Pa-O National Organisation (PNO) broke out after the PNO coerced villages for speedboats and militia recruits. In late 2022, Chin State resistance forces used drones in a week-long siege of an outpost in Falam Township, killing 74% of the junta forces stationed, but failing to take the outpost against aerial bombardments. In February 2023, CNA captured Thantlang police station and took control of the town. In Kachin State, the Shanni Nationalities Army (SNA) became more actively allied with the junta as conflict between SNA and the KIA grew. In August, the SNA and the Myanmar Army set fire to hundreds of homes in Kachin state forcing KIA withdrawal from the area. Chin forces also targeted convoys on roads within the state. In March 2023, combined Chin resistance consisting of CNA, CNDF, and CDFs conducted multiple ambushes on a regime convoy between Kalay, Falam and Hakha capturing and destroyed multiple armoured vehicles. The NUG awarded the combined Chin forces 400 million kyat for seizing two armoured vehicles. The following day, the groups attacked another junta convoy carrying 80 troops on the road between Matupi and Paletwa, killing over 30 junta soldiers. In April, CNDF attacked a junta base on the Kalay-Falam road near Varr, Falam Township, killing eleven regime soldiers and capturing fourteen. In November 2022, resistance in Bago Region increased. In Monyo Township, western Bago Region, the PDF attacked a police building using cluster bombs. In eastern Bago, 15 junta soldiers were killed in a Bago PDF raid on a police station in Yedashe Township. Thousands of civilians also fled Shwegyin Township as joint KNLA and NUG-led resistance forces seized three military outposts. In early December, a video of PDF forces beating and shooting a woman dead emerged on social media. The NUG Ministry of Defence said that the incident happened in June in Tamu, Sagaing and that they were investigating the incident after detaining the perpetrators involved. In early January 2023, PDF groups in Kani Township, Sagaing Region attacked junta supply ships, killing at least 25 soldiers. The junta increasingly used waterways for supplies, avoiding roadways in resistance-held areas. In April 2023, a combined PDF force from nearby townships seized the Tower Taing hill base Kani Township, killing 30 junta soldiers and seizing weapons. In early 2023, the Mandalay PDF announced their intentions to ramp up military operations. Alongside the TNLA, they engaged in a series of intense clashes with the junta forces in Nawnghkio Township near the Shan-Mandalay border, killing at least 75 junta soldiers and wounding 60 others. A combined force of at least 900 junta and pro-junta militia troops attacked resistance positions with the help of artillery attacks and airstrikes during the clashes but were forced to retreat. In 2023, attacks in urban areas increased. In March 2023, the urban guerilla group Urban Owls assassinated Minn Tayzar Nyunt Tin, a legal and money-laundering aide to the junta with links to former Air Force commander General Myat Hein, in Thanlyin, Yangon. Minn Tayzar Nyunt Tin helped draft the repressive Cyber Security Law, which was seen as violating digital rights, privacy, and freedom of expression. In October 2022, battles and skirmishes increased as the junta committed several civilian atrocities. On 21 October, junta forces decapitated Saw Tun Moe, a high school teacher from Thit Nyi Naung, and impaled his head on a NUG-administered school's spiked gate after burning and looting Taung Myint village in Magway Region. On 23 October, over 80 people were killed by an airstrike in Hpakant Township, Northern Myanmar, during an anniversary celebration for the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO). At least 80 civilians were killed, making it the deadliest attack on civilians since the start of the renewed civil war. The junta denied civilian casualties while the United Nations condemned the attack. In November 2022, the junta continued burning villages in Sagaing Region, including the home village of Cardinal Charles Maung Bo, the head of the Catholic Church in Myanmar. Junta soldiers also hid in civilian trucks impersonating workers to ambush local defence forces in Shwebo Township. On 2 February 2023, Min Aung Hlaing imposed martial law in 37 townships with resistance activity, affecting millions of residents. In November 2022, the dry season allowed the greater use of the Myanmar Air Force to weaken the resistance forces' ability to maintain strategic positions and outposts. Aerial bombardment, helicopter raids and artillery strikes typically followed skirmishes once junta ground forces sustained substantial losses and retreated. Once the entrapped forces were relieved by aerial support, they would engage in scorched earth tactics. World War Two veterans described the destruction as worse than that of the Burma campaign of World War II due to the deliberate targeting of civilian villages. The heavy use of air forces came alongside a decrease in junta's ability to fight on the ground. During the week of 21 November, repeated junta air attacks along the Sagaing-Kachin border killed 80 and disrupted supply chains between the two resistance regions. The junta's scorched earth campaign stretched across northern Myanmar, burning bases and villages they could no longer defend. Thousands of residents fled during the campaign as hundreds of homes were destroyed. In early 2023, one scorched earth push by the junta aimed to resecure the Letpadaung Copper Mine in Salingyi Township for Chinese foreign workers planning to leave for their holidays. On 23 February 2023, army troops launched a new military offensive in Sagaing, raiding and pillaging villages at the confluence of the Irrawaddy and Mu Rivers. During the offensive, troops from the 99th Light Infantry Division executed at least 17 villagers during the Tar Taing massacre. On 26 November 2022, the Arakan Army and the junta agreed to a temporary ceasefire starting on 27 November. The ceasefire was brokered by Yลhei Sasakawa of the Nippon Foundation. Arakan Army spokespeople maintained that they agreed to the ceasefire for humanitarian reasons, as opposed to international pressure. The Arakan Army did not withdraw from fortifications held at the time of the ceasefire. Junta spokespeople said that this was the first step towards a permanent ceasefire with the Arakan Army. As of mid-December, tensions remained high with forces from both sides remaining in deployment within northern Rakhine State. On 30 November, the military launched a major assault on the Kokang Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army using heavy weapons on a base near Chinshwehaw by the Chinese border. This assault continued into 2 December, reportedly sending 500 junta soldiers. The military continued its campaign in northern Shan State against the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). On 7 December 2022, the junta launched a ground offensive on the TNLA in the Battle of Namhsan using aerial bombs. After six days of fighting, the TNLA captured four villages from junta control, killing 70 soldiers and capturing 28. On 17 December, the junta retreated, claiming that they had reached an agreement with TNLA, and that they intended to target the PDF forces and attacked the TNLA in mistake. The TNLA rejected the statement. Continued clashes in late December forced over a thousand civilians to flee to Mogok. According to analysts in early 2023, the civil war was in a state of stalemate. Despite several successful engagements, there was still a significant disparity in power between the joint resistance forces and the junta. The PDF and EAOs faced resource constraints as they primarily relied on donations for funding and underground channels to acquire arms. The resistance also increasingly used coordinated drone attacks, such as on 27 August 2023, when 11 resistance groups jointly conducted drone strikes in Sagaing Township, killing 17 soldiers. In early April, the Kawthoolei Army (KTLA) launched an offensive on the Karen State Border Guard Force (BGF)-held Shwe Kokko in retaliation for the imprisonment and killing of the group's spokesperson by the BGF. After the reported capture of 5 BGF bases, by 8 April, the offensive began to stall. After junta/BGF counterattacks, the KTLA was forced to retreat, receiving heavy losses. Afterwards, the KNU stated that they did not approve these attacks, nor that they would accept the KTLA in their territory. In early June 2023, NUG announced the formation of the PDF's first battalion in Yangon Region โ€“ Battalion 5101. On 19 June 2023, the Urban Owls guerilla group assassinated Ye Khaing, the operations director and head of security of Yangon International Airport, and a former air force major, outside his house at Mingaladon Township, Yangon. Ye Khaing was allegedly providing information to the junta and detaining anti-junta activists at Myanmar's primary international airport. Urban Owls also claimed that Ye Khaing was a confidante of Steven Law, the owner of Asia World Company, which operates the airport, and is a major supporter of the regime together with the second-in-command, Senior General Soe Win. In late June 2023, a combined resistance force of PDF and KNLA took control of the National Highway 8 in Mon State, installing checkpoints and arresting junta personnel. Also in June, the Ye Township-based resistance group Ye Belu launched successive guerrilla attacks on the junta in June 2023. On 22 June, they attacked a junta security checkpoint at Chaung Taung bridge, killing four soldiers and one official working for the junta's Ministry of Immigration and Population in Lamaing. On 26 June, the group assassinated a Pyusawhti militia leader in Duya, Ye Township. Two days later, they ambushed an army convoy from the junta's No. 19 Military Operations Command, killing five soldiers and injuring others. The attacks caused a breakdown in junta administration in Ye Township. All administration offices in the three townsโ€”Lamaing, Khawzar and Yeโ€”closed down. On 10 August 2023, junta forces clashed with a coalition of several rebel groups at Thandaung, near Nay Pyi Taw. The rebel forces aimed to capture the 606th Light Infantry Division Headquarters. On 15 September 2023, members of the Northern Thandaung Defence Force, along with the Lethal Prop drone unit, attacked the Aye Lar military base near the Nay Pyi Taw International Airport with 2 makeshift bombs. It was the first documented drone attack by resistance forces against an air base. On 31 August and 9 September, the Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA) raided 2 Chinland Defense Force (CDF) outposts in Tonzang Township, killing 2 CDF soldiers. These attacks were not the first between the ZRA and Chin resistance, which have been clashing since 2021, and came despite the ZRA issuing a public statement of support for anti-junta resistance in 2021. In August 2023, the NUG claimed that 3,012 junta troops were killed between January and July 2023. In Kayah state alone, 667 military junta troops and 99 resistance members were killed. In a September interview, Duwa Lashi La claimed that resistance forces had taken effective control of about 60% of Myanmar's territory. In early June 2023, a coalition force of KNLA and other resistance forces ambushed junta forces at Don Tha Mi bridge checkpoints on the border of Karen and Mon States, inflicting heavy casualties. The next day, resistance groups raided the police station and junta offices in Kyain Seikgyi Township, Karen State, killing 10 junta soldiers and injuring 15. The junta retaliated with artillery fire and deployed attack helicopters, killing two local civilians and a monk. In Kayah State on 13 June 2023, the Karenni National People's Liberation Front (KNPLF), who had previously been in a ceasefire with the junta and became a Border Guard Force in 2009, openly defected to anti-junta forces. The KNPLF began attacking Burmese military positions, joining forces with KA, KNDF, KNLA, and PDF, and seizing junta outposts in the Battle of Mese. The combined forces took over Mese Township in Eastern Kayah State. 430 soldiers of the Light Infantry Battalion, including their lieutenant colonel commander, surrendered to the resistance. Later in July, KNLA forces and allies captured the Lat Khat Taung hill junta base. During an attempt to recapture the hill, 20 junta soldiers were killed and 34 wounded. From July to September 2023, the Ta'ang National Liberation Army and the Mandalay People's Defence Force jointly conducted Operation Kanaung against junta forces in the Mandalay Region. Over that period, 76 junta soldiers were killed, 19 were wounded, and a large amount of weapons and ammunition were seized. On 27 October 2023, the Three Brotherhood Alliance initiated an offensive it called Operation 1027, targeting the junta's checkpoints and bases near Lashio and the Phaung Seik border trade post near Chinshwehaw. Chinshwehaw fell into ethnic armies' hands. Lashio Airport and two important Chinaโ€“Myanmar border crossings near Laukkai closed. Over the next three days, the coalition forces captured 57 bases, and the junta responded with aerial bombardments. Simultaneously, the AA engaged junta forces in Htigyaing Township, Sagaing Region. On 30 October, Nawnghkio fell under limited TNLA and Mandalay PDF control and 41 junta combatants in Kunlong surrendered to the MNDAA. The next day, combined AA and KIA forces captured Gangdau Yang base on the Myitkyina-Bhamo road. A junta convoy came the next day to reinforce Nawnghkio but TNLA and PDF forces blew up an armored car, took weapons and POWs. The convoy retreated and established a camp in southwest Nawnghkio Township, which was assaulted by rebel forces the following morning. The junta acknowledged having lost control of three towns in Northern Shan State, including Pang Hseng. TNLA, MNDAA, and AA declared control over four towns, including Hsenwi. On 6 November, TNLA forces seized bridges and road gates near Namhkam, Shan State, and took the town after a three-day assault. Kawlin also fell to the coalition, marking the first district-level capital seized during the operation. Over the next three days, the coalition took Khampat, Kunlong and Monekoe across northern Myanmar, re-establishing local government functions after securing towns. They also took Panlong base in Kunlong Township, killing Brigadier General Aung Kyaw Lwin in the battle, and the strategic Goktwin bridge near the Goteik viaduct on the main Mandalay-China highway. On 17 November, the TNLA captured the Sakhan Thit Kone base in Namhkam Township, but lost it to a junta offensive the following day. The TNLA accused the junta of using chemical weapon bombs during the counter-siege. Through December, the TNLA seized Namhsan and Mantong taking over the Pa Laung Self-Administered Zone from junta control. On 29 November, the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) declared a truce between their respective armies in response to the Operation, with the SSPP stating that the 2 armies "[intended] to unite as one in the future." In early December, the Tatmadaw allegedly asked China to pressure the Three Brotherhood Alliance to stop Operation 1027. On 11 December, China helped hold peace talks between the Tatmadaw and various rebel groups, including the Brotherhood Alliance. The Brotherhood Alliance announced on 13 December that these talks "lasted only 10 minutes" and vowed to continue fighting. In late January 2024, BBC News said that the "bloody two-year stalemate" of the civil war appeared to "have been broken" with the success of the offense of the three ethnic armies in Operation 1027. On the morning of 13 November 2023, as part of Operation 1027, the Arakan Army (AA) attacked two Border Guard Police stations in Rathedaung Township, breaking the Rakhine State Ceasefire Agreement between the junta and the Arakan Army. Dong Paik camp was captured by 6:30 am. On 14 November, the junta had already abandoned around 40 outposts in Rakhine state after attacks by the Arakan Army, but few came under their immediate control. Dozens of Myanmar security officers surrendered to the Arakan Army the following day. On 14 November, the Arakan Army launched an offensive in Paletwa Township in neighbouring Chin State. The Arakan Army accused the Tatmadaw of using chemical weapons during the ensuing battles. The following night, the Arakan Army launched an attack on Pauktaw, seizing the township police station. By the next morning, the Arakan Army had taken control of the town. The junta sent two helicopter gunships alongside naval support to fire back, including at civilian housing, with heavy machine gun fire. Pauktaw's proximity to the Rakhine state capital, Sittwe, posed a threat to the junta. Junta forces detained about 100 residents who were unable to flee, and positioned themselves to surround the town, using two navy ships to blockade the harbour. On 6 December, the Arakan Army would capture a major military base in the township. In late November and December, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) closed in on Laukkai, the capital of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone. They seized several strategic positions from junta forces during the ensuing Battle of Laukkai. MNDAA forces attacked junta bases around the city in early December. On 26 December, ninety junta soldiers surrendered to the MNDAA. and, two days later, the artillery shelling of Laukkai would stop as the city mostly fell under MNDAA control. On 5 January 2024, the MNDAA seized control of the junta battalion headquarters in Laukkai and gained full control of the city. A few days later, the Three Brotherhood Alliance claimed it had captured the towns of Kutkai and Theinni on 8 January after seizing junta military posts in the towns, including the headquarters of the 16th Military Operations Command in Theinni. On 23 January, the Tatmadaw sentenced three of the brigadier generals who surrendered at Laukkai to death and the other three to life imprisonment, under military law. In the wake of these gains and the fall of Laukkai, on 12 January, China announced that it had negotiated another ceasefire between the junta and the 3BA, known as the "Haigeng Agreement". The two sides agreed to disengage personnel and to not compromise the safety of Chinese border residents. However, the following day, the TNLA reported that the junta had broken their agreement with airstrikes in Lashio Township and Kyaukme Township. The Irrawaddy reported on 22 November 2023 that the Tatmadaw was preparing 14,000 soldiers for the defence of Naypyitaw, including by moving troops from other regions to the capital and mobilizing civil servants into the military. These preparations started soon after Operation 1027 was launched against the Tatmadaw. In addition, the Tatmadaw was preparing 10,000 troops for the defence of Mandalay, Bago and Yangon. There were also fortification works beginning, with Naypyitaw police stations "also preparing concrete blocks, sandbags and other materials needed to transform into defensive bases in just a few days". Ronan Lee, a professor at Loughborough University, stated that the recent strategic reversals, nationwide territorial losses and economic decline meant momentum had strongly shifted away from Myanmar's junta, and the junta "may now be in a death spiral". Operation 1027 was supported by several concurrent operations by other anti-junta groups elsewhere in the country, including in the eastern regions Shan State and Kayah State. In northern Shan State, the KNLA and PDF clashed with the Tatmadaw around the town of Kawkareik in late October 2023. In Mese Township (part of Kayah State), the KNPLF, KA and KNDF launched a joint military operation called Operation 1107 that captured several border posts starting on 7 November. Four days later, they launched the major Operation 1111 against Loikaw, the capital of Kayah State. The military operations in Kayah displaced tens of thousands of civilians, especially from Loikaw. After over a month of heavy fighting, rebel forces had won control of 85% of the capital. Nonetheless, fighting continued into January. By late January, however, the offensive on Loikaw had mostly stalled. Other anti-junta forces launched Operation Taungthaman in Madaya Township, Mandalay Region. On 13 November, fighting erupted in Kinn Village, eastern Madaya Township between the TNLA and the junta, who responded with air and artillery strikes and later burned the village down. By 28 November, PDF and TNLA forces captured a junta base in the township. The TNLA additionally supported the operations with attacks in Nawnghkio and Kyaukme Townships in southern Shan State to cut off junta reinforcements. On the morning of 13 November 2023, after two days of fighting, the Chin National Army (CNA) and local Chinland Defense Force (CDF) units, captured the town of Rikhawdar on the Indiaโ€“Myanmar border. This marked the first town captured by resistance forces in Chin State since the coup. At least 40 junta soldiers and police officers fled to the Indian state of Mizoram, where they surrendered and were eventually repatriated. The Chin National Defence Force (CNDF), took a junta camp on the Mizoram border two days later. The following week on 21 November, local Zoland PDF units seized a military base on Kennedy Peak, the second highest mountain in Chin State. Over the next week, CNA and its allies captured Lailenpi and Rezua in Matupi Township. On 6 December 2023, the Chin National Front ratified the Chinland Constitution, proclaiming the state of Chinland. On 17 January 2024, the Taingen camp on the Falam road to the Indian border was captured, with Chin resistance forces seizing arms and ammunition. On 20 January 2024, after more than 600 junta soldiers and refugees crossed the Indiaโ€“Myanmar border, the Government of India announced a plan to fence the entire border. Following the fall of Laukkai and the junta facing serious threats by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, the war has turned into a more multipolar landscape with borderlands being seized by powerful anti-junta groups with significant implications for the foreign relations of Myanmar. Groups not a part of the alliance took advantage of the situation, but remained constrained by both tense relations and limited coordination. On 8 January 2024, the Arakan Army continued their offensive and captured the Taung Shey Taung base and its 200 junta soldiers in Kyauktaw Township, Rakhine State. On 15 January, the Arakan Army seized Paletwa, a strategic town for Indo-Myanmar infrastructure projects, and the entire township in Chin State. A week later, the Arakan Army captured the town of Pauktaw in Rakhine State concluding a three-month battle. On 3 February 2024, as the clashes between Arakan Army and Tatmadaw increased in Rakhine, mortar shells and several bullets reportedly landed in Bangladesh territory, which injured some local residents near Ukhia, Cox's Bazar. At least 229 Myanmar Border Guard Police (BGP) personnel entered Bangladesh seeking refuge from AA, where the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) disarmed them. Between 4 and 6 February, the Arakan Army launched attacks on Rakhine BGP outposts in Maungdaw Township, later alleging without providing evidence that the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) fought alongside the Rakhine BGP. The RSO denounced AA's accusations and the AA labeling them as "Bengalis" among other issues. Later in February when the junta began conscripting largely non-citizen displaced Rohingyas living in Kyaukphyu, the AA urged Rohingya people to flee into AA-controlled areas. The Arakan Army captured most remaining Tatmadaw bases in Minbya Township by 6 February 2024. It captured Kyauktaw the next day and continued fighting in Mrauk U and Ramree. The Tatmadaw abandoned Myebon to reinforce Kyaukphyu on 9 February, leaving ammunition behind in their rush and abandoning the southern township of Mrauk-U District. On 10 February 2024, the Arakan Army took the district capital town of Mrauk U, completing their control over the township. During the battle, three Myanmar Navy landing craft were reportedly sunk. Over the following week, the Arakan Army consolidated control over the district, capturing Myebon on 15 February and capturing the remainder of Minbya Township on 28 February. Early 2024 also saw a theatre reemerge in southern Shan state when the Tatamadaw and the Pa-O National Army (PNA) attempted to confiscate the Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLA)'s weapons on 20 January. The PNLA, supported by KNDF and PDF forces, attacked Hsi Hseng and captured it on 26 January. The PNLA's political wing formally revoked its participation in the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, pledged to help the NUG replace the junta with a federal system and urged the PNA's political wing to defect. Between 21 January and 24 February, junta shelling killed 40 civilians in the Pa-O Self-Administered Zone, according local activists. Towards the end of February, clashes between junta/PNA forces and PNLA forces broke out east of Hopong and along the Taunggyi-Loilem road. The junta regained control of Hsi Hseng by late March, amid accusations of using chemical bombs according to the PNLA. Between 26 and 27 March the MNDAA and the Shan State Army (SSPP) clashed in Hseni Township after the alleged MNDAA bombing of SSPP camps. On 3 May, the Shan State Progress Party announced that its armed forces would join revolutionary forces before retracting the statement two days later. On 27 May, after a month of warnings, the TNLA began blockading several villages in Namhkam Township and detaining SSPP soldiers stationed in those villages. In response, the SSPP withdrew from camps in Hsenwi, Kutkai, and Pang Hseng. The United Nations voiced deep concern over renewed fighting in eastern Myanmar and allegations that the Myanmar armed forces employed heavy weapons against civilians, as well as abducted and forcibly recruited children in its ranks. Its Special Adviser on Prevention of Genocide and the Special Adviser on Responsibility to Protect also highlighted the responsibility of the military to protect all people. Tatmadaw forces recaptured the district capital of Kawlin on 10 February after almost 10 days of fighting. Junta forces razed the town, destroying the majority of homes in Kawlin and surrounding villages. On 22 February, junta forces attempted to recapture the town of Maw Luu from the KIA and ABSDF. On 14 March, junta forces took the village of Kampani, Kalay Township to weaken anti-junta attacks on Kalay. Despite this campaign, on 16 March resistance forces captured the Pyusawhti-controlled village of Kyaung Taik north of Kalay. While the junta launched its counteroffensives, the allied resistance launched an offensive to capture Kani, capturing around 80% of the town by 7 March. After almost 10 days of fighting, by 15 March, rebels were forced to retreat after overwhelming junta resistance. On 4 April 2024, the PDF launched an unprecedented drone attack against Aye Lar Air Base, the main Tatmadaw headquarters, and Min Aung Hlaing's residence in the capital, Naypyidaw. Almost 30 drones were deployed; junta forces claimed 7 were shot down while Myawaddy TV said 13 fixed-wing drones were shot down and there were no casualties or damage to property. NUG claimed the attack was "a success". On 12 April, local People's Defense Forces claimed that they killed over a dozen junta soldiers in another attack on Aye Lar Air Base. On 19 April junta forces launched a counteroffensive to retake Shwe Pyi Aye, Homalin Township, after it was captured in November 2023. After Operation 1027 and the Battle of Kawkareik in October 2023, the KNLA continued to make gains throughout Karen State, Mon State, Bago Region, and Tanintharyi Region. On 29 January 2024, KNLA and PDF forces shot down a Tatmadaw Eurocopter AS365, killing Brigadier General Aye Min Naung of the 44th Light Infantry Division. In late February, PDF and KNLA forces took most of Myitta, Tanintharyi Region. By 29 February, KNLA and aligned forces captured half of Kawkareik township, gaining fire control over the Myawaddy-Kawkareik highway. The KNLA continued gaining pushing east on the highway, capturing the Hpu Lu Gyi camp, south of Myawaddy, after a "five minute fight". This camp held both strategic and moral significance as the historic staging point for attacks on Manerplaw and Kawmoora after the junta captured it in 1990. The next day, KNLA forces captured a junta base in Kyaikdon. Fighting also broke out in KNLA 7th Brigade territory near Methawaw, forcing a junta retreat. Tensions also rose between the junta and the Karen State Border Guard Force (BGF), who refused orders to engage in battle and withdrew from their bases in Papun. On 23 January, deputy commander-in-chief Soe Win met with Karen BGF leader Colonel Saw Chit Thu The Karen BGF announced they would no longer accept salaries from the junta, and would remain "neutral" in the conflict. Later, on 6 March, the Karen BGF announced it would rename itself to the "Karen National Army". While the KIA is a very close military and political partner of the Three Brotherhood Alliance, being part of the Northern Alliance, it was not affected by the Chinese-brokered ceasefire. Combined forces of the KIA, ABSDF, and Kachin PDF captured the town of Mongmit on 19 January and neighboring Mabein on the 20th. The next day, they captured the strategically significant Man Wein Gyi base near Ruili. The junta recaptured Mongmit on 25 January. The KIA also intensified attacks in Hpakant Township, capturing a camp southwest of Hpakant on 20 January and threatening the Myitkyina-Hpakant road with the capture of Namtein outpost on 2 February. There were also attacks in Mansi Township, including the capture of the Si Kham Gyi base, which had been held by the junta for 30 years. On 7 March the KIA simultaneously launched attacks on over ten junta outposts in eastern Kachin. Fighting primarily took place along the highway between Bhamo and the Kachin State capital, Myitkyina, as well as around Laiza. The attacks were the beginning of a wider offensive in Kachin State- colloquially termed Operation 0307. Over 8 March, the KIA seized three major junta bases and several outposts, including Hpyun Pyen Bum, the junta's closest forward base to KIA headquarters in Laiza. The KIA and AA defending Laiza alleged that junta airstrikes had landed on the Chinese side of the border, east of Laiza. During the fighting, the leader of the junta-aligned Lisu "Wuyang People's Militia", U Shwe Min, was killed. By 22 March, the KIA claimed to have captured over 50 military outposts and 13 strategically significant junta bases around the Myitkyina-Bhamo Road. In April, the KIA had captured the key Chinese border trade hub of Lweje, cut off a major road to Hpakant, and captured Sezin. and Hsinbo. Within Hsinbo, they cut off the Bhamo-Myitkyina road and encircled Bhamo. The KIA then launched simultaneous offensives throughout Waingmaw Township and around Sumprabum, capturing several junta bases, camps and command centers. By 8 May, they had captured 11 battalion headquarters throughout the state and captured Sumprabum Township. Through the rest of May, the KIA captured Momauk after junta soldiers retreated, attacked a bridge at the entrance of the state capital Myitkyina. and made gains in Mansi and Tanai The KIA took an additional dozen junta bases in Waingmaw Township starting in 20 May, securing their positions. At the same time, the Rakhine offensive continued through March. On 5 March, the Arakan Army captured Ponnagyun and threatening the regional capital Sittwe, only 33 kilometres away. On 17 March, continued Arakan Army assaults took Rathedaung and its township, cutting off Sittwe from the rest of Rakhine by land. On 12 March, after an 85-day battle, the Arakan Army captured the town of Ramree. The capture of Ramree brought nearly all of Ramree Island under the Arakan Army's control except for the deep sea port city of Kyaukphyu. On 24 March, the Arakan Army began an offensive in central Rakhine concurrently with their offensive on Sittwe, launching attacks on Ann, the headquarters of the junta's Western Command. North of Ann, the Arakan Army launched attacks on neighbouring Ngape Township in Magway Region. Ann's location is strategically important as the link between Rakhine and Magway via the Minbu-Ann road through the Arakan Mountains and as a gateway preventing AA from attacking southern Rakhine State. Through April, the Arakan Army captured a portion of the Ann-Minbu Highway, cutting off Ann from neighboring Padein, and captured bases in the hilltops of Ann township. Northern Rakhine offensives saw little territory change until 3 May when the Arakan Army captured the headquarters of the Border Guard Police in Maungdaw Township at Kyee Kan Pyin, forcing at least 128 junta soldiers to cross the border into Bangladesh. Buthidaung and its surrounding township fell to the Arakha Army on 18 May. After its capture, Rohingya activists accused the Arakan Army of burning and targeting Rohingya homes in the town, a claim which the Arakan Army denied. On 29 May, junta and allied Arakan Liberation Army soldiers killed over 70 villagers in Byian Phyu near Sittwe due to suspected Arakan Army sympathies in the village. From late May to early June, the Arakan Army launched attacks on the remainder of Maungdaw Township. On 16 June, the AA urged the residents of Maungdaw to evacuate the town, claiming that all junta bases in the township had either been captured or encircled, and that they would attack the town. In response, the Bangladesh Navy deployed warships to the disputed St. Martin's Island, which had been shot at several times by junta forces. On 4 July, the AA entered Maungdaw, attacking the last junta holdout in the town. On 20 March, the Karen National Liberation Army and its PDF allies began to besiege the town of Papun, the capital of Hpapun District, Karen State. Eight days later, the town was captured, with fighting moving to the hills outside the town. After a prolonged siege and several days of negotiations, on 5 April over 600 junta soldiers and their families in Myawaddy surrendered to the KNU and withdrew across the border to Mae Sot, leaving only the 275th Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) near the western entrance to defend the town. By 10 April, KNLA and PDF troops captured the LIB base with the 200 LIB soldiers withdrawing to the 2nd Thai-Myanmar Friendship Bridge on the border. This prompted Thailand to deploy the 3rd Army along the border. The junta sent reinforcements to retake the town, but they were stalled in Kyondoe. On 12 April, Thai officials and the KNU confirmed the capture of Myawaddy. The junta retaliated with airstrikes although locals reported no KNLA presence in the streets. Despite the KNLA's major role in the battle, they ceded control of the town to the Karen National Army (KNA) to ensure security and reportedly due to the KNA's role in negotiations for the initial surrender. On 19 April the KNLA attacked the remaining LIB 275th soldiers who were still holding out under the 2nd Thai-Myanmar Friendship Bridge. The junta responded with airstrikes, killing several civilians and forcing the KNLA to delay further attacks. After Myawaddy's capture the junta launched Operation Aung Zeya, a counteroffensive to retake the town led by Light Infantry Division (LID) 55, numbering around 1,000 and reportedly led by the junta's second-in-command Soe Win. On 16 April, the LID 55 began attempting to cross the Dawna Range but was continually intercepted by the KNLA and allies, being forced to retreat and reportedly experiencing heavy losses. Early in the counteroffensive KNLA forces withdrew from most of Kawkareik. On 21 April, a junta convoy was routed in Kawkareik Township, but junta forces successfully recaptured Kawkareik the next day despite losing vehicles to the KNLA. On 23 April, the KNA helped the LIB 275th soldiers sheltering under the 2nd Friendship Bridge to retake their base west of Myawaddy. The following day, KNU spokesman stated that they would "temporarily withdraw" from Myawaddy, but vowed to continue guerrilla attacks along the AH1. The stalled LID 55 advancement moving through the Dawna Range reached the Taw Naw waterfall by 29 April. However, the counteroffensive stalled again, without any major gains the following month. Residents reported that the KNA had helped "hundreds" of junta soldiers to reach Myawaddy through forested paths. Karenni resistance continued with Operation 1111 aiming to capture Kayah State and its capital Loikaw. On 12 January, joint Karenni forces captured Pekon in neighboring Shan State. On 29 January, the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF) captured the town of Mawchi. On 14 February, combined forces of the Karenni Army (KA) and KNDF captured the town of Shadaw after almost a month-long battle, marking the second township to be completely captured in the state. Karenni forces captured Hpasawng and most of Hpasawng Township on 14 March. In a joint statement on 23 March, the KNDF and allies announced that they were in control of nearly 90% of Kayah State, having captured 65 junta positions throughout the state, and six out of nine towns in Kayah[q] (excluding Moebye in Southern Shan State). On 20 January 2024, local resistance forces in Ye Township, Mon State intensified attacks, announcing their intent to capture Ye. On 14 February, the New Mon State Party (Anti-Military Dictatorship) (MNLA-AMD) split from the Mon National Liberation Army (a signatory of the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement) and effectively declared war on the junta. Around 22 March, Mon State resistance groups began vehicle inspections near Kaleinaung, prompting the junta close roads. On 25 March, the MNLA-AMD and allies, captured the Kawt Bein Police Station in Kawkareik Township, Karen State. In response, junta forces shelled the Kawt Bein area and eventually recaptured the area after a battle on 25 April. On 8 April, Mon PDF forces launched drone attacks on the Southeastern Command headquarters in Mawlamyine while junta deputy commander-in-chief Soe Win was present. Whether Soe Win was affected remains unknown. On 29 May, junta forces launched an offensive to resecure Loikaw from Karenni resistance โ€“ which had controlled around 80% of the city since November 2023. Junta columns advanced on Loikaw, reaching Kayan Tha Yar village 10 kilometres north of Loikaw the next day and then the Loikaw-Mobye-Hsi Hseng intersection by 3 June before stalling. On 25 June, Karenni resistance captured Maesalawng Hill, near Bawlakhe, after a six day offensive. From 8 May to 20 May, junta forces also conducted an offensive throughout Thayetchaung Township, the longest of such offensives in Tanintharyi Region since the 2021 coup. The offensive displaced 5,000 civilians from 8 villages. In late May, junta forces captured Pedak outpost on the road between Dawei and Myeik. In early June, around 600 junta soldiers were sent to recapture areas of the Ye - Dawei highway from Karen, Mon, and PDF forces who had captured the highway in March, The junta used heavy artillery and the resistance warned civilians to avoid the road, accusing the junta of using human shields and reinforcements disguised as civilians. On 1 July, junta forces launched an offensive on the Zardi Village Tract of Yebyu Township, attempting to recapture areas surrounding the Dawei Special Economic Zone. In June 2024, the Three Brotherhood Alliance's Haigeng ceasefire with the junta broke down seeing junta battalions destroyed and multiple towns in Shan state and beyond fall to the resistance, culminating in the capture of the Northern Shan State capital and headquarters of the Northeast Command, Lashio, in August 2024. Outside Shan State, the Myanmar military faced significant losses in Rakhine State where the Arakan Army gained almost full control by August 2024. In Mandalay, the Brotherhood Alliance and other armed groups escalated attacks, getting close to Mandalay. Despite these setbacks, the military continued efforts to reassert control, including forming new militias and intensifying conscription across the country. Although 1027 began in Shan State, widespread escalation dramatically shifted the balance of power, leading to EAOs in other areas making dominant gains and crippling the military junta with personnel attrition and historic levels of defections. While it took until June for the Haigeng ceasefire to fully break down, tensions began as early as March. The ceasefire was formalised on 1 March at a meeting in Kunming, with the junta reportedly agreeing to recognise the MNDAA's authority over Kokang. But as early as 26 March, junta forces attempted to invade MNDAA territory near Lashio but was repelled militarily. In response, the Chinese ambassador to Myanmar met with the junta foreign minister to discuss ending the clashes. Tensions began to grow again in Northern Shan State on 9 June after the junta launched airstrikes on TNLA positions in Mongmit Township. TNLA would accuse the junta of violating the ceasefire. Through mid-June, junta forces amassed near 3BA-territories and destroyed roads in the area On 23 June, the junta clashed with Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) near Lashio. and with the TNLA around Kyaukme, Nawnghkio Township, and Mogok Township on 24 June. On 25 June, the TNLA announced that it had restarted Operation 1027 in Northern Shan State, and encircled Kyaukme. On 26 June, most of Nawnghkio was captured by PDF and TNLA forces. By 28 June, the TNLA had captured most of the district capital town Kyaukme and continued attacking the junta bases around the town. Concurrently in early June, the Arakan Army made significant gains in southern Rakhine state. On 2 June, clashes erupted on the Thandwe-Taungup highway and near the resort beach of Ngapali, Thandwe Township, trapping resort goers. Over the next week, the fighting moved closer to Thandwe, forcing the Thandwe Airport to close. On 15 June, the Arakan Army clashed with junta forces near neighbouring Taungup and on the Taungup-Pandaung road. After months of relative peace in the area, heavy clashes broke out outside of Kyaukphyu on 17 June as junta forces left Danyawaddy naval base. On 23 June, AA forces captured Thandwe Airport, the first airport to be captured by resistance forces since the 2021 coup. The airport's capture was not confirmed for another week, with AA claiming that 400 junta soldiers had died in the battle. The AA began attacking the beach itself on 26 June. On 17 July, AA forces captured Thandwe itself after three weeks of fighting. Various Chin actors continued the war against the junta in early 2024, with resistance efforts picking up in May. However, in June, the Chin resistance began to engage in conflict with each other as infighting increased in June. Signs of infighting began as early as January when CDFs and CNA clashed with the Maraland Defence Force (MDF), a CBA member. The infighting in Chin State became broadly split along those aligned with the Chin Brotherhood Alliance (CBA) and the Chinland Council, which is dominated by the Chin National Army (CNA). Local Chinland Defense Forces (CDFs) are generally aligned with the CBA, though some like the CDF-Mara are aligned with the CNA. On 2 May 2024, CBA aligned groups captured the strategic town of Kyindwe, Kanpetlet Township with the aid of the Arakan Army during the conclusion of the four-month long Battle of Kyindwe. The CC would then attempt to take Tonzang from the junta and its ally the Zomi Revolutionary Army capturing the town and neighbouring Cikha by 21 May. The following week, the CBA moved on neighbouring Tedim, By mid-June, the junta pushing back from Tedim, recaptured positions along the Tedim-Kalay road and took back Kennedy Peak. Junta forces pushed as far as to recapture the strategic Tainngen village before losing both Kennedy Peak and Taingen to Chinland Council-led counteroffensives and retreating to Khaing Kham by 27 June. On 27 July, the CNA and ZRA met in Aizawl for peace negotiations. On 30 May, CDF-Matupi captured the district administrative office on the Matupi-Hakha road in Matupi Township. On 24 June, CDFs clashed with junta forces outside of the Chin State capital Hakha. The junta retaliated by setting fires to homes in the town. On 20 July, as part of "Operation Rung", the CDF-Hakha captured the Hakha Main Police Station, releasing 62 detainees. On 9 June, the CBA, Arakan Army and Magway-based Yaw Army began "Operation Chin Brotherhood" attacking Matupi. Shortly after the announcement, the Chinland Council issued a statement asking the Arakan Army to refrain from military and administrative operations in Chinland. This came days after Global Khumi Organisation urged the Arakha Army against committing human rights violations against the Khumi Chin people of Paletwa Township. Operation Chin Brotherhood continued with CBA aligned forces capturing one of the two junta battalion bases outside Matupi on 17 June. Clashes between the CBA and CNA broke out during the push towards the final base, leading to 2 CBA deaths. The CNA/Chinland Council was forced to retreat from the Matupi area by 24 June On 29 June, the CBA captured the remaining junta base near Matupi and took over the town. Infighting continued with CNA detaining other Yaw Defense Force soldiers and MDF and AA taking Lailenpi, Matupi Township from the CDF-Mara and CNA. On 4 June renewed clashes broke out outside of Momeik. A week later, KIA forces captured the Waingmaw-Sadung-Kanpaikti road, cutting off the state capital Myitkyina from the border. On 15 July, junta forces launched an offensive to recapture areas near Momauk. A month later, on 19 August, KIA forces captured the last junta base in Momauk, completing their capture of the township. Shortly after, junta forces launched another counteroffensive to retake the town, but were stalled at Aung Myay village. On 1 July, junta forces began attacking KNDF positions south of Pinlaung, attempting to relieve the Karenni siege on Pekon. In early July, fighting further intensified in Loikaw as Karenni resistance attempted to recapture areas of the town they had earlier been forced to withdraw from. The Irrawaddy reported on 8 July that fighting is intensifying after reinforcements of 500 troops had arrived to help the already stationed 1,500 Tatmadaw troops. By mid July in Hpasawng Township, there has been reports of fresh intense fighting, incl. Karenni claims of poisoned gas use by Tatmadaw against the resistance fighters. Meanwhile, in Loikaw, pro-Tatmadaw sources confirm fighting in Loikaw, Pekhon and Mobye. In addition it claims Tatmadaw progressed in the direction of Loikaw University. On 2 July, the MNDAA began the Battle of Lashio against the heavily defended capital and largest town of northern Shan State. The TNLA joined the offensive the next day with the 2 armies attacking 4 junta bases surrounding Lashio. Pro-junta Telegram channels accused the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) of joining the offensive. On 5 July, TNLA forces entered Lashio proper from the south. The next day, the MNDAA captured Nampawng village south of Lashio, encircling the town, and began launching attacks into Lashio. Concurrently MNDAA forces clashed with junta forces in Mongyai Township and TNLA began launching attacks into Momeik. Tensions and disputes rose between TNLA and the Shan State Army (SSPP), with both sides asking the United Wa State Army (UWSA) for mediation. On 10 July, the TNLA attacked junta positions near Tangyan. Following an agreement with the Tatmadaw, the neutral UWSA deployed thousands of soldiers around Tangyan to prevent clashes from spreading to the area. On 13 July, SSPP forces occupied Mongyai, with residents claiming that clashes might break out in the town due to the apparent SSPP-junta agreement. On 25 July, in a "historic victory", the MNDAA claimed to have captured the Northeastern Command headquarters of Lashio, the first regional command headquarters to ever be captured by resistance forces. On 30 July, MNDAA forces ambushed junta reinforcements attempting to reach Lashio, inflicting heavy casualties. On 3 August, the capture of Lashio and the Northeastern Command headquarters was confirmed, with hundreds of Burmese soldiers surrendering. The Northeastern Command had exiled their leadership to Muse, which remained the last junta stronghold in the area due to its proximity with the Chinese border. On 14 July, the MNDAA instituted a tenuous 4-day ceasefire after meeting with the Chinese Communist Party. Despite the ceasefire, clashes continued. TNLA and SSPP leaders also met in Panghsang, Wa State, to discuss an end to the clashesn 16 July, TNLA captured most of Mongmit and began launching attacks on the junta headquarters south of the town. At the same time as the renewed 1027 offensive, the NUG announced that it had joined in the offensive through its People's Defense Forces in Mandalay Region, calling the attacks a "Shan Man" operation. As part of Operation Shan-Man, the Mandalay People's Defence Force (MDY-PDF) captured 36 junta positions in late June and early July throughout the northern Mandalay Region. The MDY-PDF and TNLA also captured Nawnghkio on 10 July and Singu Township by 12 July, further cutting off junta forces in Northern Shan State. On 20 July, the 3BA, reportedly under pressure from China, agreed to extend the ceasefire to 31 July. Despite the agreements, junta reinforcements launched renewed attacks on Kyaukme on the same day. On 24 July, TNLA and PDF forces completely captured Mogok, Mandalay Region. The TNLA captured the Shan state towns of Momeik on 31 July and Kyaukme on 6 August. On 10 August, TNLA forces launched an offensive against Hsipaw, capturing the town's prison and then nearby Nawngkawgyi village by 13 August. On 12 August, MDY-PDF captured Tagaung, the first historical capital of the Burmese monarchy, after a one-day battle. The following week, Mandalay-PDF captured Thabeikkyin, capturing the town and its surroundings. The entirety of Thabeikkyin District came under rebel control. After the fall of Lashio, the junta launched counter offensives, but facing an inability to make progress, changed its tactics to favour aerial bombardment to destroy towns they could not take, like Lashio. The rebels, too, have failed to make as much progress due to diplomatic pressures and supply issues. Analyst Yun Sun from the Stimson Center noted Director of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission Wang Yi's visit in mid-August as indicative of a shift in China's stance from greenlighting Operation 1027 in November 2023 to endorsing the State Administration Council and criticising the Northern Alliance and the United Wa State Army (UWSA) for not standing down. There are signs that China is accelerating weapons transfers to the junta and restricting key ammunition supplies to the TNLA, affecting the resistance's realistic prospects of taking Mandalay despite the junta being in its weakest position since 2021. However, this recent alignment with the military regime has strained its influence over border groups like the 3BA, diminishing China's sway and ability to mediate in this new landscape. China's support temporarily slowed the rebels' momentum but failed to reverse the trend of humiliating losses, including the fall of a second Regional Military Command in Ann, Rakhine State. Instead, China finds its interests threatened as the Arakan Army surround Kyaukphyu and Kachin groups seize control of rare earth mineral mines. Chinese-backed peace talks and pressure for MNDAA to retreat from Lashio continued in early 2025 but failed in late March 2025. In January 2025, The New York Times reported that the rebels were opening colleges and universities in the territory they controlled. In late August 2024, the Tatmadaw began preparing an offensive to recapture key towns in northern Shan State, terming it as "Operation Hsin Phyu Shin" (after the Burmese king Hsinbyushin). Throughout September and October, the Tatmadaw began massing forces in the final towns it controlled in Northern Shan State (Namlan, Mongyai, and Tangyan) in preparation for the counteroffensive to retake Lashio. This came in the context of strained China-3BA relations. On 29 August, the Ruili City Security Commission issued a statement demanding the TNLA to end all offensive operations against the junta, threatening "more deterrent and disciplinary measures" if it did not. 4 days later, the junta designated the Three Brotherhood Alliance and its members as "terrorist groups". On 19 September, the MNDAA announced that it would end its offensive operations, further stating it would refuse to ever work with the National Unity Government of Myanmar. Despite the Chinese threat, the TNLA captured the last junta base in Hsipaw on 13 October. On 19 October, Tatmadaw forces launched a counteroffensive, aimed at retaking Nawnghkio instead of Lashio. On 18 November, it was confirmed that MNDAA leader Peng Daxun had been detained in Yunnan by Chinese authorities since late October, further pressuring MNDAA forces to relinquish Lashio to the junta. In early December, the MNDAA declared a unilateral ceasefire and expressed willingness to engage in peace talks with the junta, with China acting as a mediator. The MNDAA announced its readiness to send a high-level delegation for dialogue to resolve conflicts through political means. However, despite this announcement, airstrikes on TNLA-held areas continued. On 20 January 2025, the MNDAA and the junta agreed to a Chinese-brokered ceasefire, with several sources claiming that a withdraw of the former from Lashio was a condition for the deal. However, at the time neither the junta nor the MNDAA revealed any details of the deal. The pressure for MNDAA to retreat from Lashio continued but ceasefire talks failed in late March 2025. In early August, the PNLA launched a renewed assault on the outskirts of Hsi Hseng after junta forces in the town bombed the PNLA headquarters in Mawkmai Township. At the same time, the junta-allied PNO intensified military preparations by training 10,000 militia members in Pinlaung Township, in southern Shan State, aimed at bolstering the defense of Naypyitaw. On 10 September, the PNLO split after disputes surrounding a ceasefire with the junta, with pro-ceasefire leaders breaking off to form the "PNLO-NCA-S." On 19 September, the Tatmadaw and allied Lahu military attacked a Shan State Army (RCSS) base in Yanghkam, Mong Ping Township. The People's Defence Forces also continued fighting outside of the Shan-Man context. On 11 June, the Union Liberation Front and Sagaing Region People's Defence Organisation captured a junta base near the Sagaing capital Monywa. On 27 June, a coalition of several PDFs attacked Budalin. On 17 July, People's Defense Forces launched 2 rockets at Nay Pyi Taw International Airport, causing no casualties. On 10 August, PDFs in Myingyan District, central Mandalay Region, launched an offensive against Taungtha and Natogyi. Natogyi was briefly captured before being recaptured by the junta soon after. On 15 August, PDF launched an offensive on Tabayin, Sagaing Region, again capturing the town by 18 August briefly before withdrawing shortly after due to junta counter attacks. In mid-August, the KIA and PDF launched joint offensives on Indaw, Pinlebu, and Htigyaing, Sagain Region. Resistance forces captured Pinlebu on 8 October, defeating almost 800 junta soldiers. On 11 November, the Burma National Revolutionary Army and several other PDF's launched attacks on Pale before being forced to retreat due to junta counterattacks. On 7 September, KIA forces began attacking Singtawnโ€”outside Hpakantโ€”after junta forces raided a hotel in the area, capturing the village one month later. In late September, it was reported that junta forces were preparing an offensive to retake Sumprabum and Tiyangzug. On 29 September, the KIA launched an offensive on Chipwi and Hsawlaw, capturing both towns by 2 October. Shortly after, the KIA asked the Kachin Border Guard Forces to defect, but were denied. In response, the KIA launched an offensive on Kachin BGF battalions 1002 and 1003, capturing both by 22 October. The KIA then captured the Kachin BGF's headquarters in the town of Pang War on 20 October with Kachin BGF leader Zahkung Ting Ying fled to China. On 1 November, the KIA launched an attack on the final BGF 1001 bases at Nuzaungbaung and Phimaw, capturing both by the next day. Border Guard Forces fled to Kangfang (Ganfai), which the KIA captured days later. On 10 November, KIA forces completed the capture of Kachin Special Region 1 and all of the Kachin BGF territory when they took Lanse village. On 20 November, despite Chinese pressure, the KIA captured Kanpaikti, the final Kachin BGF base. In December, the KIA and allies attacked Myanmar junta targets in Bhamo and Mansi townships. In early August, the Chin National Army and allies took in Thantlang after about a week of fighting. On 9 November, the Chin Brotherhood Alliance relaunched Operation Chin Brotherhood, launching simultaneous offensives on Falam and Mindat, capturing most of the former. In December 2024, the Chin Brotherhood Alliance (CBA) achieved significant victories in Chin State. On 15 December 123 junta troops and police officers from Mindat district and township police compounds, together with their families, surrendered to the CBA. On 21 December, the CBA declared Mindat a junta-free zone following the rescue of 13 political prisoners. These victories further consolidated the CBA's control in the region and demonstrated the strength of Operation Chin Brotherhood. After the capture of Thandwe, Arakan Army forces launched an offensive south towards Gwa, capturing Kyeintali by 14 August 2024. On 5 September, the AA captured Maung Shwe Lay Naval Base, the first naval base to be captured by resistance forces. On 25 September, the AA launched an offensive on the remaining bases in Ann. By 25 October, the AA captured the remaining Mae Taung bases, encircled Ann, and captured the town's airport. On 7 November, the AA launched an offensive on neighboring Taungup. The Arakan Army captured Maungdaw in the first half of December, after securing the junta's last remaining position there. The AA captured General Thurein Tun during the operation. In December 2024, the AA achieved significant victories in Rakhine State. On 8 December, the AA captured Maungdaw Township, securing full control over the 271-kilometer border with Bangladesh. This strategic gain was followed by the seizure of the Western Regional Command headquarters in Ann Township on 20 December, marking the second regional command center to fall to ethnic armed groups within five months. On 29 December, the AA extended its campaign by seizing full control of Gwa Township, the southernmost town in Rakhine State, after junta troops retreated from the area. This victory further consolidated the AA's dominance in the region, leaving only a few townships under junta control. The AA's leadership has since expressed readiness to engage in political dialogue to seek resolution to the ongoing conflict. In January 2025, Arakan Army and joint PDF forces pushed into Shwethaungyan Subtownship, northwest Ayeyarwaddy Region taking the village of Magyizin. Battles with the junta intensified in the area as the Myanmar Navy increased bombardments to the Bawmi coastline area near Magyizin by 20 January 2025. By late March, AA had reached the eastern side of the Arakan mountains taking villages in Lemyethna Township near the Pathein-Monywa Highway. After the Karen National Army set a five-month deadline in May 2024 for Chinese scamming operatives to leave Myawaddy, many have migrated to the Three Pagodas Pass, controlled by the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army. Throughout May, the KNLA, aided by allies, captured all but three of the remaining junta bases in Hpapun Township. On 1 June, clashes erupted between KNLA-led forces and joint Karen National Army/junta forces near Tonetatdar. A source close to the junta claimed that Karen National Army (KNA) soldiers were coordinating to join with junta soldiers from Operation Aung Zeya to retake Myawaddy, Thingannyinaung and to attack the Asian Highway 1 (AH1). However, after being stalled for months by ambushes on the AH1, the Aung Zeya column was forced to retreat to Kawkareik. On 9 August, KNLA forces clashed with junta reinforcements near Zayatkyi, Htantabin Township. In December 2024, the KNLA achieved significant victories in Kayin State. On 17 December, the KNLA attacked the Swe Taw Kone junta camp near Lay Kay Kaw village, capturing prisoners and seizing weapons. Additionally, the KNLA recaptured its former headquarters, Manerplaw, on the Thai border, further consolidating its control in the region. In early August, the Tatmadaw and civilian sources reported that the Tatmadaw had secured Loikaw and much of the surrounding township. On 5 September, the KNDF attempted to assassinate Tatmadaw leader Min Aung Hlaing while he was visiting Loikaw. As of 20 September 2024, the Myanmar junta only controlled Loikaw and Bawlakhe townships. During October, fighting shifted to North Kayah State after the flooding of Typhoon Yagi. Tatmadaw troops and Pa-O militia attacked several Karenni resistance-held settlements including Pinlaung, Mobye and Pekon. Pekon was taken in a military counter-offensive, taking advantage of the flooding caused by Yagi. However, Karenni leadership did not believe that the Tatmadaw aimed to hold the territory, as the Tatmadaw needed helicopters to maintain some supply lines. Fighting was reported in early December along the Pekon-Moebye-Loikaw road. On 29 October 2024, several Karenni resistance groups were reported to have united as the Kayan National Army. In January 2025, the town of Demoso was reported to have become a major centre for refugees, housing some 150,000 displaced civilians. Tatmadaw has succeeded in taking Mobye, the town, during its offensive in December. Now as of early February the KNDF launches an advance to retake the town. In early March, there were reports of air and artillery strikes in Pekhon and Loikaw. While KNDF had announced it launched an offensive to retake Mobye from Tatmadaw, who had taken it in December. The junta was reported to have taken high casualties when taking the town. With KNDF now defending against a junta bid to "reclaim" Mobye from KNDF. The junta sent reinforcements from Loikaw to help in this effort. Additional areas are mentioned, with the Irrawaddy citing an KNDF member saying: "Fighting has also broken out in [Karenniโ€™s] Loikaw, Hpasaung, and Bawlakhae townships over the past month, but Mobye has seen the heaviest clashes. The junta has suffered significant casualties while we have also lost some comrades". Mobye is strategically located 40 km from Loikaw. On 28 March 2025, the 2025 Myanmar earthquake struck, deepening the nation's humanitarian crisis and shifting the focus of the civil war. The resistance, junta, and EAOs all declared various unilateral ceasefires that were observed to varying degrees. The junta continued airstrikes on civilian targets under the guise of defending against the resistance. It used the chaos to position itself as the only actor capable of coordinating a disaster response, attempting to block aid efforts of the resistance to reinforce its authority. But this also gave the resistance a chance to show its state-building efforts to gain legitimacy as a governing body in resistance-held areas by organising aid and evacuation and highlighting the junta's attempts to block relief. The earthquake also entangled the civil war with international actors as relief organisations navigated the complex situation on the ground. Far from being a moment of unity, the disaster allowed external actors to consolidate influence and the military to secure its symbolic authority rather than delivering relief equitably. Beyond aid, China orchestrated the MNDAA's handover of Lashio to the junta in part by exploiting the post-earthquake political vacuum to tighten its grip on Myanmar's borderlands. Meanwhile, offensives continued in areas unaffected by the earthquake or ceasefire declarations, like in Indaw and Karen State. After the earthquake, the NUG announced a two week unilateral pause in offensive actions to coordinate humanitarian efforts with the UN and non-governmental groups and provide access to resistance held areas. The air base in Monywa continued operations against resistance-held Chaung-U Township, deploying a paradrop attack at 19:00 MMT on the day of the earthquake.[citation needed] The following day, the junta resumed aerial bombardment on territories held by resistance forces in Karen, northern Shan, Bago and Sagaing regions. The People's Defence Force, a rebel force, said they would observe a partial ceasefire for two weeks beginning on 30 March. Despite this, the junta conducted a bombing campaign in Pauk Township, Sagaing Region. An airstrike in Singu Township, Mandalay, on 31 March injured several residents and burnt down their homes. On 1 April 2025, the Three Brotherhood Alliance announced a one-month unilateral humanitarian pause, refraining from offensive operations in conflict areas to facilitate post-earthquake rescue efforts. But junta leader Min Aung Hlaing announced on Myawaddy TV that he would continue military operations against rebels. The next day, the military fired warning shots at a Chinese Red Cross aid convoy. Later that day, Min Aung Hlaing announced that he would implement a 20-day ceasefire until 22 April. The KIA announced that it would similarly cease offensive operations later that day. The next day, the junta conducted an aerial bombing campaign in Indaw, Sagaing Region and continued firing artillery in Bhamo, Kachin State. By 7 April, joint ABSDF and PDF forces had captured Indaw completely. On 1 May, The Three Brotherhood Alliance again announced a ceasefire, extending it to 31 May for the extended support of post-earthquake recovery. Despite ceasefires, fighting in Nawnghkio Township continued, with the TNLA losing eight outposts to the junta. The junta also continued bombings to push a counteroffensive to retake Madaya Township in Mandalay Region. On 12 May, the junta launched airstrikes on a village school in Depayin, killing around 50, mostly children, despite the declared ceasefire. In July, the junta successfully pushed back against the TNLA and allied PDF forces, recapturing Nawnghkio in northeast Shan State on 15 July. A junta flotilla aided troops to land in Thabeikkyin in northern Mandalay Region, capturing the town on 23 July. As part of this amphibious operation, the junta also ramped up airstrikes in southern Sagain to protect the flotilla. However, the flotilla was ambushed further upstream after Thabeikkyin north of Shwegu by PDF forces, preventing it from aiding in the continuing Battle of Bhamo. As of November 2025, the battle is still ongoing. As of 30th November, Tatmadaw has begun an counter-offensive to retake all of the city. The PDF and allied KIA forces captured several Tatmadaw and Shanni Nationalities Army bases near the town of Banmauk starting on 17 September 2025. Banmauk was then besieged by the Shanni National Army. However, three days later, the PDF and the KIA captured Banmauk in northern Sagaing Region. As of December 2025, fighting continued in Banmuk. By January 2026, the junta took half of Banmuk, and by February 8, most of the town had fallen to the SNA and Tatmadaw. In early October 2025, the junta recaptured the district-level town of Kyaukme from the TNLA as part of their ongoing counteroffensive. By mid-October, Hsipaw fell to the Junta. TNLA signed a ceasefire with the Tatmadaw and agreed to cede Mogoke and Mongmit. After the TNLA withdrawal, the PDF moved into Mogok to take control of it. The Tatmadaw continued to advance against the PDF, taking among other places the Sedawgyi Dam. By mid-November, BNI reported that the Tatmadaw counter-offensive had retaken numerous cities amounting to 11.3% of the land it lost during Operation 1027. The Ta'ang National Army, as of mid-November, threatened the PDF that it would 'escort' the Tatmadaw into Mogok. In the second half of November, accusations were levied against TNLA over the secession of Mogok. Amid pressure, the PDF gave up Mogok. Fighting broke out between the Tatmadaw and KIA along the Mogokโ€“Momeik road. The PDF was reported to be fighting alongside KIA. Amid the fighting, Tatmadaw opted to set fire to parts of Mogok. Fighting for the town of Mogok itself continued. The TNLA deployed troops to protect Tatmadaw in Mogomit. In addition, the TNLA also posted 100 troops on the Mongmit-Mantong road, preventing an advance by the rebels from the east. Meanwhile, the Tatmadaw was digging trenches in Mogomit to prevent KIA and PDF from taking the town. As of January 16, 2026, junta is in control of Mogok and Momeik with PDF having been in the cities before TNLA's handover. As of January, fighting is still ongoing especially in Htonehpo, Hwayleik, and Konemakan villages. NUG also established the Mogok-Momeik Region Operation Command on November 9. Major General Tar Bone Kyaw, explains the reason the TNLA was forced to sign the agreement with Tatmadaw was because of shortages of ammunition and funding and a decline in troop strength. Pincer movement in progress by Tatmadaw against Singu with some villages already fallen to the advance. The Resistance enters Katha. Tatmadaw solidifies its hold on the Mogok area. In Chin State, the district capital Falam was captured by the Chin Brotherhood on 7 April 2025. The junta also continued bombing campaigns in Rakhine State, destroying parts of the hospital in Arakan Army-controlled Ponnagyun on 28 March, with the Arakan Army continuing offensive operations in Kyaukphyu Township. On 14 April 2025, a joint force of the Karen National Liberation Army and the PDF launched a coordinated offensive against juntaโ€™s headquarters and bases in Kyondoe, southern Karen State. On 9 May, the KNA and its allies and seized the juntaโ€™s Htee Khee base on the Thai border in Dawei Township, Tanintharyi Region, capturing the border trade hub and strategic link in the oil and gas trade route between Dawei and Thailand. On 10 June, the armed forces of the Burmese Communist Party shot down a junta fighter jet during the battle for Kan Dauk police station in Pale Township, Sagaing Region. It was the tenth such shoot-down since 2021. By 19 June, the Communists had taken the village and pushed out the junta forces. As of September 2025, the junta was making gains at Myawaddy, advancing some 14 kilometres. Lay Kay Kaw, south of the city, was stormed by the Tatmadaw. Fierce fighting nearby continued during late October with Tatmadaw making gains and Lay Kay Kaw changing hands. The KNU took Mawdaung from the Tatmadaw in November 2025. As of January 2026, there was fresh fighting in Myawaddy, and a new rebel group called the KNA was formed. In September 2025, the Tatmadaw launched an offensive to relieve encircled cities in Rahkine, with some initial victories for the Arakan Army. As heavy fighting continued, more Arakan victories were reported. As of late October, the Tatmadaw sent reinforcements to the Sittwe front and the first reports of Tatmadaw advances emerged in late October. Pyinshwe, Kalarbar, and Thaingchaung fell to the Tatmadaw hands. The Battle of Kyaukphyu began over control of the township. Fighting raged between the Tatmadaw and Arakan Army, with some territorial advances reported for the latter. The battle of Sittwe was still raging as of January 2026. The Irrawaddy has listed a numbers of battles fought in 2025 between the Arakan Army and Tatmadaw, included clashes in Maungdawโ€“Buthidaung, Sittwe, Kyaukphyu, Nat Yay Kan, Padaung and Ayeyarwady. In February 2026, the Tatmadaw was reported to be intensifying its offensive efforts to enter Arakan territory. In January 2026, fighting erupted for Penwegon town in Bago. On 18 April, junta administrators and the Myanmar Police Force re-entered Lashio as part of a deal with the MNDAA. Reportedly, the junta will control the city; the MNDAA retains administration over Lashio's outskirts. Over the following two days, a convoy of vehicles flying the Chinese flag, whose occupants identified themselves as members of the Ceasefire Monitoring Group, drove into Lashio from China. On 21 April, the MNDAA lowered its flags in Lashio but its police officers and administrators functioned as before. The MNDAA then retreated to checkpoints five miles north and three miles south, continuing to surround the city and control portions of Lashio's outer wards. The quake affected residents, limiting their water access. However, combat also continued in the Kayah theatre with junta airstrikes in Hrupso and Loikaw townships. Reportedly, some Karenni civilians initially confused the earthquake with airstrikes. Several villages saw combat along the Loikaw-Hsihseng road. There were reports that the Tatmadaw controlled Loikaw, Bawlakhe and Hpasawng in Karenni, as well as the MOC 7 in Pekon town, southern Shan as of early April. An undercover BBC team reported daily fighting in Mobye, with frontlines some 100 meters from a military base located there. In late June, fighting continued to be intense with homes in Saung Nan Khae being burnt by the junta. On 3 July, Mobye was taken by the Tatmadaw. In December, the election in Loikaw was reported to be restless, with forced voting and bombings. On 19 August 2025, the Tatmadaw claimed control of Demoso. Karenni resistance forces denied the junta had taken full control of the town and said there was still fierce fighting for control, but admitted that the centre of the town had been taken by Tatmadaw from the Karenni. By end of August, battle for Demoso ongoing, control split between Tatmadaw and Karenni resistance. As of early September, despite claims of fighting by the Karenni resistance, many news agencies still list Demoso in Tatmadaw hands. Bawyan has seeing heavy fighting since September 2025. During December the Karenni coalition launched a counter-offensive in the Pekon Township, around Salong, lasting until 8 December. Both sides suffered casualties and fighting was described as "really intense". With fighting occurring in the Bawyan, Salong North and Salong South villages. Tatmadaw was reported to have seen the use of artillery and drones. During the second week of September, Tatmadaw armoured columns had managed to move into the three villages. In February 2026, the Tatmadaw was reported to have broken the siege of Hpasawng with "overwhelming" forces, employing artillery and suicide drones. The KNDF is restricting access to the Thanlwin River located three kilometres south of the town. The Tatmadaw reportedly fought dozens of clashes with the Karenni resistance. In December 2025, the Spring Revolution Alliance was formed by 19 member groups largely consisting of groups adjacent to the PDF, forming a 10,000 member coalition. In January 2026, a new Chin Peopleโ€™s Army was formed by merging CDFโ€“Mindat, CDFโ€“Matupi, CDFโ€“Kanpetlet, and CDFโ€“Daai. Humanitarian impact and war crimes The human rights situation in Myanmar has deteriorated substantially since the beginning of the civil conflict. The Burmese military has escalated its use of war crimes, including murder, mass killings, sexual violence, torture, arbitrary detention, attacks on religious buildings, and targeting civilians. The junta has also seized the properties of political opponents as part of an intimidation strategy, impacting hundreds of families. BBC News reports that the pro-junta paramilitary Pyusawhti militias have been accused of more than one atrocity against civilians. Since the onset of the civil conflict, both the Burmese military and resistance forces alike have used educational facilities as bases and detention sites. In 2021, over 190 violent attacks on schools were reported in 13 of Myanmar's states and regions. As of June 2022, 7.8 million children remained out of school. Myanmar's public health system has effectively collapsed, and the civil war has worsened the country's food security crisis, with one in four people experiencing food insecurity. Poverty and food insecurity have disproportionately affected Myanmar's Dry Zone and the Irrawaddy delta regions, which account for over 80% of the country's agricultural area and are home to a third of the country's population. As of September 2022, 1.3 million people had been internally displaced, and over 13,000 children had been killed. By March 2023, the UN estimated that since the coup, 17.6 million people in Myanmar required humanitarian assistance, while 1.6 million were internally displaced, and 55,000 civilian buildings had been destroyed. In March 2023 Volker Tรผrk, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, reported that armed conflict had continued to grow. He stated that they were investigating hundreds of incidents of houses being burnt and civilians, including children, being killed. Overall, 15.2 million people faced food insecurity. In March 2024 Tom Andrews, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar, stated that 18.6 million people were in need of humanitarian aid. On 27 November 2024, the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor Karim Ahmad Khan filed an application for an international arrest warrant for Senior General and Acting President Min Aung Hlaing. As the acting president and commander-in-chief of the Myanmar Defence Services, Min Aung Hlaing "bears criminal responsibility for the crimes against humanity of deportation and persecution of the Rohingya, committed in Myanmar, and in part in Bangladesh," according to Khan. The arrest warrant request is the first by the ICC in its Bangladesh/Myanmar investigation. Human Rights Watch legal advisor Maria Elena Vignoli described the request as "a strong warning to Myanmar's abusive military leaders that they're not beyond the reach of the law". According to the Nyan Lin Thit Research Group, from February 2021 to April 2024, the military junta conducted 2,471 airstrikes across the country which resulted in the deaths of 1,295 civilians including women and children whereas injuring 1,634 others. The attacks destroyed 187 religious buildings, 114 schools, and 39 hospitals. Economic impact Economic conditions in Myanmar have substantially worsened due to the ongoing war and to economic mismanagement by the SAC. In 2021, Myanmar's GDP declined by 5.9%. In an interview, Christian Lechervy, the French ambassador to Myanmar, highlighted the impact of the coup on the country's economy: "In 2021, Myanmar's economic growth has contracted by more than 18%, poverty has doubled, the number of people in need of humanitarian aid has multiplied by seven and more than 450,000 people have been forced to flee their homes". Between March and June 2022, almost 10,000 people per month left the country through official channels, worsening the country's brain drain and mirroring the civilian exodus that followed the 1962 and 1988 military coups. The local job market has collapsed. In September 2022 the G7-led Financial Action Task Force announced plans to blacklist Myanmar for failing to stem money laundering and terrorist financing. At that time, only Iran and North Korea were on the Financial Action Task Force blacklist. In October 2022, Myanmar was blacklisted by the task force, which increased volatility in the value of the Burmese kyat. The war disrupted transport and stunted the export of agricultural goods like rice and corn, and the illegal cultivation of poppy became an economic pillar for many Burmese. Myanmar became the world's biggest opium producer, producing about 1,080 metric tons in 2023. In parts of the Dry Zone such as Sagaing Region's Ayadaw Township, cannabis supplanted betel nut, cotton, and rice due to economic downturn and rising pest infestation. During the war there has been a "mass refusal" among Myanmar's people to pay taxes and other charges to the junta, leading to a 33% drop in state revenue according to an analysis by the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M). According to the SAC-M, "69% of businesses reported not paying tax to the junta in the first three months of 2022". The cessation of payments of electricity bills by large portions of the population has also significantly cut off the junta's revenue sources. The conflict also facilitated the conditions for the proliferation of human trafficking into fraud factories in Myanmar. In these facilities, foreign nationals are trafficked into the country and forced to commit online scams. In August 2024 CNN published its year-long investigation concluding that approximately half of Myanmar's 54 million inhabitants live below the poverty line. This dire economic situation compels many to resort to extreme measures, including participating in the illicit trade of human organs online. Such transactions can yield an amount equivalent to two years' worth of salary. People often publicize their intent to sell organs on social media platforms, creating a relentless cycle in which families repeatedly turn to these transactions as their financial resources deplete. By September 2022 the value of the Burmese kyat had depreciated by over 60%, while basic commodity prices had increased by up to 57%. The World Bank estimated Myanmar's economy would contract by 18% in 2022. Since April 2022, the country has experienced foreign currency shortages, which have acutely impacted importers, resulting in shortages of basic products like medicines and fertilisers. The military regime has imposed foreign currency controls, which has worsened the shortage of US dollars among international firms operating in the country. Many foreign and multinational companies, including Telenor, Ooredoo, Chevron, British American Tobacco and Woodside Energy have exited the Burmese market as the conflict has intensified. At the end of July 2023 the SAC announced that it would issue a limited number of new 20,000-kyat banknotes. The announcement led to an increase in the price of gold, as well as in foreign currency exchange rates. In March 2024, it was reported that the civil war had significantly increased prices of everyday goods, such as rice (160โ€“220%), fuel (520%), and palm oil (75%) from prewar levels. Also, the US dollar to Kyat exchange rate had increased by 160%. In April 2024 the price of gold was around 4.5 million kyat per kyattha (a Burmese unit of mass) compared to 1 million per kyattha in February 2021. By May 2024 it was 5.8 million kyat per tical, and by September 2024 it was 7.2 million kyat per tical. The SAC regularly accuses goldsmiths of price manipulation when gold prices rise. An arrest of five traders and the closure of seven shops, caused the price to drop in early April 2024 as traders were fearful of doing business. By May 2024, the U.S. dollar to kyat exchange rate had increased from 1300 before the coup to 5000 on the black market, with the junta reportedly abandoning the fixed exchange rate of 2100. Since the 2021 coup, Myanmarโ€™s military junta has frequently denied or delayed pensions and compensation to families of its own soldiers killed in action, much less Myanmar civilian casualties. Benefits are often withheld unless the soldierโ€™s body is recovered, leaving many widows without financial support. Lower-ranking and conscripted soldiersโ€™ families face the greatest difficulties, while higher-ranked officersโ€™ families sometimes receive reduced payments through rank manipulation. Despite official claims of caring for fallen soldiersโ€™ families, testimonies describe widespread neglect and broken promises. This failure worsens poverty for bereaved families, affecting their ability to support childrenโ€™s education and basic needs. The National Unity Government of Myanmar established an Interim Central Bank (ICB) led by its Planning, Finance and Investment minister, Tin Tun Naing. The goal of establishing this bank is to contest foreign reserves and assets held by the Central Bank in Naypitaw. It was also reported that the ICB seized 44 billion Kyats from other banks. Radio Free Asia explained in regards to Central Banks raising funds for their government; "The NUG has acknowledged raising over $150 million since the coup" and that while "it dwarfs in comparison to the revenue of the junta, which gave itself a raise of 51 percent in FY2023 to $2.7 billionโ€”it's not insignificant either." Under the direction of the ICB there is a newly established for-profit bank called Spring Development Bank, with an intent to establish its own cryptocurrency. Environmental impact The deterioration in law and order in many parts of Myanmar has caused "a surge in illegal mining activities" in rural parts of the country. Environmental activists in Myanmar have accused the junta of supporting illegal mining of rare-earth elements which have "devastating and unpredictable consequences for the regionโ€™s ecosystem and inhabitants". Rivers have been contaminated, causing the destruction of local ecosystems, decreasing community access to clean water and disrupting agricultural activities of local farmers. The junta has cracked down on environmental activists who have criticized the government. The conflict has also seen a significant rise in deforestation in Myanmar. Manpower and procurement A February 2022 report by United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar Tom Andrews stated that China, Russia, India, Belarus, Ukraine, Israel, Serbia, Pakistan and South Korea were selling weapons to the Tatmadaw. The Karen National Union documented the use of North Korean weaponry by the SAC in November 2023. Anti-SAC forces have claimed that the Tatmadaw has severely struggled with recruitment and morale. The Tatmadaw has adopted drones in response to rebel groups using drones. On 31 January 2023 the Ministry of Home Affairs issued a directive enabling organisations and citizens deemed "loyal to the state," including civilians, civil servants, and army personnel, to obtain firearms licenses. The regulatory shift has enabled the SAC to arm pro-military Pyusawhti militias and to suppress pro-democracy forces in light of waning military recruitment and their challenges with concurrently operating in multiple war theatres throughout the country. On 12 February 2023, a leaked document purportedly from the Ministry of Home Affairs detailed the SAC issuing firearms licenses to pro-military civilians for the operation of counter-insurgency paramilitaries based on the new firearm licensing directive. SAC-aligned Pyusawhti militias have reportedly used force to recruit local men, but have been less than effective in building up grassroots enforcement on behalf of the junta, and have "taken root only in the small number of communities where the military's own party is traditionally strong." One man contacted by the BBC in the area where Wathawa has been mobilising since early 2022 said he had only been able to recruit a maximum of 10โ€“15 men in each village, and then only by threatening to burn down their homes. He said many of the recruits had run away, and were being helped by other villagers to hide from Wathawa and his gun-toting monks. In early December 2023, the Tatmadaw-led government appealed for deserters to return, promising them exoneration. The National Unity Government claimed that 20,000 soldiers who had deserted had rejoined its ranks. By 7 December, the junta began freeing soldiers who had been jailed for desertion to ease apparent manpower shortages as a result of battlefield pressures from recent operations. On 10 February 2024 the Tatmadaw announced the People's Military Service Law, requiring all men aged 18 to 35 and women aged 18 to 27 to complete up to two years of mandatory military service, amid its territorial losses. Those who fail to enlist face imprisonment for up to five years during a national emergency. This announcement has been interpreted by some as a sign of increasing desperation in the face of steadily advancing resistance forces. In the wake of the announcement, Deutsche Welle also reported that "thousands" of young people were fleeing to Thailand to evade conscription before it came into effect. Local Myanmar government officials are reportedly extorting bribes from those seeking to avoid being conscripted. 21 administrators in Rakhine's Thandwe announced their resignation in response to the military recruitment. Rebel groups killed at least 37 local officials carrying out the junta's conscription efforts. Activist Thinzar Shunlei Yi thought the military's historic "indoctrination techniques are deeply rooted in nationalism and religious ideologies" leaving "soldiers and their families feeling disoriented amidst shifting societal paradigms". The limited possession of guns by ethnic insurgent movements along with the lack of international support and formal means of acquiring military material has presented the anti-junta forces with a challenging situation for the confrontation of the military regime. Faced with this difficulty since the early stages of the armed insurgency, the resistance movement sought ways to manufacture the necessary weapons and equipment for the conflict. Initially, the rebels expanded the production of a traditionally made, single-shot rifle known as Tumi, especially in the Chin state. Nonetheless, this kind of rifle is severely limited for battleground action. For this reason, the fighters have developed alternative models which are more advanced, while still calling them Tumi. Since then, the resistance movement has developed many kinds of carbines, landmines and bomb drones, to be manufactured within the technological and material means of liberated territories and underground cells. Commercially available drones rigged to carry bombs were used to attack military positions. PDF groups reportedly produced naval bombs to target government logistics in rivers. Meanwhile, defected soldiers developed 60 mm long-range mortars. The use of 3D printing was also reported, both to salvage weapons taken from the junta and for the improvised production of FGC-9 semiautomatic carbines. An arms trafficker in possession of nuclear materials was found working with an unnamed insurgent ethnic armed group in Myanmar. The success of Operation 1027 enabled the Brotherhood Alliance to seize enormous caches of arms and ammunition from the Tatmadaw, making it better equipped than before it launched Operation 1027. On 20 August 2025, the United Wa State Army declared that they would no longer provide weapons or financial aid to the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, and Shan State Army (SSPP). Speculation arose that the UWSA's announcement, combined with Tatmadaw offenses in Shan State, contributed to a rise in prices for weapons and ammunition in the supply chains of the anti-junta insurgencies. Foreign involvement and spillover In June 2021 the United Nations General Assembly passed a non-binding resolution asking member states to impose an arms embargo on Myanmar. Two hundred international organisations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have continued to press the UN and its member states to adopt a global arms embargo. The United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and the European Union have, in response to the ongoing violence, sanctioned individuals and organisations associated with the Burmese military. However, the effectiveness of these sanctions has been undermined by poor coordination among governments and the lack of sanctions against high-impact targets. ASEAN blocked Myanmar from participating in regional summits after the 2021 coup. However, this was reversed after New Zealand invited junta officials to two ASEAN Summits hosted in Wellington in April 2024. ASEAN member states have not taken a consistent, coordinated approach with respect to the ongoing civil war, due to internal divisions. Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore are strongly opposed to the military junta, but Thailand was a key ally of the junta until the election of Srettha Thavisin as prime minister. India, which represents Myanmar's fourth-largest export market and fifth-largest import partner, has continued a business-as-usual approach to cross-border relations and continues to recognize the military junta. State-owned and private Indian companies supply arms and raw materials to the junta. On the other hand, India had hostile relations with China for the first several years of the war, which in part may have contributed to India's ongoing support for the junta as a balance attempt to prevent Chinese encroachment, which is met with criticism. Bangladesh recognizes the military junta, but does not support its actions, in part because the Rohingya genocide has led to around 1 million Rohingya refugees fleeing to Bangladesh.[citation needed] Its position in the conflict has been informed by repeated spillover of the conflict into its territory. As of December 2023 East Timor remains the only government to have openly expressed sympathies to the anti-regime forces in Myanmar. In August 2023, the State Administration Council expelled the East Timorese ambassador in retaliation for the East Timorese government meeting with the NUG. Since the coup d'รฉtat, China and Russia have supported the military junta and have been its main arms suppliers. China is Myanmar's largest trading partner. The two countries have blocked any substantive action against Myanmar's military at the United Nations Security Council, while Myanmar's security forces have reportedly used Chinese and Russian-supplied weapons to perpetrate human rights violations. Chinese support for the junta has led to a rise in popular anti-Chinese sentiment in Myanmar. However, the fact that the Three Brotherhood Alliance's Operation 1027 in late 2023 was carried out near the Chinaโ€“Myanmar border may indicate a shift in China's stance, which was attributed by analysts to concerns about cyber-scam centers, the pursuit of favorable concessions from the junta on the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, and the opportunity to influence the PDF in light of evolving dynamics between NUG and EAO groups. Russia has embraced deeper ties with the Burmese military junta as the civil war has progressed. Russia has provided materiel, military training for over 50 Myanmar Air Force pilots, and diplomatic backing to the regime. Min Aung Hlaing has visited Russia several times, personally meeting with Russian president Vladimir Putin in September 2022. The military junta backed the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Russia was among the few countries[r] to send a congratulatory message to the junta on Myanmar's Independence Day. In March 2024, Special Rapporteur Tom Andrews saw Russia as still the junta's top source of weapons. Although small in number, foreign volunteers serving with anti-junta forces have been documented. One such volunteer, going under the nom de guerre Azad, joined the Anti-Fascist Internationalist Front to assist fighters in the Chin theater. Azad gained military experience while fighting in the Syrian Rojava conflict. In a video recorded by pro-Tatmadaw media during the 2025 Tianjin SCO summit, Min Aung Hlaing personally thanked China for "exerting pressure on the armed groups in the border regions for the development of northern Myanmar." See also Notes References External links
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bashar,_Plateau_State] | [TOKENS: 1890]
Contents Bashar, Plateau State Bashar is a town and district in Wase Local Government Area (LGA), Plateau State, Nigeria. |coordinates = 9ยฐ18โ€ฒ46โ€ณN 10ยฐ09โ€ฒ29โ€ณE๏ปฟ / ๏ปฟ9.31278ยฐN 10.15806ยฐE๏ปฟ / 9.31278; 10.15806 The kingdom is dominated by the Yankam people, who eventually lost their language to Hausa. Located in the southern zone of plateau in Wase L.G.A is a district known as Bashar. The town regards their chief as REKNA due to the history of their language. The town has a population of over 32,000. It was ruled by ALH. Adamu Idris for 59 years, assisted by his son Yusuf Adamu Idris in his old age. Rekna of Bashar Alh. Adamu Idris died at the age of 96 and was succeeded by his younger brother Alh. Abdullahi Idris Isa the last-born of the family of Rekna Alh. Idris Isa. Nomenclature The Yangkam (Yaล‹kam) people have been called 'Bashar' or 'Basherawa' (the Hausanised version of the people's name) in almost all literature (Greenberg 1963; Williamson 1971; Benue-Congo Comparative Wordlist; Hansford et al. 1976; Gerhardt 1989; Crozier & Blench 1992). The correct name of the Bashar language and people is Yร ล‹kร m, plural aYaล‹kam. Although Yangkam has nearly disappeared as a language, the populations who formerly spoke it are likely to retain Basherawa and Basheranci as their name for the people and language as long as they retain a separate identity. Location and settlements The Yangkam live in a region west of Bashar town, 25 km north from Jarme on the Amper-Bashar road, Kanam LGA, in Plateau State. Yangkam is spoken in four villages: Tukur, Bayar, Pyaksam, and Kiram (CAPRO also mentions Gambam and Kwakkwani, but this was not confirmed). There are many hamlets around Bashar town in Wase LGA whose populations are ethnically Yangkam but who no longer speak the language. In the two main cartographic sources, Hansford et al. (1976) and Blench and Crozier (1992), it is located quite inaccurately. Section gives its correct location, and it should appear in a map correctly sited in the Millennium edition of the Ethnologue (Grimes, forthcoming). Language status Crozier and Blench (1992) give a figure of 20,000 speakers of the language located in and around Bashar town, some 50 km east of Amper on the Muri road. This estimate turned out to be entirely erroneous. The Bashar people seem to have been heavily affected by nineteenth century slave raids, perhaps by the Jukun as well as the Hausa. They were converted to Islam and a relatively powerful centre was established at Bashar. At the same time they began to switch to speaking Hausa, while still retaining their Bashar identity. In the region of Bashar town today, there are just two old men who remain reasonably fluent in the language, in the village of Yuli, 15 km northwest of Bashar. However, it turns out that at the time of the raids, the population split into two and another group sought refuge in Tukur. However, even here Yangkam is only spoken by people over fifty and all the young people speak Hausa. The local estimate of the number of fluent speakers is 100, and falling every year. There seems to be no likelihood that Yangkam will be maintained as speakers are quite content with the switch to Hausa, while remaining proud of their historical identity. Yangkam history The earliest account of Yangkam history is in Ames (1934:). A Hausa history of 'Bashar' is in circulation in Bashar town, but this has so far not been translated. CAPRO (ined.) contains a recent version of the Bashar narrative. Yangkam say they are descendants of the Badar, who migrated from the east fleeing forcible conversion. The Badar passed through the Sudan, where they met with the Kanuri and together moved to Birni Gazargamu. When the Gazargamu kingdom fell, the people moved to Borno, where they settled with the Kanuri, Bolewa, Bade, and Bura in the present Borno State. The Kanuri went to settle at Dikwa, the Bolewa went to Fika, the Bura went to Biu and the Bade to the Gashua area. The Yangkam and Jukun people decided to move away from Borno. The Jukun went to establish Kwararafa, but the Yangkam people went to the Kaltungo area of the present Bauchi State. When they moved away from the Kaltungo area, they went to settle at Kwakwani and later to the foot of Wase rock in Plateau State. They were there until they made peace with the Emir of Bauchi, Yakubu, during the reign of Tartar. When Tartar made peace, Yakubu Bauchi asked Madaki Hassan to stay in the Wase area with the Yangkam people. Soon after Hassan got to Wase, the Yangkam were faced with many conflicts. It is said[who?] that though the Yangkam gave Madaki Hassan and his people a place to stay and room to farm, he did not respect them and sold their children as slaves. So, the Yangkam people moved away from Wase rock to Ganuwa. Shortly after reaching Ganuwa, Tartar, the chief of Yangkam, died. A message about his death was sent to Bauchi to inform Emir Yakubu, who sent his condolences to the Yangkam and urged them to appoint the son to succeed the father. He said the son should come to Bauchi for the turbaning. When the Yangkam people were preparing for the installation of the new chief, they agreed among themselves that when they reached Bauchi they should accept Islam as their religion. When the turbaning ceremony was over, the people told Emir Yakubu about their interest in becoming Muslims. Yakubu was very happy and gave them an Islamic flag, the sword and other symbols of Islam for them to take back home. This is the genesis of Islam among the Yangkam people, and today it is difficult to find a Yangkam man identifying with any religion other than Islam. In fact, Bashar town is known in its neighbourhood as an Islamic town. Bashar and Wase towns have produced many prominent Islamic scholars. The son of Tartar was recognised by the Yangkam people as the first chief to be turbaned by the Fulani. His name was Karo and he was succeeded by Yamusa. But, during the reign of Abubakar, the people left Ganuwa to settle in Gwaram, south of the present Yangkam town, because of wars (yakin Kalumbu). After ten years, Abubakar founded the present Bashar town, in the area that they are still occupying. Abubakar was succeeded by Muhammadu Lamlam, who was followed by a series of short reigns. At present, Usman Idris, also known as Hakimin Bashar, rules, subject to the king of Wase. The chief among the Yangkam is known as the Rekna Bashar. The Yangkam ruling clan is known as Argando, while the kingmakers include the Madakin Bashar, Kuyanbaba Bashar, Mansu Bashar, and the Imam (Islamic religious leader) of Bashar. Yangkam culture Before the Yangkam people embraced Islam, their traditional customs and religion were closely related to those of the Boghom people. Before marriage, the suitor had to serve the in-laws in the farm, give a hand-woven white cloth (alikyala), do building and roofing, and give animals as bride-price. Yangkam burial rites were like those of the Boghom. They used to remove the skull of the deceased for observation after three months. Naming and circumcision rites were formerly similar with those of the Boghom, although today all these rites are performed according to Islamic laws. The Yangkam have the same name as the Boghom for the Supreme Being, Bappi, as well as formerly having masquerades and shrines. But today, these have fallen into disuse since conversion to Islam. Although Christianity was brought to Yangkam in 1968, by Mr. Bala Abdu, a COCIN evangelist, they rejected it. When some non-Yangkam residents accepted the gospel, the chief was reluctant to give them land to build a place of worship. References
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plateau_State] | [TOKENS: 2037]
Contents Plateau State Plateau is a Nigerian state located in the North Central geopolitical zone. Its capital city is Jos. Officially nicknamed the "Home of Peace and Tourism", the state has a population of around 4.7 million people. Geography Located between latitude 8ยฐ24' N and 10ยฐ30' N and longitude 8ยฐ32' E and 10ยฐ38' E, Plateau State encompasses a range of hills and rock formations of the eponymous Jos Plateau, where bare rocks scatter across grasslands. The state's altitude ranges from around 1,200 metres (3,900 ft) to a peak of 1,829 metres (6,001 ft) above sea level in the Shere Hills near Jos. Although situated in the tropical zone, the higher altitude gives Plateau State a near-temperate climate, with an average temperature between 13 and 22 ยฐC. Harmattan winds cause the coldest weather between December and February, with the warmest temperatures usually in the dry season months of March and April. The mean annual rainfall varies between 1,317 mm (52 in) in the southern part to 1,460 mm (57 in) on the plateau, with the highest rainfall during the wet season in July and August. The cooler climate has led to a reduced incidence of some tropical diseases such as malaria. The Jos Plateau is the source of many rivers in northern Nigeria, including the Kaduna, Gongola, Hadeja and Damaturu rivers. Both Plateau State in general and the Jos Plateau in particular are thought to be formed on areas of younger granite intruding through an area of older granite rock. These younger granites, thought to be about 160 million years old, create the Jos Plateau's unusual scenery. There are numerous hillocks with gentle slopes emerging from the ground like mushrooms scattered with huge boulders. Volcanic activity 50 million years ago created numerous volcanoes and vast basaltic plateaus from lava flows, as well as regions of mainly narrow and deep valleys and pediments (surfaces made smooth by erosion) from rounded hills with sheer rock faces. Years of tin and columbite mining have left the state strewn with deep gorges and lakes. Tourism Plateau State is officially nicknamed The Home of Peace and Tourism. Although the tourism sector is not thriving due to perennial security issues and state government failure, its natural endowments are still attractions to tourists, mostly from within Nigeria. Natural resources Natural resources in the state include: barite, bauxite, bentonite, bismuth, cassiterite, clay, coal, emeralds, fluoride, granite, iron ore, kaolin, lead / zinc, marble, molybdenite, pyrochlore, salt, tantalite / columbite, and tin / wolfram. History Plateau state has been adjusted to its present borders many times. Colonial manipulation was from a desire to protect the railway construction and guarantee safe passage of mined tin to the coast. There was also an attempt initially to create a province of largely non-Muslims under one Resident. Later alterations came from strong local desires for self-government. The British began to exert colonial control of Nigeria in the early 20th century. At that time, much of Plateau State was part of Bauchi Province. In 1926, Plateau Province, made up of Jos and Pankshin Divisions, was carved out of Bauchi. The border changed several times in subsequent years as the government sought not to split ethnic groups. In May 1967, Benue and Plateau Provinces were merged to form the large Benue-Plateau State. At this time Nigeria had twelve states. Following the civil war, Benue-Plateau State was one of several large states which were further split up following pressure on the federal government. Under the military administration of General Yakubu Gowon, the country was further divided into nineteen states in 1976 and Plateau State was created from Benue-Plateau covering the area of the original Plateau Province. In 1996, Plateau State was further subdivided to create Nasarawa State which was carved out of the western half of Plateau State by Sani Abacha's military regime. Tin mining activities began in 1902 under the British and continue to the present day. During the 21st century, Plateau State has experienced significant violence, including riots, bombings, and clashes between different ethnic and religious groups. The region has seen conflicts involving various actors, including jihadist insurgents like Boko Haram, as well as tensions between Muslim Hausa-Fulani herders and predominantly Christian farmers, similar to other states in Nigeria's Middle Belt. While some attacks have been attributed to Fulani herders, there have also been reports of violence by Christian militias and other local armed groups. In June 2018, ethnic violence in Jos resulted in the deaths of 86 people. According to Christian Solidarity Worldwide, 238 people were killed in a single weekend in June 2018, and 1,061 people lost their lives in the first three months of that year due to attacks linked to Fulani herders. However, violence in the region is not one-sided. In recent years, Fulani communities have also suffered attacks, including incidents where armed groups have targeted Muslim herders and travelers on roads. Reports indicate that Christian-majority vigilantes and local militias have engaged in reprisal killings, further escalating tensions. For example, in January 2024, a senior military officer and several soldiers were killed in Plateau State in an attack linked to ongoing communal unrest. While many portray the conflict through an ethnic and religious lens, analysts suggest that factors such as climate change, competition over land, and political instability also play significant roles. In 2022, a bandit gang attacked several villages, leading to significant casualties. More recently, in December 2023, at least 200 people died in a series of new attacks. The ongoing violence in Plateau State underscores the complexity of the crisis, where multiple groups engage in attacks and retaliations, worsening instability in the region. Government The Plateau State administrative structure consists of the state cabinet, the House of Assembly and local government areas. The state government is run by the governor (chief executive), deputy governor, secretary to the state government, commissioners (cabinet members), special advisers, permanent secretaries, board chairmen and general managers. The current governor is Caleb Manasseh Mutfwang. He was sworn in on 29 May 2023 under the party PDP. The House of Assembly consists of 25 members. The current Speaker of the house is Rt. Hon. Naanlong Daniel who was elected on 2nd July 2025 by the members of the 10th assembly after former speaker Gabriel Dewan resigned. The local government is headed by a chairman, who is the chief executive, while his cabinet consists of elected councilors who make up the legislative arm. Plateau State is also divided into 17 local government areas, each encompassing ethnic groups who share common affinities or distant bloodlines. Leaders of these local government areas are elected by the people from amongst several contestants who may not be related to any past chiefdom leaders. In 1976, Plateau State consisted of fourteen local government areas (LGAs). New LGAs were carved out of the large ones in 1989, 1991 and 1996, so that the new Plateau State is subdivided into the following seventeen LGAs: Plateau state residents are predominantly Christians. The Roman Catholic Church includes 830,714 faithful in the Archdiocese of Jos (1934) with 60 parishes under Archbishop Matthew Ishaya Audu (2020), and two suffragan dioceses of Pankshin (2014) with 32 parishes under Bishop Michael Global Gokum (2014), and Shendam (2007) with 31 parishes under Bishop Philip Davou Dung (2016). The Anglican Diocese of Jos (1980) within the Province of Jos, is led by Bishop Benjamin Kwashi (2008). Church of Christ in Nations (COCIN) is leb by Amos Mozoh ant it headquarters is located in Jos North. Demographics The state has over forty ethno-linguistic groups. Some of the indigenous ethnic groups in the state are: These ethnic groups are predominantly farmers and have similar cultural and traditional ways of life. People from other parts of country have come to settle in the state; these include the Idoma, Igbo, Yoruba, Ibibio, Annang, Efik, Ijaw, and Bini. Each ethnic group has its own distinct language, but as with the rest of the country, English is the official language in the state. Hausa is also a common medium of communication and commerce as is the case in most parts of the state. Transport A3 highway (Nigeria) northeast from Kaduna State at Jenta via Makera, Bukuru and Jos to Bauchi State at Rafin Jaki A236 highway (Nigeria) northwest from Jos as the Kakwonka-Tudun Wada Rd via Mista Ali and Jere to Kaduna State at Jengre as the Pambeguwa-Jengre Rd. The 1067 mm Cape Gauge Eastern Line north from Lafia in Nasarawa State via Jos to Bauchi State. Yakubu Gowon Airport in Jos with flights to Abuja and Lagos. Education Tertiary institutions in Plateau State include: Sports Association football is Plateau State's most popular sport. Prominent football clubs include Plateau United in the top-tier Nigeria Premier Football League and Mighty Jets F.C. in the second-tier Nigeria National League. Languages Languages of Plateau State listed by LGA: Notable people See also References External links
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China%E2%80%93Poland_relations] | [TOKENS: 2288]
Contents Chinaโ€“Poland relations Relations between the People's Republic of China and Poland officially began on October 5, 1949. History Contact between the Polish and Chinese people date back several centuries. In the mid-17th century, notable Polish Jesuit missionaries Michaล‚ Boym and Jan Mikoล‚aj Smogulecki arrived to China. Boym significantly expanded the knowledge of China in Europe with his works, among which were the pioneering botany book Flora Sinensis and detailed maps of China. He also introduced Chinese medicine in Europe, including the analysis of the pulse. Smogulecki taught European mathematics and astronomy in China, and introduced logarithms to China. Both Boym and Smogulecki had contacts with the Imperial Court of China. In the 17th century, there were diplomatic approaches between the courts of John III Sobieski and the Kangxi Emperor. Relations between the Polish King John III Sobieski and the Chinese Emperor Kangxi of the Qing Dynasty were the first official diplomatic contacts between Poland and China after the Battle of Vienna (1683). After defeating Turkey, John III Sobieski sent his portrait to the Emperor of China and also commissioned the Polish Jesuits stationed at the Emperor's court to provide the Polish King with all the valuable information about the organization of the Emperor's court and the Chinese Empire. This stemmed from the fact that the Polish King was deeply impressed by Chinese power and sought a strong ally. Seeking allies against Turkey, Sobieski sent an embassy to Beijing, to which the Emperor responded by sending gifts, including a valuable porcelain set, elements of which are preserved at the ลaล„cut Castle Museum. After the victory at Vienna in 1683, John III Sobieski was building an international anti-Turkish coalition. The embassy aimed to establish relations with China, which was also engaged in warfare at the time, potentially binding Russian forces (an ally of Turkey). Letters and gifts were sent to the court of Emperor Kangxi. Although the direct correspondence has not survived in its entirety, this gesture is considered the beginning of Polish-Chinese diplomacy. The Chinese Emperor Kangxi honored the Polish king by sending him luxurious, high-quality porcelain. Many of these gifts became part of the collection at ลaล„cut Castle and constitute unique evidence of John III Sobieski's far-reaching diplomacy. Sobieski ran his own collection of Chinese art in his Wilanรณw palace. In the 1820s and 1830s, Polish physician Jรณzef Wojciechowski was active in Beijing, and became renown for successfully curing a prince from the imperial court deemed incurably ill by local doctors, for which he was honoured with a memorial in Beijing in 1829. In the late 19th century and early 20th century, when Poland remained partitioned and occupied by neighbouring powers, thousands of Polish emigrants, including engineers, architects, doctors, teachers, many of them political refugees, settled in Manchuria and greatly contributed to the foundation and development of the Chinese Eastern Railway and the city of Harbin. The founder and first mayor of Harbin was Polish engineer Adam Szydล‚owski. The city's layout was planned by Polish engineer Stanisล‚aw Jokisz, and other Polish engineers were also responsible for its construction. Poles established a prosperous and influential community in the city, with Polish press, schools, organizations, churches (including the present-day Sacred Heart of Jesus Cathedral) and sports teams, and peacefully co-existed with the city's other ethnicities including the Chinese. Many Poles were employed at the Chinese Eastern Railway, which was managed at the time by Polish railway engineer Stanisล‚aw Kierbedลบ. Tadeusz Nowkuล„ski was the head physician of the central hospital of the Chinese Eastern Railway, active in fighting the plague and cholera epidemics in Manchuria. Poles introduced sugar beet cultivation to China and established the country's first brewery, now known as the Harbin Brewery. Poles also established the first steam mills, metallurgical plants, and furniture and cigarette factories in Manchuria. Several Polish writers, including Teodor Parnicki, Edward Kajdaล„ski and Kazimierz Grochowski, were either born or spent part of their childhood or adulthood in Harbin, before eventually moving to Poland, where they popularized knowledge about China and East Asia. In 1918 Poland regained independence after the partitions period, and diplomatic relations between China and Poland began in 1919. A friendship, trade and navigation treaty between China and Poland was signed in Nanjing in 1929 to strengthen and evolve the relations. Ludwik Rajchman, a Polish physician and bacteriologist, was an advisor to Chiang Kai-shek and T. V. Soong. The Polish community in Harbin remained strong, until many Poles gradually left for Poland in the 1930s, and the remaining Poles were mostly repatriated by the Polish government in 1949. Very few Chinese people lived in Poland in the interwar period, including four in Warsaw, and one each in Ciechanรณw, Brzeล›ฤ‡ and Nieล›wieลผ, according to the 1921 Polish census. During World War II, some 13 ethnic Chinese from Warsaw were deported by the German occupiers to the Gross-Rosen concentration camp in 1944. During World War II, China and Poland were allies, with both the Chinese government and the Polish government-in-exile having signed the United Nations Declaration. Although Poland fought against Germany, and China fought against Japan, Poles were not indifferent to the struggles of the Chinese and saw similarities in their fates. In 1941, Poland declared war on Japan (and China declared war on Germany), and a year later in 1942 during the stay of Marshal Chiang Kai-shek in Bombay, representatives of the Polish delegation as well as the Polish Relief Committee paid him a visit. The Poles presented Marshal Chiang Kai-shek with a memorandum in which they praised the heroism of the defenders of China and assured the Marshal that the Poles would fight alongside the Chinese until tyranny is crushed and freedom is restored to the nations that have lost it. Chiang Kai-shek was captivated by the struggle of the Poles and expressed his gratitude for the memorandum. General Wล‚adysล‚aw Sikorski met with the Chinese ambassador and the Chinese foreign minister. During their conversation, the idea of โ€‹โ€‹establishing a Polish air force to fight the Japanese in China emerged. Among the Polish volunteers fighting in defense of China was the renowned pilot Witold Urbanowicz. Relations between the newly founded People's Republic of China and the Polish People's Republic began on October 5, 1949, and diplomatic missions were established shortly after on October 7, 1949. Poland, a part of the Communist Bloc, had friendly relations with China and both countries cooperated in international issues such as the Korean War. The bilateral relations deteriorated significantly as a result of the Sino-Soviet split. However, when China called for the permanent United Nations Security Council seat, then held by the Taiwan-based Republic of China, to be transferred to the mainland government, Poland supported its case. Zhou Enlai, the Premier of China, paid two state visits to Poland. Polish communist leaders, including Bolesล‚aw Bierut, Edward Ochab and Jรณzef Cyrankiewicz also made multiple visits to China. In 1957, fears in Poland grew of an armed intervention by the Soviet Union, the leadership of which was alarmed by the events of the Gomuล‚ka thaw. The Chinese leadership opposed the plan of an intervention in Poland, believing Gomuล‚ka's reforms to be justified. China's protest weakened Nikita Khrushchev's stance on Poland and helped avert an armed confrontation. The support from China strengthened Gomuล‚ka's position in the Communist Bloc and reinforced his efforts to pursue more autonomy from the Soviet Union. China promoted the idea of a โ€œnational path to socialism,โ€ which aligned with Gomuล‚kaโ€™s reformist course and made it possible to move away from Stalinism without breaking away from the Communist Bloc altogether. In 1989 Communism in Europe fell, and Poland underwent widespread democratization and market-oriented economic reform. At this time, China was also becoming more market-driven, largely as a result of the economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping. The newly formed Third Polish Republic chose to align itself with the West, joining NATO in 1999, and the European Union in 2004. Despite this, relations between Poland and China remained steadfast throughout the 2000s. In 2016, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping visited Poland, where he claimed that "Polish companies will benefit hugely" from China's Belt and Road Initiative. Duda and Xi signed a joint declaration on strategic partnership in which they reiterated that Poland and China viewed each other as long-term strategic partners. In January 2019, Huawei employee Wang Weijing was arrested in Poland on charges of spying for China. In July 2024, the People's Liberation Army and the Armed Forces of Belarus conducted joint military exercises in the Brest Region a few kilometers from the Belarusian-Polish border. The same month, Poland threatened to cut off a Chinese rail export route to the European Union via Poland in order to pressure Belarus. In June 2024, Poland supported tariffs on imported Chinese electric vehicles. The Chinese government privately urged Chinese automakers to stop making large investments in European countries that supported tariffs. In November 2024, it was reported that Leapmotor and Stellantis had canceled plans to produce the B10 model in Poland and decided to move its production to Slovakia and Germany. In June 2025, Poland's Internal Security Agency's Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT GOV) stated that advanced persistent threats from the PRC had expanded their cyberattacks against Poland's critical infrastructure. In February 2026, Poland prohibited all Chinese-made vehicles from its entering military facilities, citing fears of "uncontrolled data acquisition." Economic relations During the 1950s to 1990s, the two countries conducted economic activities using accounts on government agreements. Their annual trade valued nearly US$1 billion in 1986. In the 1990s, an agreement on trade payments in convertible foreign exchanges was signed. In 1990, trade dipped from US$0.322 billion to US$0.144 billion in 1991. Bilateral trade began to increase again in 1992. Trade between Poland and China increased significantly over the years. By 2001, the trade between the two countries was valued at US$1.242 billion, up 29.5% from 2000. The countries' economic relations revolve primarily around environmental protection, finance, agricultural technology, and the copper and coal industries. It has also recently started to include high technology, clean energy, labour, services and infrastructure. In 2008, Poland's exports to China totaled approximately US$1 billion, and its imports from China amounted to about US$11 billion. Resident diplomatic missions See also References External links
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wikipedia:About&mobileaction=toggle_view_mobile] | [TOKENS: 435]
Wikipedia:About Wikipedia is a free online encyclopedia that anyone can edit, and millions already have. Wikipedia's purpose is to benefit readers by presenting information on all branches of knowledge. It consists of freely editable content, with articles that usually contain numerous links guiding readers to more information. Wikipedia is one of many Wikimedia projects hosted by the nonprofit Wikimedia Foundation. Written collaboratively by volunteers known as Wikipedians, Wikipedia articles can be edited by anyone with Internet access, except in limited cases in which editing is restricted to prevent disruption or vandalism. Since its creation on January 15, 2001, it has grown into the world's largest reference website, attracting over a billion visitors each month. Wikipedia is a multilingual project, with more than sixty-six million articles in more than 300 separate wikis for almost as many languages. This includes 7,140,493 articles in English, with 293,013 active contributors in the past month. Wikipedia's fundamental principles are summarized in its five pillars. While the Wikipedia community has developed many policies and guidelines, new editors do not need to be familiar with them before they start contributing. Anyone can edit Wikipedia's text, data, references, and images. The quality of content is more important than the expertise of who contributes it. Wikipedia's content must conform with its policies, including being verifiable by published reliable sources. Contributions based on personal opinions, beliefs, or personal experiences, unreviewed research, libellous material, and copyright violations are not allowed, and will not remain. Wikipedia's software makes it easy to reverse errors, and experienced editors watch and patrol bad edits. Wikipedia differs from printed references in important ways. Anyone can instantly improve it, add quality information, remove misinformation, and fix errors and vandalism. Since Wikipedia is continually updated, encyclopedic articles on major news events appear within minutes. For over 25 years, editors have volunteered their time and talents to create history's most comprehensive encyclopedia while providing references and other resources to researchers worldwide (see Researching with Wikipedia). In summary, since 2001 Wikipedia has tested the wisdom of the crowd, and has found that it succeeds.
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish_Armed_Forces] | [TOKENS: 2945]
Contents Polish Armed Forces The Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland (Polish: Siล‚y Zbrojne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, pronounced [หˆษ•iwษจ หˆzbrษ”jnษ› สษ›tอกส‚pษ”sหˆpษ”litษ›j หˆpษ”lskสฒษ›j]; abbreviated SZ RP), also called the Polish Armed Forces and popularly called Wojsko Polskie in Poland ([หˆvษ”j.skษ” หˆpษ”l.skjษ›], roughly "the Polish Military"โ€”abbreviated WP), are the national armed forces of the Republic of Poland. The name has been used since the early 1800s, but can also be applied to earlier periods. The Polish Legions and the Blue Army, composed of Polish volunteers from the United States and those who switched sides from the Central Powers, were formed during World War I. In the war's aftermath, the Polish Army was reformed from the remnants of the partitioning powers' forces and expanded significantly during the Polishโ€“Soviet War of 1920. World War II dramatically impacted Polish military structures, with the initial defeat by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union invasions leading to the dispersion of Polish forces into the underground. After the war, the Polish People's Army (LWP) was formed, and its standards aligned with those of the former Warsaw Pact. The LWP's reputation suffered due to its role in political suppression both domestically and abroad, such as during the Prague Spring. Following the fall of communism, Poland shifted towards Western military standards, joining NATO in 1999, participating in missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and undertaking substantial modernization of its forces. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland comprise five main service branches: the Polish Land Forces (Wojska Lฤ…dowe), the Polish Navy (Marynarka Wojenna), the Polish Air Force (Siล‚y Powietrzne), the Polish Special Forces (Wojska Specjalne), and the Polish Territorial Defence Force (Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej), under the command of the Ministry of National Defence of Poland. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Poland spent $38.0 billion on its defense budget in 2024, ranking 13th globally in terms of military expenditures. In 2024, Poland spent the greatest share of its GDP for military expenditures (4.12%) among all NATO members. With over 216,100 active personnel in 2024, the Polish Armed Forces are the third-largest military in NATO, right after Turkey and the United States. Mission Pursuant to the national security strategy of Poland, the supreme strategic goal of Poland's military forces is to ensure favourable and secure conditions for the realization of national interests by eliminating external and internal threats, reducing risks, rightly assessing undertaken challenges, and ably using existing opportunities. The Republic of Poland's main strategic goals in the area of defence include: History The List of Polish wars chronicles Polish military involvement in armed conflicts since the year 972. The present armed forces trace their roots to the early 20th century, yet the history of Polish armed forces in their broadest sense stretches back much further. After the partitions of Poland, during the period from 1795 to 1918, the Polish military was recreated several times during national insurrections that included the November Uprising of 1830, the January Uprising in 1863, and the Napoleonic Wars that saw the formation of the Polish Legions in Italy. Congress Poland, being part of the Russian Empire with a certain degree of autonomy, had a separate Polish army in the years 1815โ€“1830, which was disbanded after the unsuccessful November Uprising. Large numbers of Poles also served in the armies of the partitioning powers, the Russian Empire, Austria-Hungary, and the German Empire. During World War I, the Polish Legions were set up in Galicia, the southern part of Poland under Austrian occupation. They were both disbanded after the Central Powers failed to provide guarantees of Polish independence after the war. General Jรณzef Haller, the commander of the Second Brigade of the Polish Legion, switched sides in late 1917 and, via Murmansk, took part of his troops to France, where he created the Blue Army. It was joined by several thousand Polish volunteers from the United States. It fought on the French front in 1917 and 1918. The Polish Army was recreated in 1918 from elements of the three separate Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and German armies, and armed with equipment left following World War I. The force expanded during the Polishโ€“Soviet War of 1919โ€“1922 to nearly 800,000 men, but was then reduced after peace was reestablished. At the onset of World War II, on 1 September 1939, Nazi Germany invaded Poland. Polish forces were overwhelmed by the German attack in September 1939, which was followed on 17 September 1939 by an invasion by the Soviet Union. Some Polish forces escaped from the occupied country and joined Allied forces fighting in other theaters, while those that remained in Poland splintered into guerrilla units of the Armia Krajowa ("Home Army") and other partisan groups which fought in clandestine ways against the foreign occupiers. Thus, there were three threads to the Polish armed forces from 1939: the Polish Armed Forces in the West, the Armia Krajowa and other resistance organizations fighting the Germans in Poland, and the Polish Armed Forces in the East, which later became the post-war communist Polish People's Army (LWP). Until the fall of communism, the army's prestige under communist rule continued to fall, as it was used by the government to resettle ethnic minorities immediately after the war (Operation Vistula), and to violently suppress opposition several times, during the 1956 Poznaล„ protests, the 1970 Polish protests, and during martial law in Poland in 1981โ€“1983. The LWP also took part in the suppression of the 1968 democratization process of Czechoslovakia, commonly known as the Prague Spring. That same year, Marshal of Poland Marian Spychalski was asked to replace Edward Ochab as chairman of the Council of State, and General Wojciech Jaruzelski, at that time the Chief of the General Staff, was named to replace him. Jaruzelski, a known Soviet loyalist, was put in place by the Soviets in order to ensure that a trusted group of officers was in control of one of the least trusted armies in the Warsaw Pact. After January 1990 and the collapse of the communist bloc, the name of the armed forces was changed to "Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland" to accord with the Polish State's new official name. Following the subsequent disbandment of the Warsaw Pact, Poland was admitted into NATO on 12 March 1999, and the Polish armed forces began a major reorganization effort in order to conform to the new Western standards. From 2002 until 2014, Polish military forces were part of the Coalition Forces that participated in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan led by NATO. Poland's contribution to ISAF was the country's largest since its entrance into NATO. Polish forces also took part in the Iraq War. From 2003 to 2008, Polish military forces commanded the Multinational Division (MND-CS) located in the South-Central Occupation Zone of Iraq. The division consisted of troops from 23 nations and totaled as many as 8,500 soldiers. In March 2003, the Polish Armed Forces took part in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, deploying special forces and a support ship. Following the destruction of Saddam's regime, the Polish Land Forces supplied a brigade and a division headquarters for the 17-nation Multinational Division Central-South, part of the U.S.-led Multi-National Force โ€“ Iraq. At its peak, Poland had 2,500 soldiers in the south of the country. Other completed operations include the 2005 'Swift Relief' in Pakistan, in which NATO Response Force-allocated personnel were dispatched. Polish Land Forces personnel sent to Pakistan included a military engineering company, a platoon of the 1st Special Commando Regiment, and a logistics component from the 10th Logistics Brigade. Elsewhere, Polish forces were sent to MINURCAT in Chad and the Central African Republic (2007โ€“2010). As of 2008, Poland had deployed 985 personnel in eight separate UN peacekeeping operations (the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, MINURSO, MONUC, UNOCI, UNIFIL, UNMEE, UNMIK, UNMIL, and UNOMIG). Formerly set up according to Warsaw Pact standards, the Polish armed forces are now fully organized according to NATO requirements. Poland is also playing an increasingly larger role as a major European peacekeeping power in the world through various UN peacekeeping actions, and cooperation with neighboring nations through multinational formations and units such as the Multinational Corps Northeast and POLUKRBAT. As of 1 January 2010, the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland have transitioned to a completely contract-based manpower supply system. On 10 April 2010, a Polish Air Force Tu-154M crashed near Smolensk, Russia, while it was travelling to a ceremony commemorating the Katyn massacre. On board the plane were the President (Commander-in-Chief), the Chief of Staff, all four Branch Commanders of the Polish Military, and a number of other military officials; all were killed.[citation needed] In 2014โ€“2015, the Armed Forces General Command and Armed Forces Operational Command were both established, superseding the previous individual service branch command structures. Prompted in part by the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Homeland Defence Act was unanimously passed by the Polish parliament on March 17, 2022, and signed into law by President Andrzej Duda the following day. In accordance with the act, Poland intends to roughly double the size of the armed forces to 300,000 personnel, and to spend at least 3% of GDP on the defence budget in 2023. This includes increasing the size of the tank fleet by adding approximately 1,000 new tanks and adding 600 new howitzers to Poland's ground forces. Poland's Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Mariusz Bล‚aszczak said that it is Poland's goal to build the most powerful ground forces of all the North Atlantic Treaty Organization members in Europe. Equipment Since 2011, the Armed Forces have been in the middle of a long-term modernization program. Plans involve new anti-aircraft missile systems, ballistic missile defense systems, a Lead-In Fighter Trainer (LIFT) aircraft, medium transport and combat helicopters, submarines, unmanned aerial vehicles, as well as self-propelled howitzers.[citation needed] Technical modernization plans for the years 2013 through to 2022 have been put in place. During the 2013 to 2016 period of the plan, 37.8 billion PLN, or 27.8% of the period's military budget of 135.5 billion PLN, was invested into technical modernisation. Significant military equipment acquisitions are also planned for through the 2022 period, with the Ministry of Defense outlining 61 billion zล‚oty to be spent on further modernization. A major feature of the program is the acquisition of around 1,200 unmanned aerial vehicles, including at least 1,000 with combat capabilities. Additionally, new helicopters and air defense systems are to be procured along with five light vessels for the navy. A new submarine force is to be jointly operated with a NATO partner, and general upgrade and modernization efforts are aimed at the country's air defenses, naval forces, cyber warfare capabilities, armored forces, and territorial defense forces (to have 50,000 volunteer members). Organization The Polish Armed Forces consist of 292,000+ active duty personnel. In 2023, troop strength in the five different branches was as follows: All five branches are supported by: Traditions The Polish armed forces have consistently held two yearly military parades (Polish: Defilada wojskowa) on Armed Forces Day and National Independence Day. These parades take place on Ujazdรณw Avenue and near the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier on Piล‚sudski Square, respectively. The Armed Forces Day Parade was introduced in 2007 and 2008 as the first grand military parades since the holiday was reinstated and has been held yearly since 2013. The first Polish military parade took place on 17 January 1945, and as of 2019, the 3 May Constitution Day parade was officially reinstated. Marsz Generalski and Warszawianka (1831) are the main military musical pieces performed at ceremonial events. While the former is a solemn march used during inspections and the march on of the Polish flag, the latter is a march strictly used for marches pasts, military parades, and other processions. The Polish Armed Forces are the only military entity in the world to use a two-finger salute, which is only used while wearing a hat (it refers to the fact that the salute is given to the emblem itself) with the emblem of the Polish eagle, such as military hat, rogatywka. The salute is performed with the middle and index fingers extended and touching each other, while the ring and little fingers are bent and touched by the thumb. The tips of the middle and index fingers touch the peak of the cap, two fingers supposedly meaning Honour and Fatherland (Honor i Ojczyzna). Czoล‚em ลปoล‚nierze (the Polish language version of Greetings Soldiers) is the official military greeting of the armed forces, usually given by the members of the government or military establishment, as well as visiting dignitaries during ceremonial occasions. The soldiers will usually respond with Czoล‚em (States title/rank of dignitary). See also References Further reading External links
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sensor] | [TOKENS: 2090]
Contents Sensor A sensor is often defined as a device that receives and responds to a signal or stimulus. The stimulus is the quantity, property, or condition that is sensed and converted into electrical signal. In the broadest definition, a sensor is a device, module, machine, or subsystem that detects events or changes in its environment and sends the information to other electronics, frequently a computer processor. Sensors like PIR sensor or touch sensor are used in everyday objects such as touch-sensitive elevator buttons (tactile sensor) and lamps which dim or brighten by touching the base, and in innumerable applications of which most people are never aware. With advances in micromachinery and easy-to-use microcontroller platforms, the uses of sensors have expanded beyond the traditional fields of temperature, pressure and flow measurement, for example into MARG sensors. Analog sensors such as potentiometers and force-sensing resistors are still widely used. Their applications include manufacturing and machinery, airplanes and aerospace, cars, medicine, robotics and many other aspects of our day-to-day life. There is a wide range of other sensors that measure chemical and physical properties of materials, including optical sensors for refractive index measurement, vibrational sensors for fluid viscosity measurement, and electro-chemical sensors for monitoring pH of fluids. A sensor's sensitivity indicates how much its output changes when the input quantity it measures changes. For instance, if the mercury in a thermometer moves 1 cm when the temperature changes by 1 ยฐC, its sensitivity is 1 cm/ยฐC (it is basically the slope dy/dx assuming a linear characteristic). Some sensors can also affect what they measure; for instance, a room temperature thermometer inserted into a hot cup of liquid cools the liquid while the liquid heats the thermometer. Sensors are usually designed to have a small effect on what is measured; making the sensor smaller often improves this and may introduce other advantages. Technological progress allows for sensors to be manufactured in bulk on a microscopic scale as microsensors using MEMS technology. In most cases, a microsensor reaches a significantly faster measurement time and higher sensitivity compared with macroscopic approaches. Demand has increased for disposable sensors for shortโ€term monitoring or singleโ€shot measurements, due to their low cost and simpiclity of use. Using this class of sensors, information can be obtained without the need for recalibration, and without potential contamination. Classification of measurement errors A good sensor obeys the following rules: Most sensors have a linear transfer function. The sensitivity is then defined as the ratio between the output signal and measured property. For example, if a sensor measures temperature and has a voltage output, the sensitivity is constant with the units [V/K]. The sensitivity is the slope of the transfer function. Converting the sensor's electrical output (for example V) to the measured units (for example K) requires dividing the electrical output by the slope (or multiplying by its reciprocal). In addition, an offset is frequently added or subtracted. For example, โˆ’40 must be added to the output if 0 V output corresponds to โˆ’40 C input. For an analog sensor signal to be processed or used in digital equipment, it needs to be converted to a digital signal, using an analog-to-digital converter. Since sensors cannot replicate an ideal transfer function, several types of deviations can occur which limit sensor accuracy: All these deviations can be classified as systematic errors or random errors. Systematic errors can sometimes be compensated for by means of some kind of calibration strategy. Noise is a random error that can be reduced by signal processing, such as filtering, usually at the expense of the dynamic behavior of the sensor. The sensor resolution or measurement resolution is the smallest change that can be detected in the quantity that is being measured. The resolution of a sensor with a digital output is usually the numerical resolution of the digital output. The resolution is related to the precision with which the measurement is made, but they are not the same thing. A sensor's accuracy may be considerably worse than its resolution. Chemical sensor A chemical sensor is a self-contained analytical device that can provide information about the chemical composition of its environment, that is, a liquid or a gas phase. The information is provided in the form of a measurable physical signal that is correlated with the concentration of a certain chemical species (termed as analyte). Two main steps are involved in the functioning of a chemical sensor, namely, recognition and transduction. In the recognition step, analyte molecules interact selectively with receptor molecules or sites included in the structure of the recognition element of the sensor. Consequently, a characteristic physical parameter varies and this variation is reported by means of an integrated transducer that generates the output signal. A chemical sensor based on recognition material of biological nature is a biosensor. However, as synthetic biomimetic materials are going to substitute to some extent recognition biomaterials, a sharp distinction between a biosensor and a standard chemical sensor is superfluous. Typical biomimetic materials used in sensor development are molecularly imprinted polymers and aptamers. A chemical sensor array is a sensor architecture with multiple sensor components that create a pattern for analyte detection from the additive responses of individual sensor components. There exist several types of chemical sensor arrays including electronic, optical, acoustic wave, and potentiometric devices. These chemical sensor arrays can employ multiple sensor types that are cross-reactive or tuned to sense specific analytes. Biosensor In biomedicine and biotechnology, sensors which detect analytes thanks to a biological component, such as cells, protein, nucleic acid or biomimetic polymers, are called biosensors. Whereas a non-biological sensor, even organic (carbon chemistry), for biological analytes is referred to as sensor or nanosensor. This terminology applies for both in-vitro and in vivo applications. The encapsulation of the biological component in biosensors, presents a slightly different problem that ordinary sensors; this can either be done by means of a semipermeable barrier, such as a dialysis membrane or a hydrogel, or a 3D polymer matrix, which either physically constrains the sensing macromolecule or chemically constrains the macromolecule by bounding it to the scaffold. Neuromorphic sensors Neuromorphic sensors are sensors that physically mimic structures and functions of biological neural entities. One example of this is the event camera. MOS sensors The MOSFET invented at Bell Labs between 1955 and 1960, MOSFET sensors (MOS sensors) were later developed, and they have since been widely used to measure physical, chemical, biological and environmental parameters. A number of MOSFET sensors have been developed, for measuring physical, chemical, biological, and environmental parameters. The earliest MOSFET sensors include the open-gate field-effect transistor (OGFET) introduced by Johannessen in 1970, the ion-sensitive field-effect transistor (ISFET) invented by Piet Bergveld in 1970, the adsorption FET (ADFET) patented by P.F. Cox in 1974, and a hydrogen-sensitive MOSFET demonstrated by I. Lundstrom, M.S. Shivaraman, C.S. Svenson and L. Lundkvist in 1975. The ISFET is a special type of MOSFET with a gate at a certain distance, and where the metal gate is replaced by an ion-sensitive membrane, electrolyte solution and reference electrode. The ISFET is widely used in biomedical applications, such as the detection of DNA hybridization, biomarker detection from blood, antibody detection, glucose measurement, pH sensing, and genetic technology. By the mid-1980s, numerous other MOSFET sensors had been developed, including the gas sensor FET (GASFET), surface accessible FET (SAFET), charge flow transistor (CFT), pressure sensor FET (PRESSFET), chemical field-effect transistor (ChemFET), reference ISFET (REFET), biosensor FET (BioFET), enzyme-modified FET (ENFET) and immunologically modified FET (IMFET). By the early 2000s, BioFET types such as the DNA field-effect transistor (DNAFET), gene-modified FET (GenFET) and cell-potential BioFET (CPFET) had been developed. MOS technology is the basis for modern image sensors, including the charge-coupled device (CCD) and the CMOS active-pixel sensor (CMOS sensor), used in digital imaging and digital cameras. Willard Boyle and George E. Smith developed the CCD in 1969. While researching the MOS process, they realized that an electric charge was the analogy of the magnetic bubble and that it could be stored on a tiny MOS capacitor. As it was fairly straightforward to fabricate a series of MOS capacitors in a row, they connected a suitable voltage to them so that the charge could be stepped along from one to the next. The CCD is a semiconductor circuit that was later used in the first digital video cameras for television broadcasting. The MOS active-pixel sensor (APS) was developed by Tsutomu Nakamura at Olympus in 1985. The CMOS active-pixel sensor was later developed by Eric Fossum and his team in the early 1990s. MOS image sensors are widely used in optical mouse technology. The first optical mouse, invented by Richard F. Lyon at Xerox in 1980, used a 5 ฮผm NMOS sensor chip. Since the first commercial optical mouse, the IntelliMouse introduced in 1999, most optical mouse devices use CMOS sensors. MOS monitoring sensors are used for house monitoring, office and agriculture monitoring, traffic monitoring (including car speed, traffic jams, and traffic accidents), weather monitoring (such as for rain, wind, lightning and storms), defense monitoring, and monitoring temperature, humidity, air pollution, fire, health, security and lighting. MOS gas detector sensors are used to detect carbon monoxide, sulfur dioxide, hydrogen sulfide, ammonia, and other gas substances. Other MOS sensors include intelligent sensors and wireless sensor network (WSN) technology. The typical modern CPUs, GPUs and SoCs are usually integrated electric sensors to detect chip temperatures, voltages and powers. See also References Further reading
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/ื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ_ืžื•ื—ืœื˜] | [TOKENS: 3804]
ืชื•ื›ืŸ ืขื ื™ื™ื ื™ื ื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ ืžื•ื—ืœื˜ ื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ ืžื•ื—ืœื˜ ื”ื™ื ืกื™ืกืžื” ืฉื˜ื‘ืข ืจืืฉ ืžืžืฉืœืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ, ื‘ื ื™ืžื™ืŸ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื‘ืชื•ืจ ื™ืขื“ ื•ืžื˜ืจื” ืœืžืœื—ืžืช ื—ืจื‘ื•ืช ื‘ืจื–ืœ. ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื”ื–ื›ื™ืจ ืœืจืืฉื•ื ื” ืืช ื”ืกื™ืกืžื” ื‘ื ืื•ื ื‘ื›ื ืกืช ื‘ืขืช ื”ืงืžืช ืžืžืฉืœืช ื”ื—ื™ืจื•ื, 12 ื‘ืื•ืงื˜ื•ื‘ืจ 2023. ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื—ื–ืจ ืขืœ ื”ืกื™ืกืžื” ืคืขืžื™ื ืจื‘ื•ืช ื‘ืžืฉืš ื”ืžืœื—ืžื”. ืกื™ืกืžื” ื–ื• ื–ื›ืชื” ืœื”ืชื™ื™ื—ืกื•ืช ื ืจื—ื‘ืช ื‘ืืžืฆืขื™ ื”ืชืงืฉื•ืจืช ื•ื‘ืฉื™ื— ื”ืฆื™ื‘ื•ืจื™. ื˜ื‘ื™ืขืช ื”ื‘ื™ื˜ื•ื™ ื‘ื ืื•ื ืฉื ืฉื ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื‘-23 ื‘ื™ื ื•ืืจ 2024 ื‘ืคื ื™ ื—ื ื™ื›ื™ ืงื•ืจืก ืžืคืงื“ื™ ืคืœื•ื’ื•ืช ืฉืœ ืฆื”"ืœ ื”ื•ื ืืžืจ: "ื”ืฆื™ืคื™ื™ื” ื”ืขื™ืงืจื™ืช ืฉืœื™ ื–ื” ื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ ืžื•ื—ืœื˜. ืœื ืคื—ื•ืช ืžื–ื”. ืื™ืŸ ืชื—ืœื™ืฃ ืœื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ. ืื ื™ ืฉื•ืžืข ื‘ืื•ืœืคื ื™ื, ืคืจืฉื ื™ื ื•ื›ืœ ืžื™ื ื™ ื–ื” ืžืกื‘ื™ืจื™ื 'ืื™ ืืคืฉืจ' ื•'ืœื ืฆืจื™ืš'. ืืคืฉืจ, ืฆืจื™ืš ื•ื’ื ืื™ืŸ ืœื ื• ื‘ืจื™ืจื” ืื—ืจืช. ื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ ืžื•ื—ืœื˜." ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื—ื–ืจ ืขืœ ืžืกืจ ื–ื” ืขื•ื“ ืคืขืžื™ื ืจื‘ื•ืช, ื‘ื™ืŸ ื”ืฉืืจ ื‘-24 ื‘ืžืจืฅ, ื›ืฉืืžืจ, ื‘ืื™ืจื•ืข ืงืจื™ืืช ืžื’ื™ืœื”: "ืื ื—ื ื• ื ื™ื›ื ืก ืœืจืคื™ื— ื•ื ืฉื™ื’ ืืช ื”ื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ ื”ืžื•ื—ืœื˜. ื—ื™ืกืœื ื• ืืช ื”ืžืŸ ื ื—ืกืœ ื’ื ืืช ืกื™ื ื•ื•ืืจ", ื‘ืžื›ืชื‘ ืœืžืฉืคื—ื•ืช ื”ืฉื›ื•ืœื•ืช ืœืงืจืืช ื™ื•ื ื”ื–ื™ื›ืจื•ืŸ ืœื—ืœืœื™ ืžืขืจื›ื•ืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ, ื‘ื ืื•ืžื• ื‘ืคื ื™ ื”ืงื•ื ื’ืจืก ืฉืœ ืืจืฆื•ืช ื”ื‘ืจื™ืช ื‘ื™ื•ืœื™ 2024, ื•ื‘ื ืื•ืžื• ื‘ืขืฆืจืช ื”ืื•"ื ื‘ืกืคื˜ืžื‘ืจ 2024. ืืช ื ื™ืžื•ืงื™ื• ืœืคื™ื˜ื•ืจื™ ืฉืจ ื”ื‘ื™ื˜ื—ื•ืŸ, ื™ื•ืื‘ ื’ืœื ื˜, ื‘ื ื•ื‘ืžื‘ืจ 2024, ื”ื—ืœ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื‘ืžื™ืœื™ื: "ื”ืžื—ื•ื™ื‘ื•ืช ื”ืขืœื™ื•ื ื” ืฉืœื™ ื›ืจืืฉ ืžืžืฉืœืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื”ื™ื ืœืฉืžื•ืจ ืขืœ ื‘ื™ื˜ื—ื•ืŸ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื•ืœื”ื‘ื™ื ืื•ืชื ื• ืœื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ ืžื•ื—ืœื˜." ื‘-9 ื‘ื“ืฆืžื‘ืจ 2024 ืืžืจ ื›ื™ "ื”ื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ ื”ืžื•ื—ืœื˜ ืฉืœื’ืœื’ื• ืขืœื™ื• ื”ื•ืคืš ื”ื™ื•ื ืœืžืฆื™ืื•ืช". ืฉื™ืžื•ืฉ ื‘ื‘ื™ื˜ื•ื™ ื‘ื–ืžืŸ ื”ืžืœื—ืžื” ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื”ื–ื›ื™ืจ ืืช ื”ื‘ื™ื˜ื•ื™ ื‘ืžื™ื•ื—ื“ ืœืื—ืจ ืื™ืจื•ืขื™ื ืฉื ื—ืฉื‘ื• ื›ื”ืฆืœื—ื” ืฉืœ ื”ืžืœื—ืžื”. ืœืžืฉืœ, ื‘ืžืกื™ื‘ืช ืขื™ืชื•ื ืื™ื ืฉืงื™ื™ื ื‘-9 ื‘ื“ืฆืžื‘ืจ 2024 ืื—ืจื™ ื ืคื™ืœืช ืืกื“ ืืžืจ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•: "ื”ื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ ื”ืžื•ื—ืœื˜ ืฉืœื’ืœื’ื• ืขืœื™ื• ื”ื•ืคืš ื”ื™ื•ื ืœืžืฆื™ืื•ืช. ืื—ืจื™ ื ืคื™ืœืช ื”ืžืฉื˜ืจ ื‘ื“ืžืฉืง, ื—ืžืืก ืžื‘ื•ื“ื“ ื™ื•ืชืจ ืžืชืžื™ื“, ื”ื•ื ืงื™ื‘ืœ ืืช ื”ืชืคื•ืจืจื•ืช ื”ื–ื™ืจื•ืช ื”ื•ื ืฆื™ืคื” ืœืขื–ืจื” ืžื—ื–ื‘ืืœืœื”, ืื™ืจืืŸ ื•ืžืฉื˜ืจ ืืกื“ - ื–ื” ื›ื‘ืจ ืœื ื™ืงืจื”." ืœืขื•ืžืช ื–ืืช, ืœืื—ืจ ืื™ืจื•ืขื™ื ืฉื ืชืคืกื• ื›ื”ืชืคืฉืจื•ืช ื›ืžื• ื—ืชื™ืžืช ื”ืกื›ื ื™ืฉืจืืœโ€“ืœื‘ื ื•ืŸ 2024 ื ืžื ืข ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืžืื–ื›ื•ืจ ื”ื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ ื”ืžื•ื—ืœื˜. ื“"ืจ ื—ื™ื™ื ืžืฉื’ื‘ ืชืžืš ื‘ื’ื™ืฉืชื• ืฉืœ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื•ื›ืชื‘: "ื”ืžืœื—ืžื” ืžื•ืœ ื”ืฆื•ืจืจ ื”ืขื–ืชื™ ืฆืจื™ื›ื” ืœื”ืกืชื™ื™ื ื‘ื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ ืžื•ื—ืœื˜. ื›ืœ ืชื•ืฆืื” ืื—ืจืช ืชืžื™ื˜ ืืกื•ืŸ ืขืœ ื›ื•ืœื ื•." ืžื‘ืงืจื™ื• ืฉืœ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื”ืจื‘ื• ืœื”ื–ื›ื™ืจ ืืช ื”ืกื™ืกืžื” ื‘ืขืช ืขืฆื™ืจื•ืช ืื• ืคืฉืจื•ืช ื‘ืžืœื—ืžื”. ื›ืš, ื‘ื™ื•ื ื™ 2024 ื‘ืขืช ืฉื”ืชื’ื‘ืจื• ื”ื“ื™ื‘ื•ืจื™ื ืขืœ ืขืกืงื” ืขื ื”ื—ืžืืก ืื™ืชืžืจ ื‘ืŸ ื’ื‘ื™ืจ ื”ืฉืชืžืฉ ื‘ื‘ื™ื˜ื•ื™ ื›ืฉื”ืขื‘ื™ืจ ื‘ื™ืงื•ืจืช ืขืœ ืขืกืงื” ืขื ื”ื—ืžืืก. ื‘ื ื•ื‘ืžื‘ืจ 2024 ื‘ืขืงื‘ื•ืช ื—ืชื™ืžืช ื”ืกื›ื ื™ืฉืจืืœโ€“ืœื‘ื ื•ืŸ 2024, ืžื‘ืงืจื™ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื”ื–ื›ื™ืจื• ืืช ื”ืกื™ืกืžื” ื•ื˜ืขื ื• ืฉื”ื”ืกื›ื ืื™ื ื ื• ืชื•ืื ืืช ื”ื”ื‘ื˜ื—ื•ืช ืœ"ื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ ืžื•ื—ืœื˜". ืœืื—ืจ ื”ื—ืชื™ืžื” ืขืœ ื”ืกื›ื ื—ืžืืกโ€“ื™ืฉืจืืœ, ื‘ื™ื ื•ืืจ 2025, ื”ืฆื™ื’ื• ืžื‘ืงืจื™ื• ืฉืœ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืžื™ืžื™ืŸ ื•ืžืฉืžืืœ ืืช ื”ืขืกืงื” ื•ื”ืคืกืงืช ื”ืœื—ื™ืžื” ื›ื›ื–ื• ืฉืขื•ืžื“ืช ื‘ืกืชื™ืจื” ืœ"ื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ ืžื•ื—ืœื˜". ื—ื‘ืจื™ ืžืคืœื’ืช "ืขื•ืฆืžื” ื™ื”ื•ื“ื™ืช", ืฉื”ืชืคื˜ืจื• ืžื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื‘ืขืงื‘ื•ืช ื—ืชื™ืžืช ื”ืขืกืงื” ื›ื™ื ื• ืื•ืชื” "ื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ ืžื•ื—ืœื˜ ืœื—ืžืืก". ื‘"ืขื›ืฉื™ื• 14" ืฉื•ื“ืจ ืื™ื™ื˜ื ืขืœ ื”ื”ืชื ื”ืœื•ืช ื‘ื—ื–ื™ืช ื”ืฆืคื•ื ื™ืช ื‘ืžืœื—ืžืช ื—ืจื‘ื•ืช ื‘ืจื–ืœ, ืฉื”ืกืชื™ื™ืžื” ื‘ืžื™ืœื™ื: "ื›ื›ื” ืœื ื ืจืื” ื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ ืžื•ื—ืœื˜, ื›ื›ื” ื ืจืื” ื›ื™ืฉืœื•ืŸ ืžื•ื—ืœื˜", ื•ื‘ื™ืงื•ืจืช ืขืœ ื ื™ื”ื•ืœ ื”ื”ืกื‘ืจื” ื”ื™ืฉืจืืœื™ืช ืฉื›ืœืœื” ืืช ื”ืžืฉืคื˜ "ืžื“ื™ื ืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื”ื›ืจื™ื–ื” 'ื›ื™ืฉืœื•ืŸ ืžื•ื—ืœื˜' ื‘ืžืœื—ืžืช ื”ื”ืกื‘ืจื”". ืื‘ื™ื’ื“ื•ืจ ืœื™ื‘ืจืžืŸ ื”ืขื‘ื™ืจ ื‘ื™ืงื•ืจืช ืขืœ ื ื™ื”ื•ืœ ื”ืžืœื—ืžื” ื•ื”ืฉืชืžืฉ ื‘ื‘ื™ื˜ื•ื™ ื›ืฉืืžืจ "ื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ ืžื•ื—ืœื˜? ื‘ื™ื–ื™ื•ืŸ ืžื•ื—ืœื˜!". ื›ื•ื‘ืขื™ ื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ ืžื•ื—ืœื˜ ื‘-27 ื‘ื™ื ื•ืืจ ื”ื•ืคื™ืข ื™ื•ืขืฅ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื™ื•ื ืชืŸ ืื•ืจื™ืš ืขื ื›ื•ื‘ืข ืžืฆื—ื™ื™ื” ืขื ื”ื›ื™ืชื•ื‘ "ื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ ืžื•ื—ืœื˜". ื‘ืคื‘ืจื•ืืจ 2024 ื”ื—ืœ ื”ืขื™ืชื•ื ืื™ ื™ื ื•ืŸ ืžื’ืœ ืœื”ื•ืคื™ืข ื‘ืชื—ื™ืœืช ืชื•ื›ื ื™ืชื• "ื”ืคื˜ืจื™ื•ื˜ื™ื" ื›ืฉืœืจืืฉื• ื›ื•ื‘ืข ืžืฆื—ื™ื™ื” ื•ืขืœื™ื• ื”ืกื™ืกืžื”, ื•ื”ื—ืœ ืžื•ื›ืจ ื›ื•ื‘ืขื™ื ื›ืืœื”, ืฉื ืžื›ืจื™ื ื’ื ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ืชื ื•ืขืช "ืื ืชืจืฆื•". ื”ื›ื•ื‘ืข ื”ื•ืฆื’ ื‘ืื•ืคืŸ ื‘ื•ืœื˜ ื‘ืชืžื•ื ืช ื™ื—ืกื™ ืฆื™ื‘ื•ืจ ืฉืœ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื‘ื˜ื™ืกืชื• ืœืืจืฆื•ืช ื”ื‘ืจื™ืช. ืืชืจ ืžื›ื™ืจืช ื”ื›ื•ื‘ืข ื™ืจื“ ื•ืœื ื”ื™ื” ืคืขื™ืœ ืœืื—ืจ ื”ื—ืชื™ืžื” ืขืœ ื”ืคืกืงืช ืืฉ ื‘ืœื‘ื ื•ืŸ ื‘ืกื•ืฃ ื ื•ื‘ืžื‘ืจ 2024. ื”ืชื™ื™ื—ืกื•ืช ืœื‘ื™ื˜ื•ื™ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืœ"ืœ ืœืฉืขื‘ืจ, ื’ื™ื•ืจื ืื™ื™ืœื ื“, ื‘ื™ืงืจ ืืช ื”ืฉื™ืžื•ืฉ ื‘ื‘ื™ื˜ื•ื™ ื‘ื’ืœืœ ืฉืœื“ื‘ืจื™ื•, ืžื“ื•ื‘ืจ ื‘ืžื•ืฉื’ ืฉืชื•ื›ื ื• ืœื ื”ื•ื‘ื”ืจ ืœื“ืจื’ ื”ืฆื‘ืื™ ื•ื”ื•ื ืœื ื ืคืจื˜ ืœื”ื ื—ื™ื•ืช ื•ืœื”ื’ื“ืจื•ืช ื‘ืจื•ืจื•ืช, ื•ื›ื™ ื”ื•ื ืคืฉื˜ื ื™ ื•ืื™ื ื• ืžืชืื™ื ืœืชื™ืื•ืจ ืžืฆื™ืื•ืช ืžื•ืจื›ื‘ืช. ื”ื™ื• ืคืจืฉื ื™ื ืฉืคืจื˜ื• ืืช ืžื” ืฉืœื“ืขืชื ื™ื™ื—ืฉื‘ ืœ"ื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ ืžื•ื—ืœื˜". ืื—ื“ ื”ืคืจืฉื ื™ื ื˜ืขืŸ ืฉื”ืฉื’ืช "ื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ ืžื•ื—ืœื˜" ืชื‘ื—ืŸ ืœืื—ืจ ืžืกืคืจ ืฉื ื™ื ืขืœ ืคื™ ื”ืฉืืœื” ื”ืื ื”ื—ืžืืก ืขื“ื™ื™ืŸ ืฉื•ืœื˜ ื‘ืจืฆื•ืขืช ืขื–ื”. ื’ืœืขื“ ืฉืจื•ืŸ ื˜ืขืŸ ืฉื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ ืžื•ื—ืœื˜ ื”ื•ื "ืฉื—ืจื•ืจ ื”ื—ื˜ื•ืคื™ื ื•ื—ื™ืกื•ืœ ืื• ื›ื ื™ืขืช ืžื—ื‘ืœื™ ื—ืžืืก". ื”ืžื‘ืงืจื™ื ืืช ืžืฉื›ื” ื”ืจื‘ ืฉืœ ื”ืžืœื—ืžื” ื”ืชื™ื™ื—ืกื• ืœื‘ื™ื˜ื•ื™ ื›ืืœ ืžื” ืฉืžื‘ื˜ื ืืช ืจืฆื•ื ื• ืฉืœ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืœื“ื—ื•ืช ืืช ืกื™ื•ืžื” ื•ืืช ื”ื”ืกื›ื ืขื ื”ื—ืžืืก ื•ื”ืฉื‘ืช ื”ื—ื˜ื•ืคื™ื. ืฉืจ ื”ื‘ื™ื˜ื—ื•ืŸ, ื™ื•ืื‘ ื’ืœื ื˜ ื‘ื™ืงืจ ืืช ื”ืฉื™ืžื•ืฉ ื‘ืžื•ืฉื’ ืฉืœื˜ืขื ืชื• ืขื•ืžื“ ื‘ืกืชื™ืจื” ืœืžืขืฉื™ื ื‘ืคื•ืขืœ ืฉืœ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•. ื”ื•ื ืืžืจ: "ืื ื™ ืฉื•ืžืข ืืช ื›ืœ ื”ื’ื™ื‘ื•ืจื™ื ืขื ื”ืชื•ืคื™ื, 'ื”ื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ ื”ืžื•ื—ืœื˜' ื•ื”ืงืฉืงื•ืฉื™ื ื”ืืœื”. ืืช ืื•ืžืฅ ื”ืœื‘ ืจืื™ืชื™ ื›ืฉื–ื” ื‘ื ืœื“ื™ื•ืŸ", ื•ื”ื‘ื™ืข ืชืžื™ื›ื” ื‘ื”ืกื›ื ืœืฉื—ืจื•ืจ ื”ื—ื˜ื•ืคื™ื. ื‘ื™ืงื•ืจืช ื ื•ืกืคืช ื”ื™ื™ืชื” ืฉืœื ื ื™ืชืŸ ืœื”ืฉื™ื’ "ื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ ืžื•ื—ืœื˜", ืื• ืฉืœื ื ื™ืชืŸ ืœื”ืฉื™ื’ื• ื‘ืžืกืคืจ ื—ื•ื“ืฉื™ื. ื”ื‘ื™ื˜ื•ื™ ื–ื›ื” ื’ื ืœื”ืชื™ื™ื—ืกื•ืช ืกืื˜ื™ืจื™ืช, ื‘ืชื•ื›ื ื™ืช "ืืจืฅ ื ื”ื“ืจืช" ื•ื‘ืชื•ื›ื ื™ืช "ืฆื•ื•ืช ืฉืœื™ื™ืŸ" ื‘ืขืจื•ืฅ "ืจืœื•ื•ื ื˜". ื”ืขืจื•ืช ืฉื•ืœื™ื™ื
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/ืจืง_ืœื_ื‘ื™ื‘ื™] | [TOKENS: 3412]
ืชื•ื›ืŸ ืขื ื™ื™ื ื™ื ืจืง ืœื ื‘ื™ื‘ื™ "ืจืง ืœื ื‘ื™ื‘ื™" (ืœืขื™ืชื™ื ื‘ืจืืฉื™ ืชื™ื‘ื•ืช: ืจืœ"ื‘; ืื• ื›ืชื•ืคืขื” ืจืœ"ื‘ื™ื–ื) ื”ื•ื ื‘ื™ื˜ื•ื™ ืคื•ืœื™ื˜ื™, ืœืจื•ื‘ ื‘ื™ืงื•ืจืชื™, ื”ืžืชื™ื™ื—ืก ืœืžื—ื ื” ื”ืคื•ืœื™ื˜ื™ ื‘ืžื“ื™ื ืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืฉืงื•ืจื ืœื”ื—ืœื™ืฃ ืืช ื‘ื ื™ืžื™ืŸ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ("ื‘ื™ื‘ื™") ื‘ืชืคืงื™ื“ ืจืืฉ ืžืžืฉืœืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ. ื”ื™ืกื˜ื•ืจื™ื” ื”ืžื•ื ื— "ืจืง ืœื ื‘ื™ื‘ื™" ื ืžืฆื ื‘ืฉื™ืžื•ืฉ ื‘ืฉื™ื— ื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืขื•ื“ ืžืชื—ื™ืœืช ื”ืžืื” ื”-21. ื‘ืชืงื•ืคืช ื”ื‘ื—ื™ืจื•ืช ื‘ืฉื ืช 1999, ืขืžื•ืชื” ื‘ืฉื "ืกื˜ื•ื“ื ื˜ื™ื ืจื•ืฆื™ื ืฉื™ื ื•ื™" ืงื™ื™ืžื” ืงืžืคื™ื™ืŸ ืฉื›ืœืœ ื‘ืขื™ืงืจ ืฉืœื˜ื™ ืคืœืจื™ื’, ืคืœื™ื™ืจื™ื ื•ืกื˜ื™ืงืจื™ื ืฉื‘ื”ื ื”ื•ื‘ืœื˜ื” ื”ืกื™ืกืžื”: โ€ื‘ืจืง, ืžืจื“ื›ื™, ื‘ื’ื™ืŸ, ืื•ื—ื ื”, ื‘ื-ื’ื“, ืขื–, ืื ื™, ืืชื” - ืจืง ืœื ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•โ€. ื‘ื“ื•"ื— ืžื‘ืงืจ ื”ืžื“ื™ื ื” ื ืงื‘ืข ื›ื™ ื”ืชืขืžื•ืœื” ื ื•ืขื“ื” ืœืงื“ื ืืช ืžืคืœื’ืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืื—ืช ืฉืœ ืื”ื•ื“ ื‘ืจืง. ื‘-2007, ื ืขืฉื” ืฉื™ืžื•ืฉ ืจืืฉื•ืŸ ื‘ืžื•ื ื— ื‘ืืžืฆืขื™ ื”ืชืงืฉื•ืจืช ื‘ืžื™ื™ื ืกื˜ืจื™ื, ืื– ื”ืคื•ื‘ืœื™ืฆื™ืกื˜ ื™ื•ืืœ ืžืจืงื•ืก ืคืจืกื ื‘ืขื™ืชื•ืŸ "ื”ืืจืฅ" ืžืืžืจ ื‘ื›ื•ืชืจืช ื–ื•. ืœื›ืชื‘ื™ื• ื”ื’ื™ื‘ ื™ืฆื—ืง ื’ืื’ื•ืœื”, ืœืฉืขื‘ืจ ื—ื‘ืจ ื”ื›ื ืกืช ืžื˜ืขื ืžืคืœื’ืช ืฉ"ืก, ื‘ืžืืžืจ "ืœืžื” ื›ืŸ ื‘ื™ื‘ื™". ื›ืชื‘ื•ืช ื‘ื ื•ืฉื ืคื•ืจืกืžื• ื‘ื›ืœื™ ืชืงืฉื•ืจืช ืฉื•ื ื™ื ืœืื•ืจืš ื”ืขืฉื•ืจ ื”ืฉื ื™ ืฉืœ ื”ืžืื” ื”-21. ื”ืชืงื‘ืขื•ืช ื”ืžื•ื ื— ื‘ืฉื™ื— ื”ืฆื™ื‘ื•ืจื™ ื”ื™ื™ืชื” ื‘ืขื™ืงืจื” ื‘ืžื”ืœืš ื”ืžืฉื‘ืจ ื”ืคื•ืœื™ื˜ื™ ืฉื”ื—ืœ ื‘-2019, ืื– ืžื—ื ื” ื”ื™ืžื™ืŸ ืžื•ืœ ืžื—ื ื” ื”ืžืจื›ื– ื•ื”ืฉืžืืœ ื ื—ืœืงื• ืกื‘ื™ื‘ ื”ืžืฉืš ื›ื”ื•ื ืชื• ืฉืœ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื›ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื”. ื‘ืขื•ื“ ืชื•ืžื›ื™ ืžืคืœื’ืช "ื”ืœื™ื›ื•ื“" ื•ื’ื•ืฉ ื”ื™ืžื™ืŸ ื”ื‘ื™ืขื• ืชืžื™ื›ื” ื‘ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•, ื”ืžืจื›ื– ื•ื”ืฉืžืืœ ื”ืชื ื’ื“ื• ืœื• ื‘ืื•ืคืŸ ืื™ืฉื™. ืขื ื”ื–ืžืŸ ื”ืชืจื—ื‘ื” ื”ื”ืชื ื’ื“ื•ืช ืœื—ืœืงื™ื ืžื’ื•ืฉ ื”ื™ืžื™ืŸ. ืขื™ืงืจ ื”ื”ืชื ื’ื“ื•ืช ืœื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืœื ื ื’ืขื” ื‘ืคื•ืขืœื• ื›ืจืืฉ ืžืžืฉืœื”, ืืœื ื‘ื—ืงื™ืจื•ืชื™ื• ื”ืคืœื™ืœื™ื•ืช (ืชื™ืงื™ "1000", "2000" ื•-"4000") ืฉื”ื‘ืฉื™ืœื• ืœื›ื“ื™ ื”ื’ืฉืช ื›ืชื‘ ืื™ืฉื•ื. ืœืžืจื•ืช ืฉืขื™ืงืจ ื”ื”ืชื ื’ื“ื•ืช ื”ื™ื™ืชื” ืขืงื‘ ื—ืงื™ืจื•ืชื™ื• ื”ืคืœื™ืœื™ื•ืช ืฉืœ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•, ื‘ื™ืงื•ืจืช ืจื‘ื” ื”ื•ืคื ืชื” ื›ืœืคื™ื• ื’ื ื‘ื’ืœืœ ืžื“ื™ื ื™ื•ืชื• ื•ืคื•ืขืœื• ื›ืจืืฉ ืžืžืฉืœื”. ืžื”ื•ืช ื˜ื™ืขื•ืŸ ื”ืžืชื ื’ื“ื™ื ื”ื™ื ืฉืื“ื ื”ืžื•ืืฉื ื‘ืฉื—ื™ืชื•ืช ื‘ืฉื•ื—ื“ ื•ื‘ืžืจืžื” ื•ื”ืคืจืช ืืžื•ื ื™ื ืื™ื ื• ื™ื›ื•ืœ ืœื›ื”ืŸ ื›ืจืืฉ ืžืžืฉืœื”. ื˜ืขื ื” ื–ื• ื ืกืžื›ื”, ื‘ื™ืŸ ื”ื™ืชืจ, ืขืœ ื“ื‘ืจื™ื ืฉืืžืจ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื‘ืขืฆืžื• ื‘-2008 ืขืœ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื“ืื– ืื”ื•ื“ ืื•ืœืžืจื˜. ืœืคื™ื”ื, "ืจืืฉ ืžืžืฉืœื” ื”ืฉืงื•ืข ืขื“ ืฆื•ื•ืืจ ื‘ื—ืงื™ืจื•ืช" ืขืœื•ืœ ืœื”ื›ืจื™ืข "ืขืœ ื‘ืกื™ืก ื”ืื™ื ื˜ืจืก ื”ืื™ืฉื™ ืฉืœ ื”ื”ื™ืฉืจื“ื•ืช ืฉืœื•, ื•ืœื ืœืคื™ ื”ืื™ื ื˜ืจืก ื”ืœืื•ืžื™". ืœืื•ืจ ื”ืœื›ืช ื“ืจืขื™-ืคื ื—ืกื™, ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืื•ืœืฅ ืœื”ืชืคื˜ืจ ืžื›ืœ ืชืคืงื™ื“ื™ื• ื”ื ืœื•ื•ื™ื ื›ืฉืจ, ืื ื›ื™ ื”ื—ื•ืง ื”ืชื™ืจ ืœื• ืœื”ืžืฉื™ืš ื•ืœื›ื”ืŸ ื›ืจืืฉ ืžืžืฉืœื” ื›ืœ ืขื•ื“ ืœื ื”ื•ืจืฉืข. ืœืื•ืจ ื–ืืช, ื”ื•ืฆืข ืœืฉื ื•ืช ืืช ื”ื—ื•ืง ื›ืš ืฉื™ืืœืฅ ืื•ืชื• ืœื”ืชืคื˜ืจ. ืคื•ืœื™ื˜ื™ืงืื™ื ืฉื•ื ื™ื, ืžืฉืžืืœ ื•ืžื™ืžื™ืŸ, ื”ืชื™ื™ื—ืกื• ืœืžื•ื ื— "ืจืง ืœื ื‘ื™ื‘ื™" ื›ื‘ื™ืงื•ืจืช ืขืœ ืื’'ื ื“ื” ืคื•ืœื™ื˜ื™ืช, ืื• ืชื•ืš ื›ื“ื™ ื”ื›ื—ืฉื” ืฉืžื“ื•ื‘ืจ ืขืœ ืื’'ื ื“ื” ืคื•ืœื™ื˜ื™ืช. ืขื ืืœื• ื ืžื ื™ื, ื‘ื™ืŸ ื”ื™ืชืจ, ืื™ื™ืœืช ืฉืงื“, ื‘ื ื™ ื’ื ืฅ, ืชืžืจ ื–ื ื“ื‘ืจื’ ื•ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืขืฆืžื•. ืชืฉื“ื™ืจ ื‘ื—ื™ืจื•ืช ื‘ื ื•ืฉื ื–ื” ื”ืชืคืจืกื ืžื˜ืขื "ื”ืœื™ื›ื•ื“" ื‘ืžื”ืœืš ืžืขืจื›ืช ื”ื‘ื—ื™ืจื•ืช ืœื›ื ืกืช ื”ืขืฉืจื™ื ื•ืฉืœื•ืฉ. ืฉื™ืžื•ืฉ ื”ืฉื™ืžื•ืฉ ื‘ืžื•ื ื— ืจื•ื•ื— ืžืฆื“ ืื ืฉื™ ืชืงืฉื•ืจืช ื•ืคื•ืœื™ื˜ื™ืงืื™ื ืžื”ื™ืžื™ืŸ ื›ืœืคื™ ืื ืฉื™ ืชืงืฉื•ืจืช ื”ื ืชืคืกื™ื ื‘ืขื™ื ื™ื”ื ื›"ืฉืžืืœื ื™ื". ืœืจื•ื‘, ื”ื‘ื™ืงื•ืจืช ื”ื™ื ืขืœ ื›ืš ืฉื‘ืžืงื•ื ืœื”ืชื™ื™ื—ืก ืœืกื•ื’ื™ื•ืช ืžื”ื•ืชื™ื•ืช ื”ื”ืชืงืคื•ืช ื”ืŸ ืคืจืกื•ื ืœื™ื•ืช ื ื’ื“ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•. ื–ืืช, ื›ื‘ื™ื›ื•ืœ, ื‘ื ื™ื’ื•ื“ ืœื›ืœืœื™ ื”ืืชื™ืงื” ื”ืขื™ืชื•ื ืื™ืช, ื”ื™ื•ืช ืฉืžืชื ื’ื“ื™ื• ื–ื•ื›ื™ื ืœืฉื‘ื—ื™ื. ื”ื‘ื™ืงื•ืจืช ืžืชื™ื™ื—ืกืช ืœื›ืš ืฉื’ื™ืฉื” ื–ื• ืื™ื ื” ืจืฆื™ื•ื ืœื™ืช ืœื“ืขืชื, ื•ื”ื™ื ืžื›ื•ื ื™ืช "ืื•ื‘ืกืกื™ื”", "ืคืกื™ื›ื•ื–ื”" ื•"ื›ืช". ื‘ื™ืงื•ืจืช ืขืœ ื’ื™ืฉืช "ืจืง ืœื ื‘ื™ื‘ื™" ื›ื•ื•ื ื” ื’ื ื›ืœืคื™ ืžืคืœื’ื•ืช ื”ืžืจื›ื– ื•ื”ืฉืžืืœ ื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ, ืžืคื ื™ ืฉืืœื•, ืœื“ืขืช ื”ืžื‘ืงืจื™ื, ืœื ื”ืฆื™ืขื• ื—ืœื•ืคื” ืžืฉืžืขื•ืชื™ืช ื•ื ื™ื”ืœื• ืงืžืคื™ื™ืŸ ืคืจืกื•ื ืœื™. ื˜ืขื ื” ืื—ืจืช ื”ื™ื™ืชื” ืฉืžืคืœื’ื•ืช ืืœื• ืžื•ื›ื ื•ืช ืœื”ืชืคืฉืจ ืขืœ ืกื•ื’ื™ื•ืช ืคื•ืœื™ื˜ื™ื•ืช ืขืœ ืžื ืช ืœื”ื—ืœื™ืคื•. ื‘ื™ืงื•ืจืช ื’ื ื ืžืชื—ื” ืขืœ ืจืฉื™ืžืช "ื›ื—ื•ืœ ืœื‘ืŸ", ื•ื ื˜ืขืŸ ืฉื”ืื™ื“ืื•ืœื•ื’ื™ื” ื”ืžืื—ื“ืช ืืช ื—ื‘ืจื™ื” ื”ื™ื "ืจืง ืœื ื‘ื™ื‘ื™", ื“ื‘ืจ ืฉื”ื•ื›ื—ืฉ ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ืจืืฉ ื”ืจืฉื™ืžื”, ื‘ื ื™ ื’ื ืฅ. ืœืขื•ืžืช ื–ืืช, ืื™ืฉ ื”ืชืงืฉื•ืจืช ื‘ืŸ ื›ืกืคื™ืช, ืžืžื‘ืงืจื™ื• ื”ื™ื“ื•ืขื™ื ืฉืœ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•, ืงืจื ืœ"ืจืง ืœื ื‘ื™ื‘ื™" ืื’'ื ื“ื” ื”ื’ื™ื•ื ื™ืช ื•ืžื ื•ืžืงืช. ืœื˜ืขื ืช ืคืจื•ืคืกื•ืจ ื“ืจื•ืจ ืคื™ื™ื˜ืœืกื•ืŸ ื”ืžื•ื ื— ืžืฉืงืฃ ืกืœื™ื“ื” ืžื’ื™ืฉื” ืœื ืขื ื™ื™ื ื™ืช ืฉื”ื•ืคื›ืช ืืช ื”ื›ืœ ืœืคื•ืœื™ื˜ื™. ืœื’ื™ืฉืชื•, ื›ืฉื”ื›ืœ ืคื•ืœื™ื˜ื™, ืœื ื ืฉืืจ ืžืงื•ื ืœื ืชื•ื ื™ื ื•ืฉื™ืงื•ืœื™ื ืขื ื™ื™ื ื™ื™ื ืฉืœ ื‘ื—ื™ืจืช ื—ืœื•ืคื•ืช. ื›ืฉื”ื›ืœ ืคื•ืœื™ื˜ื™ ืœื ืžืชื—ืฉื‘ื™ื ื‘ื”ืฉืœื›ื•ืช ืฉืœ ื”ืชื ื”ืœื•ืช ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ืขืœ ื”ืžื“ื™ื ื” ื•ื”ืื–ืจื—ื™ื ื”ื—ืœืฉื™ื ื‘ื”, ื•ื‘ื˜ื— ืœื ื‘ื”ืฉืœื›ื•ืช ืœื˜ื•ื•ื— ืืจื•ืš. ื”ืชื•ืฆืื” ื”ื™ื ื‘ื”ื›ืจื— ื”ื—ืœื˜ื•ืช ืœื ืžื™ื˜ื‘ื™ื•ืช. ื‘ืื•ืงื˜ื•ื‘ืจ 2021 ื›ืชื‘ ืจื•ืžืŸ ื‘ืจื•ื ืคืžืŸ ืฉื”ืžื•ื“ืœ ื”ืคื•ืœื™ื˜ื™ "ืจืง ืœื ื‘ื™ื‘ื™" ืžื™ื™ืฆื’ ื—ืœื•ืงื” ืคื•ืœื™ื˜ื™ืช ืœืžื—ื ื•ืช ืขืœ ืคื™ ืืžื•ืช ืžื•ืกืจ ื•ืœื ืขืœ ืคื™ ืื™ื“ืื•ืœื•ื’ื™ื”, ืฉืœื ื”ื™ื™ืชื” ืงื™ื™ืžืช ืœืคื ื™ ื›ืŸ, ื•ืืคื™ื™ืŸ ื’ื™ืฉื” ื–ื• ื›ืชื•ืคืขื” ืขื•ืœืžื™ืช ื‘ืจืžื” ื”ืžื“ื™ื ื™ืช ื•ื”ืคื•ืœื™ื˜ื™ืช. ืœื“ื‘ืจื™ื•, ื—ืœื•ืงื” ืคื•ืœื™ื˜ื™ืช ื“ื•ืžื” ื”ืชืจื—ืฉื” ื‘ืื•ืชื” ืชืงื•ืคื” ื‘ื—ื™ืœื•ืคื™ ืžืžืฉืœ ื‘ืฆ'ื›ื™ื”, ื•ืชื”ืœื™ื›ื™ื ื“ื•ืžื™ื ืงื•ืจื™ื ื‘ื”ื•ื ื’ืจื™ื” ื•ื‘ืคื•ืœื™ืŸ. ืจืื• ื’ื ื”ืขืจื•ืช ืฉื•ืœื™ื™ื
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Japanese_general_election] | [TOKENS: 2962]
Contents 2026 Japanese general election Sanae Takaichi LDP Sanae Takaichi LDP Early general elections were held in Japan on 8 February 2026 in all constituencies, including proportional blocks, to elect all 465 seats of the House of Representatives, the lower house of the National Diet. The election took place nearly four months into Sanae Takaichi's tenure as Prime Minister of Japan, which began on 21 October after she won the 2025 Liberal Democratic Party presidential election and formed the Liberal Democratic Partyโ€“Japan Innovation Party coalition (LDPโ€“JIP). The election also saw the debut of the newly formed Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA), a new political party formed as a merger between the primary opposition Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) and Komeito, the LDP's former longtime coalition partner. Takaichi described the election as a public referendum on her leadership as prime minister, and of the LDPโ€“JIP coalition. The LDP won a historic landslide victory, with the party regaining its majority in the House and setting a new postwar record for the most seats won by a single party with 316 seats. This gave the party a two-thirds supermajority in its own right, and surpassed the previous record of 308 seats won by the Democratic Party of Japan in 2009 and the LDP record of 300 seats won in 1986. Meanwhile, the CRA severely underperformed, losing more than two-thirds of its pre-election seats and leading to the resignations of party co-leaders Yoshihiko Noda and Tetsuo Saito after the election. Other parties that gained seats included the ultraconservative and far-right party Sanseitล and the new e-democracy party Team Mirai. Analysts credited the LDP's victory to Takaichi's high personal popularity at the time of the election, particularly among young voters and conservatives who had previously defected from the party, as well as to CDP and Komeito voters who opposed their parties' merger declining to support the CRA. The Economist described the result as a personal mandate for Takaichi, and a repudiation of the CRA. The LDP's victory marked a reversal of fortune from the 2023โ€“2024 slush fund scandal that had cost the party its majority in the previous election, with 41 of the 43 LDP candidates linked to the scandal winning their races. Background The 2024 Japanese general election and 2025 Japanese House of Councillors election both resulted in the loss of majorities for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito governing coalition under Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba. After both elections, Ishiba invoked a parliamentary plurality in both houses, and stated that he believed the LDP had a responsibility to lead the government, as it would in most other parliamentary democracies. Pressure continued to mount on Ishiba to resign as the LDP president, but he refused and said he planned to continue serving as Prime Minister. On 7 September, Ishiba announced that he would resign as president of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan. Ishiba stated he sought to claim "responsibility" as party leader for losses in recent elections, and to avoid dividing the party. Ishiba's announcement effectively cancelled the emergency election process entirely. He instead instructed LDP Secretary-General Hiroshi Moriyama, whose resignation had not been accepted by Ishiba, to begin the process to hold an extraordinary presidential election. Ishiba said he determined that now was the "appropriate time" to step aside, after a written version of the Japanโ€“U.S. tariff agreement had been finalized. Ishiba promised to continue serving as Prime Minister until a new leader was elected, and did not endorse a candidate in the subsequent election. His tenure lasted about one year. In the 2025 LDP leadership election on 5 October, Takaichi was elected as the LDP's first female president. In her first acts as party president, Takaichi appointed Tarล Asล as vice president and Shun'ichi Suzuki as secretary-general of the LDP. On 10 October, Komeito chief representative Tetsuo Saito announced that it would leave the ruling coalition, over disagreements with Takaichi's leadership and the party's handling of the 2023โ€“2024 Japanese slush fund scandal, ending 26 years of the LDPโ€“Komeito coalition. Following this, the vote to confirm Takaichi as prime minister was delayed to 20 October. On 20 October, Takaichi and the Japan Innovation Party (Ishin) leader Hirofumi Yoshimura agreed to sign a coalition agreement. Takaichi was elected prime minister by the Diet on 21 October, with the support of Ishin and independents, and the right-wing conservative coalition was formed. On 13 January 2026, it emerged that Takaichi had communicated her intention to dissolve the House of Representatives, when it re-convened on 23 January to senior LDP officials. Subsequently, the LDP instructed its prefectural chapters to register general election candidates by 19 January. Japanese national broadcaster NHK reported that the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications had instructed prefectural election boards to prepare for a general election. In response to an apparently leaked LDP projection of the results of an election, LDP officials said that "260 seats seems like too much in reality", and that "within the party, it's assumed that at least a simple majority of 233 seats will be won". On 19 January, Takaichi officially announced her intention to dissolve the House of Representatives on 23 January at a press conference. Campaigning would begin on 27 January, with election day beginning after polls opened on 8 February. It was the shortest election campaign in Japan's postwar history. In response to the reports of an imminent election, the CDP considered forming a new political alliance with opposition parties to run a single proportional representation list against the LDP, potentially including Komeito, who previously had a 26-year alliance with the governing LDP. The CDP also instructed its prefectural chapters to meet with Komeito's local organisations, and Diet members to seek electoral cooperation. On 14 January, it was found that the cooperation between the CDP and Komeito had begun with view to a merger of the two parties. The merged party would caucus separately in the House of Councillors, but operate as a single party in the House of Representatives, with current CDP leader Yoshihiko Noda and Komeito leader Tetsuo Saito serving as co-leaders. The merged party's proposed name was Chลซdล Kaikaku (ไธญ้“ๆ”น้ฉ; Centrist Reform), before its official name was finalised as Chลซdล Kaikaku Rengล (ไธญ้“ๆ”น้ฉ้€ฃๅˆ; lit. Centrist Reform Alliance) (CRA). Saito said that Noda would be named prime minister if the CRA won the election. Komeito announced it would not contest any constituency seats in favour of running in the proportional blocks. Jiji Press created a model of the constituency seats which projected that the LDP would win 97 constituency seats and the CDP would win 139 with the results of the 2024 election. Nippon Television projected that, with a hypothetical CDPโ€“Komeito merger, the LDP would retain just 60 of its 132 single member districts with the 2024 election. As a result of this merger, the new CRA would now have 172 seats in the National Diet, thus significantly weakening the LDP's already fragile grip on power. Electoral system The 465 seats of the House of Representatives are contested via parallel voting. Of these, 289 members are elected in single-member constituencies using first-past-the-post voting, while 176 members are elected in 11 multi-member constituencies via party list proportional representation. Candidates from parties with legal political party-list, which requires either โ‰ฅ5 Diet members or โ‰ฅ1 Diet member and โ‰ฅ2% of the nationwide vote in one tier of a recent national election, are allowed to stand in a constituency and be present on the party list. If they lose their constituency vote, they may still be elected in the proportionally allocated seats; however, if such a dual candidate wins less than 10% of the vote in their majoritarian constituency, they are also disqualified as a proportional candidate. Political parties Campaign Riding on the high approval ratings of her cabinet, the snap election was seen as a power move to boost Sanae Takaichi's mandate and gain a majority in the lower house, which was only one seat away if including the Nippon Ishin No Kai. Takaichi also announced that she would resign as prime minister if the ruling bloc did not win a majority. The LDP was campaigning on its promises of increased spending, tax cuts, in the name of "responsible yet aggressive fiscal policy", and a new security strategy by abolishing the "five categories" which restricted defence equipment exports to non-combat purposes. The party also looked to tighten rules on foreign acquisition of housing and land. Despite being the largest opposition party after the merge, the Centrist Reform Alliance (CRA) target of changing the government apparently faded into the background given the prevalent multi-party situation which made it difficult for a single party to gain a majority. The coalition aimed to accelerating political restructuring, with the possibility of the Democratic Party for the People (DPP) and part of the LDP joining the coalition after the election in mind. Komeito candidates only ran in proportional representation seats in this election, with its voters' inclination becoming a focus of attention due to the previously longstanding cooperative relationship with the LDP. The party campaigned on "putting ordinary citizens first and their livelihoods at the center" and lowering the consumption tax on food to zero, as well as the LDP slush fund scandal, by proposing stricter rules on corporate and group donations. Nippon Ishin No Kai, LDP coalition partner, recommended LDP candidates in over 80 constituencies. The reports of an election prompted both Yoshimura (governor of Osaka Prefecture) and Hideyuki Yokoyama (mayor of Osaka) to resign from their posts with the aim of running for re-election alongside the general election, as well as to seek endorsement of the Osaka Metropolis Plan. The party said to carry out reforms that the LDP had not been able to implement, with the focus on national security, economic security and economic growth and the aim to reduce consumption tax on food to zero. The right-leaning DPP, which gained significant ground in the 2025 Japanese House of Councillors election, pledged to ensure that everyone's take-home pay would be increased by 60,000 yen per year. It also called for consumption tax reduction to 5% until wage growth stabilised at 2% above inflation. The Japan Communist Party (JCP) called for immediate cut of consumption tax to 5% and its eventual abolition, while sought to legalise the option of separate surnames for married couples and same-sex marriage, as well as correcting the gender pay gap, while the left-wing pacifist Reiwa Shinsengumi campaigned on abolishing the consumption tax, providing a stopgap cash payment of 100,000 yen, lowering social insurance premiums and not participating in the war business. On 24 January, two new minor right-wing parties, Tax Cuts Japan and Yukoku Alliance and the New Unionist Party, were announced by former MPs Kazuhiro Haraguchi (also former Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications) and Takashi Kawamura, along with the independents. Five incumbent MPs have joined the party, qualifying it for national party status. The party also campaigned on abolishing the consumption tax and investing in developing hypersonic missiles. Sohei Kamiya, the leader of the far-right political party Sanseitล, said that the party plans to field candidates in LDP constituencies where the incumbent has "advocated multicultural coexistence". It campaigned on abolishing the consumption tax, while also opposing the "excessive acceptance of immigrants" by limiting their numbers. Debates Opinion polling Color key: Exit poll Turnout Overall turnout was estimated at 55.68% in single-seat districts, higher than the last election's relatively low turnout of 53.85%. Early voting turnout in 2026 amounted to over 27 million voters or 26% of the electorate, a new all-time high for both national parliamentary (Representatives/Councillors) elections. This was attributed to the harsh winter weather during the election. Results The LDP won a landslide victory, with the party winning an outright two-thirds supermajority and regaining its majority status in the chamber. The LDP's total of at least 316 seats is the most ever won by a party in Japanese post-war electoral history, surpassing the previous record of 308 seats won by the DPJ in the 2009 election and its own record of 300 seats in the 1986 election, as well as its previous record in terms of the share of seats from the 1960 election. The total LDPโ€“JIP coalition, including 36 seats from JIP, now composed three-fourths of the House of Representatives. It was also the first time that the second-place party had less than 50 seats in Japan's postwar history. The LDP actually won enough votes to win 330 seats; however, due to so few district candidates from the LDP losing, it did not have enough candidates to fill its seats in the proportional tier. The LDP therefore forfeited 14 seats to other parties, including 6 in the Southern Kantล block, 5 in the Tokyo block, 2 in the Hokuriku-Shin'etsu block, and 1 in the Chลซgoku block. These 14 seats went to the CRA (6), DPP (2), Ishin (2), Team Mirai (2), Sanseitล (1), and Reiwa Shinsegumi (1). Meanwhile, Team Mirai forfeited two seats in the Kinki block, as its district candidates did not cross the 10% eligibility threshold to be elected from the proportional tier; these two seats went to the CRA and Ishin. Notes See also References
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sanae_Takaichi] | [TOKENS: 7471]
Contents Sanae Takaichi Sanae Takaichi (้ซ˜ๅธ‚ ๆ—ฉ่‹—, Takaichi Sanae; born 7 March 1961) is a Japanese politician who has been Prime Minister of Japan and President of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) since October 2025. She is the first woman to hold either of these positions. A member of the House of Representatives from 1993 to 2003 and since 2005, she also held ministerial posts during the premierships of Shinzo Abe and Fumio Kishida. Born and raised in Yamatokลriyama, Nara Prefecture, Takaichi graduated from Kobe University and worked as an author, legislative aide, and broadcaster before beginning her political career. Elected as an independent to the House of Representatives in the 1993 general election, she joined the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1996. A protรฉgรฉ of Prime Minister Abe, she held various positions during Abe's premiership, most notably as Minister for Internal Affairs and Communications. She was a candidate in the 2021 LDP leadership election, but was eliminated before the runoff, achieving third place. From 2022 to 2024, during Fumio Kishida's premiership, she served as the Minister of State for Economic Security. Takaichi made her second run for the party leadership in the 2024 leadership election, where she came in first in the first round but narrowly lost in a runoff to her predecessor Shigeru Ishiba. She ran for the third time in the 2025 leadership election and placed first in both rounds of voting, defeating Shinjirล Koizumi, and becoming the party's first female president. Following the end of the LDPโ€“Komeito coalition, Takaichi secured a coalition agreement with the Japan Innovation Party, and was elected prime minister by the National Diet on 21 October. Early in her premiership, Takaichi faced a diplomatic crisis with China after a statement she made regarding Japan's involvement regarding a potential Chinese attack on Taiwan and subsequent threatening remarks by a Chinese diplomat. Takaichi's administration has consistently polled high in approval ratings. In 2026, she called a snap general election, which resulted in a historic landslide victory for the LDP, securing a two-thirds supermajority and the largest number of seats ever won in postwar Japanese electoral history. Takaichi's views have been variously described as conservative or ultraconservative. Her domestic policy includes support for proactive government spending and continuing Abenomics. She has taken conservative positions on social issues, such as opposing same-sex marriage, recognition of separate surnames for spouses, and female succession to the Japanese throne. Takaichi supports revising Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan โ€“ which renounces the use of military force โ€“ has a pro-Taiwanese foreign policy, and supports strengthening the USโ€“Japan alliance. A member of the far-right Nippon Kaigi, she has been described as holding revisionist views of Japan's conduct during the Second World War, and criticised the Murayama and Kono statements which apologised for Japanese war crimes. She made regular visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine prior to her premiership. Since her election as prime minister, Takaichi has been described as one of the most powerful women in the world. Early life Sanae Takaichi was born on 7 March 1961 in Yamatokลriyama, Nara Prefecture, to a dual-income middle-class family. Her father, Daikyลซ Takaichi, worked for an automotive firm affiliated with Toyota. Her mother, Kazuko Takaichi (1932โ€“2018), served in the Nara Prefectural Police [ja]. Takaichi graduated from Nara Prefectural Unebi High School [ja]. Despite qualifying to matriculate at Keio and Waseda universities in Tokyo, she did not attend as her parents refused to cover tuition fees if she left home or chose a private university because she was a woman. Instead, Takaichi commuted six hours from her family home to attend Kobe University, paying her way with part-time work. During her university years she joined a band, playing the drums and was once a member of a heavy metal band. In 1984, she graduated from Kobe with a bachelor's degree in business administration, then enrolled in the Matsushita Institute of Government and Management. In 1987, with sponsorship from Matsushita Institute, she moved to the United States to work as a congressional intern for Democratic congresswoman Pat Schroeder. In 1989, upon her return to Japan, she worked as a legislative analyst with knowledge of American politics, and wrote books based on her experience. In March 1989, she became a presenter for TV Asahi, co-hosting the station's Kodawari TV Pre-Stage program with Renhล. In November 1990, Takaichi was employed as a presenter for Fuji Television, later serving as anchor of the morning information program Asa Da! Dล Naru [ja]. Political career Takaichi first attempted to run for the Nara Prefecture Electoral District of the House of Councillors during the 1992 House of Councillors elections. She eventually ran as an independent candidate and competed with Mitsuo Hattori for the post, after Mitsuo's father, Yasuji Hattori, decided not to run for the post. Of the 313 eligible voters, Takaichi lost to Hattori as Hattori received a total of 162 votes while Takaichi received a total of 137 votes and 1 invalid vote. Hattori was later proclaimed as the winner of the election. Takaichi was first elected to the Japanese parliament's lower house, the House of Representatives, in the 1993 Japanese general election as an independent. In 1994, she joined the minor "Liberals" party led by Koji Kakizawa, which soon merged into the New Frontier Party. In 1996, Takaichi ran as a sanctioned candidate from the New Frontier Party and was re-elected to the House of Representatives, despite the New Frontier Party losing nationally. On 5 November, she responded to recruitment from the Secretary-General of the LDP Koichi Kato and joined the LDP. Her act of switching parties, two months after winning the election with anti-LDP votes, resulted in heavy criticism from New Frontier Party members. In the LDP, Takaichi belonged to the Mori Faction, formally, the Seiwa Seisaku Kenkyลซkai, and she served as a Parliamentary Vice Minister for the Ministry of International Trade and Industry under the Keizล Obuchi cabinet. She also served as chairman of the Education and Science Committee. In the 2000 House of Representatives election she was placed in first position on the LDP's proportional representation list and easily won her third term. In 2002, she was appointed as the Senior Vice Minister of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry under Junichiro Koizumi. In the 2003 Japanese general election, she was defeated in the Nara 1st district by Democratic Party lawmaker Sumio Mabuchi. She moved to the nearby city of Ikoma and won a seat representing the Nara 2nd district in the 2005 Japanese general election. In 2004, while she was out of the Diet, she took an economics faculty position at Kinki University. Takaichi served as Minister of State for Okinawa and Northern Territories Affairs, Minister of State for Science and Technology Policy, Minister of State for Innovation, Minister of State for Youth Affairs and Gender Equality, and Minister of State for Food Safety in the Japanese Cabinet of Prime Minister Shinzล Abe. In August 2007, she was the only Abe cabinet member to join former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi in visiting Yasukuni Shrine on the anniversary of the end of World War II. After the LDP's victory in the 2012 Japanese general election, Takaichi was appointed to head the party's Policy Research Council (่‡ช็”ฑๆฐ‘ไธปๅ…šๆ”ฟๅ‹™่ชฟๆŸปไผš้•ท). In January 2013, she recommended that Abe issue an "Abe Statement" to replace the Murayama Statement that apologized for "tremendous damage and suffering" brought by Japan's "colonial rule and aggression". In 2015, the day before the 70th anniversary of the surrender of Japan, Abe gave the official Cabinet statement, declaring that previous apologies including Murayama's will "remain unshakeable" but arguing against current or future apologies. The statement was criticized by state media in China and North Korea, and Yonhap News Agency in South Korea. In September 2014, Takaichi was selected as Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications to replace Yoshitaka Shindล. After she was named as a cabinet minister, a photograph was published of her in 2011 together with Kazunari Yamada, the leader of the National Socialist Japanese Workers' Party โ€“ a small neo-Nazi party in Japan. Yamada was also pictured with LDP policy chief Tomomi Inada. Yamada stated that the pictures were taken when he visited Inada and Takaichi's offices "for talks", according to his blog. Takaichi denied any link with Yamada and said she would not have accepted the picture had she known Yamada's background. Takaichi was also shown promoting a controversial book praising Adolf Hitler's electoral talents in 1994. In 2014, Takaichi was among the three members of the cabinet to visit the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, became the first sitting cabinet member to attend the shrine's autumn festival in 2016, and was one of four cabinet ministers who visited Yasukuni on the 75th anniversary of the end of World War II in August 2020. In the December 2014 general election, she won an overwhelming 96,000-vote majority in her district, defeating the runner-up by 58,000 votes. In February 2016, Takaichi commented that the government could suspend the operations of broadcasters that aired politically biased content. The U.S. State Department later described this as "[giving] rise to concerns about increasing government pressure against critical and independent media." An electoral redistricting in 2017, which Takaichi oversaw as internal affairs minister, eliminated one of Nara Prefecture's districts and resulted in Takaichi again potentially facing off with her former rival Sumio Mabuchi. Takaichi was replaced by Seiko Noda in August 2017, but returned to the Internal Affairs and Communications post in September 2019, replacing Masatoshi Ishida. Among other initiatives, she put pressure on NHK to cut its licence fee and reform its governance, and oversaw the distribution of cash handouts during the COVID-19 pandemic. From August 2022, Takaichi served as Minister of State for Economic Security in Kishida's government. She was in charge of preparing a bill to implement a security clearance system for classified information relating to economic security. The lack of such a system had prevented Japan from joining the Five Eyes. The bill was made law by the Diet in May 2024. On 2 March 2023, Hiroyuki Konishi, a House of Councillors member from the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, said that he obtained a government document indicating that the former Abe government may have intended to interfere with the freedom of broadcasting by putting pressure on broadcasters that were critical of the LDP. Takaichi was Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications at the time the document was said to have been created. When pressed during a committee session the following day, Takaichi said that the document was "fabricated" and vowed to resign from parliament if the document were proven genuine. Several days later, on 7 March 2023, the Internal Affairs ministry confirmed that the document was created by ministerial officials, and opposition Diet members called on Takaichi to resign. Following the announcement, Takaichi held to her position that the remarks attributed to her within the document were fabricated, adding that Konishi should bear the burden of proving the document's authenticity. In August 2023, Takaichi expressed concern that plans to sell the government's stake in Nippon Telegraph and Telephone could make Japan's telecommunications infrastructure vulnerable to China. In August 2021, Takaichi expressed her willingness to challenge then-Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga for the presidency of the LDP in the scheduled election on 29 September. On 3 September, Suga announced that he would not seek re-election; Takaichi officially announced her bid on 8 September with the support of former prime minister Abe. Takaichi was eliminated in the first round of voting, and Fumio Kishida was elected. In August 2024, former prime minister Fumio Kishida announced that he would not seek re-election to his post as President of the LDP. On 9 September, Takaichi announced her second bid to become LDP leader. Among the nine contenders, Takaichi emerged as a frontrunner alongside Shigeru Ishiba and Shinjirล Koizumi. She came first in the first round of voting with 181 votes, but was defeated by Ishiba in the runoff election with 215 votes to Takaichi's 194 votes. Following Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba's announcement of his resignation in September 2025, Takaichi announced her candidacy for LDP president in the resulting leadership election on 18 September 2025. In early polling, Takaichi and agricultural minister Shinjirล Koizumi were identified as the frontrunners. Ultimately, Takaichi won both rounds, defeating Koizumi with 185 votes to 156 votes in the runoff and becoming the first woman to hold the post of LDP president. Upon her election as party president, it was already speculated that a Takaichi government would accommodate an interest rate increase by the Bank of Japan early in her possible tenure as prime minister. After her election, the Nikkei 225 share index surged past the 47,000 level for the first time, and the value of the yen fell. The Nikkei rose over 4% to hit a record high and the index closed 4.75% higher at the end of the trading day, while the yen fell 1.8% against the dollar. On 10 October, Komeito party leader Tetsuo Saito announced that his party would break with the LDP and leave the governing coalition, citing disagreements with Takaichi's leadership and the LDP's handling of the slush fund scandal. This development signified the collapse of the 26-year-old LDPโ€“Komeito coalition. As a result, the parliamentary election to choose Japan's next prime minister was pushed back from 15 to 20 October. On 15 October, Takaichi asked Hirofumi Yoshimura, the leader of the Japan Innovation Party, to enter into a coalition with the LDP. On 17 October, the National Diet voted to set 21 October as the session confirmation date. On 19 October, the LDP and the Japan Innovation Party agreed to form a coalition. The leaders of both parties signed a coalition agreement the following day, clearing Takaichi's path to the premiership. At the 21 October meeting of the National Diet, both houses nominated Takaichi to succeed Shigeru Ishiba as prime minister. Takaichi avoided a runoff in the lower house, garnering 237 votes against Constitutional Democratic Party leader Yoshihiko Noda's 149. She was officially appointed prime minister by Emperor Naruhito in a ceremony at the Tokyo Imperial Palace later that day. She became both the first woman and the first person from Nara Prefecture to hold the post. Premiership (2025โ€“present) After becoming prime minister on 21 October, Takaichi formed her first cabinet. While she had said that she wanted her cabinet to include as many women as those in the Nordic countries, only two women actually joined the cabinet: Satsuki Katayama as Japan's first female finance minister, and Kimi Onoda as economic security minister. In her inaugural press conference, Takaichi said that she "prioritised equality of opportunity" above all else, and had selected ministers based on their qualifications, not gender. The cabinet was viewed as favoring party unity, with Takaichi's rivals receiving key positions: Toshimitsu Motegi as foreign minister, Yoshimasa Hayashi as internal affairs minister and Shinjiro Koizumi as defense minister. Ishiba's confidant Ryosei Akazawa was promoted to minister of economy, trade and industry, showing a degree of continuity. Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara, however, is ideologically aligned with Takaichi, a break from recent prime ministers. During the first press conference of her premiership on 21 October 2025, Takaichi outlined her priorities such as tackling rising inflation and said that she would work to implement suspension of the provisional gasoline tax rate. According to local reports, Takaichi planned a ยฅ13.9 trillion ($92.19 billion) economic stimulus package as part of her first economic initiative policies aimed at "responsible proactive fiscal policy", with three main pillars: measures to counter inflation, investment in growth industries, and national security. Other proposals included the expansion of local government grants for small and medium-sized businesses and additional investments in technology such as artificial intelligence and semiconductors. On 24 October 2025, during her first policy speech at the National Diet, Takaichi repeated her priorities in tackling inflation, fiscal spending, the creation of an economic growth panel, and her previous proposal on scrapping the provisional tax on gasoline. Takaichi stated that she would bring forward Japan's plans to raise annual military spending to 2% of GDP, announcing a new target of March 2026, rather than the previous target of 2027. Takaichi mentioned the need to continue Japan's alliance with the United States, while enhancing Japan's diplomacy to the international community. Takaichi renewed her two predecessors' efforts to make Japan a leading asset management center and for their plan of setting up an agency for disaster prevention. Takaichi emphasized the need for immigrant labor, saying that foreign workers were still needed to supplement Japan's declining population. She highlighted the need to balance labor market needs and the increasing immigrant population, noting that Japan's acceptance of migrants was premised on their compliance with Japan's rules and laws, and vowed to strengthen regulations to enforce compliance. On 23 January 2026, Takaichi dissolved the House of Representatives, allowing a general election to be held on 8 February. The election resulted in a historic landslide victory for the LDP, with the party winning an outright two-thirds supermajority and regaining its majority status in the chamber. The LDP's total of at least 316 seats is the most ever won by a party in the Dietโ€™s Lower House in Japanese electoral history. Analysts credited the party's victory to Takaichi's high personal popularity at the time of the election. She was especially popular among young voters, with one poll finding that 84 percent of respondents in their 20s and 78 percent of those in their 30s backed the prime minister and her cabinet (compared with 67 percent of voters overall). In opinion polls conducted during late Octoberโ€“early November 2025, Takaichi's government received the approval of between 65% and 83% of respondents, among the highest such ratings of any government in twenty years. Takaichi made her diplomatic debut at the 47th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, where she made efforts to strengthen cooperation on the maritime, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity sectors. She also held bilateral meetings with Philippine president Bongbong Marcos, Malaysian prime minister Anwar Ibrahim, and Australian prime minister Anthony Albanese. During the ASEAN meeting, Takaichi also attended the ASEAN+3 Summit, the ASEANโ€“Japan Summit, the 20th East Asia Summit, and the Second ASEAN Global Dialogue. Takaichi skipped the remaining events of the summit, flying back to Tokyo to meet with U.S. president Donald Trump the next day. Takaichi met with Trump on 28 October 2025 at the Akasaka Palace. The two leaders signed agreements on trade, minerals, nuclear technology and rare earths. Takaichi also expressed her intent to strengthen the USโ€“Japan alliance. After their meeting, Takaichi gave Trump a putter formerly owned by former prime minister Shinzo Abe, a golf ball signed by Japanese professional golfer Hideki Matsuyama, and a gold-leaf golf ball. During their visit at the US Yokosuka Naval Base, aboard the USS George Washington (CVN-73), Takaichi vowed to bring the USโ€“Japan alliance into a "golden age", amid a "severe security environment". According to Trump's press secretary, she also told Trump privately she would recommend him for the Nobel Peace Prize. Chinese leader Xi Jinping made an unusual move by not sending a congratulatory telegram on the day Takaichi assumed the post of prime minister, but a Japan-China summit meeting between Xi and Takaichi was held on 31 October. There, the two sides agreed to promote a "mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests." However, since Prime Minister Takaichi held talks with Taiwan's former Vice Premier Lin Hsin-i on 1 November, China lodged a protest with Japan, and Japan counter-argued, leading to the deterioration of the relationship. During deliberations in the House of Representatives' budget committee on 7 November, Takaichi said that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could constitute an "existential crisis situation" for Japan, allowing the country to take military action in self-defence. In response to the comments, the Chinese consul-general in Osaka, Xue Jian, wrote on X on that "we have no choice but to cut off that dirty neck that has lunged at us without a moment's hesitation. Are you ready?"[a] Although the post was later deleted after protest by the Japanese government, it led to a diplomatic row between Japan and China. In addition to cross-party calls in Japan for his expulsion, Xue's comment triggered criticism from the Taiwanese government and the US ambassador to Japan, while Chinese officials condemned Takaichi's remarks. Japan and China issued mutual travel advisories and summoned the other country's ambassador. China subsequently dispatched China Coast Guard vessels and military drones to patrol through the Senkaku Islands. Political positions Defunct Defunct Takaichi has been described as holding hard-line conservative and Japanese nationalist views, citing former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher as a role model and deeply influential on her personal political beliefs.[b] Like Thatcher, she is called the "Iron Lady".[c] Takaichi is a member of Nippon Kaigi, a far-right ultraconservative organisation that argues for a reinterpretation of Japanese history along ultranationalist lines. Taro Kono, another LDP minister and member of the House of Representatives, has said that Takaichi is on the far right of the political spectrum within the LDP. Takaichi has been described as "far-right" by Deutsche Welle and the South China Morning Post, and various sources including Time magazine, the Los Angeles Times, The New York Times, The Guardian, Politico, Foreign Policy and the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) have described her as "ultraconservative". She has also been described as an "ultranationalist" by The Conversation and Democracy Now!, and as having an "ultranationalist agenda" by Ming Gao of Lund University. Like her fellow candidates in the 2025 LDP leadership election, Takaichi has been described as taking a "hard-line stance" on immigration. The New York Times stated that during her leadership campaign "she seized on a wave of anti-immigrant sentiment". Specifically she has been described as wanting "tighter restrictions on immigration" and employed "anti-immigration rhetoric" during her campaign. During the campaign she called for a "crackdown" on illegal migration and emphasized that "foreigners must strictly obey" Japanese law, stating that those who overstay their visa or abscond from justice should be treated as harshly as Japanese citizens. She proposed that policies be reconsidered from the ground up, with the aim of establishing an "orderly coexistence" between Japanese citizens and immigrants based on "mutual consideration" in communities. In her campaign manifesto she also proposed establishing an agency to tackle issues such as visa overstays, overtourism, and land purchases by foreign nationals, particularly near defense facilities and strategic assets. On refugees she explicitly stated: "For those who come [to Japan] with financial motives and claim that they are refugees, I'll have you go home." Takaichi supports adoption of a "Comprehensive Economic Security Act" that would establish laws and organizations to prevent foreign students and engineers who come to Japan from nations like China from taking Japanese technology back to their home countries for military purposes. Takaichi is known for favouring proactive government spending. She supports heavy government investment in critical strategic sectors in what she refers to as "crisis management investment". These include artificial intelligence, semiconductors, nuclear fusion, biotechnology, and defence. She supports maintaining Shinzo Abe's policy of Abenomics. During the 2025 LDP leadership election, she said she would consider paying for an economic stimulus plan by issuing bonds to service the national debt. During her 2021 run for LDP leader, she put forward a three-pronged "Plan to Strengthen the Japanese Economy", also known as "New Abenomics" or "Sanaenomics". The first prong is expansionary monetary policy, the second prong is "flexible fiscal spending in response to crises," and the third prong is "bold investment in crisis management and growth". The plan places particular emphasis on "bold crisis management and growth investment", which will involve large-scale fiscal spending and the development of legal systems and new economic bonds. Takaichi has advocated for tax increases on corporations. She has considered raising taxes on cash deposits rather than retained earnings, and in September 2021 she estimated that "a 1% tax on corporate cash deposits would increase tax revenue by 2 trillion yen. Even if companies with capital of 100 million yen or less are excluded, tax revenue would increase by 1 trillion yen." Takaichi has expressed socially conservative views on several issues. She said in December 2020 that proposed legislation to recognize separate family names for married couples could "destroy the social structure based on family units", and led an LDP group of legislators opposed to the change. Takaichi also opposes revising the Imperial Household Law to allow women to ascend the Chrysanthemum Throne again. While opposing the legalization of same-sex marriage, she has also said that "there should be no prejudice against sexual orientation or gender identity" and expressed support in "promoting understanding itself." Takaichi has supported shutting down media outlets that demonstrate repeated political bias. Noting a discrepancy in the existing law, which criminalises causing damage to foreign, but not Japanese flags, she proposed and supported a bill to penalize damaging the Japanese flag with "imprisonment for two years or less, or a fine of up to 200,000 yen (about $1,930)". Takaichi, like all other candidates in the 2025 LDP leadership election, supports revising article nine of the Japanese constitution to include mention of the Japan Self-Defence Forces. In 2021, she advocated revising the constitution to reposition the Self-Defense Forces as a "National Army", and increasing defense spending to promote the procurement of advanced equipment and research and development. She stated that in the event of war, "it is important to neutralize enemy bases first." She has proposed the adoption of anti-espionage legislation, something also supported by opposition parties such as the Democratic Party for the People. She is also in favour of the creation of a national intelligence agency. Takaichi has been critical of Chinese economic practices such as intellectual property theft, and has voiced support for reducing economic dependence on China. She has argued for deployment of US medium-range missiles to Japan, and the removal of marine buoys placed by China in waters both countries claim as part of the Senkaku Islands dispute. In April 2025, she visited Taiwan and met with President Lai Ching-te. She has repeated Shinzo Abe's statement that a "Taiwan emergency is a Japan emergency." During the 2021 Liberal Democratic Party leadership election, in which she placed third, her stance on China was the most hawkish of any candidate. In 2008, Takaichi published a statement on protests calling for revision of the U.S.โ€“Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), following the arrest of a US marine in Okinawa on suspicion of child rape. Takaichi argued the US was unlikely to approve a more favorable extradition agreement, as the US would not accept the Japanese judicial system's barring of a defense attorney presence during interrogations, and could also weaken its military commitment to Japan. She also argued that changing the SOFA with the US could lead to a change in the SOFA between the United Nations and Iraq, exposing the Japanese Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group to Iraqi jurisdiction. On nuclear weapons policy, she has said "It is contradictory to say that we will adhere to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles while gaining deterrence under the US nuclear umbrella." She has argued for the consideration of allowing US nuclear weapons into Japanese territory on land and sea in an emergency. In March 2022, she said that "Ukraine is not a distant issue", pointing to Russian military bases in the Kuril Islands, as well as China. Defunct Defunct Takaichi has been described as holding revisionist views of Japan's conduct during the Second World War. Takaichi has made multiple visits to Yasukuni Shrine, which is viewed as controversial in China and Korea, primarily surrounding its enshrinement of Japanese Second World War-era Class A war criminals. She made visits in April and August 2024, both times signing as minister of state. She also visited in August 2025, on the 80th anniversary of the surrender of Japan. In the 2021 LDP leadership race, she said she would continue to visit the shrine if elected prime minister, but in the 2025 race avoided commenting on the question. In 2022, Takaichi made remarks about the Yasukuni Shrine issue that were controversial in South Korea. She said, "When we act ambiguously, such as stopping our visits to Yasukuni Shrine midway, the other side climbs up," using the derogatory Japanese word tsukeagaru, which means "to take advantage of someone's politeness or kindness and act impudently". She went on to say that continuing to visit the shrine would eventually make "neighbouring countries...look foolish and stop complaining". Takaichi has said that war crimes committed by Japan in World War II have been exaggerated. She takes a negative view of the Kono and the Murayama statements, which issued apologies for Japanese war crimes, including comfort women. In an appearance on a television program on 18 August 2002, Takaichi was asked, "Do you think Japan's war after the Manchurian Incident was a war of self-defence?" to which she replied, "I think it was a war for security." In 2004, Takaichi wrote a column on her website regarding the Japanese history textbook controversies. She defended recent comments by Nariaki Nakayama, the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) that textbooks were "extremely self-deprecating" and should continue decreasing usage of terms including "comfort women" and "forced labor". She wrote that the Imperial Japanese Armed Forces made "overseas advances" (ๆตทๅค–ใงใฎ้€ฒ่ป, kaigai deno shingun) that textbooks termed as "invasion" (ไพต็•ฅ, shinryaku), while foreign offensives like the Soviet invasion of Manchuria were termed "southward advance" (ๅ—ไธ‹, nanka). She argued against the inclusion by some school textbooks of China's death toll estimate for the Nanjing Massacre. She recounted her complaint to MEXT against textbooks that included criticism of the government's Act on National Flag and Anthem and of thenโ€“Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine. She said it was "clear" that Japan "intended to wage a war of self-defense". Takaichi is not in favour of female succession. However, in the past she has said "I'm not opposed to a female emperor. I'm opposed to a matrilineal emperor." Adding "In reality, I imagine it would be difficult for a woman to succeed to the throne." Before finally stating "it would be better to restore the former imperial families to the imperial family." She later changed her position and is now opposed to female succession. Personal life Takaichi married a fellow member of the House of Representatives, Taku Yamamoto, in 2004. They have no children together, but Takaichi adopted Yamamoto's three children from a previous marriage. They divorced in July 2017, with Takaichi citing differing political views and aspirations as the reason. They remarried in December 2021. She has four grandchildren through her stepchildren. After undergoing surgery for a gynecological disease, Takaichi found it difficult to conceive and give birth, and gave up on having children. In 2007, she said, "I want society to be welcoming to infertile women." During her first marriage, Takaichi assumed her husband's family name legally, but continued to use her maiden name in public life. Upon remarriage, Taku Yamamoto took the name Takaichi instead, fulfilling the legal requirement that married couples have the same family name. Yamamoto suffered from a cerebral infarction in 2025, leaving the right side of his body paralysed. Takaichi serves as his caregiver. Despite being members of opposing political parties, Takaichi is known to be friends with Yoshihiko Noda, leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, the largest opposition party, since 2024. Noda was Takaichi's senior during their time at the Matsushita Institute of Government and Management. Since becoming prime minister, Takaichi's popularity among younger voters has resulted in her choices of handbags, fashion, and stationery becoming sold out; this has been dubbed as "Sana-mania". Takaichi is an avid fan of JRA horse racing, a heavy metal and Japanese rock listener, especially from artists Demon Kakka, B'z, and X Japan, and is a supporter of sporting teams such as Gamba Osaka and Hanshin Tigers. Takaichi was known to play the drums and the piano during her youth. She also holds a title of Honorary Sommelier and has an interest in motorcycles, having owned a Kawasaki Z400. Takaichi reportedly practices judo, karate, and scuba diving. She is a car enthusiast, owning a 1991 Toyota Supra A70 2.5GT Twin-Turbo Limited during her early years in parliament, during which she used the car to drive to her workplace for over 20 years. Takaichi's Supra A70 served as a replacement to her Toyota Supra Celica XX. The car is currently on display in a local Toyota dealership museum in Nara. Takaichi is a member of the Parliamentarians' League for Japan's Anime, Manga, and Games. Electoral history Notes References External links
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/ืคื’ื™ืขืช_ื”ื›ื˜ื‘"ื_ื‘ื‘ื™ืช_ืžืฉืคื—ืช_ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•_ื‘ืงื™ืกืจื™ื”] | [TOKENS: 1501]
ืชื•ื›ืŸ ืขื ื™ื™ื ื™ื ืคื’ื™ืขืช ื”ื›ื˜ื‘"ื ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ืžืฉืคื—ืช ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื‘ืงื™ืกืจื™ื” ืคื’ื™ืขืช ื”ื›ื˜ื‘"ื ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ืžืฉืคื—ืช ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื‘ืงื™ืกืจื™ื” ื”ืชืจื—ืฉื” ื‘-19 ื‘ืื•ืงื˜ื•ื‘ืจ 2024, ื•ื‘ื” ื›ืœื™ ื˜ื™ืก ื‘ืœืชื™ ืžืื•ื™ืฉ ืฉืฉื™ื’ืจ ืืจื’ื•ืŸ ื”ื˜ืจื•ืจ ื—ื–ื‘ืืœืœื” ืคื’ืข ื‘ื—ืœื•ืŸ ื‘ื™ืชื ื”ืคืจื˜ื™ ืฉืœ ืจืืฉ ืžืžืฉืœืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ, ื‘ื ื™ืžื™ืŸ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•, ื•ืจืขื™ื™ืชื• ื‘ืงื™ืกืจื™ื”. ื”ืคื’ื™ืขื” ื”ื™ื™ืชื” ื—ื™ืฆื•ื ื™ืช ื‘ืœื‘ื“ ื•ืœื ื—ื“ืจื” ืœืชื•ืš ื”ื‘ื™ืช, ื•ื’ืจืžื” ืœื ื–ืง ืงืœ. ืจืงืข ื”ืชืงื™ืคื” ื”ืชืจื—ืฉื” ืขืœ ืจืงืข ืžื‘ืฆืข ื—ื™ืฆื™ ื”ืฆืคื•ืŸ, ืฉื›ืœืœ ื”ืชื ืงืฉื•ื™ื•ืช ื‘ื‘ื›ื™ืจื™ ืืจื’ื•ืŸ ื—ื–ื‘ืืœืœื”, ื›ื•ืœืœ ื”ืžื–ื›"ืœ ื—ืกืŸ ื ืกืจืืœืœื”. ื”ืคื’ื™ืขื” ื‘-19 ื‘ืื•ืงื˜ื•ื‘ืจ 2024, ื‘ืฉืขื” 06:20 ื‘ืขืจืš, ื—ื“ืจื• ืœื™ืฉืจืืœ ืฉืœื•ืฉื” ื›ื˜ื‘"ืžื™ื ืฉืœ ื—ื–ื‘ืืœืœื” ืžืกื•ื’ ืฆื™ืื“ 107. ืฉื ื™ ื›ื˜ื‘"ืžื™ื ื™ื•ืจื˜ื•, ื•ื”ืฉืœื™ืฉื™ ืคื’ืข ื‘ื—ืœื•ืŸ ื—ื“ืจ ื”ืฉื™ื ื” ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ืžืฉืคื—ืช ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื‘ืงื™ืกืจื™ื”. ื”ืžืฉืคื—ื” ืœื ืฉื”ืชื” ื‘ืžืงื•ื ื‘ืขืช ื”ืคื’ื™ืขื”, ื•ืœืคื™ ืœืฉื›ืชื•, ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื›ืœืœ ืœื ืฉื”ื” ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ื‘ืฉื‘ื•ืข ืœืคื ื™ ืคื’ื™ืขืช ื”ื›ื˜ื‘"ื. ืœื‘ื™ืช ื ื’ืจื ื ื–ืง ืงืœ. ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื”ืฉื™ื‘ ื‘ืชื’ื•ื‘ื”: "ืฉื•ื ื“ื‘ืจ ืœื ื™ืจืชื™ืข ืื•ืชื ื•, ืื ื—ื ื• ืžืžืฉื™ื›ื™ื ืขื“ ื”ื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ". ื“ื•ื‘ืจ ื—ื–ื‘ืืœืœื”, ืžื•ื—ืžื“ ืขืคื™ืฃ, ืืžืจ ืฉืืจื’ื•ื ื• ืื—ืจืื™ ืœืชืงื™ืคืช ื‘ื™ืช ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•, ื•ืจืžื– ืฉื™ื ืกื” ืœืชืงื•ืฃ ืื•ืชื• ืฉื•ื‘. ื ืฆื™ื’ื•ืช ืื™ืจืืŸ ื‘ืื•"ื ื”ื›ื—ื™ืฉื” ืืช ืžืขื•ืจื‘ื•ืชื”, ื•ื™ื—ืกื” ืื•ืชื” ืœื—ื–ื‘ืืœืœื”. ืœืื—ืจ ื”ืคื’ื™ืขื” ืฉืžืื™ื ื ืฉืœื—ื• ืœืฉื ืื•ืžื“ืŸ ื”ื ื–ืงื™ื ืฉื ื’ืจืžื• ื•ืžืชืŸ ืคื™ืฆื•ื™ ืœืคื™ ื—ื•ืง ืžืก ืจื›ื•ืฉ ื•ืงืจืŸ ืคื™ืฆื•ื™ื™ื, ืืœื™ื”ื ื”ืฆื˜ืจืคื• ืžื ื›"ืœ ืžืฉืจื“ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื”, ื™ื•ืกื™ ืฉืœื™, ื•ืžื ื›"ืœ ืจืฉื•ืช ื”ืžืกื™ื ื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ, ืฉื™ ืื”ืจื•ื ื•ื‘ื™ืฅ'. ืžืฉืจื“ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื‘ื™ืงืฉ ืฉื ื™ ืžื™ืœื™ื•ืŸ ืฉืงืœื™ื ืœืžื™ื’ื•ืŸ ื”ื‘ื™ืช, ื‘ื ื•ืกืฃ ืœืขืœื•ื™ื•ืช ืฉืชืฉืงื™ืข ื”ืžื“ื™ื ื” ื‘ืชื™ืงื•ืŸ ื”ื ื–ืงื™ื. ื”ืžื“ื™ื ื” ืฉื™ืœืžื” 1.66 ืžื™ืœื™ื•ืŸ ืฉ"ื— ืขืœ ื”ื—ืœืคืช ื”ื—ืœื•ืŸ. ืœืคื™ ื“ื™ื•ื•ื— ื‘"ื”ืืจืฅ", ืœืื—ืจ ืคื’ื™ืขืช ื”ื›ื˜ื‘"ื ื”ื•ืฆื‘ ืฆื•ื•ืช ืฉืœ ืฉื™ืจื•ืช ื”ื‘ื™ื˜ื—ื•ืŸ ื”ื›ืœืœื™ ื‘ืžื•ืฆื‘ ื”ืคื™ืงื•ื“ ื”ืขืœื™ื•ืŸ, ื›ื“ื™ ืœืขืงื•ื‘ ืื—ืจ ืชื ื•ืขื•ืชื™ื• ืฉืœ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื•ืœืชืช ื”ืชืจืขื” ื‘ื–ืžืŸ ืืžืช ื‘ืžืงืจื” ืฉืœ ืฉื™ื’ื•ืจ ืœืžืงื•ื ืฉื‘ื• ื”ื•ื ื ืžืฆื. ืขืจื‘ ื›ื ื™ืกืชื• ืœืชื•ืงืฃ ืฉืœ ื”ืกื›ื ื™ืฉืจืืœโ€“ืœื‘ื ื•ืŸ 2024, ื”ืจื’ ืฆื”"ืœ ืืช ื’'ืขืคืจ ืขืœื™ ืกืžืื—ื”, ื‘ื›ื™ืจ ื‘ื™ื—ื™ื“ืช ื”ื›ื˜ื‘"ืžื™ื ืฉืœ ื—ื–ื‘ืืœืœื”, ืฉื”ื™ื” ืื—ืจืื™ ืขืœ ืฉื™ื’ื•ืจ ื”ื›ื˜ื‘"ื. ื”ืขืจื•ืช ืฉื•ืœื™ื™ื
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2028_Philippine_presidential_election] | [TOKENS: 1296]
Contents 2028 Philippine presidential election Bongbong Marcos PFP Sara Duterte Hugpong A presidential election in the Philippines is scheduled to be held on May 8, 2028, as part of a general election that will also determine the control of the Congress of the Philippines and numerous local positions in the country. This will be the 18th direct presidential election and 16th vice presidential election in the country since 1935, and will be the seventh sextennial presidential and vice presidential election since 1992. Incumbent president Bongbong Marcos is term-limited under the Constitution of the Philippines and is ineligible for re-election. Incumbent vice president Sara Duterte is eligible for re-election to a second term but has decided to run for president instead. Therefore, this election will determine the 18th president and the 16th vice president. The president and vice president are elected separately, thus, the two winning candidates may come from different political parties. Background In the 2022 Philippine presidential and vice presidential elections, the UniTeam ticket of former Senator Bongbong Marcos of the Partido Federal ng Pilipinas (PFP) and Davao City mayor Sara Duterte of Lakas won, running on a platform that promised broad continuity of incumbent president Rodrigo Duterte's programs and policies. The two became the first presidential ticket to win since 2004 and the first president and vice president to be elected by a majority since the establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1987, defeating the Liberal-led opposition ticket of incumbent vice president Leni Robredo and senator Kiko Pangilinan alongside several other candidates. Being the only candidate of the opposition Team Robredoโ€“Pangilinan alliance to be re-elected in the 2022 Senate election,[a] senator Risa Hontiveros of Akbayan emerged as the de facto leader of the opposition against Marcos and Duterte. During the Marcos presidency, relations between Marcos and Duterte worsened. Duterte left Lakas in May 2023 and later resigned from his cabinet in June 2024. On February 5, 2025, the vice president was impeached in the House of Representatives, following Duterte's controversial use of confidential and intelligence funds and her assassination threat against Marcos and his family. She became the first sitting vice president, and the fourth official in Philippine history, to be impeached. If Duterte had been convicted, she was to be removed from office and be barred from holding any government position, including the presidency. For the 2025 midterm Senate election, Marcos formed the Alyansa para sa Bagong Pilipinas (Alyansa) electoral alliance, while former president Duterte formed a separate slate of candidates under the DuterTen in support of the vice president. The traditional opposition led by Hontiveros fielded two candidates under the KiBam ticket. During the campaign period, former president Duterte was arrested on charges related to the Philippine drug war. In response, the president's sister, Imee Marcos, withdrew from Alyansa. Six Alyansa candidates won seats, while three DuterTen candidates were elected. Two winning candidates, Imee and Camille Villar (an Alyansa candidate), were guest candidates on the DuterTen slate. Meanwhile, both candidates from the KiBam ticket secured victories, marking a significant gain for the opposition. Duterte ally and incumbent senator Bong Go emerged as the top-ranking candidate in the Senate race. Following the election, the Senate minority sought to formally convene the Senate as an impeachment court on June 9; the court was officially convened the following day, June 10. Senators allied with Duterte attempted to dismiss the impeachment complaint, but the Senate ultimately voted to return the articles of impeachment to the House. On July 25, Duterte's impeachment was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court on the basis that the fourth impeachment case violated the one-year ban on the filing of multiple impeachment cases but maintained that it was not absolving the vice president. While the House filed a motion for reconsideration, on August 6, the Senate voted to archive the articles of impeachment, with only senators Bam Aquino, Hontiveros, Pangilinan, and Tito Sotto voting against. A flood control projects scandal emerged shortly after the election, with allegations of corruption around ghost projects, substandard construction, and irregularities in the bidding process of projects around the country. In response, a series of anti-corruption protests began in September 2025. Electoral system Presidential elections in the Philippines are held every six years, after 1992, on the second Monday of May. Elections to the presidency and vice presidency use the first-past-the-post voting to determine the winner, with the candidate with the highest number of votes, whether or not one has a majority, winning the contested position. The elections are held in parallel and voters may split their ticket. If two or more candidates are tied for either position, Congress shall vote from among them which shall be president or vice president, as the case may be. Both winners will serve six-year terms commencing at noon on June 30, 2028, and ending on the same day, six years later. The Constitution of the Philippines limits the occupancy of the presidency and vice presidency to natural-born citizens aged 40 on the day of the election who are registered to vote, who have been a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election, and are able to read and write. Incumbent presidents who have served a complete a six-year term are term-limited while their vice president may seek reelection for a second consecutive term. Timeline Candidates The following individuals have been mentioned as potential presidential candidates in at least two reliable media sources in the last six months. The following individuals have been mentioned in media discussions as possible presidential candidates but have not publicly expressed interest in running Individuals below have been mentioned in media discussions as possible vice presidential candidates but have not publicly expressed interest in running. The following individuals have been mentioned as potential candidates but have publicly declined to run. Opinion polling Social research institutions in the Philippines, including Social Weather Stations (SWS), Pulse Asia, OCTA Research, have conducted surveys for the 2028 Philippine presidential election as early as 2025. In each poll, bold indicates the leading candidate whereas italics indicate runner(s)-up within the margin of error. Notes References External links
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vice_President_of_the_Philippines] | [TOKENS: 4375]
Contents Vice President of the Philippines Vice President of the Philippines (Filipino: Pangalawang Pangulo ng Pilipinas, also referred to as Bise Presidente ng Pilipinas) is the title of the second-highest official in the executive branch of the Philippine government and is first in the presidential line of succession. The vice president is directly elected by the citizens of the Philippines and is one of only two nationally elected executive officials, the other being the president. The current office of the vice president was re-established under the 1987 Constitution, bearing similarities with the office as created in the 1935 Constitution that was abolished by the Marcos regime. The vice president may be elected to two consecutive six-year terms. The 15th and incumbent vice president Sara Duterte was inaugurated on June 19, 2022, but her term officially began 11 days later on June 30, as per the constitution. Title The official title of the office in Filipino is Pangalawang Pangulo, although Bise Presidente, derived from Spanish, is the usual title used in some of the major Philippine languages, such as Cebuano and Hiligaynon language. The text of the 1987 Constitution refers to the person and office of the vice-president, with a hyphen connecting the two words. However, the person and office is usually referred to today without the hyphen, as the vice president. History The first known vice president claiming to be part of a government was Mariano Trรญas, whose term started on March 22, 1897. He was elected during the elections of the Tejeros Convention, and was later elected vice president of the Supreme Council that oversaw negotiations for the Pact of Biak-na-Bato in 1897. This Supreme Council had no sovereignty, did not govern any state, and was just used for bargaining with the Spanish. This council was replaced later, with no such position existing during the country's declaration of independence in 1898, which had a dictatorial government. Officially, the country's first actual republic was founded in 1899, and it too had no vice president. Trias instead served in the cabinets of Apolinario Mabini and Pedro Paterno, as finance minister and war minister, respectively. Trias is not considered a Philippine vice president as the Supreme Council did not proclaim any sovereign state. The 1935 Constitution, largely patterned after the U.S. Constitution, provided the basis for the Commonwealth government. It also established the position of vice president, and as per Section 12, Subsection 3, the vice president may be appointed by the president to a cabinet position. But unlike their U.S. counterpart, the vice president is not the president of the Philippine senate as senators choose their president from among their ranks. The first person elected to the position of vice president under the constitution was Sergio Osmeรฑa, elected together with Manuel L. Quezon in the first Philippine national elections. Since the inception of the 1935 constitution, the president and vice president came from the same ticket and political party, until the 1957 elections, which saw the first-ever split ticket that won the presidency and vice presidency. The 1973 Constitution abolished the office of the vice president and Fernando Lopez was therefore unable to finish his term. Subsequent amendments, particularly the 1984 amendments restored the vice presidency. Arturo Tolentino was officially proclaimed vice president-elect by the Regular Batasang Pambansa in 1986. He took his oath as vice president on February 16, 1986, before Chief Justice Ramon Aquino, but because of popular belief that the elections had been rigged, he never actually served out his term as vice president. Within a week after Tolentino's oath, the People Power Revolution resulted in the collapse of the Marcos regime. The People Power Revolution installed Corazon Aquino into the presidency. On February 25, 1986, Aquino and her running mate, Salvador Laurel, were sworn in as president and vice-president, respectively. Since the promulgation of the 1987 constitution, only two elections have produced a president and a vice president from the same ticket: Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Noli de Castro in 2004 and Bongbong Marcos and Sara Duterte in 2022. Powers and roles Aside from being mandated to assume the presidency in case of the death, disability, or resignation of the incumbent president, the 1987 Constitution did not lay out any explicit powers for the vice president, giving rise to the office being called a "spare tire". Article 7, Section 3 of the Constitution provided, however, that the vice president may be appointed to a cabinet position, without the need for confirmation. Appointments usually must be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, as per Article 7, Section 16 of the Constitution. Since the inception of the 1935 Constitution, vice presidents have been appointed to Cabinet positions, with a few rejecting the offer made by the seating president. Osmeรฑa was given the highest-ranking cabinet portfolio with inauguration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines in November 1935. Prior to independence in 1946, that cabinet portfolio was Secretary of Public Instruction, which had once been reserved only for the vice governor-general (an American). Vice President Osmeรฑa held that position from 1935 to 1939, and a similar portfolio in the War Cabinet during World War II. After independence, the highest-ranking cabinet position became that of secretary of foreign affairs (it is still the highest-ranking cabinet portfolio in official protocol to this day), which was given to Vice President Elpidio Quirino. Vice President Fernando Lopez declined the foreign affairs portfolio when he became Quirino's vice president in 1949 and instead served as secretary of agriculture and natural resources during his two non-consecutive terms. However, Vice Presidents Carlos P. Garcia and Emmanuel Pelaez also held the foreign affairs portfolio, a tradition revived in the Fifth Republic, as well as Vice Presidents Salvador Laurel and Teofisto Guingona Jr. after the position's restoration in 1986. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo served as secretary of social welfare and development and incumbent Sara Duterte served as the secretary of education. Other Cabinet positions with no secretary title was given to Vice President Joseph Estrada as chairman of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission and to Vice Presidents Noli de Castro, Jejomar Binay, and Leni Robredo as chairman of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council. Among the vice presidents, Diosdado Macapagal alone was not given any cabinet position, since he was the first elected vice president that did not originate from the same party as the incumbent president. The vice president is first in the presidential line of succession. The Constitution provides several circumstances where the vice president (or the vice president-elect) shall assume the presidency or serve as acting president. There have been four cases where the vice president has assumed the presidency, three of which because of the president's death, and one because of the president's resignation: Aside from their constitutional roles, the vice president may initiate various programs and services under the Office of the Vice President. The vice president also performs ceremonial functions, occasionally representing the president, the government, and the country in official gatherings and diplomatic functions. The vice president was also a member of the National Security Council, until its reorganization in 2025 which removed the vice president from the body. Election process Article 7, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution mandates that the vice president must bear the same qualifications as the president which is: Natural-born Filipinos are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines at the time of their birth and those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are considered natural-born Filipinos. The vice president is elected in the same manner as, but separately from, the president: by direct vote every six years, usually on the second Monday of May. The latest election was held in 2022. Both the president and the vice president are elected by direct plurality vote where the candidate who garners the highest number of votes, whether a majority or not, wins the election. While candidates usually run in tandem for the offices of president and vice president, under their own political parties, it is possible and not unusual for candidates from different parties to be elected as president and vice president; since the establishment of the Fifth Republic in 1986, only the elections of 2004 and 2022 had the winners come from a single ticket. The returns of every election for president and vice president, duly certified by the board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to Congress, directed to the president of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the president of the Senate shall open all the certificates in the presence of a joint public session of Congress not later than 30 days after election day. Congress then canvasses the votes upon determining that the polls are authentic and were done in the manner provided by law. Traditionally, the vice president takes the oath first, a little before noon for two reasons. First, according to protocol, no one follows the president (who is last due to his supremacy), and second, to establish a constitutionally valid successor before the president-elect accedes. During the Quezon inauguration, however, the vice president and legislature were sworn in after the president, to symbolize a new start. In 2016 and 2022, the inaugurations for president and vice president were held separately. Vice President-elect Sara Duterte broke tradition by taking oath on June 19, 2022, or days ahead prior to her scheduled assumption of office on June 30. The vice president-elect recites an oath, similar to the one recited by the president-elect, as provided by the 1987 Constitution: "I, (name), do solemnly swear (or affirm), that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as President (or Vice President or Acting President) of the Philippines. Preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the Nation. So help me God." (In case of affirmation, last sentence will be omitted.) โ€” Constitution of the Philippines, art. 7, sec. 5 The Filipino text of the oath used for the inaugurations of presidents Fidel V. Ramos, Joseph Estrada, Benigno Aquino III, and Bongbong Marcos reads: "Ako si (pangalan), ay taimtim kong pinanunumpaan (o pinatototohanan) na tutuparin ko nang buong katapatan at sigasig ang aking mga tungkulin bilang Pangulo (o Pangalawang Pangulo o Nanunungkulang Pangulo) ng Pilipinas, pangangalagaan at ipagtatanggol ang kanyang Konstitusyon, ipatutupad ang mga batas nito, magiging makatarungan sa bawat tao, at itatalaga ang aking sarili sa paglilingkod sa Bansa. Kasihan nawa ako ng Diyos." (Kapag pagpapatotoo, ang huling pangungusap ay kakaltasin. โ€” Konstitusyon ng Pilipinas, Artikulo VII, SEK. 5 Traditionally, the language that the incoming president uses for his oath shall also be the one used by the incoming vice president. Incumbency Under the 1935 Constitutions, the vice president, along with the president, set the vice president's term at six years, with possibility of re-election as only the president was barred from seeking re-election. In 1940, it shortened the term from six to four years, again without limitations on the number of terms for the vice president. The president, however, was barred from serving more than two terms. Under the provisions of these constitutions, only vice presidents Osmeรฑa and Lopez have won re-election. To date, only Fernando Lopez has served more than one term (a total of three terms), from 1949 to 1951, from 1965 to 1969, and again from 1969 until 1972 when the office was abolished. Under the 1987 Constitution, the vice president is barred from serving more than two consecutive terms (i.e. can be re-elected after one election cycle in between the last allowed term). Impeachment in the Philippines follows procedures similar to the United States. The House of Representatives, one of the houses of the bicameral Congress, has the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment against the president, vice president, members of the Supreme Court, members of the Constitutional Commissions and the ombudsman. When a third of its membership has endorsed the impeachment articles, it is then transmitted to the Senate of the Philippines which tries and decide, as impeachment tribunal, the impeachment case. A main difference from US proceedings however is that only a third of House members are required to approve the motion to impeach the president (as opposed to the majority required in the United States). In the Senate, selected members of the House of Representatives act as the prosecutors and the senators act as judges with the Senate president and chief justice of the Supreme Court jointly presiding over the proceedings. Like the United States, to convict the official in question requires that a minimum of two-thirds (i.e., 16 of 24 members) of the senate vote in favor of conviction. If an impeachment attempt is unsuccessful or the official is acquitted, no new cases can be filed against that impeachable official for at least one full year. The Constitution enumerates the culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, and betrayal of public trust as grounds for the impeachment of the vice president, as applicable for the president, the members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the ombudsman. Sara Duterte is the first and only vice president in Philippine history to have been impeached by the House of Representatives. On February 5, 2025, 215 lawmakers signed the impeachment complaint against Duterte, with an additional 25 representatives signing a document the following day in support of the complaint, bringing the total to 240. Voting 19-4-1, the complaint had been "archived" by the Senate; it is not yet clear if a trial could proceed later, in consideration of the pending motions for reconsideration before the Supreme Court. Section 9 of Article VII of the 1987 Philippines Constitution provides that whenever the office of vice president is vacant, the president shall nominate a vice president from among members of the Senate and House of Representatives, who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all members of both houses of Congress, voting separately. When the vice president becomes the president by succession, the new president can nominate a member of the Congress subject to confirmation from the majority of all members of both houses of the Congress. The Senate president may not directly be in succession for the position of the vice presidency, unless nominated. There is only one instance where a member of the Congress has assumed a vacancy in the vice president position, that is in the case of then-Senator Teofisto Guingona Jr., who was appointed as vice president of the Philippines by Arroyo on February 7, 2001. Guingona is the only vice president not nationally elected to the position. He is also the oldest person to have held the position, being appointed at the age of 72. He also concurrently served as secretary of foreign affairs. Historically, the vice president was not given an official residence. However, the vice president also held office along with the president at the Executive Building (now Kalayaan Hall) in the complex of Malacaรฑang Palace from 1935 until 1972, when the position was abolished under martial law and the 1973 Constitution. When the position was reinstated, Vice President Salvador H. Laurel held office at the former Legislative Building on Padre Burgos Avenue, Manila, until the building became the National Museum of Fine Arts of the National Museum of the Philippines. The vice president's office was transferred to the Philippine International Convention Center, and again to the PNB Financial Center, both in Pasay, Metro Manila in 2005. In 2011, the Coconut Palace, also in Pasay, was designated as the principal workplace of the vice president of the Philippines. Beginning June 30, 2016, the office was transferred to the Quezon City Reception House in Quezon City. In July 2022, the vice president's office was transferred to Cybergate Plaza in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Vice President Sara Duterte plans to establish a permanent office for the position. Vice presidents Elpidio Quirino and Fernando Lopez used a 1946 Packard Clipper. The official state car of the Vice President of the Philippines from 1994 to 2016 was a Mercedes-Benz W140 S-Class. Jejomar Binay, the Vice President between 2010 and 2016, used a bulletproof Toyota Land Cruiser 200 Series (which was replaced by the LC 300 Series in 2022) or a Lexus LX 570 on some occasions. The Vice President is also accompanied by a convoy of vehicles such as the Toyota Innova, Hilux, Fortuner, HiAce, Coaster, Land Cruisers, and Nissan Urvan, which contain personnel and security. In some instances, a Toyota Sequoia was also utilized by Vice President Duterte. Vice President Sara Duterte uses a Sikorsky S-76C++ helicopter. It has been criticized by some people, who argue that it is a waste of taxpayer money. However, the Vice President's office has defended the use of the helicopter, saying that it is necessary for her to travel quickly and safely around the country, and so she can visit her children anytime. The Vice Presidential Security and Protection Group (VPSPG) is tasked with providing the vice president and his or her immediate family security throughout their term in office. Previously a separate unit, the VPSPG was put under the Presidential Security Command in 2024. Prior to the VPSPG's activation in 2022, the Vice Presidential Security Detachment (VPSD) was responsible for the security of the vice president, from Salvador Laurel to Leni Robredo. Similar to the setup of the PSC, the VPSPG's personnel jointly comes from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police. As of November 2024, the VPSPG has a strength of 350 military and police personnel. In 2022, a Commission of Audit (COA) report revealed that the VPSPG had an initial strength of 433 personnel. By contrast, in 2020, the then-VPSD had a maximum of 83 personnel, before being reduced to 78 the following year. List of vice presidents Post-vice presidency Several vice presidents either lose re-election alongside their running mate or ascend to the presidency. After having been re-elected in 1941, Osmeรฑa ascended to the presidency after President Quezon's death. Vice presidents Quirino and Garcia never ran for re-election as vice president as they would ascend to the presidency following the president's death. Vice president Lopez did not run for re-election in 1953, opting to run for senator instead. After being elected in 1998, Arroyo ascended to the presidency after President Estrada was ousted in the Second EDSA Revolution. She later ran for re-election in 2004 and won. Five vice presidents ran for the presidency after their vice presidential term ended. Two of them, Macapagal in 1961 and Estrada in 1998 won. Three of them, Laurel in 1992, Binay in 2016, and Robredo in 2022 lost. Five vice presidents ran for another office after their vice presidential term ended and two succeeded. In 1953, Lopez ran and won for senator, finishing first. He would go on to win the vice presidency once more in 1965 and 1969. President Macapagal's running mate Pelaez also did not seek re-election for vice president, but instead sought the nomination of the opposing Nacionalista nomination for president, which he would eventually lose to then-senator Marcos. He would run for a seat in the House of Representatives in 1965 and won. In 2022, two vice presidents ran for senator; Binay lost, while de Castro withdrew less than a week after filing his candidacy. In 2025, Robredo ran for and won the position of Mayor of Naga City. She is the first former vice president who did not later serve as president to run for and win a seat in a local executive position. Only Teofisto Guingona Jr. did not pursue other office after his vice presidential term ended. See also References External links
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/ืžืฉืจื“_ื”ืžื•ืจืฉืช] | [TOKENS: 869]
ืชื•ื›ืŸ ืขื ื™ื™ื ื™ื ืžืฉืจื“ ื”ืžื•ืจืฉืช ืžืฉืจื“ ื”ืžื•ืจืฉืช ื”ื•ื ืžืฉืจื“ ืžืžืฉืœืชื™ ื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ, ืฉื”ื•ืงื ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ืžืžืฉืœืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื”-34 ื‘ืฉื ืช 2015 ื›ืžืฉืจื“ ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื ื•ืžื•ืจืฉืช, ื•ืœืงืจืืช ื”ืงืžืช ืžืžืฉืœืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื”-37 ื”ื•ื—ืœื˜ ืขืœ ืคื™ืฆื•ืœื• ืžืžืฉืจื“ ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื ื•ืžื•ืจืฉืช ื•ื”ืงืžืชื• ื›ืžืฉืจื“ ืขืฆืžืื™. ื”ื™ืกื˜ื•ืจื™ื” ืขื ื›ื™ื ื•ืŸ ืžืžืฉืœืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื”ืฉืœื•ืฉื™ื ื•ืืจื‘ืข ื”ื—ืœื™ื˜ื” ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ืขืœ ื”ืงืžืช ืžืฉืจื“ ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื ื•ืžื•ืจืฉืช ื•ื”ืขื‘ืจืช ืกืžื›ื•ื™ื•ืช ื•ืฉื˜ื—ื™ ืคืขื•ืœื” ืžืžืฉืจื“ื™ ืžืžืฉืœื” ืฉื•ื ื™ื, ืชื•ืš ื”ืขื‘ืจืช ืื’ืฃ ื”ืžื•ืจืฉืช ืžืžืฉืจื“ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ืœืžืฉืจื“ ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื ื•ืžื•ืจืฉืช. ืœืงืจืืช ื”ืงืžืช ืžืžืฉืœืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื”ืฉืœื•ืฉื™ื ื•ืฉื‘ืข ื”ื•ืกื›ื ื‘ื”ืกื›ื ื”ืงื•ืืœื™ืฆื™ื•ื ื™ ื‘ื™ืŸ ื”ืœื™ื›ื•ื“ ืœืขื•ืฆืžื” ื™ื”ื•ื“ื™ืช ืฉืžืฉืจื“ ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื ื•ืžื•ืจืฉืช ื™ืคื•ืฆืœ ืœืžืฉืจื“ ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื ื•ืžืกื•ืจืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื•ืœืžืฉืจื“ ื”ืžื•ืจืฉืช. ืขืžื™ื—ื™ ืืœื™ื”ื• ื™ืžื•ื ื” ืœืฉืจ ื”ืžื•ืจืฉืช, ื•ืžืื™ืจ ืคืจื•ืฉ ื™ืžื•ื ื” ืœืฉืจ ืœืขื ื™ื™ื ื™ ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื ื•ืžืกื•ืจืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ. ืœืคื™ ื”ื—ืœื˜ืช ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื‘-29 ื‘ื™ื ื•ืืจ 2023, ืžืฉืจื“ ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื ื•ืžื•ืจืฉืช ืฉื™ื ื” ืืช ืฉืžื• ืœืžืฉืจื“ ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื ื•ืžืกื•ืจืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ. ืชื—ื•ืžื™ ื”ืคืขื•ืœื” ื”ืงืฉื•ืจื™ื ืœืขื ื™ื™ื ื™ ืžื•ืจืฉืช ืขื‘ืจื• ืœ"ืžืฉืจื“ ืžื•ืจืฉืช", ื•ื”ืชื•ื•ืกืคื• ืœื• ืกืžื›ื•ื™ื•ืช ื ื•ืกืคื•ืช ืžืžืฉืจื“ื™ื ืื—ืจื™ื. ื’ื•ืคื™ื ื”ื›ืคื•ืคื™ื ืœืžืฉืจื“ ืฉืจื™ ื”ืžื•ืจืฉืช (ืชืงื•ืคืช ื—ื™ื™ื) (1979-) (1979-) ืจืื• ื’ื ืงื™ืฉื•ืจื™ื ื—ื™ืฆื•ื ื™ื™ื ื”ืขืจื•ืช ืฉื•ืœื™ื™ื
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/ืงืื™ื”_(ื›ืœื‘ื”)] | [TOKENS: 3633]
ืชื•ื›ืŸ ืขื ื™ื™ื ื™ื ืงืื™ื” (ื›ืœื‘ื”) ืงืื™ื” (10 ื‘ืืคืจื™ืœ 2005 โ€“ 26 ื‘ืคื‘ืจื•ืืจ 2018) ื”ื™ื™ืชื” ื›ืœื‘ื” ืžืขื•ืจื‘ืช ืžืกื•ื’ ืืœืกืงืŸ ืžืœืžื•ื˜, ืฉืื•ืžืฆื” ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ืžืฉืคื—ืช ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื‘ื—ื•ื“ืฉ ื™ื•ืœื™ 2015 ื‘ื’ื™ืœ 10, ื•ืžืื– ื’ืจื” ืขื ื”ืžืฉืคื—ื” ื‘ืžืขื•ืŸ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื‘ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื. ืžืื– ืฉืื•ืžืฆื” ื–ื›ืชื” ืงืื™ื” ืœืกื™ืงื•ืจ ื‘ืชืงืฉื•ืจืช ื‘ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื‘ืฉืœ ืื™ืจื•ืขื™ื ืฉื•ื ื™ื ืฉื”ื™ื• ื›ืจื•ื›ื™ื ื‘ืฉืžื”, ื‘ื”ื ื ืฉื™ื›ืชื• ืฉืœ ื‘ื ื™ืžื™ืŸ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื•ื›ืžื” ืžืžืงื•ืจื‘ื™ื•. ื”ืฆืขืช ื—ื•ืง ืฉืขื‘ืจื” ื‘ื›ื ืกืช ื‘ืงืจื™ืื” ืจืืฉื•ื ื”, ืฉื‘ื™ืŸ ื”ื™ืชืจ ื”ื™ื™ืชื” ืืžื•ืจื” ืœืืคืฉืจ ื”ืกื’ืจ ืœื›ืœื‘ื™ื ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ื‘ืขืœื™ื”ื ื•ืœื ื‘ืชื—ื ืช ื”ืกื’ืจ ืœื‘ืขืœื™ ื—ื™ื™ื, ื›ื•ื ืชื” ื‘ืคื™ ื“ื•ื‘ืจื™ื ื”ืžืชื ื’ื“ื™ื ืœืžืžืฉืœื” ื‘ืฉื "ื—ื•ืง ืงืื™ื” ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•". ื—ื™ื™ื” ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ืžืฉืคื—ืช ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืงืื™ื” ืื•ืžืฆื” ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ืžืฉืคื—ืช ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•, ืœืื—ืจ ืฉื ื ื˜ืฉื” ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ื‘ืขืœื™ื” ื”ืงื•ื“ืžื™ื, ื•ืœืื—ืจ ืฉื ื•ื“ืข ืœื‘ื ื™ ื”ืžืฉืคื—ื” ื›ื™ ื‘ื›ื•ื•ื ืช ื”ื›ืœื‘ื™ื™ื” ืฉื‘ื” ืฉื”ืชื”, ืœื”ืจื“ื™ืžื”. ื”ื™ื ื”ื’ื™ืขื” ืœื‘ื™ืช ื”ืžืฉืคื—ื” ื‘ื’ื™ืœ 10 ื›ืฉื”ื™ื ืกื•ื‘ืœืช ืžื‘ืขื™ื•ืช ื‘ืื’ืŸ ื”ืžืงืฉื•ืช ืขืœ ื”ืœื™ื›ืชื”, ื•ืžืœื™ืงื•ื™ื™ื ื‘ืฉืžื™ืขืชื”. ื‘-12 ื‘ื™ื•ืœื™ 2015 ืคืจืกื ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืคื•ืกื˜ ื‘ืขืžื•ื“ ื”ืคื™ื™ืกื‘ื•ืง ืฉืœื• ื‘ืžื™ืœื™ื ื”ื‘ืื•ืช: "ื”ื›ื™ืจื• ืืช ืงืื™ื”, ื‘ืช ืขืฉืจ, ื›ืœื‘ื” ืขื“ื™ื ื” ื•ื ืขื™ืžืช ืžื–ื’ ืฉื”ืฉืชืœื‘ื” ืžื™ื“ ื‘ืžืฉืคื—ืชื ื•. ื›ืฉื‘ื ื™ ืื‘ื ืจ ืฉืžืข ืฉื”ื™ื ืขื•ืžื“ืช ื‘ืคื ื™ ื”ืจื“ืžื”, ื”ื•ื ื‘ื™ืงืฉ ืžื›ื•ืœื ื• ืœืืžืฅ ืื•ืชื” ื•ื‘ื›ืš ืœื”ืฆื™ืœ ืืช ื—ื™ื™ื”. ื‘ืกื•ืฃ ื”ืฉื‘ื•ืข ื”ืื—ืจื•ืŸ ืงื™ื‘ืœื ื• ืื•ืชื” ื‘ื—ื•ื ื•ื‘ืื”ื‘ื”". ื›ืžื• ื›ืŸ ืคื ื” ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ืœืฆื™ื‘ื•ืจ, ื•ืืžืจ ื›ื™ ืงืื™ื” ื”ื‘ื™ืื” ืื•ืจ ืจื‘ ืœื‘ื™ืชื ื•ื‘ื™ืงืฉ ืžืžื ื• ืœื ื”ื•ื’ ื›ืžื•ืชื ื•ืœืืžืฅ ื’ื ื›ืœื‘ื™ื ืžื‘ื•ื’ืจื™ื ื›ื“ื™ ืœื”ืฆื™ืœ ื•ืœื”ืืจื™ืš ืืช ื—ื™ื™ื”ื. ื‘ื“ืฆืžื‘ืจ 2015, ื‘ืžื”ืœืš ืžืกื™ื‘ืช ื—ื ื•ื›ื” ื‘ื‘ื™ืช ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื”, ื ืฉื›ื” ืงืื™ื” ืืช ื—"ื› ืฉืจืŸ ื”ืฉื›ืœ ื•ืืช ื‘ืขืœื” ืฉืœ ืกื’ื ื™ืช ืฉืจ ื”ื—ื•ืฅ, ืฆื™ืคื™ ื—ื•ื˜ื•ื‘ืœื™. ื‘ืขืงื‘ื•ืช ื”ื ืฉื™ื›ื” ื”ื•ื›ื ืกื” ืงืื™ื” ืœื”ืกื’ืจ. ืฉืจื” ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื“ื™ื•ื•ื—ื” ื›ื™ ืงืื™ื” ื ืžืฆืืช ื‘ืžืฆื‘ ื—ืจื“ื” ืžื•ื’ื‘ืจ ื•ื‘ื ื•ืกืฃ ืœืžืฆื‘ื” ื”ืคื™ื–ื™ ื”ืงืฉื” ื ืžืฆืืช ื›ืขืช ื’ื ื‘ืžืฆื‘ ื ืคืฉื™ ืงืฉื”. ืืชื™ ืืœื˜ืžืŸ, ืžืžื™ื™ืกื“ื™ ืชื ื• ืœื—ื™ื•ืช ืœื—ื™ื•ืช, ื”ืชื™ื™ื—ืกื” ืœืื™ืžื•ืฆื” ืฉืœ ืงืื™ื” ื•ืืžืจื” ื›ื™ "ื‘ื ื™ ืžืฉืคื—ืช ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืขืฉื• ืžืขืฉื” ื—ืฉื•ื‘ ืžืื™ืŸ ื›ืžื•ืชื• ื•ืœืงื—ื• ืœื‘ื™ืชื ื›ืœื‘ื” ืžื‘ื•ื’ืจืช ื•ื—ื•ืœื”. ื”ื ืžื˜ืคืœื™ื ื‘ื” ื‘ืžืกื™ืจื•ืช. ืื ื™ ื™ื•ื“ืขืช ื›ืžื” ื›ืœื‘ื™ื ืžื‘ื•ื’ืจื™ื ื ื ื˜ืฉื™ื ื‘ืื›ื–ืจื™ื•ืช ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ื”ื‘ืขืœื™ื ืฉืœื”ื. ืชืืžื™ื ื• ืœื™ ืฉืืฃ ืื—ื“ ืื—ืจ ืœื ื”ื™ื” ืœื•ืงื— ืื•ืชื”". ืžืกืคืจ ื—ื•ื“ืฉื™ื ืœืื—ืจ ืฉืื•ืžืฆื” ืงืื™ื” ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ืžืฉืคื—ืช ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•, ื—ืฉืคื” ื›ืชื‘ืช "ืขื•ื‘ื“ื”" ืจื•ื™ื˜ืœ ื—ื•ื‘ืœ ื›ื™ ื”ื—ืฉื‘ ืฉืœ ืžืฉืจื“ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ืงื™ื‘ืœ ื‘ืงืฉื” ืžืžืฉืคื—ืช ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืœืงื‘ืœ ืžื™ืžื•ืŸ ืžื”ืžื“ื™ื ื” ืœืจื›ื™ืฉืช ืžื–ื•ืŸ ื›ืœื‘ื™ื ืขื‘ื•ืจ ืงืื™ื”. ื”ื‘ืงืฉื”, ืฉื”ื’ื™ืขื” ื‘ืกื•ืคื• ืฉืœ ื“ื‘ืจ ืœืœืฉื›ืชื” ืฉืœ ื”ื—ืฉื‘ืช ื”ื›ืœืœื™ืช ื‘ืžืฉืจื“ ื”ืื•ืฆืจ, ื ื“ื—ืชื” ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ื” ื‘ื˜ืขื ื” ื›ื™ ืขืœ ืžืฉืคื—ืช ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืœืžืžืŸ ืžื›ื™ืกื” ื”ื•ืฆืื” ื–ื•, ื‘ืฉืœ ื”ื™ื•ืชื” ื”ื•ืฆืื” ืคืจื˜ื™ืช. ืžืžืฉืจื“ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื ืžืกืจ ื›ื™ "ื›ืœ ื”ื”ื•ืฆืื•ืช ืžืžื•ืžื ื•ืช ืžื›ืกืคื™ ืžืฉืคื—ืช ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•". ืงืื™ื” ืžืชื” ื‘-26 ื‘ืคื‘ืจื•ืืจ 2018. ื‘ื ื™ืžื™ืŸ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื›ืชื‘: "ื›ืžื” ืื•ืฉืจ ื•ืื•ืจ ื”ื™ื ื”ื‘ื™ืื” ืœื—ื™ื™ื ื•. ืœืžื“ื ื• ืžืงืื™ื” ืžื” ื–ืืช ื ืฉืžื” ื•ืชื•ื“ืขื” ืฉืœ ื‘ืขืœื™ ื—ื™ื™ื. ืฉืžื—ื ื• ืœื”ืขื ื™ืง ืœื” ื‘ื™ืช ื•ืžืฉืคื—ื” ื•ื‘ื›ืš ืœื”ืืจื™ืš ืœื” ื‘ืฉื ื™ื ื ื•ืกืคื•ืช ืืช ื—ื™ื™ื”, ื•ื”ื™ื ื‘ื—ื–ืจื” ื”ืขื ื™ืงื” ืœื ื• ื”ืจื‘ื” ืฉืžื—ื”. ื‘ื”ื–ื“ืžื ื•ืช ื–ื• ืื ื• ืงื•ืจืื™ื ืœื›ืœ ืžื™ ืฉื™ื›ื•ืœ ืœืืžืฅ ื‘ืขืœื™ ื—ื™ื™ื ืžื‘ื•ื’ืจื™ื: ืชื ื• ืœื”ื ื‘ื™ืช ื•ื—ื™ื™ื โ€“ ื•ืชืงื‘ืœื• ืžื”ื ื›ืœ ื›ืš ื”ืจื‘ื” ื—ื•ื ื•ืื”ื‘ื”". ื‘ืคื•ืกื˜ ื‘ืคื™ื™ืกื‘ื•ืง ืฉื”ืขืœื” ื‘ืžืจืฅ 2018, ืฆื™ื˜ื˜ ื‘ื ื™ืžื™ืŸ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ืืช ื“ื‘ืจื™ื• ืฉืœ ื”ืกื•ืคืจ ืื™ืœ ืžื’ื“ ื‘ื˜ื•ืจ ื‘ืขื™ืชื•ืŸ ื”ืืจืฅ ื‘ื• ื”ื‘ื™ืข ื”ืกื•ืคืจ ื”ืขืจื›ื” ืœื”ืชื™ื™ื—ืกื•ืชื• ืฉืœ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ืœื‘ืขืœื™ ื”ื—ื™ื™ื ื‘ืชืงื•ืคื” ืกื•ืขืจืช ื–ื• ื•ื‘ื›ืš "ืžืชื•ืงืฃ ื”ื™ื•ืชื• ืžื ื”ื™ื’, ืžื ืกื” ื‘ื™ื•ื“ืขื™ืŸ ืื• ืฉืœื ื‘ื™ื•ื“ืขื™ืŸ - ืœืขืฆื‘ ืขืžื“ื” ืžื•ืกืจื™ืช ืฉืœ ืฆื™ื‘ื•ืจ ืฉืœื" ืชื•ืš ื™ืฆื™ืื” ืžื ืกื™ื‘ื•ืช ืื™ืฉื™ื•ืช ืœืชื—ื•ื ื”ืื•ื ื™ื‘ืจืกืœื™. ืขืœ ืงื‘ืจื” ื”ื•ืฆื‘ื” ืœื•ื—ื™ืช ื–ื™ื›ืจื•ืŸ ืกืžืœื™ืช ืžืžืฉืคื—ืช ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•, ื‘ื” ืฆื™ืจืคื• ื’ื ืืช ืชืžื•ื ืชื” ืฉืœ ืงืื™ื”. ื”ื—ื•ืง ืฉืžืื–ื›ืจ ืืช ืฉืžื” ืงืื™ื” ื ืฉื›ื” ืžืกืคืจ ื“ืžื•ื™ื•ืช ื”ืงืฉื•ืจื•ืช ืœืคื•ืœื™ื˜ื™ืงื” ื”ื™ืฉืจืืœื™ืช, ื•ื‘ื”ืŸ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ืขืฆืžื•, ื—ื‘ืจืช ื”ื›ื ืกืช ืฉืจืŸ ื”ืฉื›ืœ, ื‘ืขืœื” ืฉืœ ืกื’ื ื™ืช ืฉืจ ื”ื—ื•ืฅ ืฆื™ืคื™ ื—ื•ื˜ื•ื‘ืœื™, ื•ื›ืŸ ืžืื‘ื˜ื— ื‘ืžืขื•ื ื•ืช ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื”. ื™ื•ืžื™ื™ื ืœืื—ืจ ืžื›ืŸ ื”ื•ื›ื ืกื” ืงืื™ื” ืœื”ืกื’ืจ ื‘ืŸ ืขืฉืจื” ื™ืžื™ื ื‘ืžืชืงืŸ ื”ืกื’ืจ ืฉืœ ืขื™ืจื™ื™ืช ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื ื”ืžืžื•ืงื ืœื™ื“ ื”ืจ ื—ื•ืฆื‘ื™ื. ื–ืืช ื‘ื”ืชืื ืœืคืงื•ื“ืช ื”ื›ืœื‘ืช ืžืฉื ืช 1934, ื”ืงื•ื‘ืขืช ื›ื™ ื›ืœื‘ ืฉื ืฉืš ืžื•ืขื‘ืจ ืื•ื˜ื•ืžื˜ื™ืช ืœื”ืกื’ืจ ืขื™ืจื•ื ื™ ืœืžืฉืš ืขืฉืจื” ื™ืžื™ื. ื‘ืฉื ืช 2014 ื•ืขื“ื” ื‘ื™ืŸ-ืžืฉืจื“ื™ืช ืคืจืกืžื” ื”ืžืœืฆื•ืช ืœื”ื›ื ืกืช ืชื™ืงื•ื ื™ื ื‘ืคืงื•ื“ื”. ื‘ื™ื•ืœื™ 2017 ืื™ืฉืจื” ื•ืขื“ืช ื”ืฉืจื™ื ืœืขื ื™ื™ื ื™ ื—ืงื™ืงื” ืืช ื”ืฆืขืช ื”ื—ื•ืง ืœืžื ื™ืขืช ืžื—ืœืช ื”ื›ืœื‘ืช, ื”ืžืืคืฉืจืช ื”ืกื’ืจ ื‘ื™ืชื™ ืœื›ืœื‘ ืื• ืœื—ืชื•ืœ ืฉื ืฉืš, ื‘ืžืงื•ื ืœื”ื‘ื™ืื• ืœื›ืœื‘ื™ื™ื” ืขื™ืจื•ื ื™ืช. ื‘ื”ืฆื‘ืขื” ื‘ืงืจื™ืื” ืจืืฉื•ื ื” ืœื ื”ื•ืฉื’ ืจื•ื‘. ื‘ืื•ื’ื•ืกื˜ 2017 ืื™ืฉืจื” ื”ื›ื ืกืช ืืช ื”ืฆืขืช ื”ื—ื•ืง ื‘ืงืจื™ืื” ืจืืฉื•ื ื” ื‘ืžื•ืฉื‘ ืคื’ืจื” ืžื™ื•ื—ื“. ื“ื•ื‘ืจื™ื ื”ืžืชื ื’ื“ื™ื ืœืžืžืฉืœื” ื›ื™ื ื• ืื•ืชื” "ื—ื•ืง ืงืื™ื” ื ืชื ื™ื”ื•". ืœืื—ืจ ืžื›ืŸ ื”ื•ืขื‘ืจ ื”ื—ื•ืง ืœื•ื•ืขื“ืช ื”ื›ืœื›ืœื” ืฉืงื™ื™ืžื” ื‘ื”ืฆืขื” ืฉื ื™ ื“ื™ื•ื ื™ื ื•ืœื ื”ืขืœื• ืื•ืชื” ืœื”ืฆื‘ืขื”. ืœืื—ืจ ืฉื”ื•ื•ืขื“ื” ื•ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ืœื ื‘ื™ืงืฉื• ืœื”ื—ื™ืœ ืขืœ ื”ื”ืฆืขื” ื“ื™ืŸ ืจืฆื™ืคื•ืช ื‘ืชื•ื ื›ื”ื•ื ืช ื”ื›ื ืกืช ื”ืขืฉืจื™ื, ื”ื•ืกืจื” ื”ืฆืขืช ื”ื—ื•ืง ืžืขืœ ืกื“ืจ ื”ื™ื•ื ืฉืœ ื”ื›ื ืกืช. ื”ืฆืขืช ื—ื•ืง ื“ื•ืžื” ื”ื•ืขืœืชื” ื‘ืฉื ืช 2020 ื‘ื›ื ืกืช ื”ืขืฉืจื™ื ื•ืฉืœื•ืฉ, ื•ื‘ืกื•ืฃ ืื•ืชื” ืฉื ื” ืื•ืฉืจื” ื‘ืงืจื™ืื” ืฉื ื™ื™ื” ื•ืฉืœื™ืฉื™ืช ื›ืชื™ืงื•ืŸ ืœืคืงื•ื“ืช ื”ื›ืœื‘ืช. ื‘ืชืจื‘ื•ืช ืงื™ืฉื•ืจื™ื ื—ื™ืฆื•ื ื™ื™ื ื”ืขืจื•ืช ืฉื•ืœื™ื™ื
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/ืขืžื™ื—ื™_ืืœื™ื”ื•] | [TOKENS: 4847]
ืชื•ื›ืŸ ืขื ื™ื™ื ื™ื ืขืžื™ื—ื™ ืืœื™ื”ื• ืขืžื™ื—ื™ ืืœื™ื”ื• (ืฉืžื• ื”ืจืฉืžื™: ืขืžื™ื—ื™ ื‘ืŸึพืืœื™ื”ื•; ื ื•ืœื“ ื‘ึพ24 ื‘ืืคืจื™ืœ 1979, ื›"ื– ื‘ื ื™ืกืŸ ื”'ืชืฉืœ"ื˜) ื”ื•ื ื—ื‘ืจ ื”ื›ื ืกืช ืžื˜ืขื ืžืคืœื’ืช ืขื•ืฆืžื” ื™ื”ื•ื“ื™ืช. ืžื›ื”ืŸ ื›ืฉืจ ื”ืžื•ืจืฉืช ื‘ืžืžืฉืœืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื”ืฉืœื•ืฉื™ื ื•ืฉื‘ืข. ืžื™ื™ืกื“ "ืื™ื’ื•ื“ ืจื‘ื ื™ ืงื”ื™ืœื•ืช". ื‘ื™ื•ื’ืจืคื™ื” ื ื•ืœื“ ื‘ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื ื›ื‘ืŸ ื”ื‘ื›ื•ืจ ืฉืœ ื˜ื•ื‘ื” ื•ื”ืจื‘ ืฉืžื•ืืœ ืืœื™ื”ื•. ื ื›ื“ื ืฉืœ ื”ืจื‘ ืžืจื“ื›ื™ ืืœื™ื”ื• ื•ืฆื‘ื™ื” ืืœื™ื”ื•. ื’ื“ืœ ื‘ืฉืœื•ืžื™ ื•ื‘ืฆืคืช. ืœืžื“ ื‘ืชืœืžื•ื“ ืชื•ืจื” ืžื•ืจืฉื”, ื™ืฉื™ื‘ื” ื”ืชื™ื›ื•ื ื™ืช ื ืชื™ื‘ื•ืช ื™ื•ืกืฃ ื•ื‘ื™ืฉื™ื‘ืช ื”ื”ืกื“ืจ ืฆืคืช. ืืœื™ื”ื• ืฉื™ืจืช ื‘ืฆื”"ืœ ื›ืœื•ื—ื ื‘ื’ื“ื•ื“ 202 ืฉืœ ื—ื˜ื™ื‘ืช ื”ืฆื ื—ื ื™ื. ืœืื—ืจ ืฉื™ืจื•ืชื• ื”ืฆื‘ืื™ ื”ืคืกื™ืง ืœื—ื‘ื•ืฉ ื›ื™ืคื”, ืืš ื‘ื”ืžืฉืš ื—ื–ืจ ืœืงื™ื™ื ืื•ืจื— ื—ื™ื™ื ื“ืชื™ ื•ื”ื—ืœ ืœืœืžื•ื“ ื‘ื™ืฉื™ื‘ืช ืขื˜ืจืช ื ื—ืžื™ื”. ื‘ืžืกื’ืจืช ืฉื™ืจื•ืชื• ื‘ืžื™ืœื•ืื™ื ืœื—ื ื‘ืžืœื—ืžืช ืœื‘ื ื•ืŸ ื”ืฉื ื™ื™ื”. ื‘ืฉื ื™ื 2009โ€“2013 ื—ื™ื ืš ื‘ื™ืฉื™ื‘ื” ืชื™ื›ื•ื ื™ืช ื—ื™ืกืคื™ืŸ. ื‘ืฉื ืช 2013 ื™ื™ืกื“ ื’ืจืขื™ืŸ ืชื•ืจื ื™ ื‘ืฉื "ืื•ืจื•ืช ื™ื”ื•ื“ื”" ื‘ืžื’ื“ืœ ื”ืขืžืง. ื‘ืฉื ืช 2014 ื”ืงื™ื ืืช "ืื™ื’ื•ื“ ืจื‘ื ื™ ืงื”ื™ืœื•ืช", ืืจื’ื•ืŸ ื”ืžืื’ื“ ืชื—ืชื™ื• ืžืื•ืช ืจื‘ื ื™ ืงื”ื™ืœื•ืช ื“ืชื™ื•ืช ื•ืžืกื•ืจืชื™ื•ืช ื‘ื›ืœ ืจื—ื‘ื™ ื™ืฉืจืืœ, ื•ืขืžื“ ื‘ืจืืฉื• ืขื“ ืฉื ืช 2022. ื‘ื ื•ืกืฃ, ื”ืงื™ื ืืช ืืจื’ื•ืŸ "ืฉื“ืจื™ื" ื™ื—ื“ ืขื ื”ืจื‘ ื—ื™ื™ื ืžืจืงื•ื‘ื™ืฅ ื”ืขื•ืกืง ื‘ื—ื™ื‘ื•ืจ ื‘ื™ืŸ ื™ื”ื•ื“ื™ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืœืชืคื•ืฆื•ืช ื•ื‘ืงืœื™ื˜ืช ืขืœื™ื™ื”. ื‘ืฉื ืช 2016 ื”ืงื™ื ืืช ืืจื’ื•ืŸ "ืฆื• ืื—ื“", ื”ืคื•ืขืœ ืœืฉืžื™ืจื” ืขืœ ืขืจื›ื™ ื”ื—ื™ื™ืœื™ื ืฉื•ืžืจื™ ื”ืžืกื•ืจืช. ื‘ื™ืŸ ื”ื™ืชืจ, ื”ืฆืœื™ื—ื” ื”ืขืžื•ืชื” ืœื”ื‘ื™ื ืœื”ืคืจื“ื” ื‘ืฉื™ืจื•ืชื™ื ื‘ื‘ืกื™ืกื™ื ื•ืœืฉื™ื ื•ื™ื™ื ื‘ืคืงื•ื“ืช ื”ื’ื™ืœื•ื— ื‘ืฆื”"ืœ. ื‘ื‘ื—ื™ืจื•ืช ืœื›ื ืกืช ื”-21 ื‘-2019 ื•ืœื›ื ืกืช ื”-22, ื”ื•ืฆื‘ ื‘ืจืฉื™ืžืช "ื”ืื™ื—ื•ื“ ื”ืœืื•ืžื™ โ€“ ืชืงื•ืžื”", ืืš ืœื ื ื›ื ืก ืœื›ื ืกืช. ื‘ื‘ื—ื™ืจื•ืช ืœื›ื ืกืช ื”-23 ื•ื”-24 ืœื ื”ื•ืฆื‘ ื‘ืจืฉื™ืžื” ื›ืœืฉื”ื™ ืœื›ื ืกืช. ืœืงืจืืช ื”ื‘ื—ื™ืจื•ืช ืœื›ื ืกืช ื”-25 ื”ื•ืฆื‘ ื‘ืžืงื•ื ื”ืจื‘ื™ืขื™ ื‘ืจืฉื™ืžืชื” ืฉืœ "ืขื•ืฆืžื” ื™ื”ื•ื“ื™ืช", ื•ื”ื•ืฆื‘ ื‘ืžืงื•ื ื”ืชืฉื™ืขื™ ื‘ืจืฉื™ืžื” ืžืฉื•ืชืคืช ืœืขื•ืฆืžื” ื™ื”ื•ื“ื™ืช ืขื ื”ืฆื™ื•ื ื•ืช ื”ื“ืชื™ืช ื•ื ืขื. ืื™ื—ื•ื“ ื”ืžืคืœื’ื•ืช ืงื™ื‘ืœ 14 ืžื ื“ื˜ื™ื ื•ืืœื™ื”ื• ื ื›ื ืก ืœื›ื ืกืช. ื‘ืžืžืฉืœืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื”-37 ืžื•ื ื” ืœืฉืจ ื”ืžื•ืจืฉืช. ื›ืžื” ืฉืขื•ืช ืœืื—ืจ ื”ืฉื‘ืขืชื• ื›ืฉืจ ื‘ืžืžืฉืœื”, ื”ืชืคื˜ืจ ืžื”ื›ื ืกืช ื‘ืžืกื’ืจืช "ื”ื—ื•ืง ื”ื ื•ืจื•ื•ื’ื™" ื•ื‘ืžืงื•ืžื• ื ื›ื ืก ืœื›ื ืกืช ื—ื‘ืจ ืžืคืœื’ืชื•, ื™ืฆื—ืง ืงืจื•ื™ื–ืจ. ื‘-19 ื‘ื™ื ื•ืืจ 2025 ื”ืชืคื˜ืจ ืžื”ืžืžืฉืœื”, ื™ื—ื“ ืขื ื™ืชืจ ื”ืฉืจื™ื ืžืžืคืœื’ืชื•, ื™ื•ื ืœืื—ืจ ืฉืื•ืฉืจ ื‘ืžืžืฉืœื” ื”ื”ืกื›ื ื—ืžืืกโ€“ื™ืฉืจืืœ ืฉืžืคืœื’ืชื• ื”ืชื ื’ื“ื” ืœืชื ืื™ื•. ื”ืชืคื˜ืจื•ืชื• ื ื›ื ืกื” ืœืชื•ืงืฃ ื™ื•ืžื™ื™ื ืœืื—ืจ ืžื›ืŸ, ื•ื”ื•ื ืฉื‘ ืœื›ื”ืŸ ื›ื—ื‘ืจ ื”ื›ื ืกืช. ื‘-19 ื‘ืžืจืฅ 2025 ืฉื‘ ืœื›ื”ืŸ ื›ืฉืจ ื”ืžื•ืจืฉืช. ื ืฉื•ื™ ื•ืื‘ ืœืฉื‘ืขื”, ืžืชื’ื•ืจืจ ื‘ืจื™ืžื•ื ื™ื. ื“ืขื•ืชื™ื• ืืœื™ื”ื• ืžื–ื•ื”ื” ืขื ื”ื™ืžื™ืŸ ื”ื™ืฉืจืืœื™. ื”ื•ื ืชื•ืžืš ื‘ื”ื—ืœืช ืจื™ื‘ื•ื ื•ืช ื™ืฉืจืืœื™ืช ืžืœืื” ื‘ื™ื”ื•ื“ื” ื•ืฉื•ืžืจื•ืŸ, ื•ืžืชื ื’ื“ ืœื”ืงืžืช ืžื“ื™ื ื” ืคืœืกื˜ื™ื ื™ืช. ื”ื•ื ื“ื•ื’ืœ ื‘ืขืžื“ื•ืช ืฉืžืจื ื™ื•ืช ื‘ืชื—ื•ื ืขืจื›ื™ ื”ืžืฉืคื—ื” ืœืคื™ ื”ื™ื”ื“ื•ืช ื”ืื•ืจืชื•ื“ื•ืงืกื™ืช ื•ืชื•ืžืš ื‘ื”ื’ื‘ืœืช ืกืžื›ื•ื™ื•ืช ืžืขืจื›ืช ื”ืžืฉืคื˜. ื”ื•ื ืžืืžื™ืŸ ื‘ืฉื™ื— ื‘ื™ืŸ ืจื‘ื ื™ื ื•ืžืชื ื’ื“ ืœื—ืจืžื•ืช ื‘ื™ืŸ ืื™ืฉื™ ืฆื™ื‘ื•ืจ. ื‘ื ื•ืฉื ื”ื™ื—ืก ืœื™ื”ื•ื“ื™ ื”ืชืคื•ืฆื•ืช, ืืœื™ื”ื• ืžืืžื™ืŸ ื‘ื”ื™ื“ื‘ืจื•ืช ื™ืฉื™ืจื” ืขื ืžื ื”ื™ื’ื™ื ื•ืจื‘ื ื™ื ื‘ืชื ื•ืขื•ืช ื”ืจืคื•ืจืžื™ื•ืช ื•ื”ืงื•ื ืกืจื‘ื˜ื™ื‘ื™ื•ืช ื‘ืืจืฆื•ืช ื”ื‘ืจื™ืช, ื•ื ืคื’ืฉ ื‘ืขืฆืžื• ืขื ืžื ื”ื™ื’ื™ื ื›ืืœื” ื‘ืžืกืข ืฉืขืจืš. ื‘ืžืงืจื” ืื—ืจ ืคืจืฉ ืž"ืงื•ืืœื™ืฆื™ื™ืช ื”ืืจื’ื•ื ื™ื ื”ื“ืชื™ื™ื ืœื‘ืจื™ืื•ืช ื”ื ืคืฉ", ืœืื—ืจ ืฉื ื•ื“ืข ืœื• ืฉื”ืชื ื•ืขื” ื”ืจืคื•ืจืžื™ืช ื’ื ื”ื™ื ื—ื‘ืจื” ื‘ืืจื’ื•ืŸ. ื‘ื”ืžืฉืš ื›ื”ื•ื ืชื• ื”ื•ืกื™ืฃ ืœื”ื™ืคื’ืฉ ืขื ืจื‘ื ื™ื ืจืคื•ืจืžื™ื ื•ืงื•ื ืกืจื‘ื˜ื™ื‘ื™ื™ื ืœืฆื•ืจืš ืงื™ื“ื•ื ืื™ื ื˜ืจืกื™ื ืฆื™ื•ื ื™ื™ื. ืืœื™ื”ื• ื”ื•ื ื”ื™ื—ื™ื“ ืžื ืฆื™ื’ื™ ืžืคืœื’ืช ืขื•ืฆืžื” ื™ื”ื•ื“ื™ืช ืฉื ืžื ืข ืžืขืœื™ื™ื” ืœื”ืจ ื”ื‘ื™ืช, ื‘ืฉืœ ืคืกื™ืงืชื• ื”ื”ืœื›ืชื™ืช ืฉืœ ืกื‘ื•, ื”ืจื‘ ืžืจื“ื›ื™ ืืœื™ื”ื•. ืืœื™ื”ื• ืžืชื ื’ื“ ืœืฉื™ื“ื•ืจื™ ืชืื’ื™ื“ ื”ืฉื™ื“ื•ืจ ื”ื™ืฉืจืืœื™ ื‘ื˜ืขื ื” ืฉืื™ื ื• ืžื™ื™ืฆื’ ืžืกืคื™ืง ืžื•ืจืฉืช ื™ื”ื•ื“ื™ืช. ื‘ื–ืžืŸ ืžืœื—ืžืช ื—ืจื‘ื•ืช ื‘ืจื–ืœ ืงืจื ืœืกื’ื•ืจ ืืช ื”ืชืื’ื™ื“ ื•ืœื”ืขื‘ื™ืจ ืืช ื”ืชืงืฆื™ื‘ ืœืžืืžืฅ ื”ืžืœื—ืžืชื™. ื‘ื–ืžืŸ ืžืœื—ืžืช ื—ืจื‘ื•ืช ื‘ืจื–ืœ, ืขื•ืจืจื• ืžืกืคืจ ื”ืชื‘ื˜ืื•ื™ื•ืช ืฉืœื• ื‘ื™ืงื•ืจืช: ื‘ืจื™ืื™ื•ืŸ ืœืจื“ื™ื• ืงื•ืœ ื‘ืจืžื” ื‘ื ื•ื‘ืžื‘ืจ 2023, ืืžืจ ืืœื™ื”ื• ื›ื™ ื‘ืจืฆื•ืขืช ืขื–ื” "ืื™ืŸ ื‘ืœืชื™ ืžืขื•ืจื‘ื™ื, ื•ืœื ื”ื™ื™ื ื• ืžื›ื ื™ืกื™ื ืกื™ื•ืข ื”ื•ืžื ื™ื˜ืจื™ ืœื ืืฆื™ื. ื›ืœ ืžื™ ืฉื’ื™ื“ืœ ืืช ื”ืžืคืœืฆื•ืช ื”ืืœื” ืฆืจื™ืš ืœืชืช ืืช ื”ื“ื™ืŸ". ื›ืฉื ืฉืืœ ืื ื”ืžืฉืžืขื•ืช ื”ื™ื ืฉื™ืฉ ืœื”ื˜ื™ืœ ืคืฆืฆืช ืื˜ื•ื ืขืœ ื”ืจืฆื•ืขื”, ืขื ื” ื›ื™ "ื–ื• ื“ืจืš ืื—ืช, ื”ื“ืจืš ื”ืฉื ื™ื™ื” ื”ื™ื ืœื‘ื“ื•ืง ืžื” ื™ื™ืฆื•ืจ ืœื”ื ืืช ื”ื”ืจืชืขื” ื”ื‘ืื”. ืฆืจื™ืš ืœื–ื›ื•ืจ ืฉื”ื ืœื ืžืคื—ื“ื™ื ืžื”ืžื•ื•ืช". ืœืื—ืจ ื”ื’ื™ื ื•ื™ื™ื ืฉืกืคื’, ืืœื™ื”ื• ื˜ืขืŸ ื›ื™ "ื‘ืจื•ืจ ืœื›ืœ ื‘ืจ ื“ืขืช ืฉื”ืืžื™ืจื” ืขืœ ืื˜ื•ื ื”ื™ื ืžื˜ืืคื•ืจื™ืช". ื‘ืขืงื‘ื•ืช ื“ื‘ืจื™ื• ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื‘ื ื™ืžื™ืŸ ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื”ื•ื“ื™ืข ืฉื™ืฉืขื” ืื•ืชื• ืžื™ืฉื™ื‘ื•ืช ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ืขื“ ืœื”ื•ื“ืขื” ื—ื“ืฉื”. ืขื ื–ืืช, ืืœื™ื”ื• ื”ืฉืชืชืฃ ื‘ื”ืฆื‘ืขื” ื˜ืœืคื•ื ื™ืช ืฉืœ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ืžืื•ื—ืจ ื™ื•ืชืจ ื‘ืื•ืชื• ื”ื™ื•ื. ื“ื‘ืจื™ื• ืฆื•ื˜ื˜ื• ื‘ืชืœื•ื ื” ื ื’ื“ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื‘ื’ื™ืŸ ืจืฆื— ืขื. ื‘-24 ื‘ื™ื•ืœื™ 2025, ื‘ืจื™ืื™ื•ืŸ ืœืจื“ื™ื• ืงื•ืœ ื‘ืจืžื”, ืืœื™ื”ื• ืืžืจ ื›ื™ "ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื“ื•ื”ืจืช ืœื–ื” ืฉืขื–ื” ื ืžื—ืงืช, ืชื•ื“ื” ืœื”ืฉื ืฉืื ื—ื ื• ืžื•ื—ืงื™ื ืืช ื”ืจื•ืข ื”ื–ื”", ื•ื›ืŸ "ื›ืœ ืขื–ื” ืชื”ื™ื” ื™ื”ื•ื“ื™ืช". ื“ื‘ืจื™ื• ื’ื•ื ื• ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ืจื‘ื™ื ื‘ืื•ืคื•ื–ื™ืฆื™ื”, ื•ื™ื—ื™ืืœ ืœื™ื™ื˜ืจ ืฉื’ืจื™ืจ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื‘ืืจืฆื•ืช ื”ื‘ืจื™ืช ื”ืฆื”ื™ืจ ื›ื™ "ื“ื‘ืจื™ ืืœื™ื”ื• ื”ื ืฉื’ื•ื™ื™ื ื•ืžื˜ื•ืคืฉื™ื ื•ืื™ื ื ืžื™ื™ืฆื’ื™ื ืืช ืžื“ื™ื ื™ื•ืช ื”ืžืžืฉืœื”". ืœื™ื™ื˜ืจ ื’ื ื”ืชืงืฉืจ ืœืืœื™ื”ื• ื•ื“ืจืฉ ืžืžื ื• ื›ื™ ื™ื—ื–ื•ืจ ื‘ื• ืžื“ื‘ืจื™ื•, ืฉื™ืฆืจื• "ื ื–ืง ืื“ื™ืจ" ืžื•ืœ ืฉื•ืชืคื™ื” ืฉืœ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื‘ืืจืฆื•ืช ื”ื‘ืจื™ืช. ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ื ืชื ื™ื”ื• ื›ืชื‘ ื‘ื—ืฉื‘ื•ืŸ ื”ื˜ื•ื•ื™ื˜ืจ ืฉืœื• ื‘ืื ื’ืœื™ืช ื›ื™ ื”ืฉืจ ืืœื™ื”ื• ืœื ืžื“ื‘ืจ ื‘ืฉื ื”ืžืžืฉืœื”, ืืš ืœื ื ืงื˜ ื ื’ื“ื• ื›ืœ ืฆืขื“ื™ื ืžืฉืžืขืชื™ื™ื. ืขืœ ืืฃ ื”ื‘ื™ืงื•ืจืช ืฉืœ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื”, ืืœื™ื”ื• ื—ื–ืจ ื•ืืžืจ ื‘ืจืื™ื•ืŸ ื‘-30 ื‘ื™ื•ืœื™ 2025 "ืขื–ื” ืฆืจื™ื›ื” ืœื”ื™ื•ืช ื™ื”ื•ื“ื™ืช ื•ืื– ื’ื ืœืขืจื‘ื™ื ื™ื”ื™ื” ื˜ื•ื‘ ื™ื•ืชืจ". ืืœื™ื”ื• ื”ืžืฉื™ืš ื•ืืžืจ: "ืฆืจื™ืš ืœื”ื’ื“ื™ืจ ืืช ื”ื—ื˜ื•ืคื™ื ื›ืฉื‘ื•ื™ื™ื. ื‘ืฉื‘ื•ื™ื™ื ืžืชืขืกืงื™ื ืจืง ื‘ืกื™ื•ื ื”ื ื™ืฆื—ื•ืŸ". ื“ื‘ืจื™ื• ืืœื• ื’ื•ื ื• ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ืจื‘ื™ื ื‘ืื•ืคื•ื–ื™ืฆื™ื”, ื•ืืฃ ืขืœ ื™ื“ื™ ื ืฉื™ื ื”ืžื“ื™ื ื”. ืขืฅ ืžืฉืคื—ื” ืงื™ืฉื•ืจื™ื ื—ื™ืฆื•ื ื™ื™ื ื”ืขืจื•ืช ืฉื•ืœื™ื™ื ืฉืจ ื”ืžื•ืจืฉืช ืขืžื™ื—ื™ ืืœื™ื”ื• โ€ข ืฉืจ ื‘ืžืฉืจื“ ื”ืื•ืฆืจ ื–ืื‘ ืืœืงื™ืŸ โ€ข ืฉืจ ื‘ืžืฉืจื“ ื”ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื, ื”ืฉืจ ืœืฉื™ืชื•ืฃ ืคืขื•ืœื” ืื–ื•ืจื™ ื•ื”ืฉืจ ื”ืžืงืฉืจ ื‘ื™ืŸ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื” ืœื›ื ืกืช ื“ื•ื“ื™ ืืžืกืœื โ€ข ื”ืฉืจ ืœื‘ื™ื˜ื—ื•ืŸ ืœืื•ืžื™ ืื™ืชืžืจ ื‘ืŸ ื’ื‘ื™ืจ โ€ข ืฉืจ ื”ื›ืœื›ืœื” ื•ื”ืชืขืฉื™ื™ื” ื ื™ืจ ื‘ืจืงืช โ€ข ื”ืฉืจื” ืœืฉื•ื•ื™ื•ืŸ ื—ื‘ืจืชื™ ื•ืงื™ื“ื•ื ืžืขืžื“ ื”ืื™ืฉื” ืžืื™ ื’ื•ืœืŸ โ€ข ืฉืจืช ื”ื—ื“ืฉื ื•ืช, ื”ืžื“ืข ื•ื”ื˜ื›ื ื•ืœื•ื’ื™ื” ื’ื™ืœื” ื’ืžืœื™ืืœ โ€ข ืฉืจ ื”ื—ืงืœืื•ืช ื•ื‘ื™ื˜ื—ื•ืŸ ื”ืžื–ื•ืŸ ืื‘ื™ ื“ื™ื›ื˜ืจ โ€ข ืฉืจ ื”ื ื’ื‘, ื”ื’ืœื™ืœ ื•ื”ื—ื•ืกืŸ ื”ืœืื•ืžื™ ื™ืฆื—ืง ื•ืกืจืœืื•ืฃ โ€ข ืฉืจ ื”ืชืจื‘ื•ืช ื•ื”ืกืคื•ืจื˜ ืžื™ืงื™ ื–ื•ื”ืจ โ€ข ืฉืจ ื”ืื ืจื’ื™ื” ื•ื”ืชืฉืชื™ื•ืช ืืœื™ ื›ื”ืŸ โ€ข ืฉืจ ื”ื‘ื™ื ื•ื™ ื•ื”ืฉื™ื›ื•ืŸ, ืฉืจ ื”ื‘ืจื™ืื•ืช, ืฉืจ ื”ืจื•ื•ื—ื” ื•ื”ื‘ื™ื˜ื—ื•ืŸ ื”ื—ื‘ืจืชื™ ื•ืฉืจ ื”ืชื™ื™ืจื•ืช ื—ื™ื™ื ื›ืฅ โ€ข ืฉืจ ื”ื‘ื™ื˜ื—ื•ืŸ ื™ืฉืจืืœ ื›"ืฅ โ€ข ืกื’ืŸ ืจืืฉ ื”ืžืžืฉืœื”, ืฉืจ ื™ืจื•ืฉืœื™ื ื•ืžืกื•ืจืช ื™ืฉืจืืœ, ืฉืจ ื”ืžืฉืคื˜ื™ื, ืฉืจ ื”ืขื‘ื•ื“ื” ื•ื”ืฉืจ ืœืฉื™ืจื•ืชื™ ื“ืช ื™ืจื™ื‘ ืœื•ื™ืŸ โ€ข ืฉืจ ื”ืขืœื™ื™ื” ื•ื”ืงืœื™ื˜ื” ืื•ืคื™ืจ ืกื•ืคืจ โ€ข ืฉืจืช ื”ื”ืชื™ื™ืฉื‘ื•ืช ื•ื”ืžืฉื™ืžื•ืช ื”ืœืื•ืžื™ื•ืช ืื•ืจื™ืช ืกื˜ืจื•ืง โ€ข ื”ืฉืจื” ืœื”ื’ื ืช ื”ืกื‘ื™ื‘ื” ืขื™ื“ื™ืช ืกื™ืœืžืŸ โ€ข ืฉืจ ื”ืื•ืฆืจ ื•ืฉืจ ื‘ืžืฉืจื“ ื”ื‘ื™ื˜ื—ื•ืŸ ื‘ืฆืœืืœ ืกืžื•ื˜ืจื™ืฅ' โ€ข ืฉืจ ื”ื—ื•ืฅ ื’ื“ืขื•ืŸ ืกืขืจ โ€ข ืฉืจ ื”ื—ื™ื ื•ืš ื™ื•ืื‘ ืงื™ืฉ โ€ข ืฉืจ ื”ืชืงืฉื•ืจืช ืฉืœืžื” ืงืจืขื™ โ€ข ืฉืจืช ื”ืชื—ื‘ื•ืจื” ื•ื”ื‘ื˜ื™ื—ื•ืช ื‘ื“ืจื›ื™ื ืžื™ืจื™ ืจื’ื‘ โ€ข ืฉืจ ื”ืชืคื•ืฆื•ืช ื•ื”ืžืื‘ืง ื‘ืื ื˜ื™ืฉืžื™ื•ืช ืขืžื™ื—ื™ ืฉื™ืงืœื™
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