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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_exercise] | [TOKENS: 2011] |
Contents Military exercise A military exercise, training exercise, maneuver (American English), manoeuvre (Commonwealth English), or war game is the employment of military resources in training for military operations. Military exercises are conducted to explore the effects of warfare or test tactics and strategies without actual combat. They also ensure the combat readiness of garrisoned or deployable forces prior to deployment from a home base. While both war games and military exercises aim to simulate real conditions and scenarios for the purpose of preparing and analyzing those scenarios, the distinction between a war game and a military exercise is determined, primarily, by the involvement of actual military forces within the simulation, or lack thereof. Military exercises focus on the simulation of real, full-scale military operations in controlled hostile conditions in attempts to reproduce war time decisions and activities for training purposes or to analyze the outcome of possible war time decisions. War games, however, can be much smaller than full-scale military operations, do not typically include the use of functional military equipment, and decisions and actions are carried out by artificial players to simulate possible decisions and actions within an artificial scenario which usually represents a model of a real-world scenario. Additionally, mathematical modeling is used in the simulation of war games to provide a quantifiable method of deduction. However, it is rare that a war game is depended upon for quantitative results, and the use of war games is more often found in situations where qualitative factors of the simulated scenario are needed to be determined. The actual use of war games and the results that they can provide are limited by possibilities. War games cannot be used to achieve predictive results, as the nature of war and the scenarios that war games aim to simulate are not deterministic. Therefore, war games are primarily used to consider multiple possible outcomes of any given decision, or number of decisions, made in the simulated scenario. These possible outcomes are analyzed and compared, and cause-and-effect relationships are typically sought for the unknown factors within the simulation. It is typically the relationships between visual aspects of the simulation that aid in the assessment of the problems that are simulated within war games, like geographic locations and positionings that would be difficult to discern or analyze at full-scale and for complex environments. Military exercises involving multiple branches of the same military are known as joint exercises, while military exercises involving two or more countries are known as combined, coalition, bilateral, or multilateral exercises, depending on the nature of the relationship between the countries and the number of them involved. These exercises allow for better coordination between militaries and observation of enemy tactics, and serve as a visible show of strength and cooperation for the participating countries. According to a 2021 study, joint military exercises within well-defined alliances usually deter adversaries without producing a moral hazard because of the narrow scope of the alliance, while joint military exercises outside of an alliance (which are extremely rare) usually lead to conflict escalation. Exercises in the 20th and 21st centuries have often been identified by a unique code name, such as Cobra Gold, in the same manner as military contingency operations and combat operations like Operation Phantom Fury. Military exercises are sometimes used as cover for the build up to an actual invasion, as in the cases of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, or it can provoke opponents at peace to perceive it as such, as in the case of Able Archer 83. Types A Command Post Exercise (CPX) typically focuses on the battle readiness of staffs such as a particular Unified Combatant Command or one of its components at any level. It may run in parallel with an FTX or its equivalent, or as a stand-alone event for headquarters staff only with heavy emphasis on simulated events. Historical names for the field exercise, or the full-scale rehearsal of military maneuvers as practice for warfare in the military services of the British Commonwealth include "schemes", while those of the military services United States are known as Field Training Exercises (FTX), or, in the case of naval forces, Fleet Exercises (FLEETEX). In a field exercise or fleet exercise, the two sides in the simulated battle are typically called "red" (simulating the enemy forces) and "blue", to avoid naming a particular adversary. This naming convention originates with the inventors of the table-top war-game (the "Kriegsspiel"), the Prussian Georg von Reisswitz; their army wore Prussian blue, so friendly forces were depicted by the color blue. Several different armed forces of the same nation training together are described as having a joint exercise. Those involving forces of multiple nations are described as having a combined exercise or coalition exercise. These are called a bilateral exercise if based on security agreements between two nations, or a multilateral exercise if the agreement is between multiple nations. Other types of exercise include the Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TEWT), also known as a sand table, map, cloth model, or computer simulation exercise. These allow commanders to manipulate models through possible scenarios in military planning. This is also called warfare simulation, or in some instances a virtual battlefield, and in the past has been described as "wargames". Such examples of modern military wargames include DARWARS, a serious game developed since 2003 by DARPA with BBN Technologies, a defense contractor which was involved in the development of packet switching, used for ARPANET, and which developed the first computer modem in 1963. Military operations and training have included different scenarios a soldier might encounter with morals and different ethics. In one military operation soldiers are frequently asked to engage in combat, humanitarian, and stabilization roles. These increase the ambiguity of a role one may encounter and challenge of ethics. This will also lead the military personnel to have to make a difficult call in challenging circumstances. Even in difficult situations and conditions, military personnel still has to follow rules and regulations such as: 1) when the right thing to do is not immediately clear; 2) when two or more important principles or values support different actions, and 3) when some harm will result, regardless of the actions taken (Defense Ethics Program, Department of National Defense, 2012). These simulations involve crude living conditions, sleep deprivations, time limit, and either lack or ambiguous amount of information. A subset of simulated exercises is the Table Top Exercise (TTX), typically limited to senior personnel stepping through the decision-making processes they would employ in a crisis, a contingency, or general warfare. History The use of military exercises and war games can be found to date back to as early as the early 19th century, wherein it was the officers of the Prussian Army who created the contemporary, tactical form of wargames that have since been more widely used and developed by other military conglomerations throughout the world. Non-tactical forms of wargames have existed for much longer, however, in the forms of tabletop games such as chess and Go. The modern use of military exercises grew out of the military need to study warfare and to reenact old battles for learning purposes. During the age of Kabinettskriege (Cabinet wars), Frederick the Great, King of Prussia from 1740 to 1786, "put together his armies as a well-oiled clockwork mechanism whose components were robot-like warriors. No individual initiative was allowed to Frederick's soldiers; their only role was to cooperate in the creation of walls of projectiles through synchronized firepower." This was in the pursuit of a more effective army, and such practices made it easier to look at war from a top-down perspective. Disciplined troops should respond predictably, allowing study to be confined to maneuvers and command. Prussia's victory over the Second French Empire in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71) is sometimes partly credited to the training of Prussian officers with the wargame Kriegsspiel, which was invented around 1811 and gained popularity with many officers in the Prussian army. These first wargames were played with dice which represented "friction", or the intrusion of less than ideal circumstances during a real war (including morale, meteorology, the fog of war, etc.). 21st century militaries still use wargames to simulate future wars and model their reaction. According to Manuel de Landa, after World War II the Command, Control and Communications (C3) was transferred from the military staff to the RAND Corporation, the first think tank. Around the mid to late 20th century, computer simulated war games were created to replace traditional war gaming methods with the goal of optimizing and speeding up the process and making it possible to analyze more complex scenarios with greater ease. In 1958, the Naval War college installed a computer war game system where their traditional war gaming activities were held. The system was called the Navy Electronic Warfare System, and cost over $10 million to install. The change from traditional war gaming methods to electronic computer simulated ones meant that the value and accuracy of a war game simulation was less dependent on skill and individual experiences, and more dependent on quantitative data and complicated analysis methods. Von Neumann was employed by the RAND Corporation, and his game theory was used in wargames to model nuclear dissuasion during the Cold War. Thus, the U.S. nuclear strategy was defined using wargames, "SAM" representing the U.S. and "IVAN" representing the Soviet Union. Early game theory included only zero-sum games, which means that when one player won, the other automatically lost. The prisoner's dilemma, which models the situation of two prisoners in which each one is given the choice to betray or not the other, gave three alternatives to the game: This model gave the basis for the massive retaliation nuclear doctrine. The zero-sum fallacy and cooperative games would be theorized only later, while the evolution of nuclear technology and missiles made the massive retaliation nuclear strategy obsolete. List of military exercises See also References External links |
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/גולדה_מאיר] | [TOKENS: 69885] |
תוכן עניינים גולדה מאיר גּוֹלְדָּה מֵאִיר (במקור מֵאִירסוֹן; נולדה בשם גולדה מאבוביץ'; 3 במאי 1898, י"א באייר ה'תרנ"ח – 8 בדצמבר 1978, ח' בכסלו ה'תשל"ט) הייתה מדינאית ישראלית, ראש ממשלת ישראל בין 1969 ל-1974 והאישה היחידה שכיהנה בתפקיד זה. לפני כן כיהנה מאיר כשגרירת ישראל בברית המועצות, כחברת הכנסת, כשרת העבודה ושרת החוץ. כלת פרס ישראל לשנת תשל"ה (1975) על תרומה מיוחדת לחברה ולמדינה. גולדה מאיר נולדה בקייב, האימפריה הרוסית, ובילדותה היגרה משפחתה לארצות הברית, בה גדלה. בגיל 23 עלתה ארצה יחד עם בעלה, מוריס מאירסון. תחילה הייתה חלוצת התיישבות בקיבוץ קודם שנעשתה לאשת ציבור. מאיר החלה את דרכה הפוליטית כמזכירת מועצת הפועלות בהסתדרות העובדים, ומטעמה יצאה מספר פעמים לשליחויות באמריקה בסוף שנות ה-20 ובתחילת שנות ה-30 של המאה ה-20. עם השנים התקדמה בתפקידיה בתנועת הפועלים ובתנועה הציונית ופעלה בארץ ישראל ובארצות הברית. ב-1948 מונתה כחברת מועצת העם, והייתה מחותמות מגילת העצמאות. מאיר נבחרה לאספה המכוננת, שבהמשך הפכה לכנסת הראשונה, ומונתה לשרת העבודה בממשלת ישראל הראשונה. בתפקידה זה הובילה חקיקה חברתית רחבה. ב-1955 הוצבה כמועמדת מפא"י לראשות עיריית תל אביב, אך לא נבחרה לתפקיד. ב-1956 מונתה לשרת החוץ ובעקבות זאת עברתה כנהוג אז את שם משפחתה ממאירסון למאיר. היא כיהנה כשרת החוץ במשך עשור, בתקופה שבה פרצה מלחמת סיני. היא פרשה מתפקידה ב-1966, אך עד מהרה חזרה לפעילות פוליטית ומונתה למזכירת מפא"י. בתור מזכירת מפא"י פעלה רבות למען איחוד מפלגות הפועלים, מטרה שהוגשמה עד מהרה, ומאיר כיהנה כמזכירת מפלגת העבודה. עם מותו של לוי אשכול, הוחלט על מינויה ליושבת-ראש מפלגת העבודה (שרצה במשותף עם מפ"ם במסגרת המערך), ובמרץ 1969 הרכיבה את ממשלת ישראל הארבע עשרה. המערך בהנהגתה זכה ב-56 מושבים בכנסת השביעית, ההישג הגבוה ביותר של רשימה כלשהי בישראל. עם כניסתה לתפקיד הנהיגה את ישראל תוך מלחמת ההתשה. גולדה מאיר וממשלתה דחו את ההצעה המצרית במסגרת יוזמת יארינג בראשית שנות השבעים. עיקר המחלוקת היה דרישת ישראל לשיחות ישירות (יארינג הציע "שיחות קרבה"), ומנגד, דרישת מצרים שישראל תיסוג קודם כל לקווי ארבעה ביוני 1967. יארינג הציע מהלך של פתיחת התעלה, בתואנה של שחרור הספינות הלכודות בה, ומשה דיין אף צידד בהצעה, אך היא נדחתה על ידי חסידי הקו הנוקשה בצמרת המדינית-ביטחונית בישראל – גולדה מאיר, ישראל גלילי וחיים בר-לב. במשך השנים נטען כי אילו התקבלה הצעתו של יארינג, ניתן היה למנוע את מלחמת יום הכיפורים. במהלך כהונתה כראש הממשלה עמדה מאיר במספר משברים: מחאת הפנתרים השחורים, אליה הגיבה בצורה שנחשבה מנותקת בעיניי חלק ניכר מהציבור; גל הטרור; ומלחמת יום הכיפורים, שבה נפלו 2,656 חללים. ועדת אגרנט, שהוקמה בעקבות הכשל המודיעיני שסבב סביב פריצת מלחמת יום כיפור, האשימה במסקנותיה את הדרג המבצעי וזיכתה את הדרג המדיני ואת ראש הממשלה מאיר, מה שגרם לתסיסה ציבורית וחוסר אחדות פנים מפלגתית שהביאו להתפטרותה מתפקידה כראש ממשלה. בפוליטיקה הישראלית של תקופתה בלטה מאיר בהיותה אישה. בין היתר הייתה האשה הראשונה שכיהנה כשרת חוץ בישראל, האישה הראשונה (והיחידה עד כה) שכיהנה בתפקיד כראש ממשלת ישראל, ואחת הנשים הראשונות בעולם שהנהיגו מדינה דמוקרטית. כמו כן, היא אחת משתי הנשים היחידות החתומות על מגילת העצמאות (יחד עם רחל כהן-כגן). ביוגרפיה גולדה מאיר נולדה ב-3 במאי 1898 (ה'תרנ"ח) בשם גולדה מאבוביץ' בקייב (כיום בירת אוקראינה, אז חלק מהאימפריה הרוסית), למשפחה יהודית מסורתית ענייה. גולדה נקראה על שם סבתא רבתא שלה, שהייתה האישיות הדומיננטית במשפחת אמה. הוריה היו משה יצחק מאבוביץ', נגר במקצועו, ובלומה מאבוביץ' לבית ניידיץ, אחות מטפלת. השניים נפגשו במסדר טירונים בעת שהתגוררו בפינסק. סבה מצד אמה שירת כ-13 שנה בצבא הרוסי, לאחר שנחטף כשהלך בעיירה בה התגורר וגויס בכפייה לצבא הרוסי במסגרת מדיניות הקנטוניסטים של משטר הצאר. לאחר ששוחרר מהשירות הכפוי, הורשה למשפחת אביה לחיות מחוץ לתחום המושב, והמשפחה עברה לעיר קייב. מאז לידתה סבלה משפחתה ממחסור במזון, בביגוד ועוד. מתוך שמונה ילדים שנולדו למשה ולבלומה, חמישה מהם שנולדו לפני גולדה מתו בטרם הגיעו לגיל שנה, והיא נותרה עם שתי אחיותיה, שיינא וציפורה (קלרה). בשלוש שנים שבהן ניסה אביה לפרנס את משפחתו, החליפה המשפחה תשע פעמים דירה. בהיותה כבת ארבע חוותה את הפוגרום שאירע נגד משפחות יהודיות באזור מגוריה. לימים הסבירה שחווייתיה מהפוגרום, תחושת הפחד ומפח הנפש שליוו אותה, לא הרפו ממנה כל שנות חייה, וגרמו לה לטראומה נפשית. בשנת 1903, לאחר שאביה התקשה למצוא עבודה, הוא היגר בגפו לארצות הברית ושהה שם לבדו במשך שלוש שנים. שאר בני המשפחה עברו לעיר פינסק, בה התגוררו במשך כשלוש שנים, בבית סבא וסבתא שלה. בשנתיים בהן המשפחה שהתה בפינסק ללא האב, התמסרה אחותה שיינה, הגדולה ממנה בתשע שנים, לפעילות ציונית-מהפכנית שסיכנה אותה בהסתבכות עם השלטונות, והדבר הותיר חותם עמוק על גולדה הצעירה. עקב המחסור של המשפחה, התחנכה גולדה בבית, מחוץ למסגרת בית ספרית, ואחותה שיינה לימדה אותה קרוא וכתוב ביידיש ולאחר מכן אריתמטיקה. שנתיים לאחר הגעתו של משה לניו יורק, הוצע לו לעבור למילווקי, ויסקונסין, והוא החל לעבוד בהכנת אדנים מעץ בחברה שעזרה בהנחת מסילות רכבת בעיר, וכן ושינה את שמו למוריס. כמה חודשים אחר כך השיג מספיק כסף כדי לרכוש לשאר בני משפחתו כרטיסי נסיעה למילווקי. על מנת להגיע לספינה שתפליג למילווקי רכשו בלומה ובנותיה דרכונים מזויפים, ואימצו את השמות שניתנו להם בדרכונים. בהגיעם לאנטוורפן, המתינו כמה ימים עד להגעת הספינה לעיר. המשפחה שהתה על האונייה במשך שבועיים שלמים עד הגיעה לעיר. זמן קצר לאחר שהגיעו למילווקי, פתחה בלומה חנות מכולת סמוך לבית, בדומה למכולת שהייתה לאביה בעת שהייתה ילדה. משה סירב לעזור לבלומה בניהול החנות. בלומה נעזרה בגולדה ואילו שיינה סירבה לעבוד בחנות ומצאה עבודה במתפרה. שלושה חודשים לאחר שהגיעו למילווקי, בספטמבר 1906, החלה גולדה ללמוד בבית הספר הציבורי שבשכונתה. כ-85% מתלמידי בית ספר זה היו יהודים. הוריה, שנותרו עניים גם לאחר שאִמהּ פתחה את החנות, לא היו בעלי שאיפות גבוהות בקשר לחינוכה של גולדה, במיוחד לנוכח עימותיהם עם אחותה הגדולה שיינה, שאת רעיונותיה הסוציאליסטיים תיעבו. גם לאחר ששיינה עברה לתמוך ב"פועלי ציון", היחס של בלומה כלפי שיינה לא השתנה. "הוריי היו משוכנעים שחינוך תיכוני עבורי הוא מותרות לא הכרחיים ולא רצויים", סיפרה לימים. העיר מילווקי נחשבה לפלורליסטית במיוחד לזמנה, והדבר השפיע על החינוך וראיית העולם של גולדה. בבית הספר היסודי כונתה "גולדי" ובלטה בציונים הגבוהים ביותר בכיתתה. בקיץ 1909 הובילה מחאת תלמידים לאחר שידם של כמה מהתלמידים לא הייתה משגת לקנות ספרי לימוד. היא נאמה בהפגנה וקראה לגייס כסף עבור התלמידים. הנאום הוזכר בתקשורת המקומית והעירייה הסכימה לסבסד את הספרים למען ילדים עניים. לשם רכישת ספרים ייסדה יחד עם חברתה, רגינה המבורגר, את "האגודה האמריקנית של האחיות הצעירות". מטרת האגודה הייתה איסוף כסף למען רכישת ספרי לימוד לנערות הזקוקות לכך. אירוע התרמה לאגודה הוכתר בהצלחה ואף הוזכר בעיתונים המקומיים. גולדה התעקשה על לימודים בבית ספר תיכון, והתעמתה על כך עם אמה. אחותה שיינה ובעלה סיפקו לה פתח מילוט. למרות זאת, רשמה גולדה את עצמה, ללא ידיעת הוריה, לבית ספר תיכון ברובע הצפוני של מילווקי, ובספטמבר 1912 החלה את לימודיה שם. לאחר שהוריה ניסו לשדך לה את משה גודשטיין, סוכן נדל"ן אמיד שגילו היה כפול מגילה, החליטה גולדה לברוח מהבית. אחותה שיינה הציעה לה לעבור אליה לדנוור, וגולדה הסכימה והחלה לאסוף כסף בחשאי עבור הנסיעה באמצעות שיעורים פרטיים שהעבירה למהגרים שהגיעו למילווקי. בפברואר 1913 כתבה פתק להוריה וביקשה מהם סליחה על כך שהיא פוגעת בהם. לאחר מכן יצאה מביתה ועלתה על רכבת לדנוור, שם נפגשה עם שיינה. לאחר כשנה, כשהייתה בת 16, שכרה גולדה דירה משלה בדנוור ועזבה את ביתה של שיינה. מספר חודשים לאחר מכן התחדש הקשר בין גולדה לבין אביה. תחילה שלח לה מכתב ובו בקשה שתחזור, למען אִמהּ. כששמע על מצוקת בתו, חזר וביקש ממנה לחזור למילווקי. לבסוף חזרה גולדה למילווקי בקיץ 1915, כשנתיים לאחר עזיבתה. בתקופה בה שהתה אצל אחותה ובעלה, התוודעה לחבורת הצעירים היהודים הסוציאליסטים שהתאספה בביתן. שיחותיהם ורעיונותיהם הציוניים ריתקו אותה. בייחוד נמשכה ליצירותיו של אהרן דוד גורדון, מהוגי הדעות החשובים של הציונות הסוציאליסטית. אחד מהאורחים היה מוריס מאירסון, לימים בעלה, שמשך את ליבה בידיעותיו הרחבות ובאהבתו למוזיקה ולשירה. מאירסון היגר לאמריקה מפלך ליטא של האימפריה הרוסית. כשחזרה למילווקי בגיל 17, שבה גולדה הצעירה להתגורר עם הוריה בבית המרווח שרכשו. הוריה היו פעילים בקהילה היהודית במילווקי, והצליחו לקנות לעצמם מעמד בה, ולא התנגדו עוד לרצונה של בתם לרכוש לעצמה השכלה. היא סיימה את לימודיה בתיכון והמשיכה ללימודים בסמינר למורים (היום האוניברסיטה של ויסקונסין-מילווקי), שם למדה שני סמסטרים. לאחר מכן לימדה בבתי הספר הציבוריים של מילווקי. בעת מלחמת העולם הראשונה, פתחה, ביחד עם אביה, קרן צדקה למען יהודים באירופה שאיבדו את ביתם. עוד בשנת לימודיה האחרונה, הוגדרה על ידי הצעירים היהודים שחיו אז במילווקי כפעילה ציבורית המזוהה עם התנועה הציונית. בשל שליטתה בשלוש שפות, נשלחה גולדה על ידי פועלי ציון לערים ברחבי ארצות הברית. גולדה המשיכה לגלות עניין רב בפעילות במסגרת מפלגת "פועלי ציון", ואף ארגנה הפגנה נגד פרעות פטליורה באוקראינה. בהדרגה, בהשפעת בואם לעיר של מבקרים מארץ ישראל כדוד בן-גוריון ויצחק בן-צבי, התגבשה בה נחישות לעלות לארץ ישראל, אך מוריס התנגד לכך. במחאה על סירובו של מוריס לעלות עמה לארץ ישראל, עזבה גולדה את מילווקי בתחילת 1917, מאוחר יותר עברה לשיקגו, שם שהתה מספר חודשים. השניים שבו להיות יחדיו כעבור מספר חודשים, לאחר שגולדה הצליחה לשכנע את מוריס לעלות עמה ארצה. מוריס לא היה ציוני אדוק כגולדה, ועיקר עניינו היה ביצירה האמנותית של ההוגים הציוניים. ראייתו הייתה לקויה והוא היה נמוך, והיו אלו האינטלקט, ההומור העצמי, הצניעות והנימוסים שלו שקסמו לגולדה. ב-24 בדצמבר 1917 התחתנה עִמו בבית הוריה במילווקי, ועל אף שהעדיפה חתונה אזרחית, שכנעו אותה אמה ומוריס לערוך נישואים יהודיים. כדי לחסוך כסף לקראת המסע לארץ ישראל, גולדה החלה לעבוד כספרנית בספרייה מקומית. כאשר ביקשה להתנדב לגדודים העבריים במטרה לסייע לבריטניה במלחמתם באימפריה העות'מאנית, מפקדם של דוד בן-גוריון ויצחק בן-צבי סירב לכך בשל היותה אישה. גולדה זכתה להכרה על פעילותה כשנבחרה על ידי הקונגרס היהודי האמריקאי לאחת מהצירות של "פועלי ציון" במילווקי בוועידה הארצית של הקונגרס בדצמבר 1918, שכונס לקראת ועידת השלום בפריז שנערכה בתום המלחמה. למורת רוחה של משפחתה, היא הרבתה בנסיעות פוליטיות על חשבון זמנה עם בעלה. היא מלאה תפקיד פעיל בישיבות הקונגרס הנבחר בפילדלפיה, בו הוחלט, בהמשך להצהרת בלפור, שהתנועה הציונית תומכת בהקמתו של בית לאומי יהודי בארץ ישראל בחסות מנדטורית של האימפריה הבריטית. לאחר שהייתה פעילה ב"פועלי ציון" במשך שנתיים, החליטה גולדה לפרוש מפעילות בה. באותו זמן החלה לשקול ברצינות לעלות לארץ ישראל, המניע לכך היה ככל הנראה תחילת המנדט הבריטי על ארץ ישראל והכוונה לשנות את השלטון בארץ ישראל מצבאי לאזרחי. סיבה נוספת לכך הייתה ככל הנראה קשורה גם לסיום פעילותה ב"פועלי ציון". בקיץ 1920 החלו גולדה ומוריס את ההכנות לעלייתם לארץ ישראל. הם עזבו את מילווקי ועברו להתגורר בשכירות בשכונת מורנינגסייד הייטס (אנ') שבניו יורק בספטמבר אותה שנה, בדירה בה התגוררו יחד עם שני זוגות נוספים, שגם הם התכוונו לעלות לארץ ישראל. בינואר 1921 הגיעה גולדה לביתה של שיינה בשיקגו, שם שמעה שיינה לראשונה על החלטתה לעלות לארץ ישראל, והחליטה להצטרף אליה ב-23 במאי 1921 הפליגו מאירסון ואחותה עם משפחותיהן לארץ ישראל בספינת קיטור בשם "פוקהונטס" (Pocahontas). הנסיעה, שהייתה צפויה לארוך שבועיים, ארכה 44 ימים והייתה רצופת אסונות ואירועים חריגים, בהם שביתת מלחים, התאבדותו של רב החובל, והתערערות נפשו של אחיו. הספינה הגיעה לבסוף ליפו, אולם הסבלים הערבים סירבו להוריד את העולים לחוף, והספינה המשיכה לנמל אלכסנדריה שבמצרים. משם הגיעה מאירסון ושאר העולים ב-14 ביולי 1921 ברכבת לתל אביב. עם הגעתן לארץ ישראל התגוררו שתי המשפחות בדירה שכורה ביפו, וגולדה החלה לשמש כמורה מחליפה בגימנסיה העברית "הרצליה", ולימדה ילדים אשר התקשו באנגלית. לימים, השתמשה בימיה הראשונים בארץ ישראל כדי להמחיש לעולים חדשים את העובדה שגורלם שפר עליהם. היא לא זכתה לסיוע ממשרד לקליטת עלייה, איש לא הופקד על עזרה לה ולמשפחתה במגורים ובלימוד עברית (העולים מצִדם ראו המחשה זו לעיתים כהתנשאות וכהטפת מוסר, כפי שהודתה גולדה עצמה). בספטמבר 1921 הגישו הזוג בקשה להתקבל לקיבוץ מרחביה בעמק יזרעאל, שבו היה לזוג מאירסון ידיד ותיק מאמריקה. במרחביה חששו תחילה ממי שנראתה כבת תפנוקים אמריקאית שבהגיעה לארץ ישראל העדיפה לעסוק בהוראת אנגלית ולא בעבודת כפיים, אולם בסוף ניאותו לקבלה. מאירסון נהנתה מחיי הקיבוץ והתמחתה בגידול עופות. אולם בעלה התקשה להסתגל לתנאי החיים הקשים ולחוסר הפרטיות ומלכתחילה כלל לא רצה להגיע לקיבוץ. הוא אף סירב להביא ילד לעולם שיגדל בדרך השיתופית שהייתה נהוגה אז בקיבוץ. בעקבות מחלתו ונפילתו למשכב למשך כמה שבועות, המליץ להם הרופא לעזוב את מרחביה בהקדם. מאוחר יותר, נבחרה גולדה לחברת מזכירות מועצת הפועלות, והחל מ-15 בדצמבר 1922 נכחה בדיוני המועצה בתל אביב. מ-7 עד 10 בינואר 1923 נאמה ביידיש בוועידתה השנייה של ההסתדרות הכללית של העובדים בארץ ישראל כנציגת מועצת הפועלות ומרחביה מטעם מפלגת "אחדות העבודה". בנאומיה בוועידה טענה כי מועצת הפועלות צריכה להפוך לגוף נפרד מההסתדרות, בניגוד לדעתה של עדה פישמן. באביב באותה שנה חלה מוריס. ייתכן שהייתה זו מלריה אך מכל מקום פסק הרופא שבדק אותו כי על הזוג לעזוב את הקיבוץ. במרץ 1923, לאחר שהות של כשנה וחצי בקיבוץ, עזב הזוג את הקיבוץ, ובאוקטובר באותה שנה עבר להתגורר בביתה של שיינה בעיר. לאחר מכן עברו לשכונת נחלת אחים בירושלים, שם סידר להם דוד רמז עבודה במשרדי סולל בונה. מוריס עבד בהנהלת חשבונות וגולדה עבדה כקופאית במשרה חלקית. את שנותיה בעיר תיארה לימים כ"אומללות ביותר בחייה". היא סיפרה שכדי להכניס את בתה לגן היה עליה להתנדב לכבס את בגדי כל הילדים שבו, משום שלא הייתה יכולה לעמוד בתשלום הנדרש מההורים. במאי 1923 השתתפה בוועידת הקבוצות שהתקיימה בדגניה א'. בוועידה היא דיברה יידיש, היות שעוד לא שלטה בעברית. בזיכרונותיה כתבה גולדה כי הוועידה רוממה את רוחה. הן בשל היעדר ההגשמה החלוצית והן בשל העוני, גולדה עזבה את ירושלים במרץ 1925, לאחר חצי שנה בלבד, וחזרה למרחביה יחד עם מוריס ובנם. אולם בסתיו של אותה שנה חזר הזוג לדירתם הקודמת בירושלים. חצי שנה אחר כך, במאי 1926, ילדה את בתה, שרה. במחצית השנה הוריה של מאיר עלו לארץ ישראל והתיישבו בהרצליה. ב-1927 הציע לה דוד רמז, שהתיידד עמה, היה ער למצוקתה, ולימים אף הפך למאהבה, לשמש מזכירת מועצת הפועלות בהסתדרות. גולדה הסכימה, ובישיבת מועצת הפועלות בדצמבר אותה שנה נבחרה לתפקיד, החלה אותו בינואר 1928 ועברה לתל אביב. במקביל שימשה כחברת הוועד המפקח הארצי של "קופת חולים" מאז הקמתו בנובמבר 1927 ועד 1933, אולם היא כמעט לא השתתפה בישיבותיו. לעומת זאת, בעלה מוריס החל לעבוד כמתורגמן מאנגלית לעברית בהסתדרות. תפקידה הפך את מאירסון, שהייתה שייכת למפלגת "אחדות העבודה" שלימים הפכה למרכיב מרכזי של מפא"י, לראש ארגון נשים ציוני גדול. היא ניהלה חיים עמוסי פעילות ונסיעות, והייתה לנואמת נחשבת. ביוני 1928 הציעה עצמה כשליחה לארצות הברית מטעם מועצת הפועלות, למען גיוס כספים לטובת ההסתדרות. שליחים מטעם ההסתדרות יצאו לארצות הברית עוד בשנת 1926, וב-1928 החלה גם רחל ינאית בן-צבי לשמש כשליחה כזאת, במגמה שהתמקדה בעיקר בארגון הנשים האמריקאי. באותה שנה ביקשו ממנה ראשי ההסתדרות לנאום בוועידה העולמית של ויצו בברלין שהתקיימה בקיץ 1928. בין ויצו למועצת הפועלות היה משבר באותה תקופה, המשבר בנוגע לחלוקת הכספים של ויצו. דוד בן-גוריון, דוד רמז וחבריהם חששו שגולדה תסכם לבדה עם ראשי ויצו את הנושאים שהיו אז במחלוקת, מאחר שעמדתם הייתה מנוגדת לשלהם. בשל כך, הוחלט כי היא תצטרף לעדה פישמן בוועידה, אולם פישמן סירבה, וטענה כי לא ניתן לסמוך על גולדה. ראשי ההסתדרות דחו את טענתה, וביולי 1928 הייתה מאירסון לצירה בוועידה מטעם מזכירות מועצת הפועלות. במהלך הוועידה נוצר קשר בין ויצו למועצת הפועלות לאחר מאבק משותף של גולדה ופישמן. בעוד שפישמן נאמה בוועידה, גולדה כלל לא הוזמנה לנאום בה, והיא הגדירה את הוועידה כמתסכלת וכלא יעילה. כאשר פישמן העלתה הצעה שתאשר כי לארגון הנשים האמריקאי יש זיקה פוליטית ל"פועלי ציון", דרשה גולדה מחברי מזכירות מועצת הפועלות לדחות את ההצעה. ההחלטה על הצעת פישמן לא צלחה במזכירות מועצת הפועלות, ובשל כך הועברה לוועד הפועל של ההסתדרות, שם נדחתה ברוב של 5 נגד, 3 בעד, ו-2 נמנעים. פישמן העלתה את הצעתה שוב ב-5 בנובמבר 1928 בישיבת מזכירות הוועד הפועל, ונדחתה בשנית. בשלהי אותה שנה, הוחלט כי גולדה תשהה במשך כחצי שנה לפחות בארצות הברית, למען גיוס כספים עבור ארגון הנשים האמריקאי וצירוף חברות חדשות. יוכבד בת-רחל החליפה אותה בתפקידה במועצת הפועלות. היא החלה את שהותה בארצות הברית בנובמבר אותה שנה. לפני שעמדה לחזור לארץ, הוחלט כי היא תשמש כצירה מטעם "פועלי ציון" בקונגרס הציוני העולמי ה-16 שנערך בקיץ 1929, אך גולדה כלל לא נאמה בו. בקונגרס לא ייצגה גולדה את אחדות העבודה, אלא את הסניף האמריקאי של "פועלי ציון". לבסוף, חזרה לארץ בסוף אוגוסט 1929. עוד כשהייתה בארצות הברית, נודע לגולדה שהיא תצטרך לשוב למזכירות מועצת הפועלות. דוד רמז חשב שגולדה היא היחידה שתוכל לבלום את עדה פישמן במועצה. מששמעה על כך פישמן, היא החלה לבקר את שליחותה של גולדה בארצות הברית, ובין היתר האשימה אותה שהיא בוגדת בתפקידה מאחר שהיא מייצגת את מפלגתה, ולא את מועצת הפועלות. בינואר 1930 התפטרה מאיר מתפקידה כמזכירת מועצת הפועלות. במרץ אותה שנה החליפה אותה שושנה גולדין. גולדה נשארה במועצת הפועלות כחברת "המזכירות המורחבת", אך כחברה בה בלבד. בסוף מאי אותה שנה יצאה לבריטניה ושהתה שם עד סוף יולי למען איסוף תרומות למפלגתה ולהסתדרות. במקביל, השתתפה כנציגת מפא"י בשלוש ועידות שהתקיימו בבריטניה: ועידת מפלגת הלייבור ונשותיה, וועידת פועלי ציון באנגליה. היא חזרה לתל אביב בראשית אוגוסט. בבחירות לאספת הנבחרים השלישית, שובצה גולדה במקום ה-20 ברשימת מפא"י לבחירות. ב-5 בינואר 1931 הסתיימה ספירת הקולות, מפא"י זכתה ברוב מוחץ, וגולדה נבחרה לאספת הנבחרים השלישית. בפברואר אותה שנה השתתפה במושבה הראשון של האספה. חודש אחר כך השתתפה בדיוניה של מועצת ההסתדרות, שהתוותה את מדיניות ההסתדרות. באותו הזמן הופעלו עליה לחצים רבים לצאת שוב לשליחות באמריקה. מוריס התנגד לכך, היות שהטיפול בילדיהם הועבר ישירות אליו ואל המטפלת שלהם, תהילה שפירא. מה גם שבאותה העת התגלתה אצל הבת שרה מחלת כליות. בראשית 1931 השתפר מצבה של שרה, וגולדה החליטה שבסתיו תצא לארצות הברית. לאחר שזלמן שזר הצליח לשכנע את חברי המפלגה למנות עורך זמני במקומו לעיתון דבר ובכך לאפשר לו לשהות בארצות הברית למשך תקופה ארוכה, גולדה אישרה רשמית כי היא מוכנה לצאת שוב לשליחות. ב-30 בספטמבר 1931 יצאה לארצות הברית. שז"ר הגיע לניו יורק חודש אחריה. ביוני 1932 הפציר בה מוריס לחזור ארצה עקב מצבה הבריאותי של שרה, וגולדה נענתה. כשחזרה לארץ נדהמה לראות עד כמה הידרדר מצבה של שרה. באישור מוריס, הוסכם כי היא תנותח בניו יורק. למרות אזהרות הרופאים לפיהן שרה עלולה למות, יצאו גולדה וילדיה לניו יורק באוגוסט 1932. שרה נותחה בבית החולים "בית ישראל" במשך שישה שבועות, עד שהחלימה. במהלך שהות זו בארצות הברית ניהלה גולדה את ה"פיוניר וומאן", ובוועידה השנתית של הארגון שנערכה בטורונטו מ-27 עד 30 באוקטובר נבחרה למזכירתו. היא עסקה בפעילות ציונית ובאיסוף תרומות כמזכירת ארגון הנשים למען החלוצות. ביתה שרה קיבלה שם טיפול רפואי למחלת הכליות הקשה שממנה סבלה. עם חזרתה מונתה למזכירת "הוועד הפועל", ההנהגה העליונה של ההסתדרות, שבה כיהנה לצד אישים כדוד בן-גוריון, דוד רמז וברל כצנלסון. היה לה תפקיד מרכזי במימוש רעיון ה"מפדה", מס שנגבה מחברי ההסתדרות לשם סיוע למובטלים. היא סיימה את שליחותה ביולי 1934. לאחר ששבה לארץ התגוררה בחדר זמני בתל אביב, וביקשה לעבור לקיבוץ. עד לקבלת ההחלטה בעניין החליטה לעבור לעין חרוד. היא גם נדדה עם ילדיה לביתה של בבה אידלסון, מזכירת מועצת הפועלות וממקורבותיה של גולדה, אך לבסוף בקשתה סורבה. גולדה שכרה דירה בתל אביב ושלחה את שני ילדיה ללימודים בבית החינוך ע"ש א"ד גורדון, שבו למדו גם יצחק רבין ושולמית אלוני. לאחר מכן טיפלה במספר נושאים מטעם הוועד הפועל לבקשת דוד רמז. רמז ביקש ממנה לעמוד על זכויותיהם של חברי ההסתדרות במספר מוסדות, כמו הצבא הבריטי, לדאוג לפיתוח יחסי החוץ של הארגון, לטפל באנשים שהגיעו לראות את הארגון מחוץ לארץ ולעסוק בבעיות שהיו קשורות למחפשי עבודה ביישוב. מאיר תמכה בהסכמי בן-גוריון–ז'בוטינסקי, אם כי הסתייגה מהם מעט. היא אף הייתה מעורבת בדיונים לאישור ההסכמים. אולם לבסוף תמכה בכך שהוועד הפועל של ההסתדרות יכריע בעניין. בהמשך התנגדה לאישור החלק השני של ההסכם. לבסוף ההסכם נדחה לאחר משאל בין חברי הוועד במרץ 1935. באוגוסט אותה שנה יצאה לשווייץ והשתתפה בקונגרס הציוני העולמי ה-19. חודש לפני כן הוצע לה לשמש באופן רשמי כשליחת ההסתדרות בארצות הברית אך היא התעקשה להישאר בארץ ישראל. לבסוף נאלצה להסכים ובשלהי דצמבר יצאה לארצות הברית לפרק זמן של שמונה חודשים כנציגת ההסתדרות, יחד עם זלמן שזר. בעת שהותה בארצות הברית פרץ המרד הערבי הגדול. היא שמעה על כך במהלך שהותה שם אך לא ייחסה לו חשיבות רבה. בשלהי יולי 1936 חזרה לארץ. היא דחתה את טענות המנהיגים הערביים למרד וטענה כי מספר הערבים בארץ ישראל הוכפל מאז ראשית ההתיישבות העברית. היא התנגדה לדרישת המנהיגים להפסיק את העליות גם לאחר אלפי מאורעות הדמים שאירעו באותה השנה. כשנתבקשה להסביר את מניעיהם של המנהיגים הערביים טענה כי רצונם הוא "לגזול מאיתנו את ארצנו". אף על פי כן, היא תמכה במדיניות ההבלגה של ההגנה וטענה כי היא " הדרך היחידה, והדרך המוסרית היחידה". את תמיכתה במדיניות זו הסבירה בכך שעל אנשי היישוב להיות שומרי חוק בעיני הבריטים על מנת שלא יקצצו בעלייה ובהתיישבות. ב-17 בדצמבר נבחרה, יחד עם דב הוז, להציג בפני חברי ועדת פיל את עמדת ההסתדרות בכל הנוגע לתביעות היישוב. אולם לבסוף קבעה הוועדה כי חששותיהם של הפלסטינים מוצדקים וכי יש לצמצם את העלייה ולחלק את ארץ ישראל לשתי מדינות: יהודית וערבית. הצעת הוועדה פורסמה ב-7 ביולי 1937 וגולדה התנגדה לה רבות. לימים חזרה בה מהתנגדותה לתוכנית אם כי דווקא ההתנגדות הערבית היא שגרמה לאי הוצאתה לפועל. ב-28 בינואר 1937, חודשיים לאחר מותו של משה בילינסון, מונתה במקומו ליושבת ראש הוועד המפקח הארצי של "קופת חולים". הגוף פיקח, ניהל וכיוון את הארגון של ההסתדרות שהיה אמון על ביטוחם הרפואי של רבים מאנשי היישוב. באוקטובר אותה שנה ניהלה לראשונה את ישיבתו. במהלך כהונתה בתפקיד גדלו מספר החברים בארגון, מספר המרפאות שלו ומספר המיטות בבתי החולים בכל רחבי ארץ ישראל. באותה שנה הוקמה חברת הדיג נחשון על ידי ההסתדרות, ורמז הציב לה למטרה לגייס כסף על מנת להרחיב את צי הספנות שלה. לשם כך יצאה לארצות הברית מספר פעמים. היא אומנם הצליחה למכור אלפי מניות לחברה, אך לא אספה מספיק כסף למען הרחבת הצי. ב-1938 השתתפה כמשקיפה בוועידת אוויאן, מטעם הסוכנות היהודית, יחד עם ארתור רופין ונחום גולדמן. הנהלת הסוכנות הייתה ספקנית לגבי תוצאות הוועידה אולם החליטה לשלוח נציגות. החשש שהובע בהנהלה היה כי היא תפגע במאמץ הציוני להפוך את ארץ ישראל ליעד ההגירה העיקרי של יהודי העולם. עד אותה שנה שימשה מאיר כממלאת מקום במרכז מפלגת מפא"י, והחל משנה זו הייתה לחברת קבע בו ולחברת מזכירות המפלגה. חודש לפני התכנסות הקונגרס הציוני העולמי ה-21 התקבלה הצעתה שלה ושל שז"ר ולפיה לא יוכלו יהודים להשתתף בוועידת השולחן העגול אלא אם יתקיים משא ומתן בדבר הקמת מדינה יהודית. היא גם הציעה לדחות את ההחלטות בנושא ההשתתפות ולהעביר את הכדור לידי הסוכנות. הפעם לא התקבלה הצעתה. במאי 1939 פורסם הספר הלבן, שנועד להגביל באופן חמור את עליית היהודים ולהגביל משמעותית רכישת קרקעות בבעלות ערבית, בידי יהודים. יממה לאחר פרסומו, ב-18 במאי, הייתה גולדה ממנהיגי המחאה נגדו, יחד עם יוסף שפרינצק, לוי אשכול, זלמן ארן ואנשים נוספים. אולם עד מהרה התברר כי ההפגנות לא היו תכליתיות, והאיום הנאצי היווה סכנה גדולה יותר לעם היהודי מאשר הספר הלבן. ב-1 בספטמבר אותה שנה, בעת שהייתה על האונייה בדרך לארץ מהקונגרס הציוני העולמי ה-21, נתבשרה על פרוץ מלחמת העולם השנייה. ב-21 בספטמבר 1939 התפטרה מהוועד הפועל של ההסתדרות, לאחר שפרץ מאבק בינה לבין חברי סיעה ב' שאיימו לשבות ולהחרים את מוסדות הארגון אם יוכרחו להקצות כספים למפדה - הטלת מס על כל פועל למען סיוע למובטלים. חברי מפא"י השתמשו בהתפטרות כדי להשיג הישגים פוליטיים. לאחר מותו של דב הוז בתאונת דרכים בדצמבר 1940, עמדה מאיר בראש המחלקה המדינית של ההסתדרות (שנקראה אז המחלקה ליחסים פוליטיים), ובמסגרת תפקיד זה טיפלה בקשריה של הסוכנות היהודית עם השלטון הבריטי. היא שימשה בתפקיד זה במשך שש שנים עד לתום מלחמת העולם השנייה. מלבד זאת, ניסתה מאיר לתווך בין ארגון ההגנה לארגון האצ"ל. היא הזמינה את דוד רזיאל ואליהו גולומב לביתה, על מנת שתניעם לשתף פעולה במהלך מלחמת העולם השנייה. הניסיון נקטע לאחר שבן-גוריון שמע על כך והורה לסיים זאת. בנוסף, הייתה מאיר אחראית, בין היתר, על התנדבות היישוב לצבא הבריטי במלחמת העולם השנייה. היא טענה כי יש לעזור לצבא הבריטי ולעודד את הגיוס אליו, זאת בעקבות הסכנה שגרמניה הנאצית תפלוש לארץ ישראל. היא גם תמכה בשיתוף פעולה צבאי בין היישוב לבריטניה כנגד גרמניה הנאצית, ובתוכנית א', שהורתה על הקמת הפלמ"ח. מאיר חששה בתחילה מתוכנית בילטמור, עקב העובדה שלא נדרשה בה עצמאות מדינית גמורה. אולם מאחר שנדרשה לתאם את דרכה עם דרכיו של בן-גוריון, הפכה מאיר לתומכת נלהבת של התוכנית, אם כי עדיין התנגדה לחלק מחלקיה. היא אף מתחה ביקורת חריפה על ראשי הקיבוץ המאוחד, שהתנגדו נחרצות לתוכנית. נוסף על כך, ניסתה מאיר, יחד עם שותפיה, לנהל משא ומתן עם הבריטים למען הגדלת מספר הסרטיפיקטים. היא אף נפגשה, יחד עם יצחק בן-צבי, יו"ר "הוועד הלאומי", עם הנציב העליון כדי להגיש לו עצומה בנושא בשמם של אנשי היישוב. היא גם ניסתה לעכב גירוש של מעפילים שהיו על האוניות "פאסיפיק" ו"מילוס", אך הניסיון נכשל גם כן. כמו כן, הוצע לה לשמש כשליחה ברחבי העולם על מנת להסב את תשומת ליבו לשואה, אך היא סירבה בתוקף. מאיר הייתה תומכת נלהבת של בן-גוריון, ובעת שהוויכוח בינו לבין חיים ויצמן, ייעצה לו גולדה לשלוח לו מכתב ב-11 ביוני 1942, הכולל איום בהתפטרותו של בן-גוריון מהנהלת הסוכנות היהודית או בניתוק הקשר בין השניים. לאחר מכן הסלים המצב עד שב-11 ביולי הודיע בן-גוריון שאם ויצמן לא יגיע לשיחת בירור, יתפטר. ויצמן סירב, וב-26 באוקטובר מימש בן-גוריון את האיום והתפטר מתפקידו. לאחר מכן ניסו חבריו במפא"י לשכנעו לשוב לתפקידו, וברל כצנלסון אף איים בפירוק מפא"י אם בן-גוריון לא יעשה כן. המאבק הצליח, בן-גוריון וויצמן השלימו ביניהם והוא חזר לתפקידו ב-1944. מספטמבר 1943 כיהנה כמזכירת מועצת פועלי תל אביב-יפו מטעם הוועד הפועל של ההסתדרות. בשנת 1943 נתנה עדות מרשימה מטעם הסנגוריה במשפט סירקין-רייכלין שבו האשימו הבריטים את חברי ההגנה בהברחת נשק. מאיר התנגדה ל"פורשים" מארגון ההגנה ואף קראה לנקוט צעדים קיצוניים נגדם גם אם הדבר יעלה במלחמת אזרחים. עם זאת, כשנתבקשה מהנציב העליון לפעול להפסקת פעולותיהם, אמרה לו גולדה כי מוסדות היישוב לא יכולים לבלומם בעת שהממשלה "נוקטת פעולות פרובוקטיביות". בעת שירותה בארגון "ההגנה", היו למאיר ארבעה שמות קוד, שהידוע בהם הוא "פזית". שמות נוספים היו: "ג'ק" (בארצות הברית), "וינר" ו"זהבה". בן-גוריון וחבריו לוועד הפועל הציוני ביקשה ממנה להעיד בוועדת החקירה האנגלו-אמריקאית לענייני ארץ ישראל. ואכן, ב-25 במרץ 1946, העידה בפני חברי הוועדה. לא ברור עד כמה התרשמו מעדותה אם בכלל, אך כן ברור שהם לא קיבלו את דרישתה העיקרית - הקמת מדינה יהודית. באותה העת נמשכו ההפגנות נגד השלטון הבריטי בארץ ישראל. באפריל הודיעו מנהיגי היישוב על שביתה כללית ועל שביתת רעב למשך יממה, בעקבות שביתת הרעב של המעפילים שנתפסו בנמל לה ספציה על האוניות "דב הוז" ו"אליהו גולומב". על אף עצות רופאיה, שבתה גולדה רעב למרות שקודם לכן החלימה ממחלה ברגלה השמאלית. עם זאת היא שתתה תה ללא סוכר ועישנה במהלך השביתה ואף הצליחה לנאום בפני האנשים שהזדהו עם השובתים. בשבת השחורה ב-1946 נשלחו רבים ממנהיגי הוועד הפועל, ובהם משה שרת, ראש המחלקה המדינית של הסוכנות היהודית, למעצר בלטרון. מאירסון החליפה אותו בתפקיד במשך ארבעה חודשים. למרות זאת, היא לא נחשבה אז לחברה בגוף העליון של מקבלי ההחלטות ביישוב העברי. לאחר השבת השחורה האשימה את ממשלת בריטניה כי מדיניותה נועדה להרוס את היישוב היהודי. הבריטים ניסו להידבר עימה יחד עם אנשים אחרים בסוכנות, אך היא סירבה והודיעה כי היא מתנגדת לכך. כשחיים ויצמן הביע התנגדות נחרצת למרי אזרחי נגד הבריטים, הייתה בין המתייצבים הבולטים מולו. הוא אף איים להתפטר מתפקידו אם לא יפסקו פעולות המרי. חברי "ועדת x", שהייתה אחראית על תיאום פעולות המחתרות השונות, הבטיחו לוויצמן כי "ישתדלו" למלא את דרישתו. לאחר פיצוץ מלון המלך דוד הורה גם בן-גוריון להפסיק את הפעולות, לפחות עד להתכנסות הקונגרס הציוני העולמי ה-22. ויצמן המשיך לעמוד על עמדתו ודרש מגולדה להתערב בעניין. היא הצליחה לשכנע את לוי אשכול שאין טעם בפעולות הללו וכי יש להפסיק באופן זמני את פעילות הוועדה. אשכול לא הסכים לפזר את הוועדה וביקש למנות מחליפים לחברי הוועדה העצורים בלטרון, והיא צייתה לו. בן-גוריון ראה בגולדה כמי שתהיה חברה בהנהלת הסוכנות גם אם ישוחררו עצורי השבת השחורה, כפי שאכן קרה ב-5 בנובמבר. זמן לא רב אחר כך הפכה לנציגת מפא"י בוועד הפועל הציוני ואחר כך גם בהנהלה הציונית. לאחר ששוחרר שרת הוא ניהל את המחלקה המדינית מוושינגטון, ואילו מאיר עמדה בראשה בירושלים מינואר 1947 ולמעשה ניהלה אותה בפועל. לצורך כך עברה לגור בשכונת רחביה. באותו החודש נידון למוות לוחם האצ"ל דב גרונר, שנתפס במהלך התקפת האצ"ל על המשטרה הבריטית ברמת גן. ב-26 בינואר, יומיים לפני ההוצאה להורג המתוכננת של גרונר, חטפו אנשי האצ"ל קצין מודיעין בריטי בירושלים. למחרת, ב-27 בינואר, חטפו אנשי האצ"ל גם את נשיא בית המשפט המחוזי הבריטי בתל אביב. 16 שעות לפני המועד המתוכנן של ביצוע גזר הדין הודיע מפקד הכוחות הבריטיים בארץ על דחייתו ל"זמן בלתי מוגבל", והאצ"ל שחרר את בני הערובה. גולדה הייתה האחראית הישירה לשחרור בני הערובה, ומאותו החודש שימשה כאשת קשר עם הבריטים, לבקשת בן-גוריון. בשל קרבתה לממשל המנדט כינוה אנשי "הפורשים" כ"מתווכת בין השלטון המרצח לבין היישוב", ואף השווה אותה למנהיגי גטו וילנה חברי היודנראט. באביב 1947 חלתה, וב-29 ביוני התפטרה מהנהלת הסוכנות. התפטרותה נדחתה, ובמקום זאת היא יצאה לחופשת מחלה. באוקטובר 1947 הקימה את "מרכז ההתגייסות", והעמידה בראשו את לוי אשכול ובנימין אבניאל, שהפכו באופן לא רשמי לאחראים על הגיוס לארגון ההגנה מטעם המפקדה הארצית. מאוחר יותר הצטרפה, לבקשת בן-גוריון, ל"ועדה ב'", שהופקדה מטעם הסוכנות להקים "מנגנון ממשלתי מסודר" ומנגנוני עזר שיסייעו לאוכלוסייה. ב-10 בנובמבר טסה לקפריסין כדי לנהל משא ומתן עם מנהיגי מחנות המעצר שם, לאחר שהצליחה לשכנע את הנציב העליון אלן גורדון קנינגהם ולהגיע עמו להסכם לפיו ישוחררו מאות תינוקות, ילדים והוריהם מהמחנות, למען קידומם לראש רשימת הוותיקים במחנות, שהאנשים שבראשה זכו לשחרור מוקדם. לאחר כמה ימים היא הגיעה עם מנהיגי המחנות להסכמה דומה, וכ-3,800 תינוקות, ילדים והוריהם שוחררו ממחנות המעצר ועלו ארצה. הדבר היווה ניצחון "אנושי ואישי" עבור גולדה. ב-15 בנובמבר נורו יריות לעבר ביתה שברחביה, והיא הגדירה אירוע זה כמכונן בחייה. בטרם קום המדינה נפגשה מאיר פעמיים עם עבדאללה מלך ירדן. בפגישה הראשונה, ב-17 בנובמבר 1947, היה עבדאללה לבבי ופייסן, והבטיח שלא תהיה התנגשות בין כוחותיו לבין היישוב, ואילו מאירסון הבטיחה שהיהודים יראו בעין יפה את השתלטותו על החלק הערבי של הארץ, כפי שיוחלט בתוכנית החלוקה. מייד לאחר כ"ט בנובמבר נתבקשה שוב על ידי בן-גוריון להיות מופקדת מטעם הנהגת היישוב על "הפעילות המדינית והמוניציפלית בירושלים", וכן עמדה בראש "ועדת ירושלים", שהתכנסה בדצמבר אותה שנה, והיא ניהלה את העניינים האזרחיים של ירושלים ותושביה היהודים עד סמוך להכרזת העצמאות. ב-26 בדצמבר תקפו הערבים שיירה של מכוניות בשער הגיא. אחת מהן הייתה המונית שבה נסעה גולדה על מנת לבלות את סוף השבוע בתל אביב. השומרים שהיו בתוכה השיבו ביריות ובכך היא שרדה, אך לאחר מכן נפגעה קל לאחר שניסתה לפתוח את דלת המונית כדי להכניס לתוכה פצוע. בתחילת ינואר 1948 הסכימה לצאת במקום בן-גוריון לארצות הברית, לאחר שאליעזר קפלן נכשל בגיוס כספים למען רכישת נשק ובן-גוריון רצה לסייע לו בהשגת המטרה. בן-גוריון הופתע מרצונה של גולדה לסייע לו בכך, שכן היא סירבה קודם לכן לצאת לשליחויות לארצות הברית. ואכן, ב-22 בינואר יצאה גולדה לארצות הברית, ולמחרת נחתה שם. במהלך מסעה ליוו אותה שני אישים יהודיים-אמריקאיים בכירים: הנרי מונטור, המנהל הכללי של המגבית הארץ-ישראלית המאוחדת, והנרי מורגנטאו הבן שכיהן כמזכיר האוצר של ארצות הברית בתקופת ממשלו של פרנקלין רוזוולט. נאומה בכינוס השנתי של מועצת ההסתדרויות וקרנות הסעד היהודית זכה להצלחה מסחררת וראשי הארגון התחייבו להעביר 25 מיליון דולר. במלון פאלם ביץ' נחלה הצלחה גדולה עוד יותר כאשר הצליחה לגייס עוד מיליון וחצי דולר, ובתום המסע ניתנו לה התחייבויות להעביר סכום כולל של 50 מיליון דולר. חלק נרחב מצורכי היישוב והמדינה מומנו בעזרת הכסף שגייסה, וייתכן שבלעדיו לא היה ניתן לרכוש די נשק לבלימת ההתקפה הערבית במלחמה. היא נבחרה למועצת העם, אך לא למנהלת העם. זאת עקב התנגדותם של כמה מחברי מרכז מפא"י, ובראשם יוסף שפרינצק ודב יוסף, בהצבעה שנערכה ב-6 במרץ 1948. בן-גוריון זעם על כך, ובאפריל אף התפטר לזמן קצר ממזכירות המפלגה ומהממשלה הזמנית, אך חזר בו. ב-26 באפריל חזרה לשמש כראש המחלקה המדינית בירושלים, לבקשת בן-גוריון, ולצורך כך שבה למשרדה בעיר ושהתה בה מספר ימים. ב-1 במאי הציעה לבן-גוריון שתיפגש שוב עם המלך עבדאללה כדי לברר מה מדינתו תעשה. בן-גוריון לא היה שלם עם הבקשה מאחר שהיה סבור שהמלך ומדינתו עתידים להצטרף למלחמה. לבסוף אישר את בקשתה, וב-12 במאי 1948 נפגשה גולדה בשנית עם עבדאללה. במהלך הפגישה כבר היה ברור שבדעתו לשלוח את הלגיון הירדני להילחם ביהודי ארץ ישראל. במאמץ אחרון להניא אותו, הגיעה אליו מאירסון מחופּשת לערבייה, בצוותא עם מומחה לענייני ערבים, עזרא דנין, שהתחזה לבעלה. כשהגיעה לבסוף למפגש אמר לה המלך בנימה של התנצלות שמהלך העניינים אינו תלוי עוד בו, והציע למאיר שהיישוב היהודי בארץ יוכפף לשלטון ממלכת ירדן כמיעוט, יהודיה יקבלו ייצוג בפרלמנט משותף ואוטונומיה באזורי מגוריהם, ללא הקמת מדינה עצמאית וללא המשך עליית יהודים לארץ - הצעה שלא התקבלה על דעתה. המסקנה הברורה מהפגישה הייתה שעבדאללה אכן מתכוון להצטרף כצד במלחמה, וגולדה נפרדה מהמלך במילים: "ניפגש לאחר המלחמה". בבוקר אותו היום התקבלה ההחלטה על הקמת מדינת ישראל בישיבת מועצת העם ברוב דחוק, וגולדה השתתפה בה לבקשת בן-גוריון, על אף שלא הייתה חברה בה. יומיים לאחר מכן, בה' באייר תש"ח, 14 במאי 1948, יום הכרזת העצמאות, נתבקשה על ידי בן-גוריון לבשר לראשי השלטון הבריטי על ההחלטה להקים את מדינת ישראל ולשמש מטעם הממשלה הזמנית כ"אחראית לענייני ירושלים". באותו היום ניסתה לחזור לירושלים הנצורה, ועל כן, לא הייתה אמורה להיות נוכחת בטקס ההכרזה, אך מטוס ה"פרימוס" שלה חזר על עקבותיו בשל מזג אוויר סוער, והיא נכחה בטקס וחתמה על מגילת העצמאות בבית דיזנגוף. החתימה הייתה מלווה, כפי שתיארה זאת, בבכי סוער מצִדה. לאחר החתימה יצאו אל ההמונים שהתקהלו מחוץ לבית דיזנגוף שני נואמים: תחילה בן-גוריון שנתן נאום מאופק, ומייד אחריו גולדה שנתנה נאום נלהב ומרגש. מייד לאחר מכן שוב נשלחה לגייס כספים בארצות הברית למען המאמץ המלחמתי. מארצות הברית היא נשלחה לברית המועצות, אולם בוששה להגיע לשם לאחר שאושפזה בבית חולים בניו יורק בעקבות תאונת דרכים. הסובייטים, וגם הציבור בארץ, סברו שמדובר ב"מחלה דיפלומטית". הדבר מובן לאור העובדה שהמינוי נבע מניסיון של משה שרתוק (לימים שרת) להרחיקה מהארץ וממוקדי ההשפעה כי היה מאוים ממנה פוליטית וידע כי היא הראשונה בה יתמוך בן-גוריון שנתן בה אמון מלא (אך לא העריך באותה מידה את שרתוק). גולדה התנגדה למינוי זה גם מכיוון שחשה שאינה בעלת כישורים דיפלומטיים מספיקים. ביוני 1948 הודיע לה שרת באמצעות מברק כי מונתה על ידי הממשלה ל"ציר מוסמך" במוקסבה, אך היא המשיכה להיאבק בהחלטה וניסתה לדחות זאת ככל האפשר, אך לשווא. ב-2 בספטמבר 1948 הגיעה למוסקבה, שם עמדה גולדה בראש צירות ישראל בברית המועצות, ושהתה שם כחצי שנה. כחלק מההכנות לנסיעה למוסקבה היה צריך למצוא מלווה דובר צרפתית, שכן הוחלט שהצרפתית תהיה שפת הדיפלומטיה הישראלית. לבסוף נבחרה צעירה ילידת פריז, לו קדר, שהתלוותה לנסיעה והפכה לעוזרת של מאיר ולידידה קרובה שלה למשך שנים. חוויה קשה לחברי המשלחת צפן הכורח להימנע מביקורי קרובי משפחה המתגוררים בברית המועצות מחשש לשלומם באווירה הסטליניסטית ששררה במדינה. הסובייטים האמינו בקיומה של אנטישמיות בארצות הלאום הקפיטליסטיות, ובשל כך קיבלו את הצורך במדינה יהודית כפתרון זמני. עם זאת, גרסו שבמדינות הקומוניסטיות לא קיימת אנטישמיות כלל, ולכן מגע בין יהודים במדינות אלו לבין ישראל הוא פסול מיסודו. אף על פי כן לא נמנעו יהודים רבים מלבקר בבית הכנסת הגדול במוסקבה בחגים, בזמן שבו הגיעו אליו אנשי המשלחת הדיפלומטית הישראלית. קבלת הפנים שנערכה להם הייתה לבבית. עשרות אלפים הרעיפו אהבה רבה על נציגי המדינה היהודית הצעירה. מפורסמת מאוד תמונתה של גולדה מאירסון רוקדת עם היהודים בשמחת תורה, אשר הופיעה על שטר של עשרה ש"ח. אמנם אחרי זמן מה כבר גבר הפחד, והיהודים היו הססניים למדי לגבי התקרבות לדיפלומטים הישראלים. ב-5 בדצמבר הגיעה לביקור בארץ ישראל, בה הודיע לה בן-גוריון כי היא תמונה לחברה בממשלת ישראל הראשונה לאחר הבחירות לאספה המכוננת בינואר 1949. בשל כהונתה ארוכת השנים בוועד הפועל ובניסיונה בעיסוק בנושאים הקשורים ליחסי העבודה ביישוב, מונתה לשרת העבודה והביטוח העממי, תיק שיועד בכלל למפ"ם. ב-1949 חזרה לישראל כדי לכהן כשרת העבודה, לאחר שנבחרה לכנסת הראשונה מטעם מפא"י. סגנה מרדכי נמיר החליף אותה. למרות ההחלטה למנותה לשרת העבודה והביטוח העממי, המשיך שרת לנסות להשאירה במוסקבה, אך לשווא. מלבד שרת גם חברי הממשלה הדתיים התנגדו לכך שתמונה לשרה. אולם ב-8 במרץ 1949 הושבעה לתפקיד ויומיים אחר כך החלה את כהונתה. ב-7 בינואר 1951 שונה שם המשרד ל"משרד העבודה". אחד מתפקידיהם של גולדה ומשרדה היה קליטת העולים החדשים, אך גם לדאוג להם או למצוא להם תעסוקה. אולם במקביל נתבקשה לצאת בדחיפות לארצות הברית על ידי ראשי המגבית היהודית המאוחדת והנהלת הסוכנות היהודית. בן-גוריון דחה את הבקשה וטען כי "לא ייתכן הדבר עכשיו". ב-24 במאי 1949 הציגה תוכנית לפיה יבנו למעלה מ-30 אלף יחידות דיור ברחבי מדינת ישראל, למען חיסול מחנות האוהלים. מכיוון שלממשלה לא היו את התקציבים הדרושים לכך, יצאה לניו יורק בתחילת יוני, בהסכמתו של בן-גוריון. היא לא הצליחה להגיע ליעד והשיגה רק כחמישית ממנו. ב-17 במאי 1951 הגישה תוכנית דומה אך שונה מעט בפני הממשלה. על אף שקצב בניית הדירות היה איטי תחילה הוא גדל אט אט והגיע לשיא בשנים 1954–1956. באותו החודש חנכה, יחד עם בן-גוריון, את מפעל הבונדס בארצות הברית, ועד סוף אותה שנה הצליחו פעיליו לגייס כ-140 מיליון דולר. ב-7 בנובמבר 1949 אמרה כי היא שואפת לקיים "חקיקה סוציאלית נרחבת" ש"הצעת חוק לביטוח עממי" במרכזה. חזונה התממש רק כעבור כמה שנים, וב-1953 נתקבל בכנסת "חוק הביטוח הלאומי", ונחשב להצלחה גדולה שנחלה. לטענת יוסי גולדשטיין חיזקו ניסיוניתיה העקשניים לפתור את מצוקת העולים את כוחה הפוליטי, כמו גם החקיקה הנרחבת בנושאים סוציאליים. כמו כן התחזק עם הזמן מעמדה המפלגתי במפא"י. מאיר תמכה בהכרזת ירושלים כבירת ישראל ולאחר ההכרזה עברה לגור בדירת גג בשכונת טלביה. היא טענה כי הדירה הפכה אותה ל"ירושלמית בנפשה". במהלך סיורה בארצות הברית ביוני 1949 ביקשה מאגף השיכון להקים כ-50,000 יחידות דיור זמניות. בראשית 1950 הוחלט על הקמת המעברות, שבנייתן החלה עוד בשנה הקודמת. כמרבית המנהיגים באותה התקופה, הייתה מודעת לתנאים הקשים ששררו במעברות, וביקשה לחסלן משום שהן אינן מספקות את צורכי העולים. המעברה הראשונה הוקמה בהרי ירושלים ב-23 במאי 1950, ובשלהי 1951 הן אכלסו כ-256 אלף איש. בנובמבר 1950 מונתה ל"מרכזת הפעולות של משרדי הממשלה במעברות", לאחר שמשרדים נוספים (דוגמת משרד הביטחון) החלו להתערות בפעילותן. מאיר תמכה בהסכם השילומים, אם כי עשתה זאת בלב כבד. על ההסכם אמרה בין היתר כי "זה חובה המגיע לנו ומצבנו הוא כזה שלא רק שאנו לא צריכים לוותר על זאת [על השילומים] כי אם חטא יהיה לוותר על זאת." בסתיו 1951 החלה הנהגת סלקציה במחנות העולים ונקבעו סדרי עדיפויות לעלייה. בין היתר נקבע כי העולים יעברו בדיקות רפואיות על ידי רופאים ישראלים עוד בארץ מוצאם וכי תוגבל עליית חולים (למעט "עליות הצלה"). הסלקציה הייתה גורם חשוב בהפחתת מספר העולים באופן דרסטי יחסית, ובנוסף סייע גם לקליטת עולים בצורה טובה יותר ולשיפור חיי תושבי המעברות. אולם מנגד היא זכתה ללא מעט ביקורת ונטען כלפי יוזמי הסלקציה (ובהם מאיר) כי פעלו מאינטרסים של אפליה עדתית, שכן בתקופה שבה נקבעה הסלקציה היו אמורים לעלות בעיקר יהודים מארצות האסלאם. כאמור הייתה תומכת נלהבת וידידה קרובה של בן-גוריון, אולם לא אחת התגלעו ביניהם מחלוקות וחילוקי דעות, שברובן התיישרה עם מעשיו, אך מדי פעם הצליחה להטות את הכף לטובתה. טרם הקמת ממשלת ישראל השנייה רצה לצרף את מפלגת "הציונים הכלליים". מאיר התנגדה בתוקף לרעיון, ולבסוף קמה ממשלה צרה עם המפלגות הדתיות וללא "הציונים הכלליים". ב-1952 חוסלו רק 16 מעברות. מטרתה הייתה לחסל את כולן עד שלהי 1955, אולם היא לא השלימה את משימתה וביום סיום תפקידה התגוררו במעברות כ-55 אלף איש. המעברות חוסלו רק בתחילת שנות השישים. על אף שתמכה בחיסולן מלכתחילה, טענה לימים שהמעברות תרמו רבות לקליטת כ-686 אלף עולים בין 1948 לסוף 1951. במקביל היא סבלה מבעיות בריאותיות בתחילת כהונתה כשרה. היא חלתה רבות ונטתה ליפול ובשל כך נזקקה לעבור אשפוזים וניתוחים. היא אף ביקשה להתפטר מתפקידה בשל כך אולם סורבה על ידי בן-גוריון, על אף שידע בעצמו על מצבה. במקביל לכך עברה בתה שרה הפלה, חלתה גם היא ונשקפה סכנה לחייה, מה שגרם לה לחרדה עזה. גם פטירת ידידה דוד רמז, פרודה מוריס ואימה בלומה העיקו עליה מבחינה נפשית. נוספו לכך ענייני ילדיה, מנחם, שהתגרש ושרה שעברה לידה שקטה. היא גם סבלה מתת-לחץ דם ומבצקות בריאות, ובמקביל גם עישנה 60 סיגריות ביום ושתתה הרבה קפה טורקי. לאחר שבן-גוריון התפטר מראשות הממשלה וממשרד הביטחון סירבה להיות מועמדת להחליפו, אם כי לא שללה אפשרות זו כלל. גם לוי אשכול סירב לכך, ולבסוף נבחר משה שרת ליורשו. בין השניים שררה מתיחות, בין היתר בגלל ששרת כמעט ולא העריכה כלל. אולם יממה לפני הקמת הממשלה, ב-25 בינואר 1954, בירכה את שרת על מינויו לתפקיד וטענה כי הוא "הגיע למה שמגיע לו". בתקופה זו הייתה חברה, יחד עם שרת, פנחס לבון, אשכול וזלמן ארן ב"ועדת השרים המיוחדת לענייני ביטחון ומדיניות חוץ" (ועדת החמישה). שבע שנים הייתה מאיר שרת העבודה – חמש שנים בממשלתו של דוד בן-גוריון ועוד שנתיים כאשר היה משה שרת ראש הממשלה. בתקופה זו שימשה זמן מה, בין השנים 1955–1956, יו"ר מועצת המנהלים של חברת עמידר. בתקופת כהונתה הונחה התשתית למשפט העבודה הישראלי, ונחקקו דיני העבודה הראשונים: ב-31 בדצמבר 1954 חנכה מאיר את המרכז הראשון להכשרה מקצועית במדינת ישראל, בבאר שבע, אשר התפתח למכללה הטכנולוגית ללימודי הנדסאים. ב-1955 הציבה אותה מפא"י כמועמדת מטעמה לראשות עיריית תל אביב-יפו מול מועמד הציונים הכלליים, חיים לבנון. באותה עת לא היו נהוגות בחירות ישירות, וחברי מועצת העיר הם שבחרו בראש העירייה. מאיר נהנתה מתמיכתן של סיעות השמאל, ואילו סיעות הימין תמכו בלבנון. מפא"י אכן ניצחה בבחירות עם 30.6% מהקולות, ומאיר ציפתה כי חברי הסיעות הדתיות יתמכו במועמדותה, אך חלקם הביעו את התנגדותם לכך שאישה תכהן כראש העירייה וחלקם התנו את תמיכתם בכך שתופסק התחבורה הציבורית בשבת בחיפה. את ההתנגדות חיזק רב קהילת צ'רנוביץ בעיר, הרב שמואל מאיר הולנדר, ששלח ללבנון מכתב בו פירט את הסיבות הדתיות כנגד בחירת אישה לתפקיד. בסיבוב ההצבעה הראשון במועצת העיר קיבלה מאיר 13 קולות, לעומת שמונה ללבנון וחמישה לנציג תנועת החרות משה איכילוב, אלא שהחוק דרש אז רוב מוחלט, כלומר 16 קולות, שהושג רק בסיבוב ההצבעה הרביעי, בו נבחר לבנון עם 16 קולות הציונים הכללים, חרות והדתיים כנגד 14 קולות מפלגות השמאל. מאיר הגיבה על התוצאות באומרה כי "בארץ זו של חנה סנש מעזים בשנת 1955 להעלות מחדש את הארגומנטציה החשובה הזו – שאין זכות שווה לאישה במדינת ישראל". כחברת ממשלה תמכה מאירסון בפעולות התגמול וצידדה בעמדתו הנִצית של בן-גוריון. משחזר בן-גוריון ב-1955 לראשות הממשלה הלכו והחריפו עימותיו עם שׁרת, שר החוץ שלו. בן-גוריון הציע למאיר להחליף אותו במשרד החוץ. היא נענתה להצעה, במחיר עוינות מצד שׁרת, שראה אותה כמי שהייתה שותפה להדחתו, על אף שהכחישה זאת. לאחר כניסתה לתפקיד עברה לגור בדירת שרד, מה שהקשה עליה להסתגל למעמדה החדש. כשנכנסה לתפקידה עברתה את שם משפחתה מ"מאירסון" ל"מאיר", בהוראתו של בן-גוריון. מזכיר ההסתדרות מרדכי נמיר מונה במקומה לשר העבודה. היא תמכה במדיניותו התוקפנית של בן-גוריון כלפי שכנותיה של מדינת ישראל וכן המשיכה לתמוך בביצוע פעולות תגמול רחבות יותר כנגד ירדן, בניגוד לקודמה בתפקיד, שרת, שהתנגד לפעולות אלה. לאחר הלאמת תעלת סואץ ב-24 ביולי 1956 וסגירתה לאוניות ישראליות, טענה כי מצרים ביצעה הפרה של החוק הבין-לאומי ועל כן יש לישראל עילה למלחמה נגדה. בשלהי ספטמבר עמדה בראש משלחת לפריז שנועדה לקדם שיתוף פעולה צבאי ואסטרטגי עם צרפת. לאחר ששבה לארץ טענה כי הסיכויים שצרפת תחבור לישראל במלחמה נגד מצרים הם מופרזים מדי, אולם לבסוף הסכימה צרפת לכך. כעבור זמן קצר הגיעו שמועות לפיהן גם בריטניה תצטרף לכך, וב-16 באוקטובר סוכם הדבר על ידי ראשי שלוש המדינות. היא הייתה חברה בקבינט המלחמתי שהחליט על יציאתו של בן-גוריון לפגישה בפריז, בה סוכמו פרטי המבצע, על גיוס מילואים ועל היציאה למבצע. המבצע החל ב-29 באוקטובר. כבר במהלכו טענה כי הושגו מטרותיו, אולם יממה לאחר סיומו יצאה עם שמעון פרס לפריז כדי להיפגש עם שר החוץ הצרפתי כריסטיאן פינו וראש ממשלת צרפת מוריס בורז'ס-מונורי. בפגישה המליצו הצרפתים לסגת מהשטחים שנכבשו במהלך המבצע, ואכן כך היה. שגריר ישראל בצרפת יעקב צור אמר כי מאיר יצאה "מיואשת" מהפגישות. לאחר סיום המבצע קיבל האו"ם החלטה לפיה חייב צה"ל לסגת מהשטחים. מאיר לא ייחסה לכך חשיבות רבה משום שההחלטה לא כללה הטלת סנקציות על ישראל, שהיו יכולות להיגרם בעקבות קבלת החלטה נגד ישראל במועצת הביטחון. אף על פי כן היא זכתה לאהדה בקרב הציבור בארצות הברית. ב-5 בדצמבר נאמה בעצרת הכללית של האו"ם וזכתה לסיקור חיובי רב בעיתונים בארצות הברית. אולם בדיעבד הבינה כי הם הצטרפו לדרישה הסובייטית לסגת מהשטחים. לבסוף שוכנעה ההנהגה הישראלית כי יש לסגת מהשטחים בתנאי שהאו"ם ישלוט ברצועת עזה. בן-גוריון ביקש ממנה להודיע על הסכמתה של ישראל בעצרת האו"ם, על אף שלא הייתה שלמה עם כך. ב-1 במרץ מסרה את ההודעה באו"ם וכעבור שבוע הושלמה הנסיגה. ביולי 1957 נסעה לפריז כדי לברר אם יש אפשרות לישראל לרכוש צוללות מגרמניה. על אף שדיווחה לבן-גוריון כי הדבר לא אפשרי כרגע, ניהל שמעון פרס מגעים סודיים עם הגרמנים שהובילו לחתימה על עסקה, ללא ידיעתה. הדבר נחשף רק בסוף השנה, גרם להתפטרותו של בן-גוריון ולהקמת ממשלה חדשה. מאיר התנגדה לזכות השיבה עקב תוקפנות הערבים במלחמת העצמאות. היא הבדילה בין יהודים-ערבים לפלסטינים וקבעה כי שניהם לא יוחזרו לבתיהם. אולם כאשר הפציר בה ראש ממשלת איטליה אמינטורה פאנפאני (אנ') לקלוט פליטים מארצות ערב כדי לקדם את השלום, אמרה כי ישראל מוכנה לסייע בשיקומם בארצות מוצאם אך רק "אם תתקבל עזרה כספית בין-לאומית" או שרק כמה אלפים מהם ייקלטו. היא ראתה בברית המועצות בהנהגת חרושצ'וב כמדינה עוינת הרוצה לסייע למדינות ערב, העוינות גם הן, למרות נטייתן לשלום. אולם מאחר רצונה של ישראל להעלות אליה את יהודי ברית המועצות, השתדלה שלא להקצין את היחסים הדיפלומטיים איתן. ב-29 באוקטובר 1957, בדיוק שנה לאחר פרוץ מלחמת סיני, הושלך רימון יד בכנסת. מאיר נפצעה יחד עם בן-גוריון ועוד מספר שרים. עובדת היותה פצועה לא הפתיעה רבים, משום שלא הייתה בקו הבריאות. ב-31 בדצמבר 1957 התפטר בן-גוריון על רקע הדלפות מישיבות הממשלה והפרות של המשמעת הקואליציונית. הממשלה השמינית, שכוננה שבעה ימים מאוחר יותר, התבססה על הרכב קואליציוני זהה ומאיר המשיכה בכהונתה כשרת החוץ, על אף שאיימה לא להצטרף לממשלה על רקע צירופם לממשלה של פרס, אבא אבן ומשה דיין (שהשתייכו לקבוצת "הצעירים" במפא"י), אולם חזרה בה מאוחר יותר לאחר לחצו של בן-גוריון. הוא לא מינה את אבן לשר בלי תיק האחראי על ענייני חוץ כפי שהובטח לו, לבקשת מאיר, ובכך הסכימה להישאר בתפקידה. לאחר הבחירות לכנסת הרביעית שוב איימה להתפטר, לאחר שבן-גוריון לא קיבל את מסקנות "ועדת השבעה" בעניין העסק הביש. בן-גוריון חש כי היא באמת מתכוונת לכך והציע לה לכהן כיושבת ראש הכנסת, אולם היא חזרה בה. עם לכידת אדולף אייכמן במאי 1960 וזעמה של ארגנטינה על ישראל, טענה מאיר שייתכן וישראל אכן עברה על החוק הארגנטינאי, אך הדבר לא משתווה לפשעיו של אייכמן. ב-23 ביוני גינתה מועצת הביטחון את ישראל, אך לא הטילה עליה סנקציות, והסכסוך עם ארגנטינה הסתיים בהתנצלותה של מאיר. מאיר פעלה למען רכישת נשק אמריקאי לאחר שארצות הברית הפסיקה את הסיוע הכלכלי לישראל לאחר מבצע קדש. לאחר בחירתו של ג'ון קנדי לנשיאות ארצות הברית הוא הסכים לספק לישראל טילי MIM-23 הוק, לאחר שמזכיר המדינה כריסטיאן הרטר אמר למאיר כי ניתן יהיה לעשות זאת, אך דבריו מומשו חלקית. היא ועוד מספר בכירים בצה"ל העדיפו נשק אמריקאי על פני צרפתי. לעומת זאת, התנגדו לכך שמעון פרס, שקודם לסגן שר הביטחון, ועוד כמה בכירים אחרים בצה"ל. הקמת הכור בדימונה הייתה סיבה להעמקת תלותה המדינית של ישראל בצרפת, משום שהיא סייעה בהקמתו. שלושה הסכמים הקשורים לתחום הגרעין נחתמו בין ישראל לצרפת באותה התקופה. גם הפעם העדיפה מאיר את האמריקאים ולא את הצרפתים. על אף ששמעון פרס היה גורם מרכזי בעניין, היא הסכימה איתו בסוגיה ספציפית זו, ולכן כשנתבקשה לנסוע לצרפת כדי לחתום על הסכם בספטמבר 1957, שכלל הסכמה על שיתוף פעולה גרעיני בין ישראל לצרפת, עשתה זאת ללא לבטים. שליחותה נכשלה וכעבור שנתיים הודיעה צרפת כי היא חוזרת בה מההסכמות עם ישראל בנושא הגרעין. אולם ב-29 בדצמבר 1960 נחתם הסכם לפיו תתמשך ההתפתחות הגרעינית של ישראל. אך למרות הכל עדיין חשבה שהתלות המדינית של ישראל צריכה להיות בידי ארצות הברית. בן-גוריון, פרס והממונה על שירותי הביטחון איסר הראל התנגדו לכך בתוקף. לאחר זמן לא רב דרש נשיא ארצות הברית קנדי ששני משקיפים ממדינתו יבחנו את הכור. מאיר הפעילה לחץ על בן-גוריון שיאפשר זאת, על אף התנגדותו הצפויה של פרס, ולבסוף אישר זאת. המשקיפים שביקרו בכור ראו כי אין בו פעילות ועל כן לא ניתן לקבוע שישראל מתכננת לפתח נשק גרעיני. בפגישתו עם בן-גוריון במאי 1961 אמר קנדי כי הדבר מרצה אותו. מאיר עשתה מאמץ גדול להבקיע את חומת המצור המדיני באמצעות התחברות למדינות העולם השלישי, בעיקר על ידי טיפוח יחסי אפריקה–ישראל. היא תרמה להבאת אלפי אפריקאים לישראל על מנת שירכשו השכלה ויקבלו הדרכה חקלאית, ומומחים ישראלים רבים יצאו לסייע בכלכלה במדינות באפריקה. בדיעבד, התבררה ההשקעה הגדולה באפריקה כתמימה, שכן מדינות היבשת השחורה נטשו את ישראל בשעתה הקשה ביותר, בזמן מלחמת יום הכיפורים; בזו אחר זו הן הודיעו על ניתוק הקשרים עִמה. מאיר הוסיפה להצדיק את המאמצים באפריקה גם אז כהגשמת חובה יהודית מוסרית של סיוע למדוכאים ומימוש דברי הרצל: "כשאראה בגאולת בני עמי היהודים, ארצה להושיט יד גם לגאולת האפריקאים". היא גם פעלה לשיפור היחסים עם איראן, עם טורקיה ועם אתיופיה, ודיון שנערך בביתה ב-21 ביולי 1958 נחשב לאבן דרך מהותית בכינון "ברית הפריפריה". ב-1960, בשיאה של פרשת לבון, תוצאת העסק הביש, יצא בן-גוריון בחריפות כנגד פנחס לבון וטען שחייבים לברר את מידת אחריותו לפרשת הריגול והחבלה במצרים, שגולדה ויתר השרים הבכירים כלל לא ידעו עליה. קודם לכן טענה שלבון הוא האחראי לפעולה ושעליו להתפטר. אולם כעת, משוועדת שרים זיכתה את לבון, התנגדה להדחתו. בן-גוריון התפטר וקרא לחקירה משפטית בעניין. הוא החל במאבק נזעם נגד הנהגת מפא"י והאשימהּ בשחיתות, ומאיר הייתה לאחת מגדולי יריביו. בישיבת מזכירות מפא"י אמרה כי "גם האדם הנערך ביותר עלול לשגות" וגרמה לזעזוע רב בקרב חברי המזכירות. ב-1 בפברואר 1961 התכנסו ראשי מפא"י בבית מלון בהרצליה, יממה לאחר שבן-גוריון הגיש מכתב התפטרות. בן-גוריון טען כי מאיר וזלמן ארן "הורסים את מפא"י". בתגובה פרצה מאיר בבכי. הדבר היווה נקודת שפל ביחסים בין השניים. באוגוסט 1961 התפזרה הכנסת הרביעית והבחירות לכנסת החמישית הוקדמו. מאיר חששה מכך היות שידעה שלאחר הבחירות יהיה לבן-גוריון רוב בממשלה והוא יקים ועדת חקירה משפטית בעניין "הפרשה", כפי שרצה. מאיר האשימה את ממשלת גרמניה המערבית באחריות לפעילות המדענים הגרמנים במצרים, וב-20 במרץ 1963 נתקבלה בממשלה ובכנסת החלטה שהציעה הדורשת מגרמניה להפסיק את פעילות המדענים. בן-גוריון תקף אותה על כך והדבר יצר משבר שהוביל להתפטרותו של הממונה על שירותי הביטחון איסר הראל ארבעה ימים לאחר מכן. כעבור כחודש, ב-19 באפריל אושפזה במשך שלושה שבועות. בעיתונות נטען כי הסיבה לכך היא המצב הפוליטי המתוח בארץ, אולם הרופאים קבעו שהסיבה היא אורח חייה הלא מסודר. ב-15 ביוני ביקשה מבן-גוריון לצנזר ידיעה שהגיעה מסוכנות הידיעות הגרמנית, שלא הייתה קשורה למדענים במצרים. בן-גוריון סירב וטען שעיקר הידיעה הוא חיובי. היא פנתה לאשכול ולמנכ"ל משרד ראש הממשלה טדי קולק שיתערבו בעניין ואיימה להתפטר אם דעתו של בן-גוריון לא תשתנה. למחרת הודיע בן-גוריון על התפטרותו מראשות הממשלה וממשרד הביטחון. הוא טען שמאיר רצתה בחיסולו הפוליטי ושפרשת המדענים במצרים היא אחת מהסיבות להתפטרותו, אולם כעבור כשש שנים הסביר למאיר שהסיבה האמיתית הייתה רצונו לפנות לכתיבת ההיסטוריה של מדינת ישראל. ב-10 במרץ 1965 נחתם מזכר הבנות בין ישראל לארצות הברית, שבמסגרתו הבטיחה האחרונה את "דאגתה לשמירה על ביטחון ישראל" בעוד ש"ישראל לא תהיה הראשונה שתכניס נשק גרעיני לאזור המזרח התיכון". מאיר ואשכול היו מרוצים ממזכר הבנות זה היות שהוא עיגן רשמית את "האוריינטציה החדשה ביחסי החוץ של ישראל". כלומר, ישראל המשיכה לשמור על עמימותה הגרעינית וארצות הברית המשיכה לספק לה נשק. במכתב ששלח בן-גוריון למאיר הביע התנגדות למזכר ההבנות שחתם אשכול עם ארצות הברית ושהוא מזיק לביטחון ישראל. ייתכן שבן-גוריון התכוון בדבריו למדיניות העמימות הגרעינית שנקבעה במזכר. לאחר הקמת רפ"י ביולי אותה שנה העריך בן-גוריון שהמזכר יעכב את פיתוח הפצצה, היות שנקבע בו כי לפקחים אמריקאים תינתן כניסה אליו. מאחר שהצנזורה הורתה לא לפרט על פרטי המזכר, הופצו מספר שמועות בנושא שפגעו קשות באשכול ומאיר, אך גם בהנהגת המדינה. קודם לכן, ב-1964 נעתר קנצלר גרמניה המערבית לודוויג ארהארד לספק נשק כבד לישראל, לבקשת ארצות הברית, על אף החשש הכבד שהיה שהדבר ייחשף וארצות ערב יכירו בגרמניה המזרחית. הדבר נתגלה בראשית 1965, ארהארד הפסיק את אספקת הטנקים לישראל אך הסכים לפצותה על כך. מאיר סירבה לכך, בתמיכת אשכול. אולם לאחר ביקורו של מנהיג גרמניה המזרחית ולטר אולבריכט במצרים, הודיע ארהארד על ניתוק היחסים עם מצרים וכינון יחסים דיפלומטיים עם ישראל. ב-14 במרץ 1965 החליטה ממשלת ישראל על כינון היחסים. בוועידת מפא"י העשירית, שהתנהלה ב-17 בפברואר 1965 ובמסגרתה התקבלה ההחלטה על הקמת המערך, דרשו שוב בן-גוריון וחבריו להקים ועדת חקירה משפטית לעסק הביש. מאיר התנגדה לכך כצפוי ואיימה להתפטר אם הנושא יידון שוב בוועידה. אך לבסוף היא חזרה בה והנושא נידון במהלך הוועידה. באותה הוועידה נשאה נאום ביקורתי חריף נגד בן-גוריון, לאחר שאשכול ומשה שרת מתחו ביקורת גם הם על בן-גוריון בנאומיהם. בנאומה אמרה מאיר לבן-גוריון: "דבריך אינם תואמים את האמת [...] למה לא אמרת לנו [כאשר התפטרת] שאתה עתיד לדרוש חקירת הפרשה? [...] אני חושבת שלו ידעתי מה צפוי לנו, לא היינו הולכים לממשלה אחרי התפטרותך". הוועידה כונתה "ליל הסכינים הארוכות". לפי יוסי גולדשטיין הפכה מאיר לאחר "ליל הסכינים הארוכות" למתנגדת הפוליטית הגדולה ביותר של בן-גוריון. לימים אפילו החרימה את מסיבת יום הולדתו ה-80 ב-1966, התנהגות שהעליבה אותו קשות. רק בשנותיו האחרונות של בן-גוריון התרחש מעין פיוס בין השניים. ב-1966 החליף אותה אבא אבן בתפקיד שר החוץ. עייפות ובריאות רופפת אילצו אותה לפרוש מהממשלה, אך לא מהכנסת. קודם לכן נתגלה שחלתה בלימפומה, אולם היא הוסתרה מעיני הציבור, ולא מנעה ממנה לתפקד היטב בשנים לאחר מכן. את הטיפולים הכימותרפיים קיבלה בחשאי. אבן, שניסה להפגין התנתקות ממאיר, אמר כי הוא ממלא את תפקידו בצורה טובה יותר מקודמתו, והתגאה בכך שפיטר כמה בעלי תפקידים במשרדו שהיו מקורבים אליה. מאיר זעמה על כך אך לא ייחסה לכך חשיבות רבה. לאחר הבחירות לכנסת השישית הודיע ראובן ברקת על פרישתו מתפקיד מזכ"ל מפא"י וכי הוא יסיים את תפקידו ב-20 בינואר 1966. מלכתחילה רצו להחליפו במאיר, אולם היא סירבה בתחילה, אך לאחר שכנועים רבים הסכימה. ב-3 בפברואר נבחרה לתפקיד פה אחד. היא נכנסה לתפקיד בתקופה שבה נעשה מאמץ לאחדה עם רפ"י ועם אחדות העבודה - פועלי ציון, מאמץ שהתגשם ב-1968 עם הקמת מפלגת העבודה. בתקופת ההמתנה שקדמה למלחמת ששת הימים נתבקשה לצאת לארצות הברית ולאירופה, על מנת לקבל ערבויות לחידוש חופש השיט בים האדום. בפועל היה זה תפקידו של שר החוץ אבן, אולם אשכול חשש כי שליחותו תתקבל בחוסר אמון בקרב הישראלים, בשל מתינותו המדינית. משגילה על כך איים להתפטר אם מאיר תצא לשליחות זו, ואשכול נאלץ לחזור בו. מאיר התנגדה בתוקף להקמת ממשלת אחדות לאומית, אך בה בעת להדחתו של אשכול מתפקיד שר הביטחון, שכן היה ברור שרק מינויו של משה דיין מרפ"י לתפקיד ימנע זאת. ב-29 במאי 1967 ניהלה משא ומתן עם נציגי גח"ל בראשות מנחם בגין. הם הגיעו להסכמה פרט למינוי דיין, שהיה הכרחי כדי שתצטרף לממשלה. כעבור יממה אושר המינוי בוועידת מפא"י, בניגוד לדעתה שלה ושל אחרים, והוקמה ממשלת אחדות לאומית עם גח"ל ורפ"י. ב-21 בינואר 1968, לאחר הקמת המפלגה המאוחדת, המשיכה בכהונתה כמזכ"לית, אך בראשית יולי אותה שנה הודיעה על פרישתה מהתפקיד, וההתפטרות נכנסה לתוקפה ב-1 באוגוסט. אולם מאיר עתידה הייתה לחזור במהרה ובאופן מפתיע למרכז הבימה הפוליטית. עם מותו של לוי אשכול בפברואר 1969 הועדפה מאיר על פני מועמדים כיגאל אלון, ראש הממשלה בפועל בימים שאחרי פטירת אשכול, כמשה דיין, שעימות בינו לבין אלון נחשב למסוכן למפלגה, וכפנחס ספיר, שהסיכוי שלו לזכות בתפקיד היה טוב יותר, אך הוא העדיף לוותר עליו. מאיר, שהסקרים שיקפו לה אפס אחוזי פופולריות בקרב הציבור טרם נבחרה, נחשבה למועמדת של פשרה כשמונתה על ידי מרכז מפלגת העבודה ברוב של 287 חברים, 45 נמנעים וללא מתנגדים לראשות הממשלה מטעמה. אנשי רפ"י בהובלת פרס היו היחידים במערך שהביעו התנגדות למינויה, אך הם היו מיעוט. מאיר החלה את כהונתה בתפקיד ראש ממשלת ישראל ב-17 במרץ 1969, והייתה ראש ממשלה במשך חמש שנים. ממשלת ישראל ה-14 שהקימה הייתה בהרכב זהה לממשלת אשכול. מאיר הייתה האישה הראשונה והיחידה בישראל שמילאה תפקיד זה, והשלישית בעולם שכיהנה כראש ממשלה. למרות זאת מעולם לא רחשה אהדה לתנועה הפמיניסטית, והיו שהאשימו אותה שאף פגעה בקידום נשים בסביבתה. רק החרדים הביעו במפורש התנגדותם למינויה על רקע מגדרי. יצחק מאיר לוין, נציג אגודת ישראל, אמר בכנסת: בבחירות לכנסת השביעית, בשנת 1969, זכה המערך (השני) ב-56 מנדטים, ההישג הטוב ביותר של רשימה כלשהי בבחירות בישראל. מצד שני, המפלגות שהרכיבו את המערך מנו 63 מנדטים בכנסת הקודמת (אם כי בן-גוריון לא הצטרף למערך, והתמודד ברשימה הממלכתית, שזכתה בארבעה מנדטים). גולדה מאיר בחרה להרכיב את ממשלת ישראל ה-15 כהמשך של ממשלת הליכוד הלאומי הקיימת מאז יוני 1967, וצירפה לממשלתה את גח"ל וראשה מנחם בגין כשר בלי תיק. ב-11 בדצמבר הודיעה לנשיא זלמן שזר כי עלה בידה להקים ממשלה, וב-15 בדצמבר היא החלה את כהונתה. בתקופתה החלה העלייה מברית המועצות לצבור תאוצה. היא הייתה תומכת נלהבת של העלייה ואמרה למספר עיתונאים שניתן יהיה לקלוט אף מיליוני עולים. היא גם דאגה להפיץ את דבר מבצע חתונה ושפיטת מבצעיו לגזר דין מוות (גזר דין שבהמשך הומתק). הדבר עורר סערה בין-לאומית. הלחץ הבין-לאומי על הקרמלין הביא להמתקת גזרי הדין ופתח את מסך הברזל לכ-300,000 אזרחי ברית המועצות בשנות ה-70, מתוכם 245,951 יהודים, אשר מביניהם עלו לישראל 163,000 יהודים. זאת לעומת שנות ה-60, שבהן רק כ-3,000 יהודים קיבלו אישורי יציאה. בזירה החברתית היו שטענו שכהונתה של גולדה מאיר התאפיינה בשמרנות ובחוסר שימת לב לשכבות המצוקה. בעקבות פגישתה עם אנשי תנועת הפנתרים השחורים מיוחסת לה האמירה: "הם אינם בחורים נחמדים" (13 באפריל 1971). מאיר טענה כי דבריה הוצאו מהקשרם, וכי התייחסה להתפרעויות מצד חלק מפעילי התנועה שהשליכו בקבוקי תבערה על שוטרים. בפועל, הפגישה הסתיימה בטוב משני הצדדים ואחד ממשתתפיה אף אמר לה: "גברת גולדה היקרה, את אמא של כולנו". היא עצמה העלתה על נס פרויקטים שקידמה לרווחת תושבי עיירות הפיתוח ושכונות המצוקה. בעקבות המחאה הקימה ממשלתה של מאיר ב-1970 ועדה לילדים ונוער במצוקה והשתתפה בכל ישיבותיה. אולם לא אחת נטען כי כישלונותיה של מאיר היו בעיקר בתחום הפנים בשל העובדה שהעניקה משקל נגד למדיניות החוץ. בהקשר הפלסטיני זכורות, בין היתר, אמירותיה "כשאני עליתי ארצה, לא היה דבר כזה עם פלסטיני" ו"לעולם לא אסלח לערבים על שלימדו אותנו להרוג את בניהם". בשונה מקודמה לוי אשכול, גולדה התנגדה לנסיגה מחבלי הארץ ששוחררו במלחמת ששת הימים, ואף תמכה בהתיישבות יהודית בהם כבר ב-1967. בריאיון עיתונאי אמרה כי: "כל השולחן (הכוונה לחברי ממשלתה), כולל מפ"ם, אומר: רמת הגולן זה טאבו. עזה נשארת בידינו לפי רוב מכריע, וגם שארם א-שייח'. ישנם דברים, שבהם לא נחוצה החלטה. ההחלטה היסודית היא, שגבול שנת 1967 אינו קיים עוד. הוא מת". ממשלתה פעלה במתווה תוכנית אלון ומסמך גלילי להתיישבות יהודית בבקעת הירדן, שלתפיסתה, היא והרכסים בעורפה יהיו גבול השלום המזרחי של מדינת ישראל, ברמת הגולן ובפתחת רפיח. בדיוני ממשלתה אודות התיישבות יהודית בחבל עזה הייתה תמימות דעים כי "הפרחת האזור תאפשר לשנות את השיח עם הערבים שיתפקחו מהאשליה שאנו עתידים לצאת משם, וכך יהיו פחות פיגועים". בתקופתה קמו חבל ימית והעיר ימית, היאחזות הנח"ל כפר דרום בחבל עזה, והתאפשרה התנחלות של יהודים באזור חברון ובקריית ארבע. בראשית כהונתה כראש הממשלה התחבטה בשאלה האם יש להרחיב את מלחמת ההתשה, שפרצה כמה ימים לאחר מלחמת ששת הימים, לעומק שטח מצרים. זאת עקב איומה של ברית המועצות, שאם ישראל תפלוש לעבר השני של תעלת סואץ היא תיתקל ביועצים סובייטים שפעלו עבור צבא מצרים. שגריר ישראל בארצות הברית יצחק רבין טען כי יש להתייצב נגד האיום. אך למרות זאת היא חששה מהאיום ולא קיבלה את עצותיו של רבין, בתמיכת שר הביטחון דיין. במקביל ניסו דוברי הממשל האמריקאי לשכנע את ישראל לחתום על האמנה למניעת הפצת נשק גרעיני, מחשש שנמצא נשק גרעיני בידי צה"ל. מאיר סירבה לכך בתוקף. חודשיים לפני כניסתה לתפקיד הושבע ריצ'רד ניקסון לנשיא ארצות הברית. מאיר חשבה שינקוט קו פרו-ישראלי לעומת קודמו, אולם ניקסון הציע הסכם שלום שמאיר חשבה שיזיק לישראל היות שכלל נסיגה לגבולות הקו הירוק. ב-26 בספטמבר 1969 יצאה לארצות הברית ונפגשה עם ניקסון ואנשי ממשל אמריקאים בכירים. במפגש, שהיה אמור להתקיים קודם לכן ונדחה בסמוך ליום הבחירות לכנסת השישית, הנושאים החשובים לדיון היו הסכמים עם מדינות ערב וכן רשימה של ציוד צבאי שהוגשה לנשיא ונענתה. הביקור נמשך 10 ימים. בתקופת כהונתה כראש הממשלה נעשו ניסיונות להגיע לפתרון מדיני של הסכסוך בין ישראל למצרים. מזכיר המדינה של ארצות הברית ויליאם רוג'רס ערך מסעות דילוגים בניסיון לגבש פשרה בקוורטט בינלאומי: אמריקני, בריטי, צרפתי ורוסי. לדעת מאיר, הוא התייחס בתמימות רבה מדי להצהרות הערבים על רצונם בשלום: "כמו ג'נטלמנים רבים, הוא הניח בטעות שכל העולם כולו מורכב מג'נטלמנים כמוהו". למרות המאמצים הדיפלומטיים, יחסי ישראל–מצרים נותרו עוינים, והשתפרו רק לאחר מלחמת יום הכיפורים וסיום כהונתה. ב-9 בדצמבר 1969 פרסם רוג'רס את תוכניתו, שהתבססה על הסכמה אליה הגיעו נציגים אמריקנים וסובייטים בשיחות ביניהם. התוכנית, שהתייחסה במיוחד לסכסוך שבין ישראל ומצרים כללה את נסיגתה של ישראל מן השטחים שנכבשו במלחמת ששת הימים, וזאת במסגרת משא ומתן על הסדרי שלום, שיושג בתיווכו של שליח האו"ם גונאר יארינג, ועל בסיס האמור בהחלטה 242 של מועצת הביטחון. על פי התוכנית יובטח חופש השיט בתעלת סואץ, על מעמדן של שארם א שייח ורצועת עזה יקיימו הצדדים משא ומתן, וירושלים תימסר לניהול נציגי שלוש הדתות הגדולות. מאיר דחתה את התוכנית מכל וכל. בריאיון לעיתון הניו יורק טיימס קבעה כי "אם נקבל את תוכנית ארצות הברית תהיה זו התאבדות ובגידה בעמנו", והאשימה כי רוג'רס מנסה לשבות את לב הערבים על חשבון התמיכה בישראל. לטענת הגורמים הישראלים, לא ניתן לקבל תוכנית שלא כללה בסופה חתימה על הסכמי שלום פורמליים, וכן פגיעה במעמד ישראל בירושלים. בהמשך קיבלה הכנסת החלטה ברוב סוחף לדחות את כל הצעות השלום שהציעה ארצות הברית. גם מצרים דחתה את התוכנית משום שדרשה נסיגה של ישראל מכלל השטחים שכבשה. ב-7 בינואר 1970 החלו "מבצעי פריחה", שבמסגרתם הופצצו מטרות איכות בעומק מצרים. מאיר דחתה כל אפשרות להפסקת אש, ובתגובה להמשך ההפצצות הודיע ניקסון על הקפאת אספקת מטוסים חדשים לישראל ב-2 במרץ. בסופו של דבר הסכימה מצרים להפסקת אש של שלושה חודשים ורבין הציע למאיר שגם ישראל תסכים לכך. אולם גם הפעם סירבה. רק לאחר שניקסון הבטיח לה הבטחות חסרות תקדים על מנת שתסכים להפסקת אש, הסכימה מאיר להגמיש את מדיניותה ולהסכים עקרונית לנסיגה של צה"ל מקווי הפסקת האש גם ללא הסכם שלום מלא כדי להשיג הפסקת אש במלחמת ההתשה; ב-31 ביולי הודיעה בכנסת על קבלת החלטה 242 של מועצת הביטחון של האו"ם שהייתה הבסיס להפסקת האש, למעט מספר הסתייגויות. דבר זה הביא לפרישת שרי גח"ל מהממשלה, ב-4 באוגוסט 1970, עם קבלת הפסקת האש. עם זאת, היא לא הסכימה להיעזר בתיווכו של נחום גולדמן, נשיא הקונגרס היהודי העולמי, שחפץ לנסוע למצרים לשם פגישה עם נאצר. סירוב זה הוליד את "מכתב השמיניסטים", שכתבו: "איננו יודעים אם נהיה מסוגלים לבצע את המוטל עלינו בצבא". לאחר שהמצרים והסובייטים החלו בקידום טילי קרקע אוויר לאזור תעלת סואץ, בניגוד להסכמה שהושגה על ידי רוג'רס לפיה יוקפא המצב הצבאי באזור התעלה, הקפיאה מדינת ישראל את השתתפותה בשיחות בהוראת מאיר. ניקסון ביקש להיפגש עמה על מנת שתסביר לו את מניעיה, וב-18 בספטמבר הגיעה לביקור בארצות הברית ונועדה עמו. ניקסון אמר לה שינסה לפעול להסגת הטילים. בתחילת 1971, הגיש שליחו של מזכיר האו"ם גונאר יארינג הצעה לתוכנית שלום בין ישראל ומצרים. שתי המדינות קיבלו עקרונית את התוכנית, אך עם הסתייגויות שהיו ביניהם הבדלים גדולים. המצרים דרשו מישראל להתחייב לנסיגה מלאה מסיני ומעזה ולהשגת פתרון צודק לפליטים הפלסטיני, ושרק לאחר מכן יפתח משא ומתן לשלום. הסכם שלום יושג רק לאחר התחייבות לנסיגה מלאה של ישראל מכל השטחים שנכבשו ב-1967 לקווי יוני 1967. הייתה זו הפעם הראשונה בה הצהיר נשיא מצרים כי הוא מוכן להכיר בישראל ולהגיע עמה לשלום. הדרישות המצריות היו אמורות להרע את מצב ישראל אפילו יחסית למצב שהיה לפני יוני 1967, למשל שחיילים סובייטים ישתתפו בכוח האו"ם, ושהאזורים המפורזים יהיו בעומק שווה משני צידי הגבול. ב-1972 הועבר לה שדר, דרך נשיא רומניה ניקולאה צ'אושסקו, לפיו אנואר סאדאת יסכים להיפגש עִמה. גולדה הגיבה בחיוב, אולם בהמשך לא נתקבלה תשובה מסאדאת. בעת ביקורה ברומניה, במאי 1972, הגיעה לבוקרשט מבירות קבוצה של פלסטינים מצוידים בדרכונים מצריים, כדי להתנקש בה בעת שהלכה ברגל לבית הכנסת. שירותי הביטחון הרומנים עצרו את המתנקשים לפני שהספיקו לבצע את זממם. מזכיר המדינה של ארצות הברית הנרי קיסינג'ר הציע למצרים ולישראל תוכנית שלום ב-1973, כחצי שנה לפני מלחמת יום הכיפורים, שלפיה ישראל תכיר בריבונות מצרית על כל סיני, כאשר תהיה נוכחות ביטחונית ישראלית במספר נקודות בסיני. גולדה הסכימה לתוכנית בעוד שסאדאת לא השיב ולאחר מספר חודשים פתח במלחמת יום הכיפורים. בתקופת כהונתה של מאיר כראש הממשלה, התגברו פעולות הטרור הפלסטיני של אש"ף, בישראל ומחוצה לה. בין היתר, ב-22 במאי 1970 אירעה ההתקפה על אוטובוס ילדי אביבים; ב-9 במאי 1972 שחרר צה"ל את נוסעי המטוס של חברת "סבנה", שנחטף בידי מחבלים והונחת בלוד; ומספר ימים לאחר מכן ב-30 במאי בוצע הטבח בנמל התעופה לוד על ידי אנשי "הצבא האדום היפני"; ב-5 בספטמבר באותה שנה אירע טבח הספורטאים באולימפיאדת מינכן בידי ארגון "ספטמבר השחור". בעקבות טבח זה הורתה הממשלה בראשותה ל"מוסד" לחסל את כל ראשי ארגוני הטרור הפלסטיניים, בישראל ומחוצה לה, שהיו מעורבים ברצח הספורטאים. באישורה ביצע "המוסד" מבצע חיסולים נרחב ברחבי אירופה, ובנוסף סיירת מטכ"ל התנקשה בבכירי אש"ף בביירות במבצע "אביב נעורים" באפריל 1973. כתגובה, בוצע ניסיון התנקשות במאיר בעת שביקרה בארצות הברית ב-4 במרץ 1973. לפי צבי זמיר מטרת המבצע הייתה פגיעה ביכולת המחבלים. לחיסולים לא היה קשר לשאלה האם המחבל היה קשור לטבח הספורטאים באולימפיאדת מינכן. פרשת שנאו, בה נחטפו בני ערובה בידי מחבלים פלסטינים באוסטריה בסוף ספטמבר 1973, הובילה את הקנצלר האוסטרי ברונו קרייסקי להיכנע לדרישות הטרוריסטים ולהורות על סגירת מחנה המעבר בשנאו. מאיר הגיעה לפגישה עִמו ולא הצליחה לשנות את דעתו. הוא הצהיר בה: "גולדה ואני שייכים לשני עולמות שונים, והיא שייכת לעולם המלחמה". גולדה מצידה הגיבה לאחר הפגישה במילים "אפילו כוס מים הוא לא הציע לי". באמצע שנת 1973 הייתה דעת הקהל אוהדת מאוד את גולדה מאיר. בחודשים שלפני מלחמת יום הכיפורים זרמו התרעות רבות מפני מלחמה מתקרבת. כבר באוקטובר 1972 דווח לה מאגף המודיעין שהמועצה העליונה של הכוחות המזוינים של מצרים בראשות סאדאת החליט על יציאה למלחמה. ב-1 בדצמבר אותה שנה נערך דיון ב"מטבח" ובו טענו שר הביטחון דיין, ראש אמ"ן זעירא ואף ראש המוסד צבי זמיר כי הסיכוי שתפרוץ מלחמה אינו גדול. אולם מאפריל 1973 החלו להתקבל ידיעות על ידי המוסד הטוענות כי מצרים וסוריה מתכננות מלחמה נגד ישראל. בעקבות דיון מאוחר יותר ב"מטבח" הוחלט על העלאת רמת הכוננות של צה"ל והעסקת יחידות מילואים באימונים ברמה גדולה מהרגיל. אולם כעבור שבועות אחדים התברר כי זעירא צדק: שום מלחמה לא החלה וכל המגויסים שוחררו. באוגוסט 1973, כ-10 ימים לאחר ישיבת המועצה העליונה של הכוחות המזוינים של מצרים וסוריה, הודיע אשרף מרואן, חתנו של נאצר שעבד כסוכן של המוסד, כי המלחמה עליה הוחלט בישיבה קודמת של המועצה נדחתה לקיץ אך סאדאת מכוון למלחמה. המלך חוסיין נפגש עם מאיר מספר פעמים לפני המלחמה. הפגישה האחרונה התקיימה ב-25 בספטמבר 1973 בתל אביב, בה נכחו גם ראש ממשלת ירדן זייד אל-ריפאעי, מנכ"ל משרד ראש הממשלה מרדכי גזית, לו קדר, מזכירתה של מאיר, ובכירי אגף המודיעין שצפו והקשיבו לשיחה. לפי צבי זמיר, ראש "המוסד" באותה עת, המלך חוסיין התריע בפגישות אלה מפני מלחמה קרובה. לפיכך התייעצה גולדה עם שר הביטחון משה דיין שהרגיע אותה. כמה ימים לאחר הפגישה יצאה לשטרסבורג כדי להשתתף בישיבת מועצת המפלגות הסוציאליסטיות, לאחר שהתייעצה על כך עם דיין. בעת ביקורה התקיימה הפגישה עם קרייסקי, אשר כאמור, לא הצליחה לשנות את דעתו. במהלך שהותה בשטרסבורג טלפן אליה ישראל גלילי וביקש ממנה, לאחר התייעצות עם דיין, להקדים את שובה לישראל בשל ההסלמה בצפון. ב-2 באוקטובר דיווח לה דיין כי צבאות מצרים וסוריה מתחילים ב"תנועות מדאיגות". אולם זעירא נותר בשלו. מייד לאחר דיון ב"מטבח", שממנו יצאה רגועה לאור דבריו של אריה שלו, עוזר ראש אמ"ן למחקר כי מלחמה איננה סבירה, נפגשה עם זמיר, שלא השתתף בדיון, שסבר בפניה כי תפרוץ מלחמה. אולם דיין אמר לה כי הוא מקבל את עמדת אגף המודיעין. ב-4 באוקטובר התבצעה גיחת צילום מעל מצרים וסוריה, שתמכה בעמדת זמיר כי מלחמה בפתח. זעירא המשיך לדבוק בדעתו אך לא הפעיל את ה"אמצעים המיוחדים", שבמקרה חירום נועדו להבין את הנעשה במצרים. דיין והרמטכ"ל דוד אלעזר שאלו אותו אם הפעיל את אותם אמצעים, והוא השיב בחיוב. גם בערב יום כיפור נמנעה מאיר מגיוס מילואים, בהתבסס על דעתם של משה דיין, הרמטכ"ל דוד אלעזר, ראש אמ"ן אלי זעירא והרמטכ"ל לשעבר – השר חיים בר-לב, החלטה שהיא הגדירה כטעותה הגדולה ביותר, שעליה "לא הייתה לה נחמה". לפי דעה אחרת, בישיבת ממשלה מצומצמת שהתקיימה ביום שישי, ערב יום כיפור 5 באוקטובר 1973, גולדה החליטה לא לגייס מילואים לפי המלצת שר הביטחון משה דיין, הרמטכ"ל דוד אלעזר שהעריך סבירות לא גבוהה למלחמה, וראש אמ"ן אלי זעירא ששלל אפשרות של מלחמה והרשים את השרים בביטחון שבו דיבר. עם זאת גולדה הוסמכה לגייס מילואים במהלך יום הכיפורים, אם יהיה בכך צורך. ביום הכיפורים עצמו, בשעה 03:40 לפנות בוקר, דווחה, יחד עם שר הביטחון והרמטכ"ל, כי "הערב יפתחו [המצרים והסורים] באש". מאיר, שהורגעה פעם אחר פעם כי הסבירות שתפרוץ מלחמה נמוכה אך עדיין לא הייתה בטוחה בכך, לא התרשמה מההודעה. שעות לפני פרוץ המלחמה, החליטה מאיר לגייס בין 100–120 אלף חיילי מילואים, לבקשתו של הרמטכ"ל דוד אלעזר, בניגוד לדעתו של דיין, שחשש שהעולם יראה זאת כהתגרות וכתוקפנות. עם זאת, היא סירבה להצעתו של הרמטכ"ל להנחית מכה מקדימה, מחשש שכך תמנע הגעת עזרה בינלאומית במהלך המלחמה. בשעות אלה, דרש שר החוץ האמריקאי קיסינג'ר מישראל לא להנחית מכה מקדימה וקיבל אישור על כך מגולדה. סמוך לשעה שתיים בצהריים, בשעה 13:55, פרצה המלחמה. בעדותה בפני ועדת אגרנט, לאחר המלחמה, אמרה מאיר: "אני חושבת שהכותרת של האסון שקרה לנו בערב יום הכיפורים זה טעויות. כל אחד בשטח שלו טעה קצת", אמרה מאיר לוועדה. "אני לא חושבת שיש אדם אחד שיכול לקום ולהגיד אני לא טעיתי. אם הוא טעה מתוך מידע, זאת אומרת העריך את המידע לא נכון, או שטעה מתוך – לא העז, נאמר, מול מומחים להגיד דבר שמומחים לא אמרו", היא אומרת לחברי הוועדה. "אני לוקחת את עצמי לדוגמה, מה היה קורה לי? היו חושבים שהיא טיפשה. אבל מה היה קורה לי לו הייתי אומרת כמו שהרגשתי באותם הימים. זה לא טוב לי, אני לא יכולתי לעמוד בעימות עם ראש אמ"ן או הרמטכ"ל". יו"ר הוועדה אגרנט השיב לדבריה של מאיר ואמר: "זו בדיוק הנקודה", אך היא טענה: "אבל זה לא היה לי טוב. על מה אני מייסרת את עצמי, לא שהייתי יותר חכמה או שידעתי יותר טוב, אבל מדוע לא אמרתי רבותיי, אולי בכל זאת גיוס? נניח שלא היו מקבלים את זה. אינני יודעת אם היו מקבלים זאת או לא. יותר קל לי להעמיד את עצמי לדוגמה מאשר להעמיד אנשים אחרים דוגמה, אבל שפה אין איש כמעט שיכול להגיד זאת... לא היה איש שלא אמר דבר שאולי יכול היה להציל, לו דעתו נתקבלת. זאת היא אמת. נדמה לי שזו הערכה אובייקטיבית, שקל לי להגיד את זאת, מפני שאני משייכת את עצמי בתוך החבורה הזאת". אגרנט המשיך ואמר למאיר: "זה מפני שכל אלה אין להם מכשירי הערכה. יש רק אחד שמעריך, זה אמ"ן, שיש לו מכשיר הערכה, שכל הידיעות עומדות לרשותו. והוא צריך לעשות סלקציה של עובדות, לחשוב עליהן ולהעריך אותן". החלטתה הראשונה של מאיר לאחר פרוץ המלחמה הייתה הקמת קבינט מלחמה מצומצם שהורכב מלבדה ומדיין מישראל גלילי ומיגאל אלון. בשעה 22:00 קיימה ישיבת ממשלה בקריה על מנת שתוכל לקבל דיווח ראשוני על המתרחש בדרום ובצפון. ביומה השני של המלחמה שמעה הממשלה מפי שר הביטחון דיווח קודר על המצב בשתי החזיתות. תחזיותיו זעזעו את חברי הממשלה ואת העומדת בראשה, ובשיחות פרטיות מאיר אף אמרה כי אם התחזיות הללו תתממשנה, לא תראה עוד טעם בחייה. בימיה הראשונים של המלחמה, כאשר היה נראה שמלאי התחמושת של צה"ל אוזל בקצב מסחרר, הציעה לטוס בעצמה לארצות הברית כדי לשכנע את הנשיא ניקסון להקים "רכבת אווירית" לישראל, אולם לבסוף מבצע ניקל גראס יצא לדרך גם ללא נסיעה זאת. בקבינט המצומצם הוחלט, בין היתר, לקבל את עמדת הרמטכ"ל כי יש להמשיך באופן מיידי במתקפה לכיוון דמשק במטרה להביא להתמוטטות הצבא הסורי, ובכך לאלץ את סוריה לבקש הפסקת אש. בבוקר 11 באוקטובר חודשה המתקפה בסוריה, על אף התנגדותו של דיין. למרות שהסורים הסכימו להפסקת אש כבר בליל 13 באוקטובר, אולם היא לא נכנסה לתוקף אלא רק כעבור 10 ימים. לאחר כישלון המתקפה הוחלט שהסמכות להחליט בענייני המלחמה תופקד בידי הממשלה עצמה ולא בידי הקבינט המצומצם. למחרת, בליל 14 באוקטובר, החליטה הממשלה על צליחת תעלת סואץ, כדברי מאיר "במטרה לגרום להריסת עיקר כוחו של הצבא המצרי". יומיים אחר כך, ב-16 באוקטובר, הודיעה במליאת הכנסת כי חציית התעלה הושלמה. על אף שידעה שהודעה כזו עלולה להוות סיכון ביטחוני, החליטה לשלב זאת בנאומה לאחר התייעצות. בפגישה שערך קיסינג'ר עם שר החוץ הסובייטי אנדריי גרומיקו הוחלט על הפסקת אש, וכבר בליל 21 באוקטובר נודע על כך לממשל בישראל. למחרת כבר הועברה החלטה 338 של מועצת הביטחון של האו"ם, שפסקה על הפסקת אש. הדבר הכעיס את מאיר, במיוחד בשל העובדה שקיסינג'ר כלל לא שיתף אותה בעניין. למרות זאת קיבלה הממשלה החלטה המאשרת את החלטת מועצת הביטחון. אולם גם לאחר כניסתה של הפסקת האש לתוקף המשיכה ישראל בכיתור הארמיות המצריות, מה שהוביל לקביעת החלטה 339 של מועצת הביטחון של האו"ם, שבעקבותיה נכנסה הפסקת האש לתוקף באופן רשמי בבוקר 24 באוקטובר, אך האש הופסקה רשמית יומיים אחר כך, ב-26 באוקטובר. חרף תוצאות המלחמה נבחרה גולדה מאיר שנית לראשות הממשלה בבחירות לכנסת השמינית, שנערכו חודשיים לאחר המלחמה, והרכיבה את הממשלה ה-16 אך הביקורת הציבורית גברה. מאיר התאמצה למנוע הקמת ועדת חקירה ממלכתית, או לפחות לדחות את הקמתה, וניסתה לתעל את הדרישות לבדיקה מבצעית של כשלים נקודתיים. מאמציה לא צלחו והיא נאלצה להסכים להקמת ועדת אגרנט. הוועדה פרסמה דו"ח ביניים ב-1 באפריל 1974. הוועדה ניקתה את הדרג המדיני וקבעה שמאיר פעלה בצורה שקולה ונכונה והחלטותיה היו נכונות. יומיים לאחר פרסום הדו"ח התפטר הרמטכ"ל דוד אלעזר, תוך שהוא טוען כי נגרם לו עוול, בעיקר על רקע העובדה כי הוועדה לא המליצה על סנקציות כלשהן נגד הדרג המדיני. בעקבות זאת גברה הביקורת הציבורית כלפי מאיר. העובדה שאיבדה גם את אמון מפלגתה הייתה כנראה הגורם המידי להגשת התפטרותה ב-11 באפריל 1974, חודש בלבד לאחר שהקימה את ממשלתה השלישית. החשש שלא תוכל להחזיק מעמד, פיזית, הטריד אותה כבר חודשים רבים לפני פרוץ המלחמה. עתה, בגיל 76, הטריד אותה מצב בריאותה שבעתיים. המלחמה והביקורת הנוקבת שהוטחה בה בעקבותיה הייתה עוד סיבה להחלטה. בעקבות ההאשמות החמורות שהוטחו נגדה לאחר המלחמה, מצבה היה קשה מאוד עד כי ביקשה להתאבד. ב-3 ביוני 1974 החליף אותה יצחק רבין בראשות הממשלה. מאיר עוד הספיקה לחתום על הסכמי הפרדת הכוחות עם מצרים (שלימים הוחלף בהסכם הביניים ולאחר מכן בהסכם השלום) ועם סוריה (ההסכם האחרון שנחתם עם מדינה זו). היא גם הספיקה למנות את מרדכי גור לרמטכ"ל במקומו של אלעזר שפרש ועוד מספר בכירים אחרים בצה"ל ולהנהיג את מדינת ישראל במהלך הפיגועים בקריית שמונה ובמעלות, והמשיכה להתנגד למשא ומתן עם המחבלים. לאחר פרישתה חילקה את זמנה במשך השבוע בין תל אביב, ובסופי שבוע בקיבוץ רביבים שבו חייתה בִּתה שרה, ושם גם ניתנה לה דירה. מאיר המשיכה להביע עמדות בענייני השעה וביקרה את הממשלה על הוויתורים המופלגים למצרים במסגרת הסכם השלום עם מצרים. ב-1976 חזרה לפעילות במפלגת העבודה והצטרפה ל"פורום העליון" במפלגה, שדן בבעיותיה העיקריות. המשמרת הצעירה של מפלגת העבודה ותנועת "הפנתרים השחורים" התנגדו להצטרפותה של מאיר לפורום זה. בנובמבר 1977 נפגשה עם נשיא מצרים אנואר סאדאת במהלך ביקורו ההיסטורי בישראל, העניקה לו מתנה קטנה לרגל הולדת נכדתו, וסאדאת נתן לה מתנה אף הוא. עוד לפני שהתמנתה לראש הממשלה, חלתה מאיר בלוקמיה כרונית, ובמהלך כהונתה טופלה בכימותרפיה. בתחילת 1978 אושפזה פעמיים בבית החולים בילינסון עקב סיבוכי המחלה. דבר אשפוזה פורסם לציבור, אך הסיבה האמיתית לאשפוזים הוסתרה. מאוגוסט 1978 היא אושפזה מספר פעמים בבית החולים הדסה עין כרם. הופעתה הציבורית האחרונה הייתה ב-18 בספטמבר 1978 בישיבת מפלגת העבודה שעסקה בשאלה כיצד על המפלגה להצביע בכנסת על הסכם השלום עם מצרים. היא נפטרה ביום שישי, 8 בדצמבר 1978, ח' בכסלו ה'תשל"ט, ונקברה לאחר ארבעה ימים ב-12 בדצמבר 1978 בחלקת גדולי האומה בהר הרצל. לאחר מותה פורסמה צוואתה. משפחתה וחייה הפרטיים למאיר ולבעלה, מוריס, נולדו שני ילדים בירושלים – מנחם (1924–2014) ושרה (1926–2010). מנחם היה צ'לן, למד בין השאר אצל פבלו קזאלס, וניהל את הקונסרבטוריון הישראלי למוזיקה תל אביב מאמצע שנות ה-60 עד 1980. שרה סיימה לימודים תיכוניים בתל אביב, הצטרפה לקיבוץ רביבים ולימדה אנגלית ועברית. לימים נישאה לזכריה רחבי. כאשר עברה לתל אביב ב-1928, נאלצה לעיתים קרובות להשאיר את הילדים לטיפולם של אחרים, אורח חיים שגרם לה לסבל רב וכדבריה ל"תחושת אשם נצחית", ואילו בעלה פקד אותה רק בסופי שבוע. חיי הנישואים שלהם החלו להתפורר, ובשנת 1943 נפרדו במוצהר, אולם הם מעולם לא התגרשו, ונותרו נשואים עד לפטירתו במאי 1951. מאירסון נפטר בגיל 57 בעת שביקר בביתה של מאיר, כאשר לא שהתה בביתה. הוא נטמן בבית העלמין נחלת יצחק. ב-1959 עברה לגור ברחוב הברון הירש 8 בתל אביב, שם התגוררה עד יום מותה. בספטמבר 1972 נטמנה ליד קברו של מוריס, אחותה של מאיר, שיינה קורנגולד (כמו גם ליד קבר בעלה שמאי קורנגולד). כבר בגיל עשרים ותשע, עם ההכרה שחיי הנישואין שלה אינם צולחים, ניהלה מאיר פרשיות יחסים עם כמה מן האנשים המקורבים אליה בהנהגת המפלגה. בתקופה מסוימת ניהלה חברות רומנטית עם דוד רמז, שהיה נשוי ובמקביל ניהל יחסים עם אישה נוספת. לימים התפרסמה חליפת מכתבי אהבה בין גולדה מאיר לרמז, אם כי באותה תקופה הם הסתירו את יחסי הקרבה ביניהם בקנאות ואף הגדירו אותם כידידות איתנה בלבד. אישים נוספים שהוזכרו היו זלמן שזר, זלמן ארן ויעקב חזן. פרשיות האהבה עם אישים אלה נשזרו לאורך כמה שנים לסירוגין. מורשתה אף שהייתה ראש ממשלה מטעם תנועת העבודה, היא אינה זכורה באהדה רבה בחלק מחוגי השמאל, והיא נתפסת בעיניהם כמי שבעקשנותה ובחוסר גמישותה המדינית סללה את הדרך למלחמת יום הכיפורים, וכמי שרקבונו של מנגנון מפא"י גבר בתקופתה. יוסי שריד נהג לכנותה: "אֵם כל חטאת". לפי דעה אחרת, המצרים לא רצו בשלום. אלמנת הנשיא סאדאת, ג'יהאן סאדאת, הדגישה ב-1987 כי סאדאת לא ניסה להשיג שלום אמיתי לפני 1973, והוסיפה כי סאדאת היה זקוק למלחמה נוספת כדי לנצח ולפתוח במשא ומתן מעמדה שווה. היא אמרה: "בעלי היה איש של שלום, אך כמנהיג ערבי, לא היה מוכן לשבת עם ישראל ולהרגיש שהוא 'נמוך'". אחרים מוצאים בה חום של "אמא יהודייה" ויכולת עמידה במצבי לחץ. בנוסף, היא מפורסמת כאישה היחידה שכיהנה כראש ממשלת ישראל. לדברי הביוגרף שלה, יוסי גולדשטיין, "את הסיבה להבדל הדרמטי שבין דימויה הכושל של גולדה בעיני הציבור בשלושים השנים האחרונות, לבין הצלחתה המזהירה לאורך עשרות שנים, צריך לחפש כנראה בפסיכולוגיה של הזיכרון הקולקטיבי הישראלי, ואין זה מן העניין כאן. בקביעה המושתתת על חקר ההיסטוריה בלבד נמצא שגולדה מאיר הייתה אחת האישים החשובים ביותר בתולדות מדינת ישראל בראשיתה". אניטה שפירא אומרת שעל אף שגולדה לא הזדהתה כפמיניסטית, היא פעלה רבות למען זכויות האישה ושילוב נשים במערכת הפוליטית, אם כי לא רבים בעולם ראו בה כפורצת דרך: "גולדה לא הייתה פמיניסטית, במובן של מאבק אקטיבי למען זכויות הנשים. יתרה מזו, היא גם לא הכירה בצורך במאבק כזה, או לפחות כך טענה. היא השליכה מן הניסיון החיובי שלה להשתלב במערכות הפוליטיות של תנועת העבודה ומדינת ישראל על כלל החברה ועל כלל הנשים: אם אני יכולה – משמע הדרך פתוחה בפני כל אישה. אך לאמיתו של דבר, גולדה לא הייתה דוגמה מייצגת, אלא יוצאת מן הכלל שאינה מעידה על הכלל. עם זאת, אין להתעלם מן העובדה שהיא שימשה דמות סמל למיליוני נשים בעולם, ששאבו ממנה ומהצלחתה עידוד והשראה לגבי מקומן הן בחברה שלהן, ובדרך זו הקרינה מסר פמיניסטי ממדרגה ראשונה". כתביה ראו גם לקריאה נוספת קישורים חיצוניים הערות שוליים |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rapha%C3%ABl_Arnault] | [TOKENS: 646] |
Contents Raphaël Arnault Raphaël Archenault (French pronunciation: [ʁafaɛl aʁʃəno]; born 8 January 1995), known as Raphaël Arnault ([aʁno]), is a French far-left activist and politician who has represented the 1st constituency of Vaucluse in the National Assembly since 2024. A member of La France Insoumise (LFI), he co-founded the Jeune Garde Antifasciste collective in 2018 and was one of its spokespersons. The collective grew close to LFI before it was outlawed for its violence by the government in 2025. In 2022 Arnault had already been found guilty of violent behaviour following an assault in 2021. Early life and activism A native of Lyon, Arnault became politically active during the 2016 protests against the El Khomri law. He was a member of the New Anticapitalist Party and ran under its label in Rhône's 2nd constituency in 2022, placing fourth in the first round. In 2018 he co-founded the anti-fascist collective Jeune Garde Antifasciste in Lyon and became one of its spokespersons. Political career In the 2024 legislative election Arnault was elected to the National Assembly in Vaucluse's 1st constituency, defeating incumbent Catherine Jaouen of the National Rally with 54.9% of the second-round vote. In Parliament he sits with the LFI–NFP (La France Insoumise–New Popular Front) group and has served on the Committee on Cultural Affairs and Education. Controversies In May 2024 Arnault was questioned by police regarding an October 2023 communiqué that initially referred to Hamas as a "resistance movement" and was later withdrawn the same day. During the 2024 legislative campaign multiple outlets described Arnault as listed under a "Fiche S" by the government, meaning he has been flagged as a threat for national security. According to Europe 1, he was subject to three such listings; Arnault criticised proposals to render "Fiché S" individuals ineligible for office. In February 2022 Arnault was convicted in first instance by a Lyon court of voluntary grouped violence ("violences volontaires en réunion") for an assault that occurred in April 2021 in Lyon; he was handed a four-month suspended prison sentence. He initially appealed the judgment but later withdrew his appeal in 2025. On 16 February 2026, Jacques-Élie Favrot, a parliamentary assistant to Arnault, had his access to the National Assembly suspended by President of the National Assembly Yaël Braun-Pivet after being suspected of involvement in the killing of Quentin Deranque, an activist with the far-right Collectif Némésis in Lyon two days prior. On 17 February, Favrot was arrested by police in connection to the death, alongside another staffer for Arnault, Robin Chalendard. Media reported that both are also "Fiché S" by the government. References |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Far-right_politics_in_France] | [TOKENS: 6641] |
Contents Far-right politics in France The far-right (French: Extrême droite) tradition in France finds its origins in the Third Republic with Boulangism and the Dreyfus affair. In the 1880s, General Georges Boulanger, called "General Revenge" (Général Revanche), championed demands for military revenge against Imperial Germany as retribution for the defeat and fall of the Second French Empire during the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71). This stance, known as revanchism, began to exert a strong influence on French nationalism. Soon thereafter, the Dreyfus affair provided one of the political division lines of France. French nationalism, which had been largely associated with left-wing and Republican ideologies before the Dreyfus affair, turned after that into a main trait of the right-wing and, moreover, of the far right. A new right emerged, and nationalism was reappropriated by the far-right who turned it into a form of ethnic nationalism, blended with anti-Semitism, xenophobia, anti-Protestantism and anti-Masonry. The Action française (AF), first founded as a journal and later a political organization, was the matrix of a new type of counter-revolutionary right-wing, which continues to exist today. During the interwar period, the Action française and its youth militia, the Camelots du Roi, were very active. Far-right leagues organized riots. After World War II, the Organisation armée secrète (OAS) was created in Madrid in 1961 by French military personnel opposed to the independence of Algeria. Jean-Marie Le Pen founded the Front National (FN) party in 1972. At the 1986 legislative elections, the FN managed to obtain 35 seats, with 10% of the votes. Mark Frederiksen, a French Algeria activist, created in April 1966 a neo-Nazi group, the FANE (Fédération d'action nationaliste et européenne, Nationalist and European Federation of Action). However, in 1978, neo-Nazi members of the GNR-FANE broke again with the FN. During the 1980s, the National Front managed to gather, under Jean-Marie Le Pen's leadership, most rival far-right tendencies of France, following a succession of splits and alliances with other, minor parties, during the 1970s. Third Republic (1871–1940) The French Third Republic (1871–1940) was established after France's defeat in the 1870 Franco-Prussian War and the subsequent Paris Commune of 1871. From 1894 to 1906, French society became deeply divided by the Dreyfus affair, a major political scandal that proved to be a turning point in the history of France. The modern "far right", or radical right, formed as a distinct political current during the Dreyfus affair. However, it had some antecedents in earlier years of the Third Republic. Many French nationalists came to oppose the Third Republic soon after its founding, believing that it had adopted an "English" constitution by creating a strong parliament and a weak presidency; in place of this, nationalists favored a political system led by a strong ruler, originally a presidential republic, although some eventually came to support the idea of a restored monarchy. Across French society, there was also a common feeling of pride in the army and resentment about its defeat by the Germans. This defeat was blamed on the politicians who later became leaders of the Third Republic, and there were increasing anti-Semitic tendencies that accused Jewish politicians and officers of disloyalty to the nation. For the nationalists, the army was "the people armed", the truest representative of the nation, and any criticism of the army was seen as an attack on France itself. Thus, they rallied to "defend the army" when they felt it was under threat from internal enemies, such as first during the Boulanger affair and later during the Dreyfus affair. The political coalitions originally built to support the army during these affairs, provided the foundations for the 20th century radical right. The "Boulanger Affair", which culminated in 1889, championed the vague demands of the former Minister of War, General Georges Boulanger. Boulanger had earlier attracted popular support by ordering lenient treatment of strikers when the army was called upon to suppress strikes. He also rattled his saber against Germany, which pleased French patriots intent on taking revenge. But this alarmed the other ministers, who dropped Boulanger from the government. When his champions mounted an electoral campaign to have him elected to the Chamber of Deputies, the government reacted by forcing him out of the army. Violent agitation in Paris on the election night in 1889 convinced the government to prosecute Boulanger in order to remove him from the political scene. Instead of facing trumped up charges, Boulanger fled to Belgium. His supporters, called "Boulangists", afterward nursed an intense grievance against the Republic and reunited during the Dreyfus affair to oppose the Republic and "back the army" once again. In 1894, a Jewish officer, Alfred Dreyfus, was arrested on accusations of treason and sharing intelligence with the German Empire. The Dreyfus affair provided one of the political fault lines of France. Before the Dreyfus affair, Nationalism had been a left-wing and Republican ideology; after, it became a main trait of the right-wing and, moreover, of the far-right. Émile Zola entered the political scene with his open letter "J'Accuse…!", followed by other writers, artists and scholars supporting him with a "Manifesto of the Intellectuals", helping to define the meaning of the term "intellectual", while the left and right were at loggerheads, mainly over the questions of militarism, nationalism, justice and human rights. Until then, nationalism was a Republican, left-wing ideology, related to the French Revolution and the Revolutionary Wars. It was a liberal nationalism, formulated by Ernest Renan's definition of the nation as a "daily plebiscite" and as formed by the subjective "will to live together". Related to "revanchism", the belligerent will to take revenge against Germany and retake control of Alsace-Lorraine, nationalism could then be sometimes opposed to imperialism. In the 1880s, a debate thus opposed those who opposed the "colonial lobby", such as radical Georges Clemenceau, who declared that colonialism diverted France from the "blue line of the Vosges" (referring to Alsace-Lorraine), socialist Jean Jaurès and nationalist Maurice Barrès, against Moderate Republican Jules Ferry, republican Léon Gambetta and Eugène Etienne, the president of the parliamentary colonial group. However, in the midst of the Dreyfus affair, a new right emerged, and nationalism was appropriated by the far right who turned it into a form of ethnic nationalism, itself blended with anti-Semitism, xenophobia, anti-Protestantism and anti-Masonry. Charles Maurras (1868–1952), founder of "integralism" (or "integral nationalism"), created the term "Anti-France" to stigmatize "internal foreigners", or the "four confederate states of Protestants, Jews, Freemasons and foreigners" (his actual word for the latter being the far less polite métèques). A few years later, Maurras would join the monarchist Action française, created by Maurice Pujo and Henri Vaugeois in 1898. Maurras, who was an agnostic, spearheaded a monarchist and Catholic revival. He pragmatically conceived of religion as an ideology useful to unify the nation. Most French Catholics were conservatives, a trait that continues today. On the other hand, most Protestants, Jews and atheists belonged to the left. Henceforth, the republicans' conception was, to the contrary, that only state secularism could peacefully bind together diverse religious and philosophical tendencies, and avoid any return to the Wars of Religion. Furthermore, Catholic priests were seen as a major reactionary force by the republicans, among whom anti-clericalism became common. The Ferry laws on public education had been a first step for the Republic in rooting out the clerics' influence: they would be completed by the 1905 law on the separation of Church and State. Action française, first founded as a review, was the matrix of a new type of counter-revolutionary right-wing, and continues to exist today. Action française was quite influential in the 1930s, in particular through its youth organization, the Camelots du Roi, founded in 1908, and which engaged in many street brawls. The Camelots du Roi included such figures as Catholic writer Georges Bernanos and Jean de Barrau, member of the directing committee of the National Federation, and particular secretary of the duc d'Orléans (1869–1926), the son of the Orléanist count of Paris (1838–1894) and hence Orléanist heir to the throne of France. Many members of the OAS terrorist group during the Algerian War (1954–62) were part of the monarchist movement. Jean Ousset, Maurras' personal secretary, created the Catholic fundamentalist organization Cité catholique, which would include OAS members and founded a branch in Argentina in the 1960s. Apart from the Action française, several far-right leagues were created during the Dreyfus affair. Mostly anti-Semitic, they also represented a new right-wing tendency, sharing common traits such as anti-parliamentarism, militarism, nationalism, and often engaged in street brawls. Thus, the nationalist poet Paul Déroulède created in 1882 the anti-semitic Ligue des patriotes (League of Patriots), which at first focused on advocating 'revanche' (revenge) for the French defeat during the Franco-Prussian War. Along with Jules Guérin, the journalist Edouard Drumont created the Antisemitic League of France in 1889. Also anti-Masonic, the League became at the start of the 20th century the Grand Occident de France [fr], a name chosen in reaction against the Masonic lodge of the Grand Orient de France. Between the wars During the interwar period, the Action française (AF) and its youth militia, the Camelots du Roi, were very active in Paris. Apart from the AF, various far-right leagues were formed and opposed both Cartel des gauches (Coalition of the left) governments. Pierre Taittinger thus formed the Jeunesses Patriotes in 1924, which imitated the style of the Fascists, although it remained a more traditional authoritarian movement. The following year, Georges Valois created Le Faisceau, heavily inspired by Benito Mussolini's Fascism. In 1933, the year Adolf Hitler gained power in Germany, perfumer François Coty founded Solidarité française and Marcel Bucard formed the Francisme, which was subsidised by Mussolini. Another important league was François de la Rocque's Croix de Feu, which formed the base for the Parti Social Français (PSF), the first mass party of the French right-wing. Mussolini was much more popular in right-wing circles than Hitler due to the negative reaction many French conservatives had to Hitler's repression of dissident German conservatives and Catholics in 1933 and 1934. Apart from the leagues, a group of Neosocialists (Marcel Déat, Pierre Renaudel, etc.) were excluded in November 1933 from the French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO, the socialist party) because of their revisionist stances and admiration for fascism. Déat would become one of the most ardent collaborationists during World War II. Another major player in France's right-wing world between the wars was Jacques Doriot. Doriot had been expelled by the French Communist Party after proposing a Popular Front with other leftist parties, which at that time was seen as heresy by his party's hierarchy. Personally hurt and embittered by his expulsion, Doriot would slowly change sides, eventually openly denouncing communism and going on to found the Parti Populaire Francais or PPF, the largest pre-war right wing party. Other important figures of the 1930s include Xavier Vallat, who would become General Commissioner for Jewish Affairs under Vichy, members of the Cagoule terrorist group (Eugène Deloncle, Eugène Schueller (the founder of L'Oréal cosmetic firm), Jacques Corrèze, Joseph Darnand, who later founded the Service d'ordre légionnaire militia during Vichy, etc.). To obtain arms from fascist Italy, the group assassinated two Italian antifascists, the Rosselli brothers, on June 9, 1937, and sabotaged aeroplanes clandestinely supplied by the French government to the Second Spanish Republic. They also attempted a coup against the Popular Front government, elected in 1936, leading to arrests in 1937, ordered by Interior Minister Marx Dormoy, during which the police seized explosives and military weapons, including anti-tank guns. Far right leagues organised major riots on 6 February 1934. The groups did not coordinate their efforts and the riots were suppressed by the police and military. Elements on the left were convinced that unity was essential to suppress fascism, and in 1936 they formed the Popular Front and dissolved the leagues. However the right-wing leagues promptly reorganized as political parties and continued vocal attacks on the left. Vichy France Fifth Republic The Organisation armée secrète (OAS) was created in Madrid by French military officers opposed to the independence of Algeria. Many of its members would later join various anti-communist struggles around the world. Some, for example, joined the Cité catholique fundamentalist group and went to Argentina, where they were in contact with the Argentine Armed Forces. Jean Pierre Cherid, former OAS member, took part in the 1976 Montejurra massacre against left-wing Carlists. He was then part of the Spanish GAL death squad, and participated in the 1978 assassination of Argala, one of the ETA members who had killed Franco's Prime minister, Luis Carrero Blanco, in 1973. Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour was the far-right candidate at the 1965 presidential election. His campaign was organised by Jean-Marie Le Pen. Charles de Gaulle said of Tixier-Vignancourt: "Tixier-Vignancour, that is Vichy, the Collaboration proud of itself, the Milice, the OAS". Jean-Marie Le Pen founded the Front National (FN) party in 1972, along with former Occident member Jacques Bompard, former Collaborationist Roland Gaucher, François Duprat, who introduced the negationist thesis to France, and others nostalgics of Vichy France, Catholic fundamentalists, etc. Le Pen presented himself for the first time in the 1974 presidential election, obtaining 0.74%. The electoral rise of the FN did not start until Jean-Pierre Stirbois's victory, in 1983, in Dreux. The FN became stronger throughout the 1980s, managing to unite most far-right tendencies, passing electoral alliances with the right-wing Rally for the Republic (RPR), while some FN members quit the party to join the RPR or the Union for a French Democracy (UDF). At the 1986 legislative elections, the FN managed to obtain 35 seats, with 10% of the votes. Meanwhile, other far-right tendencies gathered in Alain de Benoist's Nouvelle Droite think-tank, heading a pro-European and neopagan line. Some radical members of the "national revolutionary" tendency quit the FN to form other minor parties (Party of New Forces, PFN, and French and European Nationalist Party, PNFE). Mark Frederiksen, a French Algeria activist, created in April 1966 a neo-Nazi group, the FANE (Fédération d'action nationaliste et européenne, Nationalist and European Federation of Action). The FANE boasted at most a hundred activists, including members such as Luc Michel, now leader of the Parti communautaire national-européen (National European Communautary Party), Jacques Bastide, Michel Faci, Michel Caignet [fr] and Henri-Robert Petit, a journalist and former Collaborationist who directed under the Vichy regime the newspaper Le Pilori. The FANE maintained international contacts with the British group the League of Saint George. The FANE rallied Jean-Marie Le Pen's National Front in 1974, gathered around François Duprat and Alain Renault [fr]'s Revolutionary Nationalist Groups (GNR), which represented the nationalist revolutionary tendency of the FN. But in 1978, neo-Nazi members of the GNR-FANE broke again with the FN, taking with them sections of the FN youth movement, the Front National de la Jeunesse. On the other hand, GNR activists closer to the Third Position (Jacques Bastide and Patrick Gorre) joined Jean-Gilles Malliarakis to found, on February 11, 1979, the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement [fr] (Mouvement nationaliste révolutionnaire), which became in 1985 Third Way (Troisième Voie). After this brief passage at the National Front, Mark Fredriksen created the Faisceaux nationalistes européens (FANE) in July 1980. These would eventually merge with the Mouvement national et social ethniste in 1987, and then with the PNFE (French and European Nationalist Party) in January 1994, which also gathered former National Front members. Dissolved first in September 1980 by Raymond Barre's government, Fredriksen's group was recreated, and dissolved again in 1985 by Laurent Fabius' government. Finally, it was dissolved a third time in 1987 by Jacques Chirac's government, on charges of "violent demonstrations organised by this movement, which has as one of its expressed objective the establishment of a new Nazi regime", the "paramilitary organisation of this association and its inciting of racial discrimination". In the 1980s, Alain de Benoist became chief theorist of the Nouvelle Droite movement, creating the think-tank GRECE in 1968, some of whose members were involved with the formation of the Club de l'Horloge in 1974. They advocated an ethno-nationalist stance focused on European culture, which advocated a return of paganism. Members of the GRECE quit the think tank in the 1980s, such as Pierre Vial who joined the FN, or Guillaume Faye who quit the organisation along with others members in 1986. Faye participated in 2006 in a conference in the US organised by American Renaissance, a white separatist magazine published by the New Century Foundation. Alain de Benoist occasionally contributed to the Mankind Quarterly review, which supports hereditarianism and is associated with the US think tank the Pioneer Fund, headed by J. Philippe Rushton, the author of Race, Evolution and Behavior (1995), which argues in favour of a biological conception of "race". GRECE and the Pioneer Fund are actively involved in the race and intelligence debate, postulating that there is an identifiable link between levels of intelligence and distinct ethnic groups. The Club de l'horloge itself had been founded by Henry de Lesquen, a former member of the conservative Rally for the Republic, which he quit in 1984. Others members of the Club de l'horloge, such as Bruno Mégret, later joined the FN after a short time in the RPR. During the 1980s, the National Front managed to gather, under Jean-Marie Le Pen's leadership, most rival far-right tendencies of France, following a succession of splits and alliances with other, minor parties, during the 1970s. One of those parties, the Party of New Forces (PFN, Parti des forces nouvelles), was an offshoot of the National Front, formed from a 1973 split headed by Alain Robert and François Brigneau who first organised the Comité faire front which subsequently merged into the PFN. The PFN was formed mainly by former members of New Order (Ordre nouveau, 1969–1973), who had refused to merge into the FN at its 1972 creation. New Order, dissolved by Interior Minister Raymond Marcellin in 1973, was itself a successor to Occident (1964–1968) and of the Union Defense Group (GUD, Groupe union défense). Close to the Third Position and supporting a "national-revolutionary" thesis, this tendency maintained links with the FN, despite some tensions. The GUD, in particular, had published the satiric monthly Alternative with the Youth Front (Front de la jeunesse), the youth organisation of the FN. They also had attempted alliances with other far-right parties in Europe, with New Order organising the alliance "A Fatherland for Tomorrow" (Une patrie pour demain) with the Spanish Falange, the Italian Social Movement (MSI) and the German National Democratic Party. This European strategy was continued by the PFN, who launched the Euroright alliance, with the MSI, the Spanish New Force and the Belgian PFN, for the 1979 European elections. Headed by Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour, the PFN won 1.3% of the vote. This electoral failure prompted Roland Gaucher and François Brigneau to quit the party and join Le Pen's National Front. The French far-right was divided in the 1981 presidential election, with both Pascal Gauchon (PFN) and Le Pen (FN) attempting, without success, to secure the 500 signatures from mayors necessary to stand as candidates. François Mitterrand (Socialist Party) won those elections, competing against Jacques Chirac (Rally for the Republic, RPR). These succeeding electoral defeats prompted the far-right to unify itself. In 1983, the FN managed to make its first electoral breakthrough, taking control of the town of Dreux: Jean-Pierre Stirbois obtained 17% of the votes in the first round, for the FN municipal list. In the second round, he merged his list with Chirac's RPR list (headed by Jean Hieaux), enabling the right to claim a victory against the left. Chirac supported the alliance with the far-right, claiming that the Socialist Party, allied with the Communist Party in government, had no lessons to give. This first electoral success was confirmed at the 1984 European elections, the FN obtaining 10% of the votes. Two years later, the FN gained 35 deputies (nearly 10% of the votes) at the 1986 legislative elections, running under the label of "Rassemblement national". Those elected included the monarchist Georges-Paul Wagner. Internal disputes continued however to divide the far-right. Following the 1986 elections, which brought Jacques Chirac to power as Prime Minister, some hardliners inside the FN broke away to create the French and European Nationalist Party (PNFE, Parti Nationaliste Français et Européen), along with members of Mark Frederiksen's Third Position FANE. Three former members of the PNFE were charged of having desecrated, in 1990, a Jewish cemetery in Carpentras. The PNFE was also implicated in the 1988 Cannes and Nice attacks. The most important split was headed by Bruno Mégret in 1999. Taking many FN elected representatives and party officials with him, he then created the National Republican Movement (MNR). However, with an eye to the 2007 legislative elections, he supported Le Pen's candidacy for the presidential election. During these presidential elections, Jean-Marie Le Pen only took 10.4% of the vote, compared to his 16.9% first round result in 2002, qualifying him for the second round, where he achieved 17.79% against 82.21% for Jacques Chirac (Rally for the Republic, RPR). With only 1.85% in the second round of the 2002 legislative elections, the FN failed to gain any seats in the National Assembly. In the 2007 presidential election, Le Pen finished fourth, behind Nicolas Sarkozy, Ségolène Royal and François Bayrou. Philippe de Villiers, the Catholic traditionalist candidate of the Movement for France (especially strong in the conservative Vendée region), was sixth, obtaining 2.23% of the vote. This electoral slump for the FN was confirmed at the 2007 legislative elections, the FN obtaining only 0.08% of the votes in the second round, and therefore no seats. These electoral defeats, which contrasted with the high score obtained at the 2002 presidential elections, caused financial problems for the FN, which was forced to sell its headquarters, the Paquebot, in Saint-Cloud. Le Pen then announced, in 2008, that he would not compete again in presidential elections, leaving the way for contest for the leadership of the FN between his daughter, Marine Le Pen, whom he favoured, and Bruno Gollnisch. The latter had been condemned in January 2007 for Holocaust denial, while Marine Le Pen attempted to follow a slicker strategy to give the FN a more "respectable" image. Since her election as the leader of the party in 2011, the popularity of the FN continued to grow apace as the party won several municipalities at the 2014 municipal elections; it topped the poll in France at the 2014 European elections with 25% of the vote; and again won more votes than any other party in the 2015 departmental elections. The party once again came in first place in the 2015 regional elections with a historic result of just under 28% of the vote. By 2015, the FN had established itself as one of the largest political forces in France, unusually being both most popular and most controversial political party. For the 2012 presidential election, Le Pen came third in the first round, scoring 17.9% – the partys then best showing ever for the FN. For the 2017 presidential election, Le Pen came second in the first round, scoring 21.3% – the best showing ever for the FN. in the second round she came second with 33.9% a best for NF. In 2018, the National Front was renamed National Rally. Far right parties have never enjoyed such a big popularity as they have done since the results of the 2017 and 2022 elections. For the 2022 presidential election, Le Pen came second in the first round, scoring 23.15% – the best showing ever for the RN. Eric Zemmour got 7.07%. Total Far Right vote was 32%, the highest vote ever in a French election. Marine Le Pen may have lost in the second round, but nonetheless her defeat had a taste of victory: the score of 41.46% was the best showing ever for the RN or for a Far Right candidate. The main reason of the success of the Rassemblement National lies with the political strategies of normalisation and dediabolisation led by Marine Le Pen and her fellow members of the party, to rally votes of right wing centrists, and to sweep away the extremism her father had cast upon the party. However, the most radical fraction of the Rassemblement National accused Marine Le Pen of not being radical enough. In parallel, Éric Zemmour, a far-right pundit with no previous party affiliation or political experience, created his own party, Reconquête. His views, as a former journalist, in topics such as immigration are much more outspoken and radical than Le Pens. He even overtook Le Pen in one of the polls in the early days of the creation of his party. Le Pen's niece, Marion Maréchal Le Pen, former member of RN became a member of Reconquête in 2021 while arguing herself and her aunt had "ideological differences". She was excluded of the party on the 18th June, accused of high treason by the head-of-party Eric Zemmour after she showed support for the Central- Far Right coalition between Eric Ciotti's Party The Republicans (France) and Rassemblement National. In the June 2022 Assemblée Nationale election, the RN gained 89 seats in the national assembly, winning the party enough seats to form a parliamentary group for the first time since 1986. The result of the European election was a long-awaited result for Le Pen. Arriving ahead of all other parties, Jordan Bardella's party "La France revient!" (lit. "France is coming back") cumulated 31,37% of votes. Turnout rate reached 51.49% and was 1.37 points higher than in 2019. To this, President Emmanuel Macron dissolved the French Assembly and called for anticipated legislative elections on 30th and 3 July, acknowledging "that he wouldn't act as is nothing had happened." and arguing that far right parties are the impoverishment of French people. On the night of June 9, following the announcement of new elections, Marion Maréchal called for a "coalition of the rights" in the hopes of forming a union between the RN, LR, Reconquête! and DLF, mixing right-wing and far-right parties. In the following days, Marion Maréchal met with RN officials to discuss the modalities of a potential RN and Reconquête! coalition. However, on June 11, talks between the two parties failed as Jordan Bardella refused "any direct or indirect association with Éric Zemmour". Despite not reaching an agreement, Marion Maréchal exhorted her followers to vote for the RN-LR alliance the next day. Éric Zemmour denounced Marion Maréchal's declaration, calling her out for her "treason" and excluding her from Reconquête!. On June 11, Éric Ciotti, the president of LR, announced during an interview on TF1 that he intended to form an alliance between his party and the RN, triggering The Republicans crisis. This announcement broke the historical cordon sanitaire between the French republican right and the far-right. However, many figures of LR criticized Éric Ciotti's decision to ally with the RN. In an interview in the evening on France 2, Jordan Bardella, president of the RN, confirmed the alliance between the RN and LR, declaring that a "deal" has been made between the two parties and that the RN will support multiple candidates of LR. On June 12, a political committee composed of influential members of LR declared the exclusion of Éric Ciotti from the party. Éric Ciotti contested this decision, claiming that he was still president of the party. This issue was brought to justice, where a judge temporarily invalidated the political committee's decision. However, a second political committee again excluded Éric Ciotti from LR on June 14. In response to the threat of a potential RN government, France's 4 major leftist parties, the PS, LFI, Les Écologistes and the PCF, announced a union of the lefts, forming the New Popular Front. Moreover, around 640 000 people mobilized against the far-right in a nationwide protest on June 15; 75 000 or 250 000 of which, depending on sources, were in Paris. Individuals and groups Other minor groups that are or have been active in the Fifth Republic include: See also References Bibliography In French |
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/פנחס_לבון] | [TOKENS: 19606] |
תוכן עניינים פנחס לבון פנחס לָבוֹן (12 ביולי 1904 – 24 בינואר 1976) היה מנהיג פועלים ופוליטיקאי ישראלי, חבר הכנסת ושר בממשלת ישראל. בתקופת כהונתו כשר הביטחון ולאחריה עמד במרכזה של פרשת העסק הביש שזיעזעה את הפוליטיקה הישראלית בשנים 1954–1965. קורות חייו נולד ב-1904 כפנחס לוּבּיַאנִיקֶר בעיירה קופיצ'ינצה (Kopyczyńce) בגליציה המזרחית, אז חלק מהאימפריה האוסטרו-הונגרית וכיום באוקראינה. בשנת 1926 הצטרף לתנועת הנוער גורדוניה והיה תוך זמן קצר למנהיג התנועה. בשנת 1929 עלה לארץ ישראל, הצטרף לקבוצה שהקימה את חולדה. הוא היה חבר בקבוצה, אך בעיקר עסק בפעילות ציבורית ופוליטית בחבר הקבוצות, בהסתדרות הכללית של העובדים ובמפא"י. בשנת 1937 התמנה לתפקיד מזכיר מפא"י ביחד עם נציג אחדות העבודה יצחק בן-אהרן בין השניים היו חילוקי דעות ובשנת 1938 התפטרו מתפקידם. לבון השתתף כנציג מפא"י בקונגרסים הציוניים בסוף שנות השלושים ובשנות הארבעים. ב-1940 נסע ללמוד בבית הספר לכלכלה של לונדון במימון משפחתו, ובמקביל פעל ליצירת קשרים עם מפלגת מפלגת הלייבור הבריטית (יחד עם משה שרת). ב-1942 נבחר לוועד הפועל של ההסתדרות ועד סוף שנות ה-40 מילא תפקידים שונים בהסתדרות. כמנהיג צעיר וכריזמטי היה לבון מושא להערצת נשים והיה מעורב במספר קשרים רומנטיים. ב-1948 התחתן עם לוסי אלשטיין, אישה משכילה ומוכשרת, שהייתה לו לעזר בחייו הציבוריים. נישואין אלה, בגיל מאוחר יחסית, שמו קץ לרינונים ולשמועות שנפוצו על יחסיו עם נשים. לזוג לא היו ילדים. בשנים 1949–1961 כיהן לבון כחבר הכנסת מהכנסת הראשונה ועד הכנסת הרביעית מטעם מפא"י. במקביל, כיהן בשנים 1949–1950 גם כמזכ"ל ההסתדרות הכללית. לקראת בחירות 1951, היה לבון אחד משלושת חברי ועדת המינויים (לצד דוד בן-גוריון ומשה שרת) שקבעו את רשימת מפא"י לכנסת. בשנת 1951 צורף על ידי בן-גוריון לממשלתו. בתחילה, בין השנים 1951–1952, היה שר החקלאות, ובשנים 1952–1953 היה שר בלי תיק. ביולי 1953 יצא בן-גוריון לחופשה ובחר בלבון לשמש ממלא מקומו כשר הביטחון. ב-7 בדצמבר 1953 מינה את לבון כשר ביטחון במקומו. לבון התפטר ב-1955 בעקבות עסק הביש והפרשה, ומונה ב-1956, בפעם השנייה, כמזכ"ל ההסתדרות. הוא אולץ להתפטר ב-1961 כתוצאה מההתעוררות הנוספת של הפרשה. ב-1964 פרש מפעילותו הציבורית. פנחס לבון היה מנהיג מוערך מאוד, אך גם שנוי במחלוקת, שנוהגו השכלתני ולשונו המושחזת הקנו לו יריבים ואויבים. בכל תפקידיו נחשב לאיש ביצוע מהמעלה הראשונה, וגם דובר חריף, ומתווה דרך פוליטי. נאומיו והמאמרים שכתב פורסמו במספר קבצים – "יסודות" (1941), "בוויכוח המדיני" (1945), "ערכים ותמורות" (1959). פנחס לבון נפטר ב-24 בינואר 1976, לאחר מחלה קשה שנמשכה שנים מספר ונקבר בבית העלמין בחולדה. ילדותו עברה בצל אירועי מלחמת העולם הראשונה, והפוגרום שערכו גייסותיו של סימון פטליורה ביהודי העיירה ב-1920. את אימי המלחמה הביאו לעיירה חיילי הצבאות הלוחמים שעברו בה והפליטים הרבים שמצאו בה מקלט. במהלך המלחמה הוגלה האב לסיביר על ידי השלטונות הרוסים, בתור "ערב" ככבא כח הקהילה היהודית, ומצבה הכלכלי של המשפחה – שלא הייתה עשירה עוד קודם לכן – הידרדר. בשנת 1917 חזר האב מהגלות, אך מיד לאחר מכן חלתה האם ומתה. פנחס, שהיה הבן הצעיר בין ששת ילדי המשפחה, התייתם בהיותו בן 14, וגודל על ידי אחותו חוה. אביו, הרב יוסף לוביאניקר, היה תלמיד חכם שחיבר את ספר ההלכות "חוט המשולש ברכי יוסף" ומראשי חסידות הוסיאטין, אך שלח את פנחס ללמוד בגימנסיה בלבוב. פנחס הצטיין בלימודים ועם סיום לימודיו התיכוניים נרשם לאוניברסיטת לבוב והתקבל לפקולטות היוקרתיות למשפטים ולכלכלה. גם באוניברסיטה הצטיין בלימודיו אך בעיקר קרא הרבה והרחיב את ידיעותיו בתחומי הכלכלה, החברה והפוליטיקה. אביו עודד אותו להמשיך בלימודיו ואף מימן אותם בחלקם, אך פנחס שבעקבות אחיו, זליג וצבי לבון (לוביאניקר) התרחק מהדת, היה לציוני נלהב וריכז את מאמציו בפעילות בתנועת הנוער הציונית גורדוניה. אחיו זליג ואחותו חוה עלו לארץ ישראל ב-1924, בלווית אביהם שכחסיד הוסיאטין נטה לקו הציוני. לבון (אז עוד לוביאניקר) לא היה בין מייסדיה של גורדוניה, שנוסדה בגליציה ב-1925, אך עם הצטרפותו לתנועה ב-1926 היה לאחד ממנהיגיה הבולטים. כמו תנועות הנוער היהודיות הציוניות האחרות, שפרחו במרכז ובמזרח אירופה בשנים שלאחר מלחמת העולם הראשונה, חיפשה גורדוניה את ייחודה כארגון של בני נוער ואת דרכה המיוחדת בציונות. גורדוניה הושפעה בראשית דרכה מהשומר הצעיר, שבאותן שנים הייתה תנועת הנוער המובילה במזרח גליציה. גורדוניה שאלה ממנה את דפוסי ההתארגנות אך לא את רוח התנועה. לבון הסתייג מרוח "תרבות הנעורים" שאימץ השומר הצעיר בהשראת תנועת הנוער הגרמנית "ואנדרפוגל". לדעתו החברותא הנרקמת בין בני הנוער היא חשובה, אך אינה ישות תרבותית מקורית, היכולה לצמוח רק מתוך יצירה אמנותית, מסורת הדורות וניסיון החיים. הוא התנגד לגישה המתנשאת הפוסלת את העם היהודי "הגלותי" וטען שעל הנוער לפעול בתוך החברה ומתוך התחשבות במציאות להביא לשינוי המיוחל. המהפכה הציונית והיהודית שהנוער שואף אליה חייבת להיות חלק מ"שלשלת ההיסטוריה העברית ומערכי הרוח ההיסטוריים של האומה" כבר בימיו הראשונים בגורדוניה התבלט לבון כאחד הדוברים הרהוטים והמרשימים ביותר בוועידות התנועה ובהופעותיו בסניפים. הוא אימץ את המצע האידאי של מייסדי גורדוניה שראו עצמם כממשיכי הדרך של צעירי ציון והפועל הצעיר וכתלמידיו של א"ד גורדון, גם ביחס ללאומיות ולציונות וגם ביחס לסוציאליזם. הוא התנגד בחריפות גם לסוציאליזם המרקסיסטי הדוגמטי שאימצה תנועת השומר הצעיר וגם ללאומנות ולמיליטריזם של התנועה הרוויזיוניסטית. הייעוד של גורדוניה ותפקידה בהגשמת הציונות התמצו לדעתו בעליה לארץ ו"כיבוש הארץ והעבודה, החקלאות, השפה והאדם, תוך מאמצי הגשמה חלוציים". בשנת 1929 עלה לארץ ישראל עם קבוצת גורדוניה א' שהייתה אחת מחמש קבוצות של חניכי גורדוניה שעלו באותה שנה. הקבוצה שישבה בחדרה הייתה מיועדת להצטרף לפלוגה מקובצת של נציגים מקבוצות גורדוניה שיצאו להקים מחדש את הנקודה חולדה, שנהרסה במאורעות תרפ"ט. לבון היה מעורב מאוד בחיי הקבוצה, בעיקר בתהליכי קבלת חברים חדשים ובגיבוש חיי החברה שלה. לבון דחף את חברי הקבוצה לעלות להתיישבות למרות שלא זכו לתמיכת המוסדות הלאומיים, וניסה לעזור להם על ידי גיוס תרומות מסניפי גורדוניה בגולה ומנדבנים. עם זאת, לבון לא השתלב כלל במשימות העבודה של חברי הקבוצה. למרות הדיבורים הגבוהים על ערך העבודה בכלל והעבודה בחקלאות בפרט ולמרות הקשר המיוחד שהיה לו עם הקבוצה, קודם בחדרה ואחר כך בחולדה, הוא היה פעיל ציבור שנע בין ירושלים, תל אביב ופולין, ועסק בענייני קבוצות ההתיישבות של גורדוניה, בשאלות הארגוניות והאידאולוגיות של התנועה ואחר כך המפלגה. לבון הפך למנהיג הבלתי מוכרז של גורדוניה גם בזכות יכולותיו האינטלקטואליות וכישוריו הארגוניים, וגם מכיוון שהיה היחידי מבין האישים המובילים בתנועה שהיה לו את האמביציה והדחף לקידום ולהנהגה פוליטית. אחד מן הנושאים המרכזיים שבהם עסק היה המשך קיומה של גורדוניה כתנועה עצמאית השומרת על דרכה הייחודית, אל מול הצורך להשתלב ולהתאחד עם ארגונים גדולים יותר. גורדוניה הייתה קשורה מימיה הראשונים בפולין עם מפלגת "ההתאחדות העולמית של 'הפועל הצעיר' ו'צעירי ציון'". ואחר כך בארץ ישראל עם מפא"י, אך המשיכה לראות את עצמה לא כגוף מפלגתי-פוליטי אלא כתנועת נוער המגשימה את הציונות בדרך של ההתיישבות הקיבוצית, ורואה את עיקר תפקידה בחינוך האדם. לבון הסתייג מדרכן של התנועות הקיבוציות שהתגבשו כבר בשנות ה-1920 – הקיבוץ הארצי שהיה קשור לתנועת השומר הצעיר והקיבוץ המאוחד שהייתה לו זיקה ברורה למפלגת אחדות העבודה. לבון התנגד לקולקטיביות הרעיונית של השומר הצעיר, ולדרך של "הקיבוץ הגדול" ולארגון הארצי הצנטרליסטי שדגל בו הקיבוץ המאוחד. הוא האמין ב"קבוצה אורגנית-משקית" – קבוצה שבין חבריה מתקיימת שותפות באורח חיים, עזרה הדדית, ושאיפה ליצירת הוויה תרבותית-חברתית. קבוצה כזו היא מצומצמת במספר חבריה "כדי שתהיה בה מזיגה בין יעילות משקית, קשרי חברה ויעילות חינוכית". על אף קשיים והתלבטויות הצטרפה גורדוניה ב-1934, בהנהגת לבון, לחבר הקבוצות, התנועה הקיבוצית שהלמה יותר את אופיה וייחודה. בתחילת שנות הארבעים הוביל לבון לאיחוד גורדוניה עם תנועת "מכבי הצעיר". למרות שעם הזמן התרכז לבון בפעילותו במפא"י ובהסתדרות, יוצאי גורדוניה שהתיישבו בקבוצות הפזורות בארץ המשיכו לראות בו את מנהיגם, לפנות אליו בשעת דחק, וגם לעמוד לצידו בימים הקשים שנכונו לו בפוליטיקה. לבון נבחר לוועד הפועל של ההסתדרות ב-1942 אך היה מעורב בשאלות הקשורות בקביעת דרכה עוד קודם לכן. במאבק החריף שפרץ בשנות ה-1930 בין מפא"י וההסתדרות לבין הסתדרות העובדים הלאומית, התנועה הרוויזיוניסטית ובית"ר, התנגד לבון לניסיונות למנוע עבודה מפועלים רוויזיוניסטים. על אף שהיה מתנגד חריף ביותר לדרכה של התנועה הרוויזיוניסטית, בעיקר לאחר שדבקה בה ההאשמה ברצח ארלוזורוב, שאותו העריץ, ושהיה ידידו ושותפו לדרך. לבון טען שגם פועלים רוויזיוניסטים וחברי בית"ר שייכים למעמד הפועלים ואין למנוע מהם עבודה ולנהוג כלפיהם באלימות. הוא חתר להסכם שבו יכירו הרוויזיוניסטים בעקרון של זכות השביתה של הפועל, גם כדי לצמצם את יכולתם של הרוויזיוניסטים לשבור את השביתות שהכריזה ההסתדרות כדי לאלץ את המעסיקים, בעיקר הפרדסנים, להעסיק פועלים יהודים. לבון גילה דעות עצמאיות המנוגדות לעמדה המקובלת במפא"י ובהסתדרות גם בשאלת מעמדו של הפועל הערבי. ב-1947 עמד לבון בראש ועדה במפא"י שעסקה במעמד הפועל הערבי במדינה היהודית שתקום. לבון ראה לנגד עיניו מדינה דמוקרטית עם דגש על זכויות האזרח שיתקיים בה שיתוף פעולה בין עובדים יהודים וערבים. הוא תבע ביטול כל אפליה כלפי עבודה ערבית (חוץ מעבודות הקק"ל) ודרש שמפא"י תתמוך בפתיחת שעריה של ההסתדרות הכללית בפני פועלים ערבים. ביולי 1949 נבחר לבון למזכ"ל ההסתדרות אך כיהן בתפקיד רק כשנה וחצי, מאחר שצורף לממשלה ב-1950, תחילה כשר החקלאות והמזון ואחר כך כשר בלי תיק, המתאם בין השרים הכלכליים. מינואר 1954 כיהן בתפקיד שר הביטחון עד התפטרותו בפברואר 1955 בעקבות עסק הביש. בין השנים 1956–1961 כיהן שוב כמזכ"ל ההסתדרות. מעברים אלה בין הממשלה לבין הנהגת ההסתדרות נתפסו כמובנים מאליהם בתקופה שבה ההסתדרות היוותה בעצם מעין זרוע מבצעת של הממשלה לקידום יעדים לאומיים כמו קליטת עלייה, פיתוח המשק, פיזור אוכלוסין ופיתוח אזורי הספר. הממשלה כיבדה את עצמאות ההסתדרות ולא הלאימה את מוסדותיה שמילאו תפקידים שהיו במהותם ממלכתיים, ונתנה לגופים הכלכליים של חברת העובדים קדימות מובהקת ומונופולין. לבון דגל במשק מבוזר שיש בו גם מגזרים סוציאליסטיים וגם קפיטליסטיים, ועם זאת שיש בו שליטה והכוונה של המדינה באותן נקודות מפתח הדרושות לפיתוח ומונעות מונופולים. בקדנציה השנייה שלו בהסתדרות נחשב לבון כרפורמטור חשוב. עיקרן של הרפורמות שניסה להוביל היו יתר דמוקרטיזציה – ביזור הכוח ושילוב העובדים באיגוד המקצועי, בקופת חולים ועוד. כוונתו הייתה לצמצם את הריכוזיות ולהגביר את השיקולים הכלכליים בפעילות החברות של חברת העובדים. הוא ביקש מחד לחזק את מזכירות חברת העובדים כגוף מפקח, שהחברות מחויבות להציג לו דו"ח שנתי של פעילותן. מאידך פעל לחיזוק המניעים הכלכליים העצמאיים של המפעלים על ידי ביטול העזרה ההדדית הבלתי-מותנית למפעלים כושלים וסגירת מפעלים בלתי כלכליים, העדפת שותפויות עם גורמים לא הסתדרותיים ובעיקר הממשלה וביזור וחלוקת סמכויות של מפעלים גדולים. בנוסף ניסה לפעול ליתר דמוקרטיזציה במקומות העבודה. לבון חשב שצריך לנתק את החברות בקופת החולים מהחברות בהסתדרות, בטענה שאנשים פונים לקופת חולים על מנת להבריא, ולא משיקולים סוציאליסטיים. לפיכך הציע שדמי החברות בקופת חולים ייגבו על ידי המדינה ולא על ידי ההסתדרות. ההצעה נבלמה על ידי ראשי מפא"י, שחששו לאבד עוצמה פוליטית. עם זאת בתקופת כהונתו יזם לבון שינויים רבים בנוהלי העבודה בקופת חולים שמטרתם שיפור השירות שהיא מעניקה לחבריה. בין היתר נוצר אז המוסד של "רופא המשפחה". לבון גם עמד מאחורי גיוס הכספים להקמת בית החולים סורוקה בבאר שבע, לרווחת תושבי הנגב. במרכז הרפורמות שניסה להעביר בהסתדרות היה המהלך לריסון כוחה של סולל בונה. בשנות ה-50 גדל כוחה של "סולל בונה". מנהלי הקונצרן ובראשם הלל דן עשו בו כבתוך שלהם, מנעו תחרות במשק והפריעו להקמת שורה של מפעלים באזורי הפיתוח תוך ניצול מעמדם כמונופול. לבון פיצל את "סולל בונה" לשניים: קונצרן תעשייתי – "כור", וחברת בניה ששמרה על השם "סולל בונה". הרפורמה נעשתה חרף התנגדותם של רבים ממנהלי הקונצרן, בקדימות שנתן להבטחת יציבות המשק במדינה ולשמירת השיקולים הממלכתיים, נמצא לבון בכמה מקרים בעמדה המנוגדת למאבק עובדים על שכרם ותנאי עבודתם, כמו בשביתת הימאים ב-1951 ובשביתה של פועלי בית החרושת אתא ב-1956. עמדתו של לבון הייתה כרוכה גם בהתנגדותו למדיניות העצמאית והכוחנית שנקט יוסף אלמוגי, מזכיר מועצת פועלי חיפה, ובחשש מכוחה של מפ"ם שאותה האשים בנטיות מרכסיסטיות מסוכנות. בסופו של דבר, השאלות החשובות בנושאי משק וכלכלה באותן שנים, ומינוי בעלי התפקידים בהסתדרות או בממשלה ובשירות המדינה, הוכרעו בישיבות של "חברינו" – הנהגת מפא"י, שלבון היה חלק ממנה. גם אם היו בהן דיונים, ויכוחים ומחלוקות קשות, מי שהשפיע ובדרך כלל קבע בהן היה דוד בן-גוריון. כשיצא בן-גוריון לחופשה של שלושה חודשים ב-19 ביולי 1953, הוא מינה את לבון כממלא מקומו במשרד הביטחון. לאחר שהודיע על פרישתו לשדה בוקר ב-7 בדצמבר 1953 מינה את לבון כשר ביטחון במקומו ומשה שרת מונה כראש ממשלה. יום לפני כן מינה את שמעון פרס למנכ"ל משרד הביטחון ואת משה דיין לרמטכ"ל. ההרכב הפרסונלי הזה היה הגורם העיקרי למתחים ולסכסוכים שליוו את תקופת כהונתו של לבון כשר הביטחון. בתקופה שקדמה לקום המדינה היה לבון רחוק מנושאי הביטחון ביישוב. הוא החזיק בעמדות מתונות בנושאים המדיניים והביטחוניים ונמנה עם האגף המתון במפא"י. הוא הסתייג מפעולות אלימות כנגד הבריטים והתנגד למעשי נקמה אלימים, הכוללים פגיעה בחפים מפשע, בתגובה לטרור הערבי. פעילותו במשרד הביטחון החלה בתקופה שהתאפיינה במתח ביטחוני רב. פלסטינים שחיו במחנות פליטים ברצועת עזה ובירדן ניסו עם תום מלחמת העצמאות להסתנן אל מעבר לגבול כדי לחזור לכפריהם, לקצור את שדותיהם ולאסוף את היבול. בהמשך החלו המסתננים להתארגן בקבוצות. מקצתן של הקבוצות גויסו לשם פעולות מודיעין בישראל ואחרות ביצעו מעשי שוד, חבלה ורצח. ישראל הגיבה בפעולות תגמול שאותן הובילו בן-גוריון ודיין, בעוד ששרת הסתייג מהן כשר החוץ ואחר כך כראש הממשלה וסבר שעל ישראל להגיב במישור המדיני על ידי תלונות לוועדת שביתת הנשק של האו"ם. לבון סבר שהתלונות הללו אינן אפקטיביות, ועל מעשי טרור יש להגיב בפעולות תגמול צבאיות. לבון, על אף עברו המתון, תמך בפעולות התגמול, אם כי הזהיר מפני ריבוי מקרים של פעולות שלא קיבלו את אישור הדרג המדיני ומפני פעולות הפוגעות באוכלוסייה חפה מפשע. דוגמה מובהקת לחילוקי הדעות בין לבון ושרת היא פרשת "בת גלים". המצרים חסמו את תעלת סואץ בפני אוניות ישראליות, בניגוד לדרישת המעצמות. ביוזמת שרת נשלחה האנייה "בת גלים" כדי להעמיד את המצרים במבחן. המצרים עצרו את האנייה ושבו את צוותה. האו"ם והמעצמות מחו בקול רפה, אך לא נקפו אצבע, בדיוק כפי שלבון חזה. חילוקי הדעות הללו זכו לביטוי פומבי כאשר שרת הציג בכנסת את השאלה האם מדינת ישראל חפצה להיות "מדינה של חוק או של שוד"? בדיון אחר בכנסת התייחס לבון לשאלה זו באומרו: "מדינת ישראל, כמו כל מדינה, חיה על פי שני חוקים – ואין סתירה בין שני החוקים האלה. החוק האחד הוא החוק הבינלאומי, ומדינת ישראל רואה עצמה מחויבת לפעול על פי החוק הזה. אבל היא חיה גם על פי חוק שני, שעל פיו חיות גם יתר המדינות, והוא החוק הטבעי של ההגנה העצמית". עם זאת לבון נכשל בדיווח לקוי לראש הממשלה הממונה עליו. פעמים רבות בוצעו פעולות צבאיות בניגוד להוראות הדרג המדיני או תוך חריגה מהן. לבון נאבק בראשי הצבא על מנת לאכוף משמעת, אך כלפי חוץ העניק גיבוי לקצונה הבכירה וכך נוצר הרושם שלבון מנהל מדיניות עצמאית בניגוד לדעתו של ראש הממשלה. כתוצאה מכך הורעו מאוד היחסים בין שרת ולבון. היחסים בין לבון לבין דיין לא היו תקינים מלכתחילה, ובמהלך כהונתו של דיין כרמטכ"ל תחת שר הביטחון לבון, הורעו היחסים אף יותר. לבון היה איש דור הביניים במפא"י, ויריבו הפוליטי של דיין. ברוח הימים ההם היה דיין חבר מרכז מפא"י והתפטר ממנו רק משהתמנה לרמטכ"ל. לבון ראה את עצמו כיורשו של בן-גוריון, ואת מינויו לשר ביטחון ראה כאישור למעמדו זה. ראייה זו הכניסה אותו למסלול התנגשות עם חבורת הצעירים שטיפח בן-גוריון, ובראשם דיין ושמעון פרס ששימש כמנכ"ל משרד הביטחון. על אף ששני האישים, דיין ולבון, החזיקו בראייה ביטחונית דומה, החלו עד מהרה סכסוכים ביניהם. המאבק על הסמכויות בין שר הביטחון לבין הרמטכ"ל הביא לחוסר בהירות באשר לשאלת הקשר הישיר בין קצינים בכירים ובין שר הביטחון. כאשר נודע לדיין, באמצע 1954 כי מפקד חיל האוויר, דן טולקובסקי, נועד ישירות עם לבון, הגיש את התפטרותו, אך שוכנע על ידי דוד בן-גוריון לחזור בו. לחילוקי דעות אלו היו גורמים נוספים, שהתבטאו אף בדברים עקרוניים, כגון דרישתו של דיין לרכוש מן הצרפתים טנקים מסוג AMX-13, עליה הטיל לבון וטו. דיין ופרס ראו חשיבות עליונה ביצירת ברית עם ממשלת צרפת, תוך תמיכה במדיניותה הקולוניאליסטית באלג'יר. דיין אף הציע לצרפתים שיתוף פעולה צבאי באלג'יר. לבון, שהבין שהעידן הקולוניאליסטי הגיע לידי סיום, ראה בצרפת משענת קנה רצוץ ושאף לחיזוק הקשרים עם ארצות הברית. תפיסתו של לבון מומשה כעשר שנים מאוחר יותר בימיו של לוי אשכול כשר הביטחון. לבון נתקל בקושי לכפות את מרותו כשר גם על המנכ"ל פרס. בניגוד לבן-גוריון שנהג לפקוד את משרד הביטחון רק פעם בשבוע היה לבון שר ביטחון במשרה מלאה, פעיל ויורד לפרטים. הוא חלק על טענת פרס שמערכת הביטחון יעילה וראה הזדמנויות לחיסכון גם במערכת הביטחון. הוא קיצץ בצבא הקבע מבלי לפגוע במצבת הכוח הלוחם, ובכך אפשר הצטיידות של הצבא באמצעי לחימה נוספים. בשנת כהונתו כשר ביטחון הוגדלה מצבת החטיבות הלוחמות של צה"ל. יחידה 101 פורקה והשתלבה בחטיבת הצנחנים. לבון עמד על זכותו כשר ביטחון להמשיך בפגישות עם בכירי צה"ל, וביניהם ראש אמ"ן, אל"ם בנימין גיבלי. לימים תהיה לעניין חשיבות מכרעת בשאלה "מי נתן ההוראה" לגיבלי להפעיל רשת של מרגלים יהודים במצרים, ולהורות להם לחבל במתקנים בריטים על מנת למנוע את הסתלקותה של בריטניה מאזור תעלת סואץ. בעת שניתנה ההוראה לגיבלי, היה דיין בביקור בארצות הברית, ולבון טען כי לא הוא שנתן את ההוראה. לימים תהיה לפרשיה זו, שנודעה בכינוי "העסק הביש", חשיבות מכרעת בהיסטוריה הפוליטית של מדינת ישראל. על פי יומניו של משה שרת, לבון רצה ליזום פעולות פרובוקציה נוספת במדינות ערב, בין השאר להפציץ בירות שונות במזרח התיכון, בהן בגדאד, ולפגוע בקונסוליה הבריטית כדי לסכסך בין הממלכה המאוחדת וירדן. ב-8 בדצמבר 1954 הודיעה מצרים כי חשפה רשת ריגול ישראלית. העצורים, צעירים יהודים אזרחי מצרים, נשפטו לתקופות מאסר ארוכות, ושניים מהם אף נתלו על חלקם ברשת. פעולות הרשת נחשפו עוד ביולי 1954. על אף שישראל הכחישה את חלקה ברשת, התברר כי גורמים בצה"ל הורו לצעירים לפגוע באתרים בעלי קשר לבריטניה ולארצות הברית, על מנת להבאיש את ריחה של מצרים בעיני מדינות המערב. ניסיון ראשון לברר מי אחראי לתסבוכת שנוצרה נעשה על ידי שרת, שמינה לשם כך ועדת שניים: נשיא בית המשפט העליון, יצחק אולשן, והרמטכ"ל לשעבר, יעקב דורי. הוועדה לא הצליחה לרדת לשורש העניין, וכתבה: "לא שוכנענו למעלה מכל ספק המתקבל על הדעת כי ראש אמ"ן לא קיבל את ההוראה משר הביטחון פנחס לבון. עם זאת, איננו בטוחים שלבון נתן את ההוראה המיוחסת לו". בעקבות פעילות הוועדה התפטר לבון מתפקידו בפברואר 1955, אף שטען כי לא נתן את ההוראה. בשנת 1960 התעוררה מחדש "הפרשה". דוד בן-גוריון כותב בספרו "דברים כהוויתם": עד שנת 1960 לא הגיע אלי שום הד מ'פרשת 1954' ... ביום 5 במאי 1960 בא אצלי לבון ואמר לי ששמע ... כי זויפו תעודות בצה"ל... מיד הטלתי על מזכירי הצבאי לבדוק העניין. בן-גוריון מוסיף כי ביקש גם הקמת ועדת חקירה בעניין "האדם השלישי", שהיה קשור ב"עסק הביש", "ועדת כהן", שהוקמה בעת שהותו של לבון בחו"ל. לבון, על ידי מזכירו, ביקש מבן-גוריון את ביטולה. בשובו לישראל, נפגש לבון עם בן-גוריון ב-26 בספטמבר 1960 ודרש את טיהור שמו מן האחריות ל"עסק הביש". בן-גוריון סירב ואמר לו: פנחס, אני לא פסלתי אותך, אבל אני איני שופט, ואיני יכול לזכות אותך. לבון פירש זאת כהתחמקות ותקף בחריפות את שמעון פרס, שהיה מנכ"ל משרד הביטחון בתקופת "העסק הביש", ואת מי שהוזכר רק בכינוי "הקצין הבכיר" – בנימין גיבלי, שעמד בראש אגף המודיעין של צה"ל. גיבלי טען שקיבל הוראה בעל פה משר הביטחון, לבון. ועדת בירור שמינה הרמטכ"ל, בראשות השופט חיים כהן, לא גילתה הוכחות לזיוף המכתב של גיבלי, אך קבעה כי נעלמו מסמכים והייתה הדחה לעדות שקר וכך חיזקה בממצאיה את טענותיו של לבון. ב-1958 נעצר ונשפט אברי אלעד מי שכונה "האדם השלישי", מפעיל הרשת במצרים ואחד מהעדים נגד לבון בוועדת אולשן-דורי, בגין מגע עם סוכן זר, והגילוי כי הוא נחשד כסוכן כפול מצרי. בעקבות זאת החליטה הממשלה למנות לבירור נוסף ועדה שהורכבה משבעה שרי ממשלה, בראשותו של שר המשפטים, פנחס רוזן. ב-25 בדצמבר 1960 הגישה "ועדת השבעה" את מסקנותיה, שבהן נקבע פה-אחד שלבון לא נתן את ההוראה, ואף לא ידע על הפעולה. בעקבות מסקנות אלה התפטר בנימין גיבלי מצה"ל. לימים התברר כי עדויות קציני אמ"ן בפני ועדת אולשן-דורי היו מתואמות, ומסמך שהוצג בפניה זויף על ידי דליה כרמל, מזכירתו של בנימין גיבלי. בן-גוריון, שלא הסכים למתן זיכוי לפוליטיקאי על ידי ועדה של פוליטיקאים (גם אם כולם שרים) שאינה "ועדת חקירה משפטית", דרש (מסיבות אחרות, לדבריו) להדיח את לבון מהזירה הפוליטית. בציבור נוצר הרושם כאילו בן-גוריון רואה בלבון אויב אישי, ורודף אותו על לא עוול בכפו. מרכז מפא"י, שנאלץ להכריע בסכסוך זה, נכנע ללחצו של בן-גוריון, וב-4 בפברואר 1961 הדיח את לבון מתפקיד מזכ"ל ההסתדרות, ומחק אותו מרשימת מועמדי המפלגה לכנסת. בשנת 1962 התגבשה סביב לבון קבוצה מבין חברי מפא"י, שפעלה תחת השם "מן היסוד". בקבוצה נכללו כמה מהאינטלקטואלים החשובים של התקופה כמו הפרופסורים נתן רוטנשטרייך, יהושע אריאלי, יעקב טלמון ושלמה אבינרי, העיתונאים לוי יצחק הירושלמי ודן הורביץ, הסופר עמוס עוז ויונה כסה שהיה חבר כנסת ומזכיר מפא"י לשעבר. הקבוצה הוציאה דו-שבועון בשם "מן היסוד", בו ניתנה במה גם לאישים מחוץ לקבוצה (למשל, ראש הממשלה לשעבר, משה שרת). הקבוצה ראתה עצמה כהתארגנות אידאולוגית שמטרתה להעלות את רמת השיח הציבורי במדינת ישראל, בפרט בשאלות חברתיות-כלכליות ולא כהתארגנות מפלגתית-סיעתית. אנשי הקבוצה הביעו דאגה עמוקה למצבה של מפא"י, ההולכת ומתרחקת מציבור העובדים אותו היא מתימרת לייצג. לדעתם הגיעה השעה לבירורים עקרוניים-אידאולוגים בשאלות יסוד. בשנת 1964 הודיעה קבוצת מן היסוד על פרישה ממפא"י, אך המאבקים בתוך מפא"י נמשכו, כשהתקפות בן-גוריון כוונו עכשיו כנגד ההנהגה הוותיקה ובעיקר כנגד לוי אשכול ראש הממשלה. עם הקמת המערך – דרשו נציגי מפא"י התחייבות מוקדמת שלבון לא ייכלל ברשימה המשותפת מטעם "אחדות העבודה". לבון ראה בהקמת המערך צעד חשוב, ועל כן עודד את תומכיו להצטרף למערך על בסיס אישי, בעוד הוא נותר בחוץ. קבוצת "מן היסוד" לא התגבשה למפלגה, ולבון עצמו הוכרע על ידי מצב בריאות רופף, ופרש כליל מעולם הפוליטיקה עוד בשנת 1964. בשנת 1968 יצא לאור ספרו של לבון, "בנתיבי עיון ומאבק", ובו אוסף מאמרים ונאומים שלו, וכן הספר "חברת עבודה". פנחס לבון נפטר בשנת 1976 והובא למנוחות בקיבוץ חולדה. על שמו קרויים היישוב לבון בגליל, מכון לבון: המכון לחקר תנועת העבודה והחלוץ ורחובות בתל אביב, בחולון, חיפה, בנתניה, בפתח תקווה ובקריית ים. מספריו לקריאה נוספת קישורים חיצוניים הערות שוליים שרים נוספים במשרד הביטחון: מיכאל ביטון • בצלאל סמוטריץ' |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_Minister_of_Artsakh] | [TOKENS: 140] |
Contents State Minister of Artsakh The State Minister of Artsakh was a political post in the government of Republic of Artsakh. The position was introduced after constitutional amendments, which were approved in a constitutional referendum in 2017, and after the Prime Minister of Artsakh post was abolished. Following the Azerbaijani offensive on 19 September 2023, Artsakh agreed to dissolve itself by 1 January 2024, however instead of dissolving, they established a government-in-exile in Yerevan, Armenia. The Prime Minister of Armenia, Nikol Pashinyan, has since severely opposed the government-in-exile's existence in Armenia. List of state ministers See also References External links |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Republic_of_Artsakh] | [TOKENS: 12507] |
Contents Republic of Artsakh Artsakh (/ˈɑːrtsɑːx, -sæx/ ART-sa(h)kh), officially the Republic of Artsakh[d] or the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh (/nəˌɡɔːrnoʊ kərəˈbɑːk/ nə-GOR-noh kər-ə-BAHK),[e] was a breakaway state in the South Caucasus whose territory was internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan. Between 1991 and 2023, Artsakh controlled parts of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic, including its capital Stepanakert. It had been an enclave within Azerbaijan from the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war until the 2023 Azerbaijani offensive, when the Azerbaijani military took control over the remaining territory controlled by Artsakh. Its only overland access route to Armenia after the 2020 war was via the five-kilometre-wide (3.1 mi) Lachin corridor, which was placed under the supervision of Russian peacekeeping forces. The predominantly Armenian-populated region of Nagorno-Karabakh was claimed by both the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic and the First Republic of Armenia when both countries became independent in 1918 after the fall of the Russian Empire. A brief war over the region broke out in 1920. The dispute was largely shelved after the Soviet Union established control over the area, and created the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) within the Azerbaijan SSR in 1923; however, throughout the Soviet period, Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast were heavily discriminated against. The Soviet Azerbaijani authorities worked to suppress Armenian culture and identity in Nagorno-Karabakh, pressured Armenians to leave the region and encouraged Azerbaijanis to settle within it, although Armenians remained the majority population. The local Armenians of the area, motivated by fears of cultural and physical erasure under government policies from Azerbaijan, began the 1988 Karabakh movement advocating for reunification (Miatsum) with Armenia.[verification needed] This was met with extreme violence from Azerbaijani authorities and civilians, escalating tensions and culminating in a referendum in 1991 which overwhelmingly opted for independence. The conflict erupted into a full-out war in 1992. The war was won by Artsakh with support from Armenia. Although a ceasefire agreement was signed in 1994, the frozen situation left the predominantly Armenian-populated territory de facto independent, with a self-proclaimed government in Stepanakert, but still heavily reliant on and closely integrated with Armenia, in many ways functioning as a de facto part of Armenia. Even though Armenia never officially recognised the region's independence, it became the main financial and military supporter of the territory. In 2017, a referendum in the area approved a new constitution that transformed the system of government from a semi-presidential to a presidential democracy with a unicameral legislature in addition to changing the name of the state from the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh to the Republic of Artsakh, although both names remained official. From 1994 until 2020, Armenian and Azerbaijani troops remained separated by a contested line of contact which saw sporadic deadly incidents during the intervening years. In 2020, a new war was fought in the region, with Azerbaijan achieving victory and regaining all the surrounding occupied districts and a significant portion of Artsakh's claimed territory. The Lachin corridor linking Artsakh to Armenia was blockaded by Azerbaijan in December 2022. In September 2023, Azerbaijan launched another military offensive. The government of Artsakh agreed to disarm and enter talks with Azerbaijan, resulting in the expulsion of all ethnic Armenians from the area. On 28 September 2023, the president of Artsakh signed a decree to dissolve all of the republic's institutions by 1 January 2024, though the president later attempted to annul this decree. By 1 October 2023, almost the entire population of the region had fled to Armenia, marking the end of a millennia-old Armenian presence in Nagorno-Karabakh. Etymology According to scholars, inscriptions dating to the Urartian period mention the region under a variety of names: "Ardakh", "Urdekhe", and "Atakhuni". In his Geography, the classical historian Strabo refers to an Armenian region which he calls "Orchistene", which is believed by some to be a Greek version of the old name of Artsakh. According to another hypothesis put forth by David M. Lang, the ancient name of Artsakh possibly derives from the name of King Artaxias I of Armenia (190–159 BC), founder of the Artaxiad dynasty and the kingdom of Greater Armenia. Folk etymology holds that the name is derived from "Ar" (Aran) and "tsakh" (woods, garden) (i.e., the gardens of Aran Sisakean, the first nakharar of northeastern Armenia). The name "Nagorno-Karabakh", commonly used in English, comes from the Russian name which means "Mountainous Karabakh". Karabakh is a Turkish/Persian word thought to mean "black garden". The Azerbaijani name for the area, "Dağlıq Qarabağ", has the same meaning as the Russian name. The term "Artsakh" lacks the non-Armenian influences present in "Nagorno-Karabakh". Artsakh was revived for use in the 19th century, and was the preferred term used by the population, in English and Russian as well as Armenian. "Mountainous Karabakh" was sometimes employed directly as part of the official English name, "Republic of Mountainous Karabakh". This reflected an attempt to shift away from the negative associations thought linked with "Nagorno-Karabakh" due to the war. History In the lead-up to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was revitalised. In 1987–88, a mass movement started in Nagorno-Karabakh and Soviet Armenia calling on the Soviet authorities to transfer the region to Armenia, citing self-determination laws in the Soviet constitution. Starting with the pogrom against Armenians in the Azerbaijani town of Sumgait in February 1988, the conflict became increasingly violent, and attempts by Moscow to resolve the dispute failed. In summer 1988, the legislatures of Soviet Armenia and the NKAO passed resolutions declaring the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, which were rejected by Azerbaijani and central Soviet authorities. Azerbaijan declared its independence from the Soviet Union on August 30, 1991, and Azerbaijan formally achieved its sovereignty following a referendum on September 21, 1991. Later, on November 27, 1991, the parliament revoked the autonomous status of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, prompting local leaders to call for a referendum on independence from Azerbaijan on December 10, 1991. The result saw approximately 99 percent of ethnic Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh region vote for separation. Artur Mkrtchyan was chosen as president of the Nagorno-Karabakh region following parliamentary elections on December 28, 1991. On January 2, 1992, President Ayaz Mutallibov of Azerbaijan placed the Nagorno-Karabakh region under direct presidential control, and Nagorno-Karabakh formally declared its independence from Azerbaijan on January 6, 1992. The declaration was rejected by newly independent Azerbaijan, leading to the outbreak of full-scale war with Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh on one side and Azerbaijan on the other. The First Nagorno-Karabakh War ended with a ceasefire in May 1994, with Armenian forces controlling practically the entire territory of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast as well as most of seven adjacent districts of Azerbaijan. According to UNHCR, the conflict resulted in over 600,000 internally displaced people within Azerbaijan. The Republic of Artsakh became a de facto independent country, though closely integrated with Armenia, while its territory remained internationally recognised as part of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Professor Matt Qvortrup considered it hypocritical that Western Europe countries had eagerly recognised the succession of several states from Yugoslavia, ignoring the laws of territorial integrity, but simultaneously did not show the same interest for the Nagorno-Karabakh referendum, noting "the practice of independence referendums seemingly owes more to national interest than to adherence to principles of jurisprudence". Intermittent fighting over the region continued after the 1994 ceasefire without significant territorial changes, while long-standing international mediation attempts to create a peace process were initiated by the OSCE Minsk Group in 1994. On 27 September 2020, a war broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Artsakh. Fighting continued until November, and Azerbaijan recaptured territories, primarily in the southern part of the region, as well as the strategic town of Shushi. A ceasefire agreement signed on 10 November 2020 between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia declared an end to the renewed fighting, and established that Armenia would withdraw from remaining occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh over the next month. The agreement included provisions for a Russian peacekeeping force to deploy to the region, with Russian President Vladimir Putin stating that the ceasefire agreement would "create the conditions for a long-term settlement". The war may have claimed thousands of lives. After the 2020 war, the Republic of Artsakh maintained control over the areas of the former oblast that had not been captured during the war. In 2021, Russia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia held a trilateral meeting about Artsakh. This was expected to be the first of a regular series of meetings between the three countries, per an agreement to promote economic and infrastructure development throughout the region. In December 2022, Azerbaijanis claiming to be environmental activists blocked the Lachin corridor, the sole road connecting Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia and the outside world. On 23 April 2023, Azerbaijani forces installed a checkpoint on the Lachin corridor. The blockade led to a humanitarian crisis for the population in Artsakh; imports of essential goods were blocked, as well as humanitarian convoys of the Red Cross and the Russian peacekeepers, trapping the 120,000 residents of the region. Limited traffic was conducted by Russian peacekeepers and the International Committee of the Red Cross to transport patients in need of medical care and provide humanitarian supplies. However, from 15 June 2023, Azerbaijan intensified the blockade, blocking all passage of food, fuel, and medicine from the Red Cross and the Russian peacekeepers through the Lachin corridor. On 19 September, Azerbaijan launched a military offensive into Artsakh-controlled territory. The following day, the government of the Republic of Artsakh agreed to disarm and a ceasefire took effect. Initial negotiations between representatives of the Karabakh Armenian community and the Government of Azerbaijan took place on 21 September in Yevlakh to discuss security, rights and "integration". The talks, which lasted two hours, ended without a formal agreement; however, a statement by Azerbaijani Presidency said that they were "constructive and positive" and that further negotiations would continue. On 24 September, a mass evacuation of ethnic-Armenian civilians started, fearing persecution and ethnic cleansing if they remained. A second round of negotiations between representatives of Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and Azerbaijan took place in Khojaly on 25 September, where humanitarian issues were discussed. A third meeting between took place in Yevlakh on 29 September. On 28 September, Artsakh president Samvel Shahramanyan signed a decree stating that all state institutions would be dissolved by 1 January 2024, bringing the existence of the republic to an end. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev visited the region on 15 October and officially raised the flag of Azerbaijan at the building that was previously used as the Artsakh Presidential Palace. On 22 December 2023, Shahramanyan said that there was no official document stipulating the dissolution of government institutions, and his office stated that it was "empty paper". Geography The Artsakh Republic was mountainous, a feature which has given it its former name (from the Russian for "Mountainous/Highland Karabakh"). It is 3,170 km2 (1,224 sq mi) in area. The largest water body is the Sarsang Reservoir, and the major rivers are the Tartar and Khachen rivers. The country is on a plateau which slopes downwards towards the east and southeast, with the average altitude being 1,100 m (3,600 ft) above sea level. Most rivers in the country flow towards the Artsakh Valley. The geology of Artsakh is primarily part of the Kussary-Divichi Foredeep – the northern foredeep of the Greater Caucasus. The trough is filled with Oligocene to Quaternary age deepwater, molasse and marine sedimentary rocks. The climate is mild and temperate. The average temperature is 11 °C (52 °F), which fluctuates annually between 22 °C (72 °F) in July and −1 °C (30 °F) in January. The average precipitation can reach 710 mm (28 in) in some regions, and it is foggy for over 100 days a year. Over 2,000 kinds of plants exist in Artsakh, and more than 36% of the country is forested. The plant life on the steppes consists mostly of semi-desert vegetation, while subalpine zone and alpine tundra ecosystems can be found above the forest in the highlands and mountains. Government and politics Artsakh was a presidential democracy (transformed from a semi-presidential one, after the 2017 referendum). The Prime Minister's post was abolished and executive power resided with the President who was both the head of state and head of government. The president was directly elected for a maximum of two-consecutive five-year terms. The last President was Samvel Shahramanyan. The National Assembly was a unicameral legislature. It had 33 members who were elected for 5-year terms. Elections took place within a multi-party system; in 2009, the American NGO Freedom House ranked the Republic of Artsakh above the republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan with respect to civil and political rights. Five parties had members in the parliament: the Free Motherland party had 15 members, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation had 8 members, Democratic Party of Artsakh had 7 members, Movement 88 had 2 members and the National Revival party had one member. A number of non-partisan candidates had also taken part in the elections, with some success; in 2015, two of the 33 members to the National Assembly took their seats without running under the banner of any of the established political parties in the republic. Elections in Artsakh were not recognised by the European Union, the United States and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, as well as numerous other countries, who called them a source of increased tensions. Artsakh was heavily dependent on Armenia, and in many ways de facto functioned and was administered as part of Armenia. However, Armenia was hesitant to officially recognise Artsakh. The founding documents of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic were the Proclamation of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and the Declaration of State Independence of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic. For a long time no constitution was created, with the republic instead declaring Armenian law applied on its territory through a 1992 law. Even when new laws were passed, they were often copies of equivalent Armenian laws. On 3 November 2006, the then-president of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Arkadi Ghukasyan, signed a decree to hold a referendum on a draft Nagorno-Karabakh constitution. It was held on 10 December of the same year and according to official preliminary results, with a turnout of 87.2%,[citation needed] as many as 98.6 per cent of voters approved the constitution. The first article of the document described the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, alternatively called the Republic of Artsakh, as "a sovereign, democratic state based on social justice and the rule of law." More than 100 non-governmental international observers and journalists who monitored the poll evaluated it positively, stating that it was held to a high international standard. However, the vote was criticised harshly by the European Union, OSCE and GUAM, which rejected the referendum, deeming it illegitimate. The EU announced it was "aware that a 'constitutional referendum' has taken place," but emphasised its stance that only a negotiated settlement between Azerbaijan and ethnic Armenians could bring a lasting solution. Secretary General of the Council of Europe Terry Davis asserted that the poll "will not be recognized... and is therefore of no consequence". In a statement, the OSCE chairman in office Karel De Gucht voiced his concern that the vote would prove harmful to the ongoing conflict settlement process, which, he said, had shown "visible progress" and was at a "promising juncture". The holding of the referendum was also criticised by Turkey, which traditionally supports Azerbaijan because of common ethnic Turkic roots, and has historically had severe tensions with Armenia. Another referendum was held on 20 February 2017, with an 87.6% vote in favour on a 76% turnout for instituting a new constitution. This constitution among other changes turned the government from a semi-presidential to a fully presidential model. Its name was changed from "Constitution of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic" to "Constitution of the Republic of Artsakh", though both remained official names of the country. The referendum was seen as a response to the 2016 Nagorno-Karabakh clashes. Artsakh was divided into seven provinces and one special administrative city. According to its authorities, it consisted of the territories in which the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic was proclaimed in 1991: the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), the Shahumyan Region and the Getashen subdistrict; and those territories that formed part of the Republic of Artsakh before the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Also claimed by Artsakh was the Shahumyan Region of the Azerbaijan SSR, which has been under Azerbaijani control since the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. While the Shahumyan Region was not part of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, representatives from Shahumyan declared independence along with the Oblast, and the proclamation of Artsakh includes the Shahumyan region within its borders. After the end of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, an agreement was signed according to which most of the controlled territories of the Republic of Artsakh were transferred to Azerbaijani control, but the Republic of Artsakh continues to claim these territories. Following the Republic of Artsakh's declaration of independence, the Azerbaijani government abolished the NKAO and created Azerbaijani districts in its place. As a result, some of Artsakh's divisions corresponded with the Azerbaijani districts, while others had different borders. Law enforcement in Artsakh was inconsistent, as the region was a de facto independent republic and officially part of Azerbaijan. Law enforcement in Nagorno-Karabakh was the responsibility of the Interior Ministry and the NSS. After the annexation of Artsakh to the Azerbaijan SSR, on 4 August 1923, the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was established. In the years following the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, the Republic of Artsakh created its own police force. In 2001, the National Assembly's law "On Police" was adopted on 30 November 2006.[clarification needed] On 11 March 2014, Police Day in Artsakh was declared for 16 April. The police force followed an organisation similar to that of the Police of Armenia. Artsakh had its own National Security Service, based on the NSS of Armenia. It was a republican body that elaborated and implemented the policies of the government in the national security sector. By decree of the NKR Supreme Council adopted on 18 January 2006, the NKAO State Security Department was named the State Department of National Security under the NKR Council of Ministers. By order of the NKR National Assembly on 26 November 2003, the NKR laws "On National Security Bodies" and "On Service in National Security Bodies" were adopted. The activities of the NSS were based in the decrees of 25 September 2012. The NSS was headed by Lieutenant General Kamo Aghajanyan. According to the Constitution of Artsakh, the army was under the civilian command of the government. The Artsakh Defense Army was officially established on 9 May 1992 as a defence against Azerbaijan, but was subsequently disbanded on 21 September 2023 under the terms of Nagorno-Karabakh ceasefire agreement following the 2023 Azerbaijani military offensive. It fought the Azerbaijani army to a ceasefire on 12 May 1994. At its peak, the Artsakh Defense Army consisted of around 18,000–20,000 officers and soldiers. However, only around 8,500 citizens from Artsakh served in the army; some 10,000 came from Armenia. There were also 177–316 tanks, 256–324 additional fighting vehicles, and 291–322 guns and mortars. Armenia supplied arms and other military necessities to Artsakh. Several battalions of Armenia's army were deployed directly in the Artsakh zone on occupied Azerbaijani territory. The Artsakh Defense Army fought in Shusha in 1992, opening the Lachin corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh (1992), and staged the defence of the Martakert front from 1992 to 1994. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was based in Stepanakert. Since no UN member or observer ever recognised Artsakh, none of its foreign relations were of an official diplomatic nature. However, the Republic of Artsakh operated five permanent Missions and one Bureau of Social-Politic Information in France. Artsakh's Permanent Missions existed in Armenia, Australia, France, Germany, Russia, the United States, and one for Middle East countries based in Beirut. The goals of the offices were to present the Republic's positions on various issues, to provide information and to facilitate the peace process.[citation needed] In his 2015 speech, the President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan stated that he considered Nagorno-Karabakh "an inseparable part of Armenia". The Republic of Artsakh was neither a member nor observer of the UN or any of its specialised agencies. However, it was a member of the Community for Democracy and Rights of Nations, commonly known as the "Commonwealth of Unrecognized States".[citation needed] While no UN member states recognised Artsakh, some unrecognised and partially recognised states had done so, including Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Various sub-national governments, including several U.S. states, had issued calls for recognition of Artsakh by their national governments. De facto independent Artsakh (1993–2023): conflicting ideologies and diplomacy Artsakh was a de facto independent state, calling itself the Republic of Artsakh.[citation needed] It had close relations with Armenia and used the same currency, the dram. According to Human Rights Watch, "from the beginning of the Karabakh conflict, Armenia provided aid, weapons, and volunteers. Armenian involvement in Artsakh escalated after a December 1993 Azerbaijani offensive. The Republic of Armenia began sending conscripts and regular Army and Interior Ministry troops to fight in Artsakh." The politics of Armenia and the de facto Artsakh are so intertwined that Robert Kocharyan served as the first President of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, from 1994 to 1997, then as prime minister of Armenia from 1997 to 1998, and then as the second President of Armenia, from 1998 to 2008.[citation needed] However, Armenian governments have repeatedly resisted internal pressure to unite the two, due to ongoing negotiations under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group. In his case study of Eurasia, Dov Lynch of the Institute for Security Studies of WEU believes that "Karabakh's independence allows the new Armenian state to avoid the international stigma of aggression, despite the fact that Armenian troops fought in the war between 1991 and 1994 and continue to man the Line of Contact between Karabakh and Azerbaijan." Lynch also cites that the "strength of the Armenian armed forces, and Armenia's strategic alliance with Russia, are seen as key shields protecting the Karabakh state by the authorities in Stepanakert". Some sources consider Artsakh as functioning de facto as a part of Armenia. Representatives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, France, Russia and the United States met in Paris and in Key West, Florida, in early 2001. Despite rumours that the parties were close to a solution, the Azerbaijani authorities – both during Heydar Aliyev's period of office, and after the accession of his son Ilham Aliyev in the October 2003 elections – have firmly denied that any agreement was reached in Paris or Key West. Further talks between the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents, Ilham Aliyev and Robert Kocharyan, were held in September 2004 in Astana, Kazakhstan, on the sidelines of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) summit. Reportedly, one of the suggestions put forward was the withdrawal of the occupying forces from the Azeri territories adjacent to Artsakh and then holding referendums (plebiscites) in Artsakh and Azerbaijan proper regarding the future status of the region. On 10 and 11 February 2006, Kocharyan and Aliyev met in Rambouillet, France, to discuss the fundamental principles of a settlement to the conflict. Contrary to the initial optimism, the Rambouillet talks did not produce any agreement, with key issues such as the status of Artsakh and whether Armenian troops would withdraw from Kalbajar still being contentious. Talks were held at the Polish embassy in Bucharest in June 2006. Again, American, Russian, and French diplomats attended the talks that lasted over 40 minutes. Earlier, Armenian President Kocharyan announced that he was ready to "continue dialogue with Azerbaijan for the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and with Turkey on establishing relations without any preconditions". According to the Armenian foreign minister in 2006, Vardan Oskanyan, no progress was made at this latest meeting. Both presidents failed to reach a consensus on the issues from the earlier Rambouillet conference. He noted that the Kocharyan-Aliyev meeting was held in a normal atmosphere. "Nevertheless," he added, "the foreign ministers of the two countries are commissioned to continue talks over the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and try to find common points before the next meeting of the presidents." The major disagreement between both sides at the Bucharest conference was the status of Artsakh. Azerbaijan's preferred solution would be to give Artsakh the "highest status of autonomy adopted in the world". Armenia, on the other hand, endorsed a popular vote by the inhabitants of Artsakh to decide their future, a position that was also taken by the[which?] international mediators. On 27 June, the Armenian foreign minister said both parties agreed to allow the residents of Artsakh to vote regarding the future status of the region. The Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs officially refuted that statement. According to Azeri opposition leader Isa Gambar, Azerbaijan did indeed agree to the referendum, but his claim was never substantiated. The "Prague Process" overseen by the OSCE Minsk Group was brought into sharp relief in the summer of 2006 with a series of rare public revelations seemingly designed to jump-start the stalled negotiations. After the release in June of a paper outlining its position, which had until then been carefully guarded, U.S. State Department official Matthew Bryza told Radio Free Europe that the Minsk Group favoured a referendum in Karabakh that would determine its final status. The referendum, in the view of the OSCE, should take place not in Azerbaijan as a whole, but in Artsakh only. This was a blow to Azerbaijan, and despite talk that their government might eventually seek a more sympathetic forum for future negotiations, this did not occur. On 10 December 2007 Azerbaijan's deputy foreign minister said Azerbaijan would be prepared to conduct anti-terrorist operations in Nagorno-Karabakh against alleged bases of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Armenian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Vladimir Karapetian previously rejected the allegations as "fabricated" and suggested the accusations of the PKK presence were a form of provocation. Armenia did not recognise Azerbaijani claims to Nagorno-Karabakh and believed the territory should have self-determination. Both the Armenian and Artsakhi governments emphasised that the independence of Artsakh was declared around the time the Soviet Union dissolved and its members became independent. The Armenian government insisted that the government of Artsakh be part of any discussions on the region's future, and rejected ceding occupied territory or allowing refugees to return before talks on the region's status. In 2009, the president of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Bako Sahakyan declared that "Artsakh will never be a part of Azerbaijan. Artsakh security should never be an article of commerce either. As to other issues, we are ready to discuss them with Azerbaijan". In 2010 president of Republic of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan in his speech in the Chatham House of the British Royal Institute of International Affairs declared that "Karabakh was never a part of independent Azerbaijan: it was annexed to Azerbaijan by a decision of the Soviet Union party body. The people of Karabakh never put up with this decision, and upon the first opportunity, seceded from the Soviet Union fully in line with the laws of the Soviet Union and the applicable international law". In 2008, Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev stated that "Nagorno-Karabakh will never be independent; the position is backed by international mediators as well; Armenia has to accept the reality" and that "in 1918, Yerevan was granted to the Armenians. It was a great mistake. The khanate of Iravan was Azeri territory, the Armenians were guests here". On 14 March 2008, the United Nations General Assembly passed a non-binding resolution by a vote of 39 to 7, with 100 abstentions, reaffirming Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, expressing support for that country's internationally recognised borders and demanding the immediate withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all occupied territories there. The resolution was supported mainly by members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and GUAM. Azerbaijan is a member of both groups, which include other nations facing breakaway regions. The resolution was opposed by all three members of the OSCE Minsk Group. On 20 May 2010, the European Parliament adopted a resolution "on the need for an EU strategy for the South Caucasus", which states that the EU must pursue a strategy to promote stability, prosperity and conflict resolution in the South Caucasus.: 3, 38 The resolution "calls on the parties to intensify their peace talk efforts for the purpose of a settlement in the coming months, to show a more constructive attitude and to abandon preferences to perpetuate the status quo created by force and with no international legitimacy, creating in this way instability and prolonging the suffering of the war-affected populations; condemns the idea of a military solution and the heavy consequences of military force already used, and calls on both parties to avoid any further breaches of the 1994 ceasefire".: 6 The resolution also calls for the withdrawal of Armenian forces from all occupied territories of Azerbaijan, accompanied by the deployment of international forces to be organised with respect of the UN Charter in order to provide the necessary security guarantees in a period of transition, which will ensure the security of the population of Artsakh and allow the displaced people to return to their homes and further conflicts caused by homelessness to be prevented; and states that the EU believes that the position according to which Artsakh includes all occupied Azerbaijani lands surrounding Artsakh should rapidly be abandoned.: 8, 10 It also notes "that an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh could offer a solution until the final status is determined and that it could create a transitional framework for peaceful coexistence and cooperation of Armenian and Azerbaijani populations in the region.": 10 On 26 June 2010, the presidents of the OSCE Minsk Group's co-chair countries, France, Russia, and United States made a joint statement, reaffirming their "commitment to support the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan as they finalize the Basic Principles for the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict". During his August 2019 visit to Stepanakert, the Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan presented the strategic development goals set for Armenia for the next three decades. He added that he made no special provision for Nagorno-Karabakh because "Artsakh is Armenia and there is no alternative". Soon afterwards, Armenia's Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan commented on Pashinyan's statement by saying he had "nothing to add" to Pashinyan's formulation of Armenia's position in the conflict. Displacement, landmines problem during conflict (1988–2023) The first Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resulted in the displacement of 597,000 Azerbaijanis (this figure includes 230,000 children born to internally displaced people (IDPs) and 54,000 who had returned) including Artsakh,[clarification needed] and 220,000 Azeris, 18,000 Kurds and 3,500 Russians fled from Armenia to Azerbaijan from 1988 to 1989. The Azerbaijani government estimated that 63% of IDPs lived below the poverty line, compared to 49% of the total population. About 154,000 lived in the capital, Baku. According to the International Organization for Migration, 40,000 IDPs lived in camps, 60,000 in dugout shelters, and 20,000 in railway cars. Forty-thousand IDPs lived in EU-funded settlements and UNHCR provided housing for another 40,000. Another 5,000 IDPs lived in abandoned or rapidly deteriorating schools. Others lived in trains, on roadsides in half-constructed buildings, or in public buildings such as tourist and health facilities. Tens of thousands lived in seven tent camps where poor water supply and sanitation caused gastrointestinal infections, tuberculosis, and malaria. The government required IDPs to register their place of residence in an attempt to better target the limited and largely inadequate national and international assistance due to the Armenian advocated and US imposed restrictions on humanitarian aid to Azerbaijan. Many IDPs were from rural areas and found it difficult to integrate into the urban labour market. Many international humanitarian agencies reduced or ceased assistance for IDPs citing increasing oil revenues of the country. The infant mortality among displaced Azerbaijani children was 3–4 times higher than in the rest of the population. The rate of stillbirth was 88.2 per 1,000 births among the internally displaced people. As of 2003, the majority of the displaced had lived in difficult conditions for more than 13 years. During the 2020 war President Aliyev stated he intended for refugees to return to the area. While many former cities are currently uninhabitable, the Azerbaijani government and some Azerbaijani companies have announced plans to rebuild infrastructure and invest in the newly controlled territories. The Azerbaijani military is clearing mines prior to resettlement, which may take 10–13 years. 280,000 people – virtually all ethnic Armenians who fled Azerbaijan during the 1988–1993 war over the disputed region of Artsakh – were living in refugee-like circumstances in Armenia. Some left the country, principally to Russia. Their children born in Armenia acquire citizenship automatically. Their numbers are thus subject to constant decline due to departure, and de-registration required for naturalisation. Of these, about 250,000 fled Azerbaijan (areas outside Nagorno-Karabakh); approximately 30,000 came from Nagorno-Karabakh. All were registered with the government as refugees at year's end. Mines were laid in the region from 1991 to 1994 by both conflicting parties in the first Nagorno-Karabakh War. In 2005, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) claimed that 123 people had been killed and over 300 injured by landmines near Nagorno-Karabakh since the 1994 truce. HALO Trust, a UK-based demining NGO, was the only international organisation conducting demining in Nagorno-Karabakh. They destroyed 180,858 small arms ammunition, 48,572 units of "other explosive items", 12,423 cluster bombs, 8,733 anti-personnel landmines, and 2,584 anti-tank landmines between 2000 and 2016. By 2018, they had cleared 88% of the territory's minefields, with a target to clear the rest by 2020. The main cities of Stepanakert and Shusha, as well as the main north–south highway, had been cleared and were safe for travel. The demining effort had been largely funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Economy The socio-economic situation of the Republic of Artsakh was greatly affected by the 1991–1994 conflict. Yet, foreign investments began to come. The origin of most venture capital comes from Armenians in Armenia, Russia, United States, France, Australia, Iran, and the Middle East. Notably the telecommunications sector was developed with Karabakh Telecom investing millions of dollars in mobile telephony, spearheaded by a Lebanese company. Karabakh Telecom was disconnected from external communication on 27 September 2023, calls and internet traffic to the Nagorno-Karabakh region are carried out from then on only through telecom operators and providers of Azerbaijan. Copper and gold mining has been advancing since 2002 with development and launch of operations at Drmbon deposit. Approximately 27–28 thousand tons (wet weight) of concentrates are produced with average copper content of 19–21% and gold content of 32–34 g/t. Azerbaijan considers any mining operations in Nagorno-Karabakh illegal and has vowed to engage an international audit company to determine the damages suffered by Azerbaijan's state-run ore management company as a result. In 2018, the government of Azerbaijan announced that it was planning to appeal to an international court and the law enforcement agencies of the countries where the mining companies involved are registered. The banking system was administered by Artsakhbank (a Yerevan-based Armenian bank fulfilling the functions of the state bank of Nagorno-Karabakh) and a number of other Armenian banks. The republic used the Armenian dram. Wine growing and processing of agricultural products, particularly wine (i.e., storage of wine, wine stuffs, cognac alcohol) was one of the prioritised directions of the economic development. The republic developed a tourist industry geared to Armenia and the Armenian diaspora. The republic showed a major increase in tourists over the last several years of its existence because of Artsakh's many cultural sights. Before the 2020 war there were nine[non-primary source needed] hotels in Stepanakert. The Artsakh development agency said 4,000 tourists visited Artsakh in 2005. The figures rose to 8,000 in 2010 (excluding visitors from Armenia). The agency cooperated with the Armenia Tourism Development Agency (ATDA) as Armenia is the only way tourists (mainly Armenians) could access Artsakh. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Artsakh reported continuous expansion of visitors' geography. Tourist infrastructure was developed around sites such as monasteries that showcase the Armenian history in the region, with Islamic sites rarely restored, while some ghost cities and areas near the front line were off limit to tourists. The Tourism Development Agency of Artsakh was established in Yerevan as a non-governmental organisation in the Republic of Armenia to promote tourism further in Artsakh. It made preparations for tour operators, travel agencies and journalists covering the region, and arranges for hotel services, shopping, catering, and recreation centres.[citation needed] Tourist attractions included: Other tourist attractions included: Janapar Trail is a marked trail, through mountains, valleys, and villages of Artsakh, with monasteries and fortresses along the way. It is not hikable since the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. The trail was broken into day hikes, which brought tourists to a different village each night. The paths have existed for centuries but now are marked specifically for hikers. The Himnakan Janapar (backbone trail), marked in 2007, leads from the northwest region of Shahumian to the southern town of Hadrut, now under Azerbaijani control. Side trails and mini trails take one to additional parts of Artsakh. The important sites passed along this hike include Dadivank Monastery, Gandzasar monastery, Shusha, the Karkar Canyon with its high cliffs, Zontik Waterfall, and the ruins of Hunot and Gtichavank monastery. One of the noteworthy side trails is the Gtichavank Loop Trail. This loop starts from Tugh Village, now under Azerbaijani control. However, those who travelled to Artsakh without the Azerbaijani government's prior consent and permission were denied entry to Azerbaijan since the country considered Artsakh their territory unlawfully occupied by the Armenian army. The Azerbaijani government also kept and published online a list of foreign nationals who visited these occupied areas without prior approval. In late 2017, the list contained 699 names with additional details (date, country, profession, purpose of visit). The earliest entry recorded a visit to Artsakh that occurred on an unspecified date sometime between 1993 and 1996. The list included many journalists and members of parliaments of foreign countries.[citation needed] Before the 2020 war, the Artsakh Wine Fest took place annually in Togh since 2014. The festival was held on the third Saturday of each September. The festival was initiated by the Department of Tourism and Protection of Historical Places of the Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Youth Affairs of the Republic of Artsakh and was aimed to develop tourism in Artsakh. It was meant to restore Artsakh winemaking traditions. The festival provided a platform to the winemakers of Artsakh and Armenia giving them an opportunity to sell their products, exchange knowledge, promote their wine etc. The annual festival's program included grape stomping, tasting of traditional Artsakh cuisine, an exhibition of artworks, an exhibition of ancient artefacts that belonged to the Melik Yegan's Palace, as well as an exhibition and sale of local wine, where one could find products from 5 different regions of Artsakh and Armenia. Traditionally, the festival was accompanied by Armenian national singing and dancing. The festival evolved into a national holiday. The transportation system had been damaged by the 1991–1994 conflict. The North–South Artsakh motorway alone largely facilitated the development of the transportation system. Before the 2020 war, the 169-kilometre (105 mi) Hadrut-Stepanakert-Askeran-Martakert motorway was the lifeline of Artsakh, and $25 million donated during the Hayastan All-Armenian Foundation telethons was allotted for the construction of the road. A new route from the Armenian capital Yerevan to Stepanakert was planned to bypass the 8–9 hours drive via the Lachin corridor. It was opened in September 2017. A third road was planned in 2019. Authorities in the USSR opened a railway line in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast in 1944. It connected the capital, Stepanakert, and Yevlax in Azerbaijan. It was built to Russian gauge of 1520mm. Due to the first Nagorno-Karabakh War, the line the railway was badly damaged and the line was closed. Stepanakert Airport, the sole civilian airport of the Republic of Artsakh, located about 8 kilometres (5 miles) east of the capital, has been closed since the onset of the war in 1990. It was expected that the airport would have regular flight services only to Yerevan, Armenia, with state-owned carrier Artsakh Air, but no flights had ever started. Karabakh Telecom (KT), the only telecommunications company in Artsakh, was started on February 1, 2002 by the Lebanese-Armenian businessman and Chairman Pierre Fattouch. In 2019, Fattouch was charged with tax evasion in Lebanon and in July 2019 a Lebanese Prosecutor General ordered a closure of quarries owned by Fattouch for failure to acquire a legal license. On December 10, 2020, the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) investigated the offshore firm Crossbridge Capital, which manages billions in shareholder assets, including those of Pierre Fattouch. KT was also run by the General Director Ralf Yerikian, a Lebanese-born businessman of Armenian origin. The company was considered a CJSC, a closed joint stock company, in which shares of company stock can be bought or sold by shareholders. The company had USD $9.9 million in revenue in the 4th quarter of 2019. From Q1 of 2020 until Q2 of 2021, it shared the same amount in revenue for every quarter – USD $11.1 million. The company has not publicly disclosed their accurate financials between 2020 and 2021. It has invested over USD $12 millions in mobile telecommunication projects throughout Artsakh.[citation needed] Demographics In September 2023, over half of Artsakh's ethnic Armenian population fled the country. According to Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, 100,417 people arrived in Armenia from Artsakh. In 2015, the country's population was 145,000, made up of 99.7% Armenians. This composition represents a sharp change from the 1979 and 1989 census, when the Azerbaijani population was 23 and 21.5 per cent, respectively. The annual birth rate was recorded at 2,200–2,300 per year, an increase from nearly 1,500 in 1999. OSCE report, released in March 2011, estimates the population of the "seven occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh" to be 14,000, and states "there has been no significant growth in the population since 2005." An International Crisis Group report published in December 2019 recorded the population of these territories to be 17,000, or 11.48% of the total population: 15,000 west and southwest of the former oblast, and 2000 in the Agdam District. Until 2000, the country's net migration was at a negative. For the first half of 2007, 1,010 births and 659 deaths were reported, with a net emigration of 27. According to age group: 15,700 (0–6), 25,200 (7–17) 75,800 (18–59) and 21,000 (60+) Population by province (2006): Population of the Republic of Artsakh (2000–2008) From 1989 to 1994, there was significant depopulation in the territory that ended up held by Artsakh, leaving only around 40% of the pre-war population. Much of this was due to the displacement and death of Azerbaijani residents in both the former NKOA and the surrounding territories, leaving some former urban areas virtually empty. The Russian minority present also declined, meaning the resulting population was almost 100% Armenian. Beginning in 1995, the population began to increase due to births and immigration. While the territory captured outside the former NKAO was initially treated as a potential bargaining chip, it slowly began to be seen as part of the country by both officials and the general population. The Stepanakert-based administration launched various programs aimed at bringing in permanent Armenian settlers to the depopulated lands, including into regions previously populated by Azeris, with those that bordered Armenia – Lachin and Kalbajar – being the priority. Lachin was key to a land connection between Armenia and the former NKAO, and Kalbajar had water resources utilised by both Artsakh and Armenia. Azerbaijan regards this as a violation of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, to which Armenia became party in 1993, whereby "[t]he Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies". The ruling party of Azerbaijan accuses the Armenian side of artificially changing the demographic situation and the ethnic composition of the occupied region so that it can lay future claims to them, comparing this to the 1950s campaign of resettling diaspora Armenians in previously Azeri-populated locales in Soviet Armenia where Azeris were forcibly deported from in 1948–1950. In 1979, the total Armenian population of the districts of Kalbajar, Lachin, Qubadli, Zangilan, Jabrayil, Fuzuli and Agdam was around 1,400 people. An OSCE fact-finding mission established at Azerbaijan's request visited these regions in February 2005 with the intention to assess the scale of the settlement attempts. The mission's findings showed that these districts had as of 2005 an overall population of 14,000 people, mostly living in precarious social conditions. It consisted primarily of ethnic Armenians displaced from the non-conflict zones of Azerbaijan during the war. It was noted, however, that most of them had settled in the conflict zone after having lived in Armenia for several years and some held Armenian passports and even voted in Armenian elections. A smaller segment of the settlers was originally from the towns of Gyumri and Spitak in Armenia who had lived in temporary shelters following the devastating 1988 earthquake before moving to Karabakh, as well as a small number of natives of Yerevan who moved there for financial reasons. A field assessment mission revisited the region in October 2010, confirming that there had not been much growth in population or change in the living conditions of the settlers. The Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group who visited Nagorno-Karabakh, Kalbajar and Lachin in 2014 reported seeing signs of improvements in the infrastructure but could not observe any indications that the size of the population had changed in recent years. By June 2015, an estimated 17,000 of Syria's once 80,000-strong Armenian population had fled the civil war and sought refuge in Armenia. David Babayan, spokesperson of the Artsakh leader Bako Sahakyan, confirmed that some of those refugees had been resettled in Artsakh. The Economist put the number of the resettled families at 30 as of June 2017. In December 2014, Armenian media cited local municipal authorities in stating that dozens of Syrian Armenian families had been resettled in the disputed zone, in particular in the city of Lachin and the village of Xanlıq in Qubadli. Azerbaijan's Minister of Foreign Affairs Elmar Mammadyarov expressed his concern over Armenia's attempts to change the demographic situation in the region and informed of his intention to raise this issue with the Minsk Group. In February 2019, Armenia's National Security Service director Artur Vanetsyan visited Nagorno-Karabakh amid public concern about Nikol Pashinyan's government alleged readiness to cede some of the Armenian-controlled territories as part of a peace settlement. Vanetsyan pointed out that settling Armenians and investing into infrastructural projects along the Iranian border, in the previously Azeri-populated regions outside of the former autonomous province, was "a clear message" to the international community that there would be no territorial concessions. He referred to the ongoing settlement efforts as a method of "guaranteeing security". Azerbaijan's Foreign Ministry reacted by qualifying Vanetsyan's statement as an "attempt to undermine the peace talks and defy the work of the mediators" and vowed to address the issue to the UN and the OSCE. The ceasefire ending the 2020 war stipulated that these territories were to be turned over to Azerbaijani control. Armenian settlers in these areas evacuated prior to the arrival of Azerbaijani forces. Ethnic Groups of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (1926–1989) and the Republic of Artsakh (2015) according to census data Armenian functioned as the only state language and an official language in the Republic of Artsakh, and was the native language of over 99% of the population. Under Soviet rule, the ethnic Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh became more proficient in Russian than both Azerbaijanis in the region and Armenians in the Armenian SSR. Few Armenians learnt Azerbaijani, and the language was actively removed following the Nagorno-Karabakh War. While Russian remained in some use after this time, and was valued as a second language, it was not widely spoken at a native level. Russian was widely spoken in Artsakh, with efforts having been made since late 2020 in the parliament in Stepanakert to establish it as an additional official language; the official justifications for this being that Russian was already the second language of many residents, and that it would create "conditions for deepening cooperation in all spheres, [as well as contributing] to the development of relations within the legal framework." The Parliament of Artsakh approved a bill grating Russian official status on March 25, 2021, with 27 votes in favour, 0 votes against and 2 abstentions. Most of the Armenian population in Artsakh was Christian and were adherents of the Armenian Apostolic Church, which is an Oriental Orthodox Church. Some Eastern Orthodox and Evangelical denominations also existed. Education in Artsakh was compulsory, and was free up to the age of 18. The education system was inherited from the old system of the Soviet Union. Artsakh's school system was severely damaged because of the 1991–1994 conflict. But the government of the Republic of Artsakh with considerable aid from the Republic of Armenia and with donations from the Armenian diaspora, rebuilt many of the schools. Prior to the 2020 war, Artsakh had around 250 schools of various sizes, with more than 200 lying in the regions. The student population was estimated at more than 20,000, with almost half in the capital city of Stepanakert. Artsakh State University was founded by Artsakh and Armenian governments' joint efforts, with main campus in Stepanakert. The university opening ceremony took place on 10 May 1992. Yerevan University of Management also opened a branch in Stepanakert.[citation needed] This is a list of universities in Republic of Artsakh, a former breakaway state in the Caucasus region. Culture "We Are Our Mountains" (Armenian: Մենք ենք մեր սարերը) by Sargis Baghdasaryan is a monument located in Stepanakert. The sculpture was widely regarded as a symbol of the Republic of Artsakh. It is a large monument from tuff of an old Armenian man and woman hewn from rock, representing the mountain people of Artsakh. It is also known as Tatik yev Papik (Տատիկ և Պապիկ, "Grandma and Grandpa") in Armenian. The sculpture was featured prominently on Artsakh's coat of arms. Artsakh has often been portrayed as a "shield" to the Armenian nation that protects it from Pan-Turkism. When lecturing his fighters during the First Nagorno Karabakh-War, Monte Melkonian would say "If we lose this land, we turn the last page on Armenian history." Artsakh State Museum was the historical museum of the Republic of Artsakh. Located at 4 Sasunstsi David Street, in Stepanakert, the museum offered an assortment of ancient artefacts and Christian manuscripts. There were also more recent items, ranging in date from the 19th century to World War II and from events of the Karabakh Independence War. Azat Artsakh (Armenian: Ազատ Արձախ, lit. 'Free Artsakh') was the official newspaper of the Republic of Artsakh. It had a daily print and was offered in Armenian, English, and Russian. Typical topics included the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenian genocide, and other Armenian-related issues. Aside from Azat Artsakh, many print media were published in more than one language, usually offering Russian and English sections in addition to the main Armenian section.[citation needed] Sports in the Republic of Artsakh were organised by the Artsakh Ministry of Culture and Youth. Due to the non-recognition of Artsakh, sports teams from the country could not compete in most international tournaments.[citation needed] Football was the most popular sport in Artsakh.[citation needed] Stepanakert had a well-built football stadium.[citation needed] In mid-1990s, football teams from Artsakh started taking part in some domestic competitions in Armenia.[citation needed] Lernayin Artsakh FC represented the city of Stepanakert. In Artsakh, domestic football clubs played in the Artsakh Football League. The Artsakh football league was launched in 2009. The Artsakh national football team was formed in 2012 and played their first competitive match against the Abkhazia national football team in Sokhumi, a match that ended with a result of 1–1 draw. The return match between the unrecognised teams took place at the Stepanakert Stadium, on 21 October 2012, when the team from Artsakh defeated the Abkhazian team 3–0.[citation needed] There was also interest in other sports, including basketball and volleyball.[citation needed] Sailing was practised in the town of Martakert.[citation needed] Artsakh sports teams and athletes also participated in the Pan-Armenian Games organised in Armenia.[citation needed] The following is a list of public holidays in the Republic of Artsakh: See also Notes References After accepting the rank of [the country's] high priest, he left to enlighten the countries of Iberia and Aluank. He arrived in the ghavar of Haband and preached and admonished not to break the commandments of the Son of God. Here he began the building of a church in Amaras and hired workers and foremen to finish it. After returning to Armenia, he consecrated and appointed instead of himself his son Vrtanes, filled with his father's virtues, who lived according to the [Christian] teaching and punished and admonished all those who adhered to the heresy of idol-worship. Bibliography Further reading External links |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Far-left_politics_in_France] | [TOKENS: 1003] |
Contents Far-left politics in France The far-left in France encompasses political organizations, movements, and ideologies that are considered to be at the furthest left end of the political spectrum. It includes a variety of political traditions, such as revolutionary socialism, anarchism, Maoism, and Trotskyism. Historically, the far-left has distinguished itself by opposing the reformist left represented by the PCF and the SFIO, advocating instead for the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of a classless, egalitarian society. History The roots of the far-left in France can be traced back to the French Revolution (1789–1799), particularly to the ideas of Gracchus Babeuf and the "Conspiracy of the Equals" in 1796. Babeuf envisioned a classless society and sought to overthrow the Directory to achieve "perfect equality." His vision laid the groundwork for modern communist and socialist ideologies. The ideas of this movement were later reflected in the Manifesto of the Equals, co-authored by Babeuf and Sylvain Maréchal. During the 19th century, far-left ideas evolved through various revolutionary movements. Early socialists and communists emerged within republican circles opposed to the Bourbon Restoration and the rise of Napoleon III. Thinkers such as Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Karl Marx began to influence the ideological underpinnings of the far-left. The revolutionary fervor culminated in the Paris Commune of 1871, which became a defining moment for the far-left. The Commune—a radical socialist and revolutionary government—served as a model for future far-left movements, emphasizing workers' control and direct democracy. The Russian Revolution of 1917 had a profound impact on the French far-left. The establishment of the Third International inspired the creation of the French Communist Party (PCF) in 1920. However, some revolutionary socialists rejected the authoritarianism of the Soviet Union, leading to the emergence of various Trotskyist, anarchist, and left-communist currents. The interwar years also saw the rise of syndicalism and anarcho-syndicalism, with the CGT-SR playing a key role. These groups emphasized direct action and workers' autonomy, contrasting with the centralized structure of the PCF. After 1945, the far-left gained renewed momentum. The PCF became a dominant force in French politics, but its alignment with Soviet policies led to criticism from other revolutionary groups. The Fédération Anarchiste (FA) and Trotskyist organizations like the Parti Communiste Internationaliste (PCI) expanded their activities. In the 1960s, the New Left emerged, driven by anti-colonial movements and opposition to the Vietnam War. Groups such as the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR) and Lutte Ouvrière (LO) gained prominence, advocating for workers' councils and anti-capitalist struggle. The May 1968 protests marked a watershed moment for the far-left. Students and workers united in strikes and demonstrations, challenging both capitalism and traditional political structures. The protests inspired a wave of activism, leading to the growth of Maoist and autonomist groups. The Gauche Prolétarienne (GP), a Maoist organization, and the Union des Jeunesses Communistes Marxistes-Léninistes (UJCML) played pivotal roles. However, state repression and internal divisions eventually led to their decline. The decline of Soviet communism in the 1980s forced far-left groups to adapt. The Parti des Travailleurs (PT) emerged from the Trotskyist tradition, while anarchist groups like Alternative Libertaire gained influence within social movements. The rise of the alter-globalization movement in the 1990s, exemplified by protests against the World Trade Organization (WTO), provided new opportunities for the far-left to organize. Groups such as ATTAC and Ras l'Front focused on anti-capitalist and anti-fascist activism.[page needed] The far-left has continued to play a significant role in French politics and social movements. The Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste (NPA), founded in 2009, sought to unite anti-capitalist forces. Figures like Olivier Besancenot and Philippe Poutou became prominent voices for the movement. Recent years have seen the rise of autonomist activism, including the ZAD de Notre-Dame-des-Landes and Black Bloc tactics during protests. The far-left also played a role in the Gilets Jaunes movement, emphasizing direct democracy and anti-austerity policies. Key movements and organizations Current challenges and prospects The far-left in France faces challenges such as internal fragmentation, declining membership, and competition from other left-wing movements like La France Insoumise. However, its influence remains significant in social movements, labor strikes, and grassroots activism. As global issues like climate change and inequality persist, the far-left continues to adapt its strategies to address contemporary challenges. See also References Works cited |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crimes_against_humanity] | [TOKENS: 6576] |
Contents Crimes against humanity Crimes against humanity are certain crimes committed as part of a large-scale attack against civilians. Unlike war crimes, crimes against humanity can be committed during both peace and war and against a state's own nationals as well as foreign nationals. Together with war crimes, genocide, and the crime of aggression, crimes against humanity are one of the core crimes of international criminal law and, like other crimes against international law, have no temporal or jurisdictional limitations on prosecution (where universal jurisdiction is recognized). The first prosecution for crimes against humanity took place during the Nuremberg trials and subsequent Nuremberg trials against defeated leaders of Nazi Germany and collaborators. Crimes against humanity have been prosecuted by other international courts (such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, and the International Criminal Court) as well as by domestic courts. The law of crimes against humanity has primarily been developed as a result of the evolution of customary international law. Crimes against humanity are not codified in an international convention, so an international effort to establish such a treaty, led by the Crimes Against Humanity Initiative, has been underway since 2008. According to the Rome Statute, there are eleven types of crimes that can be charged as a crime against humanity when "committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population": "murder; extermination; enslavement; deportation or forcible transfer of population; imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; torture; rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity...; enforced disappearance...; the crime of apartheid; other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health." Origins of the term The term "crimes against humanity" is potentially ambiguous because of the ambiguity of the word "humanity", which originally meant the quality of being human (first recorded in 1384) but more recently (in 1450) additionally took on another meaning as a synonym of mankind. The context of the term in documents related to the Nuremberg trials suggests the latter sense was intended. The term "crimes against humanity" was used by George Washington Williams, an American minister, politician and historian, in a letter he wrote to the United States Secretary of State describing the atrocities committed by Leopold II of Belgium's administration in the Congo Free State in 1890. This was an early but not, as is often claimed, the first use of the term in its modern sense in the English language. In his first annual message in December 1889, U.S. President Benjamin Harrison spoke about the slave trade in Africa as a "crime against humanity". Already in 1883, Williams had used the same term in his reflections about slavery in the United States. In treaty law, the term originated in the Second Hague Convention of 1899 preamble and was expanded in the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 preamble and their respective regulations, which were concerned with the codification of new rules of international humanitarian law. The preamble of the two Conventions referenced the "laws of humanity" as an expression of underlying inarticulated humanistic values. The term is part of what is known as the Martens Clause. On 24 May 1915, the Allied Powers, Britain, France, and Russia, jointly issued a statement explicitly and for the first time ever charging another government with committing "a crime against humanity". An excerpt from this joint statement reads: In view of these new crimes of Turkey against humanity and civilization, the Allied Governments announce publicly to the Sublime Porte that they will hold personally responsible for these crimes all members of the Ottoman Government, as well as those of their agents who are implicated in such massacres. At the conclusion of the war, the Allied Commission of Responsibilities recommended the creation of a tribunal to try "violations of the laws of humanity" because the law of war did not cover atrocities committed by a state against its own nationals or allied persons. However, the US representative objected to references to the "law of humanity" as being imprecise and insufficiently developed at that time, and the concept was not pursued. Nonetheless, a UN report in 1948 referred to the usage of the term "crimes against humanity" regarding the Armenian genocide as a precedent to the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. On 15 May 1948, the Economic and Social Council presented a 384-page report prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission (UNWCC), set up in London (October 1943) to collect and collate information on war crimes and war criminals.: 129 The report was in compliance with the request by the UN Secretary-General to make arrangements for "the collection and publication of information concerning human rights arising from trials of war criminals, quislings, and traitors, and in particular from the Nuremberg trials and Tokyo Trials." The report had been prepared by members of the Legal Staff of the commission. The report is highly topical regarding the Armenian Genocide, not only because it uses the 1915 events as a historic example but also as a precedent to Articles 6 (c) and 5 (c) of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters, and thereby as a precursor to the then newly adopted UN Genocide Convention, differentiating between war crimes and crimes against humanity. By referring to the information collected during WWI and put forward by the 1919 Commission of Responsibilities, the report titled "Information Concerning Human Rights Arising from Trials of War Criminals" used the Armenian case as a vivid example of crimes committed by a state against its own citizens. The report also noted that while the Paris Peace Treaties with Germany, Austria, Hungary and Bulgaria did not include any reference to "laws of humanity", instead basing the charges on violations of "laws and customs of war", the Sèvres Peace Treaty with Turkey did so. In addition to the Articles 226–228, concerning customs of war (corresponding to Articles 228–230 of the Treaty of Versailles), the Sèvres Treaty also contained an additional Article 230, in compliance with the Allied ultimatum of 24 May 1915 regarding "crimes against humanity and civilization".: 130 After the Second World War, the Nuremberg Charter set down the laws and procedures by which the Nuremberg trials were to be conducted. The drafters of this document were faced with the problem of how to charge the men at the Nuremberg Trial with committing the Holocaust and other state-sanctioned atrocities committed in Germany and German-allied states by the Nazi regime. As far as German law was concerned the men had committed no crime, but only followed orders. Not following orders however, in Nazi Germany, was a horribly punished crime. The problem in trying the individuals responsible for the German atrocities lay in the fact that, like in World War I, a traditional understanding of war crimes gave no provision for atrocities committed by a state on its own citizens or its allies. Therefore, to solve this problem and close the loophole, Article 6 of the Charter was drafted to include not only traditional war crimes and crimes against peace, but also crimes against humanity, defined as: Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. Under this definition, crimes against humanity could be prosecuted and punished, even as ex post facto infractions, only insofar as they could be connected somehow to war crimes or crimes against peace. The jurisdictional limitation was explained by the American chief representative to the London Conference, Robert H. Jackson, who pointed out that it "has been a general principle from time immemorial that the internal affairs of another government are not ordinarily our business". Thus, "it is justifiable that we interfere or attempt to bring retribution to individuals or to states only because the concentration camps and the deportations were in pursuance of a common plan or enterprise of making an unjust war". The judgement of the first Nuremberg trial found that "the policy of persecution, repression and murder of civilians" and persecution of Jews within Germany before the outbreak of war in 1939 were not crimes against humanity, because as "revolting and horrible as many of these crimes were, it has not been satisfactorily proved that they were done in execution of, or in connection with", war crimes or crimes against peace. The subsequent Nuremberg trials were conducted under Control Council Law No. 10 which included a revised definition of crimes against humanity with a wider scope. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), also known as the Tokyo trial, was convened to try the leaders of the Empire of Japan for three types of crimes: "Class A" (crimes against peace), "Class B" (war crimes), and "Class C" (crimes against humanity), committed before and during the Second World War. The legal basis for the trial was established by the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (CIMTFE) that was proclaimed on 19 January 1946. The tribunal convened on 3 May 1946, and was adjourned on 12 November 1948. In the Tokyo Trial, Crimes against Humanity (Class C) was not applied for any suspect.[additional citation(s) needed] Prosecutions related to the Nanking Massacre were categorised as infringements upon the Laws of War.[additional citation(s) needed] A panel of eleven judges presided over the IMTFE, one each from victorious Allied powers (United States, Republic of China, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Provisional Government of the French Republic, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, British India, and the Philippines). Types of crimes against humanity The definition of a crime against humanity varies both between and within countries and it also varies on both the international and domestic levels. Isolated and inhumane acts of a certain nature which are not committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack may constitute grave infringements of human rights, or – depending on the circumstances – war crimes but they are not classified as crimes against humanity. According to the Rome Statute, there are eleven types of crimes that can be charged as crimes against humanity when they are "committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population": The systematic persecution of members of one racial group by members of another racial group, such as the persecution which was practiced by the South African apartheid government, was recognized as a crime against humanity by the United Nations General Assembly in 1976. The Charter of the United Nations, Articles 13, 14, 15 makes actions of the General Assembly advisory to the Security Council. In regard to apartheid in particular, the UN General Assembly has not made any findings, nor have apartheid-related trials for crimes against humanity been conducted. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters did not contain any explicit provisions which recognized sexual and gender-based crimes as war crimes or crimes against humanity, but Control Council Law No. 10 recognized rape as a crime against humanity. The statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda both included rape as a crime against humanity. The ICC is the first international court which expressly includes various forms of sexual and gender-based crimes – including rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation, and other forms of sexual violence – as both an underlying act of crimes against humanity and a war crime which is committed during international and/or non-international armed conflicts. In 2008, the U.N. Security Council adopted resolution 1820, which noted that "rape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity or a constitutive act with respect to genocide". Legal status of crimes against humanity in international law Unlike genocide and war crimes, which have been widely recognized and prohibited in international criminal law since the establishment of the Nuremberg principles, there has never been a comprehensive convention on crimes against humanity, even though such crimes are continuously perpetrated worldwide in numerous conflicts and crises. There are eleven international texts defining crimes against humanity, but they all differ slightly as to their definition of that crime and its legal elements. In 2008, the Crimes Against Humanity Initiative was launched to address this gap in international law. On 30 July 2013, the United Nations International Law Commission voted to include the topic of crimes against humanity in its long-term program of work. In July 2014, the Commission moved this topic to its active programme of work based largely on a report submitted by Sean D. Murphy (the Special Rapporteur for Crimes Against Humanity). There is some debate on the status of crimes against humanity under customary international law. M. Cherif Bassiouni argues that crimes against humanity are part of jus cogens and as such constitute a non-derogable rule of international law. United Nations The United Nations has been primarily responsible for the prosecution of crimes against humanity since it was chartered in 1948. After Nuremberg and the Tokyo trials, there was no international court with jurisdiction over crimes against humanity for almost 50 years. However, work continued on developing the definition of crimes against humanity at the United Nations. For instance, in 1947, the International Law Commission was charged by the United Nations General Assembly with the formulation of the principles of international law recognized and reinforced in the Nuremberg Charter and judgment, and they were also tasked with drafting a 'code of offenses against the peace and security of mankind'. Completed 50 years later in 1996, the Draft Code defined crimes against humanity as various inhumane acts, i.e., "murder, extermination, torture, enslavement, persecution on political, racial, religious or ethnic grounds, institutionalized discrimination, arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population, arbitrary imprisonment, rape, enforced prostitution and other inhuman acts committed in a systematic manner or on a large scale and instigated or directed by a Government or by any organization or group." This definition differs from the one used in Nuremberg, where the criminal acts were to have been committed "before or during the war", thus establishing a nexus between crimes against humanity and armed conflict. On 21 March 2013, at its 22nd session, the United Nations Human Rights Council established the Commission of Inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). The Commission was mandated to investigate the systematic, widespread, and grave violations of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (i.e. North Korea), with a view to ensuring full accountability, in particular for violations that may amount to crimes against humanity. The Commission dealt with matters relating to crimes against humanity on the basis of definitions set out by customary international criminal law and in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The 2014 Report by the Commission found "the body of testimony and other information it received establishes that crimes against humanity have been committed in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, pursuant to policies established at the highest level of the State [....] These crimes against humanity entail extermination, murder, enslavement, torture, imprisonment, rape, forced abortions and other sexual violence, persecution on political, religious, racial and gender grounds, the forcible transfer of populations, the enforced disappearance of persons and the inhumane act of knowingly causing prolonged starvation. The Commission further finds that crimes against humanity are ongoing in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea because the policies, institutions and patterns of impunity that lie at their heart remain in place." Additionally, the Commission found that crimes against humanity have been committed against starving populations, particularly during the 1990s and that they were still being committed against persons from other countries who were systematically abducted or denied repatriation because they sought to gain labour and other skills for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. UN Security Council Resolution 1674, adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 28 April 2006, "reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity". The resolution commits the Council to action to protect civilians in armed conflict. In 2008 the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1820, which noted that "rape and other forms of sexual violence can constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity or a constitutive act with respect to genocide". According to the United Nations Security Council resolution 1970 (2011) concerning Libya, any direct or indirect trade of arms to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, in the form of supply, transfer, or sale should be prevented by the member nations. The arms embargo restricts the supply of arms, weapons, military vehicles, spare parts, technical assistance, finances, and the provision of armed mercenaries with origins of a country other than the one providing. Later, the United Nations claimed in its November 2019 report that the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Turkey were then violating the arms embargo imposed on Libya under the 1970 resolution. An airstrike on the migrant detention center in Tripoli in July 2019, believed to have been carried out by the United Arab Emirates, can be amounted as a war crime, as stated by the United Nations. The airstrike was deadlier than the 2011 militarized uprising that overthrew the regime of Muammar Gaddafi. International courts and criminal tribunals After the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials of 1945–1946, another international tribunal with jurisdiction over crimes against humanity was not established for another five decades. In response to atrocities committed in the 1990s, multiple ad hoc tribunals were established with jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. The statutes of the International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda each contain different definitions of crimes against humanity. In 1993, the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), with jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute three international crimes which had taken place in the former Yugoslavia: genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Article 5 of the ICTY Statute states that: "The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population: This definition of crimes against humanity revived the original 'Nuremberg' nexus with armed conflict, connecting crimes against humanity to both international and non-international armed conflict. It also expanded the list of criminal acts used in Nuremberg to include imprisonment, torture and rape. Cherif Bassiouni has argued that this definition was necessary as the conflict in the former Yugoslavia was considered to be a conflict of both an international and non-international nature. Therefore, this adjusted definition of crimes against humanity was necessary to afford the tribunal jurisdiction over this crime. The UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 1994 following the Rwandan genocide. Under the ICTR Statute, the link between crimes against humanity and an armed conflict of any kind was dropped. Rather, the requirement was added that the inhumane acts must be part of a "systematic or widespread attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds." Unlike the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the conflict in Rwanda was deemed to be non-international, so crimes against humanity would likely not have been applicable if the nexus to armed conflict had been maintained. In 2002, the International Criminal Court (ICC) was established in The Hague (Netherlands), and the Rome Statute provides for the ICC to have jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. ICC proceedings definitions of a "crime against humanity" have evolved significantly from its original legal definition or that used by the UN. Essentially, the Rome Statute employs the same definition of crimes against humanity that the ICTR Statute does, minus the requirement that the attack was carried out 'on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds'. In addition, the Rome Statute definition offers the most expansive list of specific criminal acts that may constitute crimes against humanity to date. The Rome Statute Explanatory Memorandum states that crimes against humanity: are particularly odious offenses in that they constitute a serious attack on human dignity or grave humiliation or a degradation of one or more human beings. They are not isolated or sporadic events, but are part either of a government policy (although the perpetrators need not identify themselves with this policy) or of a wide practice of atrocities tolerated or condoned by a government or a de facto authority. However, murder, extermination, torture, rape, political, racial, or religious persecution and other inhumane acts reach the threshold of crimes against humanity only if they are part of a widespread or systematic practice. Isolated inhumane acts of this nature may constitute grave infringements of human rights, or depending on the circumstances, war crimes, but may fall short of meriting the stigma attaching to the category of crimes under discussion. On the other hand, an individual may be guilty of crimes against humanity even if he perpetrates one or two of the offences mentioned above, or engages in one such offense against only a few civilians, provided those offenses are part of a consistent pattern of misbehavior by a number of persons linked to that offender (for example, because they engage in armed action on the same side or because they are parties to a common plan or for any similar reason.) Consequently when one or more individuals are not accused of planning or carrying out a policy of inhumanity, but simply of perpetrating specific atrocities or vicious acts, in order to determine whether the necessary threshold is met one should use the following test: one ought to look at these atrocities or acts in their context and verify whether they may be regarded as part of an overall policy or a consistent pattern of an inhumanity, or whether they instead constitute isolated or sporadic acts of cruelty and wickedness. To fall under the Rome Statute, a crime against humanity which is defined in Article 7.1 must be "part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population". Article 7.2.a states "For the purpose of paragraph 1: 'Attack directed against any civilian population means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack'." This means that an individual crime on its own, or even a number of such crimes, would not fall under the Rome Statute unless they were the result of a state policy or an organizational policy. This was confirmed by Luis Moreno Ocampo in an open letter publishing his conclusions about allegations of crimes committed during the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 which might fall under the ICC. In a section entitled "Allegations concerning Genocide and Crimes against Humanity," Ocampo states that "the available information provided no reasonable indicator of the required elements for a crime against humanity," i.e., 'a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population'". The ICC can only prosecute crimes against humanity in situations under which it has jurisdiction. The ICC only has jurisdiction over crimes contained in its statute – genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity – which have been committed on the territory of a State party to the Rome Statute, when a non-party State refers a situation within its country to the court, or when the United Nation Security Council refers a case to the ICC. In 2005 the UN referred to the ICC the situation in Darfur. This referral resulted in an indictment of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in 2008. When the ICC President reported to the UN regarding its progress handling these crimes against humanity case, Judge Phillipe Kirsch said "The Court does not have the power to arrest these persons. That is the responsibility of States and other actors. Without arrests, there can be no trials." Council of Europe The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 30 April 2002 issued a recommendation to the member states, on the protection of women against violence. In the section "Additional measures concerning violence in conflict and post-conflict situations", states in paragraph 69 that member states should: "penalize rape, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity as an intolerable violation of human rights, as crimes against humanity and, when committed in the context of an armed conflict, as war crimes;" In the Explanatory Memorandum on this recommendation when considering paragraph 69: Reference should be made to the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal adopted in Rome in July 1998. Article 7 of the Statute defines rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity, as crimes against humanity. Furthermore, Article 8 of the Statute defines rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization or any other form of sexual violence as a serious breach of the Geneva Conventions and as war crimes. 20th century Numerous sources cite the 20th century as the bloodiest century in global history. Millions of civilian infants, children, adults, and elderly people died in warfare. One civilian perished for every combatant killed. Prior to World War II, war criminals did not face the possibility of prosecution, apprehension, or imprisonment. Britain's Prime Minister Winston Churchill favored the outright execution of war criminals. The United States was more lenient and called for a just trial. The British Government was convinced to institute the Nuremberg Trials, which left several legacies. These include worldwide jurisdiction for severe war crimes, the creation of international war crime tribunals, judicial procedures that effectively documented the history of colossal crimes, and the success of UN courts in holding impartial trials. South Africa operated under apartheid system from 1948 into the 1990s in violation of the 1973 Apartheid convention, which declared apartheid to be a crime against humanity. Following international action and backlash, the apartheid system was dismantled at the end of the 20th century. The UN highlighted the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), specifically Article 7 (Crimes against Humanity), which defines large-scale acts of violence against a locality's civilian populace. These acts include murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation or forcible transfer of the population, imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of international laws, torture, forced prostitution and rape, persecution against certain groups, apartheid (racial discrimination and segregation), and other inhumane acts. A publication from Trial International mentioned that crimes against humanity have been codified starting in 1990. These include the 1993 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, the 1994 Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The latter contains the latest and most extensive list of detailed crimes against civilians. 21st century A report on the 2008–09 Gaza War by Richard Goldstone accused Israeli and Hamas forces of possibly committing a crime against humanity. The report concluded that Israel had used disproportionate force, targeted Palestinian civilians, used them as human shields, and destroyed civilian infrastructure. Hamas was found to have deliberately targeted Israeli civilians and Israeli infrastructure by mounting indiscriminate rocket attacks. Both the Israeli government and Hamas dismissed the findings of the report. In an April 2011 Washington Post article Goldstone wrote the report would have been a different document if he had known in 2009 what he knew in 2011. In 2019, United Nations investigators announced that Israeli troops may have committed crimes against humanity. During the Gaza protests 189 Palestinians were killed, investigators said, 183 were shot with live ammunition, including 35 children, three health workers, and two journalists. Amnesty International has accused Israel of committing the crime of apartheid against Palestinians. In 2022, the UN Human Rights Office assessment of human rights concerns in Xinjiang concluded that the extent of arbitrary and discriminatory detention of members of Uyghur and other predominantly Muslim groups in China, since 2017, pursuant to law and policy, in context of restrictions and deprivation more generally of fundamental rights enjoyed individually and collectively, may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity. The Myanmar military's targeting of the Rohingya Muslims in which more than 25,000 have been killed and more than 18,000 women and girls have been systematically raped have been labelled as crimes against humanity by United Nations and Amnesty International. OHCHR Independent Fact-Finding Mission have found Tatmadaw of committing crimes against humanity, genocide, and ethnic cleansing. A report of a UN fact-finding mission, which was released in March 2024 and presided over by Sara Hossain, revealed that the Iranian regime engaged in systematic and egregious institutionalized crimes against humanity on a large scale. Between 2021 and 2022, 551 protestors were killed during the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, and 834 people were executed in 2023. The International Court of Justice, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, and Michael Lynk (UN Special Rapporteur for the Palestinian occupied territory) have accused Israel of committing apartheid against Palestinians in the Israeli-occupied West Bank. Along with the apartheid system, Israel is also implicated in what many legal scholars say are crimes against humanity in the Gaza genocide. Human Rights Watch found that Israeli authorities systematically deprived Palestinian civilians in Gaza of water, food, and medical supplies, leading to widespread deaths and suffering, all acts of genocide. The International Criminal Court issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, citing war crimes and crimes against humanity, with a particular focus on Israel’s deliberate starvation of civilians as a weapon of war. In April 2024, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) adopted a resolution calling for Israel to be held accountable for possible war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Gaza Strip, and demanding a halt to all arms sales to the country. 28 countries voted in favor, 13 abstained, and six voted against. Israel's ambassador accused the UN of anti-Israeli bias. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) has faced significant international scrutiny for its crimes against humanity in the ongoing Sudanese conflict, particularly concerning support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Reports indicate that the UAE has been a key supplier of military equipment to the RSF, including weapons and drones, which have been used in operations leading to widespread atrocities in regions like Darfur. Investigations have uncovered evidence suggesting that the UAE violated the United Nations arms embargo on Darfur by providing arms and ammunition to the RSF. This support has allegedly fueled the RSF's campaign of violence, contributing to the ongoing humanitarian crisis in Sudan. In early 2025, former Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte was arrested after an ICC warrant due to extrajudicial killings done during his war on drugs, which are alleged to be crimes against humanity. The killings during his presidency were allegedly done or aided by Philippine National Police generals, particularly former PNP chief now Senator Ronald "Bato" dela Rosa. In January 2026, Mai Sato (Special Rapporteur on human rights in Iran) called for an independent investigation to determine whether the Iranian government’s suppression of nationwide protests constitutes crimes against humanity. References Further reading External links |
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תוכן עניינים בנימין בן אליעזר בנימין (פוּאד) בן אליעזר (12 בפברואר 1936 – 28 באוגוסט 2016) היה איש צבא ופוליטיקאי ישראלי. לאחר סיום שירותו הצבאי בדרגת תת-אלוף, בתפקיד מפקד אזור יהודה ושומרון, כיהן כחבר הכנסת ושר בממשלות ישראל. בשנים 2001–2002 כיהן כשר הביטחון בתקופת האינתיפאדה השנייה ומבצע חומת מגן. בשנים 2001–2002 עמד בראש מפלגת העבודה. בשנת 2014 היה מועמד המפלגה בבחירות 2014 לנשיאות ישראל. כמה ימים לפני הבחירות פרש בעקבות חקירת משטרה, שבסופה הועמד לדין בעבירות שוחד ומרמה. נפטר לפני הכרעת הדין במשפטו. ביוגרפיה בן אליעזר נולד ב-1936, בבצרה שבעיראק, לסאלח ופַרחה. שמו בלידתו היה פואד אלעזר. לאחר שאביו נעצר בידי השלטונות בעיראק, ובעקבות כך עלה לארץ ישראל ב־1950 במבצע עזרא ונחמיה. הנער עוברת את שמו לבנימין בן אליעזר. הוא נקלט בקיבוץ מרחביה בעמק יזרעאל. בגיל 18 עזב את הקיבוץ כדי לסייע להוריו שעלו באותה שנה לישראל. בשנת 1954 התגייס לצה"ל, לחטיבת גולני. עבר מסלול הכשרה כלוחם, קורס מ"כים וקורס קציני חי"ר ושירת בה כעשר שנים במגוון תפקידים, ובהם מפקד מחלקה ומפקד פלוגה. במלחמת סיני שירת כסגן מפקד פלוגה בחטיבה 11. לאחר המלחמה הדריך בקורס מ"כים ושירת כקצין מבצעים בגדוד 13 תחת פיקודו של זאב שחם. מונה לסגן מפקד סיירת שקד ופיקד עלייה במלחמת ששת הימים, בה לחמה בקרבות הציר המרכזי בסיני, ובמהלך מלחמת ההתשה. בשנת 1968 נפצע בן אליעזר מירי כוחות פת"ח במהלך פשיטה מוסקת של סיירת שקד בירדן. לאחר המלחמה היה אמור לצאת ללימודים בבית הספר הצבאי הגבוה בצרפת, אולם בשל האמברגו שהטיל נשיא צרפת שארל דה גול על היחסים הצבאים עם ישראל נשלח לסינגפור והפך למדריך ראשי בבית הספר לפיקוד ומטה של צבא סינגפור. בשובו לישראל מונה לסגן מפקד חטיבת הערבה. במלחמת יום הכיפורים שימש במינוי חירום כקצין אג"ם תחת פיקודו של ישראל טל.[דרושה הבהרה] ב-1974 מונה למפקד יחידה 300. בעקבות הפיגוע במעלות הוחלט שיפקד על חטיבה מרחבית שאיחדה את חטיבת בירנית עם יחידה 300 לעוצבת ברעם. במקביל שירת כקצין הקישור למובלעות בדרום לבנון, ובהמשך כקצין הקישור לכוחות הלבנוניים בביירות. במסגרת תפקידים אלה היה המפקד הראשון של יזמת ההתקשרות עם המרונים בדרום לבנון, ובין האחראים להקמתה ותפקודה של הגדר הטובה. בעקבות מבצע ליטני מונה למושל אזור דרום לבנון והקים את אד"ל (אזור דרום לבנון), שהפכה ברבות הימים ליק"ל (יחידת קישור ללבנון). בעקבות הדחת מפקד אזור יהודה ושומרון דוד הגואל במאי 1978 מונה בן אליעזר למפקד האזור וקודם לדרגת תת-אלוף. בספטמבר 1981 שונה מעמד המנהל האזרחי שקיבל את מרבית הסמכויות שהיו לבן אליעזר, דבר שהביא לפרישתו מצה"ל באוקטובר 1981. בינואר 1982 הצטרף למפלגת תמ"י ושימש כמזכיר המפלגה. הוא התפטר מהתפקיד במאי 1983.. ביולי 1983 מונה על ידי שר הביטחון משה ארנס למתאם פעולות הממשלה בשטחים. פואד, בדומה לקודמו בתפקיד רחביה ורדי, היה אזרח ולא שב לצבא עם קבלת התפקיד. פואד התפטר מהתפקיד במרץ 1984, עקב הצטרפותו למפלגת יחד. ב־1984 חבר לעזר ויצמן שהקים את מפלגת יחד. בבחירות לכנסת האחת עשרה ב-1984 קיבלה "יחד" שלושה מנדטים ובן אליעזר נבחר לכנסת האחת עשרה. לאחר הבחירות התאחדה "יחד" עם מפלגת העבודה. בן אליעזר שימש במגוון תפקידים כחבר הכנסת, עד לבחירות לכנסת השלוש עשרה ב-1992. בבחירות אלו שימש בהצלחה כראש מטה ההסברה של המפלגה, והיה בין הגורמים לעליית יצחק רבין לראשות הממשלה. לאחר ניצחון המפלגה בבחירות מונה לשר הבינוי והשיכון, תפקיד אותו מילא עד לשנת 1996. בשנת 1994 יצא בשליחותו של רבין לתוניסיה והיה השר הישראלי הראשון שנפגש לשיחה עם יו"ר אש"ף יאסר ערפאת. לאחר שובה של מפלגת העבודה לשלטון בראשות אהוד ברק בעקבות הבחירות לכנסת החמש עשרה ולראשות הממשלה ב־1999, מינה אותו ברק לסגן ראש הממשלה ושר התקשורת. ב-11 באוקטובר 2000 מונה לשר הבינוי והשיכון, נוסף על תפקידיו הקודמים. ממשלתו של ברק הייתה קצרת ימים, והוא הודיע על התפטרותו ועל עריכת בחירות לראשות הממשלה בלבד, ב-6 בפברואר 2001. בבחירות אלו ניצח אריאל שרון. מגעים בין מפלגת העבודה, בראשותו הזמנית של שמעון פרס, והליכוד, הביאו להצטרפות העבודה לממשלת שרון הראשונה. סוכם כי מפלגת העבודה תקבל שני תיקים מרכזיים. תיק החוץ, שהובטח לשמעון פרס באופן אישי, ותיק הביטחון. בן אליעזר התמודד במרכז המפלגה על קבלת תיק הביטחון מול חברי הכנסת מתן וילנאי ואפרים סנה, וניצח בהתמודדות. ב-7 במרץ 2001 הציג שרון את ממשלתו בפני הכנסת, ומינה את בן אליעזר לשר הביטחון. תקופתו כשר הביטחון הייתה תקופה של פיגועים קשים, והסלמה במלחמה שבין מדינת ישראל ובין הפלסטינים, המכונה "האינתיפאדה השנייה". שרון עלה לשלטון על רקע ציפיות לנקיטת קו תקיף. ישיבת מפלגת העבודה בממשלה, ובמיוחד ישיבתם של פרס ובן אליעזר בתיקי מפתח, סייעו לשרון למנוע מתקפות על צעדיו בזירה הבינלאומית ומחוגי השמאל. בן אליעזר ופרס גם הצטרפו לשרון בהתנגדותו לבניית גדר הפרדה לאורך מרחב התפר בין ישראל לגדה המערבית. כלפי מפלגתו הציג עצמו שרון כמי שרוצה לנקוט בצעדים כגון "גירוש ערפאת" אך נבלם על ידי אנשי השמאל בממשלתו. ההסלמה הגיעה לשיאה בפיגוע במלון פארק ובמבצע חומת מגן שבא בעקבותיו באפריל 2002. כשר ביטחון החליט בן אליעזר לפתוח בשורה של פעולות צבאיות, בהן נכללו כניסות ל"שטח A", שאליו ישראל מנועה מלהיכנס על פי הסכמי אוסלו. כמו כן החליט לפגוע ב-22 ביולי 2002 בסלאח שחאדה, ממנהיגי החמאס, בהפצצת ביתו בלב שכונת מגורים, באמצעות פצצה במשקל טון שהושלכה ממטוס F-16. בפעולה זו נהרגו מלבד שחאדה גם עוזרו ועוד 14 אנשים, ובהם אשתו ואחת מבנותיו, וכן נשים וילדים, ונפצעו עשרות אזרחים שהיו בקרבת מקום. הריגתו של שחאדה פתחה שרשרת סיכולים ממוקדים של מפקדי החמאס ובכיריו, צעדים שעוררו מחלוקת בקהילה הישראלית והבינלאומית. בחודש ספטמבר 2001 התמודד על משרת יושב ראש המפלגה, אל מול אברהם בורג. הבחירות המקדימות נותרו ללא הכרעה תוך חשד כבד לזיופים, ותחת צל של פרסומים (שאחר כך הוכחו כמסולפים) על שחיתויות של מי שהיה יושב ראש הכנסת, בורג. בחודש דצמבר של אותה שנה נערך סיבוב נוסף ב-51 קלפיות שנחשדו בהיותן מזויפות. בבחירות אלו זכה בן אליעזר ברוב הדרוש ונבחר ליושב ראש. נקבע כי המינוי הוא זמני, וכי ייערכו בחירות נוספות בשנת 2002, לקראת התמודדות בבחירות הכלליות. ישיבתה של מפלגת העבודה בממשלת האחדות לא הייתה מקובלת על יוסי ביילין וחיים רמון, שנותרו מחוץ לממשלה, והביעו את אי שביעות רצונם מתפקודה. במיוחד בלטה ביקורתו של רמון כלפי בן אליעזר בשל אי בנייתה של גדר ההפרדה. באוקטובר 2002, בעקבות הצעת תקציב המדינה לשנת 2003, תקציב לו התנגדה מפלגת העבודה בנימוק שהוא מנוגד לעקרונות המפלגה והבטחותיה לבוחר, הוביל בן אליעזר לפרישת מפלגת העבודה מהקואליציה. מצבו בתוך המפלגה פנימה הלך והחמיר. בבחירות הפנימיות שהתקיימו לאחר מכן, התמודד בן אליעזר מול רמון ועמרם מצנע, שלבסוף ניצח, אך הוביל את המפלגה לכישלון בבחירות הכלליות שהתקיימו ב-28 בינואר 2003, ולישיבה באופוזיציה. ב-10 בינואר 2005, בעקבות אישור תוכנית ההתנתקות, הצטרפה מפלגת העבודה לקואליציה, ובן אליעזר מונה לשר התשתיות הלאומיות. הוא פרש מתפקידו יחד עם שאר חברי סיעתו ב-23 בנובמבר 2005. בבחירות לראשות מפלגת העבודה ומועמדה לראשות הממשלה לקראת הבחירות לכנסת השבע עשרה, שנערכו ב-9 בנובמבר 2005, התמודד בן אליעזר מול שמעון פרס ועמיר פרץ וזכה ב-15% מהקולות. עמיר פרץ ניצח בבחירות וזכה בראשות המפלגה. עם הקמת הממשלה ה-31 בראשות אהוד אולמרט, מונה בן אליעזר בשנית לשר התשתיות. בתחילת מרץ 2007, עמד במוקד פרשה דיפלומטית שהתעוררה בעקבות שידור סרטו התיעודי של רן אדליסט, "רוח שקד", בערוץ הראשון. בסרט הובאה עדות ולפיה גדוד שקד, בפיקודו של בן אליעזר, הרג חיילי קומנדו מצריים שנפלו בשבי. טענות אלו, שהוכחשו על ידי יוצאי היחידה ובן אליעזר, עוררו סערה תקשורתית במצרים. ב-7 באפריל 2008, בעת שביקר בחמ"ל משרדו במסגרת תרגיל העורף הלאומי, אמר: "תקיפה של איראן תוביל לתגובה קשה של ישראל, שתגרום לחורבן האומה האיראנית". בבחירות לכנסת ה-18 הוצב במקום השמיני ברשימת העבודה לכנסת ונבחר לעוד כהונה בכנסת. לאחר הקמת הממשלה ה-32 בראשות בנימין נתניהו והצטרפות מפלגת העבודה לקואליציה זו, מונה בן אליעזר לשר התעשייה, המסחר והתעסוקה. בעקבות היעלמותה של מפלגת הגמלאים מהכנסת וכניסתו של שמעון פרס למשכן הנשיא, נעשה בן אליעזר לזקן חברי הכנסת. ב-17 בינואר 2011 פרש אהוד ברק מהמפלגה והקים את סיעת העצמאות. בתגובה, בן אליעזר ושרי המפלגה הנוספים, יצחק הרצוג ואבישי ברוורמן, התפטרו מתפקידיהם. ב-19 בינואר 2011, התנגדו רוב חברי הכנסת מסיעת העבודה למינויו ליושב ראש המפלגה. לקראת הבחירות לכנסת התשע עשרה הוצב בן אליעזר במקום החמישי ברשימת העבודה. בשל היותו ותיק חברי הכנסת בכנסת זו, שימש בתפקיד יושב ראש הכנסת בפועל. באוגוסט 2013 הצהיר בפני חברי כנסת על כוונתו להתמודד על תפקיד נשיא המדינה וביקש את תמיכתם. בפברואר 2014 החליטה סיעת מפלגת העבודה שבן אליעזר יהיה המועמד הרשמי של המפלגה בבחירות לנשיאות ישראל. חרף זאת מספר חברי סיעה הודיעו בגלוי בתמיכתם במועמדים אחרים גם בעקבות האשמות שהועלו מצד עמיתים בעברו על התנהגות בלתי ראויה, הפרת אמונים ואף בעבירות פליליות. ב-27 במאי 2014 הכריז מועמדות לבחירות לנשיאות שיתקיימו ב-10 ביוני 2014. ארבעה ימים לפני הבחירות זימנה אותו המשטרה לחקירה באזהרה, בחשד שקיבל בניגוד לחוק כספים למימון רכישת ביתו ביפו מאיש העסקים אברהם נניקשווילי. בעקבות זאת הודיע ב-7 ביוני 2014 על פרישתו מהבחירות לנשיאות. במהלך 2006 אושפז בן אליעזר פעמיים בבית החולים אסף הרופא בשל אירועי לב. במרץ 2011, אושפז בבית החולים אסף הרופא במחלקה לטיפול נמרץ במשך כ-40 יום בשל דלקת ריאות חריפה. אף שהיה חשש לחייו, החלים ושוחרר מבית-החולים. בריאיון לאילנה דיין בשנת 2014 חשף פואד שעבר אירוע שמוגדר כמוות קליני. בדצמבר 2014 אושפז בבית החולים אסף הרופא, ולאחר כשבוע ב-11 בדצמבר 2014 הודיע בן אליעזר על פרישה מהחיים הפוליטיים, אותה נימק בהרעה במצבו הבריאותי. הוא נפטר ב-28 באוגוסט 2016, בגיל 80 ונקבר בבית העלמין בחולון. בדצמבר 2015 הוגש כתב אישום נגד בן אליעזר באשמת שוחד, מרמה והפרת אמונים, עבירות מס והלבנת הון. על פי כתב האישום, דרש וקיבל שוחד מאנשי עסקים בעד פעולות הקשורות בתפקידיו כשר, כמו כן מסר הצהרות הון כוזבות ליו"ר הכנסת, לא הגיש דוחות כמתחייב על פי פקודת מס הכנסה, פעל במרמה כדי להתחמק מתשלום מיסים, והלבין כספים. משפטו החל בפברואר 2016, במהלכו ביקשו סנגוריו עו"ד יעקב וינרוט ועו"ד עמית חדד דחיה למשפטו בשל מצבו הרפואי וטיפולי הדיאליזה שהוא עובר בשל אי ספיקת כליות. בן אליעזר נפטר באוגוסט 2016, לפני שבית המשפט הספיק להכריע בעניינו. פרקליטות המדינה הגישה תביעה כספית על סך של כ-2.7 מיליון ש"ח כנגד עיזבונו של בן אליעזר, בנימוק שהוא קיבל סכום זה כשוחד בהיותו איש ציבור ולכן על עיזבונו להשיב סכום זה למדינה. ב-2020 הסתיים המאבק על ירושת בן אליעזר בהסכם פשרה. לפי ההסכם, המדינה הגיעה להסדר עם מנהלי העיזבון שהביא לסיומם של שלושה הליכים שניהלה המדינה נגד העיזבון - ערעור מס, הליך פלילי בבקשה לחילוט הרכוש התפוס ותובענה אזרחית שהוגשה לבית המשפט המחוזי. על פי ההסדר, העיזבון נדרש להעביר למדינה את כל סכום המזומן שנתפס בכספת של בן אליעזר בעת הפתיחה בחקירה - סך של כ-600 אלף דולר - וכן חלק משווי זכויותיו בפנטהאוז ביפו. באוגוסט 2019 הורשע איש העסקים אברהם נניקשוילי במתן שוחד בסך של כמיליון וחצי שקלים לבן אליעזר ובחתימה על הסכם הלוואה פיקטיבי שנועד להסוות את מתן השוחד. בית המשפט המחוזי גזר עליו עונש של 14 חודשי מאסר, שהוחמרו בבית המשפט העליון ל-21 חודשי מאסר לאחר ערעור של פרקליטות המדינה. חיים אישיים הניח אישה (אשתו השנייה, דולי), חמישה ילדים ונכדים. לקריאה נוספת קישורים חיצוניים הערות שוליים שרים נוספים במשרד הביטחון: מיכאל ביטון • בצלאל סמוטריץ' |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulletproof_vest] | [TOKENS: 11350] |
Contents Bulletproof vest A bulletproof vest, also known as a ballistic vest or bullet-resistant vest, is a type of body armor designed to absorb impact and prevent the penetration of firearm projectiles and explosion fragments to the torso. The vest can be either soft—as worn by police officers, security personnel, prison guards, and occasionally private citizens to protect against stabbing attacks or light projectiles—or hard, incorporating metallic or para-aramid components. Soldiers and police tactical units typically wear hard armour, either alone or combined with soft armour, to protect against rifle ammunition or fragmentation. Additional protection includes trauma plates for blunt force and ceramic inserts for high-caliber rounds. Bulletproof vests have evolved over centuries, from early designs like those made for knights and military leaders to modern-day versions. Early ballistic protection used materials like cotton and silk, while contemporary vests employ advanced fibers and ceramic plates. History In 1538, Duke Francesco Maria della Rovere, a condottiero, commissioned Filippo Negroli to create a bulletproof vest. In 1561, Maximilian II, Holy Roman Emperor is recorded as testing his armour against gunfire. Similarly, in 1590 Henry Lee of Ditchley expected his Greenwich armour to be "pistol proof". Its actual effectiveness was controversial at the time. During the English Civil War, Oliver Cromwell's Ironside cavalry were equipped with lobster-tailed pot helmets and musket-proof cuirasses which consisted of two layers of armour plating. The outer layer was designed to absorb the bullet's energy and the thicker inner layer stopped further penetration. The armour would be left badly dented but still serviceable. One of the first examples of commercially sold bulletproof armour was produced by a tailor in Dublin in the 1840s. The Cork Examiner reported on his line of business in December 1847. Another soft ballistic vest, Myeonje baegab, was invented in Joseon Korea in the 1860s shortly after the punitive 1866 French expedition to Korea. The regent of Joseon ordered the development of bulletproof armour because of increasing threats from Western armies. Kim Gidu and Gang Yun found that cotton could protect against bullets if 10 layers of cotton fabric were used. The vests were used in battle during the United States expedition to Korea, when the US Navy attacked Ganghwa Island in 1871. The US Navy captured one of the vests and took it to the US, where it was stored at the Smithsonian Museum until 2007. The vest has since been sent back to Korea and is currently on display to the public. Simple ballistic armor was sometimes constructed by criminals. In 1880, a gang of Australian bushrangers led by Ned Kelly devised their own suits of bulletproof armour. The suits had a mass of around 44 kilograms (97 lb) and were fashioned from stolen plough mouldboards, most likely in a crude bush forge and possibly with the assistance of blacksmiths. With a cylindrical helmet and apron, the armour protected the wearer's head, torso, upper arms, and upper legs. In June 1880, the four outlaws wore the suits in a gunfight with the police, during which Kelly survived at least 18 bullets striking his armour. In the 1890s, American outlaw and gunfighter Jim Miller was infamous for wearing a steel breastplate under his frock coat as a form of body armor. This plate saved Miller on two occasions, and it proved to be highly resistant to pistol bullets and shotguns. One example was his gunfight with a sheriff named George A. "Bud" Frazer, where the plate managed to deflect all bullets fired by the lawman's revolver. In 1881, the Tombstone, Arizona physician George E. Goodfellow noticed that Charlie Storms, who was shot twice by faro dealer Luke Short, had one bullet stopped by a silk handkerchief in his breast pocket that prevented that bullet from penetrating. In 1887, he wrote an article titled "Impenetrability of Silk to Bullets" for the Southern California Practitioner documenting the first known instance of bulletproof fabric. He experimented with silk vests resembling gambesons that used 18 to 30 layers of silk to protect the wearers from penetration. Kazimierz Żegleń used Goodfellow's findings to develop a silk bulletproof vest at the end of the 19th century, which could stop the relatively slow rounds from black powder handguns. The vests cost US$800 each in 1914, equivalent to $26,000 in 2025. A similar vest made by Polish inventor Jan Szczepanik in 1901 saved the life of Alfonso XIII of Spain when he was shot by an attacker. By 1900, US gangsters were commonly wearing the $800 silk vests to protect themselves. The combatants of World War I started the war without any attempt at providing the soldiers with body armor. Various private companies advertised body protection suits such as the Birmingham Chemico Body Shield, although these products were generally far too expensive for an average soldier. The first official attempts at commissioning body armor were made in 1915 by the British Army Design Committee, Trench Warfare Section in particular a 'Bomber's Shield'; "bomber" being the term for those who threw grenades rather than grenadier. The Experimental Ordnance Board also reviewed potential materials for bullet and fragment proof armor, such as steel plate. A 'necklet' was successfully issued on a small scale (due to cost considerations), which protected the neck and shoulders from bullets traveling at 600 ft/s (180 m/s) with interwoven layers of silk and cotton stiffened with resin. The Dayfield body shield entered service in 1916 and a hardened breastplate was introduced the following year. The British army medical services calculated towards the end of the War that three quarters of all battle injuries could have been prevented if an effective armor had been issued. The French experimented with steel visors attached to the Adrian helmet and 'abdominal armor' designed by General Adrian, in addition to shoulder "epaulets" to protect from falling debris and darts. These failed to be practical, because they severely impeded the soldier's mobility. The Germans officially issued body armor in the form of nickel and silicon steel armor plates that was called Sappenpanzer (nicknamed 'Lobster armor') from late 1916. These were similarly too heavy to be practical for the rank-and-file, but were used by static units such as sentries and occasionally machine-gunners. An improved version, the Infanterie-Panzer, was introduced in 1918, with hooks for equipment. The United States developed several types of body armor, including the chrome nickel steel Brewster Body Shield, which consisted of a breastplate and a headpiece and could withstand Lewis Gun bullets at 2,700 ft/s (820 m/s), but was clumsy and heavy at 40 lb (18 kg). A scaled waistcoat of overlapping steel scales fixed to a leather lining was also designed; this armor weighed 11 lb (5.0 kg), fit close to the body, and was considered more comfortable. During the late 1920s through the early 1930s, gunmen from criminal gangs in the United States began wearing less-expensive vests made from thick layers of cotton padding and cloth. These early vests could absorb the impact of handgun rounds such as .22 Long Rifle, .25 ACP, .32 S&W Long, .32 S&W, .380 ACP, .38 Special and .45 ACP traveling at speeds of up to 300 m/s (980 ft/s). To overcome these vests, law enforcement agents began using the newer and more powerful .38 Super and later the .357 Magnum cartridges.[citation needed] Meanwhile, the Dunrite Bulletproof Vest, produced by Detective Publishing Company Chicago, was used by some members of law enforcement. The vest itself was made of wool, but its protection came from 15 pounds (6.8 kg) of metal. Similar vests were often stolen or obtained in other ways by gangsters, often in direct sales. One Dunrite Bullet Bulletproof Vest was found in the back of Bonnie and Clyde's car. In 1940, the Medical Research Council in Britain proposed the use of a lightweight suit of armour for general use by infantry, and a heavier suit for troops in more dangerous positions, such as anti-aircraft and naval gun crews. By February 1941, trials had begun on body armour made of mangalloy plates. Two plates covered the front area and one plate on the lower back protected the kidneys and other vital organs. Five thousand sets were made and evaluated to almost unanimous approval – as well as providing adequate protection, the armour didn't severely impede the mobility of the soldier and were reasonably comfortable to wear. The armor was introduced in 1942 although the demand for it was later scaled down.[citation needed] In northwestern Europe, The 2nd Canadian Division during World War II also adopted this armour for medical personnel. The British company Wilkinson Sword began to produce flak jackets for bomber crews in 1943 under contract with the Royal Air Force. The majority of pilot deaths in the air were due to low-velocity fragments rather than bullets. The Surgeon General of the United States Air Force, Colonel M. C. Grow, who was stationed in Britain, thought that many wounds he was treating could have been prevented by some kind of light armor. Two types of armor were issued for different specifications. These jackets were made of nylon and were capable of stopping flak and fragmentation but were not designed to stop bullets. Flak jackets were also quickly adopted by the United States Army Air Forces. In the early stages of World War II, the United States also designed body armor for infantrymen, but most models were too heavy and mobility-restricting to be useful in the field and incompatible with existing required equipment. Near the middle of 1944, development of infantry body armor in the United States restarted. Several vests were produced for the US military, including but not limited to the T34, the T39, the T62E1, and the M12. The United States developed a vest using doron plate, a fiberglass-based fibre-reinforced plastic. These vests were first used in the Battle of Okinawa in 1945. The Soviet Armed Forces used several types of body armour, including the SN-42 (from Stalnoi Nagrudnik, Russian for "steel breastplate" and the number denotes the design year). All were tested, but only the SN-42 was put in production. It consisted of two pressed steel plates that protected the front torso and groin. The plates were 2 mm thick and weighed 3.5 kg (7.7 lb). This armour was generally supplied to assault engineers (SHISBr) and tank desantniki. The SN armour effectively protected wearers from 9×19mm bullets fired by an MP 40 submachine gun at around 100 m (110 yd) and was sometimes able to deflect 7.92 Mauser rifle bullets and bayonet blades, although only at very low angles. This made it useful in urban battles such as the Battle of Stalingrad. However, the SN-42's weight made it impractical for infantry in the open. Some apocryphal accounts note point blank deflection of 9mm bullets, and testing of similar armour supports this theory. During the Korean War several new vests were produced for the United States military, including the M-1951, which made use of fibre-reinforced plastic or aluminium segments woven into a nylon vest. These vests represented "a vast improvement on weight, but the armor failed to stop bullets and fragments very successfully," [citation needed] although officially they were claimed to be able to stop 7.62×25mm Tokarev pistol rounds at the muzzle. Such vests equipped with Doron Plate have defeated .45 ACP handgun ammunition in informal testing. Developed by Natick Laboratories (now the Combat Capabilities Development Command Soldier Center) and introduced in 1967, T65-2 plate carriers were the first vests designed to hold hard ceramic plates, making them capable of stopping 7 mm rifle rounds. These "Chicken Plates" were made of either boron carbide, silicon carbide, or aluminium oxide. They were issued to the crew of low-flying aircraft such as the UH-1 and UC-123 during the Vietnam War. Conscious of US developments during the Korean War, the Soviet Union also began the development of body armour for its troops, resulting in the adoption of the 6b1 vest in 1957. This marked a shift away from previous systems like the SN-42, which relied on large, monolithic plates that were inflexible and substantially affected a soldier's balance. The 6b1, and all subsequent Soviet body armour, would rely upon ballistic-fabric wrapped plates, initially steel and later titanium and boron carbide. Between 1957 and 1958, anywhere between 1500 and 5000 6b1 vests were produced, but they were subsequently put in storage and not issued until the early years of the Soviet–Afghan War, where they were used in limited quantities, and were able to resist shrapnel and Tokarev rounds. In 1969 the company American Body Armor was founded and began to produce a patented combination of quilted nylon faced with multiple steel plates. This armor configuration was marketed to American law enforcement agencies by Smith & Wesson under the trade name "Barrier Vest." The Barrier Vest was the first police vest to gain wide use during high-threat police operations. In 1971, research chemist Stephanie Kwolek discovered a liquid crystalline polymer solution. Its exceptional strength and stiffness led to the invention of Kevlar, a synthetic fibre, woven into a fabric and layered, that, by weight, has five times the tensile strength of steel. In the mid-1970s, DuPont, the company which employed Kwolek, introduced Kevlar. Immediately Kevlar was incorporated into a National Institute of Justice (NIJ) evaluation program to provide lightweight, able body armour to a test pool of American law enforcement officers to ascertain if everyday able wearing was possible. Lester Shubin, a program manager at the NIJ, managed this law enforcement feasibility study within a few selected large police agencies and quickly determined that Kevlar body armor could be comfortably worn by police daily, and would save lives. In 1975 Richard A. Armellino, founder of American Body Armor, marketed an all Kevlar vest called the K-15, consisting of 15 layers of Kevlar that also included a 5" × 8" ballistic steel "Shok Plate" positioned vertically over the heart and was issued US Patent #3,971,072 for this innovation. Similarly sized and positioned "trauma plates" are still used today on most vests, reducing blunt trauma and increasing ballistic protection in the center-mass heart/sternum area. In 1976, Richard Davis, founder of Second Chance Body Armor, designed the company's first all-Kevlar vest, the Model Y. The lightweight, able vest industry was launched and a new form of daily protection for the modern police officer was quickly adopted. By the mid-to-late 1980s, an estimated 1/3 to 1/2 of police patrol officers[where?] wore able vests daily.[citation needed] By 2006, more than 2,000 documented police vest "saves" were recorded, validating the success and efficiency of lightweight able body armor as a standard piece of everyday police equipment.[citation needed] During the 1980s, the US military issued the PASGT kevlar vest, tested privately at NIJ level IIA by several sources, able to stop pistol rounds (including 9 mm FMJ), but intended and approved only for fragmentation. West Germany issued a similar rated vest called the Splitterschutzweste.[citation needed] During the early 1980s, body armor vests began to see widespread use by several countries in addition to more prolific users like the US and UK. Following the 1982 Israeli intervention during the Lebanese Civil War, body armor was widely issued to Israeli troops as well as European peacekeepers and to a lesser degree, by Syrian troops. During the Soviet-Afghan war the obsolete 6b1 was rapidly replaced by the 6b2, which was issued from 1980 onward and by 1983 was issued to the vast majority of the 40th army. Kevlar soft armor had its shortcomings because if "large fragments or high velocity bullets hit the vest, the energy could cause life-threatening, blunt trauma injuries" in selected, vital areas. Ranger Body Armor was developed for the American military in 1991. Although it was the second modern US body armor that was able to stop rifle caliber rounds and still be light enough to be worn by infantry soldiers in the field, (first being the ISAPO, or Interim Small Arms Protective Overvest,) it still had its flaws: "it was still heavier than the concurrently issued PASGT (Personal Armor System for Ground Troops) anti-fragmentation armor worn by regular infantry and ... did not have the same degree of ballistic protection around the neck and shoulders." [citation needed] The format of Ranger Body Armor (and more recent body armor issued to US special operations units) highlights the trade-offs between force protection and mobility that modern body armor forces organizations to address. Newer armor issued by the United States armed forces to large numbers of troops includes the Modular Scalable Vest (MSV) used by the United States Army and United States Air Force, as well as the United States Marine Corps' Modular Tactical Vest (MTV) and Scalable Plate Carrier (SPC). All of these systems are designed with the vest intended to provide protection from fragments and pistol rounds. Hard ceramic plates, such as the Small Arms Protective Insert, as used with Interceptor Body Armor, are worn to protect the vital organs from higher level threats. These threats mostly take the form of high velocity and armor-piercing rifle rounds. Similar types of protective equipment have been adopted by modern armed forces over the world. Since the 1970s, several new fibers and construction methods for bulletproof fabric have been developed besides woven Kevlar, such as DSM's Dyneema, Honeywell's Gold Flex and Spectra, Teijin Aramid's Twaron, Pinnacle Armor's Dragon Skin, and Toyobo's Zylon. The US military has developed body armor for the working dogs who aid soldiers in battle. Performance standards Due to the various types of projectile, it is often inaccurate to refer to a particular product as "bulletproof" because this implies that it will protect against any and all threats. Instead, the term bullet resistant is generally preferred. Vest specifications will typically include both penetration resistance requirements and limits on the amount of impact force that is delivered to the body. Even without penetration, heavy bullets can deal enough force to cause blunt force trauma under the impact point. On the other hand, some bullets can penetrate the vest, but deal low damage to its wearer due to the loss of speed or small/reduced mass/form. Armour piercing ammunition tends to have poor terminal ballistics due to it being specifically not intended to fragment or expand. Body armor standards are regional. Around the world ammunition varies and as a result the armor testing must reflect the threats found locally. Law enforcement statistics show that many shootings where officers are injured or killed involve the officer's own weapon. As a result, each law enforcement agency or para-military organization will have their own standard for armor performance if only to ensure that their armor protects them from their own weapons. While many standards exist, a few standards are widely used as models. The US National Institute of Justice ballistic and stab documents are examples of broadly accepted standards. In addition to the NIJ, the UK Home Office Scientific Development Branch (HOSDB – formerly the Police Scientific Development Branch (PSDB)) and VPAM (German acronym for the Association of Laboratories for Bullet Resistant Materials And Constructions), originally from Germany, are other widely accepted standards. In the Russian area, the GOST standard is dominant. Soft and hard armor Modern body armor is generally split into one of two categories: soft armor and hard armor. Soft armor is typically made of woven fabrics, like Dyneema or Kevlar, and usually provides protection against fragmentation and handgun threats. Hard armor usually refers to ballistic plates; these hardened plates are designed to defend against rifle threats, in addition to the threats covered by soft armor. Soft armour is usually made of woven fabrics (synthetic or natural) and protects up to NIJ level IIIA. Soft armour can be worn stand-alone or can be combined with hard armor as part of an "In-Conjunction" armor system. In these in-conjunction systems, a soft armor "plate backer" is usually placed behind the ballistic plate and the combination of soft and hard armor provides the designated level of protection. Broadly, there are three basic types of hard armor ballistic plates: ceramic plate-based systems, steel plate with spall fragmentation protective coating (or backer), and hard fiber-based laminate systems. These hard armor plates may be designed to be used stand-alone or "In-Conjunction" with soft armor backers, also called "plate backers". Many systems contain both hard ceramic components and laminated textile materials used together. Various ceramic materials types are in use, however: aluminum oxide, boron carbide and silicon carbide are the most common. The fibers used in these systems are the same as found in soft textile armor. However, for rifle protection, high pressure lamination of ultra high molecular weight polyethylene with a Kraton matrix is the most common. The Small Arms Protective Insert (SAPI) and the enhanced SAPI plate for the United States Department of Defense generally has this form. Due to the use of ceramic plates for rifle protection, these vests are 5–8 times as heavy on an area basis as handgun protection. The weight and stiffness of rifle armor is a major technical challenge. Density, hardness and impact toughness are among the materials properties that are balanced to design these systems. While ceramic materials have some outstanding properties for ballistics, they have poor fracture toughness. Failure of ceramic plates by cracking must also be controlled. For this reason many ceramic rifle plates are a composite. The strike face is ceramic with the backface formed of laminated fiber and resin materials. The hardness of the ceramic prevents the penetration of the bullet while the tensile strength of the fiber backing helps prevent tensile failure. The U.S. military's Small Arms Protective Insert family is a well-known example of these plates. When a ceramic plate is shot, it cracks in the vicinity of the impact, which reduces the protection in this area. Although NIJ 0101.06 requires a Level III plate to stop six rounds of 7.62×51mm M80 ball ammunition, it imposes a minimum distance between shots of 2.0 inches (51mm); if two rounds impact the plate closer than this requirement permits, it may result in a penetration. To counter this, some plates, such as the Ceradyne Model AA4 and IMP/ACT (Improved Multi-hit Performance/Advanced Composite Technology) series, use a stainless steel crack arrestor embedded between the strike face and backer. This layer contains cracks in the strike face to the immediate area around an impact, resulting in markedly improved multi-hit ability; in conjunction with NIJ IIIA soft armor, a 3.9 lb IMP/ACT plate can stop eight rounds of 5.56×45mm M995, and a 4.2 lb plate such as the MH3 CQB can stop either ten rounds of 5.56×45mm M995 or six rounds of 7.62×39mm BZ API. The standards for armor-piercing rifle bullets are not clear-cut, because the penetration of a bullet depends on the hardness of the target armor, and the armor type. However, there are a few general rules. For example, bullets with a soft lead-core and copper jacket are too easily deformed to penetrate hard materials, whereas rifle bullets intended for maximum penetration into hard armor are nearly always manufactured with high-hardness core materials such as tungsten carbide. Most other core materials would have effects between lead and tungsten carbide. Many common bullets, such as the 7.62×39mm M43 standard cartridge for the AK-47/AKM rifle, have a steel core with hardness rating ranging from Rc35 mild steel up to Rc45 medium hard steel. However, there is a caveat to this rule: with regards to penetration, the hardness of a bullet's core is significantly less important than the sectional density of that bullet. This is why there are many more bullets made with tungsten instead of tungsten carbide. Additionally, as the hardness of the bullet core increases, so must the amount of ceramic plating used to stop penetration. Like in soft ballistics, a minimum ceramic material hardness of the bullet core is required to damage their respective hard core materials, however in armor-piercing rounds the bullet core is eroded rather than deformed. The US Department of Defense uses several hard armor plates. The first, the Small Arms Protective Insert (SAPI), called for ceramic composite plates with a mass of 20–30 kg/m2 (4–5 lb/ft2). SAPI plates have a black fabric cover with the text "7.62mm M80 Ball Protection"; as expected, they are required to stop three rounds of 7.62×51mm M80 ball, with the plate tilted thirty degrees towards the shooter for the third shot; this practice is common for all three-hit-protective plates in the SAPI series. Later, the Enhanced SAPI (ESAPI) specification was developed to protect from more penetrative ammunition. ESAPI ceramic plates have a green fabric cover with the text "7.62mm APM2 Protection" on the back and a density of 35–45 kg/m2 (7–9 lb/ft2); they are designed to stop bullets like the .30-06 AP (M2) with a hardened steel core. Depending on revision, the plate may stop more than one. Since the issuance of CO/PD 04-19D on January 14, 2007, ESAPI plates are required to stop three rounds of M2AP. The plates may be differentiated by the text "REV." on the back, followed by a letter. A few years after the fielding of the ESAPI, the Department of Defense began to issue XSAPI plates in response to a perceived threat of AP projectiles in Iraq and Afghanistan. Over 120,000 inserts were procured; however, the AP threats they were meant to stop never materialized, and the plates were put into storage. XSAPI plates are required to stop three rounds of either the 7.62×51mm M993 or 5.56×45mm M995 tungsten-carbide armor-piercing projectiles (like newer ESAPIs, the third shot occurs with the plate tilted towards the shooter), and are distinguished by a tan cover with the text "7.62mm AP/WC Protection" on the back. Cercom (now BAE Systems), CoorsTek, Ceradyne, TenCate Advanced Composites, Honeywell, DSM, Pinnacle Armor and a number of other engineering companies develop and manufacture the materials for composite ceramic rifle armor. Body armor standards in the Russian Federation, as established in GOST R 50744–95, differ significantly from American standards, on account of a different security situation. The 7.62×25mm Tokarev round is a relatively common threat in Russia and is known to be able to penetrate NIJ IIIA soft armor. Armor protection in the face of the large numbers of these rounds, therefore, necessitates higher standards. GOST armor standards are more stringent than those of the NIJ with regards to protection and blunt impact. For example, one of the highest protection level, GOST 6A, requires the armor to withstand three 7.62×54mmR B32 API hits fired from 5.10m away with 16mm of back-face deformation (BFD). NIJ Level IV-rated armor is only required to stop 1 hit of .30–06, or 7.62×63mm, M2AP with 44mm BFD. Trauma plates, also called trauma pads, are inserts or pads which are placed behind ballistic armour plates/panels and serve to reduce the blunt force trauma absorbed by the body; they do not necessarily have any ballistic protective properties. While an armour system (hard or soft) may stop a projectile from penetrating, the projectile may still cause significant indentation and deformation of the armour, also called backface deformation. Trauma plates help protect against damage to the body from this backface deformation. Trauma plates should not be confused with soft armor or with ballistic plates, both of which do inherently provide ballistic protection. Explosive protection Bomb disposal officers often wear heavy armor designed to protect against most effects of a moderate sized explosion, such as bombs encountered in terror threats. Full head helmet, covering the face and some degree of protection for limbs is mandatory in addition to very strong armor for the torso. An insert to protect the spine is usually applied to the back, in case an explosion throws the wearer. Visibility and mobility of the wearer is severely limited, as is the time that can be spent working on the device. Armor designed primarily to counter explosives is often somewhat less effective against bullets than armor designed for that purpose. The sheer mass of most bomb disposal armor usually provides some protection, and bullet-specific armor plates are compatible with some bomb disposal suits. Bomb disposal technicians try to accomplish their task if possible using remote methods (e.g., robots, line and pulleys). Actually laying hands on a bomb is only done in an extremely life-threatening situation, where the hazards to people and critical structures cannot be lessened by using wheeled robots or other techniques. It is notable that despite the protection offered, much of it is in fragmentation. According to some sources, overpressure from ordnance beyond the charge of a typical hand grenade can overwhelm a bomb suit. In some media, an EOD suit is portrayed as a heavily armoured bulletproof suit capable of ignoring explosions and gunfire; in real life, this is not the case, as much of a bomb suit is made up of only soft armor. Stab and stab-ballistic armor In the mid-1980s the state of California Department of Corrections issued a requirement for a body armor using a commercial ice pick as the test penetrator. The test method attempted to simulate the capacity of a human attacker to deliver impact energy with their upper body. As was later shown by the work of the former British PSDB, this test overstated the capacity of human attackers. The test used a drop mass or sabot that carried the ice pick. Using gravitational force, the height of the drop mass above the vest was proportional to the impact energy. This test specified 109 joules (81 ft·lb) of energy and a 7.3 kg (16 lb) drop mass with a drop height of 153 cm (60 in). The ice pick has a 4 mm (0.16 in) diameter with a sharp tip with a 5.4 m/s (17 ft/s) terminal velocity in the test. The California standard did not include knife or cutting-edge weapons in the test protocol. The test method used the oil/clay (Roma Plastilena) tissue simulant as a test backing. In this early phase only titanium and steel plate offerings were successful in addressing this requirement. Point Blank developed the first ice pick certified offerings for CA Department of Corrections in shaped titanium sheet metal. Vests of this type are still in service in US corrections facilities as of 2008. Beginning in the early 1990s, an optional test method was approved by California which permitted the use of 10% ballistic gelatin as a replacement for Roma clay. The transition from hard, dense clay-based Roma to soft low-density gelatin allowed all textile solutions to meet this attack energy requirement. Soon all textile "ice pick" vests began to be adopted by California and other US states as a result of this migration in the test methods. It is important for users to understand that the smooth, round tip of the ice pick does not cut fiber on impact and this permits the use of textile based vests for this application. The earliest of these "all" fabric vests designed to address this ice pick test was Warwick Mills's TurtleSkin ultra tightly woven para-aramid fabric with a patent filed in 1993. Shortly after the TurtleSkin work, in 1995 DuPont patented a medium density fabric that was designated as Kevlar Correctional. These textile materials do not have equal performance with cutting-edge threats and these certifications were only with ice pick and were not tested with knives. Parallel to the US development of "ice pick" vests, the British police, PSDB, was working on standards for knife-resistant body armor. Their program adopted a rigorous scientific approach and collected data on human attack capacity. Their ergonomic study suggested three levels of threat: 25, 35 and 45 joules of impact energy. In addition to impact energy attack, velocities were measured and were found to be 10–20 m/s (much faster than the California test). Two commercial knives were selected for use in this PSDB test method. In order to test at a representative velocity, an air cannon method was developed to propel the knife and sabot at the vest target using compressed air. In this first version, the PSDB '93 test also used oil/clay materials as the tissue simulant backing. The introduction of knives which cut fiber and a hard-dense test backing required stab vest manufacturers to use metallic components in their vest designs to address this more rigorous standard. The current standard HOSDB Body Armour Standards for UK Police (2007) Part 3: Knife and Spike Resistance is harmonized with the US NIJ OO15 standard, use a drop test method and use a composite foam backing as a tissue simulant. Both the HOSDB and the NIJ test now specify engineered blades, double-edged S1 and single-edge P1 as well as the spike. In addition to the stab standards, HOSDB has developed a standard for slash resistance (2006). This standard, like the stab standards, is based on drop testing with a test knife in a mounting of controlled mass. The slash test uses the Stanley Utility knife or box cutter blades. The slash standard tests the cut resistance of the armor panel parallel to the direction of blade travel. The test equipment measures the force at the instant the blade tip produces a sustained slash through the vest. The criteria require that slash failure of the armor be greater than 80 newtons of force. Vests that combined stab and ballistic protection were a significant innovation in the 1990s period of vest development. The starting point for this development were the ballistic-only offerings of that time using NIJ Level 2A, 2, and 3A or HOSDB HG 1 and 2, with compliant ballistic vest products being manufactured with areal densities of between 5.5 and 6 kg/m2 (1.1 and 1.2 lb/ft2 or 18 and 20 oz/ft2). However police forces were evaluating their "street threats" and requiring vests with both knife and ballistic protection. This multi-threat approach is common in the United Kingdom and other European countries and is less popular in the USA. Unfortunately for multi-threat users, the metallic array and chainmail systems that were necessary to defeat the test blades offered little ballistic performance. The multi-threat vests have areal densities close to the sum of the two solutions separately. These vests have mass values in the 7.5–8.5 kg/m2 (1.55–1.75 lb/ft2) range. Ref (NIJ and HOSDB certification listings). Rolls-Royce Composites -Megit and Highmark produced metallic array systems to address this HOSDB standard. These designs were used extensively by the London Metropolitan Police Service and other agencies in the United Kingdom. As vest manufacturers and the specifying authorities worked with these standards, the UK and US Standards teams began a collaboration on test methods. A number of issues with the first versions of the tests needed to be addressed. The use of commercial knives with inconsistent sharpness and tip shape created problems with test consistency. As a result, two new "engineered blades" were designed that could be manufactured to have reproducible penetrating behavior. The tissue simulants, Roma clay and gelatin, were either unrepresentative of tissue or not practical for the test operators. A composite-foam and hard-rubber test backing was developed as an alternative to address these issues. The drop test method was selected as the baseline for the updated standard over the air cannon option. The drop mass was reduced from the "ice pick test" and a wrist-like soft linkage was engineered into the penetrator-sabot to create a more realistic test impact. These closely related standards were first issued in 2003 as HOSDB 2003 and NIJ 0015. (The Police Scientific Development Branch (PSDB) was renamed the Home Office Scientific Development Branch in 2004.) These new standards created a focus on Level 1 at 25 joules (18 ft⋅lbf), Level 2 at 35 J (26 ft⋅lbf), Level 3 at 45 J (33 ft⋅lbf) protection as tested with the new engineered knives defined in these test documents. The lowest level of this requirement at 25 joules was addressed by a series of textile products of both wovens, coated wovens and laminated woven materials. All of these materials were based on Para-aramid fiber. The co-efficient of friction for ultra high molecular weight polyethylene (UHMWPE) prevented its use in this application. The TurtleSkin DiamondCoat and Twaron SRM products addressed this requirement using a combination of Para-Aramid wovens and bonded ceramic grain. These ceramic-coated products do not have the flexibility and softness of un-coated textile materials. For the higher levels of protection L2 and L3, the very aggressive penetration of the small, thin P1 blade has resulted in the continued use of metallic components in stab armor. In Germany, Mehler Vario Systems developed hybrid vests of woven para-aramid and chainmail, and their solution was selected by London's Metropolitan Police Service.[citation needed] Another German company BSST, in cooperation with Warwick Mills, has developed a system to meet the ballistic-stab requirement using Dyneema laminate and an advanced metallic-array system, TurtleSkin MFA. This system is currently implemented in the Netherlands.[citation needed] The trend in multi threat armor continues with requirements for needle protection in the Draft ISO prEN ISO 14876 norm. In many countries there is also an interest to combine military style explosive fragmentation protection with bullet-ballistics and stab requirements. Armor carriers In order for ballistic protection to be wearable, the ballistic panels and/or hard rifle-resistant plates are placed within a carrier. The term "plate carrier" is used specifically to refer to armour carriers which can hold ballistic plates. Broadly, there are two major types of carriers: overt carriers, and low-profile carriers which are meant to be concealed: Overt/Tactical armour carriers typically include pouches and/or mounting systems, like MOLLE, for carrying gear and are usually designed to provide higher amounts of protection. The Improved Outer Tactical Vest and Soldier Plate Carrier Systems are examples of military carriers design to be used with ballistic plate inserts. In addition to load carriage, this type of carrier may include pockets for neck protection, side plates, groin plates, and backside protection. As this style of carrier is not close fitting, sizing in this system is straightforward for both men and women, making custom fabrication unnecessary. Low profile/concealable carriers holds the ballistic panels and/or ballistic plates close to the wearer's body and a uniform shirt may be worn over the carrier. This type of carrier must be designed to conform closely to the officer's body shape. For concealable armor to conform to the body it must be correctly fitted to a particular individual. Many programs specify full custom measurement and manufacturing of armor panels and carriers to ensure good fit and comfortable armor. Officers who are female or significantly overweight have more difficulty in getting accurately measured and having comfortable armor fabricated. A third textile layer is often found between the carrier and the ballistic components. The ballistic panels are covered in a coated pouch or slip. This slip provides the encapsulation of the ballistic materials. Slips are manufactured in two types: heat sealed hermetic slips and simple sewn slips. For some ballistic fibers such as Kevlar the slip is a critical part of the system. The slip prevents moisture from the user's body from saturating the ballistic materials. This protection from moisture cycling increases the useful life of the armor.[full citation needed] Research The vast majority of hard body armor plates, including the U.S. military's Small Arms Protective Insert family, are monolithic; their strike faces consist of a single ceramic tile. Monolithic plates are lighter than their non-monolithic counterparts, but suffer from reduced effectiveness when shot multiple times in a close area (i.e., shots spaced less than two inches/5.1 cm apart). However, several non-monolithic armor systems have emerged, the most well-known being the controversial Dragon Skin system. Dragon Skin, composed of dozens of overlapping ceramic scales, promised superior multi-hit performance and flexibility compared to the then-current ESAPI plate; however, it failed to deliver. When the U.S. Army tested the system against the same requirements as the ESAPI, Dragon Skin showed major issues with environmental damage; the scales would come apart when subjected to temperatures above 120 °F (49 °C) – not uncommon in Middle Eastern climates – when exposed to diesel vehicle fuel, or after the two four-foot drop tests (after these drops, ESAPI plates are put in an X-ray machine to determine the location of cracks, and then shot directly on said cracks), leaving the plate unable to reach its stated threat level and suffering 13 first- or second-shot complete penetrations by .30–06 M2 AP (the ESAPI test threat) out of 48 shots. Perhaps less-well known is LIBA (Light Improved Body Armor), manufactured by Royal TenCate, ARES Protection, and Mofet Etzion in the early 2000s. LIBA uses an innovative array of ceramic pellets embedded in a polyethylene backer; although this layout lacks the flexibility of Dragon Skin, it provides impressive multi-hit ability as well as the unique ability to repair the armor by replacing damaged pellets and epoxying them over. In addition, there are variants of LIBA with multi-hit capacity against threats analogous to 7.62×51mm NATO M993 AP/WC, a tungsten-cored armor-piercing round. Field tests of LIBA have yielded successful results, with 15 AKM hits producing only minor bruises. Ballistic vests use layers of very strong fibers to "catch" and deform a bullet, mushrooming it into a dish shape, and spreading its force over a larger portion of the vest fiber. The vest absorbs the energy from the deforming bullet, bringing it to a stop before it can completely penetrate the textile matrix. Some layers may be penetrated but as the bullet deforms, the energy is absorbed by a larger and larger fiber area. In recent years, advances in material science have opened the door to the idea of a literal "bulletproof vest" able to stop handgun and rifle bullets with a soft textile vest, without the assistance of additional metal or ceramic plating. However, progress is moving at a slower rate compared to other technical disciplines. The most recent offering from Kevlar, Protera, was released in 1996. Current soft body armor can stop most handgun rounds (which has been the case for roughly 15 years [citation needed]), but armor plates are needed to stop rifle rounds and steel-core handgun rounds such as 7.62×25mm. The para-aramids have not progressed beyond the limit of 23 grams per denier in fiber tenacity. Modest ballistic performance improvements have been made by new producers of this fiber type. Much the same can be said for the UHMWPE material; the basic fiber properties have only advanced to the 30–35 g/d range. Improvements in this material have been seen in the development of cross-plied non-woven laminate, e.g. Spectra Shield. The major ballistic performance advance of fiber PBO is known as a "cautionary tale" in materials science. This fiber permitted the design of handgun soft armor that was 30–50% lower in mass as compared to the aramid and UHMWPE materials. However this higher tenacity was delivered with a well-publicized weakness in environmental durability. Akzo-Magellan (now DuPont) teams have been working on fiber called M5 fiber; however, its announced startup of its pilot plant has been delayed more than 2 years. Data suggests if the M5 material can be brought to market, its performance will be roughly equivalent to PBO. In May 2008, the Teijin Aramid group announced a "super-fibers" development program. The Teijin emphasis appears to be on computational chemistry to define a solution to high tenacity without environmental weakness. The materials science of second generation "super" fibers is complex, requires large investments, and represent significant technical challenges. Research aims to develop artificial spider silk which could be super strong, yet light and flexible. Other research has been done to harness nanotechnology to help create super-strong fibers that could be used in future bulletproof vests. In 2018, the US military began conducting research into the feasibility of using artificial silk as body armor, which has the advantages of its light weight and its cooling capability. Finer yarns and lighter woven fabrics have been a key factor in improving ballistic results. The cost of ballistic fibers increases dramatically as the yarn size decreases, so it's unclear how long this trend can continue. The current practical limit of fiber size is 200 denier with most wovens limited at the 400 denier level. Three-dimensional weaving with fibers connecting flat wovens together into a 3D system are being considered for both hard and soft ballistics. Team Engineering Inc is designing and weaving these multi layer materials. Dyneema DSM has developed higher performance laminates using a new, higher strength fiber designated SB61, and HB51. DSM feels this advanced material provides some improved performance, however the SB61 "soft ballistic" version has been recalled. At the Shot Show in 2008, a unique composite of interlocking steel plates and soft UHWMPE plate was exhibited by TurtleSkin. In combination with more traditional woven fabrics and laminates a number of research efforts are working with ballistic felts. Tex Tech has been working on these materials. Like the 3D weaving, Tex Tech sees the advantage in the 3-axis fiber orientation. Ballistic nylon (until the 1970s) or Kevlar, Twaron or Spectra (a competitor for Kevlar) or polyethylene fiber could be used to manufacture bullet proof vests. The vests of the time were made of ballistic nylon & supplemented by plates of fiber-glass, steel, ceramic, titanium, Doron & composites of ceramic and fiberglass, the last being the most effective. Ceramic materials, materials processing and progress in ceramic penetration mechanics are significant areas of academic and industrial activity. This combined field of ceramics armor research is broad and is perhaps summarized best by The American Ceramics Society. ACerS has run an annual armor conference for a number of years and compiled a proceedings 2004–2007. An area of special activity pertaining to vests is the emerging use of small ceramic components. Large torso sized ceramic plates are complex to manufacture and are subject to cracking in use. Monolithic plates also have limited multi hit capacity as a result of their large impact fracture zone. These are the motivations for new types of armor plate. These new designs use two- and three-dimensional arrays of ceramic elements that can be rigid, flexible, or semi-flexible. Dragon Skin body armor is one of these systems. European developments in spherical and hexagonal arrays have resulted in products that have some flex and multi hit performance. The manufacture of array type systems with flex, consistent ballistic performance at edges of ceramic elements is an active area of research. In addition advanced ceramic processing techniques arrays require adhesive assembly methods. One novel approach is use of hook and loop fasteners to assemble the ceramic arrays. Currently, there are a number of methods by which nanomaterials are being implemented into body armor production. The first, developed at University of Delaware is based on nanoparticles within the suit that become rigid enough to protect the wearer as soon as a kinetic energy threshold is surpassed. These coatings have been described as shear thickening fluids. These nano-infused fabrics have been licensed by BAE systems, but as of mid-2008, no products have been released based on this technology. In 2005 an Israeli company, ApNano, developed a material that was always rigid. It was announced that this nanocomposite based on tungsten disulfide nanotubes was able to withstand shocks generated by a steel projectile traveling at velocities of up to 1.5 km/s. The material was also reportedly able to withstand shock pressures generated by other impacts of up to 250 metric tons-force per square centimeter (24.5 gigapascals; 3,550,000 psi). During the tests, the material proved to be so strong that after the impact the samples remained essentially unmarred. Additionally, a study in France tested the material under isostatic pressure and found it to be stable up to at least 350 tf/cm2 (34 GPa; 5,000,000 psi). As of mid-2008, spider silk bulletproof vests and nano-based armors are being developed for potential market release.[citation needed] Both the British and American militaries have expressed interest in a carbon fiber woven from carbon nanotubes that was developed at University of Cambridge and has the potential to be used as body armor. In 2008, large format carbon nanotube sheets began being produced at Nanocomp. [citation needed] In late 2014, researchers began studying and testing graphene as a material for use in body armor. Graphene is manufactured from carbon and is the thinnest, strongest, and most conductive material on the planet. Taking the form of hexagonally arranged atoms, its tensile strength is known to be 200 times greater than steel, but studies from Rice University have revealed it is also 10 times better than steel at dissipating energy, an ability that had previously not been thoroughly explored. To test its properties, the University of Massachusetts stacked together graphene sheets only a single carbon atom thick, creating layers ranging in thickness from 10 nanometers to 100 nanometers from 300 layers. Microscopic spherical silica "bullets" were fired at the sheets at speeds of up to 3 km (1.9 mi) per second, almost nine times the speed of sound. Upon impact, the projectiles deformed into a cone shape around the graphene before ultimately breaking through. In the three nanoseconds it held together however, the transferred energy traveled through the material at a speed of 22.2 km (13.8 mi) per second, faster than any other known material. If the impact stress can be spread out over a large enough area that the cone moves out at an appreciable velocity compared with the velocity of the projectile, stress will not be localized under where it hit. Although a wide impact hole opened up, a composite mixture of graphene and other materials could be made to create a new, revolutionary armor solution. Legality In Australia, it is illegal to import body armour without prior permission from the Australian Border Force. It is also illegal to possess body armour without authorization in South Australia, Victoria, Northern Territory, ACT, Queensland, New South Wales, and Tasmania. In all Canadian provinces except for Alberta, British Columbia and Manitoba, it is legal to wear and to purchase body armour such as ballistic vests. Under the laws of these provinces, it is illegal to possess body armour without a license (unless exempted) issued by the provincial government. As of February 2019, Nova Scotia allows "only those who require such armour due to their employment" to keep and use body armor, such as police and corrections officers, citing the use of body armor by criminals. According to the Body Armour Control Act of Alberta which came into force on June 15, 2012, any individual in possession of a valid firearms licence under the Firearms Act of Canada can legally purchase, possess and wear body armour. In the European Union, the import and sale of ballistic vests and body armor is allowed. There is an exception for vests that are developed under strict military specifications and/or for main military usage; shield above the level of protection NIJ 4 are considered by the law as "armament materials" and forbidden for civilian use.[citation needed] There are many shops in the EU that sell ballistic vests and body armor, used or new.[citation needed] In Italy, the purchase, ownership and wear of ballistic vests and body armor is not subject to any restriction, except for those ballistic protections that are developed under strict military specifications and/or for main military usage, thus considered by the law as "armament materials" and forbidden to civilians. Furthermore, a number of laws and court rulings during the years have rehearsed the concept of a ballistic vest being mandatory to wear for those individuals who work in the private security sector. In the Netherlands the civilian ownership of body armour is subject to the European Union regulations. Body armour in various ballistic grades is sold by a range of different vendors, mainly aimed at providing to security guards and VIP's. The use of body armour while committing a crime is not an additional offence in itself, but may be interpreted as so under different laws such as resisting arrest. Under Schedule C (item ML13) of Cap. 60G Import and Export (Strategic Commodities) Regulations, "armoured or protective equipment, constructions and components" are not regulated "when accompanying their user for the user's own personal protection".[This quote needs a citation] United States law restricts possession of body armor for convicted violent felons. Many U.S. states also have penalties for possession or use of body armor by felons. In other states, such as Kentucky, possession is not prohibited, but probation or parole is denied to a person convicted of committing certain violent crimes while wearing body armor and carrying a deadly weapon. Most states do not have restrictions for non-felons. See also References External links |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Solar_eclipse_of_February_17,_2026] | [TOKENS: 1067] |
Contents Solar eclipse of February 17, 2026 An annular solar eclipse occurred at the Moon’s ascending node of orbit on Tuesday, February 17, 2026, with a magnitude of 0.963. A solar eclipse occurs when the Moon passes between Earth and the Sun, thereby totally or partly obscuring the image of the Sun for a viewer on Earth. An annular solar eclipse occurs when the Moon's apparent diameter is smaller than the Sun's, blocking most of the Sun's light and causing the Sun to look like an annulus (ring). An annular eclipse appears as a partial eclipse over a region of the Earth thousands of kilometres wide. The Moon's apparent diameter was near the average diameter because it occurred 6.8 days after apogee (on February 10, 2026, at 16:50 UTC) and 7.5 days before perigee (on February 24, 2026, at 23:15 UTC). Annularity was visible over Antarctica only. However, the partial eclipse was visible from the very southern tip of Argentina and Chile, as well as in much of southern Africa (including South Africa, Mozambique, and Madagascar). Images Animated path Eclipse timing Eclipse details Shown below are two tables displaying details about this particular solar eclipse. The first table outlines times at which the Moon's penumbra or umbra attains the specific parameter, and the second table describes various other parameters pertaining to this eclipse. Eclipse season The eclipse is part of an eclipse season, a period, roughly every six months, when eclipses occur. Only two (or occasionally three) eclipse seasons occur each year, and each season lasts about 35 days and repeats just short of six months (173 days) later; thus two full eclipse seasons always occur each year. Either two or three eclipses happen each eclipse season. In the sequence below, each eclipse is separated by a fortnight. Related eclipses This eclipse is a member of a semester series. An eclipse in a semester series of solar eclipses repeats approximately every 177 days and 4 hours (a semester) at alternating nodes of the Moon's orbit. The partial solar eclipses on June 12, 2029 and December 5, 2029 occur in the next lunar year eclipse set. This eclipse is a part of Saros series 121, repeating every 18 years, 11 days, and containing 71 events. The series started with a partial solar eclipse on April 25, 944 AD. It contains total eclipses from July 10, 1070 through October 9, 1809; hybrid eclipses on October 20, 1827 and October 30, 1845; and annular eclipses from November 11, 1863 through February 28, 2044. The series ends at member 71 as a partial eclipse on June 7, 2206. Its eclipses are tabulated in three columns; every third eclipse in the same column is one exeligmos apart, so they all cast shadows over approximately the same parts of the Earth. The longest duration of totality was produced by member 39 at 6 minutes, 20 seconds on June 21, 1629, and the longest duration of annularity will be produced by member 62 at 2 minutes, 27 seconds on February 28, 2044. All eclipses in this series occur at the Moon’s ascending node of orbit. The metonic series repeats eclipses every 19 years (6939.69 days), lasting about 5 cycles. Eclipses occur in nearly the same calendar date. In addition, the octon subseries repeats 1/5 of that or every 3.8 years (1387.94 days). All eclipses in this table occur at the Moon's ascending node. This eclipse is a part of a tritos cycle, repeating at alternating nodes every 135 synodic months (≈ 3986.63 days, or 11 years minus 1 month). Their appearance and longitude are irregular due to a lack of synchronization with the anomalistic month (period of perigee), but groupings of 3 tritos cycles (≈ 33 years minus 3 months) come close (≈ 434.044 anomalistic months), so eclipses are similar in these groupings. The partial solar eclipses on March 27, 1884 (part of Saros 108) and December 24, 1916 (part of Saros 111) are also a part of this series but are not included in the table below. This eclipse is a part of the long period inex cycle, repeating at alternating nodes, every 358 synodic months (≈ 10,571.95 days, or 29 years minus 20 days). Their appearance and longitude are irregular due to a lack of synchronization with the anomalistic month (period of perigee). However, groupings of 3 inex cycles (≈ 87 years minus 2 months) comes close (≈ 1,151.02 anomalistic months), so eclipses are similar in these groupings. References External links |
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/שלמה_בן_עמי] | [TOKENS: 3252] |
תוכן עניינים שלמה בן עמי שלמה בן-עמי (נולד ב-17 ביולי 1943) הוא פוליטיקאי, דיפלומט והיסטוריון ישראלי. כיהן כחבר הכנסת ושר בממשלת ישראל, ולפני כן כפרופסור להיסטוריה באוניברסיטת תל אביב. ביוגרפיה בן-עמי נולד בעיר טנג'יר שבמרוקו הספרדית, בשם שלמה בן אָבּוּ. אביו היה סוחר. עלה לישראל עם משפחתו בשנת 1955 וגדל באפיקים ולאחר מכן בקריית שמונה. בשנת 1962 התגייס לצה"ל ושובץ בחטיבת גולני. בגולני עבר מסלול הכשרה כלוחם, ולאחר מכן עבר קורס מ"כים חי"ר. בן עמי שימש כמפקד כיתה וכסמל. בשנת 1965 השתחרר מצה"ל ושינה את שם משפחתו. את התואר הראשון שלו, כמו את התואר השני, עשה באוניברסיטת תל אביב בתחומים הקשורים להיסטוריה עתיקה. בהמשך, קיבל תואר דוקטור להיסטוריה מאוניברסיטת אוקספורד, תוך התמחות בתולדות ספרד במאה ה-20. ב-1971 החל להורות באוניברסיטת תל אביב, ובשנים 1982–1986 כיהן בה כראש בית הספר להיסטוריה. שימש כשגריר ישראל בספרד בין השנים 1987 עד 1991, ובתוקף תפקידו היה חבר המשלחת הישראלית בוועידת מדריד. בשנת 1996 נבחר לכנסת ה-14 מטעם מפלגת העבודה, וכיהן כיושב-ראש ועדת המשנה לשירות החוץ, במסגרת חברותו בוועדת החוץ והביטחון, בוועדת החינוך, התרבות והספורט ובוועדת החוקה, חוק ומשפט. בן עמי התמודד מול אהוד ברק על תפקיד יושב ראש מפלגת העבודה ומועמדה לראשות הממשלה אך הגיע רק למקום השלישי בבחירות המקדימות עם 14.2% מהקולות. בשנת 1999 נבחר בן עמי בשנית לכנסת ה-15, ברשימה המאוחדת ישראל אחת (העבודה, מימד וגשר) בה הוצב במקום הרביעי, ומונה לתפקיד השר לביטחון הפנים בממשלת ברק. החל ב-2 בנובמבר 2000 כיהן במקביל לתפקידו במשרד לביטחון הפנים גם כשר החוץ, לאחר שדוד לוי התפטר ופרש מממשלת ברק. ביולי 2000 השתתף בוועידת קמפ דייוויד, משא-ומתן מרתוני בין ראש הממשלה, אהוד ברק, ליושב ראש הרשות הפלסטינית יאסר ערפאת, בחסות נשיא ארצות הברית ביל קלינטון. במהלך המשא ומתן הסכים ברק לכינון מדינה פלסטינית על שטח של יותר מ-90% משטחי עזה והגדה, ואף לבצע ויתורים בירושלים. המשא ומתן לא עלה יפה, ובן-עמי האשים את ערפאת בכישלון השיחות ובפרוץ האינתיפאדה השנייה חודשיים לאחר מכן. אף-על-פי-כן, בדיון עם האקדמאי נורמן פינקלשטיין בפברואר 2006, הודה בן-עמי שאילו הוא היה פלסטיני, גם הוא היה דוחה את ההצעה הישראלית שניתנה לפלסטינים בוועידה. לדבריו, הסרבנות הפלסטינית התבטאה בעיקר בדחיית ההצעה הישראלית בוועידת טאבה שבאה אחרי ועידת קמפ דייוויד, ומהדחייה של עקרונות מתווה קלינטון על ידי הפלסטינים. בעקבות כישלון ועידת קמפ-דייוויד הביע בן-עמי את דעתו שרק מעורבות פעילה של הקהילה הבינלאומית תוכל לכפות הסדר בין ישראל לפלסטינים. עם פרוץ האינתיפאדה השנייה, בזמן כהונתו כשר ביטחון הפנים, התרחשו אירועי אוקטובר 2000, שבמהלכם נהרגו 13 אזרחים ערבים-ישראלים בעקבות עימותים עם משטרת ישראל. הוא חווה ביקורת ציבורית קשה על תפקודו כשר ביטחון הפנים במהלך אירועים אלה, במיוחד מן המגזר הערבי במדינת ישראל. בן עמי היה בין הגורמים שהחליטו על הקמת ועדת אור לבדיקת ההרג. הוועדה קבעה במסקנותיה כי הוא השקיע מאמץ ממשי לשיפור היחסים עם ערביי ישראל, אך מתחה ביקורת על תפקודו בעת האירועים ובאי הכנת המשטרה לקראתם. הוועדה המליצה למנוע ממנו לשמש שנית בתפקיד השר לביטחון-פנים. לאחר בחירתו של אריאל שרון לראשות הממשלה, עסק במשך שנתיים במחקר אקדמי בלונדון. לאחר מכן נסע לספרד והקים את מכון טולדו לשלום שהוא מכהן כנשיאו. במסגרת המכון הוא מארגן כנסים בינלאומיים ועורך מחקרים. הוא משמש כסגן הנשיא של "המכון לניהול סכסוכים" בטולדו, גוף בינלאומי חוץ-פרלמנטרי המייעד עצמו לסייע בפתרון סכסוכים בינלאומיים. בן-עמי תומך ברעיון הקונפדרציה. בשנת 2017 קיבל אזרחות ספרדית. בן עמי נהג להשתתף בפורום ולדאי שהוקם על ידי הקרמלין, ובעל עמדות פרו-רוסיות. בבחירות לכנסת ה-18 הוצב במקום ה-113 הסמלי ברשימת העבודה לכנסת. מספריו קישורים חיצוניים הערות שוליים |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Portal:Current_events/2026_February_16&action=edit&editintro=Portal:Current_events/Edit_instructions] | [TOKENS: 1660] |
Editing Portal:Current events/2026 February 16 The daily current events "blank" boxes are now generated daily by an efficient bot, so the instructions below this only apply if the bot has been disabled. If you reached this page via the current date box's "edit" link, check whether the portal box has already been initiated, and already contains the following (parsed) wiki code (use copy/paste from the code below, if necessary, to correct any syntax errors): Then save the page, before adding any news items. This will help insure the new day displays according to the current events portal design. Note that the above items: CURRENTYEAR, CURRENTMONTH, and CURRENTDAY, all will display as positive integers once the page is saved.For example, the code to generate March 27, 2009 (Friday) in the box should appear as {{Current events|year=2009|month=3|day=27|content=... Click on the small "edit" link in the top right corner of the box that you want to edit. Only administrators are allowed to edit the actual page. Copy and paste: – — ° ′ ″ ≈ ≠ ≤ ≥ ± − × ÷ ← → · § Sign your posts on talk pages: ~~~~ Cite your sources: <ref></ref> {{}} {{{}}} | [] [[]] [[Category:]] #REDIRECT [[]] <s></s> <sup></sup> <sub></sub> <code></code> <pre></pre> <blockquote></blockquote> <ref></ref> <ref name="" /> {{Reflist}} <references /> <includeonly></includeonly> <noinclude></noinclude> {{DEFAULTSORT:}} <nowiki></nowiki> <!-- --> <span class="plainlinks"></span> Symbols: ~ | ¡ ¿ † ‡ ↔ ↑ ↓ • ¶ # ∞ ‹› «» ¤ ₳ ฿ ₵ ¢ ₡ ₢ $ ₫ ₯ € ₠ ₣ ƒ ₴ ₭ ₤ ℳ ₥ ₦ ₧ ₰ £ ៛ ₨ ₪ ৳ ₮ ₩ ¥ ♠ ♣ ♥ ♦ 𝄫 ♭ ♮ ♯ 𝄪 © ¼ ½ ¾ Latin: A a Á á À à  â Ä ä Ǎ ǎ Ă ă Ā ā à ã Å å Ą ą Æ æ Ǣ ǣ B b C c Ć ć Ċ ċ Ĉ ĉ Č č Ç ç D d Ď ď Đ đ Ḍ ḍ Ð ð E e É é È è Ė ė Ê ê Ë ë Ě ě Ĕ ĕ Ē ē Ẽ ẽ Ę ę Ẹ ẹ Ɛ ɛ Ǝ ǝ Ə ə F f G g Ġ ġ Ĝ ĝ Ğ ğ Ģ ģ H h Ĥ ĥ Ħ ħ Ḥ ḥ I i İ ı Í í Ì ì Î î Ï ï Ǐ ǐ Ĭ ĭ Ī ī Ĩ ĩ Į į Ị ị J j Ĵ ĵ K k Ķ ķ L l Ĺ ĺ Ŀ ŀ Ľ ľ Ļ ļ Ł ł Ḷ ḷ Ḹ ḹ M m Ṃ ṃ N n Ń ń Ň ň Ñ ñ Ņ ņ Ṇ ṇ Ŋ ŋ O o Ó ó Ò ò Ô ô Ö ö Ǒ ǒ Ŏ ŏ Ō ō Õ õ Ǫ ǫ Ọ ọ Ő ő Ø ø Œ œ Ɔ ɔ P p Q q R r Ŕ ŕ Ř ř Ŗ ŗ Ṛ ṛ Ṝ ṝ S s Ś ś Ŝ ŝ Š š Ş ş Ș ș Ṣ ṣ ß T t Ť ť Ţ ţ Ț ț Ṭ ṭ Þ þ U u Ú ú Ù ù Û û Ü ü Ǔ ǔ Ŭ ŭ Ū ū Ũ ũ Ů ů Ų ų Ụ ụ Ű ű Ǘ ǘ Ǜ ǜ Ǚ ǚ Ǖ ǖ V v W w Ŵ ŵ X x Y y Ý ý Ŷ ŷ Ÿ ÿ Ỹ ỹ Ȳ ȳ Z z Ź ź Ż ż Ž ž ß Ð ð Þ þ Ŋ ŋ Ə ə Greek: Ά ά Έ έ Ή ή Ί ί Ό ό Ύ ύ Ώ ώ Α α Β β Γ γ Δ δ Ε ε Ζ ζ Η η Θ θ Ι ι Κ κ Λ λ Μ μ Ν ν Ξ ξ Ο ο Π π Ρ ρ Σ σ ς Τ τ Υ υ Φ φ Χ χ Ψ ψ Ω ω {{Polytonic|}} Cyrillic: А а Б б В в Г г Ґ ґ Ѓ ѓ Д д Ђ ђ Е е Ё ё Є є Ж ж З з Ѕ ѕ И и І і Ї ї Й й Ј ј К к Ќ ќ Л л Љ љ М м Н н Њ њ О о П п Р р С с Т т Ћ ћ У у Ў ў Ф ф Х х Ц ц Ч ч Џ џ Ш ш Щ щ Ъ ъ Ы ы Ь ь Э э Ю ю Я я ́ IPA: t̪ d̪ ʈ ɖ ɟ ɡ ɢ ʡ ʔ ɸ β θ ð ʃ ʒ ɕ ʑ ʂ ʐ ç ʝ ɣ χ ʁ ħ ʕ ʜ ʢ ɦ ɱ ɳ ɲ ŋ ɴ ʋ ɹ ɻ ɰ ʙ ⱱ ʀ ɾ ɽ ɫ ɬ ɮ ɺ ɭ ʎ ʟ ɥ ʍ ɧ ʼ ɓ ɗ ʄ ɠ ʛ ʘ ǀ ǃ ǂ ǁ ɨ ʉ ɯ ɪ ʏ ʊ ø ɘ ɵ ɤ ə ɚ ɛ œ ɜ ɝ ɞ ʌ ɔ æ ɐ ɶ ɑ ɒ ʰ ʱ ʷ ʲ ˠ ˤ ⁿ ˡ ˈ ˌ ː ˑ ̪ {{IPA|}} Pages transcluded onto the current version of this page (help): |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catholic_Church_in_Colombia] | [TOKENS: 858] |
Contents Catholic Church in Colombia The Colombian Catholic Church, or Catholic Church in Colombia, is the branch of the Catholic Church in the South American nation of Colombia. Organization It is organized into 13 ecclesiastical provinces, subdivided into 13 archdioceses and 52 dioceses, and a Maronite apostolic exarchate. Over 120 religious orders, institutes, and lay organizations run hundreds of primary and secondary schools, hospitals, clinics, orphanages, colleges, and 8 universities across the country. The best known are Pontificia Universidad Javeriana (in Bogotá) and Pontificia Universidad Javeriana (in Cali), both Jesuit universities. Based on studies and a survey, about 90% of the Colombian population adheres to Christianity, the majority of which (70.9%) are Catholic, while 16.7% adhere to Protestantism (primarily Evangelicalism) or other Christian groups. In 2020, almost 10,000 priests and over 12,000 nuns served over 4,500 parishes. History Catholicism was introduced to the country in 1508. Two dioceses were organized in 1534. The Church grew significantly by the mid-17th century, in spite of the variety of indigenous languages, government interference and competition among religious orders. Some persecution followed the declaration of independence in 1819.[citation needed] Throughout Latin America, the Church was subject to Spain and served its purposes throughout the colonial period and part of the nineteenth century. It was responsible for founding and directing schools for educating native elites (San Bartolomé, Universidad del Rosario, and the Universidad Santo Tomás), creating and sustaining hospitals, help from the colonial bureaucracy and generally, as an instrument of control and social cohesion. In the late eighteenth century, the Bourbon reforms began to break down this scheme, especially with respect to education. For the first time the usefulness of the scholastic system used until then was questioned, and changes were sought. At Independence, the clergy split between those who supported the king (royalists) and those who preferred absolute independence (nationalists). The high clergy (bishops and dignitaries) supported the former, while parish priests and many of the religious, supported the latter. The role played by the clergy in Independence was decisive, because it contributed to the mobilization and recruitment of fighters; they served as chaplains and military leaders. With the 1991 Constitution of Colombia, the Colombian State became no longer Catholic. Equality and religious freedom were recognized. On June 22, 2012, media in Colombia published the report titled "The Pope is concerned about the penetration of Pentecostals in Colombia" where religious pluralism merited serious consideration. The increasingly active presence of Pentecostal and Evangelical communities in many parts of Latin America were evident. On October 31, 2012, Bishop Juan Vicente Córdoba, Secretary General of the Colombian Episcopal Conference, announced that the Catholic Church would seek parishioners in shopping centers, placing parishes in these commercial establishments. 4 Mariano de Jesus Euse Hoyos (the "father Marianito") and 7 religious of San Juan de Dios were beatified in 2000, while Mother Laura Montoya, founder of the Missionaries of Mary Immaculate and St. Catherine of Siena ("Lauritas"), was canonized. In November 2023, a book by Colombian journalists Juan Pablo Barrientos and Miguel Ángel Estupiñán which detailed an investigation into sex abuse claims against the Catholic Church in Colombia, titled El archivio secreto, was published which named at least 569 Catholic clergy in Colombia who were accused of committing acts of sex abuse. In July 2024, Pope Francis accepted the resignation of accused Colombian Bishop Óscar Augusto Múnera Ocha, who was first accused of committing acts of sex abuse in May 2024, as apostolic vicar of Tierradento. Influence Catholicism wielded a strong influence on public opinion and government affairs. The Church influences various fields and institutions, including: See also Notes |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bannu_District] | [TOKENS: 1444] |
Contents Bannu District Bannu District (Pashto: بنو ولسوالۍ, Urdu: ضلع بنوں) is a district in the Bannu Division of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. Its status as a district was formally recorded in 1861 during the British Raj.: 3 This district constitutes one of the 26 districts that collectively form the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. It borders North Waziristan to the northwest, Karak to the northeast, Lakki Marwat and Bettani to the southeast, and South Waziristan to the southwest. It is represented in the provincial assembly by four MPAs.: 3–16 Cloth weaving, sugar mills and the manufacturing of cotton fabrics, machinery and equipment are the major industries in Bannu. It is also known for its weekly Jumma fair. The district forms a basin drained by the Kurram and Gambila (or Tochi) rivers, which originate in the hills of Waziristan. Although Bannu is surrounded by rugged and dry mountains, it is a fertile place, and early English visitors had been known to refer to it as a "paradise" – see the description by Edwardes quoted by Thornton.: 6–7 Physical features The district forms a basin drained by the Kurram River, Gambila River and Tochi river: 392 which originate in the hills of Waziristan. Extending its reach to the base of the frontier hills, the Bannu Valley unfolds as an asymmetrical oval, spanning 60 miles (97 km) from north to south and 40 miles (64 km) from east to west. History The history of Bannu goes back to prehistoric times due to its strategic location. Notably, Sheri Khan Tarakai is an ancient settlement site located in the Bannu District. Here, remnants bear witness to the presence of the most ancient village settlement within the Bannu region. This site witnessed occupation from the late fifth century to the early third millennium BC. The sacred texts of Zend Avesta and Vendidad mentions Varəna, the Avestan predecessor of the name for Bannu, as one of the sixteen most beautiful and perfect lands created by Ahura Mazda. Bannu is the homeland and birthplace of Fereydun.: 47–50 Malik Dilasa Khan had also fought a successful battle against the sikh empire. in which he killed one of the prominent Sikh Military commander Jai Singh Atariwala in the Battle of Bannu. Bannu District was annexed by the British from its former Sikh rulers after the Second Anglo-Sikh War of 1848–1849. After the British annexation of Punjab, then including parts of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), the valley was administered by Herbert Edwardes. As a result of his administration, the region became a source of strong support[clarification needed], during the Indian Rebellion of 1857. Although the valley itself was peaceful, it was subject to incursions from the Waziri tribes of the Tochi Valley and the neighbouring hills. The primary export of the region was wheat, Salt and alum were also quarried at Kalabagh. As of 1911, the Indus had no bridges within the district, but was navigable for local boats throughout its course of 76 mi (122 km). On 21 June 1947 in Bannu, a jirga was held by Pashtun leaders including Bacha Khan, his brother Chief Minister Dr Khan Sahib, the Khudai Khidmatgars, members of the Provincial Assembly, Mirzali Khan (Faqir of Ipi), and other tribal chiefs, just seven weeks before the Partition of India. The jirga declared the Bannu Resolution, which demanded that the Pashtuns be given a choice to have an independent state of Pashtunistan composing all Pashtun territories of British India, instead of being made to join either India or Pakistan. However, the British Raj refused to comply with the demand of this resolution, in response to which the Khudai Khidmatgars boycotted the 1947 North-West Frontier Province referendum for merging the province into Pakistan. On 11–14 March 2022, the Pashtun National Jirga was held at Mirakhel in Bannu District in order to defend the rights of the Pashtun people in the country. The critical issues which were faced by the Pashtuns were discussed during the jirga in a bid to suggest solutions to them. Administrative subdivisions Bannu District is divided into 6 Tehsils and 46 union councils. (Urdu) (km²) (2023) (ppl/km²) (2023) (2023) (Pashto: بکاخېل تحصیل) (Pashto: بنو تحصیل) (Pashto: ډومیل تحصیل) (Pashto: ککي تحصیل) (Pashto: میریان تحصیل) Provincial and National Assembly Seats The district has 4 Provincial Seats in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Assembly while it has 1 seat in National Assembly. Demographics As of the 2023 census, Bannu district has 183,130 households and a population of 1,357,890. The district has a sex ratio of 108.33 males to 100 females and a literacy rate of 41.75%: 58.47% for males and 23.84% for females. 445,307 (32.87% of the surveyed population) are under 10 years of age. 48,398 (3.56%) live in urban areas. Pashto is the predominant language, spoken by 99.09% of the population. Universities in Bannu District Bannu has two Universities with one i.e University of Science & Technology, Bannu (USTB), founded in 2005 by Mr. Akram Khan Durrani, the then Chief Minister, has a full degree awarding status and another one as a campus of the University of Engineering & Technology (UET), Peshawar. USTB offers a wide variety of courses in Science, Engineering and Arts subjects at Bachelors, Master and PhD level. These universities host students from District Bannu, the neighboring districts of Lakki Marwat, Karak, Waziristan as well as from all over Pakistan. See also References 33°03′38″N 70°33′08″E / 33.06048°N 70.552176°E / 33.06048; 70.552176 External links |
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/אליעזר_קפלן] | [TOKENS: 3018] |
תוכן עניינים אליעזר קפלן אליעזר קפלן (27 בינואר 1891 – 13 ביולי 1952) היה שר האוצר הראשון של ישראל ושר המסחר והתעשייה. מחותמי מגילת העצמאות וחבר הכנסת. היה פעיל ציוני, חבר מועצת העיר תל אביב (1925–1933), חבר הנהלת הסוכנות היהודית ומנהל מחלקת הכספים שלה (1933–1948). ביוגרפיה קפלן נולד במינסק שבבלארוס (אז בפלך מינסק, בתחום המושב היהודי של האימפריה הרוסית), אחד מעשרת ילדיהם של פרומה ומאיר בן מיכאל קפלן, בעל בית מסחר סיטונאי גדול לחוטי אריגה. למד ב"חדר", בגימנסיה רוסית בלוביץ' (אז בתחומי האימפריה הרוסית, כיום בפולין) ובבית הספר הטכני הגבוה במוסקבה (MHTS). סיים לימודיו כמהנדס בניין ב-1917. נשא לרעיה את ד"ר דבורה לבית קפלן (בת דודו אברהם קפלן), רופאה, שעבדה שנים רבות כרופאת ילדים. עלה לארץ ישראל בשנת 1920, בתקופת העלייה השלישית, ומיד נשלח לשנתיים לגרמניה להקים את הסניף המקומי של התאחדות הפועל הצעיר, ובהמשך, לשמש כמזכירו. כשחזר לארץ ישראל בשנת 1923 כיהן כחבר הנהלה במשרד לעבודות ציבוריות ובנין וכמנהל המחלקה הטכנית של עיריית תל אביב. בקיץ 1925 השתתף בקונגרס הציוני העולמי ה-14 שנערך בעיר וינה שבאוסטריה ונבחר לנשיאות הקונגרס כנציג הפועל הצעיר. נמנה עם ראשי ההסתדרות והיה מזכיר הוועד הפועל בשנים 1929–1933. כמו כן כיהן כחבר מועצת העיר תל אביב בין השנים 1925–1933. בשנים 1933–1948 היה חבר הנהלת הסוכנות היהודית ומנהל מחלקת הכספים בה. אחרי מלחמת העולם השנייה, כגזבר הסוכנות, עסק בהכנת הבסיס הכלכלי למדינה שבדרך ובגיבוש תוכנית לעלייית מיליון איש. עם קבלת תוכנית החלוקה ופרוץ מלחמת העצמאות עסק בגיוס התקציבים הדרוש ליישוב. לפי תיאורו של זאב שרף, היה קפלן אחד מארבעת המצביעים במנהלת העם נגד הכרזת העצמאות ב-14 במאי 1948, אם כי יש היסטוריונים החולקים על זאת וטוענים שהייתה הסכמה כללית על הכרזת המדינה וההצבעה הייתה על נושא אחר. נמנה עם חותמי מגילת העצמאות. לאחר קום המדינה התמנה לשר האוצר. בתקופת כהונתו השיג את ההלוואות הראשונות ממקורות בחו"ל, שהצילו את המשק הישראלי מהתמוטטות, סיוע אמריקאי לישראל והלוואה מהבנק העולמי. בתחילת 1952 הגה והוביל את המדיניות הכלכלית החדשה. במקביל לכהונתו כשר האוצר, כיהן קפלן בשנים 1949–1950 גם כשר המסחר והתעשייה. כשבועיים לפני מותו התפטר ממשרתו בעקבות מצבו הבריאותי והתמנה לסגן ראש הממשלה ולשר בלי תיק. קפלן, שסבל ממחלת לב, קיבל התקף לב בבוקר 11 ביולי 1952 על סיפון האונייה "נגבה", כשהיה בדרכו לחופשה בשווייץ. הוא הובהל לטיפול רפואי בג'נובה שבאיטליה, שם נקבע מותו ב-13 ביולי 1952 לפנות בוקר. הוא היה הראשון להיקבר בחלקת גדולי האומה שבהר הרצל, עוד בטרם נקבעו הקריטריונים לקבורה בחלקה. בעקבות כך, קפלן הוא המנהיג היחיד (לבד מטדי קולק ורעייתו) הקבור בחלקה למרות שלא מילא את תפקיד ראש ממשלת ישראל, נשיא מדינת ישראל או יושב ראש הכנסת (או בן/בת זוגו/ה). קפלן היה אב לשתיים. הנצחתו באוגוסט 1952 הוחלט לקרוא את היישוב בית אליעזר ליד חדרה על שמו (היישוב הפך לשכונה של חדרה אחר כך). בנוסף קרויים על שמו בית החולים קפלן ברחובות, שכונת קריית אליעזר בחיפה, שכונת קריית אליעזר בנתניה, שכונת קפלן בכפר סבא ורחובות רבים בערי ישראל, בהם רחוב קפלן (ומחלף קפלן שלצידו) בתל אביב שנקרא על שמו מאז 1961, ורחוב קפלן בירושלים שבו שוכנת הכנסת ומוסדות שלטון נוספים. עוד קרוי על שמו פרס קפלן, פרס ישראלי שניתן מאז 1954 על התייעלות והעלאת פריון העבודה. את הזוכים בפרס קובעת ועדה בראשות מנהל המכון לפריון העבודה והייצור, ואת הפרס מעניק לזוכים שר העבודה. כתביו קישורים חיצוניים הערות שוליים שרים נוספים במשרד האוצר: מאיר שטרית • משולם נהרי • יצחק כהן • חמד עמאר • זאב אלקין |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colombian_conflict] | [TOKENS: 14707] |
Contents Colombian conflict Ongoing Colombia Colombian drug cartels and paramilitaries Supported by:Contras (1979–1990) Mexican drug cartels and paramilitaries Colombian rebel guerrilla groups Gustavo Petro (2022–present) FARC: Timoleón Jiménez Iván Márquez Joaquín Gómez Mauricio Jaramillo Alfonso Cano † The Colombian conflict (Spanish: Conflicto armado interno de Colombia, lit. 'Colombian internal armed conflict') began on May 27, 1964, and is a low-intensity asymmetric war between the government of Colombia, far-right paramilitary groups, crime syndicates and far-left guerrilla groups fighting each other to increase their influence in Colombian territory. Some of the most important international contributors to the Colombian conflict include multinational corporations, the United States, Cuba, and the drug trafficking industry. The conflict is historically rooted in the conflict known as La Violencia, which was triggered by the 1948 assassination of liberal political leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán and in the aftermath of the anti-communist repression in rural Colombia in the 1960s that led Liberal and Communist militants to re-organize into the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The reasons for fighting vary from group to group. The FARC and other guerrilla movements claim to be fighting for the rights of the impoverished in Colombia to protect them from government violence and to provide social justice through communism. The Colombian government claims to be fighting for order and stability and to protect the rights and interests of its citizens. The paramilitary groups claim to be reacting to perceived threats by guerrilla movements. According to a study by Colombia's National Centre for Historical Memory, 220,000 people died in the conflict between 1958 and 2013, most of them civilians (177,307 civilians and 40,787 fighters), and more than five million civilians were forced from their homes between 1985 and 2012, generating the world's second-largest population of internally displaced persons (IDPs). 16.9% of the population in Colombia has been a direct victim of the war. 2.3 million children have been displaced from their homes, and 45,000 children have been killed, according to national figures cited by UNICEF. In total, one in three of the 7.6 million registered victims of the conflict are children, and since 1985, 8,000 minors have disappeared. A Special Unit was created to search for persons deemed as missing within the context of and due to the armed conflict. As of April 2022, the Single Registry of Victims reported 9,263,826 victims of the Colombian conflict, with 2,048,563 of them being children. Approximately 80% of those killed in the conflict have been civilians. In 2022, the Truth Commission of Colombia estimated that paramilitaries were responsible for 45% of civilian deaths, the guerrillas for 27%, and state forces for 12%, with the remaining 16% attributable to other groups or mixed responsibility. On June 23, 2016, the Colombian government and the FARC rebels signed a historic ceasefire deal, bringing them closer to ending more than five decades of conflict. Although the agreement was rejected in the subsequent October plebiscite, the same month, the then Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts to bring the country's more than 50-year-long civil war to an end. A revised peace deal was signed the following month and submitted to Congress for approval. The House of Representatives unanimously approved the plan on November 30, a day after the Senate gave its backing. Background The origin of the armed conflict in Colombia goes back to 1920, with agrarian disputes over the Sumapaz and Tequendama regions. Much of the background of the Colombian conflict is rooted in La Violencia, a conflict in which liberal and leftist parties united against the dictator of Colombia, Gustavo Rojas Pinilla. Colombia at the time was a banana republic dominated by foreign monopolies, specifically, the United Fruit Company.[citation needed] The United Fruit Company existed to buy large quantities of agricultural products in Latin America at cheap prices, then resell the crops in foreign markets for inflated amounts. Local farmers were impoverished and forced to grow specific crops, creating a monoculture in which farmers depended on the company for all food, products, and wages. The United Fruit Company would usually pay their workers in coupons, worthless outside company stores, which would further charge extravagant prices compared to what workers earned. Further, the employment system was usually one in which farmers would be forced to sell their property to the United Fruit Company. They ended up having to work on the land, becoming indebted to the company and having to pay it back. The United Fruit Company would hire private militaries to enforce its power. Their purpose was to put down worker calls for reform, destroy unions, and put down worker revolutions. Any potential government threat to the United Fruit Company's interests in the country would result in its overturning in a company-backed coup. It propped up friendly puppet politicians and supported right-wing militias to maintain power.[citation needed] Workers often organized and went on strike against these conditions, forming local militias against the United Fruit Company. This would usually lead to conflict between the two sides. This culminated in a strike in November 1928 by farmers in Ciénaga for better working conditions. The striking workers called for an end to temporary contracts, the creation of mandatory worker insurance, the creation of compensation for work accidents, the creation of hygienic dormitories, the 6-day work week, the implementation of a minimum wage, the abolishment of wages through company coupons and office stores, and the recognition of farmers and tenants as employees with legal rights. The strike quickly grew, becoming the largest in Colombia's history, with many socialists, anarchists, Marxists, and leftists joining and organizing the strike. The United Fruit Company demanded that the workers and the union disband. Following several weeks of failed negotiations, the Colombian government of Miguel Abadía Méndez sent the Colombian Army to Ciénaga. After a standoff with the strikers, the Army shot into the crowd of strikers, killing between 68 and 2,000 people in what became known as the Banana Massacre. This led to an outrage in the Colombian public, creating an explosion of leftists and revolutionary organizations. In Bogotá, leftist students protested and organized against the Colombian government, eventually hoping to overthrow it. This opposition exploded in 1948. Upon hearing of the assassination of socialist candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, many poor workers saw the death of Gaitán as a political assassination orchestrated by the rich. Workers began rioting and destroying the Colombian capital of Bogotá, leading to the death of 4,000 people. When news of the death of Gaitán reached the countryside, the local militias were furious and immediately started a civil war known as La Violencia. Joined by fellow leftists, a brutal war was fought for over 10 years, leading to the death of 200,000 people and the destruction of much of the country, resulting in a peace settlement and the changing of power from the Colombian Conservative Party to the Colombian Liberal Party and the Colombian Communist Party in 1958.[citation needed] As La Violencia wound down, most self-defense and guerrilla units composed of Liberal Party supporters were demobilized. At the same time, some former liberals and active communist groups continued operating in several rural enclaves. One of the Liberal bands was a group known as the "Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia" (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), or FARC, formed by Pedro Antonio Marín in 1964. The FARC was founded out of fighters who were unhappy with the peace settlement. The goal of the FARC, among other things, was land redistribution that would benefit poor peasant farmers like Marín, along with the desire to establish a socialist state. In 1958, an exclusively bipartisan political alternation system, known as the National Front, resulted from an agreement between the Liberal and Conservative parties. The agreement had come as a result of the two parties attempting to find a final political solution to the decade of mutual violence and unrest, remaining in effect until 1974. Causes Colombia has a long history of political violence. Land, power, and wealth are unevenly distributed, and many rural citizens are used to having to fend for themselves. There is no consensus about the date on which the conflict began, with some saying 1958 (with the start of the Frente Nacional (National Front)) and others 1964 (with the creation of the FARC). In the mid-1980s, Colombia granted local governments greater political and fiscal autonomy. This strengthened the government's position in more remote regions. In 1985, during peace talks with then-President Belisario Betancur, the FARC created the left-wing Patriotic Union party as a route from violence to mainstream politics. Between 1985 and 2002, 4,153 members and supporters of the party were kidnapped and murdered by right-wing paramilitaries with government support. This included two presidential candidates, 6 out of 16 congressmembers, 17 regional representatives, and 163 councilmembers. These killings aggravated the conflict. In the 1980s, drug trafficking increased, bringing a concomitant increase in violence. Trafficking began in the 1960s and 70s when a group of Americans began to smuggle marijuana. Later, the American Mafia moved into drug trafficking in Colombia alongside local marijuana producers. Cocaine and other drugs produced in Colombia were mostly consumed in the US as well as Europe. Organized crime in Colombia grew increasingly powerful in the 1970s and 80s with the introduction of massive drug trafficking to the United States from Colombia. After the Colombian government dismantled[when?] many of the drug cartels that appeared in the country during the 1980s, left-wing guerrilla groups and right-wing paramilitary organizations resumed some of their drug trafficking activities. They resorted to extortion and kidnapping for financing, activities which led to a loss of support from the local population. These funds helped finance paramilitaries and guerrillas, allowing these organizations to buy weapons which were then sometimes used to attack military and civilian targets. During the presidency of Álvaro Uribe, the government applied more military pressure on the FARC and other outlawed far-left groups. After the offensive, many security indicators improved. As part of a controversial peace process, the AUC (right-wing paramilitaries) as a formal organization had ceased to function. Colombia achieved a great decrease in cocaine production, leading White House drug czar R. Gil Kerlikowske to announce that Colombia was no longer the world's biggest producer of cocaine. The United States is still the world's largest consumer of cocaine and other illegal drugs. In February 2008, millions of Colombians demonstrated against the FARC and other outlawed groups. The Colombian Ministry of Defense reported 19,504 deserters from the FARC between August 2002 and their collective demobilization in 2017, peaking in the year 2008. During these years, the military forces of the Republic of Colombia were strengthened. The 2012 peace process in Colombia refers to the dialogue in Havana, Cuba, between the Colombian government and the guerrilla of the FARC-EP to find a political solution to the armed conflict. After almost four years of peace negotiations, the Colombian state and the FARC announced consensus on a 6-point plan towards peace and reconciliation. The government also began a process of assistance and reparation for victims of conflict. Recently, U.P. supporters reconstituted the political party within the reconciliation process. Colombia's congress approved the revised peace accord. In February 2015, the Historical Commission on the Conflict and its Victims (Comisión Histórica del Conflicto Armado y sus Víctimas – CHCV) published its report entitled "Contribution to an Understanding of the Armed Conflict in Colombia." The document addresses the "multiple reasons for the conflict, the principle factors and circumstances that made it possible, and the most notable impacts on the population" and explains Colombia's armed conflict in terms of international law. Timeline During this period, the main conflict in Colombia was between leftist guerillas and the central government. Key concerns included access to land, the battle between communist and far-right ideologies, and the marginalization of peasant populations. In the early 1960s, Colombian Army units loyal to the National Front began to attack peasant communities. This happened throughout Colombia, with the Colombian army deeming these peasant communities as enclaves for bandits and communists. It was the 1964 attack on the community of Marquetalia that motivated the later creation of FARC. Despite the infantry and police encirclement of the villages inside Marquetalia (3500 men swept through the area), Manuel Marulanda managed to escape the army cordon. Unlike the rural FARC, which had roots in the previous Liberal peasant struggles, the ELN was mostly an outgrowth of university unrest. It would subsequently tend to follow a small group of charismatic leaders, including Camilo Torres Restrepo. Both guerrilla groups remained mostly operational in remote areas of the country during the rest of the 1960s.[citation needed] The Colombian government organized several short-lived counter-guerrilla campaigns in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The U.S. government and the CIA aided these efforts, which employed hunter-killer teams and involved U.S. personnel from the previous Philippine campaign against the Huks, who would later participate in the subsequent Phoenix Program in the Vietnam War. By 1974, another challenge to the state's authority and legitimacy had come from the 19th of April Movement (M-19), leading to a new phase in the conflict. The M-19 was a mostly urban guerrilla group, founded in response to an alleged electoral fraud during the final National Front election of Misael Pastrana Borrero (1970–1974) against former President Gustavo Rojas Pinilla. By 1982, the perceived passivity of the FARC, together with the relative success of the government's efforts against the M-19 and the ELN, enabled the administration of the Liberal Party's Julio César Turbay Ayala (1978–82) to lift a state-of-siege decree that had been in effect, on and off, for most of the previous 30 years. Under the latest such decree, President Turbay had implemented security policies that, though of some military value against the M-19 in particular, were considered highly questionable both inside and outside Colombian circles due to numerous accusations of military human rights abuses against suspects and captured guerrillas.[citation needed] Citizen exhaustion due to the conflict's newfound intensity led to the election with 47% of the popular vote of President Belisario Betancur (1982–1986), a Conservative. Betancur directed peace feelers at all the insurgents, and negotiated a 1984 cease-fire with the FARC at La Uribe, Meta, after a 1982 release of many guerrillas imprisoned during the previous effort to overpower them. A truce was also arranged with the M-19. The ELN, however, rejected any negotiations and continued to rebuild through the use of extortion and threats, in particular against oil companies of European and U.S. origin.[citation needed] At the same time as these developments, the growing illegal drug trade was becoming increasingly important to all participants in the Colombian conflict. Guerrillas and newly wealthy drug lords had mutually uneven relations and numerous incidents occurred between them. Eventually the kidnapping of drug cartel family members by guerrillas led to the creation in 1981 of the Muerte a Secuestradores ("Death to Kidnappers") death squad (MAS). The Medellín Cartel and other cartels came under pressure from the U.S. government and from critical sectors of Colombian society who supported the extradition of suspected Colombian cartel members to the U.S. The cartels responded by bribing or murdering numerous public officials, politicians and others. Their victims included Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, whose assassination in 1984 led the Betancur administration to confront the drug lords directly.[citation needed] The first negotiated cease-fire with the M-19 ended when the guerrillas resumed fighting in 1985. The M-19 claimed that the cease-fire had not been fully respected by official security forces, alleged that several of its members had suffered threats and assaults, and questioned the government's real willingness to implement any accords. The Betancur administration in turn criticized the M-19's actions and questioned its commitment to the peace process, while at the same time continuing to advance high-profile negotiations with the FARC. These negotiations led to the creation of the Patriotic Union (Unión Patriótica) -UP-, a legal and non-clandestine political organization.[citation needed] On November 6, 1985, the M-19 stormed the Colombian Palace of Justice and held the Supreme Court magistrates hostage, intending to put President Betancur on trial. The military responded with force and in the ensuing crossfire some 120 people lost their lives, including most of the guerrillas (several high-ranking operatives among them) and 12 Supreme Court Judges. Both sides blamed each other for the bloodbath, which marked the end of Betancur's peace process. Meanwhile, individual FARC members initially joined the UP leadership in representation of the guerrilla command, though most of the guerrilla's chiefs and militiamen did not demobilize nor disarm, as that was not a requirement of the process at that point in time. Tension soon significantly increased, as both sides began to accuse each other of not respecting the cease-fire.[citation needed] According to historian Daniel Pecáut, the creation of the Patriotic Union took the guerrillas' political message to a wider public outside of the traditional communist spheres of influence and led to local electoral victories in regions such as Urabá and Antioquia, with their mayoral candidates winning 23 municipalities and their congressional ones gaining 14 seats (five in the Senate, nine in the lower Chamber) in 1988. According to journalist Steven Dudley, who interviewed ex-FARC as well as former members of the UP and the Communist Party, FARC leader Jacobo Arenas insisted to his subordinates that the UP's creation did not mean that the group would lay down its arms; neither did it imply a rejection of the Seventh Conference's military strategy. Pecáut states that new recruits entered the guerrilla army and its urban militia units during this period, and that the FARC continued to carry out kidnappings and to target regional politicians for assassination. In October 1987 Jaime Pardo Leal, who had been the UP's presidential candidate the previous year, was assassinated amid a wave of violence in which thousands of the party's members perished at the hands of death squads. According to Pecáut, the killers included members of the military and the political class who had opposed Betancur's peace process and considered the UP to be little more than a "facade" for the FARC, as well as drug traffickers and landowners who were also involved in the establishment of paramilitary groups. The Virgilio Barco Vargas (1986–1990) administration, in addition to continuing to handle the difficulties of the complex negotiations with the guerrillas, also inherited a particularly chaotic confrontation against the drug lords, who were engaged in a campaign of terrorism and murder in response to government moves in favor of their extradition overseas.[citation needed] In June 1987, the ceasefire between FARC and the Colombian government formally collapsed after the guerrillas attacked a military unit in the jungles of Caquetá. According to journalist Steven Dudley, FARC founder Jacobo Arenas considered the incident to be a "natural" part of the truce and reiterated the group's intention to continue the dialogue, but President Barco sent an ultimatum to the guerrillas and demanded that they immediately disarm or face military retaliation. Regional guerrilla and Army skirmishes created a situation where each violation of the ceasefire rendered it null in each location, until it was rendered practically nonexistent.[citation needed] By 1990, at least 2,500 members of the FARC-founded Patriotic Union had been murdered, according to historian Daniel Pecáut, leading up to that year's assassination of presidential candidate Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa. The Colombian government initially blamed drug lord Pablo Escobar for the murder but journalist Steven Dudley argues that many in the UP pointed at then-Interior Minister Carlos Lemos Simmonds for publicly calling out the UP as the "political wing of FARC" shortly before the murder, while others claimed it was the result of an alliance between Fidel Castaño, members of the Colombian military and the DAS. Pecáut and Dudley argue that significant tensions had emerged between Jaramillo, FARC and the Communist Party due to the candidate's recent criticism of the armed struggle and their debates over the rebels' use of kidnapping, almost leading to a formal break. Jaramillo's death led to a large exodus of UP militants; in addition, by then many FARC cadres who joined the party had already returned to clandestinity, using the UP experience as an argument in favor of revolutionary war. The M-19 and several smaller guerrilla groups were successfully incorporated into a peace process as the 1980s ended and the 1990s began, which culminated in the elections for a Constituent Assembly of Colombia that would write a new constitution, which took effect in 1991.[citation needed] Contacts with the FARC, which had irregularly continued despite the end of the ceasefire and the official 1987 break from negotiations, were temporarily cut off in 1990 under the presidency of César Gaviria Trujillo (1990–1994). The Colombian Army's assault on the FARC's Casa Verde sanctuary at La Uribe, Meta, followed by a FARC offensive that sought to undermine the deliberations of the Constitutional Assembly, began to highlight a significant break in the uneven negotiations carried over from the previous decade.[citation needed] Both parties nevertheless never completely broke off some amount of political contacts for long, as some peace feelers continued to exist, leading to short rounds of conversations in both Caracas, Venezuela (1991) and Tlaxcala, Mexico (1992). Despite the signing of several documents, no concrete results were achieved when the talks ended.[citation needed] FARC military activity increased throughout the bulk of the 1990s as the group continued to grow in wealth from both kidnapping and drug-related activities, while drug crops rapidly spread throughout the countryside. The guerrillas protected many of the coca growers from eradication campaigns and allowed them to grow and commercialize coca in exchange for a "tax" either in money or in crops.[citation needed] In this context, FARC had managed to recruit and train more fighters, beginning to use them in concentrated attacks in a novel and mostly unexpected way. This led to a series of high-profile raids and attacks against Colombian state bases and patrols, mostly in the southeast of Colombia but also affecting other areas.[citation needed] In mid-1996, a civic protest movement made up of an estimated 200,000 coca growers from Putumayo and part of Cauca began marching against the Colombian government to reject its drug war policies, including fumigations and the declaration of special security zones in some departments. Different analysts have stressed that the movement itself fundamentally originated on its own, but at the same time, FARC heavily encouraged the marchers and actively promoted their demands both peacefully and through the threat of force. Additionally, in 1997 and 1998, town councilmen in dozens of municipalities of the south of the country were threatened, killed, kidnapped, forced to resign or to exile themselves to department capitals by the FARC and the ELN. In Las Delicias, Caquetá, five FARC fronts (about 400 guerrillas) recognized intelligence pitfalls in a Colombian Army base and exploited them to overrun it on August 30, 1996, killing 34 soldiers, wounding 17 and taking some 60 as prisoners. Another significant attack took place in El Billar, Caquetá on March 2, 1998, where a Colombian Army counterinsurgency battalion was patrolling, resulting in the death of 62 soldiers and the capture of some 43. Other FARC attacks against Police bases in Miraflores, Guaviare and La Uribe, Meta in August 1998 killed more than a hundred soldiers, policemen and civilians, and resulted in the capture or kidnapping of a hundred more.[citation needed] These attacks, and the dozens of members of the Colombian security forces taken prisoner by the FARC, contributed to increasingly shaming the government of President Ernesto Samper Pizano (1994–1998) in the eyes of sectors of public and political opinion. He was already the target of numerous critics due to revelations of a drug-money scandal surrounding his presidential campaign. Perceptions of corruption due to similar scandals led to Colombia's decertification as a country cooperating with the United States in the war on drugs in 1995 (when the effects of the measure were temporarily waived), 1996 and 1997. The Samper administration reacted against FARC's attacks by gradually abandoning numerous vulnerable and isolated outposts in more than 100,000 km2 of the rural countryside, instead concentrating Army and Police forces in the more heavily defended strongholds available, which allowed the guerrillas to more directly mobilize through and influence events in large areas of rural territory which were left with little or no remaining local garrisons.[citation needed] Samper also contacted the guerrillas to negotiate the release of some or all of the hostages in FARC hands, which led to the temporary demilitarization of the municipality of Cartagena del Chairá, Caquetá in July 1997 and the unilateral liberation of 70 soldiers, a move which was opposed by the command of the Colombian military. Other contacts between the guerrillas and government, as well as with representatives of religious and economic sectors, continued throughout 1997 and 1998.[citation needed] Altogether, these events were interpreted by some Colombian and foreign analysts as a turning point in the armed confrontation, giving the FARC the upper hand in the military and political balance, making the Colombian government a target of critics from some observers who concluded that its weakness was being evidenced, perhaps even foreshadowing a future guerrilla victory in the middle term. A leaked 1998 U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report went so far as to speculate that this could be possible within 5 years if the guerrilla's rate of operations was kept up without effective opposition. Some viewed this report as inaccurate and alarmist, claiming that it did not properly take into account many factors, such as possible actions that the Colombian state and the U.S. might take in response to the situation, nor the effects of the existence of paramilitary groups. Also during this period, paramilitary activities increased, both legally and illegally. The creation of legal CONVIVIR self-defense and intelligence gathering groups was authorized by Congress and the Samper administration in 1994. Members of CONVIVIR groups were accused of committing numerous abuses against the civilian population by several human rights organizations. The groups were left without legal support after a 1997 decision by the Colombian Constitutional Court which restricted many of their prerogatives and demanded stricter oversight. However, in April 1997, preexisting paramilitary forces and several former CONVIVIR members were joined to create the AUC, a large paramilitary militia closely tied to drug trafficking which carried out attacks on the FARC and ELN rebel groups as well as civilians starting with the 1997 Mapiripán Massacre. The AUC, originally present around the central/northwest part of the country, executed a series of raids into areas of guerrilla influence, targeting those that they considered as either guerrillas or their supporters. This resulted in a continuing series of massacres. After some of these operations, government prosecutors and/or human rights organizations blamed officers and members of Colombian Army and police units for either passively permitting these acts, or directly collaborating in their execution. On August 7, 1998, Andrés Pastrana Arango was sworn in as the President of Colombia. A member of the Conservative Party, Pastrana defeated Liberal Party candidate Horacio Serpa in a run-off election marked by high voter turn-out and little political unrest. The new president's program was based on a commitment to bring about a peaceful resolution of Colombia's longstanding civil conflict and to cooperate fully with the United States to combat the trafficking of illegal drugs.[citation needed] In July 1999, Colombian military forces attacked the town of Puerto Lleras where FARC rebels were stationed. Using U.S. supplied aircraft and equipment, and backed with U.S. logistical support, Colombian government forces strafed and bombed the town for over 72 hours. In the attack, three civilians were killed and several others were wounded as the military attacked hospitals, churches, ambulances, and residential areas. FARC rebels were forced to flee the area, and many were killed or wounded. The Colombian government claimed that this was a significant victory, while human rights groups claimed this as proof that "anti-narcotics" aid, was actually just military aid which was being used to fight a leftist insurgency. The years from 2000 to 2006 were bloody ones in Colombia with thousands of deaths every year resulting from the ongoing war between the Colombian Armed Forces, Paramilitary groups such as the AUC and the rebel groups (mainly the FARC, ELN and also the EPL). The fighting resulted in massive internal displacement of Colombia's civilian population and thousands of civilian deaths. During President Uribe's first term in office (2002–2006), the security situation inside Colombia showed some measure of improvement and the economy, while still fragile, also showed some positive signs of recovery according to observers[who?]. But relatively little has been accomplished in structurally solving most of the country's other grave problems, such as poverty and inequality, possibly in part due to legislative and political conflicts between the administration and the Colombian Congress (including those over a controversial project to eventually give Uribe the possibility of re-election), and a relative lack of freely allocated funds and credits.[citation needed] Some critical observers considered that Uribe's policies, while reducing crime and guerrilla activity, were too slanted in favor of a military solution to Colombia's internal war while neglecting grave social and human rights concerns. Critics have asked for Uribe's government to change this position and make serious efforts towards improving the human rights situation inside the country, protecting civilians and reducing any abuses committed by the armed forces. Political dissenters and labor union members, among others, have suffered from threats and have been murdered. [citation needed] In 2001 the largest government supported paramilitary group, the AUC, which had been linked to drug trafficking and attacks on civilians, was added to the US State Department's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations and the European Union and Canada soon followed suit. On January 17, 2001, right-wing paramilitaries entered the village of Chengue, and divided up the villagers into two groups. They then went from person to person in one of the groups, smashing each person's head with sledgehammers and rocks, killing 24 people, as the Colombian military sat by and watched. Two other bodies were later discovered dumped in a shallow grave. As the paramilitaries left, they set fire to the village. In 2004, it was revealed by the National Security Archive that a 1991 document from the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency had described then-Senator Uribe as a "close personal friend" and collaborator of Pablo Escobar. The Uribe administration denied several of the allegations in the 1991 report. Starting in 2004 a disarmament process was begun of Colombia's paramilitary groups (especially the AUC) and was completed on April 12, 2006, when 1,700 fighters turned in their weapons in the town of Casibare. In May 2006, the Colombian presidential election resulted in Uribe winning re-election with a historic first round vote tally of 62%, followed by leftist Carlos Gaviria with 22% and Horacio Serpa. On June 28, 2007, the FARC suddenly reported the death of 11 of the 12 kidnapped provincial deputies from Valle del Cauca Department. The Colombian government accused the FARC of executing the hostages and stated that government forces had not made any rescue attempts. FARC claimed that the deaths occurred during a crossfire, after an attack to one of its camps by an "unidentified military group".[citation needed] FARC did not report any other casualties on either side. In 2007, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and Colombian Senator Piedad Córdoba were acting as authorised mediators in the ongoing humanitarian exchange between the FARC and the government of Colombia. Colombian President Álvaro Uribe had given Chávez permission to mediate, under the conditions that all meetings with the FARC would take place in Venezuela and that Chávez would not contact members of the Colombian military directly, but instead go through proper diplomatic channels. However, President Uribe abruptly terminated Chávez's mediation efforts on November 22, 2007, after Chávez personally contacted General Mario Montoya Uribe, the Commander of the Colombian National Army. In response, Chávez said that he was still willing to mediate, but had withdrawn Venezuela's ambassador to Colombia and placed Colombian-Venezuelan relations "in a freezer". President Uribe responded by accusing Chávez of legitimizing terrorism and pursuing an expansionist project on the continent. Several scandals have affected Uribe's administration. The Colombian parapolitics scandal expanded during his second term, involving numerous members of the administration's ruling coalition. Many pro-government lawmakers, such as the President's cousin Mario Uribe, have been investigated for their possible ties to paramilitary organizations. At the end of 2007, FARC agreed to release former senator Consuelo González, politician Clara Rojas and her son Emmanuel, born in captivity after a relationship with one of her captors. Operation Emmanuel was proposed and set up by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, with the permission of the Colombian government. The mission was approved on December 26. However, on December 31, FARC claimed that the hostage release had been delayed because of Colombian military operations. At the same time, Colombian President Álvaro Uribe indicated that FARC had not freed the three hostages because Emmanuel may not be in their hands anymore. Two FARC gunmen were taken prisoner. [citation needed] Colombian authorities added that a boy matching Emmanuel's description had been taken to a hospital in San José del Guaviare in June 2005. The child was in poor condition; one of his arms was hurt, he had severe malnutrition, and he had diseases that are commonly suffered in the jungle. Having been evidently mistreated, the boy was later sent to a foster home in Bogotá and DNA tests were announced to confirm his identity. On January 4, 2008, the results of a mitochondrial DNA test, comparing the child's DNA with that of his potential grandmother Clara de Rojas, were revealed by the Colombian government. It was reported that there was a very high probability that the boy was indeed part of the Rojas family. The same day, FARC released a communique in which they admitted that Emmanuel had been taken to Bogotá and "left in the care of honest persons" for safety reasons until a humanitarian exchange took place. The group accused President Uribe of "kidnapping" the child to sabotage his liberation. However, on January 10, 2008, FARC released Rojas and Gonzalez through a humanitarian commission headed by the International Committee of the Red Cross. On January 13, 2008, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez stated his disapproval with the FARC strategy of armed struggle and kidnapping saying "I don't agree with kidnapping and I don't agree with armed struggle". He repeated his call for a political solution and an end to the war on March and June 2008, "The guerrilla war is history...At this moment in Latin America, an armed guerrilla movement is out of place". In February 2008, FARC released four others political hostages "as a gesture of goodwill" toward Chávez, who had brokered the deal and sent Venezuelan helicopters with Red Cross logos into the Colombian jungle to pick up the freed hostages. On March 1, 2008, the Colombian armed forces launched a military operation 1.8 kilometres into Ecuador on a FARC position, killing 24, including Raúl Reyes, member of the FARC Central High Command. This led to the 2008 Andean diplomatic crisis between Colombia and Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa, supported by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. On March 3, Iván Ríos, also a member of the FARC Central High Command was killed by his security chief "Rojas". In March 2008 alone, FARC lost 3 members of their Secretariat, including their founder. On May 24, 2008, Colombian magazine, Revista Semana, published an interview with Colombian Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos in which Santos mentions the death of Manuel Marulanda Vélez. The news was confirmed by FARC-commander 'Timochenko' on Venezuelan based television station Telesur on May 25, 2008. 'Timochenko' announced the new commander in chief is 'Alfonso Cano'. In May 2008, a dozen jailed paramilitary leaders were extradited to the United States on drug-related charges. In 2009, extradited paramilitary leader Salvatore Mancuso would claim that the AUC had supported Uribe's 2002 election, but said that this was a result of their similar "ideological discourse" and not the result of any direct prior arrangement. On July 2, 2008, the Colombian armed forces launched Operation Jaque that resulted in the freedom of 15 political hostages, including former Colombian presidential candidate Íngrid Betancourt, Marc Gonsalves, Thomas Howes, and Keith Stansell, three American military contractors employed by Northrop Grumman and 11 Colombian military and police. Two FARC members were arrested. This trick to the FARC was presented by the Colombian government as a proof that the guerrilla organisation and influence is declining. [citation needed] On October 26, 2008, after 8 years of captivity, the ex-congressman Óscar Tulio Lizcano escaped with the assistance of a FARC rebel he convinced to travel with him. Soon after the liberation of this prominent political hostage, the Vice President of Colombia Francisco Santos Calderón called Latin America's biggest guerrilla group a "paper tiger" with little control of the nation's territory, adding that "they have really been diminished to the point where we can say they are a minimal threat to Colombian security," and that "After six years of going after them, reducing their income and promoting reinsertion of most of their members, they look like a paper tiger." However, he warned against any kind of premature triumphalism, because "crushing the rebels will take time." The 500,000 square kilometers (190,000 sq mi) of jungle in Colombia makes it hard to track them down to fight. According to the Colombian government, in early 2009 FARC launched plan Rebirth to avoid being defeated. They planned to intensify guerrilla warfare by the use of landmines, snipers, and bomb attacks in urban areas. They also planned to buy missiles to fight the Colombian Air Force which had highly contributed to their weakness in the past. In February 2009, the guerrilla released 6 hostages as a humanitarian gesture. In March, they released Swedish hostage Erik Roland Larsson. [citation needed] In April 2009, the Colombian armed forces launched Strategic Leap, an offensive in border areas where the FARC's forces still has a strong military presence, especially in Arauca, near the Venezuelan border. In November 2009, Nine Colombian soldiers were killed when their post was attacked by FARC guerrillas in a southwestern part of the country. On December 22, 2009, FARC rebels raided the home of Provincial governor Luis Francisco Cuéllar, killing one police officer and wounding two. Cuellar was found dead the following day. On January 1, 2010, 18 FARC rebels were killed when the Colombian Air Force bombed a jungle camp in Southern Colombia. Colombian troops of the elite Task Force Omega then stormed the camp, capturing 15 FARC rebels, as well as 25 rifles, war materials, explosives, and information which was given to military intelligence. In Southwestern Colombia, FARC rebels ambushed an army patrol, killing a soldier. The troops then exchanged fire with the rebels. During the fighting, a teenager was killed in the crossfire. When Juan Manuel Santos was elected president in August 2010, he promised to "continue the armed offensive" against rebel movements. In the month after his inauguration, FARC and ELN killed roughly 50 soldiers and policemen in attacks all over Colombia. September also saw the killing of FARC's second-in-command Mono Jojoy. By the end of 2010, it became increasingly clear that "neo-paramilitary groups", referred to as "criminal groups" (BACRIM) by the government, had become an increasing threat to national security, with violent groups such as Los Rastrojos and Aguilas Negras taking control of large parts of the Colombian countryside. In 2010, the FARC killed at least 460 members of the security forces, while wounding more than 2,000. By early 2011, Colombian authorities and news media reported that the FARC and the clandestine sister groups have partly shifted strategy from guerrilla warfare to "a war of militias", meaning that they are increasingly operating in civilian clothes while hiding amongst sympathizers in the civilian population. In early January 2011, the Colombian army said that the FARC has some 18,000 members, with 9,000 of those forming part of the militias. The army says it has "identified" at least 1,400 such militia members in the FARC-strongholds of Valle del Cauca and Cauca in 2011. In June 2011, Colombian chief of staff Edgar Cely claimed that the FARC wants to "urbanize their actions", which could partly explain the increased guerrilla activity in Medellín and particularly Cali. Jeremy McDermott, co-director of Insight Crime, estimates that FARC may have some 30,000 "part-time fighters" in 2011, consisting of supporters making up the rebel militia network instead of armed uniformed combatants. In 2011, the Colombian Congress issued a statement claiming that the FARC has a "strong presence" in roughly one third of Colombia, while their attacks against security forces "have continued to rise" throughout 2010 and 2011. In 2012, the Colombia Military launched The Espada de Honor War Plan, an aggressive counterinsurgency strategies that aims to dismantle FARC's structure, crippling them both militarily and financially. The plan targets FARC leadership and it is focused on eliminating 15 of the most powerful economic and military fronts. On July 20, 2013, as peace talks were making progress, two rebel attacks on government positions killed 19 soldiers and an unspecified number of combatants. It was the deadliest day since peace talks began in November 2012. On December 15, 2014, 9 FARC guerrillas were killed in the aftermath airstrikes conducted by the Colombian air force in the Meta province. On May 22, 2015, the FARC suspended a truce after 26 of its fighters were killed in a government air and ground offensive. On June 22, 2015, a Colombian Army Black Hawk helicopter was destroyed while landing on a mine field laid by FARC: four soldiers were killed and six were wounded. On June 23, 2016, the Colombian government and FARC agreed to a ceasefire. A "final, full and definitive accord" was agreed to on August 24, 2016. This accord does not include ELN. On October 2, 2016, the results of the referendum to decide whether or not to support the peace accord showed that 50.2% opposed the accord while 49.8% favoured it. In October 2016, President Juan Manuel Santos was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his resolute efforts to bring the country's more than 50-year-long war to an end. The Colombian government and the FARC on November 24 signed a revised peace deal and the revised agreement will be submitted to Congress for approval. The House of Representatives unanimously approved the plan on November 30, a day after the Senate also gave its backing. In September 2019, Colombia's President Iván Duque Márquez launched a new military crackdown against FARC, which declared resuming the armed struggle due to the government's failure to abide by the 2016 peace deal. On April 25, senior Gulf Cartel (Clan de Golfo) leader Gustavo Adolfo Álvarez Téllez, who was one of Colombia's most wanted drug lords, with a 580 million peso bounty for his capture, was arrested at his lavish estate in Cereté while holding a party under quarantine during the COVID-19 pandemic. Álvarez was described as the "brain" of the cartel, and by this point was reported to have taken charge of the cartel's Caribbean operations. On June 26, Clan del Golfo and FARC dissidents were confirmed to be in a direct armed conflict in northern Antioquia known as Operation Mil. The Gulf Clan, which dispatched 1,000 of its paramilitaries from Urabá, southern Córdoba and Chocó, hopes to suppress FARC rebels in northern Antioquia and take control of the entire municipality of Ituango. On January 2, 2022, an internal fight occurred between the ELN and FARC dissidents in Arauca, leaving 23 people dead. On June 9, 2023, the Colombian government and ELN signed a six month nationwide ceasefire, to go into effect on August 3. This came after months of peace talks in Havana. On January 19, 2025, ELN and FARC forces erupted into combat in the Catatumbo region. Around 80 people have been killed, while thousands of residents have fled the violence. Many schools and sports stadiums have been converted into refugee shelters. Colombia has deployed 5,000 soldiers in an attempt to restore peace. Since 13 August 2025, clashes between FARC dissidents and the Military Forces of Colombia, have resulted in at least 34 deaths, a hundred more wounded and kidnapped, and a Black Hawk police helicopter shot down. Impacts The destruction of physical infrastructure has represented high costs for several sectors of the economy, directly altering production and distribution networks. The costs generated by damage to the oil infrastructure have shown a substantial increase since 1990. This is mainly explained by the increase in attacks on oil pipelines by groups outside the law. According to data from Ecopetrol, between 1999 and 2003, the costs assumed by the hydrocarbon exploitation sector grew by approximately 59%, amounting to $817,654.5 million. This equates to 23.6% of the total royalties that Ecopetrol turned to 20 departments and 110 municipalities, destined to improve the quality of life of the inhabitants. For 2004, costs decreased substantially to $11,015.5 million. This is the first sector most affected by the terrorist actions of groups outside the law. The costs are mainly derived from the spilled oil, "[...] from the repair of the pipeline, from the environmental decontamination and from the oil stopped producing 60% of the total expenses incurred." During the 1999–2003 period, costs against electrical and telecommunications towers increased substantially, representing $134,871.2 million. This is equivalent to 5.4% of 2003 GDP for the electricity, gas and water sector. On the other hand, according to data from the National Institute of Roads (INVÍAS), between 1993 and 1995, groups outside the law demolished 11 tolls and a bridge, and its reconstruction cost $378,476,248. This amount increased significantly during the 1999–2003 period, when the costs generated by the reconstruction of bridges represented $18,455.7 million. These costs are equivalent to 1.71% of the total INVÍAS budget for 2003. For 2004, costs for damages to the road infrastructure dropped substantially to $680 million. The partial interruption of the roads directly affects the transport sector, food and other private guilds, which in turn assume costs for these damages. However, generally these have not been quantified, because of the difficulty they have to be directly calculated. This tends to present itself as a generalized problem in quantifying the costs associated with conflict. This is explained, in part, by the tendency in the various economic sectors not to denounce this type of actions that, in one way or another, interrupt the normal functioning of economic activities. Colombia is the country in which more people are and have been kidnapped.[clarification needed] Kidnapping, as one of the manifestations that underlie the armed conflict, carries both direct and indirect costs. The former consist mainly of the payment of ransoms and the expenses assumed by the State to control and prevent it. Indirect costs include, "[...] the loss of human capital for the duration of the detention and for the death of the kidnapped during his captivity". There are two types of kidnapping: a) kidnapping for extortion and political purposes; and b) simple kidnapping. According to data from the Directorate of Justice and Security of the DNP, this phenomenon shows an increasing trend. With respect to the costs of sequestration, the sources suggest an increasing behavior between 1996 and 2003. In such a way that "the average annual growth rate is 9.3%, the highest rate is observed in 1998 (46.2%), and in 2000 (37.2%) year in which the number of kidnappings also it is significantly high [...] reaching its peak in the year 2000 with 1,938 cases." From then on, the trend becomes decreasing (except for a peak in 2002 with 1,542 cases) until reaching the 350 kidnappings (the lowest figure since 1996) in 2005. Within these costs, 64.4% are direct, representing US$167.4 million. 35.6% of the remaining costs are indirect, and represent US$92.7 million. In 2004, the costs of sequestration were reduced to $109,519 million, representing 0.27% of GDP in 2003. While spending on defense and security becomes very important to examine when dealing with a country immersed in an armed conflict, the analysis on this issue are relatively recent. This can be explained because until the beginning of the second half of the nineties, defense and security spending had a significant growth. Spending on defense and security includes, on the one hand, the means by which the State must have to defend sovereignty and territorial integrity, and on the other, the costs involved in maintaining internal security. Various studies of National Planning suggest that the Colombian State spends a much greater percentage in defense and security than other Latin American countries. Between 1991 and 1996, the estimated value of these resources was $3.7 billion. That is, 2.6% of GDP, while for Latin America the average of this expenditure was 1.7% of GDP. A study carried out by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) for the year 2001 "[...] shows that Colombia ranked 24th in the countries with the largest participation in military spending, out of a total of 116 investigated."The figure for the participation of military expenditures in GDP was 3.8% for Colombia while in the countries of the American continent the closest figure is that of the United States with 3.1% followed by Chile with 2.9%, Ecuador with 2.1% and the rest of countries below 2.0% ". Thus, for the period 1999–2003, defense and security spending was $8,463,611.0 million, equivalent to 10.5% of GDP in 2003. The excess of said expense, compared to the average cost of neighboring countries, It was close to 0.79% of GDP. A Fedesarrollo study states that the Spending on defense and security carried out during 2004 "[...] represented 4.5% of GDP [...] " which does not have precedents in the history of Colombia. This is directly related to the Security Policy Democratic undertaken by the government of the current president Álvaro Uribe, who focuses on hitting militarily to groups outside the law, in order to regain security national. On the other hand, for the year 2004, the expenses of the Colombian Government in war and security were 6.59%, placing the country between the tenth that invest the most in war as proportion of GDP . The estimated loss of human capital and productivity due to labor absenteeism in 2003 amounted to $366.2 billion. On the other hand, the loss of land productivity, which translates into a negative impact on administration, investment in physical and social capital, and the price of land in subsectors such as livestock and commercial agriculture is one of the consequences associated with the presence of an armed conflict. This cost is mainly assumed by farmers who experience the pressure of armed actions in their areas of operation. Within this context, the most serious consequences are related to the devaluation of the properties, the loss of productivity of the land -represented in the products that could potentially have been cultivated in these lands- and the difficulty in managing the efficient production of the lands. According to a study of National Planning, the estimated costs for the loss of productivity of land represented, between 1999 and 2003, $140,443.5 million, equivalent to 1.28% of the GDP of the agricultural sector of 2003. The duration and expansion of the national conflict has had a significant impact on the distribution of income and wealth in Colombia. According to an investigation by the CEDE of the Universidad de los Andes, "as a result of the displacement, the displaced households have left behind a little more than four million hectares, which correspond to 6.7 times of the total hectares granted by the program. of Agrarian Reform during the period between 1993 and 2000, and represent a total value of $ 2.6 billion." In this context, the enormous concentration of rural property in the hands of a few individuals is not only the result of the purchase of land by drug traffickers and the illegal appropriation by groups outside the law, but also the consequence of acquisition of properties devalued due to the armed conflict [...]. It is estimated that 1.3% of the owners control 48% of the best lands. On the other hand, a study carried out by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) states that the Colombian conflict has had a negative effect on the income of the population. According to this study, because of the conflict, Colombia has lost 17% of its per capita income in the last ten years. That is to say, "[...] the money wasted every year corresponds to about 4.6 times what the community welfare homes programs, children's homes and school restaurants of the social support network cos." Although the agents adjust their investment behavior, that is, they internalize the phenomenon of violence, assuming it as a change in the structures of the economy in the long term the investment of both the State and the private sector is diminished in substantial ways. In the Colombian case, the loss in private investment has been estimated at 0.53 points of the annual GDP, due to the public order conditions that arise directly from the presence of an armed conflict. A 1% increase in the homicide rate reduces private investment by 0.66%. Thus, we can observe that the high levels of violence directly affect the transaction costs and levels of uncertainty in society. Likewise, they reduce to a certain degree the profitability of investments. A study by Corporación Invertir en Colombia (Coinvertir) and the National Planning Department (DNP) shows that insecurity hinders the development of new foreign investments, especially in the financial, oil and gas, and electric power sectors. One of the biggest problems to invest in Colombia is that it is necessary to devote a large part of the budget to security and protection controls, which is very difficult to justify before the house. In this sense, the economic environment affected by the violence translates into a tax on investment." On the other hand, within the studies on the costs of the conflict, specific sectors such as the private sector have begun to be studied, taking into account the high costs they have had to assume due to the existence of this phenomenon. The large companies and those that operate at the national level assume the highest costs associated with the existence of the conflict. This is because they are more attractive for someone who wants to extort for example, and also those who lose most in adverse conditions. Appealing to the economic arguments that underlie the conflict, various state and international aid and cooperation institutions seek to establish the scope and potential benefits of a peaceful situation. This argument has mobilized and sensitized various sectors of society to understand that peace is also an economic necessity. In Colombia, as shown in the studies that have estimated the costs of the conflict, since the nineties it has imposed increasingly higher costs to various productive sectors of the economy and society in general. Among the sectors most affected by the conflict are the exploitation of hydrocarbons, electricity and livestock. This is explained, in part, because the areas where the operations and activities of these sectors take place, in parallel, are the territories where groups outside the law exert a very strong presence. Likewise, for the Colombian private sector, indirect costs have more impact on their activities than direct costs. With respect to indirect costs, although there is a clear difficulty to be quantified, the various studies suggest that they have been significantly high and that they have had a representative impact on society as such. The drug trafficking sales have gone up in Colombia since the 1970s due to the conflict. Many Mexican drug cartels have been spotted to operate in the area including the Sinaloa Cartel, Gulf Cartel, Beltrán Leyva Cartel, CJNG, and Los Zetas. The Medellín Cartel and Cali Cartel were the first drug trafficking organizations in Colombia and had alliances with the Guadalajara Cartel, Los Valencia Organization, and Amezcua Cartel. Since 1990, over 11,000 people have been killed or wounded by landmines in Colombia. Between 1982 and the end of 2012, 2,038 people have been killed by landmines, according to the Presidential Program for Mine Action. Since 2000, casualties from landmines in Colombia have ranged from 1,300 a year to just around 550. In the past, the Colombian government laid landmines around 34 military bases to protect key infrastructure, but it renounced their use in 1997. Landmines are primarily used by the rebel groups to protect their home bases and illegal drug crops, which fund the conflict. FARC and ELN have deployed antipersonnel mines throughout an estimated area of up to 100 square kilometers. In March 2015, FARC stated that it would begin humanitarian demining in selected parts of Colombia.[citation needed] The far-left guerrilla group Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), was one of the most powerful violent groups with which the Colombian government had to deal during the Colombian Conflict. They gained so much strength and influence that they started to look for mechanisms that helped them grow even stronger. In that sense, they developed a "Rebel Diplomacy", understood as a rebel group's conduct of foreign affairs during the development civil war for the purpose of advancing its military and political objective. This diplomacy was used as a strategy that they engaged with various international actors in the seek for any type of support during different stages of the conflict. Among these international actors we can find other countries governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational corporations. The guerrilla made intelligent and strategic use of social networks, using them as a means through which to offer the international public witnessing the conflict a vision of their own narrative of the conflict and to present themselves as a credible and preferable alternative to the Colombian government. In this way, the FARC designed a web page and obtained support from press agencies and independent digital media, mostly European. Rebel diplomacy often emerges as a kind of counter diplomacy aimed at discrediting the State against which the insurgent group is fighting, it is a way of taking the battle to the political arena and waging it in the international arena. This occurred in the case of the FARC, which beyond defending its political proposal and ideology, its international discourse focused on a frontal attack on the Government. FARC dissidents are a group formerly part of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, who have refused to lay down their arms after the FARC-government peace treaty came into effect in 2016. The dissidents number some 1200 armed combatants with an unknown number of civilian militia supporting them. The FARC dissidents have become "an increasing headache" for the Colombian armed forces, as they have to fight them, the EPL, ELN and Clan del Golfo at the same time. FARC dissidents are led by former mid-level commanders such as alias Gentil Duarte, alias Euclides Mora, alias John 40, alias Giovanny Chuspas and alias Julián Chollo. The FARC dissidents have been responsible for several attacks on the Colombian armed forces. These fighters are believed to be heavily involved in the production and sale of cocaine. Dissidents of FARC's 1st Front are located in the eastern plains of Colombia. Jhon 40 and their dissident 43rd Front moved into the Amazonas state of western Venezuela. Venezuela has served as the primary location for many FARC dissidents. On July 15, 2018, the Colombian and Peruvian governments launched a joint military effort known as Operation Armageddon to combat FARC dissidents. Peru issued a 60-day state of emergency in the Putumayo Province, an area bordering both Colombia and Ecuador. On the first day alone, more than 50 individuals were arrested in the operation, while four cocaine labs were dismantled. The group has attempted to recruit locals in the Putumayo Province in Peru to take up their cause. On July 28, 2019, during the XXV São Paulo Forum hosted in Caracas, Nicolás Maduro declared that the FARC-EP dissidents leaders Iván Márquez and Jesús Santrich were "welcome" in Venezuela and to the São Paulo Forum. Role of the United States The United States has been heavily involved in the conflict since its beginnings, when in the early 1960s the U.S. government encouraged the Colombian military to attack leftist militias in rural Colombia. This was part of the U.S. fight against communism. In October 1959, the United States sent a "Special Survey Team", composed of counterinsurgency experts, to investigate Colombia's internal security situation. In February 1962, a Fort Bragg top-level U.S. Special Warfare team headed by Special Warfare Center commander General William P. Yarborough, visited Colombia for a second survey. In a secret supplement to his report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Yarborough encouraged the creation and deployment of a paramilitary force to commit sabotage and terrorist acts against communists: A concerted country team effort should be made now to select civilian and military personnel for clandestine training in resistance operations in case they are needed later. This should be done with a view toward development of a civil and military structure for exploitation in the event the Colombian internal security system deteriorates further. This structure should be used to pressure toward reforms known to be needed, perform counter-agent and counter-propaganda functions and as necessary execute paramilitary, sabotage and/or terrorist activities against known communist proponents. It should be backed by the United States. The first paramilitary groups were organized following recommendations made by U.S. military counterinsurgency advisers who were sent to Colombia during the Cold War to combat leftist political activists and armed guerrilla groups. One multinational corporation has also been directly tied to paramilitary death squads. Chiquita Brands International was fined $25 million as part of a settlement with the United States Justice Department for having ties to paramilitary groups. In 2016, Judge Kenneth Marra of the Southern District of Florida ruled in favor of allowing Colombians to sue former Chiquita Brand International executives for the company's funding of the outlawed right-wing paramilitary organization that murdered their family members. He stated in his decision that "'profits took priority over basic human welfare' in the banana company executives' decision to finance the illegal death squads, despite knowing that this would advance the paramilitaries' murderous campaign." In December 2013, The Washington Post revealed a covert CIA program, started in the early 2000s, which provides the Colombian government with intelligence and GPS guidance systems for smart bombs. As of August 2004, the US had spent $3 billion in Colombia, more than 75% of it on military aid. Before the Iraq War, Colombia was the third largest recipient of US aid only after Egypt and Israel, and the U.S. has 400 military personnel and 400 civilian contractors in Colombia. Currently, however, Colombia is not a top recipient of U.S. aid, though it was under the first five years of the Plan Colombia. In March 2015, it was revealed DEA agents were participating in drug cartel-funded sex parties with prostitutes. Agents were provided with expensive gifts, weapons and money from drug cartel members. As a result, the head of the US Drug Enforcement Administration, Michele Leonhart, announced her retirement. According to the 2022 Truth Commission report, the 2019 arrest of Jesús Santrich on drug trafficking charges, which was a joint operation by the DEA and Colombian Attorney General Néstor Humberto Martínez, was intended to send a message from the Colombian Attorney General's to the Colombian public that the peace process had failed. Santrich's arrest led to hundreds of ex-guerrillas taking up arms again, which jeopardized the peace process. Statistics about victims of war According to a study by Colombia's National Centre for Historical Memory, 220,000 people have died in the conflict between 1958 and 2013, most of them civilians (177,307 civilians and 40,787 fighters) and more than five million civilians were forced from their homes between 1985 and 2012, generating the world's second largest population of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The report shows that the humanitarian crisis in Colombia is extremely serious in terms of both lethal and nonlethal violence. The report examines the widespread use of sexual violence against women and girls as a weapon of war, as well as the invisibility of this phenomenon. 16.9% of the population in Colombia has been a direct victim of the war. 2.3 million children have been displaced from their homes, and 45,000 children killed, according to national figures cited by Unicef. In total, one in three of the 7.6 million registered victims of the conflict are children, and since 1985, 8,000 minors have disappeared. Since the peace talks with the FARC began four years ago, some 1,000 children have been forcibly recruited by some of the myriad armed groups in the country, 75 have been killed, and 65 schools have been damaged by fighting. According to the report "Basta ya", written in 2013 by Colombia's National Centre for Historical Memory, 80% of victims affected by conflict-related violence and landmines were civilians. The report documents 1,982 massacres between 1980 and 2012. The Government also began a process of assistance, attention and comprehensive reparation for victims of conflict. During his visit to Colombia, Pope Francis brought with him a message of peace and paid tribute to the victims of the conflict. The Special Jurisdiction of Peace (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, JEP) would be the transitional justice component of the Comprehensive System, complying with Colombia's duty to investigate, clarify, prosecute and punish serious human rights violations and grave breaches of international humanitarian law which occurred during the armed conflict. Its objectives would be to satisfy victims' right to justice, offer truth to the public, contribute to the reparation of victims, contribute to the fight against impunity, adopt decisions which give full legal security to direct and indirect participants in the conflict and contribute to the achievement of a stable and lasting peace. The Special Unit for the Search of Missing Persons in the context and due to the armed conflict (Unidad especial para la búsqueda de personas dadas por desaparecidas en el contexto y en razón del conflicto armado) would be a special high-level unit created following the signature of the final agreement. It would direct and coordinate efforts to search for and locate missing persons, or find their remains so that they may be returned to their families. To carry out its work, the search unit would collect the necessary information about missing persons, analyze the information collected, strengthen and streamline processes for identifying mortal remains in coordination with the National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences, guarantee families' participation and present an official report to families informing them of the fate of missing relatives. The search unit would be administrative and financially independent and autonomous, complementing the other components of the Comprehensive System. References English books Books in other languages Journals and periodicals Government/NGO reports News External links Participants Timeline Key aspects Former guerrillas Linked to Former government program Linked to Former paramilitaries Linked to |
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/פנחס_ספיר] | [TOKENS: 10896] |
תוכן עניינים פנחס ספיר פִּנְחָס סַפִּיר (קוֹזְלוֹבְסקי; 15 באוקטובר 1906 – 12 באוגוסט 1975) היה פוליטיקאי ישראלי, שר האוצר השלישי של ישראל, מהבולטים בפוליטיקה הישראלית ברבע השלישי של המאה ה-20. נחשב ל-"אבי הכלכלה הישראלית", בשל תרומתו פורצת הדרך, כשבמצטבר כיהן 19 שנים בתור שר המסחר והתעשייה ושר האוצר, ובתקופת כהונתו בתפקיד זה היה אחראי על מיתון 1966 בישראל. ספיר כיהן גם במהלך הגאות הכלכלית בין מלחמת ששת הימים ומלחמת יום הכיפורים והתמודד עם השפעות משבר האנרגיה העולמי לאחר מלחמת יום הכיפורים. ספיר, בכהונתו כשר האוצר, אחז בהשפעה רבה על הפוליטיקה הישראלית ואף כונה "ממליך ראשי ממשלות", על שהיה בעל אחריות מרכזית במינויים של גולדה מאיר ויצחק רבין לראשי ממשלות. הוא עצמו סירב לקבל את התפקיד על אף הפצרות רבות ופרש מהפוליטיקה לאחר תום כהונת ממשלת ישראל השש עשרה. בתחום המדיני היה ספיר יוני: הוא התנגד להמשך השליטה ביהודה ושומרון וחבל עזה ולהקמת ההתנחלויות מסיבות כלכליות ודמוגרפיות, אך עם זאת תמך בראש הממשלה גולדה מאיר. ביוגרפיה ספיר נולד בשם פנחס קוֹזְלוֹבְסקי (בכתיב יידיש: קאזלאווסקי) בשנת 1906 בעיירה סובאלק שבצפון-מזרח פולין (אז תחת שלטון האימפריה הרוסית). ספיר נולד למשפחה דתית, והוא עצמו נהג כל חייו להתפלל בבתי כנסת במועדים וחגים. ב-1926 החל לעבוד כגזבר בארגון החלוץ במועצה של גרודנה וביאליסטוק. בהמשך עבר למרכז "החלוץ" בוורשה שם עסק בניהול הכלכלה של הארגון ובגיוס כספים לחוות ההכשרה בפולין וברוסיה (בין השאר לחוות ההכשרה בגרוכוב). כבר מילדות נהג לומר כי "הכל בחיים סובב סביב הכסף, מה לעשות שזה המצב." בוגר סמינר למורים, עלה לארץ ישראל ב-1929. במקור הגיע ארצה על אונייה שעגנה בנמל יפו והתיישב בכפר סבא, שם חי עד מותו ב-1975. באותם הימים כפר סבא כללה אוכלוסייה דלה ומספר פרדסים, וישבה במרכזה של שממה. ספיר הצטרף לקבוצת עבודה בפרדסי האזור ובנוסף, מיד עם הגעתו ב-1930, שקד על הקמתו של בנק חיסכון קטן בראשותו, שצמח עם השנים. תחילת פעילותו הציבורית הייתה במוסדות מקומיים בכפר סבא. בתחילה היה פעיל במועצת הפועלים ביישוב, ובהמשך חבר המועצה המקומית. בכפר סבא עמד ספיר בראש מפעל המים. דרך מפעל המים העלה ספיר מס שהועבר למימון ארגון ההגנה. במקביל, הרבה ספיר להעביר הלוואות, דרך הבנק המקומי בראשותו, לפועלים מקומיים, במטרה שיבנו שכונות פועלים. ספיר התקדם בתחום המים, עבר למישור הארצי, התמנה למזכיר חברת המים "מקורות" עם הקמתה ושימש למעשה סגנו של לוי אשכול ב"מקורות" בין השנים 1937–1950. אשכול זיהה את כישוריו של ספיר על בסיס פעילותו בכפר סבא וקידם אותו לפעילות במישור הארצי. ב-1947 היה ספיר אמון על התשתית הגדולה ביותר של "מקורות" עד לאותה העת, בניית צינור העברת מים ממרכז הארץ דרומה ליישובי הנגב. על אופיו "הסוער והנאמן" של ספיר מספר שמחה בלאס, מתכנן המים של "מקורות": סתיו 1937. נשארו כמה קילומטרים צינורות מונחים על משענות ועדיין לא עברו את מיבחן הלחץ במים לפני הורדתם לתעלות. היה זה לפני עונת הגשמים, והייתה סכנה כי יישארו בחורף... ותידרש הוצאה כספית ניכרת... ספיר יצא ביום ראשון... התרוצץ מקטע לקטע, צעק עד לב השמיים, עשה 'טרור' למפקחים ולעובדים, וראה זה פלא! כאשר באתי ביום ששי... היו כל הצינורות אחרי מיבחן הלחץ, מונחים בתוך התעלות. [...] עם הורדת הקטע האחרון לאדמה התחיל גשם שוטף. ב-1947 התמנה למנהל "אגף האפסנאות" של ההגנה, וכהמשך ישיר לכך עסק במלחמת העצמאות בהעברת נשק. מינויו נעשה על רקע הנתק עם יישובי הנגב כתוצאה מהשתלטות של חיל המשלוח המצרי על הדרך לנגב, שהגיע עד לבית שמש וכבש את אשקלון. בין היתר רכש את הזחל"מים הראשונים שצה"ל עשה בהם שימוש במהלכה של המלחמה. את המשא ומתן על הסכם הרכש ביצע מז'נבה בשווייץ. עם זאת, שירת בחיל המשמר באזור כפר סבא. עם הקמת המדינה היה למנכ"ל משרד הביטחון (אוקטובר 1949 - נובמבר 1951). בעקבות דרישתו של דוד בן-גוריון, ראש הממשלה ושר הביטחון באותה העת, לעברת את שמו (כמו מיתר בכירי השירות הציבורי), בחר בשם "ספיר", שמקורו בשם משפחתה של אימו, ספירשטיין. לאחר הלאמת חברת האשלג של משה נובומייסקי מונה ספיר למנכ"ל החברה. מיולי 1953 עד דצמבר 1955 היה מנכ"ל משרד האוצר, תחת השר לוי אשכול. ספיר היה בין יוזמיה ומקימיה של אוניברסיטת תל אביב, עמד לימינה ודאג להקמתה, לביסוסה ולגידולה המהיר. התיק הראשון של ספיר כשר היה תיק המסחר והתעשייה (1955), ובמסגרתו שקד על פיתוח התעשייה בעיירות פיתוח ודאג להשיג תקציבים לבניית מפעלים ולפרויקטים לאומיים גדולים כגון המוביל הארצי. בשנת 1959 נבחר לכנסת הרביעית מטעם סיעת מפא"י, וכיהן בכנסת עד למותו בעת כהונתו בכנסת השמינית. בתפקידו כשר המסחר והתעשייה עמל ספיר על העברת הריכוז הממשלתי מתמיכה במגזר החקלאי לתמיכה במגזר התעשייתי הצומח. ספיר, אמנם איש הממסד המדיני הריכוזי ששלט באותה העת בכלכלת המדינה, העניק תמיכה ליזמים ותעשיינים פרטיים מבטיחים שהריצו את הכלכלה הישראלית קדימה, כגון סטף ורטהיימר. ספיר השקיע מאמצים בשכנוע משקיעים זרים לבנות מפעלים בישראל. דוגמה אחת לכך הייתה כאשר הזמין ב-1960 את התעשיין ישראל פולק לבוא לישראל ולהקים מפעל לטקסטיל. ספיר רצה למקם את המפעל בקריית גת – יישוב שזה אך הוקם, והיה זקוק לזריקת עידוד – אלא שחשש מכך שפולק יירתע מן העובדה שהיישוב מרוחק מגוש דן. כדי להגשים את חזונו הוא אסף את פולק במכוניתו בחמש לפנות בוקר ממלונו בתל אביב, וציווה על נהגו לנסוע בשיא המהירות לקריית גת. מאחר שהתנועה באותה שעה הייתה מאוד דלילה, ארכה הנסיעה פחות מחצי שעה, וכך השתכנע פולק להקים את המפעל, בהניחו שהוא ימוקם במרכז הארץ. בתחילת שנות השישים התפרסמה מחדש פרשת לבון, וראש הממשלה בן-גוריון פעל להדיח את שר הביטחון לשעבר, פנחס לבון, מכל משרותיו ותפקידיו המפלגתיים בשורות מפא"י. ספיר ולבון היו ידידים קרובים, וספיר האמין בצדקתו ובחפותו של לבון. על רקע הלחץ שהפעיל בן-גוריון כל בכירי מפא"י ישרו קו עם עמדתו, כולל שר האוצר אשכול. ספיר היה היחיד מקרב השרים שהתייצב לימינו של לבון והצהיר על תמיכתו בו לאורכה של הפרשה. ספיר כיהן בתפקיד שר המסחר והתעשייה בין השנים 1955–1965, ושב לכהן בתפקיד בין השנים 1970–1972. בחלק מן השנים (1963–1965, 1970–1972) כיהן ספיר כשר המסחר והתעשייה נוסף על תפקידו כשר האוצר. עם מינוי לוי אשכול כראש הממשלה ב-1963 נתמנה ספיר לתפקיד שר האוצר (משרד שהכיר מכהונתו בו כמנכ"ל בשנים 1953–1955), נוסף על תפקידו כשר התעשייה והמסחר. גם בתפקיד זה גילה מרץ בלתי נלאה כשהוא מעורב בכל פעולות העשייה של המשרד. בתפקיד זה כיהן ספיר עד מרץ 1974, למעט תקופה של כשנה ורבע (אוגוסט 1968 – דצמבר 1969), אז עזב את משרד האוצר כדי לשמש כמזכ"ל מפלגת העבודה, אך נשאר בממשלה כשר בלי תיק. בראשית כהונתו עסק ספיר בפיתוח המשק, אולם בהמשך התמודד עם המיתון שפרץ ב-1966. המיתון פרץ ממספר סיבות: סיום השילומים עם גרמניה; השלמת העבודות הציבוריות הגדולות כמו נמל אשדוד והמוביל הארצי; הפסקת גלי העלייה הגדולים; עלייה בצריכה הפרטית ללא עלייה מקבילה בתוצר. ב-14 בפברואר 1966 הוצג תקציב המדינה בכנסת (שנת התקציב בישראל התחילה בתקופה זו ב-1 באפריל), ובמהלך הישיבה הודיע ראש הממשלה לוי אשכול על המיתון באופן רשמי. הבעיות שעמדו על הפרק ערב הכניסה למיתון היו הגירעון הלאומי המצטבר, עליית השכר במשק והגדלת תקציב הביטחון הנדרשת. על מנת לפתור את הבעיות, יזמו אשכול וספיר מדיניות שכללה מחד העלאת מסים ומאידך קיצוץ בהוצאות הממשלה (ספיר הציג זאת בכנסת: ”הגענו למצב שבו חייבת הממשלה להשתמש בכלים שברשותה כדי שעליות השכר הגדולות לא יביאו לזעזועים קשים במשק”). צעדים נוספים שנקט ספיר במסגרת המיתון היו צמצום תקציבי הפיתוח, הפחתת אשראי וקיצוץ בייבוא חומרי גלם. מדיניות הריסון הכלכלי אמנם הצליחה לצמצם את הגירעון ולמנוע עליית אינפלציה, אך הכניסה את המשק הישראלי למיתון מלא, העלתה את האבטלה מ-3.5% ל-11.5%, הובילה לירידה בתוצר ובהשקעות, ולבסוף הורידה את רמת החיים. למרות ניסיונותיהם של ספיר ואשכול לטעון כי מדובר במשבר חולף ודבריו של ספיר כי "הניתוח אינו יכול שלא להכאיב", בעקבות המשבר נפגע מאוד אמון הציבור בממשלתו ובמיוחד בהנהגתו הכלכלית (אשכול, ספיר, משרד האוצר ובנק ישראל). בתקופת ההמתנה שלפני מלחמת ששת הימים החל המיתון להחריף, לאחר שרוב הגברים העובדים במשק גויסו, והפעילות הכלכלית השתתקה. לאחר מלחמת ששת הימים הייתה ישראל שרויה במצב חדש. השטח בשליטת מדינת ישראל הוכפל פי 4, והזדמנויות כלכליות חדשות עמדו בפני ממשלת ישראל: כריית נפט ומשאבים נוספים מחצי האי סיני; קרקע פורייה לחקלאות ברמת הגולן; פיתוח התיירות (בייחוד באתרים בעלי פוטנציאל תיירותי מובהק כמו אופירה בסיני, העיר העתיקה בירושלים, בית לחם בגדה המערבית והר חרמון ברמת הגולן). כמו כן המלחמה גררה אחריה עולים משכילים ואמידים מארצות מערביות מפותחות ומברית המועצות – לצד כמיליון ערבים בשטחים, שסיפקו משאב עבודה זמין וזול. במציאות החדשה, החליטה הממשלה להילחם במיתון על ידי הגדלת הגירעון התקציבי לטובת פיתוח המדינה. ספיר התנגד בתוקף לשלטון ישראלי בשטחים, וטען כי יש להיכנס למשא ומתן עם מדינות ערב, אך קיבל את הכרעות הממשלה והמנהיגים הבולטים בתקופה (לוי אשכול, גולדה מאיר, משה דיין ויגאל אלון) ושיתף פעולה עם המציאות הקיימת. כך הוא הוביל את המשק הישראלי לאחת מתקופות הגאות המוצלחות ביותר בתולדותיו, בין השנים 1967–1973. באוגוסט 1968, לאחר התפטרותה של גולדה מאיר מתפקיד מזכ"לית מפלגת העבודה הוא קיבל את בקשת הנהגת המפלגה למלא את התפקיד לכשנה, ולשם כך עזב את משרד האוצר, ונשאר כשר ללא תיק. עם כינונה של ממשלת גולדה השנייה בדצמבר 1969 חזר למשרד האוצר, וסיים את תפקידו כמזכ"ל המפלגה, אליו נבחר אריה אליאב. עם שובו למשרד בדצמבר 1969 (ולמעשה גם בעת היעדרו) נשמרה אותה מדיניות כלכלית. ספיר המשיך בתפקידו זה עד פרישתו מהחיים הפוליטיים ביוני 1974. עם התפטרותה של גולדה מאיר מראשות הממשלה בעקבות מסקנות ועדת אגרנט ב-1974, הוצע לספיר להתמנות לתפקיד הרם במקומה, אך הוא סירב. יש הטוענים שאילו ספיר היה רוצה בראשות הממשלה באותה תקופה, דבר לא היה מונע בעדו מלהשיגה. במקום זאת תמך ספיר ביצחק רבין במועמדותו לתפקיד, וסייע לו לזכות בפריימריז מפלגת העבודה נגד יריבו שמעון פרס. ספיר היה פטרונו של חבר הכנסת ואיש העסקים אברהם שפירא, בשנת 1959 העיירה אור עקיבא הייתה לאחד מיעדי הפיתוח של ספיר, והחליט ללחוץ על שפירא ואף לעזור לו לרכוש מפעל קטן שלימים יקרא "שטיחי כרמל". מאז קשרי השניים הלכו והתהדקו. ספיר מילא את תפקיד יו"ר הסוכנות היהודית משנת 1974 ועד יום מותו. נפטר מהתקף לב במהלך טקס הכנסת ספר תורה בבית הכנסת של יהודי קוצ'ין במושב נבטים בנגב, ב-12 באוגוסט 1975. משפחתו ספיר נישא לשושנה, הם התגוררו בכפר סבא ונולדו להם בן ושתי בנות. בשנת 1971 נפטרה רעייתו ממחלה ממארת. בנובמבר 1974 נשא ספיר בשנית את רבקה אלנתן, מזכירת ארגון אמהות עובדות בירושלים. נכדתו היא הסופרת והמוזיקאית מיכל ספיר, ואחייניו הם חתני פרס ישראל, הפיזיקאי שמואל שטריקמן והביוכימאי נתן שרון. הערכת פועלו ספיר נודע במהלך השנים במנהגו להתהלך עם פנקס שחור שעל פיו ניהל את מדיניותו; ברצותו לזרז את פיתוח הארץ, סייע רבות לבעלי הון שהשקיעו בישראל, במיוחד כאשר הבטיחו ליצור תעסוקה. על כך זכה לשבחים וכן לביקורת, על שהעשיר משקיעים, ובהם גם רמאים, גנבים ואנשים שהותירו חובות כבדים שהוטלו על המדינה. ספיר נחשב לאיש החזק בפוליטיקה הישראלית. מילא תפקיד מרכזי בחשיפת הפרטים על "העסק הביש" ועל פרשת לבון, אשר הביאו לבסוף להתפטרותו של דוד בן-גוריון, ובמשך תקופה מסוימת זכה לתואר "ממליך ראשי ממשלות". תדמיתו של ספיר בציבור הייתה של דמות עממית מחוספסת, טמפרמנטית, בולדוזר שמניע דברים, אשר נוטה לחסות על בעלי הון, אשר נעזרים בו להאדיר את הונם יותר – אך שמטרתו העליונה היא טובת החברה והכלכלה הישראלית, וטובת הנאה עצמית היא ממנו והלאה. הוא חי בדירה צנועה בכפר סבא, ובעת שהותו בירושלים בענייניו הוא חלק יחד עם פוליטיקאי חבר חדר שחולק על ידי מחיצה מבד. אי-יכולתו לבטא את האות "ל" כהגייתה בעברית (הוא ביטא אותה בדומה להגה Ł בפולנית), שבאה לידי ביטוי בנאומיו ובראיונותיו והייתה ל"סמל המסחרי" שלו, הפכה אותו לאובייקט משעשע אך רק הגבירה את הפופולריות שלו בציבור. רבים טוענים כי הוא היה הטוב מבין כל שרי האוצר בישראל, ורבים מאלה שזוכרים אותו מתגעגעים אליו ואל תקופתו ואל תנופת הפיתוח האדירה שאפיינה אותו. רבים אחרים מבקרים היבטים שונים של פעילותו הנמרצת, שאופיינה על ידי ניהול ריכוזי ואישי ("הפנקס השחור"), שאינו מתיישב עם כלכלת שוק, ועל העדפת חברי מפלגה בשירות הציבורי ובחברות ממשלתיות, הסתדרותיות ואחרות. נקראים על שמו המכללה האקדמית ספיר על יד שדרות, אתר ספיר של המוביל הארצי, פרס ספיר וקרן מפעל הפיס ע"ש פנחס ספיר, המרכז לפיתוח ע"ש פנחס ספיר ליד אוניברסיטת תל אביב, אזור התעשייה החדש בנתניה (קריית ספיר; פולג), שכונה י"א בבאר שבע הקרויה באופן רשמי על שמו, היכל התרבות בכפר סבא והקריה סביבו, בתי ספר באזורים שונים בארץ ועוד. לקריאה נוספת קישורים חיצוניים הערות שוליים שרים נוספים במשרד האוצר: מאיר שטרית • משולם נהרי • יצחק כהן • חמד עמאר • זאב אלקין |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bajaur_District] | [TOKENS: 4607] |
Contents Bajaur District Bajaur District (Pashto: باجوړ ولسوالۍ, Urdu: ضلع باجوڑ), formerly Bajaur Agency, is a district in the Malakand Division of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, Pakistan. Prior to 2018, Bajaur Agency was the northernmost component of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), a semi-autonomous region along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border. In May 2018, FATA was merged into the larger Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPK) in an attempt to bring stability to the region, redesignating Bajaur Agency to Bajaur District. The district lies on Pakistan's western border, sharing a 52 km border with Afghanistan's Kunar Province, and lies 35 mi (56 km) north of the Torkham border crossing linking Jalalabad and Peshawar. 498 square kilometer miles in size, Bajaur occupies a small mountain basin and is into seven tehsil (subdistricts) with its district headquarters in the town of Khar, in the district's center. According to the 2017 Pakistani census, Bajaur District has a population of 1,090,987. Geography Before the 2018 incorporation of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas' (FATA) tribal agencies into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPK), Bajaur Agency was both the northernmost and smallest of the seven tribal agencies, bordering the slightly larger Kurram Agency to its south. Bajaur is about 45 miles (72 km) long and 20 miles (32 km) wide. It lies at a high elevation to the east of the Kunar Valley of Afghanistan from which it is separated by a continuous line of rugged frontier hills. The old road from Afghanistan's Kabul to Pakistan went through Bajaur before a new pass, Khyber Pass, was constructed. To the south of Bajaur is the district of Mohmand. To the east, beyond the Panjkora River, are the hills of Swat District. On its east side, there is the district of Malakand, while on its northeast is an intervening watershed between Bajaur and Dir. Nawagai is the chief town of Bajaur; the Khan of Nawagai was previously under the British protection for the purpose of safeguarding of the Chitral road. [citation needed] An interesting feature in the topography is a mountain spur from the Kunar range. The drainage of Bajaur flows eastwards, starting from the eastern slopes of the dividing ridge, which overlooks the Kunar and terminating in the Panjkora river, so that the district lies on a slope tilting gradually downwards from the Kunar ridge to the Panjkora. Jandol, one of the northern valleys of Bajaur, has ceased to be of political importance since the 19th century, when a previous chief, Umra Khan, failed to appropriate himself Bajaur, Dir and a great part of the Kunar valley. It was the active hostility between the Amir of Kabul (who claimed sovereignty of the same districts) and Umra Khan that led, firstly to the demarcation agreement of 1893 which fixed the boundary of Afghanistan in Kunar; and, secondly, to the invasion of Chitral by Umra Khan (who was no party to the boundary settlement), and the siege of the Chitral fort in 1895. History The area was the site of the ancient Gandhara kingdom of Apraca from the 1st century BCE to the 1st century CE, and a stronghold of the Aspasioi, a western branch of the Ashvakas (q.v) of the Sanskrit texts who had earlier offered stubborn resistance to the Macedonian invader Alexander the Great in 326 BCE. The whole region came under Kushan control after the conquests of Kujula Kadphises during the first century CE. Alexander turned south from Aornus and continued march towards the Indus, but the greatest surprise during the march came when he neared the town of Nysa (former name of Bajaur). The local people and even the flora seemed strangely out of place in these mountains. The Nysains placed their dead in cedar coffin in the trees - some of which Alexander accidentally set on fire - and made wine from grapes, unlike other tribes in the area. The Acuphis, the chief man of the city, who has been sent to them along with other thirty leaders, begged him not to harm their towns as they were descendants of settlers that the god Dionysus placed their generation before. Their prolific ivy, a plant sacred to Dionysus that nowhere else in the mountain, was proof they were the people blessed by god. Then they were only commanded to give him 300 cavalry, after which he restored their freedom and allow them to live under their own laws, having made Acuphis governor of the city. Alexander took his son and grandson as hostages. He sacrificed there to Bacchus under this god's others name of Dionysus. The Bajaur casket, also called the Indravarma reliquary, year 63, or sometimes referred to as the Avaca inscription, is an ancient reliquary from the area of Bajaur in ancient Gandhara, in the present-day Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. It is dated to around 5-6 CE. It proves the involvement of the Scythian kings of the Apraca, in particular King Indravarman, in Buddhism. The casket is made of schist. In 1518, Babur had invested and conquered the fortress of Bajaur, The Gabar-Kot from Sultan Mir Haider Ali Gabari the Jahangirian Sultan and gone on to conquer Bhera on the river Jhelum, a little beyond the salt ranges. Babur claimed these areas as his own, because they had been part of Taimur's empire. Hence, "picturing as our own the countries once occupied by the Turks", he ordered that "there was to be no overrunning or plundering [of the countryside]". It may be noted that this applied to areas which did not offer resistance, because earlier, at Bajaur, where the Pashtun tribesmen had resisted, he had ordered a general massacre, with their women and children being made captive. Babur justifies this massacre by saying, "the Bajauris were rebels and at enmity with the people of Islam, and as, by heathenish and hostile customs prevailing in their midst, the very name of Islam was rooted out...". As the Bajauris were rebels and inimical to the people of Islam, the men were subjected to a general massacre and their wives and children were made captive. At a guess, more than 3,000 men met their death. We entered the fort and inspected it. On the walls, in houses, streets and alleys, the dead lay, in what numbers! Those walking around had to jump over the corpses.[a] From late 1585 into 1586, forces of the Mughal army led by Zain Khan Koka, at the direction of the Mughal emperor Akbar the Great, waged a military campaign to subdue the Yusufzai tribes of Bajaur and Swat. The Mughal operation, which culminated in the Battle of the Malandari Pass resulted in an Afghan victory and a military embarrassment for Akbar. Bajaur was a princely state run by the Nawab of Khar. The last and most prominent Nawab was Abdul Subhan Khan, who ruled until 1990. During the Soviet invasion in the 1980s, the area was a critical staging ground for Afghan and local mujahideen to organise and conduct raids. It still hosts a large population of Afghan refugees sympathetic to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a mujahideen leader ideologically close to the Arab militants. Today,[when?] the United States believes militants based in Bajaur launch frequent attacks on American and Afghan troops in Afghanistan. Counterterrorism An aerial attack, executed by the United States targeting Ayman al-Zawahiri, took place in a village in Bajaur Agency on January 13, 2006, killing 18 people. Al-Zawahiri was not found among the dead and the incident led to severe outrage in the area.[citation needed] On October 30, 2006, 80 people were killed in Bajaur when Pakistani forces attacked a religious school they said was being used as a militant training camp. There are many unconfirmed reports that the October attack was also carried out by the United States or NATO forces, but was claimed by Islamabad over fears of widespread protest similar to those after the US bombing in January 2006. Maulana Liaqat, the head of the seminary, was killed in the attack.[citation needed] Liaqat was a senior leader of the pro-Taliban movement Tanzim Nifaz Shariat Mohammadi (TNSM), that spearheaded a violent Islamic movement in Bajaur and the neighbouring Malakand areas in 1994. The TNSM had led some 5,000 men from the Pakistani areas of Dir, Swat and Bajaur across the Mamund border into Afghanistan in October 2001, to fight US-led troops.[citation needed] In what is thought to be a reprisal for the October strike in Bajaur, in November, a suicide bomber killed dozens in an attack on an army training school in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. Loi sum is on a strategic location, road come from four sides, (khar, Nawagi, Tangai and Inzari), so approach was easy from Charmang and Ambar. That was the reason that this area was affected mostly. A military offensive by the military of Pakistan (FC and Leaves) was launched in early 8 August 2008 to retake the border crossing near the town of Loi-Sum, 12 km from khar from militants loyal to Tehrik-e-Taliban, the so-called Pakistani Taliban. In the two weeks following the initial battle, government forces pulled back to Khar and initiated aerial bombing and artillery barrages on presumed militant positions, which reportedly has all but depopulated Bajaur and parts of neighbouring Mohmand Agency, with an estimated 300,000 fleeing their homes. The estimate of casualties ran into the hundreds. The offensive was launched in the wake of Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani's visit to Washington in late July, and is believed by some to be in response to U.S. demands that Pakistan prevent the FATA being used as a safe haven by insurgents fighting American and NATO troops in Afghanistan. However, the offensive was decided by the military, not the civilian government. The bloody bombing of Pakistan Ordnance Factories in Wah on August 21, 2008, came according to Maulvi Omar, a spokesman for the Pakistani Taliban, as a response to the Bajaur offensive. after a few weeks, the Pak army came to battlefield. In an initial way toward the Loi sum Taliban did not resist and let them to come to middle position, when they reach to Rashakai, (3–4 km from Loi sum) Taliban started to attack them but the Army was far stronger than their expectation. For several weeks they stayed in Rashakai, then 1st attempt Army come to loi sum, stay for whole day and come back to Rashakai, In 2nd attempt was the same, and 3rd attempt they come to loi sum and took the control of the area. Army continues there journey, control the main road of Bajaur from Khar to Nawagi, and the peripheral areas were still in the hold of Taliban. After nine months of vigorous clashes between government security forces and Taliban, military forces have finally claimed to have forced militants out of Bajaur Agency, and advanced towards strongholds of Taliban in the region. According to figures provided by the Government of Pakistan, 1,600 militants were killed and more than 2,000 injured, while some 150 civilians also died and about 2,000 were injured in the fighting. The military operation forced more than 300,000 people to flee their homes and take shelter in IDP camps in settled districts of the province. To date, more than 180,000 IDPs have returned to their homes in Bajaur Agency, facing widespread destruction to their lives, livelihoods and massive unemployment. In August, 2012, the Pakistani Army de-listed Bajaur as conflict zone. From 2008 through 2010, Al Jazeera English produced multiple features of the ongoing conflict between Pakistani military forces and Taliban militants in the agency. In early 2013, VICE News founder Shane Smith accompanied and documented a raid on suspected Taliban fighters by the Pakistani Frontier Corps' Bajaur Scouts in Bajaur Agency. As of March 2024, the Islamic State's Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) maintains an operational presence in Bajaur, conducting 4 attacks in 2021, 21 attacks in 2022, and 18 in 2023. The majority of ISIS-K attacks in Bajaur occur in Mamond tehsil, followed by Inayat Kali, Salarzo, and Khar tehsils. Administrative divisions Bajaur District is currently subdivided into seven tehsils (sub-districts). (km²) (2023) (ppl/km²) (2023) (2023) Demographics As of the 2023 census, Bajaur district has 181,699 households and a population of 1,287,960. The district has a sex ratio of 102.14 males to 100 females and a literacy rate of 26.26%: 39.89% for males and 12.29% for females. 466,054 (36.32% of the surveyed population) are under 10 years of age. The entire population lives in rural areas. Bajaur District is 99.91% Pakistani with a relatively small population of inhabitants identifying as of a non-Pakistani nationality. Bajaur is inhabited near exclusively by Tarkanri (Mamund, Kakazai, Wur and Salarzai) Pashtuns, as well as a smaller population of Utmankhel, Wazir, Safi, and Yousafzai tribes. Gurjar and Swatis are also present. The Utmankhel are at the southeast of Bajaur, while Mamund are at the southwest, and the Tarkalanri are at the north of Bajaur. Its border with Afghanistan's Kunar province makes it of strategic importance to Pakistan and the region. The mother tongue of the majority of Bajauris are expectedly 99.85% Pashto, reflective of the indigenous Pashtun (also 'Pakthtun') population that inhabits much of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK, for which the province derives its name) and eastern Afghanistan. Other residents are first-language Urdu speakers, the national language of Pakistan, while relatively small numbers are native Balochi, Sindhi, Kashmiri, Saraiki, Brahvi (Brahui), and Punjabi speakers. Bajaur District is nearly entirely Muslim. Governance and politics Constituents of Bajaur District are politically represented locally through elected union councils, town governments, and tehsil governments. The district government includes a deputy commissioner, additional deputy commissioner, two assistant commissioners, tehsildars (heads of tehsil), district agricultural officer, district educational officer, medical superintendent, district coordination officer, assistant director for local government, and district population welfare officer. At the provincial level, constituents are represented by the Provincial Assembly of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, an elected unicameral legislature of 145 seats in the provincial capital of Peshawar, with 115 general seats, 26 reserved for women, and 4 reserved for non-Muslims. The 8 February 2024 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa provincial election, based on the results of a 2023 digital census, granted Bajaur District a fourth seat in the Provincial Assembly. A PTI candidate for the new PK-22 Bajaur-IV constituency election, Rehan Zeb Khan, was shot and killed by an ISIS-K attacker while in his car in a market in Bajaur District, leading to the postponement of that constituency's election, as well as in NA-8. A PTI candidate for the NA-8 constituency election, Rehan Zeb Khan, was shot and killed by an ISIS-K attacker while in his car in a market in Bajaur District, leading to the postponement of that constituency's election, as well as in NA-8. Education In Bajaur, the total number of SSC-level schools registered with Malakand Board are 150 (61 government-run, 89 private-run). The number of HSSC-level colleges are 56 (18 government-run, 38 private-run). In district school education rank of Pakistan, the position of is going downward, according to the Alif Ailaan ranking, the rank of Bajaur in 2014, 2015 and 2016 is the following Tourism Bajaur is located near swat and District Dir, so the climates of these districts are comparatively same. Koh-i-Mor is the highest peak in Bajaur. It is also called three peak mountain. Its top is covered with snow in winter and clouds are touching its peak. The peak of Koh-i-Mor is visible from the Peshawar valley when there is no clouds or haze. It is an historical mountain, its history is found 2000 year back, here at the foot of the Koh-i-Mor mountain, that Alexander the Great founded the ancient city of Nysa and the Nysaean colony, traditionally said to have been founded by Dionysus. The Koh-i-Mor has been identified as the Meros of Arrian's history — the three-peaked mountain from which the god issued. For hiking, like Jahaz Banda and Fairy meadow, Koh-i-Mor is the best, it is about 4 hours trekking non-local and 2,5 for locals. On the way you will see a lot of variation. In some places you will pass through thick forest of fine trees, some places have shrubs, and some place you will see some different kinds of trees. People are living in Koh-i-Mor up-to near the top. These people have simple houses with a single room, there is no extra boundary wall. Rooms are made like caves in mountain. Majority of them are shepherds. At the base of Koh-i-Mor a lot of chenar trees along with spring. Locals people are coming here and enjoy the nature, making their own cooking, some have load speakers, music, etc. majority people come along with their families. It is situated in Tehsil Salarzai, it has snowy water, people are come from all over the Bajaur and DIR to enjoy it especially in Ramadan and Eids. It is a historically spring, once here was a undefeated king .... The Charmang hills in Bajaur are covered with pine trees and also the roads is made up to top of hill.[citation needed] The road goes on top of hill from bottom to top. In winter, the whole mountain is covered with snow for months.[citation needed] Raghagan Dam is situated in Tehsil Salarzai. It a tourist spot nowadays. Boats are present here for tourists. Economy Bajaur is a semi-independent in agriculture field, The soil is fertile but the no proper irrigation system. Harvest Crops; People grow wheat, maze and rices in some areas. All the crops is mainly dependent on rain. Vegetable and Fruits; The different types of vegetables are growing in Bajaur. Potato, tomato, onion, lady fingers, spinach, and orange parsimon, etc Marbles are found in various regions, mainly in Inzari and Nawagai. There are different types of marble supper white, Badle etc. In the local areas are marble factories, cut to into different sizes of the base of demand, and supply to all over the country and even abroad. The marble cutting factories are found in Shaikh kali and Umary. The supply to the factories of marble mainly from the local mountains and they also bring the marble from ambar and Zairat. These different types and variety of marble then supply all over the country Nephrite (jade) is the precious stone, Rs 3000–5000 per kg. The mines are found in Inzari and some area in Utmankhail tehsil. It exports mainly to China, The Chinese thought so too, and for thousands of years, nephrite articles had a special value and signature and skilled artisans carved increasingly intricate designs. Maybe because it was so rare in China, yet useful for its toughness, nephrite became the status symbol of the rulers, considered imperial stone. The KPK government has started olive production projects in the Bajaur district. Previously, many wild olive trees are present in the area having no such importance. They use agricultural techniques to convert these wild trees into more farmer friendly and productive plants. With new projects of planting olive trees on more than 150000 acres of land, the Bajaur district will be the olive hub of Pakistan. Moreover, the district administration has installed olive oil extraction machine for locals. this machine started producing olive oil this year. More than 200 kg of oil has been extracted which is just a beginning. In coming years you will see huge transformation. These projects will change the fate and economical status of the district. The locals will have more new employment opportunities cause reduction in unemployment in the tribal area. Gallery See also Notes References References |
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Contents Logan Paul Women's Mid 20th century (1950−1969) 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s−2020s Late 20th century (1975−1999) 2000s 2010s 2020s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s 2020s Logan Alexander Paul (born April 1, 1995) is an American influencer, professional wrestler, entrepreneur, boxer, and actor. As a wrestler, he is signed to WWE, where he performs on the Raw brand and is a member of The Vision stable. He is a former WWE United States Champion. He has over 23 million subscribers on his YouTube channel Logan Paul Vlogs and has ranked on the Forbes list for the highest-paid YouTube creators in 2017, 2018, and 2021. He is the co-founder of beverage company Prime and snack brand Lunchly. Paul has also run the Impaulsive podcast since November 2018, which has over four million YouTube subscribers. In December 2025, Paul was appointed General Partner of the venture capital firm Anti Fund, which was co-founded by his brother Jake Paul. In 2013, Paul gained a following by posting sketches on the now-defunct video-sharing application Vine. He registered his first YouTube channel, TheOfficialLoganPaul, on October 18, 2013, where he started posting regularly following the closure of the Vine app. He later created the Logan Paul Vlogs channel on August 29, 2015, which has since become his most-subscribed YouTube channel. As of August 2023, the channel has received 23.6 million subscribers and almost 6 billion views. As an actor, Paul's television and film work includes guest appearances on Law & Order: Special Victims Unit and Bizaardvark, and roles in films The Thinning (2016) and The Thinning: New World Order (2018). He has also explored other avenues; he released his debut single "2016" in 2016, and fought English media personality KSI in a white-collar boxing match in 2018. The bout ended in a majority draw. In the 2019 rematch, which was a professional bout, KSI won by split decision. In 2023, Paul won his first professional boxing match when he defeated Dillon Danis via disqualification. Paul also transitioned to exhibition boxing in 2021, fighting Floyd Mayweather Jr. in a non-scored bout. After a couple of brief appearances in WWE in 2021, he made his professional wrestling debut as The Miz's tag team partner in a tag team match at WrestleMania 38 in April 2022, which they won and Paul received praise for his performance. He then signed a contract with WWE in June that year and later won the WWE United States Championship in November 2023. He adopted the WWE nickname the Maverick, which is a reference to his clothing line and his media company.[citation needed] Paul has been involved in several controversies, most notably in relation to a trip to Japan in December 2017, during which he visited the Aokigahara forest (a notorious suicide site), filmed himself finding the corpse of a suicide victim, and uploaded the footage to his YouTube channel. Others include his promotion of scams and failed ventures, including CryptoZoo—in which he failed to compensate more than $1.5 million to investors despite promising to do so. Early life Logan Alexander Paul was born in Westlake, Ohio, on April 1, 1995, to Pamela Ann Stepnick (née Meredith) and realtor Gregory Allan Paul.[better source needed] He claims Irish, Welsh, Jewish, French and German ancestry. He was raised in Westlake with his younger brother Jake (born 1997), who is also a media personality. Paul began creating videos for a YouTube channel called Zoosh when he was 10 years old. He attended Westlake High School, being named The Plain Dealer's All-Star football linebacker in 2012, and qualifying for the state-level Ohio High School Athletic Association 2013 Division I Wrestling Individual Championships. YouTube career By the time Paul began attending college, his YouTube channel had attained a modest following via the platform Vine. He took classes in industrial engineering at Ohio University before dropping out in 2014 to pursue a career as a full-time social media entertainer in Los Angeles, moving into an apartment complex in the city with other Vine stars. Paul rose to fame as a member on the Internet video sharing service Vine. In February 2014, he had over 3.1 million followers on various social media platforms. By April 2014, he had attained 105,000 Twitter followers, 361,000 Instagram followers, 31,000 likes on his Facebook page and about 150,000 subscribers to his YouTube channel. A YouTube compilation video of his Vine work garnered more than four million views the first week it was posted. In 2015 he was ranked as the 10th most influential figure on Vine, with his six-second videos earning him hundreds of thousands of dollars in advertising revenue. By that October, his Facebook videos alone had more than 300 million views. Logan refers to his following as the "Logang", a portmanteau of "Logan" and "gang". In early 2015, Paul appeared on Law & Order: Special Victims Unit. He also appeared on the Fox TV series Weird Loners, where he appeared in the role of the Paul Twins. He starred in two episodes of the Freeform series Stitchers. In 2016, he starred in the YouTube Red movie The Thinning opposite Peyton List. In early 2016, Paul trained with drama coaches and the comedy troupes The Groundlings and Upright Citizens Brigade. Paul wrote the screenplay for an adult comedy, Airplane Mode, which has been described as "American Pie for Gen Z", and by Paul himself as "Expendables with Internet stars". The film was originally planned to be released in 2017, but was eventually released on August 2, 2019, after being delayed. He was also involved in a number of advertising campaigns, including for Hanes, PepsiCo, and HBO. In 2016, Comcast purchased a short form digital TV series from Paul called Logan Paul VS. In February 2017, Dwayne Johnson released a YouTube video entitled "Logan Paul has been cut from, like, all of The Rock's movies", in which he informs Paul that he has been cut from all of Johnson's films, and subsequently consoles him by making him the "ambassador" to his upcoming Baywatch feature film. On November 23, 2017, Paul released his new single, "No Handlebars", a track that draws heavily on an interpolated sample of the song "Handlebars" by the American alternative hip hop group Flobots. The song was heavily criticized for its perceived sexual objectification of women, including a scene in its music video where Paul rides several women like a bicycle. Flobots frontman Jamie Laurie lambasted Paul for both the "sexist" lyrical content of the song and for unauthorized use of the sample, calling him the face of "douchebag entitlement". Laurie would later go on to release a track with lyrics deriding Paul, titled "Handle Your Bars". Paul did not respond to Laurie's comments nor the backlash towards "No Handlebars". After Flobots sued Paul for copyright infringement in 2019, he deleted the song from YouTube. On December 31, 2017, Paul uploaded a vlog to his YouTube channel depicting the corpse of a recently-deceased man who had died by hanging himself in Aokigahara at the base of Mount Fuji in Japan, known as the "suicide forest" due to its infamy as a suicide site. Initially intended to be part three of his "Tokyo Adventures" series, Paul and his group had planned to camp in the woods, but in response to finding the corpse, decided to notify the authorities and cancel their plans. The video gained 6.3 million views within 24 hours of being uploaded. Paul's video depicting the corpse, whose face was censored, and his group's reactions to it, were criticized by celebrities and politicians. In addition, he was accused by other members of the YouTube community of being insensitive to suicide victims. He was also criticized for other misbehavior he was captured taking part in during the trip, including climbing onto a moving forklift truck at the Tsukiji fish market, removing his clothing on a crowded street and then proceeding to fight with one of his traveling companions, and throwing a giant Poké Ball plush toy at passing citizens, including an officer of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department. Several petitions were posted to Change.org urging YouTube to delete Paul's channel in light of the controversy, the largest of which received more than 720,000 signatures as of February 9, 2018. As a result of the backlash, Paul removed the video from his YouTube channel, following up with a written apology on Twitter on January 1, 2018. The following day, on January 2, a subsequent video apology was released to YouTube in which Paul admitted to making "a severe and continuous lapse in [his] judgement" and described his behavior as a "coping mechanism", asking his fans to stop defending his actions in the process. On January 9, YouTube issued a statement via Twitter condemning Paul's video: "It's taken us a long time to respond, but we've been listening to everything you've been saying. We know that the actions of one creator can affect the entire community, so we'll have more to share soon on steps we're taking to ensure a video like this is never circulated again." On January 10, YouTube announced it was removing Paul's channels from Google Preferred, its preferred ad program, and New World Order, the sequel to his YouTube film The Thinning, was placed on hold, with the airing of Logan Paul VS. being halted as well. He was also cut from season 4 of the YouTube Red series Foursome and the role of Alec Fixler was terminated. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer postponed the release of the film Valley Girl, featuring Paul, following the controversies. On January 15, Paul was seen at LAX by reporters from TMZ. He said that he has learned a lot from his mistakes and believes he has been treated "fairly". When asked whether he deserves a second chance, Paul replied, "Everyone deserves second chances, bro." In response, he donated $1 million to suicide prevention agencies, a quarter of which is going to the National Suicide Prevention Lifeline. In response to the controversy, Paul hired Mike Majlak, a former marketing manager at furniture company LoveSac, to "make sure that no bad things happen" and work with Logan to help improve his reputation. On February 4, Paul officially returned to his daily vlogs on YouTube after taking a 3-week-long hiatus. YouTube CEO Susan Wojcicki said on February 12 that Paul did not violate YouTube's three-strike policy and did not meet the criteria for being banned from the platform. In the wake of the controversy regarding the suicide video, Maverick Apparel, a brand for juniors and children, threatened Paul with legal action for giving his clothing line a similar name ("Maverick by Logan Paul"), believing shoppers are confusing their line with Paul's, resulting in a deep decline in sales. On February 9, 2018, YouTube suspended all advertising on Paul's channels due to his "pattern of behavior", referring to a joke he tweeted about the Tide Pod challenge, removing a fish from his pond to "jokingly give it CPR", and tasering two dead rats. His revenue was temporarily halted as a result, and as a result of the suspension, he broadcast live on Twitch for the first time. Two weeks later, on February 26, YouTube restored ads on Paul's channel; however, his channel was still on a 90-day "probation period" during which time content from his channel was not eligible to be on YouTube's trending tab. On November 20, 2018, the first episode of Paul's Impaulsive podcast was aired. In January 2019, Paul remarked on the podcast, "What is it, male-only March? We're gonna attempt to go gay for just one month." He received widespread criticism for implying that being gay is a choice, with LGBTQ+ organization GLAAD responding to Paul's statement on Twitter, writing, "That's not how it works, Logan Paul." In March 2019, Paul released what has been described as a mockumentary exploring the Flat Earth Theory. In the video, he interviewed many self-proclaimed "Flat Earthers", and spoke at the 2018 Flat Earth International Conference, which took place in Denver, Colorado. Logan Paul was sued by Planeless Pictures in December 2020 for the aforementioned 2017 incident in Aokigahara, when he posted a video including a recently deceased suicide victim. Planeless Pictures accused him of posting the video in order to escape a movie deal he had with them where he would star in, write, and produce their film Airplane Mode. They also claimed that the video led to Google suspending their contract with them, leaving them $3 million in debt. In 2021, Paul competed on the fifth season of The Masked Singer as "Grandpa Monster". He was unmasked after his second appearance where one of his clues was a foreshadowing of his boxing match against Floyd Mayweather Jr. In September 2021, Paul released an NFT-based game called CryptoZoo, which was mocked for using stock images and was poorly received. In December 2022, YouTuber Coffeezilla released a docuseries exposing the game's lack of functionality despite substantial funding. Criticisms included marketing towards children and pre-launch cryptocurrency purchases by the team. Paul disputed these allegations, threatened legal action against Coffeezilla, and later deleted his response video. In January 2023, Paul apologized and promised a $1.3 million refund for NFT holders. By February 2023, Paul faced a class-action lawsuit from investors. A refund program began in January 2024, where Paul offered refunds to those agreeing not to sue, and he also filed a counter-claim against co-defendants. In June 2024, Paul decided to sue Coffeezilla for defamation, despite his earlier apologies. Coffeezilla responded that the lawsuit was filed in response to him asking Paul for a new investigation into Liquid Marketplace, a company co-owned by Paul and being accused of multi-layered fraud by Canadian authorities. Paul was criticized in January 2023 when his former pet pig, named "Pearl", was found abandoned by The Gentle Barn Sanctuary in California, USA. Rescuers said she was "lucky to be alive" after being diagnosed with a potentially life-threatening uterus infection, which they said has since healed. Despite facing online criticism, Paul denied any wrongdoing, stating that he responsibly re-homed the pig in 2021 when he moved to Puerto Rico, and that the pig was subsequently re-homed again unbeknownst to him at a later date. In August 2024, the BBC, wanting to cover Paul's cryptocurrency controversies, was asked to fly into Puerto Rico in the middle of Hurricane Ernesto, and instead of Paul turning up at his gym for the interview, a lookalike came instead. This was followed by a crowd which shouted abuse at the BBC. The BBC then received a letter from Paul's lawyer, who warned the BBC not to publish what they had found. Leading up to the 2024 presidential election, then-former president Donald Trump appeared on the Impaulsive podcast for a 45-minute interview with Paul. Boxing career On February 3, 2018, following his white collar amateur boxing match with Joe Weller, British YouTuber KSI challenged Paul to a boxing match. On February 24, 2018, it was announced that Paul and his brother would be fighting KSI and his younger brother, Deji, in two white-collar boxing matches. The fight ended as a majority draw, with two judges scoring the fight even at 57–57 and a third judge scoring 58–57 in favor of KSI. On September 4, 2019, it was announced that Paul would be making his professional boxing debut in a rematch against KSI, which would be broadcast exclusively on DAZN in the United States. The fight was scheduled to take place on November 9 at the Staples Center. At the UK press conference for the rematch, Paul again stirred controversy as he accused KSI of having five abortions, before remarking, "Five babies dead. I might return the favor and kill you." He received criticism from abortion rights activists, who described his comment as "horrific", while anti-abortion activists came to his defense. Paul responded by stating, "I said something distasteful and insensitive." The rematch, which consisted of six three minute rounds, resulted in a win for KSI via split decision, with two judges scoring the fight 57–54 and 56–55 for KSI, and one judge scoring it 56–55 in favor of Paul. On December 6, 2020, it was announced that Paul would face former five-division world champion Floyd Mayweather Jr. in an exhibition bout on February 20, 2021. The fight was postponed, and took place on June 6, 2021, at Hard Rock Stadium in Miami Gardens, Florida. On May 6, 2021, Mayweather and Paul met for the first time at a press conference at Hard Rock Stadium, where the latter's brother, Jake Paul, became involved in an angry brawl with Mayweather when he removed Mayweather's hat from his head. A visibly irate Mayweather was captured on video saying, "I'll kill you motherfucker! Are you crazy? I'll fuck you up, motherfucker. I don't play motherfucking games. I'll fuck you up." The bout consisted of constant clinching initiated by Paul and went the full distance to the sound of boos from the crowd, with no winner being announced. Mayweather's superior boxing was reflected by the CompuBox punch stats, with Mayweather having landed 43 punches of 107 thrown (40.2%), compared to Paul's 28 landed of 217 thrown (12.9%). In his post-fight interview, Mayweather praised his opponent, saying: "He's better than I thought he was ... he's a tough, rough competitor." Paul appeared to harbor some doubt about how seriously Mayweather had taken the fight, saying: "I'm going to go home thinking, 'Did Floyd let me survive?'" Mayweather later stated that he did hold back saying "If it was a real fight, it would've been a blowout in the first round." On July 28, 2023, it was announced that Paul and KSI would both headline MF & DAZN: X Series 10 – The Prime Card on October 14 at Manchester Arena in Manchester, England. On 31 July, it was announced that KSI would face professional boxer Tommy Fury; on August 8, it was announced that Paul would face American mixed martial artist Dillon Danis. Danis repeatedly shared pictures of Paul's fiancée Nina Agdal with other men and sometimes partially or fully nude during the build-up to the fight, and he was served with a lawsuit as a result. The bout ended in the sixth round when Danis attempted a takedown and an illegal choke. Several members of security entered the ring and a brawl broke out, resulting in Danis being disqualified and Paul was declared the winner. Professional wrestling career On the April 2, 2021 episode of SmackDown, Paul made his WWE debut as a guest of Sami Zayn for his red carpet premiere of his documentary, with Zayn later inviting Paul to be at ringside for his match at WrestleMania 37 against Kevin Owens. On Night 2 of WrestleMania 37, after Owens defeated Zayn, Paul celebrated with Owens before being hit with the Stunner by Owens. On the September 3 episode of SmackDown, Paul made his return as Happy Corbin's special guest on '"The KO Show'", where Paul helped Corbin attack Owens, establishing himself as a heel. On April 2, 2022, on Night 1 of WrestleMania 38, Paul made his in-ring debut, teaming with The Miz to defeat The Mysterios. After the match, Miz attacked Paul, turning Paul face. On June 30, 2022, Paul signed a multi-event contract with WWE. Following this, Paul wanted to avenge the attack from Miz at WrestleMania 38 and subsequently defeated him at SummerSlam. Paul then challenged Roman Reigns on the September 16 episode of SmackDown, and the two faced each other at Crown Jewel for Reigns' Undisputed WWE Universal Championship. Paul was unsuccessful in defeating Reigns, despite interference from his Impaulsive entourage and his brother Jake. The match against Reigns received universal acclaim, with critics highly praising Paul's wrestling skills. It was initially reported that Paul had suffered a torn meniscus, MCL, and ACL during the match, however, it was later revealed that Paul had only sprained his meniscus and MCL. On January 28, 2023, Paul made his return from injury at the Royal Rumble in the Royal Rumble match at #29. During the match, Paul had an encounter with Ricochet that led to both men leaping off the top rope from both sides of the ring, and colliding with each other mid-air. The spot garnered a massive crowd and social media reaction, with many deeming it one of the best moments of the match. He would go on to eliminate Seth "Freakin" Rollins before being eliminated by the eventual winner Cody Rhodes. At Elimination Chamber on February 18, Paul snuck into the Elimination Chamber match and cost Rollins the United States Championship, thus turning heel. On Night 1 of WrestleMania 39, Paul lost to Rollins; the match also saw an appearance from Paul's Prime co-owner KSI, who was dressed as a Prime bottle. Like his match against Reigns the year prior, the match received high praise from critics, and initially, it was the final match of Paul's initial contract. However, a week later, Paul signed a new multi-year contract with WWE. The new contract would see more involvement and appearances from Paul with Paul himself stating he wanted to win a championship. In the 2023 WWE Draft in late April–early May, Paul was deemed a free agent, allowing him to appear on both Raw and SmackDown. Paul then made his first appearance since Night 1 of WrestleMania 39 on the June 19, 2023, episode of Raw, where he announced that he had been added to the men's Money in the Bank ladder match, which took place at the namesake event. During the match, in which Paul was unsuccessful at winning, Paul and Ricochet would botch a Spanish fly from the top rope. This led to a match at SummerSlam, where Paul defeated Ricochet after using brass knuckles. On October 14, 2023, after defeating Dillon Danis in a boxing match at MF & DAZN: X Series 10 – The Prime Card, Paul called out United States Champion Rey Mysterio. After Mysterio accepted Paul's challenge for a title match at Crown Jewel, Paul won the United States Championship at Crown Jewel, after using brass knuckles on Mysterio, thus winning his first professional wrestling championship. Paul made his first appearance as champion on the December 1 episode of SmackDown, where he announced a tournament to determine his first challenger at the Royal Rumble, which was won by Kevin Owens. During the match at the Royal Rumble on January 27, 2024, Austin Theory and Grayson Waller gave Paul brass knuckles to use on Owens, only for Owens to use them on Paul instead. However, the referee caught Owens with the brass knuckles in his hand, giving Paul the victory by disqualification to retain the title. On the February 16 episode of SmackDown, Paul defeated The Miz in his first televised match in WWE to qualify for the men's Elimination Chamber match at Elimination Chamber: Perth. At the event, he was eliminated by Randy Orton but later returned to hit him with brass knuckles, costing him the match. On Night 2 of WrestleMania XL, Paul successfully defended the United States Championship against Kevin Owens and Randy Orton in a triple threat match after an assist by IShowSpeed. On the May 10 episode of SmackDown, SmackDown General Manager Nick Aldis announced that Paul would be the next opponent against Undisputed WWE Champion Cody Rhodes and a Champion vs. Champion match was scheduled for King and Queen of the Ring. On the following episode, during the contract signing for the match, the contract stated that the match would be for both titles. However, when Paul was about to sign the contract, he tore it up, before bringing out his own contract, which stated that only Rhodes' title would be on the line. After Paul mocked Rhodes, he signed the contract, confirming that the match would only be for Rhodes' title. At the event on May 25, Paul failed to win the title from Rhodes after interference from special guest ring announcer Ibrahim Al Hajjaj. At SummerSlam on August 3, Paul lost the title to LA Knight, ending his reign at 273 days. On December 18, as part of a special kickoff stream celebrating WWE's streaming launch with Netflix, Paul was announced as joining the Raw brand, where he expressed desire in becoming a WWE Champion. On February 1, 2025, at Royal Rumble, Paul entered the namesake match as the 30th entrant, eliminating AJ Styles and CM Punk before getting eliminated by John Cena. On the February 10 episode of Raw, Paul defeated Rey Mysterio to qualify for the men's Elimination Chamber match at Elimination Chamber: Toronto. At the event, he was eliminated by Punk. On Night 2 of WrestleMania 41, Paul defeated Styles. On May 24 at Saturday Night's Main Event XXXIX, Paul unsuccessfully challenged Jey Uso for the World Heavyweight Championship. On June 7 at Money in the Bank, Paul teamed with Cena, losing to Uso and Cody Rhodes. After Money in the Bank, Paul formed an alliance with Drew McIntyre, teaming with him on Night 1 of SummerSlam on August 2 to defeat Randy Orton and Jelly Roll in a tag team match. On August 31 at Clash in Paris, Paul lost to Cena. On the November 3, 2025 episode of Raw, Paul confronted new World Heavyweight Champion CM Punk before being caught in a brawl involving The Vision (Bron Breakker and Bronson Reed). Later that night, Punk and Jey Uso faced Breakker and Reed in a match that ended in a double count-out. After the bout, The Vision attacked Uso. Paul then returned to the ring appearing to assist Punk, but instead struck Punk with his brass knuckles and handed them to Paul Heyman, revealing his alignment with the group. On November 29, Paul's team was victorious in the men's WarGames match at Survivor Series: WarGames. On the following episode of Raw, Paul officially joined The Vision. At the Royal Rumble on January 31, 2026, Paul entered the match at #20 being eliminated by eventual winner Roman Reigns. Personal life In October 2015, Paul lived in the same apartment complex on Hollywood and Vine in Hollywood, California as other social media celebrities including Amanda Cerny, Juanpa Zurita, and Andrew Bachelor, with his roommates Mark Dohner and Evan Eckenrode. This proximity facilitated various collaborations on their respective videos. In October 2017, Paul and Eckenrode relocated to an estate in Encino, California. In a 2020 episode of Impaulsive, Paul described himself as a Christian who was "not overly religious". In February 2021, Paul announced that he would be moving to Dorado, Puerto Rico from Los Angeles. He stated that the high taxes in California were the main motivator for the move. As of June 2021, he was renting a $13 million mansion there for $55,000 a month. From 2016 to early 2017, Paul dated influencer Amanda Cerny. He then had an on and off relationship with actress Chloe Bennet, with whom he was photographed making out in Hawaii on a break from filming their movie, Valley Girl, in July 2017. The two officially broke up in October 2018. Paul and Josie Canseco started dating in January 2020 and broke up in November 2020. Besides, Logan was romantically linked with America's Next Top Model contestant Jessica Serfaty in 2015, influencer Alissa Violet in 2017, actress and model Olga Safari from late 2017 to early 2018, and actress Corinna Kopf in 2019. Paul began a relationship with Danish model Nina Agdal in 2022. They announced their engagement on July 9, 2023. On April 15, 2024, Paul revealed that he and Agdal were expecting their first child, a daughter born in September 2024. They were married on August 15, 2025, in Lake Como, Italy, the location of their engagement. Paul said in an episode of Impaulsive that he tore the cartilage in his knee playing football, requiring him to stay out of school for 3 months. In February 2019, Paul said that he has long-term brain damage, which he sustained from playing high school football. He stated that Daniel Amen, the doctor who diagnosed him, says it affects his ability to have empathy and a human connection with others. When filming a video for his Vine channel in 2014, Paul attempted a stunt during which he landed on a chair and damaged his right testicle. Boxing record Pay-per-view bouts Filmography Discography Championships and accomplishments Awards and nominations References External links |
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Contents Colombian peace process The Colombian peace process refers to the negotiations between the Government of Colombia under President Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC–EP) aimed at ending the decades-long Colombian conflict. These talks culminated in the Final Peace Agreement between the Government of Colombia and the FARC-EP. Formal negotiations began in September 2012 and were primarily held in Havana, Cuba. On August 24, 2016, negotiators announced a final agreement to end the conflict and build a lasting peace. President Santos and FARC commander-in-chief Rodrigo Londoño, also known as Timoleón Jiménez or Timochenko, publicly signed the first peace accord. Londoño had assumed leadership of the FARC in 2011 following the death of Guillermo León Sáenz (Alfonso Cano). Both leaders, along with other participants, wore white in a symbolic gesture of peace during the signing ceremony. At the event, Londoño issued a public apology, stating: “We are being reborn to launch a new era of reconciliation and of building peace.” The ceremony was witnessed by nearly one million Colombians and covered by hundreds of news outlets. However, the agreement was narrowly rejected in a national referendum held on October 2, 2016, with 50.2% voting against and 49.8% in favor. Sergio Jaramillo Caro, former Vice Minister of Human Rights and International Affairs, led the government’s negotiating team. Reflecting on the process, he stated: “All the hard work of six years was hanging by a thread. We went back to what had worked for us—a robust methodology and a capacity to engage.” A revised peace agreement was signed on November 24, 2016, and instead of holding another referendum, the government submitted it to the Congress of Colombia for ratification. Both houses of Congress ratified the new agreement on November 29 and 30, officially ending the conflict. Background The Colombian armed conflict is one of the longest-running ongoing armed conflicts in the world. It officially began in 1964 with the creation of two major guerrilla groups: the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, FARC), founded by rebel leader Manuel Marulanda, and the National Liberation Army (Colombia) (Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN), which was later led by Spanish priest Manuel Pérez Martínez, also known as El Cura Pérez. The ELN has been classified as a terrorist organization by the governments of Colombia, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and the European Union. In 1990 and 1991, several smaller guerrilla groups reached peace agreements with the Colombian government, leading to their demobilization and reintegration into civilian political life. The first to do so was the 19th of April Movement (M-19), which disarmed in exchange for a blanket amnesty. Other groups that followed similar paths included most fronts of the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) and the Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame (MAQL). However, efforts to reach a peace agreement with the FARC were consistently unsuccessful. The most notable attempt prior to the 2012 process occurred between 1999 and 2002, during the presidency of Andrés Pastrana Arango. Pastrana granted the FARC a special demilitarized zone to facilitate talks, but despite three years of negotiations, no agreement was reached. On February 20, 2002, Pastrana ended the peace process and ordered the military to retake control of the zone, just months before the 2002 presidential elections. During the process, the FARC had used the demilitarized area to hold hostages, negotiate prisoner exchanges, train fighters, and plan military operations.: 167–169 This failed peace process coincided with an escalation in violence, driven in part by the rapid expansion of right-wing paramilitary groups such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), who opposed negotiations with guerrillas. Between 1998 and 2002, Colombia experienced some of its most violent years in recent history: the national homicide rate rose from 58.9 to 69.7 per 100,000 inhabitants, there were over 3,000 kidnappings annually, 390 attacks on civilian settlements (mostly by the FARC), and 898 massacres—primarily carried out by paramilitaries—resulting in more than 5,400 deaths. Widespread public disillusionment with the peace process contributed to the election of Álvaro Uribe in 2002. Uribe ran on a hardline platform that rejected dialogue without a prior cessation of hostilities. As president, he implemented the democratic security (seguridad democrática) policy, reframing the conflict as a war on terrorism and drug trafficking. His administration pledged to “implacably punish” terrorism, dismantle armed groups, and reestablish state control across the country. Complementing this approach, Uribe launched collective and individual demobilization programs that offered pardons for political crimes and assistance to those who laid down arms. These efforts, along with the controversial Justice and Peace Law of 2005, provided the legal framework for the demobilization of paramilitary groups between 2003 and 2006. As the FARC rejected President Uribe’s new security policies, the Colombian government launched a large-scale military, political, and judicial offensive against the guerrilla group. While this strategy significantly weakened the FARC's military capabilities, it was also accompanied by serious human rights violations committed by the armed forces, most notably the "false positives" case.: 178–179 The government’s offensive forced the FARC to retreat into remote rural areas and produced key results: the recovery of control over major highways, a sharp decrease in kidnappings, a reduction in the national homicide rate, and the restoration of state authority in several regions.: 180 These achievements, widely publicized in national media, contributed to Uribe’s high approval ratings and provided the political momentum needed to pass a constitutional amendment allowing his reelection in 2006. While government forces regained territory previously held by the guerrillas in the 1980s and 1990s, the FARC adapted by relocating and reactivating their operations in new strategic and border regions.: 181 They also carried out attacks in urban areas, such as the El Nogal Club bombing, and launched a counteroffensive in 2005. During his second term, Uribe prioritized the consolidation of democratic security. Between 2006 and 2010, the military dealt several heavy blows to the FARC, including the first successful operations targeting members of the group’s high command. In March 2008, FARC leader Raúl Reyes was killed in a controversial cross-border raid into Ecuador, triggering a regional diplomatic crisis. Just two months later, the group's historic founder, Manuel Marulanda, died of natural causes. Amid these setbacks, the FARC attempted to regain political initiative by proposing a humanitarian exchange of hostages. In August 2007, facing public pressure, Uribe agreed to allow Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to mediate. However, Uribe terminated Chávez’s role in November 2007. Subsequent hostage releases were carried out unilaterally by the FARC—with Venezuelan facilitation, as in Operation Emmanuel—or through military rescue operations, most notably Operation Jaque. Although no formal peace negotiations with the FARC were initiated during President Álvaro Uribe’s administration, there were reports of clandestine contacts between the government and the guerrilla group. In 2012, as the new peace process was underway, El Tiempo reported that Uribe had pursued "secret approaches with the FARC in search of a peace process" up until the final months of his second term. In 2013, former Swiss mediator Jean Pierre Gontard revealed that, in 2006, Uribe had authorized three brief, unilateral military ceasefires to facilitate contact between the two parties. In July 2008, following the successful rescue of 15 hostages by the Colombian military during Operation Jaque, the government initiated discreet contacts with the FARC. These included outreach to the group's new commander, Alfonso Cano, offering the possibility of a “dignified” exit from the conflict. Toward the end of President Uribe’s second term, in January 2010, the then-High Commissioner for Peace, Frank Pearl, informed U.S. Ambassador William Brownfield that he had established informal channels of communication with the FARC. The goal was to build mutual confidence and develop a roadmap for the incoming administration. According to a U.S. diplomatic cable from February 2010, intermediaries were preparing a direct meeting between government representatives and FARC officials in Sweden. Despite these efforts, Uribe remained skeptical about the possibility of a negotiated settlement. In a meeting with United States Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg in February 2009, Uribe reportedly stated that the FARC “would never negotiate as long as it enjoyed a safe haven in Venezuela coupled with a steady income from drug trafficking.” Ultimately, the informal rapprochements were cut short in April 2010, when the FARC returned the remains of Colonel Julián Guevara, who had been held hostage for 12 years. The gesture, rather than opening space for dialogue, effectively marked the breakdown of exploratory efforts. Although the FARC was not militarily defeated, President Uribe significantly weakened its operational capacity and inflicted major losses on its ranks. In 2002, the group had an estimated 20,700 combatants, a number that had dropped to just over 8,000 by 2010. During the same period, attacks on civilian settlements, acts of terrorism, kidnappings, and homicides decreased markedly. According to the Colombian government's 2010–2014 National Development Plan, the FARC had been forced to revert to basic guerrilla warfare tactics, carrying out sporadic, uncoordinated attacks against security forces and using intimidation against civilians. In 2010, former Minister of Defense Juan Manuel Santos was elected president with Uribe’s endorsement, campaigning on a platform that promised to continue consolidating democratic security. In September of that year, Santos celebrated the death of FARC military commander Mono Jojoy in a targeted military operation, calling it the most significant blow against the group in its history.: 194 Nonetheless, President Santos soon began to distance himself from his predecessor. In his inaugural speech, he stated that the “door to dialogue” was not “locked with a key,” signaling openness to talks with illegal armed groups under certain conditions. In 2011, his administration secured congressional approval for the landmark Victims and Land Restitution Law (Law 1448 of 2011), which formally recognized victims of the armed conflict and granted reparation rights, including land restitution. Santos also worked to restore diplomatic relations with neighboring Venezuela and Ecuador, which had deteriorated under Uribe. As ties improved, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez shifted his position on the conflict and began advocating for a peaceful, negotiated solution—joining Cuba as a key external supporter of dialogue. This diplomatic realignment further isolated the FARC internationally and reduced external support for its armed struggle to historic lows. Peace process A number of secret exploratory meetings between representatives of the Colombian government and the FARC began taking place in the spring of 2011. The FARC report that the first of such meetings took place in March 2011 near the Colombian-Venezuelan border, with the guerrillas represented by Rodrigo Granda (the FARC's main international representative) and Andrés París (a veteran political theorist and negotiator) and the government by presidential advisers Alejandro Eder and Jaime Avendaño. Two further meetings took place by July, where both parties agreed to continue exploratory meetings in Havana, Cuba. These first contacts were meant to settle the details of where, how and when the next stage of the process – secret encounters to set an agenda for talks – would be held. In July 2011, the government appointed senior officials to participate in the process: Frank Pearl, serving as environment minister; Sergio Jaramillo Caro, national security adviser to the president; and President Santos' brother Enrique Santos, former director of El Tiempo. For the magazine Semana, Enrique Santos' inclusion was a 'gesture of confidence' by President Santos to the guerrilla, because of the familial ties between the two men and Enrique Santos' past involvement in dialogues with the guerrilla. The FARC negotiating team was joined by Mauricio Jaramillo and Marcos Calarcá. Secret negotiations continued despite the death of Alfonso Cano, the FARC leader, in a military operation in November 2011. Semana reported that both negotiating parties had agreed to the principle that nothing coming from the outside could influence the discussions, while the FARC states that its Central High Command had decided to continue the exploratory meetings, "for it was the will of Alfonso Cano." Once the negotiators had been agreed upon, the two sides moved to designate foreign guarantor countries. Cuba, host to previous encounters, was a logical choice, while Norway was chosen as the second guarantor country for its active role in international conflict mediation. Additionally, two facilitator or 'accompanying countries' were also designated. The FARC chose Venezuela, while the Colombian government chose Chile. Exploratory meetings continued in Havana in February 2012, with limited social exchanges between the two negotiating teams to preserve the confidentiality of the talks. By August 2012, nearly ten preparatory rounds had taken place, with each round lasting between four and eight days for a total of approximately 65 encounters between both sides. The five main speakers for both sides remained in Cuba for the duration of the process. In February 2012, as a first public 'gesture of peace', the FARC announced by communiqué that it would henceforth proscribe the practice of extortive kidnappings, which it had 'legalized' by its ley 002 in 2000. In August 2012, former President Álvaro Uribe, who had become the leading critic of Santos' administration, affirmed that the government was negotiating with the FARC in the Cuba; claims which were denied by defence minister Juan Carlos Pinzón and María Ángela Holguín, who was serving as Colombia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, was instrumental in managing Colombia’s diplomatic engagement with guarantor countries, particularly Cuba and Norway. Holguín also worked to defuse early criticisms of the negotiations and provided critical political support to President Santos’ strategy. Scholars and activists such as María Emma Wills, a prominent political scientist and advisor to Colombia's National Center for Historical Memory(NCHM), played a key role in shaping the evolving discourse on victims’ rights and gender inclusion in the peace process. Wills' work laid the groundwork for the eventual incorporation of a Gender Sub-Commission in the formal peace negotiations, which ensured that issues like sexual violence, women’s political participation, and reparations were explicitly addressed in the final accord. Her academic and policy contributions helped push the peace process beyond traditional security and political concerns, centering human dignity, justice, and inclusion as core principles. In a televised address on September 4, Santos announced the signature of a 'general agreement' setting the rules and agenda for peace negotiations. He stressed that "past mistakes will not be repeated" by not demilitarizing any territory, not suspending military operations and by holding the peace negotiations outside of Colombia with international support. A General Agreement for the Termination of the Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace (Acuerdo General para la terminación del conflicto y la construcción de una paz estable y duradera) was signed by representatives of the Colombian government and the FARC on August 26, 2012, in Havana, Cuba. The agreement set a road map for the initiation of a formal peace process, established the rules by which the negotiations would operate, and outlined a five-point thematic agenda. The six thematic issues to be discussed are integral rural development, political participation, end of the conflict (including bilateral and definite ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, and surrender of weapons), solution to the problem of illicit drugs and victims; and ratification, implementation and verification. As per the agreement, each delegation is composed of up to 30 people, with up to 10 participating in sessions and five being plenipotentiaries. The discussions at the negotiation table are private, but periodic reports are issued, and a mechanism to receive proposals from individuals and organizations was set up. One of the major principles of the negotiations has been that 'nothing is agreed upon until everything is agreed upon'. Compared to past peace processes, the current peace process began with a defined agenda with a limited number of issues to be discussed. In addition, it was the first peace process with the FARC where the 'end of the conflict' and the surrender of weapons by the guerrilla were explicitly listed and identified as the end goal. The delegation of the Colombian government is led by former vice president Humberto de la Calle as chief negotiator, flanked by the High Commissioner for Peace Sergio Jaramillo as well as Frank Pearl, business leader Luis Carlos Villegas, Enrique Santos Calderón, Alejandro Éder, retired general of the National Police Óscar Naranjo and retired Army general Jorge Enrique Mora. The FARC delegation is led by Iván Márquez as chief negotiator, alongside Jesús Santrich, Rodrigo Granda, Andrés París, Marcos Calarcá, Mauricio Jaramillo, Pablo Catatumbo, Tanja Nijmeijer and Simón Trinidad (currently in jail in the United States). The peace talks were formally installed in Oslo, Norway, on October 18, 2012, and moved to their permanent location in Havana in November. FARC chief negotiator Iván Márquez's speech at the installation of dialogues in Oslo in October was interpreted by the Colombian media as unexpectedly radical for its defiant tone against the government, mentioning items excluded from the agenda (economic model, foreign investment, military doctrine, mining, land ownership) and defending the armed struggle. On November 20, 2012, the FARC announced a unilateral temporary ceasefire until January 20, 2013. The guerrilla announced it as "a solid contribution to strengthening the climate of understanding necessary for the parties to start dialogue and to achieve the purpose all Colombians ask for." The peace process received the support of prominent left-wing governments in Latin America. President Hugo Chávez, in one of his last statements in October 2012, aspired to see the FARC joining a peaceful political process. Rafael Correa, the President of Ecuador, endorsed the peace process as an opportune moment for the FARC to lay down their weapons. Bolivian President Evo Morales, in December 2012, said that the FARC needed to "exchange bullets for votes." While discussions advanced on the first item on the agenda (integral rural development), the peace process faced its first major crisis at the end of January 2013 following the kidnapping of two police officers by the FARC in the Valle del Cauca on January 25. The incident was followed by a FARC ambush which killed four soldiers in the Nariño Department on January 31, and the assassination of another three police officers in La Guajira Department on February 1. The FARC claimed that these actions were in retaliation for a military bombing that left 20 guerrillas dead during the FARC's unilateral ceasefire, which came to an end on January 20. Government negotiators in Havana argued that such actions undermined the peace process. In bringing the war to the negotiating table, both sides broke their previous understanding not to let events of the conflict affect the process, and the dispute escalated into a war of words between the two parties. The government, pressed by former President Uribe's fiery opposition to the peace process, sternly warned the FARC that it would respond in kind and would not be pressured into discussing a bilateral ceasefire, as demanded by the FARC. Despite these difficulties, negotiations on the first item continued. In March, a delegation of six members of Congress travelled to Havana to meet with the FARC negotiators and the encounter was described as productive and respectful. Senator Roy Barreras (Partido de la U) declared that the peace process was moving forward, to stages never reached in prior peace processes. On May 26, both sides announced a partial agreement on the first point, comprehensive rural reform. The agreement focused on the issues of land access and use, unproductive land, property titles, rural development, infrastructure, social development in rural regions, agricultural and livestock production, technical assistance, subsidies and credits, food and nutritional policies. Notwithstanding these advances, a new major point of difference between the government and the FARC emerged: the latter's insistence on a Constituent assembly to implement the results of a final agreement. For the guerrilla, a constituent assembly was the only way to change the political regime and reform political institutions, but the government maintained its steadfast opposition to the idea for the risks entailed by changing the Constitution. Several members of the government, led by chief negotiator Humberto de la Calle, made clear the government's opposition to a constituent assembly. To ratify a final agreement, the government proposed instead an existing form of citizen participation – a popular consultation, referendum or plebiscite. In August 2013, the government presented a bill organizing constitutional referendums necessary for implementation of the final agreement, hoping to hold it alongside the 2014 congressional elections (in March) or the presidential election (in May), which would require the signature of a final agreement by the end of 2013. The FARC, pushing for a constituent assembly, opposed the government's short time frame to close negotiations and announced a 'pause' in talks. Although talks eventually continued, frustration with the slow pace of the process and the approaching 2014 electoral campaigns led to media speculation about the possibility of talks being suspended or even broken off. The peace process was given a boost with the announcement on November 6 of a partial agreement on the second point of the agenda, political participation (with the issue of the constituent assembly unresolved). The FARC announced a second unilateral temporary ceasefire on December 15, 2013, valid through January 14, 2014. In 2013, the Colombian peace process received widespread support from the international community and world leaders, including former U.S. President Bill Clinton, former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Portuguese President Aníbal Cavaco Silva and German President Joachim Gauck. In February 2014, the negotiations were rocked by revelations, made by Semana, that a military intelligence unit had illegally monitored the private communications of government negotiators in Havana. President Juan Manuel Santos declared the illegal interceptions 'unacceptable' and ordered a public investigation to determine if 'dark forces' were trying to sabotage the peace process. Within days, two generals including the head of military intelligence were dismissed and the attorney general's office began investigations. A partial agreement on another point of the agenda, illicit drugs, was reached on May 16, 2014. The developments in Havana were, however, overshadowed by the campaigns for the congressional elections (March 9) and the two-round presidential election (May 25 and June 15). Former President Álvaro Uribe, the leading opponent to the peace process, had founded his own party, the Democratic Centre (Centro Democrático, CD) and led his party's list for Senate in March. The party's Uribe-led list won over 2 million votes and 20 seats, forming a solid opposition bloc in the new legislature, although parties supportive of the peace process retained majorities in both houses of Congress. The peace process became one of the main issues in the presidential race, with the promise of peace forming the basis of President Santos' reelection campaign while Uribe's Democratic Centre candidate Óscar Iván Zuluaga opposed the peace process. Zuluaga had said that he would suspend the peace negotiations until the FARC agreed to a permanent, verifiable unilateral ceasefire within 8 days, conditions judged to be realistically impossible. Additionally, Zuluaga claimed that there was no armed conflict but rather a 'terrorist threat' and asserted that issues such as agrarian reform and illicit drugs could not be decided with the FARC, "the main drug cartel in the world". Promising instead 'peace without impunity', Zuluaga said he was disposed to reduced jail sentences for those who had committed crimes against humanity but with political eligibility limited only to guerrilla fighters, not commanders. In the first round, Zuluaga did well with a first-place finish (29.28%) ahead of President Santos (25.72%). In his second round campaign, the incumbent president doubled down on the issue of peace, presenting the election as a choice between peace or endless war, and successfully put together a broad coalition for peace with endorsements from the left and centre-left, including that of Clara López, the first round candidate of the left-wing Alternative Democratic Pole (15.21%), but also his 2010 rival Antanas Mockus and the left-wing Mayor of Bogotá Gustavo Petro. Zuluaga was endorsed by Marta Lucía Ramírez, the first round candidate of the Conservative Party (15.52%). As a result of his alliance with Ramírez, Zuluaga moderated his position on the peace process, agreeing to continue negotiations under certain conditions – an evaluation of what had been agreed upon and "tangible signs of peace" from the guerrilla. Santos was reelected in June with 51% against 45% for Zuluaga. The FARC declared two unilateral temporary ceasefires during the first and second rounds of the presidential election, between May 20 and 28 and again between June 9 and 30. In August, the first meeting between 12 victims of the conflict and the negotiators took place in Havana, an event hailed as a highly symbolic solemn exchange between the victims face-to-face with their victimizers. In a joint communiqué for the occasion, both sides reiterated that victims were at the core of the agreement. The second victims' delegation was received in September. Notwithstanding these encounters, victims of the FARC feeling that they had not been sufficiently taken into account organized a forum to have their voices taken into account. The forum brought together both opponents and supporters of the peace process. Beginning in July, a series of attacks by the FARC hit civilian populations particularly badly – bombings destroying electric pylons left Buenaventura without electricity, bombings on roads and water conduits cut off municipalities in the Meta and Guaviare from running water or communication for several days, a grenade attack by the FARC against a police officer killed his 3-year-old daughter while in the Putumayo the guerrillas forced tanker trucks to spill the crude oil they were carrying. President Santos warned the FARC that they were playing with fire, and that negotiations could not continue forever under such actions. On their side, the FARC threatened to leave the negotiation table if the government continued killing their commanders. The FARC also escalated their rhetoric, with Pablo Catatumbo blaming the state for the bulk of the victims of the conflict and justifying kidnappings, while the FARC's leader Timochenko complained in a statement that the media was making excessive demands on the guerrillas to face their victims and seek forgiveness. Despite these incidents, in Havana negotiations continued moving forward, with the creation of an historical commission on the conflict and its victims, an agreement to begin parallel discussions on the 'end of the conflict' item and the installation of a sub-commission on gender issues. In late September, President Santos announced at the United Nations General Assembly that the government had decided to make public the agreements reached up till that point in Havana – including the joint drafts of the partial agreements on comprehensive rural reform, illicit drugs and political participation. The government said it was a transparency measure to end speculation and rumours about the contents of the agreements with the guerrillas. On November 16, the FARC kidnapped General Rubén Darío Alzate, the commander of the Joint Task Force Titán; Alzate was the first general to be captured by the guerrillas in the history of the armed conflict. President Santos ordered government negotiators not to travel to Havana until the hostages were released, while the FARC mostly highlighted the political implications of the kidnapping and used it to insist on the need for a bilateral ceasefire. Through mediation, facilitated by the guarantor countries and the International Red Cross, General Alzate was released by his FARC captors on November 30 and handed over to representatives of the Red Cross. As a result of General Alzate's kidnapping, both parties in Havana began talks on de-escalation of the conflict on December 12. On December 17, the FARC announced in a statement that they would be declaring an indefinite unilateral ceasefire beginning on December 20, which would end if guerrilla fronts were attacked by the authorities. This was the FARC's fifth unilateral ceasefire since 2012, and the first indefinite one. Between January and April 2015, peace negotiations in Havana showed signs of continued progress and growing international support. On February 20, United States Secretary of State John Kerry announced the appointment of a special envoy to the Colombian peace process, Bernard Aronson. The appointment was welcomed, including by the FARC, and interpreted as a clear endorsement of Colombia's peace process by the United States, long a key foreign player in the Colombian conflict. On February 27, former United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan visited the negotiating table in Havana. On March 7, the negotiating parties in Cuba announced through joint communiqué the creation of a mine clearance pilot project, to clean and decontaminate land from the presence of anti-personnel mines, improvised explosive devices and unexploded ordnances with the leadership and coordination of the Norwegian People's Aid. The announcement was significant, as the FARC undertook to reveal the location of mines and suspending the planting of new ones in that territory, and it was the first aspect of the peace negotiations which would have an immediate impact on the ground. The pilot project was launched in the municipality of Briceño, Antioquia. On March 10, in a televised statement, President Santos recognized that the FARC had kept their word on the unilateral ceasefire and, as a gesture to de-escalate the conflict, ordered the Ministry of Defence and military commanders to cease the bombing of FARC camps for a month. 11 soldiers were killed in a FARC ambush in the Cauca on April 15, a crisis which threatened the future of the peace process and left many bewildered as to the reasons why the FARC had seemingly sabotaged the de-escalation process. The FARC negotiators in Havana justified the attack saying that the army had been advancing with reinforcements against a guerrilla camp, and denounced 'premeditated attacks' by the military but deplored the loss of life and reiterated their demands for a bilateral ceasefire. President Santos responded immediately by ordering bombings to resume. Within the government, the idea of imposing a deadline for an agreement grew in popularity, supported by Vice President Germán Vargas Lleras and even by strong supporters of the peace process like senator Horacio Serpa and interior minister Juan Fernando Cristo. President Santos also mentioned the idea in a speech on April 17. The death of the 11 soldiers turned public opinion against the peace process and boosted the popularity of its main opponent, Álvaro Uribe. In an Ipsos poll, Santos' approval fell from 40% to 29% compared to November 2014, pessimism in the peace process increased 16 points to 69% during the same period and former President Uribe's favourable image increased from 41% to 57%. Nevertheless, only 27% of respondents in the poll wanted to break off dialogues and launch a military offensive. For a skeptical public, the FARC's attack was a sign that their ceasefire had been deceitful and only heightened frustration with a peace process which had recorded no formal agreement since May 2014. However, according to the Conflict analysis resource centre (Cerac), the attack on the soldiers was the only severe violation of the ceasefire, given that the FARC had generally complied with their ceasefire up to that point, resulting in the lowest levels of violence in the conflict since 1984. As a retaliation for the attack in the Cauca, a military operation in Guapi, Cauca killed 26 guerrillas of the FARC's 29th front on May 22. Days later, guerrilla commander and general staff member Román Ruiz was killed in the Chocó. The FARC called off their unilateral ceasefire declared in December 2014. Although it had been agreed upon that negotiations would take place in the midst of continued conflict, the end of the FARC's unilateral ceasefire was seen as putting the peace process in a critical moment which would lead to its end if not handled cautiously. Combined with President Santos' historically low popularity, the negotiations' loss of credibility and the strength of Uribe's opposition to the peace progress, the Havana talks appeared to be in dire straits. The crisis worried Cuba and Norway, the two guarantor countries, who called on the two sides to continue efforts at a negotiated settlement including an agreement on a definite bilateral ceasefire. The government shuffled its negotiating team in Havana. Luis Carlos Villegas was appointed Minister of Defence and left the negotiating team, replacing Juan Carlos Pinzón who was sent as ambassador to the United States. Foreign minister María Ángela Holguín was integrated into the negotiating team, as was Gonzalo Restrepo, former president of the Grupo Éxito. Following the end of the ceasefire, both sides made small gestures of peace, with Santos ordering that the bodies of guerrillas killed in combat be identified and returned to their families while the FARC reiterated their will to remain in the negotiations. A technical sub-commission for the end of the conflict began discussions about confidence-building measures, while the mine clearance pilot project began in Briceño (Antioquia), with Humberto de la Calle highlighting the historic nature of the military and the FARC working alongside one another. The FARC's negotiators in Havana and their leader, Timochenko, adopted a conciliatory tone. Analysts opined that the talks had reached a point of maturity where both sides appreciated their common objective and jointly protect what has been accomplished. On June 4, the negotiating sides created a commission for the clarification of truth, coexistence and non-repetition – the basis for an extrajudicial truth commission on the victims of the conflict. In Colombia, however, a wave of attacks by the FARC in June seemed to undo the progress made in Havana. Sabotage to energy infrastructure left Buenaventura and Tumaco without electricity, 13,000 barrels of oil were spilled in Putumayo, a power pylon in Caquetá was bombed and a police colonel was assassinated in Ipiales. These attacks left over one million people without electricity, and the attacks against oil infrastructure created an environmental catastrophe. With these actions, the FARC had sought to regain the military initiative after the hits they suffered from the military in May and put political pressure on the government, but analysts judged that the guerrilla had miscalculated as it had further reduced their credibility in the eyes of the public. Cuba and Norway, the guarantor countries, placed pressure on both sides to begin de-escalating the conflict. The FARC responded, on July 8, by announcing a one-month unilateral ceasefire from July 20 (it has since been declared indefinite), and adding that they fully remained behind the peace process. Consideration of a bilateral ceasefire remained a more difficult question. On July 12, the government and the FARC negotiators in a joint communiqué entitled "Expedite in Havana and de-escalate in Colombia" announced a major agreement to de-escalate the conflict. Each delegation agreed to move towards a final agreement without delay by changing the format (to "a technical, ongoing and simultaneous work on the core items of the Agenda, while concurrently building agreements at the Table"), in particular on the terms of the final bilateral ceasefire, cessation of hostilities and surrender of weapons. Without agreeing to an immediate bilateral ceasefire, the government set in motion a de-escalation process of military actions consistent with the FARC's suspension of all offensive actions. In August, despite the unpopularity of the move, Santos ordered the suspension of bombings against the FARC. On September 23, the government and the FARC reached an historic agreement on transitional justice (Special Jurisdiction of Peace or Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz). Adding to the historic nature of the agreement, President Juan Manuel Santos and FARC commander Timoleón Jiménez "Timochenko" travelled to Havana for the announcement, the first public encounter between a sitting President of Colombia and the commander of the FARC. The presidential delegation included the President of the Congress and Senate Luis Fernando Velasco, the President of the Chamber of Representatives Alfredo Deluque, senator and Liberal leader Horacio Serpa, senator Antonio Navarro Wolff (himself a demobilized guerrilla from the M-19) and senator Iván Cepeda as well as Juan Carlos Henao and Manuel José Cepeda, former judges of the Constitutional Court who had played a major role in working out the agreement. The meeting ended with an unscripted handshake between President Santos and Timochenko, overlooked by Cuban President Raúl Castro. Simultaneously with the agreement, the government also announced that a final agreement would be signed within six months, or by March 23, 2016. The agreement on transitional justice was the result of lengthy discussions between government and guerrilla lawyers in Havana and Bogotá, which had begun in July working under Santos' ultimatum to reach such an agreement by November at the latest. Facing an impasse in Havana, the negotiators delegated the file to a group of six respected jurists – Spanish lawyer Enrique Santiago, Conservative politician Álvaro Leyva, human rights advocate Diego Martínez, former judge Manuel José Cepeda, University of Notre Dame professor Douglass Cassel and rector of the Universidad Externado de Colombia Juan Carlos Henao; the first three selected by the FARC, the latter three by the government. By September, the team of six had a text ready to be announced in Havana. The September 23 agreement on transitional justice was considered the most important moment in the peace process to date, because it resolved one of the most complicated issues through a formula satisfactory to both the guerrilla and the government, combining restorative justice with alternative sentences for guerrillas and agents of the State who have committed crimes against humanity with amnesty for those responsible of political crimes. With the agreement, the peace process was considered to be 'irreversible'. The announcement received acclaim internationally. Secretary of State John Kerry effusively praised the agreement, with his words even being relayed by FARC chief negotiator Iván Marquez's Twitter account. Fatou Bensouda, prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, "noted with optimism that the agreement excludes the granting of amnesties for war crimes and crimes against humanity and is designed, among other things, to end immunity for the most serious crimes." However, Human Rights Watch criticized the agreement, saying that it would exempt those responsible for the worst abuses from spending even a single day in jail, a view shared in Colombia by Álvaro Uribe. In Colombia, the announcement was greeted with cautious optimism. An Ipsos poll in October showed optimism in the peace process increasing from 29% to 46% since July, although majorities of respondents continued to doubt the FARC's commitment to peace and oppose their political participation. In mid-October, the negotiators announced immediate humanitarian measures for the search, location, identification and delivery of the remains of missing persons and the creation of a search unit for disappeared persons. The six-month window given to reach an agreement already appeared difficult to meet in November, due to delays in closing the transitional justice issue which became paralyzed despite the September 23 announcements because of different interpretations on thorny details between the two sides. On December 15, the final agreement on the fifth item of the agenda (victims), which includes transitional justice, was finally announced by the negotiating parties in Cuba. It built on the truth commission, the September 23 agreement on the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, as well as the October announcements on the search unit for disappeared persons. Disagreements between the government and the FARC continued on the mechanism for ratification of a final agreement. In November, the government gave its support to a bill submitted by senator Roy Barreras (Partido de la U) organizing a plebiscite on a final agreement. In Havana, the FARC responded negatively to the idea of the plebiscite, insisting on a constituent assembly. With the support of the government's congressional majority, the bill regulating the plebiscite was adopted by Congress in December 2015. As per the statutory law regulating the plebiscite, approval requires support equivalent to 13% of the registered electorate for the winning option, a one-time exception to the existing law regulating plebiscites (Law 1757 of 2015) which has a turnout quorum of 50%. The reduction of the quorum, and the change from a turnout threshold to a decision threshold, was controversial. Additionally, in the plebiscite voters would vote on the final agreement as a whole rather than article-by-article, something which also created some criticisms, primarily from Uribe's Democratic Centre. Following its adoption by Congress, the law passed to the Constitutional Court for a mandatory revision. Another significant step towards achieving a final agreement was made on January 19, with the announcement of a trilateral mechanism for the verification and monitoring of a final ceasefire, cessation of hostilities and surrender of weapons composed of the government, the FARC and a political mission of the United Nations composed by observers from member states of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). The international component would preside and coordinate the mechanism. In other words, the negotiators asked the United Nations Security Council to create such a political mission with unarmed observers for a renewable 12-month period. The decision was highlighted by negotiators from both sides as an historic step towards the end of the conflict and confirmation of both parties' commitment to peace. Peace commissioner Sergio Jaramillo said that, with the UN Security Council involved, the government and the FARC would have to fulfill their obligations. FARC Secretariat member Carlos Antonio Losada, in an interview with Semana, noted that the bilateral ceasefire had been installed on the ground by the force of events and that no one would accept that this situation be reversed, specially with the UN involved. President Santos had previously contacted the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to secure their support, and the FARC had been convinced following consultations with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. In early February, the government and the FARC once again found themselves at odds, on the issue of the plebiscite. The FARC, by communiqué, argued that the plebiscite contravened the general agreement (from August 2012). In response, President Santos tweeted that the final agreement in Havana would be submitted to plebiscite, whether the FARC liked it or not. In late February, the FARC's 'armed proselytism' during a 'political pedagogy' event (attended by Iván Marquez and other negotiators) in La Guajira stirred significant controversy. Since 2015, the FARC's negotiators had been authorized by the government to travel to Colombia to organize 'political pedagogy' events with their troops only, and till then all such activities had occurred without major problems. However, the presence of armed men mingling with the civilian population during this particular event in La Guajira rekindled fears about the use of weapons by the guerrillas during political events. President Santos notified the guerrillas that 'political pedagogy' events were suspended until further notice and issued an ultimatum that either a final agreement is signed on March 23 or it would be understood that the FARC are not ready for peace. Semana considered the incident as a major blow to confidence and trust in the peace process, which came at a critical moment. Due to continued disagreements, the March 23 deadline for a final agreement announced six months prior passed without any such agreement being announced. It had been hoped that a final agreement could coincide with President Barack Obama's historic visit to Cuba on March 20. Nevertheless, Secretary of State John Kerry met with both peace delegations while in Cuba, reiterating the Obama administration's support for the peace process and the post-conflict. On May 12, an agreement to provide legal security to the final agreement was reached. Once signed, the final agreement would be considered as a special agreement under the terms of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and form part of the Constitution of Colombia's constitutionality bloc (as international humanitarian law). The government would present before Congress an ordinary law to approve the final agreement as a special agreement, Congress would approve or reject it as a whole within 8 days and the Constitutional Court would review it. Afterwards, the government would present a constitutional amendment (legislative act) to incorporate the text of the final agreement in the Constitution as a transitory article. Finally, after signature of the final agreement, the President would make a unilateral declaration in the name of the Colombian State before the Secretary General of the UN, relating the final agreement to Resolution 2261 of January 25, 2016. The announcement gave the agreement legal security, increasing the FARC's confidence that the agreements would be followed – enshrinement of a final agreement in the Constitution would protect it from future changes in political conditions, and would be binding on the Colombian government before the international community. By agreeing to this procedure, the FARC signalled their acceptance of the political institutions they had rejected and fought against for decades. At the same time, without yet endorsing the plebiscite itself, the FARC indicated that the final agreement would be submitted for popular ratification, thereby implicitly dropping their insistence on a constituent assembly as an implementation mechanism. The details of the agreement on legal security sparked legal controversy in Colombia. Álvaro Uribe called it a coup d'état, while Inspector General Alejandro Ordóñez, another major critic of the peace process, wrote a letter to Santos in which he accused him of trying to replace the Constitution in collaboration with the FARC and threatened him with disciplinary action. However, lawyers not necessarily opposed to the peace process also raised questions about the legality of the measures detailed in the May 12 agreement, such as the incorporation of the final agreement into constitutional jurisprudence. Three days later, the negotiating parties announced an agreement on the release of minors under 15 years of age from FARC camps as well as a road map for the release of all other minors and a special program for their care. On June 10, the creation of an illicit crop substitution pilot project in Briceño (where the mine clearance pilot project was organized) was announced from Cuba. On June 23, the government and the FARC signed historic agreements of the Colombian Peace Accords on the 'end of the conflict' including the bilateral ceasefire, cessation of hostilities and surrender of weapons during a ceremony in Havana, Cuba. The signature of the agreements was overseen by the guarantor countries (Cuba and Norway) and attended by President Juan Manuel Santos; FARC commander 'Timochenko'; UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon; Cuban President Raúl Castro, the host; Michelle Bachelet, President of Chile (accompanying country); Nicolás Maduro, President of Venezuela (accompanying country); Norwegian foreign minister Børge Brende; Danilo Medina, President of the Dominican Republic (president pro tempore of CELAC); Salvador Sánchez Cerén, President of El Salvador; Enrique Peña Nieto, President of Mexico; and representatives of the European Union and the United States. The June 23 agreement laid down the modalities for the bilateral and definite ceasefire and cessation of hostilities, which would begin following the signature of the final agreement. Five days following the signature of the final agreement and following the redeployment of troops, the FARC would begin moving to 23 transitory rural settlement normalization zones (Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalización) and 8 encampments for the purposes of delivering their weapons to the UN mission and prepare for their reincorporation into civilian life. While the normal functioning of unarmed elected civilian authorities within these zones would not be impeded, no civilian population would be allowed to reside in the zones and access would be restricted. A 1 kilometre wide security zone, off limits to both soldiers and guerrilla, would surround each zone. The FARC would designate a group of 60 members to travel throughout the national territory in performance of tasks related to the peace agreement; likewise, within each zone, a group of 10 members of the guerrilla would travel within the municipality and department for the same reasons. The UN would collect and store all weapons received from the FARC, which would later be used to build three monuments. The guerrilla would surrender their weapons gradually in three phases over 180 days from the signature of the final agreement, and the UN mission would certify the process. The announcement offered further details about the tripartite monitoring and verification mechanism, with the international component (the UN political mission) presiding the mechanism, resolving controversies and presenting recommendations and reports about the ceasefire and surrender of weapons. In addition to the above, the negotiating parties also announced an agreement on security guarantees, aimed at ensuring the safety of social movements, communities, human rights groups, political parties and movements (especially the political movement to be created by the FARC in their reintegration to civilian life). Symbolically, this agreement includes a 'national political pact' with political parties, unions and civil society to guarantee that never again will weapons be used in pursuit of politics goals, or violent organizations promoted. Unexpectedly, on June 23, it was also announced that the FARC had agreed to support the decision to be rendered by the Constitutional Court on the plebiscite – in short, the FARC explicitly agreed to the plebiscite as the ratification mechanism for the final agreement. Prior to the June 23 announcements, Constitutional Court judge Luis Ernesto Vargas had already submitted a positive report (ponencia) on the plebiscite. On July 19, the Constitutional Court ruled that the plebiscite ratifying the final agreement was constitutional. A final agreement between the FARC and the government was announced from Havana on August 24, with the full text of the final agreement – at 297 pages – being published later that evening. The final agreement was submitted to popular ratification in a plebiscite on October 2, 2016. It failed with 50.2% voting against it and 49.8% voting in favor, on a 37.4% turnout. Notably, Colombians living in regions that were hardest hit by the conflict, including displaced Colombians abroad, voted in favor while inland and urban areas that were more insulated voted in larger numbers against it. Following the failure of the referendum, the Colombian government and the FARC, on November 24, signed a revised agreement. Colombia's congress approved the revised peace accord. It was then submitted to Congress for approval. On 29 November, the Senate approved the deal 75-0 and the House of Representatives approved it the next day by a vote of 130–0, although despite former President Alvaro Uribe's supporters boycotted the session.[citation needed] Santos welcomed the resolution, while Sergio Jaramillo, the government's peace commissioner, said: "This last part of renegotiation was exhausting. It took us to the limit. But now we pass to something more difficult, which is to change the conditions on the ground and benefit our campesinos. And to assure there is safe transit for the FARC and to worry about the security of communities. [We seek] no more political deaths in Colombia." Uribe's supporters accused the government of giving away too many rights, including FARC's ability to form a political party. The deal now means that FARC members would go to designated transitional zones within five days and hand over their weapons to the United Nations representatives within the next six months. They would also be able to form a political party.[citation needed] The country's highest court ruled in favor of the government's “fast-track” plan to quickly implement the agreement. The government can move laws through Congress more quickly than usual if they are needed to carry out the country's peace deal with the Marxist FARC rebels. "As the organizations convening the Summit, we told the negotiators in Havana that we did not want peace to be made for us, but to be the peacemakers." The Colombian peace negotiations in Havana have had higher than average women's participation – at times, one-third of delegates in Havana have been women, above global averages. The General Agreement that guided the process recognized that the negotiations "require the participation of all, without distinction." When, one year into talks, women and their concerns remained largely absent from the table, women's organizations began to push for greater inclusion. In October 2013, nearly 450 women from across Colombia gathered in Bogota at the National Summit of Women and Peace to demand inclusion in the peace process. Two weeks after the National Summit, an agreement was reached in Havana on political participation, wherein both parties formally recognized the important role that women play in conflict-prevention, conflict-resolution, and peacebuilding. Subsequently, President Santos appointed two women with greater decision-making power on behalf of the Colombian Government at the talks. In August 2014, delegations of survivors of the conflict addressed negotiating parties, 60% of whom were women. This may be the first time that women negotiating on both sides of the table met with women affected by conflict. Representatives of women's organizations and the LGBTI community also addressed negotiators as gender experts. The equal participation in the construction, implementation, verification and countersignature of the agreements reached in the Dialogues of Havana are subject of concern of women's organizations that historically have worked for peace and human rights in the country. The Red de Mujeres (1995), the Ruta Pacífica (1996), and the Iniciativa de Mujeres por la Paz (2002) are some platforms that have targeted, among other issues, to the bilateral cease of fire, demilitarization of civil life, equitable land distribution, respect for human body, justice and differential approaches. By the time when the peace process began with the FARC, Colombia's women already had a consolidated work in various peace agendas. Therefore, organizations around the country wrote open letters to the government demanding equal participation, supported by UN Women. Before finishing 2012, when began the negotiating of the principle of the end of armed confrontation with the oldest Latin American guerrillas, the Nobel Peace Prize winner Jody Williams, sent a letter to Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, claiming a space for women in Havana. With the intention that there were not more agreements without the gender perspective, at the end of October 2013 took place in Bogotá the National Summit of Women for Peace, where was a national agenda consolidated, where around 500 women from 30 of the 32 departments representations. With the motto “las mujeres no queremos ser pactadas, sino ser pactantes” (Women do not want to be agreed, but be Covenanters)," the 800 proposals that were built were given to the government delegation. In November, the summit published its declaration “Peace and democracy with women suit” where the experience of the Summit was collected. Proposals insisted on equal participation, demilitarization, bilateral cease, dismantling of paramilitary structures, truth, justice and reparation for all victims and "continue to build peace from the regions and from the everyday, strengthening the experiences of women as peacebuilders". In September 2014, a dedicated gender Subcommittee was established at the talks, mandated to ensure that a gender perspective and women's rights are included in all agreements. The gender Subcommittee of the peace talking is unique in the world. In mid-2014, when the discussion of the agreement for Victims was initiated, negotiators announced the creation of the Sub commission of gender with the mission of ensuring a gender approach in partial agreements that had been reached at the moment and in the future settlements. Additional parallel developments have been the empowerment of indigenous women, who have created the first National Commission of Indigenous Women. Women have also been able to create the first permanent dialogue space between civil society and the security sector. The Colombian peace process distinguishes itself from other conflicts because of the level of support and involvement of the international community. The role of international community in the peace process was that of a facilitator and guarantor for the peace talks. On January 25, 2016, the Security Council of the United Nations supported the ongoing peace talks in Havana by unanimously adopting resolution S/RES/2261 including the decision to accompany the end of the conflict in Colombia – one of only 14 decisions the Security Council adopted unanimously in its history. After implicit invitation of the conflict parties in section 6.3 of the final agreement, the United Nations currently monitor the conflict parties' compliance with the final agreement in accordance with resolution S/RES/2435. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) served as independent intermediary during the peace talks and provided logistical support. Apart from transporting FARC negotiators to the peace talks in Havana, the ICRC was also involved in several hostage rescues and conducted rescue operations of FARC fighters and Colombian military personnel. The peace process and the Havana peace talks were supported by the governments of Norway and Cuba that are both guarantors of the final agreement. The involvement of Norway and Cuba contributed to the mutual trust of the conflict parties and to the credibility of the peace process. While the involvement of third parties in the drafting of peace agreements does not alter the legal status of the peace agreement, it contributed to the successful conclusion of the negotiation: The lacking involvement of the international community in the peace negotiations during the presidency of Andrés Pastrana is said to have contributed to the failure of the negotiations. Norway also contributed to the peace process by sending an investigation team to determine and establish the zones contaminated by anti-personnel mines and other explosives of the civil war. Norway and Cuba both made the peace negotiations possible by providing a meeting venue: The peace talks were formally inaugurated in Oslo, Norway, on October 18, 2012, and then moved to their permanent location in Havana, Cuba. The governments of Chile and Venezuela served as observer states during the peace talks. The peace process also received the support of a number of other governments in Latin-America such as Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez, Rafael Correa the President of Ecuador, and Bolivian President Evo Morales. The Security Council of the United Nations underlined the important role that third countries played during the Colombian peace process in resolution A/RES/2261. According to Juan Manuel Santos, the peace process would not have been successful without the support of the international community. Contents of the agreements Extremely unequal land ownership is both a cause and a consequence of the Colombian armed conflict. In 1960, 0.4% of landowners held 30% of all farmland. By 1997, the concentration of land ownership was further accentuated, with 0.35% of landowners holding 45% of all farmland with 86% owning just 13%.: 66 In 2012, 1% of landowners (those owning large properties over 200 hectares) held 43% of the land, and an additional 13% of landowners (those owning medium-sized properties over 20 hectares) held 39% of the land. 79% of landowners had properties of less than 10 hectares (considered microfundio and minifundio), which accounted for just 11% of private rural land. The 2014 Agricultural Census reported that 0.4% of agricultural production units (over 500 hectares) occupy 77.6% of the country's rural area, while 71% of agricultural production units (less than 5 hectares) occupy just 2% of rural land area. On the largest landholdings (over 1,000 hectares), an average of only 28% of the land is used for agricultural purposes with the remainder of the land covered by natural vegetation, confirming common accusations that the land is underutilized. The 2014 census also showed that, since 1960, the fragmentation of smallholdings had increased – production units of less than 5 hectares increased from 63% of 71% of the total number of such units – while the weight of large landholdings (over 500 hectares) in the total rural land area had increased significantly from 40% to 77.6%. The inequitable land distribution has increased since 2000, as measured by the Gini coefficient for land ownership – 0.885 in 2009, compared to 0.877 in 2000.: 125 Colombia is one of the countries with the highest inequality in rural property in Latin America and the world.[citation needed] Poverty in rural Colombia is significantly higher than in the cities. In 2014, Colombia's multidimensional poverty rate was about 21%, but in rural areas poverty was 45%. The expansion and escalation of the armed conflict since the 1980s has greatly contributed to the consolidation of inequality in land distribution, through the illegal dispossession of land, forced displacement and re-concentration of ownership. The scale of land dispossession is disputed, but is estimated that as high as 6.6 million hectares were illegally seized (by drug traffickers, paramilitaries, agribusiness, the government or the guerrilla) over the last two decades. Agrarian reform has been one of the FARC's main causes since the guerrilla group’s foundation in 1964. However, since then, the FARC's demands on agrarian reform have evolved significantly. In 1964, the nascent guerrilla force called for the confiscation of Latifundia so that they could be delivered for free to farmers. In 1982, at their seventh conference, the FARC issued a 'law' for agrarian reform abolishing land owned by foreign, oil, mining, banana or timber companies and latifundio properties over 1,500 hectares, to be turned over to the FARC for distribution to farmers. During the Caguán peace process, the FARC demanded the recovery of unproductive land for agrarian reform. The FARC arrived in Havana with moderated views on the subject – their proposals included stimulation of agricultural use of land for food production to achieve food sovereignty, empowering rural communities and formalization of title to land. Comprehensive rural reform and development was the first item on the general agreement between the government and the FARC, and a partial agreement was signed in May 2013. The agreement has four cornerstones: access to land and land use, the establishment of special development programs, poverty reduction and eradication of extreme poverty, and food security. The main measures laid out include: The transformation from a guerrilla movement to a political party has been one of the FARC's main public aims since the beginning of negotiations. At the same time, their potential political participation is one of the most unpopular points of the peace process. The FARC considers Colombia to have a non-democratic political system marked by state terrorism, and has demanded a 'democratic opening' which includes not only institutional reforms but broader popular participation for social movements and greater direct democracy. The government considers the 1991 Constitution to have created a more democratic political system, with different possibilities for popular participation in politics. A partial agreement on political participation, the second point of the agenda, was announced on November 6, 2013. This agreement seeks to strengthen the participation of all Colombians in politics and public affairs and the expansion of democracy as a way to resolve conflicts peacefully and finally break the link between politics and armed confrontation. The three main points of this agreement are greater citizen participation, a democratic opening and breaking the link between politics and weapons. The main measures are: In July 2016, the negotiating parties announced through a joint communiqué the composition of the commissions which would study the opposition statute, electoral reform and the guarantees law for social organizations and movements. The final agreement announced on August 24 establishes guarantees for the new political party or movement to be created by the demobilized FARC following the end of the decommissioning process. The representatives of the FARC would formally register their new political movement before the National Electoral Council, providing their act of creation, party statutes, code of ethics, ideological platform and appointment of its leadership. As a result of this formal registration, the new party would be recognized as a legally constituted and recognized party under Colombian law, and it would have to comply with all the legal requirements to remain a legally registered party except for membership requirements and, until 2026, the electoral threshold (3% of votes nationally) required for other parties to maintain their legal status. To facilitate the FARC's transformation into a political party, it would receive, until 2026, public financial assistance equivalent to 10% of the annual budget for political parties and, until 2022, an additional 5% of said budget. The presidential and senatorial candidates of the new party would receive public funding for the 2018 and 2022 elections. In addition, following the conclusion of the decommissioning process, the government would amend the constitution and laws as necessary to allow for the temporary, ex officio participation of the FARC's new party in the Congress for two terms beginning in July 2018. Although the party's lists, either alone or in coalition, would compete equally for seats in both houses, the new party would be guaranteed five seats in each house, including those won according to regular electoral rules. Until 2018, the FARC would be represented in each house of Congress by three speakers who would only be allowed to participate in the debates for the constitutional and legal reforms which would follow the adoption of the final agreement. The FARC's new party would also be entitled to transitory representation in the National Electoral Council. Drug cultivation, production and trafficking has been inextricably linked to the Colombian armed conflict for decades, having served as the main source of financing for most illegal armed groups (including the FARC) while playing a central role in the Colombian and foreign governments' responses to the internal conflict. Colombia continues to be the world's single largest producer of cocaine and coca leaves. The land area under coca cultivation has decreased from over 140,000 hectares in 2001 due to aerial coca eradication and manual eradication, but there has been an increase in coca cultivation since 2013, with 96,000 hectares under coca cultivation in 2015 according to the latest United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime report, representing a 39% increase on the previous year. The majority (81%) of coca cultivation is concentrated in three southern departments (Nariño, Cauca, Putumayo, Caquetá) and in Norte de Santander Department, which are also regions with a substantial FARC presence. The UNODC suggests that different negotiations on the issue, in Havana and other settings, are generating incentives for increased coca cultivation because of the perception that the benefits of development projects would mainly be directed at coca cultivators. The FARC are involved in all stages of production, from coca cultivation to wholesale drug trade. In the 1990s, the FARC successfully co-opted some cocalero (coca cultivators) movements, and was originally primarily involved in the production stage while paramilitary groups dominated the more lucrative drug trafficking. However, by the second half of the 1990s, the dismantling of the Medellín and Cali cartels and the dissolution of the Soviet Union triggered the entrance of the FARC into the drug trafficking business.: 3 A recent investigation by the Colombian attorney general's office concluded that FARC units are involved both directly and indirectly in the cultivation, processing and distribution – directly as owners of crops, laboratories, crystallization workshops as well as the distribution corridors contacting clients including national and international drug cartels; indirectly by providing security to crops or labs, organizing peasants in anti-eradication marches, setting product prices, charging taxes on the product or by providing security to third-party drug traffickers in return for a fee. The study also estimated at over US$22,900,000 (66,277,978,247 pesos) the guerrilla's revenues from narcotics and related taxes between 1995 and 2014. The FARC adamantly reject that they are drug traffickers, but have admitted to financing their activities through taxes levied at different stages of the drug production process (on producers, buyers, laboratory production and landing strips). The Colombian and American governments have considered the FARC to be one of the world's leading drug trafficking organizations. Although "Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) remain the greatest criminal drug threat to the United States" according to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's 2015 National Drug Threat Assessment Summary, "the FARC-EP are increasingly working with Mexican TCOs to smuggle ton quantities of cocaine into the United States." The report indicates ties between the FARC and Mexican drug cartels including Los Zetas, Beltrán-Leyva Cartel, Jalisco New Generation Cartel and the Sinaloa Cartel. In Havana, the FARC claimed that "the traditional drug policy of the Colombian state has been focused on the persecution of the weakest elements of the drug-trafficking chain: cultivators and consumers." In 1999, in response to the large increase in domestic cocaine production activities and the deterioration of security conditions, the Colombian and US governments announced Plan Colombia, a joint anti-drug strategy. The main aims of the Plan were a 50% reduction in the production and trafficking of illegal drugs within six years and an improvement of security conditions in Colombia. US funding for the military component of Plan Colombia was on average US$540 million per year between 2000 and 2008, while the Colombian government invested approximately US$812 million per year.: 3–4 Following the September 11 attacks, Plan Colombia resources began to be used for anti-guerrilla operations. Over 80% of US aid to Colombia between 2000 and 2007 was military assistance, which came to reinforce the modernization of the Colombian armed forces under the Pastrana and Uribe administrations.: 167–169 Since the start of Plan Colombia, the main strategy for reducing cocaine production has been the aerial spraying of coca plantations with herbicides such as glyphosate. Since 2000 more than 1,600,000 hectares of coca crops have been sprayed and more than 413,000 have been manually eradicated.: 5 Aerial spraying of illicit crops is both very expensive and ineffective – for each hectare sprayed with glyphosate, coca crops are reduced by about 0.02 to 0.065 hectares, so 32 hectares of coca need to be sprayed to eradicate just one hectare (an effectiveness rate of just 4.2%). The marginal cost of removing one kilogram of cocaine from the market through spraying is roughly $240,000. Aerial spraying has a negative impact on the environment (deforestation, water pollution, harm to ecosystems), health (skin problems, respiratory illnesses, miscarriages) and causes internal displacement.: 9 After 2006, Colombian anti-drug policies shifted towards interdiction strategies (cocaine seizures, lab destruction, dismantling cartels) which have been far more effective than eradication strategies. These policies caused a major supply shock (increasing the street price of cocaine in the US), greatly reduced the net cocaine supply and led to major changes in the drug trafficking operations (shifting towards Central America and Mexico).: 11 Juan Manuel Santos, who had been responsible for the post-2006 drug strategy as defence minister, continued these policies as president. The Colombian government now addresses drug consumption from a public health angle and advocates for alternative development strategies in vulnerable regions affected by coca cultivation, while adopting a "rational and efficient" strategy against criminal activities tied to drug trafficking. As part of this new policy, in October 2015 the government ordered the suspension of aerial aspersion with glyphosate.: 68, 80 The partial agreement between the FARC and the government on illicit drugs, announced in May 2014, reflects this paradigmatic shift away from the traditional militaristic approach and towards the voluntary substitution of illicit crops and social transformations in affected territories. The main measures announced are: In announcing the partial agreement on illicit drugs, the FARC committed to "contribute in an effective manner, with utmost determination and in different forms and through practical actions towards the final solution to the problem of illicit drugs, and to end any relationship that, based on their rebellion, may have taken place with this phenomenon." Furthermore, the joint communiqué stated the construction of lasting peace requires everybody's "willingness to contribute to the elucidation of the relationship between conflict and the growing, production and marketing of illicit drugs and money laundering that result from this phenomenon." The fifth point on the general agreement for negotiations was victims, a vast and complex item which included important issues such as transitional justice, reparations, truth and victims' rights. The item was one of the most complicated for the two parties to find an agreement on. The FARC, which claimed that its insurgency was justified and that it was not militarily defeated, initially refused to submit to the laws and institutions of a political system which it opposed. On the other hand, the government had the obligation to design a transitional justice system which would be satisfactory to the FARC (who sought restorative justice) but also in keeping with Colombia's international treaty obligations, notably the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Complicating issues further, both the FARC and the government have historically refused to admit responsibility for crimes they have committed, with the guerrilla considering itself a victim of State oppression and the Colombian government considering itself to be the leader and defender of a democratic society. In June 2014, the two delegations in Havana announced a set of ten principles which would guide their discussions on the victims issue. These principles were: recognition of victims, recognition of responsibility, satisfaction of victims' rights, victims' participation, elucidation of the truth, reparations for victims, guarantees of protection and security, guarantees of non-repetition, reconciliation and a rights-based approach. The various components of the full agreement on victims were gradually announced to the general public throughout 2015, with the cornerstone agreement on the "special jurisdiction for peace" being announced on September 23, 2015. On December 15, 2015, a full partial agreement on victims was announced. Taken as a whole, the agreement creates a Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition (Sistema Integral de Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y no Repetición). The system would seek to satisfy the rights of all victims of the armed conflict, including victims of the guerrillas, the State and paramilitarism. Access to judicial benefits under the Comprehensive System would be conditioned to contributing to the elucidation of the truth and reparations. The Comprehensive System is made up of five components: Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence and Non-repetition; Special unit for the search of missing persons in the context of and due to the armed conflict; Special Jurisdiction for Peace; Comprehensive reparation measures for peace-building and guarantees of non-repetition. A truth commission entitled the "Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence and Non-recurrence" (Comisión para el esclarecimiento de la verdad, la convivencia y la no repetición) would be created following the signature of the final agreement. Its aim is to contribute to the construction and preservation of historical memory, reach an understanding of the conflict's multiple dimensions, satisfy victims' rights and promote coexistence. The Commission would be centered on victims (their dignification and satisfaction of their right to the truth) and its work impartial, independent, transitory and extrajudicial. It would require broad participation, working at a national level but with a territorial approach (with the aim of achieving a better understanding of the regional dynamics of the conflict) and differential and gender-based approach (it would consider the different experiences, impact and conditions of persons because of their sex, gender, age, ethnicity or disabilities). As an extrajudicial mechanism, the truth commission's activities would be non-judicial in nature and would not imply criminal responsibility for those testifying before it, nor can these testimonies be transferred to judicial authorities although the commission may request information from judges and investigative bodies as required for its work. The Commission would have as a mandate to clarify practices which constitute serious human rights, collective responsibilities for these practices, the social and human impact of the conflict on society and different groups, the impact of the conflict on politics and democracy, the historical context of the conflict with its multiple causes and the factors and conditions which contributed to the persistence of the conflict. To do so, the Commission would investigate all the aforementioned elements, hold public hearings, present a final report, diffuse its work, ensure the gender mainstreaming throughout its work and be periodically accountable. The government and the FARC have committed to contribute to the clarification of the truth and to recognize their respective responsibilities before the Commission. The Commission would be composed of 11 members, chosen by the selection mechanism for the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (see below). The Commission would work for three years, following a six months preparation period. The Special Unit for the Search of Missing Persons in the context and due to the armed conflict (Unidad especial para la búsqueda de personas dadas por desaparecidas en el contexto y en razón del conflicto armado) would be a special high-level unit created following the signature of the final agreement. It would direct and coordinate efforts to search for and locate missing persons, or find their remains so that they may be returned to their families. To carry out its work, the search unit would collect the necessary information about missing persons, analyze the information collected, strengthen and streamline processes for identifying mortal remains in coordination with the National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences, guarantee families' participation and present an official report to families informing them of the fate of missing relatives. The search unit would be administrative and financially independent and autonomous, complementing the other components of the Comprehensive System. The Special Jurisdiction for Peace (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, JEP) would be the transitional justice component of the Comprehensive System, complying with Colombia's duty to investigate, clarify, prosecute and punish serious human rights violations and grave breaches of international humanitarian law which occurred during the armed conflict. Its objectives would be to satisfy victims' right to justice, offer truth to the public, contribute to the reparation of victims, contribute to the fight against impunity, adopt decisions which give full legal security to direct and indirect participants in the conflict and contribute to the achievement of a stable and lasting peace. The JEP's guiding principles would be the centrality of victims; legal security (the JEP's decisions would be res judicata and immutable); conditionality; the right to peace; comprehensiveness as a component of the broader Comprehensive System; indivisibility (the JEP would apply to all who participated directly or indirectly in the conflict); prevalence over other criminal, disciplinary or administrative proceedings for acts committed in the armed conflict; guarantees of due process; differential focus taking into account the different consequences of crimes against women and against the most vulnerable groups; gender equality and concentration on the most serious and representative cases. Following the end of the armed conflict, the government would "grant the broadest possible amnesty" (as per section 5, article 6 of Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions) for rebels who have subscribed a final peace agreement with the State (crime of rebellion) and for those accused or condemned for political and related offences, as permitted by the Colombian Constitution. Amnesty or pardon does not absolve one from the obligation to contribute, individually or collectively, to the clarification of the truth. An amnesty law adopted by Congress would clearly determine those crimes eligible for amnesty or pardon and those which are not, as well as the definition of related offences. Political offences include rebellion, sedition, military uprising, illegal possession of weapons, death in combat compatible with international law, agreement to commit an offence for the purpose of rebellion and other related offences. Related offences would be defined by an inclusive and restrictive criteria; the first including offences specifically related to the development of the rebellion during the conflict, offences in which the passive subject is the State and any actions aimed at facilitating, supporting, financing or hiding the development of rebellion. In all circumstances, crimes against humanity, genocide, serious war crimes, hostage taking or other severe deprivations of physical liberty, torture, extrajudicial executions, forced disappearance, violent sexual intercourse and other kinds of sexual violence, child abduction, forced displacement and the recruitment of minors would not be eligible for amnesty or pardon. The Colombian Supreme Court has ruled that drug trafficking is a related offence to rebellion, as long as this activity was conducted to finance the insurgency. The inclusion of drug trafficking has generated significant controversy in Colombia. The government, pro-government legislators, the Ombudsman and the then-attorney general supported the inclusion of drug trafficking as a related offence, arguing that it was used to finance the rebellion. Senator Álvaro Uribe and inspector general Alejandro Ordóñez have strongly opposed its inclusion as a related offence, with Uribe stating that drug trafficking was tied to terrorism rather than political ends. The final agreement, in its annexes, includes the text of the amnesty law which would be presented to Congress. There would be three types of offences: ones directly eligible for amnesty (those most closely related to membership in the guerrilla), ones which would never be eligible for amnesty and others which would be defined the amnesty chamber of the JEP (including drug trafficking and kidnapping). Crimes which are not eligible for amnesty or pardon would be submitted to the JEP, which would have jurisdiction over all who participated directly or indirectly in the armed conflict: combatants of illegal armed groups who have subscribed a final peace agreement with the State, agents of the State who committed crimes in the conflict and third parties who directly or indirectly participated in the conflict without being members of an armed groups. The JEP would have jurisdiction over non-coercive financing of or collaboration with paramilitary groups for persons who had a 'determinant participation in the most serious and representative crimes'. However, members of paramilitary groups who demobilized and appeared before an ordinary court or the justice and peace tribunals would not be the competence of the JEP, although the government would commit to adopt measures to strengthen the clarification of the paramilitary phenomenon. Colombian Presidents, who benefit from a special constitutional status (article 174), would not be subject to the JEP. In the JEP, there would be "a special, simultaneous, balanced and equitable treatment" for agents of the State, founded on international humanitarian law and the military's operational rules. It was agreed in the final agreement that the legal sentences of all FARC combatants convicted of offences within the JEP's jurisdiction would be suspended until the JEP has been formed and has handled the individual's respective case. Two procedures would be applied, the first procedure in the case of acknowledgment of truth and acknowledgment of responsibility and the second procedure in the absence of acknowledgment of truth and responsibility. Responsibility would be publicly acknowledged collectively or individually in the year following the creation of the JEP; in the case of a collective acknowledgement of responsibility, individuals named may express their disagreement, in which case they would be subject to the second procedure. The Special Jurisdiction for Peace would be composed of the following five bodies and an executive secretariat: The Peace Tribunal would be made up of a total of 20 Colombian and four foreign magistrates, who would be highly qualified experts in various areas of law particularly international humanitarian law, human rights law and conflict resolution. Colombian members of the tribunal would need to meet the same requirements as members of the country's three highest courts; namely to be native-born citizens, lawyers, never convicted of any crime besides political offences and a professional or academic career of fifteen years in the field of law. The three chambers would have a total of 18 Colombian and 6 foreign magistrates. The investigation and prosecution unit would be made up of at least 16 highly qualified legal professionals, 12 of which would be Colombian nationals. The selection mechanism was announced on August 12, 2016. It is to be made up of representatives appointed by Pope Francis, the Secretary General of the United Nations, the criminal chamber of Colombia's Supreme Court of Justice, the delegation of the International Center for Transitional Justice in Colombia and the Permanent Commission of the State University System. Members of the selection committee would elect magistrates with a four-fifths majority using a voting system promoting consensus. In addition to the magistrates of the chambers and tribunal, it would also select a list of 12 Colombian and 4 foreign alternates for the tribunal and chambers, the president of the JEP and the president of the Investigation and Prosecution Unit. The agreement guarantees that extradition would not be granted for offences and crimes subject to the jurisdiction of the JEP and committed during the armed conflict prior to the signature of the final agreement. In addition, the imposition of any punishment by the JEP would not limit any right to political participation. The goal of the punishments imposed would be the satisfaction of victims' rights and the consolidation of peace, and would always be related to the level of acknowledgment of truth and responsibility in collective or individual declarations to the JEP, the gravity of the punished act, the level of participation and responsibility and the accused's commitment to truth and reparation of the victims. The punishment in cases where there has been acknowledgment of responsibility before the Chamber of Acknowledgment would be lesser than in cases of late or no acknowledgment. There would be three types of sanctions or punishments: ordinary sanctions of the JEP, alternative sanctions and ordinary sanctions, depending the level and time of acknowledgment of truth and responsibility. Ordinary sanctions of the JEP would be imposed to those who acknowledge responsibility in serious offences before the Chamber of Acknowledgment and would have a minimum duration of five years and maximum duration of eight years. The sanctions would have a restorative and reparative aim and involve 'effective restrictions of freedom and rights', including restrictions to the freedom of residence and movement which would be monitored and supervised to ensure compliance with the tribunal's orders. These sanctions would in no case involve imprisonment. For those who have did not have a 'decisive participation' in the commission of the serious acts, the punishment would be between two and five years. The restorative sanctions would be involve participation in projects, carried out in rural and urban areas, including: construction of infrastructure, environmental conservation, effective reparation for displaced peasants, substitution of illicit crops, rural and urban development, rural electrification, mine clearance and so forth. Alternative sanctions would be imposed to those who acknowledge responsibility later, before the first instance of the tribunal. They would serve an essentially retributive function and involve a deprivation of freedom – including prison – of five to eight years (two to five years for those who did not have a 'decisive participation'). Ordinary sentences would be imposed to those found guilty by the tribunal when there has been no acknowledgment of responsibility, and would be served according to provisions of regular criminal law for prison terms no lesser than 15 years and no greater than 20 years. The places where the sentences would be served would be subject to monitoring of a national and international verification body of the Comprehensive System, as well as security and protection measures Seven measures for comprehensive reparations are laid out in the agreement on victims, with the aim of contributing to the construction of peace and the recognition of victims and the damages of war. Victims are to be at the heart of all reparation measures. The guarantees of non-recurrence would be the result of the implementation of the different mechanisms and measures of the Comprehensive System, measures agreed upon under the 'end of the conflict' item and all other points of the final agreement (rural reform, political participation, illicit drugs). These guarantees are part of a broader, overarching shared commitment to respect human rights, promote the rights of all Colombians, coexistence, tolerance and free political participation. As part of guarantees of non-recurrence, the government would implement measures to strengthen human rights promotion mechanisms and the protection mechanisms for human rights organizations and advocates. Specifically, this would include the promotion of a culture of human rights for peace and reconciliation, the strengthening of national information and monitoring systems for human rights, the implementation of human rights education, the strengthening of human rights organizations, the elaboration of a comprehensive protection protocol for human rights organizations, strengthened collaboration with the attorney general's office to follow up on complaints and investigations, the implementation of a national plan for human rights, the adoption of measures and legal modifications to protect social protests and mobilizations, and the creation of an advisory commission on human rights for the government and public institutions. The government and the FARC reached an agreement on three of the main points – bilateral and definite ceasefire, decommissioning of weapons and security guarantees – of the third item on the agenda, 'end of the conflict', on June 23, 2016. The bilateral and definite ceasefire is the definite end of hostilities and offensive actions between the government and the FARC. Following the announcement of the final agreement on August 24, President Juan Manuel Santos declared that the bilateral and definite ceasefire would begin at midnight on Monday, August 29, 2016. A tripartite Monitoring and Verification Mechanism (MM&V) would monitor and verify implementation of the agreement and compliance with the rules governing the ceasefire and decommissioning of weapons. The MM&V would be integrated by representatives of the Colombian government, the FARC and an International Component made up of unarmed United Nations (UN) observers from Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) member states. The mechanism would have three instances or levels: one national, eight regional verifying structures and 'some' local monitoring structures. The International Component would preside over all levels of the mechanism, resolve disagreements (such as incidents and violations of the ceasefire or disarmament), present recommendations and present written reports. 23 Transitory rural settlement normalization zones (Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalización, ZVTN) and 8 encampents/transitory normalization points (Puntos Transitorios de Normalización, PTN) would be established throughout the country to manage the disarmament of the FARC and assist in their reincorporation in civilian life. The day following the formal signature of the final agreement, the armed forces would make the necessary logistical adjustments to facilitate the FARC's units displacement to these zones. The FARC would begin moving to these zones following mutually agreed routes of deployment. The MM&V would monitor and verify the safe movement of the FARC's units to the zones. The ZVTN would be located in mutually agreed veredas, or rural settlements, within municipalities and be accessible by land or water. They would be of 'reasonable size' to allow monitoring and verification by the MM&V and compliance with the stated objectives of the ZVTN. Once all of its men have moved to their ZVTN, the FARC would provide the government with a list of its members present in each ZVTN and the government would suspend arrest warrants for all FARC members located in the zones. While in these zones, the FARC, in coordination with the government, would be allowed to perform any type of training or education for its members. FARC combatants and militiamen would be allowed to leave the zones only in civilian clothing and without weapons. The normal functioning of unarmed elected civilian authorities within these zones would not be impeded in any way, and representatives of these civilian local authorities would have the right to permanently enter these zones except for encampments where the FARC would be concentrated. There would be civilian population within the FARC's encampments in the zones, and civilians' legal right to bear arms would be suspended for the entire duration of the zones. For the duration of the agreement on the ceasefire and disarmament, the FARC would designate a group of 60 disarmed members to travel throughout the national territory in performance of tasks related to the peace agreement; likewise, within each zone, a group of 10 members of the guerrilla would travel within the municipality and department for the same reasons. The MM&V would be charged with monitoring and verifying compliance with the mutually agreed rules governing the ZVTN. In the case that events or circumstances within the zone require the presence of the National Police or any other public authority, its entry would be coordinated by the MM&V. A one kilometer wide demilitarized security zone would be created around each ZVTN, in which no military or FARC unit would be permitted entry with the exception of MM&V teams accompanied by the police if necessary. The government and the FARC have jointly defined security protocols to guarantee the security and protection of persons (MM&V observers, public servants, FARC and civilian population), the deployment routes, deployments in the zones and the manipulation, storage, transportation and control of weapons, ammunition and explosives. The 23 ZVTN and 8 PTN would be located in 30 municipalities in 15 departments, as follows: Fonseca (Guajira), La Paz (Cesar), Tibú (Norte de Santander), Remedios (Antioquia), Ituango (Antioquia), Dabeiba (Antioquia), Vigía del Fuerte (Antioquia), Riosucio (Chocó), Tierralta (Córdoba), Planadas (Tolima), Villarrica (Tolima), Buenos Aires (Cauca), Caldono (Cauca), Corinto (Cauca), Policarpa (Nariño), Tumaco (Nariño), Puerto Asís (Putumayo), Cartagena del Chairá (Caquetá), La Montañita (Caquetá), San Vicente del Caguán (Caqueta), Arauquita (Arauca), Tame (Arauca), Mesetas (Meta), Vista Hermosa (Meta), La Macarena (Meta), Mapiripán (Meta), Cumaribo (Vichada), San José del Guaviare (Guaviare), Calamar and El Retorno (Guaviare). The decommissioning of weapons is a "technical, traceable and verifiable procedure through which the UN receives all the weapons of the FARC to destine them to the construction of 3 monuments" The FARC's decommissioning would involve the following technical procedures: registration, identification, monitoring and verification of possession, collection, storage, disablement, removal and final disposition. In short, after the UN registers, identifies and verifies possession of weapons, it would collect all of the FARC's weapons, store them in specific containers, remove them from the zone and disposes of them by building three monuments. Five days after the formal signature of the final agreement, the FARC would provide the UN with the necessary information for the decommissioning. The FARC would contribute by different means, including the provision of information and the cleaning and decontamination of areas affected by landmines, improvised explosive devices, unexploded ordnances and explosive remnants of war. The decommissioning would take place gradually over 6 months (180 days) from the formal signature of the final agreement ('D-day'). From the fifth to thirtieth day following D-day, the FARC would move to the ZVTN transporting all their individual and secondary weapons, militia armament, grenades and ammunition. The formal decommissioning of weapons would begin once all members of the FARC have reached the zones. The collection and storage of weapons would take place in three phases: 30% of weapons by D+90, an additional 30% of weapons by D+120 and the remaining 40% by D+150. By D+180 at the latest, or six months from the signature of the final agreement, the UN would have completed the process of extraction of weapons and would certify compliance of this process and duly inform public opinion. The bilateral ceasefire and the functioning the zones would end on D+180. All stages of the decommissioning process would be verified by the MM&V. In addition to the measures to be adopted for the political reincorporation of the FARC (their transformation into a political party), the final agreement provides additional measures for the socioeconomic reincorporation. To promote a collective socioeconomic reincorporation, the FARC would create an organization called Economías Sociales del Común (ECOMÚN), in which membership would be voluntary. The government would assist ECOMÚN by funding its legal and technical advice and expediting its creation. In addition, the group of citizens who would promote the creation of the FARC's future political party or movement would create a non-profit centre of political thought and education which would advance social studies and research and create political education programs. The government would also assist its creation by setting aside an annual sum of public money until 2022. A National Reincorporation Council (Consejo Nacional de la Reincorporación, CNR) would be created, made up of 2 members of the government and 2 members of the FARC, and with the objective of defining the activities, timeline and follow-up of the reincorporation process. For the purposes of managing the reincorporation process, the FARC would, following its settlement in the aforementioned zones, provide the government with a complete list of all its members which would be revised and certified by the government in good faith. Once the FARC have surrendered their weapon and expressed their commitment to comply with the agreement to reincorporate to civilian life, they would be accredited by the government. The government would identify the necessities of the socioeconomic reincorporation process through a socioeconomic census, identify possible productive programs and projects for demobilized members of the FARC and would create a one-time fund for the execution of such programs through ECOMÚN. In addition, for such purposes, each member of the FARC would have the right to a one-time economic support payment of 8 million pesos to undertake an individual or collective project. All members of the FARC, for 24 months following the end of the decommissioning process in the zones, would receive a monthly payment equivalent to 90% of the legal monthly minimum wage, as long as they lack another source of revenue. Afterwards, a monthly payment to be defined by law would be given to reincorporated members who have chosen to continue their studies. In addition to the above, at the end of the functioning of the zones, all members of the FARC would receive a one-time payment of 2 million pesos. The government would pay the social security contributions for those members lacking a source of revenue. Various social programs – including formal education, vocational training, recognition of knowledge, housing, culture, sports, recreation, environmental protection, psycho-social attention, family reunification – would be identified and developed as necessary to help the reincorporation of the FARC. On June 23, the government and the FARC also announced a set of security guarantees to protect the security of all inhabitants, and specific measures for the protection of communities, social movements, political movements and the FARC's future political movement. In addition, the agreement includes the implementation of measures to intensify the effectiveness and comprehensiveness of the fight against criminal organizations which threaten the peace. Some of the main objectives of these security guarantees are respect, protection and promotion of human rights; ensure the State's legitimate monopoly on the use of force throughout the territory and strengthening the administration of justice. The main security guarantees and measures are: Implementation and verification For the purposes of the implementation and verification of the final agreement (item 6 of the agenda), an Implementation, Monitoring, Verification and Dispute Resolution Commission of the Final Peace Agreement (Comisión de Implementación, Seguimiento y Verificación del Acuerdo Final de Paz y de Resolución de Diferencias, CSVR) would be created following the formal signature of the final agreement. It would be made up of three representatives of the government and three representatives of the FARC or its successor political party and would last until January 2019, at which time its members would decide on its continuation until 2026. During the 180-day ceasefire and decommissioning process, the CSVR would be accompanied by one delegate from each of the two guarantor countries (Cuba and Norway) and one delegate from each of the two accompanying countries (Venezuela and Chile). The commission's objectives would be the resolution of differences, monitoring of the implementation of the final agreement, verification of compliance, monitoring of the legislative implementation of the agreement and reporting on the implementation. Mechanisms would allow for citizen participation in the process. The CSVR's various responsibilities would include: Additional measures to implement the agreements include: As agreed on May 11, 2016, the final agreement would be considered as a special agreement under the terms of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and registered, following its signature, before the Swiss Federal Council in Bern. Afterwards, the President would make a unilateral declaration in the name of the Colombian State before the Secretary General of the UN, relating the final agreement to Resolution 2261 of January 25, 2016. The immediate priorities for the implementation of the agreement are: Legislative Act 1 of 2016 amends the Constitution to create a special legislative procedure for the implementation of the agreement, for a six-month period renewable once. According to the special process: In addition, the amendment gives the President special powers to issue legally binding decrees for the implementation of the agreement during a six-month period. These decrees are also subject to automatic judicial review. However, Legislative Act 1 of 2016 would only become valid following popular ratification of the final agreement in the plebiscite on October 2, 2016. The CSVR would include a verification mechanism, with an international component. The verification mechanism would include two respected figures of international renown to be selected by the government and the FARC, and the international component would include a representative from each one of the guarantor and accompanying countries. It would also include a technical component, with the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at University of Notre Dame designing the methodology to identify advances in the implementation. The verification mechanism would objectively verify the state of the implementation of the agreement, identify delays or deficiencies, provide continuous support and contribute to strengthening the agreement's implementation. The government and the FARC would request from the United Nations the creation of a new political mission, following the end of the UN's mission as part of the MM&V. The second political mission would verify the FARC's reincorporation to civic life and the implementation of the security and protection measures. The UN's mission could last up to three years. The international support for the implementation of the agreement would be meant to strengthen guarantees for the implementation of the agreement and would bring experiences, resources, monitoring and best practices to contribute to the implementation of the agreement. Some of the international organizations sought include the European Union, the Food and Agriculture Organization, Via Campesina, Unasur, Switzerland, the Dutch Institute for Multi-party democracy, UNESCO, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the United States of America, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Red Cross, the International Center for Transitional Justice, Sweden and UN Women. At least 500 social leaders have been killed between the signing of the agreement and April 2019. The former leader of the FARC, Rodrigo Londoño, claimed in an open letter to Colombian President Iván Duque in June 2019 that about 160 ex-fighters and their family members have been killed since the peace deal was signed. See also References External links Participants Timeline Key aspects Former guerrillas Linked to Former government program Linked to Former paramilitaries Linked to |
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[SOURCE: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2026_Pawtucket_shooting] | [TOKENS: 2608] |
Contents 2026 Pawtucket shooting On February 16, 2026, a mass shooting occurred at the Dennis M. Lynch Arena in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, United States. During a high school ice hockey game, 56-year-old Roberta Dorgano opened fire on her family members and a family friend. The incident resulted in the deaths of her ex-wife and their adult son and the suicide of Dorgano, and left three others hospitalized in critical condition. The shooting, which police described as an incident of domestic violence, occurred in front of dozens of spectators and was partially captured on a livestream of the game. Background Pawtucket, Rhode Island, is a city near the border with Massachusetts. Dennis M. Lynch Arena is an indoor ice hockey rink built in 1973 and managed and operated by EDGE Sports Group. The venue offers public skating sessions and hosted ice hockey games and figure and ice skating lessons and was the home of the Johnson & Wales Wildcats hockey team. The attack occurred two months after another mass shooting in Rhode Island, at Brown University in adjacent Providence, in which two students were killed and nine others injured. Shooting The shooting took place at approximately 2:30 p.m. EST during a boys' hockey game between the Coventry/Johnston co-op team and the Blackstone Valley Co-op, which includes players from St. Raphael Academy, Providence Country Day School, North Providence High School, and North Smithfield High School. The shooter, Roberta Dorgano, frequently attended her family's hockey games at the arena. According to law enforcement officials, Dorgano opened fire on four members of her family and a family friend, who were attending the game. Video showed Dorgano arriving at the hockey arena, then exiting the arena and returning not long after. Dorgano was seated with her ex-wife and family in the stands, and there did not appear to be a confrontation or conversation between her and victims before she opened fire. Aidan Dorgan, an adult son of Dorgano, attempted to shield Rhonda Dorgan, the ex-wife of Dorgano, from gunfire and attempted to disarm Dorgano before he was fatally shot. Eyewitnesses and video evidence described a rapid burst of gunfire, with as many as 11 shots heard in quick succession, causing panic among players and spectators. Many players and fans scrambled for cover, with some students abandoning their skates and equipment as they fled the arena. A livestream of the match captured the scene as people dove to the floor and fled for the exits. A mother later recounted that many were unaware of what was happening at first, as many believed the sounds were just the players banging their skates on the boards. A player stated that many players ran towards the locker rooms after the shooting began and barricaded themselves in, with another stating that they believed the gunshots were balloons popping. A man who was in attendance at the game lunged for Dorgano's weapon after she opened fire and got his hand stuck in the slide of the gun, preventing it from firing, and she fell onto him. The man was joined by other spectators, and during the struggle Dorgano reached into a jacket she was wearing and produced a second handgun, which she put into her mouth and fatally shot herself with. Police and emergency responders arrived within minutes of the shooting, securing the arena and tending to the victims. The shooter was found dead at the scene from a self-inflicted gunshot wound. Victims Two people were killed and three others injured, all of whom except one were related to the shooter. The deceased victims were identified as Dorgano's son, Aidan Dorgan, and her ex-wife Rhonda Dorgan. The three injured victims were identified as Rhonda's parents and a family friend, who were critically injured in the attack and treated at Rhode Island Hospital. Perpetrator Roberta Dorgano (July 15, 1969 – February 16, 2026), a 56-year-old trans woman, was identified as the perpetrator by law enforcement officials. Dorgano joined the US Marine Corps on April 26, 1988, but was discharged three months later on July 13, 1988, due to her service being "incongruent with Marine Corps' expectations and standards". Records confirmed that Dorgano previously lived in Jacksonville, Florida, and worked as a truck driver. Dorgano owned a van which was registered with a shipping company in Bath, Maine, and she had told employees working there that she lived in her van. At the time of the shooting, Dorgano was employed at Bath Iron Works. One of the hockey players playing that afternoon was her son. According to her daughter, Dorgano had six children and a history of mental health issues, and she had been "ostracized" from the family due to "a long history of violence and abuse". In February 2020, she accused her mother of assaulting her and acting in a "violent, threatening or tumultuous manner". Her mother was charged with assault, battery, and disorderly conduct though the case was later dismissed. That same year, during a time when she was living in a house that her father-in-law owned, Dorgano reported to police that her father-in-law had threatened to hire an Asian gang to kill her if she did not drop the charges against her mother. Her father-in-law was charged with intimidation of witnesses and victims of crimes, in addition to obstruction of the judicial system, but in 2023, those charges were dropped after Dorgano decided to no longer pursue the case. Court documents showed that an Asian relative who was going to be the middle-man to hire the gang was actually a doctor practicing in the Worcester, Massachusetts, area. Dorgano returned to Jacksonville and her former wife, Rhonda Dorgan, filed for divorce which was finalized in June 2021, writing "gender reassignment surgery, narcissistic + personality disorder traits" [sic] as the reason for the divorce before crossing it out and writing "irreconcilable differences". Dorgano and her former wife married in 1992 in Rehoboth, Massachusetts, and were first cousins, once removed. A photo taken sometime before the shooting showed that Dorgano at some point appeared to have a Schutzstaffel insignia tattoo with a skull on it on her right arm, but whether or not she had the tattoo at the time of the shooting has not been confirmed by authorities. In addition to the tattoo, she posted pro-Nazi content on Twitter, including stating repeatedly that being "to the right of Hitler" was a "compliment" and replying "wp" to an image of someone giving a Nazi salute. Dorgano expressed in her posts hatred for Democrats, support for President Donald Trump, and that she rejected the idea that all transgender people were liberals. A day before the shooting, Dorgano replied to a tweet that accused Delaware representative Sarah McBride, the first openly transgender person elected to Congress, of being a man, writing "Keep bashing us. but do not wonder why we Go BERSERK" [sic]. On that same day, Dorgano also replied to a tweet by Kentucky representative Thomas Massie, in which Massie alluded to his deceased wife, Rhonda Massie, writing that she also had "a beloved RHONDA too" [sic]. Aftermath The shooting prompted a significant police response and a temporary lockdown of Rhode Island Hospital as a precaution. Coventry Public Schools of Rhode Island superintendent Don Cowart and Providence Country Day School both confirmed the safety of all players of each team were safe and accounted for. The Rhode Island Interscholastic League announced the temporary suspension of events after the shooting, which ended four days after the shooting. The Pawtucket School Department announced that it would provide additional counseling and support services after the shooting which would be made available for all students, families, school staff, and community members. Shea High School, which had a staff member injured in the shooting, planned to have a one-hour delayed start to classes on February 23 to allow time for preparations for support for students and allow school leaders to connect with educators at the school. Investigation Pawtucket Police described the shooting as a "targeted event" stemming from a family dispute, and officials classified it as a suspected familicide and murder–suicide. Agencies involved in the investigation included the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), the Rhode Island State Police, and several local departments. Police recovered firearms from the scene, interviewed over 100 witnesses, reviewed footage of the shooting, and located a white van with a Maine license plate that belonged to Roberta Dorgana. Both weapons, a 10mm Glock 29SF Gen 3 pistol and a .357 SIG Sauer P226 pistol used in the shooting, were legally purchased, and she had a gun permit from Florida at the time of her death. Investigators have not determined if Dorgana had a concealed carry permit in Rhode Island. The ATF traced the weapons and found that the Glock had been purchased on September 19, 2021, in Jacksonville, Florida, and the SIG Sauer had been purchased on July 13, 2019, in West Warwick, Rhode Island. Pawtucket police chief Tina Goncalves said that there was "no indication" of impending violence at the ice rink and that they were looking into a Twitter account suspected to be connected to the shooter. Goncalves also said that the shooter's gender identity was "irrelevant to our investigation at this point", but that she knew that Dorgano went by a different name than her legal name and was wearing "female clothes" at the time of the shooting. On February 18, the Pawtucket Police Department searched Dorgano's apartment and work locker in Bath, Maine and also at a storage unit in Brunswick, Maine, in conjunction with the Maine State Police and Federal Bureau of Investigation. Investigators seized an electronic device, firearm accessories, and personal identification documents from the apartment and an AR-15–style rifle, a sawed-off shotgun, a handgun frame and other firearm accessories, ammunition, and mail addressed to Dorgano at the storage unit. Reactions Statements of shock and condolences were issued by local officials, school administrators, and state leaders. US senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island and Rhode Island governor Dan McKee both called the shooting a horrific tragedy and praised the swift response of law enforcement and emergency responders. McKee said that his administration would launch a statewide "support hub" for those who were affected by the shooting. US representative Gabe Amo, who represents the area, released a statement which said that he was "saddened that gun violence has impacted another community" and that he was in touch with local officials and prepared to "help secure any requested federal assistance". The mayor of Pawtucket, Donald Grebien, said that the shooting was a "stark reminder" of the consequences of domestic violence and gun violence and Pawtucket police chief Tina Goncalves requested that people "respect" the family of the victims after the "unfathomable" shooting. Michael Chippendale, the Rhode Island House of Representatives minority leader, said that "the firearm was the means, not the cause" of the shooting, and that the shooting was instead caused by "severe or untreated mental health struggles, instability, isolation, and warning signs that were missed or ignored". Pawtucket school leaders said that mental health and counseling resources were being made available for students after the shooting. The shooting prompted backlash centering around the perpetrator's gender identity from some right-wing commentators. Former chairman of the Republican Party of Florida, Christian Ziegler, posted to Twitter after the shooting that "President Trump needs to re-open mental institutions, and society needs to stop celebrating & encouraging transgender status". The anti-LGBTQ and far-right Twitter account, Libs of TikTok, which is operated by former real estate agent Chaya Raichik, posted to the platform that "Transgender people are violent and a danger to society". A day after the shooting, two vigils were held at Slatersville Congregational Church in North Smithfield, Rhode Island, to honor the victims of the shooting and provide comfort for the community. Community members also left flowers and hockey sticks outside the Dennis M. Lynch Arena, where the shooting took place, as a tribute to the victims. The Rhode Island Interscholastic League resumed hockey games on February 20, with the first game happening between The Prout School and the East Bay co-op teams featuring a moment of silence before the victims before the start. See also Notes References |
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[SOURCE: https://he.wikipedia.org/wiki/רוני_בר-און] | [TOKENS: 5631] |
תוכן עניינים רוני בר-און רוני חיים בר-און (נולד ב-2 ביוני 1948) הוא משפטן ופוליטיקאי ישראלי, שכיהן כחבר הכנסת ושר בממשלות ישראל. ביוגרפיה בר-און נולד בתל אביב בשם אהרון חיים בירנבאום, להורים דתיים ניצולי השואה. למד בבתי הספר ביל"ו וצייטלין וסיים לימודי משפטים באוניברסיטה העברית בירושלים. עבד כעשרים שנים כעורך דין במגזר הפרטי. לאחר שירות מילואים בצה"ל כלוחם ומפקד בחיל התותחנים הגיע לדרגת סגן-אלוף ושימש שופט בבית המשפט הצבאי לערעורים באזור יהודה ושומרון כ-15 שנים נוספות לאחר גיל הפרישה משירות מילואים. בין התפקידים הציבוריים שמילא בתחום המשפטי: חבר הוועד המרכזי והיחידה הארצית של לשכת עורכי הדין בישראל, חבר המועצה לבתי הדין המנהליים וחבר ועדת הסנגוריה הציבורית. באמצע העשור השני של המאה ה-21 שימש בר-און, בין היתר, כאחד מעורכי דינו של ראש הממשלה לשעבר, אהוד אולמרט. כסטודנט הצטרף בר-און לפעילות בסניף ירושלים של תנועת החרות, ונבחר כחבר מרכז הליכוד. בשנת 1997 היה מושאה של פרשת בר-און חברון, במסגרתה מונה ליועץ המשפטי לממשלה. בעקבות ביקורת חריפה על נסיבות מינויו ועל מידת התאמתו לתפקיד, התפטר מהתפקיד לאחר 48 שעות. בשנת 2003 נבחר לכנסת ה־16 מטעם הליכוד, וכיהן כיושב ראש ועדת הכנסת (10 במרץ 2003 - 18 בינואר 2006). ב-7 בנובמבר 2005 נכשל מינויו לשר התעשייה, המסחר והתעסוקה בממשלת ישראל השלושים לאחר שהכנסת דחתה את הודעה הממשלה על צירוף השרים, וזאת בשל הפילוג בליכוד. עם הקמת מפלגת קדימה על ידי אריאל שרון בסוף נובמבר 2005, עבר לצדו של שרון ושימש יו"ר הסיעה החדשה, שנקראה תחילה "אחריות לאומית". ב־18 בינואר 2006 מונה לשר התשתיות הלאומיות ושר המדע והטכנולוגיה. ב־4 במאי 2006, לאחר הבחירות לכנסת השבע עשרה, עם כינון ממשלת ישראל השלושים ואחת, מונה לשר הפנים ושימש נציג הממשלה בוועדה לבחירת שופטים (יחד עם שר המשפטים). ב־4 ביולי 2007 חדל מלכהן בתפקידים אלה והחל לכהן כשר האוצר, כשלושה חודשים לאחר שהשר הקודם, אברהם הירשזון, השעה עצמו מהתפקיד. ביוני 2008 הכריז בר-און על תוכנית להמשך הרפורמה במס הכנסה, שמרכיביה: המרכיב האחרון נתקל בהתנגדות חריפה של ההסתדרות החדשה, שהכריזה על כוונתה לצאת לשביתה כללית עקב צעד זה, ובעקבות זאת נסוג בר-און מתוכניתו. ברבע האחרון של 2008 נדרשו בר-און ומשרדו להתמודד עם השפעותיו של המשבר הכלכלי העולמי, ובפרט השפעתו על יציבותם על עסקים, על שווי החיסכון בקופות הגמל ועל התעסוקה. על אף לחצים אדירים מגורמים בעלי עניין סירב בר-און לספק רשת ביטחון לטייקונים מתוך סברה כי מצב השוק הישראלי יציב וחזק דיו - החלטה שבדיעבד הוסברה על ידי כלכלנים בכזו שאפשרה למשק הישראלי לצלוח את המשבר ביציבות וללא פגיעה מהותית. בשנת 2008 נחשפו צילומי וידאו המראים כי בהצבעה בכנסת בשנת 2003, הצביע בר-און במקום ח"כ ענבל גבריאלי. צילומים אלה סותרים עדות שמסר ב-2003: "לא ביצעתי הצבעה כפולה במקום ענבל גבריאלי". לאחר שנחשפו הצילומים טען בר-און כי גבריאלי מסרה לו את רשותה להצביע במקומה, אך גבריאלי התראיינה לערוץ 2 והכחישה מכל וכל כי הסכימה להצבעתו של בר-און. אולם בעדותה במשטרה אמרה שייתכן שנתנה לו את הסכמתה להצביע במקומה. לאחר שהיועמ"ש, מני מזוז, ופרקליט המדינה, משה לדור, הורו שלא לפתוח בחקירה, החליטה ועדת האתיקה של הכנסת לנזוף בבר-און נזיפה חמורה: "אין ספק שבר-און עבר עבירות אתיות חמורות, הן בעצם ההצבעה הכפולה, והן בהתנהלותו לאחר הצבעה זו". לאחר סיום תפקידו כשר אוצר, העיתונאי והכתב הכלכלי נחמיה שטרסלר, כתב בעיתון דה מרקר שהוא רואה בו את "איש השנה בכלכלה" לשנת 2009 כשר אוצר מוצלח. במסגרת הכנסת ה-18 כיהן בר-און כיושב ראש הוועדה לענייני ביקורת המדינה לאחר שהחליף ב-27 ביולי 2011 את יואל חסון (עד 16 במאי 2012). לאחר הצטרפות מפלגתו לקואליציה שבראשות בנימין נתניהו מונה בר-און ליושב ראש ועדת החוץ והביטחון במקומו של שאול מופז. הוא נשאר בתפקידו זה גם לאחר שקדימה פרשה מהקואליציה. במהלך כהונתו בכנסת ה-18 יזם, יחד עם גדעון עזרא, תיקון לפקודת העיריות הקובע כי הגשת קובלנה פלילית פרטית נגד עובד רשות מקומית בשל מעשה שעשה תוך מילוי תפקידו תהיה טעונה את אישור היועץ המשפטי לממשלה, בדומה להליך המקובל לגבי עובדי המדינה. בנוסף, לאחר התפטרותו מהכנסת של צחי הנגבי, הוביל את חקיקתו של החוק לפינוי שדות מוקשים, שיזם האחרון. ב-16 במאי 2012 מונה לעמוד בוועדת החוץ והביטחון ועמד בראשה עד 5 בפברואר 2013. ב-5 בדצמבר 2012 הודיע בר-און על פרישתו מן החיים הפוליטיים בר און דירקטור במספר חברות ציבוריות בהן בנק משכן, גזית גלוב, אלרוב נדל"ן ומלונאות וקרן הפנסיה "מגן זהב". בדצמבר 2015 מונה לדירקטור בחברת דלק קידוחים. בדצמבר 2021 מונה ליו"ר הדירקטוריון של חברת תמר פטרוליום. שימש בתפקידים ציבוריים שונים בהם יושב־ראש המועצה להסדר ההימורים בספורט, יושב־ראש הנהלת אגודת בית"ר ירושלים, ממלא־מקום יושב־ראש מועצת המנהלים של תיאטרון ירושלים. בשנת 2015 החל לשדר עם עירית לינור את התוכנית המילה האחרונה בגלי צה"ל, עד לפרישתו מהתוכנית כעבור כשנה, עקב שינוי שעת שידורה. נכון ל-2021 משמש בר-און כמגיש מחליף בתוכנית "בן כספית ואריה אלדד" המשודרת ב-103fm, במקומו של כספית. לאחר שמונה לתפקיד היועץ המשפטי לממשלה בעת פרשת בר-און חברון, פורסם כי הוא מרבה להמר באלפי דולרים בקזינו בלונדון, וכן כי השתתף בסדנת המודעות העצמית איי אם. בעקבות הפרסומים, שאול יהלום יושב ראש ועדת החוקה, חוק ומשפט הביע את התנגדותו למינוי. כאמור, שלש שנים לאחר מכן, בשנת 2000 מונה ליושב-ראש המועצה להסדר ההימורים בספורט. כיושב ראש הרשות נפתחה נגדו ונגד המועצה תביעת דיבה בהיקף עצום, כאשר פיטר חוקר הימורים ופרסם דעה שלילית לגביו. התביעה נדחתה ובית המשפט קבע שלבר-און הייתה הזכות לפטרו עקב ההוצאות הגבוהות למועצה. במהלך משפט אחר נגד המועצה להימורים, לא שיתף פעולה והתובע ביקש להכריז עליו כעד עוין. בסופו של דבר נדחתה התביעה האישית נגדו. בפברואר 2004 בר-און הציע הצעת תיקון לחוק העונשים, המונעת הפעלה בישראל של אתרי הימורים מקוונים, ואת השימוש בהם. באוקטובר שנת 2007 אושרה הצעת חוק שהגיש בר-און, ועוד קודם לכן הייתה תקנה שאכף בעת היותו שר אוצר, לפיה נאסר על מפעל הפיס למכור הימורים לקטינים. בשנת 2008 כשר אוצר התנגד ליוזמת שר הספורט דאז ראלב מג'אדלה להתיר הימורים במרוצי סוסים בישראל. משרד עורכי הדין "רימון-כהן-שינקמן" שיעץ לבר-און בעת היותו שר האוצר, התמחה בין היתר בהגנה וייעוץ משפטי להשקת אתרי הימורים במרשתת והפעלתם, ולאנשי עסקים שעשו את הונם מכך. חיים אישיים בר-און מתגורר במוצא עילית. הוא נשוי לבינה, שכיהנה בשנים 2013–2014 כמנכ"לית משרד המדע, הטכנולוגיה והחלל, ואב לשלושה. אחותו, גילה הרץ, הייתה חברת מועצת עיריית תל אביב-יפו. לקריאה נוספת קישורים חיצוניים הערות שוליים שרים נוספים במשרד האוצר: מאיר שטרית • משולם נהרי • יצחק כהן • חמד עמאר • זאב אלקין |
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